




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Papers Relating to the
Foreign Relations
of the
United States

The Paris Peace Conference
1919

Volume V



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THE COUNCIL OF FOUR:
MINUTES OF MEETINGS MARCH 20 TO
MAY 24, 1919

NOTE CONCERNING THE MINUTES OF THE MEETINGS
OF THE COUNCIL OF FOUR¹

The minutes of the Council of Four published in this volume and volume VI are, with two exceptions,² those prepared by Sir Maurice Hankey of the British delegation and received by the American delegation from the Secretariat of the British delegation. Other meetings of the Council of Four for which no minutes appear in the Department's files are known to have been held.

The minutes of the meetings of the Council of Four appear in two series. The first series is known as the "I. C. A." series and in it the minutes of meetings are designated by the letters "IC" followed by a serial number and a letter. The minutes in this series extend from IC-163A of March 20, 1919, 3 p. m., through IC-181G of May 7, 1919, 4:15 p. m.

In the second series the minutes are designated by the letters "CF" followed by a serial number. The CF series extends from CF-1 of May 8, 1919, 11 a. m., through CF-99A of June 28, 1919, 6 p. m.

In addition to the notes taken by Sir Maurice Hankey, notes of certain of the meetings were taken in Italian by Count Luigi Aldrovandi Marescotti, Secretary General of the Italian delegation, and have been published in two volumes, as follows: (1) for the periods April 17-24 and May 7-June 2, 1919, in *Guerra diplomatica; ricordi e frammenti di diario (1914-1919)* (Milan, 1936), pp. 211-460; (2) for the period June 3-28, 1919, in *Nuovi ricordi e frammenti di diario* (Milan, 1938), pp. 13-113. The first of these volumes has been translated into French by Mlle. F. Cravoisier: *Guerre diplomatique* (Paris, no date); and into German by Dr. Eugen Dollmann-Rom: *Der Krieg der Diplomaten; Erinnerungen und Tagebuchauszüge, 1914-1919* (Munich, 1940).

¹Occasionally referred to as the Council of Five when a Japanese representative was present (see, e. g., CF-94, vol. VI, p. 716), but in such cases to be distinguished from the Council of Foreign Ministers known regularly as the Council of Five; also occasionally referred to as the Council of Three when the Italian representative was absent (see appendix to IC-180C, p. 440).

²These exceptions are the minutes of meetings CF-18 of May 17 and CF-48 of June 5, 1919, at which Mr. C. L. Swem, President Wilson's stenographer, was present, and which are described as "stenographic notes" of these meetings.

THE COUNCIL OF FOUR: MINUTES OF MEETINGS
MARCH 20 TO MAY 24, 1919

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03401/101

IC-163A

Notes of a Conference Held in the Prime Minister's Flat at 23
Rue Nitot, Paris, on Thursday, March 20, 1919, at 3 p. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson:

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.,
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.,
General Allenby:
General Bols:
Lt.-Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.,

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau:
M. Pichon:
M. Berthelot:

ITALY

M. Orlando:
Baron Sonnino:

Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux

SYRIA AND TURKEY

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that M. Pichon should open the discussion.

M. PICHON began by explaining that the origin of this question was the agreement of May 1916 (Sykes-Picot)¹ concluded between Great Britain and France in regard to Mesopotamia, Syria, and the adjoining regions. This agreement had two objects. First, to detach the Arabs from the Turks; second, to decide the claims of Great Britain and France. He then proceeded to explain the principles of the dispositions made on a map.² The agreement fixed a zone coloured blue within which France would exercise direct administration, and a zone coloured red in which England would exercise direct administration. In addition, there was a zone coloured white enclosed by a blue line within which France should exercise indirect administration, known as zone A. and a corresponding zone enclosed in a red line within which Great Britain would exercise indirect administration (Zone B). At this stage it was unnecessary to say anything of the subsequent agreement with Italy. Within the A. and B. zones it was intended to favour the creation of an independent Arab State or Confederation of Arab States. In area A. France, and [in] area B. Great Britain should alone

¹ *Current History*, vol. XI, pt. II (March, 1920), p. 499.

² See map accompanying text of agreement, *op. cit.* No map accompanies Department's file copy of the minutes.

supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States. In addition Great Britain was to be accorded the ports of Haifa and Acre. Haifa was to be a free port as regards the trade of France, and there was to be freedom of transit for French goods through Haifa by the British railway, for which facilities were to be given. Alexandretta, which fell in the blue area, was to be a free port as regards the trade of the British Empire, and there was to be freedom of traffic for British goods through Alexandretta by railway through the blue area. In addition, there were certain customs and political stipulations. Such were the general dispositions of 1916 which he emphasised were designed :—

(1) To favour the establishment of an Arab State or Confederation of States and to detach the Arabs from Turkey :

and

(2) To decide between the claims of Great Britain and France.

The above agreement confirmed, by an exchange of Notes between M. Paul Cambon and Sir Edward Grey (Lord Grey), declarations which had been made by Great Britain as early as 1912, in which Great Britain had disinterested herself and recognised the rights of France in Syria, subject only to Great Britain's insistence on keeping untouched her economic rights. In short, Great Britain had declared she had no political claims, but that her economic rights must remain intact in Syria.

Since the conclusion of the Agreement of 1916 there had been a long further correspondence and an exchange of many Notes between France and Great Britain concerning particularly various local interests. This brought us to the most recent period in which the French made, he would not say a protest against, but a series of observations in regard to, the British attitude in Syria. The whole series of these had recently been handed by the President of the Council to Lord Milner.

The incidents referred to in this correspondence were chiefly due to the disproportion in the relative contingents furnished by Great Britain and France to the campaign in Syria. It had only been possible for France to send a very small number of troops to Syria in consequence of the large demands made on her for the protection of French soil and to the prominent part played by her armies in Salonica. Great Britain, however, had interested herself far more in the Turkish campaigns, and had sent many troops which had been led by General Allenby. From that disproportion there resulted a great many incidents. Eventually, the President of the Council had thought it right to bring them before the British Government with a view to putting an end to the faction and the friction which now existed.

From all the declarations made by the British and French Governments he only wanted to quote one, namely, that of November 9, 1918. This was particularly important as showing the disinterested attitude of both Governments towards the Arabs. This declaration had been communicated shortly after its issue by the French Ambassador in Washington to President Wilson.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE interpolated at this point that this announcement, which was the latest expression of policy by the two Governments, was more important than all the old agreements.

M. PICHON then read the declaration of November 9, 1918, as follows:—

“The aim which France and Great Britain have in view in prosecuting in the East the war let loose by German ambition is the complete and final liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native populations.

“In order to give effect to these intentions, France and Great Britain have agreed to encourage and assist the establishment of native governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia already liberated by the Allies, and in the territories which they are proceeding to liberate, and they have agreed to recognise such governments as soon as they are effectively established. So far from desiring to impose specific institutions upon the populations of these regions, their sole object is to ensure, by their support and effective assistance, that the governments and administrations adopted by these regions of their own free will shall be exercised in the normal way. The function which the two Allied Governments claim for themselves in the liberated territories is to ensure impartial and equal justice for all; to facilitate the economic development of the country by encouraging local initiative; to promote the diffusion of education; and to put an end to the divisions too long exploited by Turkish policy.”

As the difficulties between the two Governments continued, and as the French Government particularly did not wish them to reach a point where ultimate agreement would be compromised, the President of the Council, on his visit to London in December 1918, had asked Mr. Lloyd George to confirm the agreement between the two countries. Mr. Lloyd George had replied that he saw no difficulty about the rights of France in Syria and Cilicia, but he made demands for certain places which he thought should be included in the British zone, and which, under the 1916 agreement, were in the French zone of influence, namely, Mosul. He also asked for Palestine. M. Clemenceau had, on his return to Paris, been desirous that this suggestion should be examined in the most favourable spirit. In consequence, he had ordered a scheme of agreement to be prepared, with the inclusion of Mosul in the British zone of influence, and this had been handed to the British Government on the 15th February, 1919. The letter which accompanied this pro-

posal had asked for a recognition of the historic and traditional case for including the regions claimed in the French zone. It had pointed out that there was no Government in the world which had such a position as France in the regions claimed. It had given an exposition of the historic rights of France dating from the time of Louis XIV. M. Pichon continued by pointing out that French intervention in Syria had been frequent, the last instance being the case of the expedition organised in Syria and Lebanon in 1860, which had resulted in the establishment of the status of the Lebanon. France, he pointed out, had a great number of hospitals in Syria. There were a great number of schools in many villages, and some 50,000 children were educated in French primary schools. There were also a number of secondary schools and one great university in Beyrout. Moreover, the railway system of Syria was French, and included the Beyrout to Damascus line, and the Tripoli-Homs line, which latter it was proposed to prolong to the Euphrates and to unite with the Bagdad system. Altogether it was contemplated to have a system of 1,233 kilometres, of which 683 kilometres had already been constructed. Beyrout was entirely a French port. The gas and electricity works were French, and the same applied to the lighting along the coast. This was not the limit of French enterprise, for France had perfected the agriculture and the viticulture of Syria and had established many factories. No other country had anything like so complete a development in these regions. Hence, France could not abandon her rights. Moreover, France strongly protested against any idea of dividing Syria. Syria had geographical and historic unity. The French Government frankly avowed that they did not want the responsibility of administering Palestine, though they would prefer to see it under an international administration. What they asked was:—

- (1) That the whole Syrian region should be treated as a unit:
and
- (2) That France should become the mandatory of the League of Nations of this region.

On January 30 of this year Mr. Lloyd George had urged the Conference to reconsider the distribution of troops in Turkey and the Caucasus with the object of lightening the heavy burden which fell on Great Britain.³ As a result, the Military Representatives had been asked to prepare a plan. The scheme of the Military Representatives provided for:—

The occupation by France of Syria and Cilicia, with 2 divisions and 1 cavalry brigade:

The occupation by Great Britain of Mesopotamia, including Mosul, by 2 divisions and 1 cavalry brigade:

The occupation by Italy of the Caucasus and Konia.

³ See BC-18, vol. III, pp. 806-808, 817.

The economy which Great Britain would achieve by this plan would have amounted to 10 divisions of infantry and 4 divisions of cavalry. The plan of the Military Representatives had been placed on the Agenda Paper of the Conference, but at Lord Milner's request the subject had been adjourned and had never been discussed.

About this time a conversation had taken place between M. Clemenceau and M. Pichon and Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour, as a result of which Sir Maurice Hankey had handed M. Pichon a map containing a British counter proposal to the French proposal of February 15. This scheme provided for a great limitation of the territory to come under French influence, both on the east and on the south as regards the Jebel Druse. The French Government was quite unable to take this project into consideration. Recently Lord Milner had left a map with M. Clemenceau containing yet another project, which M. Pichon proceeded to explain, and which, he added, greatly circumscribed the French area. It was evident that the French Government could not look at this scheme either, even though they had the greatest desire to reach an agreement. No one felt more deeply than he what Great Britain and France owed to each other, and no one had a greater desire to reach an agreement. It was, however, quite impossible to accept a proposal such as that put forward by Lord Milner. It would be absolutely indefensible in the Chamber. It was enough for the Chamber to know that the Government were in negotiation with Great Britain for the handing over of Mosul to create a movement that had resulted in a proposal in the Budget Committee for a diminution of credits for Syria. This had not been a mere budget trick, but represented a real movement of public opinion. French opinion would not admit that France could be even partly excluded after the sacrifices she had made in the War, even if she had not been able to play a great part in the Syrian campaign. In consequence, the minimum that France could accept was what had been put forward in the French Government's Note to Mr. Lloyd George, the object of which had been to give satisfaction to his desire for the inclusion of Mosul in the British zone.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that M. Pichon had opened as though the question of the mandate for Syria was one between Great Britain and France. There was, in fact, no such question so far as Great Britain was concerned. He wished to say at once that just as we had disinterested ourselves in 1912, so we now disinterested ourselves in 1919. If the Conference asked us to take Syria, we should reply in the negative. The British Government had definitely decided this because otherwise it would be said afterwards in France that they had created disturbances in order to keep the French out. Hence, the British Government definitely intended to have nothing to do with

Syria. The question of the extent to which Great Britain and France were concerned was cleared up in the interview he had had with M. Clemenceau in London, and at which he had said that he wanted Mosul with the adjacent regions and Palestine.

As there was no question between France and Great Britain in regard to Syria, we could examine the question in as disinterested a spirit as we could a Carpathian boundary to be decided in accordance with the general principles accepted by the Conference. He wished to make this clear before General Allenby said what he had to say. In regard to Mosul, he wished to acknowledge the cordial spirit in which M. Pichon had met our desires.

But if there was a French public opinion there was also a British public opinion, and it must be remembered that the whole burden of the Syrian campaign had fallen upon Great Britain. The number of French troops taking part in the campaign had been so small as to make no difference. Sometimes they had been helpful, but not on all occasions. The British Empire and India had maintained from 900,000 to 1,000,000 troops in Turkey and the Caucasus. Their casualties had amounted to 125,000, the campaign had cost hundreds of millions of pounds. He himself had done his best to induce M. Clemenceau's predecessors to take part in the campaign. He had also pressed Marshal Foch on the subject, and to this day he had in his possession a rough plan drawn up by Marshal Foch during an air raid at Boulogne. He had begged the French Government to cooperate, and had pointed out to them that it would enable them to occupy Syria, although, at the time, the British troops had not yet occupied Gaza. This had occurred in 1917 and 1918, at a time when the heaviest casualties in France also were being incurred by British troops. From that time onwards most of the heavy and continuous fighting in France had been done by British troops, although Marshal Pétain had made a number of valuable smaller attacks. This was one of the reasons why he had felt justified in asking Marshal Foch for troops. He had referred to this in order to show that the reason we had fought so hard in Palestine was not because we had not been fighting in France. M. Pichon seemed to think that we were departing from the 1916 agreement in other respects, as well as in respect to Mosul and Palestine. In fact, we were not. M. Pichon had omitted in his lucid statement to explain that the blue area in which France was "allowed to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as they may desire and as they may think fit to arrange with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States" did not include Damascus, Homs, Hama, or Aleppo. In area A. France was "prepared to recognise and uphold an independent Arab State or Confederation of Arab States . . . under the suzerainty of an Arab Chief". Also in area A. France would "have priority of

right of enterprise and local loans . . . and . . . "shall alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States." Was France prepared to accept that? This, however, was not a question between Great Britain and France. It was a question between France and an agreement which we had signed with King Hussein.

(At this point M. Orlando and General Diaz entered).

M. PICHON said he wished to say one word. In the new arrangements which were contemplated no direct administration whatsoever was claimed by France. Since the Agreement of 1916, the whole mandatory system had been adopted. If a mandate were granted by the League of Nations over these territories, all that he asked was that France should have that part put aside for her.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that we could not do that. The League of Nations could not be used for putting aside our bargain with King Hussein. He asked if M. Pichon intended to occupy Damascus with French troops? If he did, it would clearly be a violation of the Treaty with the Arabs.

M. PICHON said that France had no convention with King Hussein.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the whole of the agreement of 1916 (Sykes-Picot), was based on a letter from Sir Henry McMahon⁴ to King Hussein from which he quoted the following extracts:—

"The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the proposed limits of boundaries. With the above modifications, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab Chiefs, we accept these limits of boundaries; and in regard to those portions of the territories therein in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally France, I am empowered, in the name of the Government of Great Britain, to give the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter:—

'Subject to the above modifications Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within territories included in the limits of boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca.'—(Extract from a letter from Sir H. McMahon to King Hussein, Oct. 24, '14).['']

M. PICHON said that this undertaking had been made by Great Britain (*Angleterre*) alone. France had never seen it until a few weeks before when Sir Maurice Hankey had handed him a copy.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said the agreement might have been made by England (*Angleterre*) alone, but it was England (*Angleterre*) who had organised the whole of the Syrian campaign. There would have been no question of Syria but for England (*Angleterre*). Great Britain had put from 900,000 to 1,000,000 men in the field

⁴ British High Commissioner for Egypt, 1914-16.

against Turkey, but Arab help had been essential; that was a point on which General Allenby could speak.

GENERAL ALLENBY said it had been invaluable.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, continuing, said that it was on the basis of the above quoted letter that King Hussein had put all his resources into the field which had helped us most materially to win the victory. France had for practical purposes accepted our undertaking to King Hussein in signing the 1916 agreement. This had not been M. Pichon, but his predecessors. He was bound to say that if the British Government now agreed that Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo should be included in the sphere of direct French influence, they would be breaking faith with the Arabs, and they could not face this. He was particularly anxious for M. Clemenceau to follow this. The agreement of 1916 had been signed subsequent to the letter to King Hussein. In the following extract from the agreement of 1916 France recognised Arab independence:—

“It is accordingly understood between the French and British Governments:—

- (1) That France and Great Britain are prepared to recognise and uphold an independent Arab State or Confederation of Arab States in the areas A. and B. marked on the annexed map under the suzerainty of an Arab Chief.”

Hence, France, by this act, practically recognised our agreement with King Hussein by excluding Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo from the blue zone of direct administration, for the map attached to the agreement showed that Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo were included, not in the zone of direct administration, but in the independent Arab State.

M. PICHON said that this had never been contested, but how could France be bound by an agreement the very existence of which was unknown to her at the time when the 1916 agreement was signed? In the 1916 agreement France had not in any way recognised the Hedjaz. She had undertaken to uphold “an independent Arab State or Confederation of Arab States”, but not the King of the Hedjaz. If France was promised a mandate for Syria, she would undertake to do nothing except in agreement with the Arab State or Confederation of States. This is the role which France demanded in Syria. If Great Britain would only promise her good offices, he believed that France could reach an understanding with Feisal.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he would now seek to establish his place in the Conference. Up to the present he had had none. He could only be here, like his colleague M. Orlando, as one of the representatives assembled to establish the peace of the world. This was his only interest, although, of course, he was a friend of both parties

to the controversy. He was not indifferent to the understanding which had been reached between the British and French Governments, and was interested to know about the undertakings to King Hussein and the 1916 agreement, but it was not permissible for him to express an opinion thereon. He would, however, like to point out that one of the parties to the 1916 agreement had been Russia, and Russia had now disappeared. Hence, the partnership of interest had been dissolved, since one of the parties had gone out. This seemed to him to alter the basis of the agreement. The point of view of the United States of America was, however, indifferent to the claims both of Great Britain and France over peoples unless those peoples wanted them. One of the fundamental principles to which the United States of America adhered was the consent of the governed. This was ingrained in the United States of America thought. Hence, the only idea from the United States of America point of view was as to whether France would be agreeable to the Syrians. The same applied as to whether Great Britain would be agreeable to the inhabitants of Mesopotamia. It might not be his business, but if the question was made his business, owing to the fact that it was brought before the Conference, the only way to deal with it was to discover the desires of the population of these regions. He recalled that, in the Council of Ten, Resolutions had been adopted in regard to mandatories, and they contained a very carefully thought out graduation of different stages of mandate according to the civilisation of the peoples concerned. One of the elements in those mandates was the desire of the people over whom the mandate was to be exercised. The present controversy broadened out into very important questions. Cilicia, for example, from its geographical position, cut Armenia off from the Mediterranean. If there was one mandatory in the south, and another in the north of Armenia, there would be a great danger of friction, since the troublesome population lived in the south. Hence, the controversy broadened into a case affecting the peace of the whole world in this region. He hoped, therefore, that the question would be discussed from this point of view. If this were agreed to, he hoped that he might ask General Allenby certain questions. If the participation of M. Orlando and himself were recognised as a matter of right and not of courtesy, the question he wanted to know was whether the undertaking to King Hussein, and the 1916 agreement, provided an arrangement which would work. If not, and you asked his opinion, he would reply that we ought to ask what is the opinion of the people in the part of the world concerned. He was told that, if France insisted on occupying Damascus and Aleppo, there would be instant war. Feisal had said that he could not say how many men he had had in the field at one time, as it had been a

fluctuating figure, but from first to last he had probably had 100,000 men.

GENERAL ALLENBY said that he had never had so many at one time.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that, nevertheless, from first to last France would have to count on having 100,000 troops against her. This would mean that France must send a large number of troops. He was greatly concerned in a fight between friends, since he was the friend of France and the friend of Feisal. He was very concerned to know if a "scrap" was developing. Hence, he asked that it might be taken for granted that this question was on the Council table, since it was one of interest to the peace of the world, and that it was not merely a question of agreement between France and Great Britain. The Turkish Empire at the present time was as much in solution as though it were made of quicksilver. Austria, at any rate, had been broken into pieces, and the pieces remained, but the Turkish Empire was in complete solution. The Councils of the world would have to take care of it. For his part, he was quite disinterested, since the United States of America did not want anything in Turkey. They would be only too delighted if France and Great Britain would undertake the responsibility. Lately, however, it had been put to him that he must approach his own people on this matter, and he intended to try, although it would mean some very good talking on his part. He admitted that the United States of America must take the responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of the League of Nations. Nevertheless, there was great antipathy in the United States of America to the assumption of these responsibilities. Even the Philippines were regarded as something hot in the hand that they would like to drop. If we said to the French Government "Occupy this region," What would happen? He had a method to propose of finding out, which he would develop later.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that General Allenby should be questioned at this point.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked the following question:—

If before we arrive at a permanent settlement under the League of Nations we invite France to occupy the region of Syria, even as narrowly defined, what would the result be?

GENERAL ALLENBY said there would be the strongest possible opposition by the whole of the Moslems, and especially by the Arabs. Shortly after the capture of Damascus, Feisal had been allowed to occupy and administer the city. He had said that he would like to be helped in the administration. A little later, after the setting up of the military administration in these regions, General Allenby had put French administrators in the blue area. When they arrived Amir Feisal had said that he could not retain the command of the Arab Army if France occupied the ports. He had said that it meant that he was occupying a house without a door, and it would be said

that he had broken faith with the Arab nation. Feisal had originally asked if he could occupy Beyrout and the ports. General Allenby had replied in the affirmative, but had told him that he must withdraw when the Allied Armies came along, and he had done so. To Feisal's protests against the occupation by the French of places in the blue zone, General Allenby had replied that he himself was in charge of the administration, as Commander-in-Chief; and that the French officers appointed as administrators must be regarded not as French officers, but as Allied military officers. Feisal had then said that he would admit it for the present, but would it last for ever? General Allenby had replied that the League of Nations intended to give the small nations the right of self-determination. Feisal had insisted that "if put under French control" he would oppose to the uttermost. General Allenby had replied that at present there was no French control, but only the control of the Allies, and that eventually Feisal's rights would be considered. Soon afterwards he had visited Beyrout, and there and in other places deputations had come to protest against the French administration. These had included various Christians, Orthodox and Protestants, as well as Mussulmans. General Allenby had again replied that it was not a French administration, but merely officers put in by himself as Allied Commander-in-Chief. Every time he had been in that country he had found the greatest opposition to French administration. He had done his utmost to make a *rapprochement* among the Arabs and the French, but without success. The French liaison officers did not get on well with the Arabs. M. Picot had been with him to Damascus and Aleppo and was perfectly conversant with the situation. M. Picot would say that General Allenby had done his best to create good feeling. Lately, Sir Mark Sykes had been to Beyrout, Aleppo, and Damascus with M. Picot and had done his best. Nevertheless, the misunderstanding continued. If the French were given a mandate in Syria, there would be serious trouble and probably war. If Feisal undertook the direction of operations there might be a huge war covering the whole area, and the Arabs of the Hedjaz would join. This would necessitate the employment of a very large force. This would probably involve Great Britain also if they were in Palestine. It might even involve them in Egypt, and the consequences would be incalculable.

He had gone with M. Picot to Damascus and had seen there Ali Riza el Rikaby Pasha, the Governor of the territory to the east of Damascus. The administration had not been doing well. There was practically no Budget, and it had been necessary to give him advisers. General Allenby had given him two British advisers, Majors Cornwallis and Stirling. M. Picot had subsequently sent a very good man named Captain Cousse, to replace a liaison officer (Captain Mercier)

who had been there before who had not got on with the Arabs because he had stood too much on his dignity. Even Captain Cousse, however, had not been able to get on well. Afterwards, General Allenby had sent a British financial expert, and had invited M. Picot to send a French financial expert. The British adviser, Colonel Graves, had cooperated with M. Moulin, the French adviser. They reported very badly on the finance. There had practically been no Budget. Then General Allenby had withdrawn Colonel Graves. M. Moulin was still there, but was meeting great difficulties owing to Ali Riza el Rikaby's dislike of the French administration. General Allenby had visited Damascus with M. Picot and had there interviewed Riza el Rikaby Pasha. General Allenby produced at the Conference a document containing the gist of the communication made by him to Riza el Rikaby Pasha.⁵ A copy of this document in Arabic and English had been left with Riza el Rikaby Pasha.

In reply to Mr. Lloyd George he said that at Damascus there was a brigade of infantry and two regiments of cavalry. The Sherifian troops were only used for police purposes, since the Sherifian Army was still in process of formation.

(At this point there was an adjournment).

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the fittest men that could be obtained should be selected to form an Inter-Allied Commission to go to Syria, extending their inquiries, if they led them, beyond the confines of Syria. Their object should be to elucidate the state of opinion and the soil to be worked on by any mandatory. They should be asked to come back and tell the Conference what they found with regard to these matters. He made this suggestion, not because he lacked confidence in the experts whose views he had heard, such as Dr. Howard Bliss and General Allenby. These, however, had been involved in some way with the population, with special objects either educational or military. If we were to send a Commission of men with no previous contact with Syria, it would, at any rate, convince the world that the Conference had tried to do all it could to find the most scientific basis possible for a settlement. The Commission should be composed of an equal number of French, British, Italian and American representatives. He would send it with *carte blanche* to tell the facts as they found them.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he adhered in principle to an inquiry, but it was necessary to have certain guarantees. The inquiry must not confine itself to Syria. Mandates were required for Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Armenia, and other parts of the Turkish Empire as well as Syria. The peoples of these districts were not isolated. They were all connected by historical and religious and other links, including mutual feuds and old quarrels existed between all of them. Without

⁵ This communication does not accompany the file copy of the minutes.

contesting what General Allenby had said, he wished it to be recorded, if there were a *procès-verbal*, that many Syrians were not Arab, and that if the Syrians were put under the Arabs they would revolt. He knew quite well the great share taken by Feisal in the Syrian campaign, and he thought that the British were also a little afraid of it. The whole inquiry would be an extremely delicate one. Orientals were very timid and afraid to say what was at the back of their minds. It was very difficult to get the real feelings of the people. It was very important, therefore, that the inquiry should not be merely superficial. Hence, he would ask for twenty-four hours of reflection before setting up the Commission. He might like to send some French Arabs there, as Feisal only represented one side of the Arab race. Moreover, Feisal was practically a soldier of England. That was a fact that all the world knew. He said he would revolt if the French were at Damascus, but, as a matter of fact, French artillery had recently been sent there and had been received quite well. He had made every effort to bring himself to agree with the principles propounded by President Wilson, but something must be said for the historical claims and for the efforts that nations had made in different regions. For example, insistence on an Arab outlet to the sea would destroy the claim of one nation in that part of the world. The Members of the Commission must be very carefully selected, and they must inquire into every Turkish mandate. Subject to these provisions he was prepared to accept President Wilson's proposal in principle.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had no objection to an inquiry into Palestine and Mesopotamia, which were the regions in which the British Empire were principally concerned. Neither would he object to an inquiry into Armenia, in which they were not so closely concerned.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he saw advantages in a unified inquiry into Turkish mandates.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said if this extension was to be given to the Commission it was essential it should get to work at once, as the burden of military forces in Turkey fell mainly on the British.

MR. BALFOUR said that he felt these proposals might postpone the making of peace.

PRESIDENT WILSON said this was not so. For the purposes of peace all that was necessary to tell Turkey was that she would have nothing.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Turkey was entitled to know who would be the mandatory for Turkish territory.

PRESIDENT WILSON said it was rather that they ought to know how much was to remain Turkish.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the question of who was to be the mandatory of Anatolia would make all the difference for the arrangements for Turkey.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that Turkey was entitled to know if she was to have territory of her own, and that other parts of Turkey were to be placed under the League of Nations. Subsequently she would be informed who would be her next-door neighbour.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he supposed that if the evidence were so overwhelming that, for example, the British Empire was ruled out of Mesopotamia they would be free to consider whether they could take a mandate elsewhere in Turkey?

PRESIDENT WILSON said this was an administrative matter and not one of sovereignty. Turkey was entitled to knowledge on all questions affecting the sovereignty.

M. PICHON suggested that, in order to avoid delay, the Commission might divide into Sub-Commissions working in different sections.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether it would be wise to include Western Anatolia in the purview of the Commission. Constantinople was mainly a military question—(President Wilson said a strategic question)—but south of the region which went with Constantinople came regions to which the Greeks laid claim.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said there was no suggestion that the Commission was to travel beyond Armenia.

At Mr. Lloyd George's request:—

President Wilson undertook to draft a
Terms of Reference to the Commission.

POLAND

M. CLEMENCEAU read a despatch from General Nudant⁶ at Spa to the effect that General Dupont,⁷ who had just returned to Berlin, telephoned that negotiations at Posen had broken down. After a series of confused notes he had received a definite intimation from the Germans which amounted to this:—

- (1) That they would not allow the disembarkation of Polish troops at Dantzig;
- (2) That they would not allow the Allied Commission at Warsaw to go into German territories east of the Vistula.

MR. BALFOUR said that this was contrary to the terms of the armistice.⁸

PRESIDENT WILSON said the Germans would probably stand on the technical point that the terms referred only to Allied troops, and the Poles were not Allies.

It was agreed that:—

The question should be discussed first on the following day.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, March 20, 1919.

⁶ Gen. P. Nudant, president of and French representative on the Interallied Armistice Commission.

⁷ Gen. Charles Joseph Dupont, head of the French Military Mission at Berlin.

⁸ Of November 11, 1918, vol. II, p. 1.

Notes of a Conversation Which Took Place in M. Clemenceau's Room at the French Ministry of War, 14 Rue Dominique, on Saturday, March 30 [29], 1919, at 3 p. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson
†General Bliss

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.,
†General Sir H. H. Wilson, G. C. B.,
D. S. C.,
*Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.,

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
†Marshal Foch
†General Weygand

ITALY

M. Orlando
*General Diaz
†General Cavalleri [*Cavallero?*]
‡Count Aldrovandi

Prof. P. J. Mantoux, *Interpreter*

The Transport of
General Haller's
Army to Dantzig

- (1) The attached telegram from General Nudant, notifying the attitude of the German Government towards the demand for passage of General Haller's¹ army to Poland through Danzig was discussed. (Appendix I).

After some discussion, the following decisions were reached:—

(1) That Marshal Foch shall invite the Germans to send a plenipotentiary to meet him at Spa on April 3rd, and shall notify them that he will give them all the explanations and guarantees referred to in General Nudant's telegram No. 808 [806²].

(2) That Marshal Foch, in making the demand for the passage of General Haller's army through Danzig, shall state that the Allied and Associated Governments think it right to explain to the German Plenipotentiaries that General Haller's army consists of allied troops, who have long been fighting on the western front; that this detachment of allied troops is sent to Poland for the preservation of order under the terms of Article 16 of the Armistice of Nov. 11th, 1918,² and they have been selected for this purpose on account of their Polish nationality; that these troops are not intended for the occupation of the town of Danzig, and will only require temporary accommodation during their passage through the port; finally, that the

* For the last part of Item 1 and for the remainder of the session. [Footnote in the original.]

† Withdrew after item 1. [Footnote in the original.]

‡ Present during item 2, and until the remainder of the session. [Footnote in the original.]

¹ Gen. Joseph Haller, Commander in Chief of the Polish Army in France.

² Vol. II, pp. 1, 4.

present decision has no connection with the final disposition of Danzig in the treaty of peace. This question is not decided, and will not be finally decided until the signature of the treaty of peace.

(3) That Marshal Foch shall further be authorized, if he thinks it desirable, to arrange for the use of Stettin and other ports to supplement Danzig, where a portion of the troops will have to be disembarked.

(4) That any refusal on the part of the Germans to accede to this demand will be interpreted as a breach of the armistice by Germany. In this event Marshal Foch shall confer with the Supreme War Council as to the action to be taken.

NOTE:—The text of the telegram sent by Marshal Foch to General Nudant in execution of conclusion (1) is as follows:—³

“All the information and guarantees requested will be furnished by me at Spa to the Plenipotentiary I have asked for (telegram, March 27). It is understood that he is to be given the full powers necessary to make a decision within 48 hours. The meeting will take place April 2 unless unavoidably prevented.”

(2) M. ORLANDO communicated the attached *aide-mémoire*, handed to Prince Borghese, the Italian Minister in Belgrade, Hungary by the new Hungarian Government. (Appendix II).

A proposal was made that, without sending a formal diplomatic mission, some discreet and confidential person should be sent to ascertain the real position.

No final decision was taken, but it was agreed:—

(1) That each Prime Minister should consult his Foreign Minister on the question:

(2) That the question should be considered again on Monday:

(3) That President Wilson should consider the name of some discreet and trustworthy American subject, who might, subject to agreement on Monday, be sent on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers, to Budapest, with a view to making a report. It was suggested that he might perhaps be associated with Prince Borghese in these inquiries.

The Prime Minister suggested the name of General Smuts, which did not altogether commend itself to M. Clemenceau.

(3) MR. LLOYD GEORGE read the attached memorandum, and handed copies round. (Appendix III).

Reparation
Article 1. President Wilson did not like the mention of the sum of £30,000,000 [£30,000,000,000]. He suggested that the first few articles should be re-drafted so as to commence as follows:—

“Recognizing the central fact that the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nations have been subjected as a direct and necessary consequence of the War is so

³ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

colossal, that it would be impracticable for the enemy States to make complete reparation," &c., &c.

Article 3. President Wilson proposed, and Mr. Lloyd George agreed, that Article 3 should be so altered as to introduce the words mentioned in the last paragraph of the observations by the Allied Governments forwarded by the United States Government with their Note to Germany of November 5, 1918,⁴ namely:—

"By it they understand that compensation will be paid by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air."

Article 4. President Wilson expressed doubts as to whether Article 4 could be included within the terms of the observations of the Allies forwarded with the Note of November 5.

Article 8. M. Clemenceau was anxious, if possible, to insert the word "priority."

The question was adjourned for independent consultation with experts.

(4) It was agreed that the next meeting should take place on Monday, April 1, at President Wilson's House at 11 a. m. when the following subjects would be discussed:—

1. The despatch of a Representative to Hungary:
2. Reparation:
3. The Saar Valley.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, March 29, 1919.

Appendix I

Copy of Telegram From General Nudant to Marshal Foch

No. 806

German answer received at 20 hours.

In concluding Armistice Germans certainly had in view only passage of Allies through Danzig and not of Poles whom the German Government do not regard as forming part of Allies. Second, textually. After close examination the German Government cannot take responsibility of a measure which failing sufficient guarantees would bring about civil war in its own country.

On the other hand it is ready to facilitate by all means disembarkation of Haller's Army at Stettin, Koenigsburg, Memel, or Libau and thus, with all its power, assist Allied intention of maintaining order in Poland. Third. Finally, in reply to your telegram 1704 of 27th

⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 468.

March, German Government with a view to preparing execution requires information regarding composition, effectives, date of first disembarkation, subsequent relays, transport, and what guarantees would be furnished to prevent all or part of Haller's Army from participating in political manifestations or eventual rioting by Polish minority.

Appendix II

Aide-Mémoire for Prince Borghese

(Communicated to the Prime Minister by M. Orlando on 29th March, 1919)

The New Government of Hungary, the Council of the Commissioners of the People, recognise the validity of the Treaty of Armistice signed by the former Government⁵ and do not think that the non-acceptance of the note presented by Colonel Vix⁶ has infringed it.

By asking Russia to enter the alliance with the Republic of the Councils of Hungary, the Government has not thought that this step might be interpreted as an expression of its desire to break all diplomatic intercourse with the Powers of the Entente, and still less as a declaration of war on the Entente. The alliance with Russia is not a formal diplomatic alliance, it is at the most—if we may use the expression—an “entente cordiale”, a natural friendship justified by the identical construction of their respective constitution[s], which in the thought of the Hungarian Government does not in any way imply an aggressive combination. The new Hungarian Republic, on the contrary, has a firm desire to live in peace with all the other Nations and to devote its activities to the peaceful social re-organisation of its country.

The Hungarian Socialist Party has been driven by the force of the events to take hold of the executive power. It wishes to organise a new social State, a State in which every man will live of his own work, but this social State will not be hostile to other Nations. It wishes on the contrary to co-operate for the great human solidarity.

The Government of the Republic of the Councils of Hungary declare themselves ready to negotiate territorial questions on the basis of the principle of self-determination of the People, and they view territorial integrity solely as in conformity with that principle.

They would gladly welcome a civil and diplomatic mission of the Entente in Budapest and would guarantee to it the right of extraterritoriality and undertake to provide for its absolute safety.

BELA KUHN
*Commissioner of the People
for Foreign Affairs*

BUDAPEST, March 24, 1919.

⁵ Armistice of November 3, 1918, vol. II, p. 175.

⁶ Of the French Army, head of the Allied Military Mission at Budapest.

Appendix III

[*Memorandum Presented to the Council of Four by Mr. Lloyd George*]

1. The loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a direct and necessary consequence of the war, imposed upon them by the aggression of the enemy states by land, air and sea, is upwards of £30,000,000,000.

2. Notwithstanding the indisputable claim of the Allied and Associated Governments to full compensation, they recognise that the financial and economic resources of the enemy states are not unlimited and that it will therefore, so far as they can judge, be impracticable for the enemy states to make complete reparation.

3. The Allied and Associated Governments, however, require that the enemy states should at least make good, at whatever cost to themselves, the value of the material damage done and of the personal losses and injuries, including those to the civilian dependents of combatants which the enemy states have caused.

4. Each of the Allied and Associated Powers ought to receive from Germany a just reparation in respect of the death and disablement or permanent injury to health directly caused to any of its subjects by hostilities or by operations of war, whether on sea or land or in the air, or by the acts of enemy forces, populations or authorities in occupied, invaded or enemy territory. For each Power interested this reparation may always be measured by the rate of pensions or allowances now established in its territories.

5. Each of the Allied and Associated Powers ought to receive from Germany a just reparation in respect of all property belonging to the State or to any of its subjects with the exception of military works or material, which has been carried off, seized or destroyed by the enemy, or damaged directly in consequence of hostilities or of any operations of war:

- (a) by immediate restoration of property carried off which can be identified in specie, with just compensation if it has been damaged;
- (b) by payment of the full cost of replacing, repairing or reconstructing such property carried off, seized, damaged or destroyed, as cannot be identified in specie, or by payment of its value.

6. The amounts to be paid, the time and mode of payments and the securities to be given therefor shall be determined by an Inter-Ally Commission after examining into the claims and giving to Germany just opportunity of being heard.

7. Compensation may be required, either in the form of payment in gold or securities or in the form of mineral deposits, delivery of commodities and chattels and other reparation in kind, to be credited by

the recipient power at a fair value at the time of delivery. The "ton for ton" and other analogous principles being adopted.

8. Each of the Allied Powers interested will receive out of each payment as and when it is made by the enemy a rateable share in proportion to its losses above mentioned.

9. In order to enable the Allied and Associated Powers to proceed at once to the restoration of their industries and economic life pending the full determination of their claims, Germany shall pay in such instalments and in such manner (whether in gold, securities, commodities or ships as they may fix) in 1919 and 1920 the equivalent of £1,000,000,000 sterling to include a due provision for the maintenance of the Armies of Occupation and for indispensable supplies of food.

10. This scheme will be developed along the above lines in further discussion.

(29.3.19)

Notes of a Meeting Held in President Wilson's House in Place des
Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday, 5 April, 1919, at 11 a. m.¹

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Colonel House (in the absence of
President Wilson, indisposed).

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

ITALY

M. Orlando.

Interpreter—Professor Mantoux.

Plenary Meeting
for Report of
Labour Commission

(1) It was agreed: That a Plenary Session should
be held on Friday, 11th April, 1919, at 3 p. m., to
consider the Report of the Labour Commission.²

Reparation

(2) At this point the following Financial Experts
were introduced:—

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Mr. Baruch.
Mr. Norman Davis.
Mr. Lamont.
Mr. McCormick.

FRANCE

M. Klotz.
M. Loucheur.
M. Sargent.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Lord Sumner.

ITALY

M. Crespi.
M. Chiesa.

Shortly after the following Secretaries were introduced.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Mr. Auchincloss.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Maurice Hankey.

ITALY

Count Aldrovandi.

The Conference had before them a Memorandum attached in the
Appendix, which had been substantially agreed to by the American
and British representatives, but which was not accepted by the
French representatives.

¹ For a somewhat different account of the proceedings of this meeting, see
Philip Mason Burnett, *Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York,
1940), vol. I, p. 825.

² For the proceedings of this plenary session, see vol. III, p. 240.

It was agreed to add in the first line after the word "affirm" the following words "and the enemy Governments accept".
 Article 1 The Clause as amended reads as follows:—

"The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and the enemy Governments accept the responsibility of the enemy States for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their Nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of the enemy States".

M. KLOTZ read the following extract from the remarks by the French delegation on the Scheme of the American and British Delegations:—
 Articles (2) & (3)

"The note brought forward by Mr. Lloyd George on the 29th of March, 1919,³ and the memorandum of the British and American Delegations of the 1st of April⁴ asserted both the right for the Allied and Associated Governments of getting full reparation for all the loss and damages caused to the persons and to the property whatever may be the cost for the enemy States. But the terms of Article III were inconsistent with that principle, since they compelled the Inter-allied Commission to limit the amount of the payments to be made by the enemy by taking into account its financial capacity during 30 years."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this was merely intended as an expression of opinion that Germany can pay in 30 years. If she can pay in that time it is better than in 40 years. The Clause, however, was not intended to limit the sum to be paid to the amount that Germany could pay in 30 years.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the British Financial Experts had taken a different opinion.

M. KLOTZ explained that the view of the British Experts had been that the whole transaction was limited to 30 years. Hence, he said, if the Commission estimated that 50 milliard of dollars represented the amount that Germany could pay, and in fact, it was only found possible to make her pay 30 milliards, in 30 years there would be a dead loss to the Allied and Associated Powers of 20 milliards.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it was no use his arguing about a point which we were not endeavouring to sustain. Supposing Germany could pay 60 milliards in 40 years, but only 50 milliards in 30 years, we should not propose to limit the total that she must pay to 30 milliards, and this document did not say that we should.

MR. DAVIS said, in this case, he did not understand this position, for the British delegates had made it quite clear that the document did so limit it.

LORD SUMNER did not admit this.

³ Appendix III to IC-169C, p. 19.

⁴ The memorandum apparently referred to here has not been found in the Department files. It is printed in Burnett, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 779.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that according to Lord Sumner, our view was that Germany ought to pay within 30 years, but that if she could not do so, the Commission should have the right to extend the time of payment.

M. LOUCHEUR said he entirely agreed with Mr. Lloyd George, but the British Delegation had not taken the same attitude in the discussions of the experts. The matter was explained clearly by the following example. Supposing the amount that Germany ought to pay was estimated by the Commission at 50 milliards of dollars, and the Commission found that Germany was only capable of paying 40 milliards in 30 years, it had been clearly explained that 10 milliards had been lost.

LORD SUMNER said that the difficulty arose out of a misunderstanding of terms. Mr. Montagu had agreed to the insertion of a limit of 30 years because he had been given to understand Mr. Lloyd George had agreed to this limitation. (MR. LLOYD GEORGE interjected, that of course he preferred a period of 30 years if it were practicable to obtain the sum within that time. Everyone had agreed to this.)

LORD SUMNER continuing said that the French Delegates had then put the question—if the total was not paid in 30 years would the balance be remitted? The British Delegates had replied in the negative. He had then understood Mr. Davis to say that the balance would be immediately payable. Then a further amendment had been introduced, namely, Clause 4, which was put in to enable the total amount to be paid by some means. It was by no means the desire, however, of the British Delegation, that Germany should escape.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Lord Sumner had presented his view perfectly correctly.

M. LOUCHEUR said if this were the case this meeting would hardly seem to have been necessary. The French Delegation were quite ready to accept Mr. Lloyd George's view, but when Article 4 had been drafted it had not really applied to this but to something else. The hypothesis had been that the Commission would estimate the total amount that Germany could pay at 50 milliard dollars, but that the amount which she could pay in 30 years was only 40 milliard dollars. Supposing, however, it was found in practice that even the 40 milliard dollars could not be paid, then it was proposed that the time might be extended for the payment of even the 40.

MR. DAVIS said he was willing to accept this draft which had been prepared by the British Delegation, but he wished to have no doubt as to what it meant. The Commission would have to decide: (1) the total estimate of the amount to be paid; (2) if they considered this amount in excess of what Germany could pay in 30 years they must say the amount we estimate she could pay in 30 years is what Germany

is required to pay, but if in practice she cannot pay in 30 years she must be allowed more time but, nevertheless, must pay it. When President Wilson agreed to include Pensions he thought it would not run up the total amount which was limited by Germany's ability to pay.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the difference of opinion was not very substantial. By May 1921 the claims for reparation would have been examined and adjusted. Suppose these amounted to 70 milliards of dollars and supposing the Commissioners thought that Germany could only pay 50 milliards of dollars. Germany might be able to pay 60 milliards in 60 years, but only 30 milliards in 30 years: in this case she would have to pay the balance after the end of the 30 years.

MR. DAVIS said she would only have to pay the amount of the default.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether, when you arrived at the capacity of Germany to pay, you took the amount of 30 years into account.

MR. DAVIS replied in the affirmative.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in this case he took the French view. If you said that Germany could only pay 30 milliards in 30 years but could pay the total of 50 milliards if the time were extended, say to 50 years, then he would unquestionably say that 50 milliards was the right sum that Germany should pay.

MR. DAVIS said that if you took so large a capital sum Germany would not even be able to pay the interest on it. It was essential to hold out a ray of light to Germany somewhere.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE and M. KLOTZ pointed out that this was a difficult point.

M. LOUCHEUR said that Mr. Lloyd George's point was that Germany should pay according to the Commissioners' view of her total capacity to pay, not on the limitation of what she could pay in 30 years.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the conclusion of the Commission ought to be confirmed by the Governments which alone could take the responsibility.

MR. DAVIS said that the only difference now was between the view that the Commission should base its estimate on what Germany could pay in 30 years rather than what she could pay in 40 or 50 years. The American view was that for a period longer than 30 years the interest would eat up the amount she could pay. They felt that if the Germans were not given something to lead them into this scheme they would absolutely reject it.

M. KLOTZ agreed that you must hold out something to the Germans, but pointed out that you must also give the French and British people something that they could accept. They would not expect to pay what it was Germany's acknowledged duty to pay. The Armistice laid down that Germany should pay reparation for damage, and it was

very undesirable that she should get off what she could not pay in 30 years. It would require a genius to discover in 1921 the capacity of what Germany could pay 30 years later. It was only in 1930 or 1940, when we should be confronted with Germany's incapacity to pay, supported on evidence, that a definite opinion could be expressed. Hence, he demanded that we should adhere to the excellent text of April 1st. If the Commission should definitely find that a prolongation of the period of payment was necessary, they could apply to the Governments concerned for instructions.

COLONEL HOUSE said that all the experts seemed to think that a 30 years basis was a right one for the Commission to take in fixing the amount. Everyone was agreed that if the Germans could not pay in 30 years, then they must pay the amount in 40 years. He did not understand, therefore, what the discussion was all about.

M. LOUCHEUR said that there was one obscure point. When the Commission met, what figure was it to arrive at? According to the American Delegates, this figure was the amount that Germany could pay in 30 years, but the French Delegates maintained that it was to ascertain the total amount that Germany could pay.

COLONEL HOUSE said they would have to pay it in 50 years if not in 30 years.

M. CLEMENCEAU said the question was whether the Commission was to fix in 1921 only what Germany could pay in 30 years, or what the total amount was that she had to pay.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said they were to work out their estimate of the total that Germany could pay, although it was, of course, desirable that she should pay in 30 years.

MR. DAVIS said the Commission would be very liberal to the Allies in its estimate of what Germany could pay in 30 years. The Commission, however, must have some basis for its work.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he did not accept that point of view.

MR. LAMONT agreed with Mr. Davis that the subjects being discussed were largely academic. We were arranging for a Commission to do two years hence what we had been trying to do lately, and had failed.

In all the Conversations of the Commission it had been agreed that it was not worth while considering a period exceeding 30 or 35 years. It was now only proposed to instruct the Commission to take the same time limit as had been taken in all recent discussions. It did not pay to figure the matter out beyond that. Of course, if it turned out that Germany could not pay in that period, then time must be given to them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE then proposed the following re-draft of the last part of Clause 2 [3], proposed by Lord Sumner:—

“The Commission shall estimate Germany's capacity to pay in the future, and shall also concurrently draw up a schedule of payments

up to or within a period of 30 years, and this schedule of payments shall then be communicated to Germany”.

He pointed out that the sequence was as follows:—First, you determine Germany’s capacity to pay. Second, you try to get the amount within 30 years. And third, if you cannot get it in 30 years you extend the limit. But the basis of calculation was Germany’s total capacity to pay.

M. KLOTZ said that Mr. Lloyd George opposed the proposal to limit Germany’s capacity to pay to her capacity for 30 years. The first point was to determine Germany’s capacity to pay, and the second point was to spread the amount over a period of 30 years.

MR. DAVIS said that you had either to fix for the Commission a limitation of years or a maximum of money to be paid.

COLONEL HOUSE agreed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE rehearsed the argument against fixing a period of 30 years. There would be a general dislocation of business everywhere, and particularly in Germany. Germany’s ships would have been taken away; if Germany undertook to repair the damage done in Belgium and in Northern France, her workmen would have been taken away. It was not as though conditions were as in 1913. It would take Germany ten years to find her feet. If you said 30 years from the year 1929, it would be a different thing. But you could not tell Germany’s capacity to pay until she found her feet. He hoped, therefore, that we would not limit it to the next 30 years, but to a period of 30 years under normal conditions. He agreed that Germany must know what she was in for. But she could obtain this from the schedule giving the items on which she had to pay. After all, Germany had been in Northern France for four years and probably had a pretty good idea of the damage she had done. She knew what ships she had sunk. She could obtain the amounts of the pensions she would have to pay. Hence, she could form a rough estimate. If she were to say “I will take no estimates from the Allies, but will make good the damage myself”, she was in a position to get the requisite information.

COLONEL HOUSE asked, then, why it was necessary to have a Commission.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there were a certain number of things in regard to which Germany would have no information, e. g. the amount to be paid for sailors and for the restitution of things she had stolen. The Commission would really work within the limits of this class of reparations, supposing that we accepted, as he understood M. Clemenceau had, Germany’s offer to make good the damage.

COLONEL HOUSE said he understood that all estimates of Germany’s capacity to pay had been on the basis of Germany as she was in 1914;

that she still possessed Alsace-Lorraine, Silesia, etc. At any rate, such had been the assumption in the American estimates.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that was not the case. He had asked our Delegates, and he found they had made allowance. Lord Sumner's paper, for instance, which was before the Conference,⁵ had made allowance for Silesia, the Saar Valley, etc.

COLONEL HOUSE said that a few minutes ago agreement had appeared imminent. President Wilson had always understood that the estimate was to be based on what Germany could pay in a period of 30 years.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he never understood this.

MR. DAVIS said President Wilson had understood that by including pensions, the total amount was not increased, owing to the 30 years limit, but that their inclusion only formed a more equitable basis for distribution.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said this was not the case. He could not face his people and say that human life was of less value than a chimney. You could rebuild a house in a year or two, but you could not supply an efficient man in less than 21 years.

MR. HOUSE said President Wilson accepted this view.

MR. DAVIS said that nevertheless, you do not thereby increase Germany's capacity to pay.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had always discredited the assumption of those who said it was possible for Germany to pay the whole of the war debt, but there was all the difference between this and making all adequate reparation.

He again read Lord Sumner's re-draft of Clause 3.⁶ He pointed out that Germany expects to have to pay a very big bill. If we were to put in a bill for reparation and human life, she will know her position.

COLONEL HOUSE suggested that the clause should be drafted in that form, and that nothing should be said about the 30 years limit.

(The Conference then adjourned for a consideration of Lord Sumner's draft of Clause 3, and for Colonel House to prepare a fresh draft, based on the above remark.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 5 April, 1919.

Appendix

1. The Allied and Associated Governments affirm the responsibility of the enemy States for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been

⁵ It is uncertain what document is meant by this reference.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 25.

subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of the enemy States.

2. The Allied and Associated Governments recognize that the financial resources of the enemy States are not unlimited and, after taking into account permanent diminutions of such resources which will result from other treaty clauses, they judge that it will be impracticable for enemy States to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage. The Allied and Associated Governments, however, require that the enemy States, to the extent of their utmost capacity, make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied or Associated Powers and to their property by the aggression of the enemy States by land, by sea, and from the air, (and also from damage resulting from their acts in violation of formal engagements and of the law of nations).

3. The amount of such damage for which compensation is to be made shall be determined by an Inter-Allied Commission, to be constituted in such form as the Allied and Associated Governments shall forthwith determine. This Commission shall examine into the claims and give to the enemy States a just opportunity to be heard. The findings of the Commission as to the amount of damage defined in Article 2 shall be concluded and communicated to the enemy States on or before May 1st 1921. The Commission shall also concurrently draw up a schedule of payments up to or within the total sum thus due, which in their judgment Germany should be able to liquidate within a period of thirty years, and this schedule of payments shall then be communicated to Germany as representing the extent of her obligations.

4. The inter-allied commission shall further have discretion to modify from time to time the date and mode of the schedule of payments in clause 3 and, if necessary, to extend them in part beyond thirty years, by acceptance of long period bonds or otherwise, if subsequently such modification or extension appear necessary, after giving Germany a just opportunity to be heard.

5. In order to enable the Allied and Associated Powers to proceed at once to the restoration of their industrial and economic life, pending the full determination of their claim, Germany shall pay in such instalments and in such manner (whether in gold, commodities, ships, securities or otherwise) as the inter-allied commission may fix, in 1919 and 1920 the equivalent of \$5,000,000,000 gold towards the liquidation of the above claims, out of which the expenses of the army of occupation subsequent to the Armistice, shall first be met, provided that such supplies of food and raw materials as may be judged by the Allied and Associated Governments to be essential to enable Germany to meet her obligations for reparation may, with the approval of the Allied and Associated Governments, be paid for out of the above sum.

6. The successive instalments paid over by the enemy States in satisfaction of the above claims shall be divided by the Allied and Associated Governments in proportions which have been determined upon by them in advance, on a basis of general equity, and of the rights of each.

7. The payments mentioned above do not include restitution in kind of cash taken away, seized or sequestered, or the restitution in kind of animals, objects of every nature and securities taken away, seized, or sequestered, in the cases in which it proves possible to identify them in enemy territory. If at least half the number of the animals taken by the enemy from the invaded territories cannot be identified and returned, the balance, up to a total of half the number taken, shall be delivered by Germany by way of restitution.

8. The attention of the four Chiefs of the respective Governments is to be called to the following:—

- (a) That necessary guarantees to insure the due collection of the sums fixed for reparation should be planned; and
- (b) That there are other financial clauses which this conference has not been charged to deal with.

ANNEXURE TO CLAUSE 2

- (1) Personal injury to or death of civilians resulting from acts of war on land, on sea or from the air, or mistreatment by the enemy.
Personal Injury
- (2) Damage to the civilian population resulting from the absence, incapacitation or death of persons serving with the forces and which damage is met by pensions or allowances of like nature made by the State.
Pensions
- (3) Damage to civilians resulting from their being forced by the enemy to labour without just remuneration, or to abstain from labour.
Damage to Labour
- (4) Damage to or interference with non-military property as from the date of damage or interference directly caused by acts of war on land, on sea or from the air or illegal act of the enemy or war measures in the nature of requisitions or sequestrations, taken by the enemy.
Damage to Property
- (5) Damage in the form of levies, fines and other similar exactions imposed by the enemy upon the civilian population.
Fines, etc.
- (6) Damage resulting from acts in violation of international law (as found by the Commission on Responsibilities) and in violation of formal engagements.
Violations of Law and Engagements

NOTE: Where the State or other public authority has already itself made compensation for the damage, it may present the claim in its own behalf.

April 2, 1919.

INTERPRETATION OF CLAUSE 2

Compensation may be claimed under Clause 2 under the following categories of damage.

I

(a) Damage caused to civilian victims of acts of war (including bombardments or other attacks on land, on sea or from the air, and all the direct consequences thereof, and of all operations of war, by the two groups of belligerents wherever arising) and to the surviving dependents of such victims.

(b) Damage caused to civilian victims of acts, cruelties, violence or maltreatment (including injuries to life or health as a consequence of imprisonment, deportation, internment or evacuation, of exposure at sea, or of being forced to labour by the enemy) committed or ordered by the enemy wherever arising and to the surviving dependents of such victims.

(c) Damage caused to civilian victims of all acts of the enemy in occupied, invaded or enemy territory, injurious to health or capacity for work or to honour and to the surviving dependents of such victims.

II

(a) All pensions and compensations in the nature of pensions to naval and military victims of war, whether mutilated, wounded, sick or invalided, and to the dependents of such victims.

(b) Cost of assistance by the State to prisoners of war and to their families and dependents.

(c) Allowances by the State to the families and dependents of mobilised persons, or persons serving with the forces.

III

Damage in respect of all property belonging to any of the Allied and Associated States or to any of their subjects, with the exception of military works or material, which has been carried off, seized, injured or destroyed, by the acts of the enemy on land, on sea, or from the air, or damaged directly in consequence of hostilities or any operations of war.

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House, Place des
Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday, 5 April, 1919, at 4 p. m.**

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Colonel House.
Mr. Baruch.
Mr. Norman Davis.
Mr. McCormick.
Mr. Lamont.
Mr. Dulles.
Mr. Auchincloss.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Klotz.
M. Loucheur.
M. Jouasset.
M. de la Chaume.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
Lord Sumner.
Lt. Col. Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.

ITALY

M. Orlando.
M. Crespi.
M. Chiesa.
Count Aldrovandi.

Interpreter—Professor Mantoux.

(1) The discussion continued on the basis of the draft that had been considered at the morning meeting—(Appendix to I. C. 170 (H)).¹

Reparation

MR. LLOYD GEORGE drew attention to paragraph 6 of the annexure to Clause (2) proposed by the American delegation (Appendix I). The wording of this Clause is as follows:—

“(6) Damage resulting from acts in violation of international law (as found by the Commission on Responsibilities) and in violation of formal engagements.”

He asked what the meaning of this Clause was? He pointed out that under this could be included the whole of the trade lost owing to submarine warfare, as well as the whole costs of the war, since the violation of Belgium was a violation of international law. Under these circumstances, he himself, would be the last person to object to it, but he thought it right to point out what it entailed.

MR. MCCORMICK said that the intention was that under this Clause Belgium would be the only country to benefit, and she was entitled to the whole of her war costs.

¹ *Ante*, p. 27.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if this Clause was adopted he would be bound to put in his claim as stated above. South Africa, for instance, maintained that the whole of her trade had been stopped by the submarine warfare. Under these circumstances she could claim reparation for the whole. He felt bound to give warning of this.

MR. DULLES said that what the draftsmen of this Clause had had in mind was that the Commission on Responsibilities had made certain recommendations relating to all kinds of breaches of the laws of war, as well as the murder of Captain Fryatt, Nurse Cavell, and other cases, and it was thought that Belgium alone would benefit.

(At this point M. Clemenceau, M. Klotz and M. Loucheur entered)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the Report of the Commission on the breaches of the laws of war also included the violation of Belgium as a breach, besides the submarine warfare.

MR. DULLES said that the United States Delegation put in the reference to the report of the Commission on the Breaches of the Laws of War on the understanding that the Clause would only apply to direct and immediate damage. If it was interpreted as extending to stoppage of trade the Clause must be ruled out.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the cost of the war and the stoppage of trade were direct results from breaches of the laws of war, namely, the violation of Belgium and the submarine warfare respectively.

COLONEL HOUSE suggested the Clause should be entirely eliminated with the understanding that Belgium should be properly provided for.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE drew attention to the interpretation of Clause (2) provided by the British Delegation (Appendix II) which he said provided for reparation for everything in the King of the Belgian's list. He himself had objected to nothing in the King of the Belgian's list, neither had Colonel House, nor M. Clemenceau. Nevertheless, if the vague words were put in Clause 6 of the draft of the American Delegation, he and M. Clemenceau would both have to put in the claims they were entitled to under it. To say that Belgium was entitled to one class of damage, and France and the British Empire to another class, was impossible.

MR. McCORMICK said that the United States Delegation had made this proposal as applying to Belgium which was entitled to all the war costs.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that France and Great Britain had paid every penny of Belgium's war costs, even down to the salaries of the Ministers.

LORD SUMNER pointed out that Belgium was not a party to the Treaty of 1839² which had only been signed by the Guaranteeing Powers, and hence was not specially entitled to all war costs.

² *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. xxvii, p. 1000.

PROFESSOR MANTOUX at Mr. Lloyd George's request then read the British draft of the interpretation of Clause 2 in French.

COLONEL HOUSE said that if Belgium was properly provided for the United States Delegation would accept the British draft provided the French were willing to.

M. KLOTZ said that very long conversations had taken place on this subject. It was true that two texts had been evolved, namely, the American and the British. The American text, however, had been discussed line by line and in great detail, and had finally been agreed to by the French subject to additions and by the Italians subject to one addition. The British text had not been studied in the same detail, consequently if this were adopted the ground would have to be gone over again in detail. Hence he thought it would be better to work on the American text. The British representatives, however, would have the right to suggest additions.

COLONEL HOUSE suggested that as the British text had been submitted at the same time as the American text and both had been discussed, there was no particular reason for adopting the latter.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if M. Klotz accepted Mr. McCormick's interpretation of Clause 6 of the American text.

M. KLOTZ replied that he did not.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this was proof that it had not been properly examined. He then read Clause 2 of the British text. He said that Clause (2) of the British text appeared to him to be a better draft from the public point of view.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that if the British text was to be taken as the basis it should be studied carefully and he suggested that a meeting should take place to consider the matter.

(It was agreed that the British text should be adopted subject to a detailed scrutiny and examination by the experts.)

M. CLEMENCEAU then made the following statement:—

"I do not accept that the Commission should have power to declare the capacity of payment of Germany. I would say this: Germany owes me X for damages to persons and property. The Governments will have the right to reduce that sum in the course of years if they deem it just. But we are not prepared to accept any reduction now. We shall see what is possible and what is not, we shall take into account the question of accumulated interest (we may have to abandon our claim to interest altogether). We are willing to let the door open to every liberal solution.

[“]But I ask, in the name of the French Government, after consultation with my colleagues, that what the enemy owes to us should be declared (if not by means of sum, at least by determining categories of damages to be compensated for). We shall retain our

faculty of allowing time to pay. Let us fix a limit of 30 years, as thought desirable by most of us. If everything has not been paid for during 30 years, then the Commission will have the right to extend the period."

COLONEL HOUSE suggested that this was a very important statement which might form the basis of an agreement.

At Colonel House's request M. Clemenceau's statement was read a second time.

MR. DAVIS said that it seemed to him to be very similar to the proposal of the United States Delegation.³

M. LOUCHEUR said that this was not the case. There was an enormous difference. Mr. Clemenceau said "What Germany owes she owes. The Commission shall have no right to reduce the amount but the Government will. The Commission will be only entitled to alter the time of payment. We instruct them to arrange for full payment in 30 years if possible."

M. CLEMENCEAU said he quite approved of this interpretation of his remarks.

MR. DAVIS reminded the meeting of the history of this question. The Commission had begun by considering two things, namely, what Germany owed, and what Germany could pay. They had always acted on the principle that she could not pay all that she owed. The basis of their calculations, was, therefore, always the amount that Germany could pay, and the limiting period had generally been taken as from thirty to thirty-five years. After that period the amount became so large that the annual instalments were swallowed up in interest. The estimates of the amount that Germany could pay varied enormously, as much as from 25 billion to 50 billion dollars.

As no agreement could be reached as to the figure and as developments seemed to render the fixing of a figure inadvisable, it was decided to try and deal with the matter in another way. In doing so the principle previously adhered to of ascertaining what Germany could pay had been departed from. If some basis of calculation was not fixed, the principle would be dropped.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE then gave an historical résumé differing somewhat from Mr. Davis's.

(After a short interval spent in an informal exchange of views and final drafting amendments, the following clauses, based on a draft prepared by M. Klotz to carry out ideas expressed by Colonel House at the morning meeting, were adopted:—

³ This remark is attributed to Colonel House in another version of the minutes of this meeting. See Burnett, *Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference*, vol. I, p. 833. For the significance of the discrepancy, see *ibid.*, p. 75, and Paul Birdsall, *Versailles, Twenty Years After* (New York, 1941), pp. 257 and 327.

NOTE: Words inserted in the original draft are underlined.⁴ Words omitted from the original draft are in brackets.

(1) The Allied and Associated Powers require *and the Enemy Powers accept* that the Enemy States at whatever cost to themselves make compensation for all damages done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers, and to their property by the aggression of the Enemy States by land, by sea, and from the air, and also for all damages resulting from permanent injury to the health of any of their nationals [and for all damages resulting from the acts of the enemy in violation of formal engagements and of the law of nations].

Deleted
From the
Original
Draft

(2) The amount of damages *as set forth in the specific categories annexed hereto*, for which compensation is to be made, shall be determined by an Inter-Allied Commission to be constituted in such form as the Allied and Associated Powers shall forthwith determine.

This Commission shall examine into the claims and give to the Enemy States a just opportunity to be heard.

The findings of this Commission as to the amount of damages shall be concluded and communicated to the Enemy States on or before May 1st, 1921.

The schedule of payments to be made by the Enemy States shall be set forth *by this Commission*, taking into account *in the fixation of the time for payment* their capacity for payment.

On Lord Sumner's suggestion, it was agreed that the following preamble should be added to the schedule:—

"Compensation is to be made in accordance with this schedule as hereinbefore provided".)

M. KLOTZ said that as the result of the previous discussion there would be consequential alterations in Articles 2, 3 and 4, but in regard to Article 5 he had some comments to make. He considered the wording of this article politically dangerous. He then read Clause 5 as follows:—

Clause 5

"In order to enable the Allied and Associated Powers to proceed at once to the restoration of their industrial and economic life, pending the full determination of their claim, Germany shall pay in such instalments and in such manner (whether in gold, commodities, ships, securities, or otherwise) as the Inter-Allied Commission may fix in 1919 and 1920, the equivalent of \$5000,000,000 gold towards the liquidation of the above claims, out of which the expense of the Army of Occupation subsequent to the Armistice shall first be met, provided that such supplies of food and raw materials as may be judged by the Allied and Associated Governments to be essential to enable Germany to meet her obligations for reparation, may, with the approval of the Allied and Associated Governments, be paid for out of the above sum."

⁴ Underlined words are printed in italics.

What he objected to was the inclusion of money for the expense of the Army of Occupation and the supplies of food and raw material for revictualling Germany. If, after saying to our peoples that we were obtaining from the enemy a certain sum of money we were to deduct a considerable sum to pay for the Army of Occupation, the effect on public opinion would be bad. In two years the cost of an Army of Occupation would amount to 14 milliards. If you added to this the cost of revictualling Germany, nothing would remain. If it was impolitic for the French people it was, in his view, equally impolitic for the German people. If we asked them to make an immediate effort to supply a certain sum of money, it was not desirable to tell them that a quarter of it would go back to them. Hence he would like in some way to separate from the total figure, the amount for revictualling and for the cost of the Army of Occupation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE points out that the figure 14 milliards was calculated for an Army of Occupation of the size now occupying the Rhinish provinces. It would be absurd to maintain so large an army when Germany only had an army of 40,000 men. He asked if M. Klotz's objection was to supplying food and raw material. Without those Germany could not make reparation.

M. LOUCHEUR was quite in accord with Mr. Lloyd George in regard to the necessity of giving Germany food and raw material, otherwise they would not be able to pay. Nevertheless, it was necessary to fix a limit. His idea was to fix a sum which Germany should pay for food and raw material.

M. LAMONT said that the text of Article 5 had been suggested after a very long discussion by the British Delegation. M. Loucheur had made his present suggestion in the course of this discussion. He had been met with the reply that the Allied and Associated Powers were fully safeguarded by the following words:—

“Provided that such supplies of food and raw materials as may be judged by the Allied and Associated Governments to be essential to enable Germany to meet her obligations for reparation may, with the approval of the Allied and Associated Governments, be paid for out of the above sum.”

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that under this clause the enemy could not obtain an ounce without our permission. The Allied and Associated Powers retained absolute control. To fix a definite amount was to encourage the enemy in making their reparation to say “We are ready to finish the job, but we cannot do so unless you give us another fifty million”. They would be continually doing this.

M. LOUCHEUR questioned whether it was desirable to have the clause so worded in the Peace Treaty as to enable Germany to come to us at once and demand food and raw materials.

M. KLOTZ said the political objection was that if we asked for \$5000,000,000, it would have the appearance to Germany of paying a far greater sum because part of it was to be paid for the Army of Occupation and for their own revictualling. He would prefer to fix a sum without saying how much Germany was to have. As the clause now ran the German people would not see that part of the money was for their own benefit, whereas the Allied population would expect to receive more than they would get. Hence he would rather reduce the figure and make a special allowance for the Army of Occupation and for revictualling.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE preferred the present article. It would give us complete control over Germany for two years. It was better that the German assets should be controlled by us than by some German Government of very doubtful authority and stability.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that undoubtedly there were great inconveniences in the present proposal, and these had been pointed out by M. Klotz, but he thought that Mr. Lloyd George had shown that there was still greater danger in dividing the figures.

M. KLOTZ said that there was one serious omission from the draft.

Nothing was said about guarantees. In the case of debts between individuals, securities or some other form of guarantee were always given for the payment of the debt. The question of political and military guarantee was outside the present enquiry. There were, however, some technical guarantees that could be taken, such as the revenue from ports, customs, railways, and the control of other sources of revenue. The British and United States experts when addressed on this subject said that no mandate had been considered. Nevertheless, he believed that these technical guarantees should be in the Treaty as well as military and financial guarantees.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, supposing you occupied the Customs Houses, what would you get? Goods? Or Marks? He could not see what would be gained by this proposal. It was really part of the whole question of the enforcement of the Treaty of Peace. It seemed to him, therefore, irrelevant to the Financial Terms. It was worth consideration, perhaps, whether some form of paper bonds should be issued, but that was entirely a different proposal and one for the Financial Experts.

M. LOUCHEUR said that this was part of the question of the means of payment.

MR. BARUCH said that on the question of control they were waiting for the Report of the Commission. If, however, a promise were re-

ceived from Germany to pay, very little would be gained by occupying territory.

MR. DAVIS said that the utmost that could be done would be to occupy a certain amount of territory.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that something ought to be put in about the right to restitution.

M. CLEMENCEAU said this was a very important point.

M. LOUCHEUR said it was vital for the French, Belgian and Italian Governments to have the faculty of choice between the various means by which payment could be made.

One method of payment was the rebuilding of houses; another was to take certain classes of goods. In this latter connection the question of coal was of the utmost importance, both to France and Italy. France would have a deficiency of 18,000,000 tons of coal, even supposing she obtained the produce of the Saar Valley, and after making allowance for the normal importation from Great Britain. The same applied to Italy, which had been asked to put down the amount of coal she required from Germany. Another form was replacement of machinery taken away.

M. CLEMENCEAU proposed that M. Loucheur should prepare a text on this subject for consideration on Monday.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the experts should meet to consider this text first.

(It was agreed that M. Loucheur should prepare a text which should be considered by the experts before the next meeting on Monday, which was arranged to take place at President Wilson's house in the Place des Etats-Unis at 11.0 a. m.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 6 April, 1919.

Appendix I

Annexure to Clause 2¹

(Draft prepared by the American Delegation)

[Same as "Annexure to Clause 2" printed on page 29.]

Appendix II

Interpretation of Clause 2

(Draft prepared by the British Delegation)

[Same as "Interpretation of Clause 2" printed on page 30.]

¹ Of the draft contained in the appendix to IC-170H, p. 27.

Notes of a Meeting of the Supreme Council Which Took Place at the Prime Minister's Flat, 23 Rue Nitot, on Monday, April 7, 1919, at 3.30 p. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Colonel House.
Mr. Auchincloss.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
Marshal Foch.
General Weygand.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
General Sir H. H. Wilson, G. C. B.,
D. S. O.
Lt.-Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.

ITALY

M. Orlando.
Count Aldrovandi.

Interpreter—Professor P. J. Mantoux.

Subjects Referred
to Foreign
Ministers

1. It was agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers should be requested to examine the questions in Appendix I.

Hungary: General
Smuts' Visit

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE distributed a paraphrase of a telegram from General Smuts to Mr. Balfour. (Appendix II).

It was agreed:

That Mr. Lloyd George should inform General Smuts that his telegram had been considered by the Supreme Council, and that it had been agreed that he should visit the French and Roumanian Headquarters, and ascertain the whole situation in all aspects before returning.

Situation
in Berlin

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE communicated the gist of a message he had received from the British Military Agents at Berlin who reported a great increase in Spartacism.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that his information corresponded to this.

Transport of
General Haller's
Army to Poland

4. MARSHAL FOCH made a short statement of the results of his negotiations at Spa in regard to the transport of General Haller's Army to Poland. He handed round the three following documents¹:—

- (1) A Report on the negotiations of April 3rd and 4th at Spa.
- (2) An Appendix to the above.
- (3) A protocol with Annexes.

¹ Not found in Department files.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE congratulated Marshal Foch on the remarkable skill and ability he had shown in the conduct of these negotiations.

COLONEL HOUSE strongly supported this expression of opinion, which was generally agreed to.

5. GENERAL WEYGAND asked that the Governments which had troops in the area of occupation on the Western bank of the Rhine should provide the Allied Officers to accompany trains carrying General Haller's troops across Germany.

Allied Officers To
Accompany Gen-
eral Haller's
Troops

GENERAL WILSON said that the number of British Officers required was 83. We should have no difficulty in supplying these.

COLONEL HOUSE said he must consult the American Military Authorities.

(Subject to Colonel House's reservation, General Weygand's proposal was agreed to.)

6. GENERAL WEYGAND said that the whole plan of transportation would require eight days to get into working order. It would therefore commence on the 15th, and would continue until June 15th. He asked if the Polish Government had been officially informed.

Official Notifica-
tion to the Polish
Government

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had seen M. Paderewski today, and he had knowledge of the position.

(It was agreed that Marshal Foch should pay an official visit to M. Paderewski, and give him an official notification on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers.)

7. GENERAL WEYGAND said that the American, British, and French Generals were in agreement that the German Government ought to be allowed to send back Russian prisoners to Russia, provided that they were not sent against their will.

Return of Russian
Prisoners

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had 120,000 Russian prisoners in France.

(It was agreed that the German Government should be permitted to return Russian prisoners, provided it was not against their will.)

Marshal Foch, General Weygand, and General Wilson withdrew, and financial experts were introduced. The Meeting with the financial experts is recorded separately.^{1a}

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 7 April, 1919.

Appendix I

The Council of Foreign Ministers is requested to examine the following questions:—

^{1a} See IC-170K, p. 44.

1. Preparation of an Article in the Treaty of Peace terminating the state of War.
2. Preparation of Articles in the Treaty of Peace in regard to the restriction of opium traffic.
3. The question of arms traffic.
4. A minor amendment of the military terms proposed by the British Delegation.
5. The question of Morocco as soon as reported on by the Moroccan Commission.
6. The preparation of Articles in the Treaty of Peace in regard to the recognition of the British Protectorate of Egypt and the renunciation of territorial privileges and the recognition of the transfer to His Majesty's Government of the Sultan's rights under the Suez Canal Convention.²
7. Preparation of Articles in the Treaty of Peace with Germany by which Germany undertakes to be bound down by the terms of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria.
8. Preparation of Articles in the Treaty of Peace whereby Germany binds herself to recognise a new regime replacing the Treaty of 1839 as to Belgium.
9. Preparation of Articles in the Treaty of Peace providing for the acceptance by the enemy of all Allied prize court decisions and orders.
10. Preparation of Articles in the Treaty of Peace providing for the recognition in advance by Germany of any arrangements made by the Allied and Associated Governments with reference to previous Russian territory, including special arrangements with new States.
11. Waiver of German claims in the Antarctic region.

PARIS, April 7, 1919.

Appendix II

Telegram From General Smuts, Buda Pesth, to Mr. Balfour, April 4, 1919

In consequence of the change which took place yesterday in the Hungarian Government, Bela Kuhn is now Chief Commissary for Foreign Affairs as well as for War, and probably the most important member of the administration. I had a long conversation with him on my arrival here this morning, and explained that the line notified to the Hungarian Government by Colonel Vix was not intended to be a permanent political frontier and therefore that the withdrawal of the Hungarian troops behind it and the creation of a neutral zone occupied by Allied troops, which was necessary if peace and good order were to be maintained, would in no way prejudice the Hun-

² Convention of October 29, 1888, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXXIX, p. 18.

garian case. I pressed him to order the withdrawal of the Hungarian troops behind that line. Bela Kuhn replied that there were two chief reasons why the withdrawal was impossible. These were:—

Firstly, that compliance with Colonel Vix' orders would involve the immediate fall of the Government, because large sections of the population attach great importance to territorial boundaries although the Government itself did not. He observed that the mere demand to withdraw had sealed the fate of the Government of Count Karolyi.

Secondly, if the Government ordered such a withdrawal it would not be obeyed and it was not willing to undertake an obligation which it knew that it could not fulfil. The reason of this was that the hold of the Government over the troops who were defending the territory in question was very slight. Those troops were local forces, mostly Szeklers. This plea is probably valid, since information from many trustworthy sources has reached me to the effect that the Government has but slight authority over the Provinces and that it is in the main effective only in the capital.

Bela Kuhn said that if the Government resigned, which it would do if the withdrawal of the troops were insisted on, there was no party capable of assuming power and that chaos would therefore ensue. If, therefore, the Entente carried out its present policy, it must be prepared to run Hungary on its own responsibility and to occupy the capital and other districts as well as the neutral zone. In reply to observations from me to the effect that great advantages would accrue to Hungary from the removal of the blockade and the establishment of friendly relations with the Powers of the Entente which would enable the country to recover its prosperity, Bela Kuhn said that he wished for such relations but that, for the reasons above given, evacuation could not be carried out at present. He proved insensible to the argument that the Armistice had to be carried out and that political frontiers could be finally settled later, though he said that the Hungarian Government adhered to the Armistice. The Hungarian Government recognised the principles of nationality laid down by Mr. Wilson and considered that the situation should be governed by popular self-determination. The Hungarian Government renounced the ideals of territorial integrity formerly prevalent, but rather than yield to the demand for evacuation which was constantly growing stronger, it preferred the definite settlement of the whole question of frontier to be arrived at at meetings between representatives of the Hungarian, German, Austrian, Bohemian, Serbian and Roumanian Governments. He suggested that I might preside at these meetings, to which the Hungarian Government would bring an accommodating spirit and willingness to make concessions from the territorial point of view. Count Karolyi suggested that these meetings might be held at Vienna or Prague. ♀

Bela Kuhn further observed that the question of food and others of a similar nature were more important to the Hungarian Government than that of frontiers. The economic position of the New States might therefore also be dealt with at these meetings and it would probably be necessary to come to some arrangement such as that advocated by Masaryk,³ among the Danubian States.

It appears to me that Bela Kuhn's suggestion might at once be adopted, as it will in any case be necessary to invite the Germans, Austrians and Hungarians to send representatives to Paris before the signature of the Preliminaries of Peace. All parties interested in the fate of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy could be called together in order to settle at least principles on which definite boundaries could be ultimately drawn, if not to decide the boundaries themselves. On this basis it would be possible to sign Preliminaries of Peace. I would accordingly suggest that, as all other interested parties already have representatives at Paris, the meetings should be at once held there and that the attendance of German and Austrian representatives should be invited. If objection is felt to a more detailed invitation to Austria and Hungary, the summons might merely ask them to state their case before the Conference. The signature of this Preliminary Peace might take place at the same time as or even before the conclusion of the Preliminary Peace with Germany, if proceedings are as far as possible expedited.

I request leave to return to Paris as there appears to be no further object in my remaining here.

³ Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, President of the Republic of Czechoslovakia.

**Notes of a Meeting Held at Mr. Lloyd George's Flat at 23, Rue
Nitot on Monday, April 7, 1919, at 4 p. m.**

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Colonel House
Mr. Baruch
Mr. Lamont
Mr. McCormick
Mr. Norman Davis
Mr. Dulles
Mr. Auchincloss

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. Lord Sumner
Mr. J. M. Keynes, C. B.
Lt.-Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey,
K. C. B.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Klotz
M. Loucheur
M. Sergent
M. Jouasset
M. Lyon (?)

ITALY

M. Orlando
M. Crespi
M. d'Amelio
Count Aldrovandi

1. The Supreme Council had before them a revised edition of the clauses on reparation prepared by Mr. Lamont, Mr. Keynes and M. Loucheur as a result of the Meeting held on Saturday, April 5th. (Appendix I).

This Article was accepted subject to the addition in line 1, after the word "affirm" of the following words: "and the Enemy States accept". This addition had been agreed to at the Meeting on April 5th, but had been dropped out in the drafting.

Clause 1, as finally approved, reads as follows:—

"The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and the Enemy States accept the responsibility of the Enemy States for causing all the loss and damage [to] which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of the Enemy States."

(As a matter of accuracy the above amendment to Clause 1 was introduced as the result of the discussion on Clause 2)

There was a prolonged discussion on various points in Clause 2.

M. KLOTZ took exception to two points in the draft of this clause. First, the statement that "The financial resources of

the Enemy States are not unlimited." He agreed that this might be expressed somewhere in the Treaty, for example, in a preamble, but he considered it would have a bad political effect on the population if stated in the Treaty.

Second, the phrase "To the extent of her utmost capacity", the wording of which, he pointed out, in a previous draft had been "At whatever cost to themselves".

In the course of the discussion, MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that it was necessary somewhere in the document for the reasons to appear why the Allies could accept less than the whole cost of the war. This phrase had not been put in for the benefit of the Germans but to enable M. Clemenceau and himself to justify to the French and British peoples their acceptance of less than the whole cost of the war.

In the course of a prolonged discussion M. KLOTZ put forward the following alternative draft:—

"The Allied and Associated Governments, recognising that financial resources of the Enemy States in the situation in which they are left at the conclusion of Peace, will not be adequate to make complete reparation for all the losses and damages mentioned in Article 1. demand that the German Government shall compensate all the losses enumerated in the annexed text".

MR. LLOYD GEORGE considered this draft would be bad from the point of view of public opinion which, both in France and Great Britain, desired very heavy damages. Public opinion would say: "Why do you take the situation at the time Peace is signed." The facts that ought to be taken into consideration were not the ephemeral conditions existing on the signature of Peace, but the permanent diminutions of Germany, such as the loss of their coal-fields, iron-fields, ships and Colonies.

After an adjournment Clause 2 was agreed to in the following form:

"The Allied and Associated Powers recognise that the financial resources of the Enemy States are not adequate, after taking into account permanent diminutions of such resources which will result from other Treaty Clauses, to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage. The Allied and Associated Governments, however, require, and the German Government undertakes, that she will make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied or Associated Powers and to their property by her aggression by land, by sea, and from the air as defined in the annexed schedule.[""]

At M. Klotz's suggestion the word "concurrently" was substituted for the word "thereupon" in the fourth sentence. Subsequently, to meet a point raised by M. Klotz on Clause 4, the following alteration was agreed to in the fourth sentence:—

Article 3

Delete the word's "providing for the discharge of" and substitute

the following words: "prescribing the time and manner for securing and discharging".

Article 3 as finally agreed to reads as follows:—

"The amount of such damage (as set forth in the specific categories attached hereto) for which compensation is to be made by the Enemy States, shall be determined by an Inter-Allied Commission, to be constituted in such form as the Allied and Associated Governments shall forthwith determine. This Commission shall examine into the claims and give to the Enemy States a just opportunity to be heard. The findings of the Commission as to the amount of damage defined as above shall be concluded and notified to Germany [the Enemy States]¹ on or before May 1st, 1921, as representing the extent of their obligations. The Commission shall concurrently draw up a schedule of payment prescribing the time and manner for securing and discharging the entire obligation within a period of 30 years from May 1st, 1921. In the event, however, that within the period mentioned, Germany shall have failed to discharge her obligation, then any balance remaining unpaid may, within the discretion of the Commission, be postponed for settlement in subsequent years: or may be handled otherwise in such manner as the Allied and Associated Governments, acting through the Commission, shall determine."

M. KLOTZ drew attention to the last sentence of Article 3 and enquired whether the Allied and Associated Governments would have to be unanimous in giving their instructions to the Commission.

MR. DAVIS said that the experts had not attempted to settle that. This sentence had only been inserted to meet M. Clemenceau's point raised on Saturday that the Commission, as a Commission, should not have too much power and that the Governments should retain power.

M. KLOTZ considered it important to settle the question of unanimity.

MR. DAVIS said that on this question of power it had throughout the discussion on the Reparation Commission been agreed by the American, British, French and Italian experts that the Commission should have powers to postpone the dates of payment.

MR. KLOTZ insisted that the Commission's question was as to whether the vote was to be a unanimous one or a majority vote.

MR. LAMONT said this was a point to be covered in the constitution of the Commission which had not yet been dealt with.

M. CLEMENCEAU urged that if the Governments were agreed on the principle, it would be better to settle it here and now.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if, while principles were being discussed, details such as the composition and constitution of the Commission and how it was to vote had to be settled, the Supreme Council would never get to the end of its task.

¹ Brackets appear in the original minutes.

M. CLEMENCEAU did not wish to insert anything in the clause now under consideration, but thought it would be as well to settle the question. He said that so far as France was concerned, the French Government considered unanimity essential.

M. ORLANDO agreed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was prepared to agree.

M. KLOTZ said that the question of sovereignty was raised by this. No Government could afford to cede its rights in this manner. The fate of the nation was in the hands of each Government which could not yield its responsibility to anyone. If the matter were handed over to a majority, the Government would be ceding its authority and its sovereignty.

(The principle of unanimity in the instructions by the Allied and Associated Governments to the Commission in regard to the manner in which any balance remaining unpaid by the enemy should be dealt with was accepted, subject to a reservation by Colonel House who said he had no authority from the President to settle the matter).

M. KLOTZ drew attention to the words "and to modify the form of payments" which he said had been introduced into the draft for the first time by the United States Delegation. He recalled a word spoken by Mr. Lloyd George on Saturday on the question of guarantees. Mr. Lloyd George had suggested that the means of forcing the enemy Government to pay was a political question for Governments to consider, but he had suggested that they might take guarantees from the enemy in the form of bonds. This was a matter for technical experts. He did not wish to make any alteration in the text of the Article but he suggested that the form of the payments should be remitted to a small Committee to prepare texts as soon as possible.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that the matter ought to be taken up. Lord Sumner, he said, had suggested to him that the question of bonds might be referred to the same experts as would examine the constitution of the proposed Commission.

MR. DAVIS said that this was a matter which would develop gradually and that there was no time at present to work out a technical bond scheme. It had been assumed that the Commission itself would work this out.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE then put forward the suggestion made to him by Mr. Keynes to meet the difficulty by the alteration in Article 3 referred to above.

M. KLOTZ wished to go rather further. He pointed out that this proposal would only affect the future. Meanwhile, the Allied Governments had to make their budgets and create funds for their own payments. Since the enemy would have to pay the debt ultimately,

he required Germany to give a signature for her indebtedness in the form of a bond. If we could get some bonds now it would be equivalent to an admission on Germany's part of her debt.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed with the idea. He read an extract from a memorandum prepared by Lord Sumner on the subject of the constitution of the Commission which corresponded closely with M. Klotz' idea. It was for this reason that Lord Sumner had thought the matter would be best dealt with by the Committee appointed to consider the constitution of the Commission.

(COLONEL HOUSE retired at this point).

Article 4 was eventually adopted without alteration.

Articles 5 and 6 were adopted.

Article 7 was adopted subject to a reservation on the part of M. Clemenceau, who reserved the right to speak to President Wilson about the deletion of a passage of the original text concerning the restitution of cattle.

Article 8 of the original text, which was merely a note drawing the attention of the Supreme War Council to certain points, was deleted and a new Article was substituted. (See the complete document at the end of Conclusions).²

M. LOUCHEUR reminded the Supreme Council that at the last meeting he had undertaken to prepare a text on the subject of the means and nature of payment including proposals for a payment in kind, especially by means of coal and by the use of German labour to make good the devastated areas. He had prepared his draft but it had not yet been examined by the experts.

MR. BARUCH said that it had already been examined, so far as coal was concerned, by the Raw Materials Committee of the Supreme Economic Council.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there were two totally different questions, which ought to be examined separately; one was the question of the use of German labour to make good the devastated areas; the other was the question of payment in kind. The examination of these two subjects would require different sets of experts and, consequently, he pressed for two separate Committees. After some considerable discussion on this subject and on the proposals for other Committees,

It was agreed:

(1) That the Raw Materials Committee of the Supreme Economic Council engaged on the examination of transitory matters should relinquish its enquiries into the question of payment in kind by means of coal, etc.

² *Post*, p. 49.

(2) That the question of form of payment (e. g. payment in kind—coal, etc.) should be considered by a small expert Committee composed as follows:—

M. Loucheur
Mr. Baruch
Sir H. Llewellyn Smith
M. Crespi

(3) That the question of utilising German labour for the restoration of the devastated areas should be referred to a special Committee composed as follows:—

M. Klotz
M. Loucheur
Lord Sumner
Lord Cunliffe
M. Crespi
M. d'Amelio
2 United States Representatives

(4) That the following Committee should consider the constitution of the Commission to be set up under the Articles of the Peace Treaty:—

M. Klotz
Lord Sumner
M. Crespi
1 American Representative

(See also final conclusion of these notes)

The Text of the Articles, as finally adopted is as follows:—

REPARATION

1. The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and the enemy States accept the responsibility of the Enemy States for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of the enemy States.

2. The Allied and Associated Governments recognise that the financial resources of the enemy States are not adequate after taking into account permanent diminutions of such resources which will result from other treaty clauses to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage. The Allied and Associated Governments however, require, and the German Government undertakes that she will make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied or Associated Powers and to their property by her aggression by land, by sea and from the air, as defined in the annexed Schedule.

3. The amount of such damage (as set forth under the specific categories attached hereto) for which compensation is to be made by the enemy States, shall be determined by an Inter-Allied Commission, to be constituted in such form as the Allied and Associated Governments shall forthwith determine. This Commission shall examine into the claims and give to the enemy States a just opportunity to be heard. The findings of the Commission as to the

amount of damage defined as above shall be concluded and notified to Germany on or before May 1st, 1921, as representing the extent of their obligations. The Commission shall concurrently draw up a schedule of payments prescribing the time and manner for securing and discharging the entire obligation within a period of 30 years from May 1, 1921. In the event, however, that within the period mentioned, Germany shall have failed to discharge her obligation, then any balance remaining unpaid may, within the discretion of the Commission, be postponed for settlement in subsequent years: or may be handled otherwise in such manner as the Allied and Associated Governments, acting through the Commission, shall determine.

4. The Inter-Allied Commission shall thereafter, from time to time, consider the resources and capacity of Germany and, after giving her representatives a just opportunity to be heard, shall have discretion to extend the date, and to modify the form of payments, such as are to be provided for in Clause 3: but not to cancel any part, except with the specific authority of the several Governments represented upon the Commission.

5. In order to enable the Allied and Associated Powers to proceed at once to the restoration of their industrial and economic life, pending the full determination of their claim, Germany shall pay in such instalments and in such manner (whether in gold, commodities, ships, securities or otherwise) as the Inter-Allied Commission may fix, in 1919 and 1920, the equivalent of \$5,000,000,000 gold towards the liquidation of the above claims, out of which the expenses of the army of occupation subsequent to the Armistice shall first be met, provided that such supplies of food and raw materials as may be judged by the Allied and Associated Governments to be essential to enable Germany to meet her obligations for reparation may, with the approval of the Allied and Associated Governments, be paid for out of the above sum.

6. The successive instalments paid over by the enemy States in satisfaction of the above claims shall be divided by the Allied and Associated Governments in proportions which have been determined upon by them in advance, on a basis of general equity, and of the rights of each.

7. The payments mentioned above do not include restitution in kind of cash taken away, seized or sequestered, nor the restitution in kind of animals, objects of every nature and securities taken away, seized or sequestered, in the cases in which it proves possible to identify them in enemy territory.

8. The German Government undertakes to make forthwith the restitution contemplated by Article 7 and to make the payments contemplated by Articles 3, 4 and 5.

The German Government recognises the Commission provided for by Article 3 as the same may be constituted by the Allied and Associated Governments, and agrees irrevocably to the possession and exercise by such Commission of the power and authority given it by Articles 3, 4 and 5. The German Government will supply to the Commission all the information which the Commission may require relative to the financial situation and operations of the German Government, its States, Municipalities and other governmental sub-divisions, and accords to the members of the Commission and its authorized agents the same rights and immunities as are enjoyed in Germany by duly accredited diplomatic agents of friendly Powers. The German Government further agrees to provide for the compensation and expenses of the Commission and of such staff as it may employ.

The Supreme Council next examined the text in regard to Categories of Damage, which had been prepared since the last meeting. (Appendix 2).

Article 1 Article 1 was adopted subject to the addition in (g) of the following words:—(French scale to be adopted).

Article 2 MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that Article 2b was too wide: a million Belgians might say that they had refused to accept wages from the Germans for 4 years and might claim compensation for the work they had abstained from. A very large sum might then be run up.

M. ORLANDO agreed.

M. KLOTZ gave the following illustration of the reason for inserting this clause:—

Supposing works existed within an area occupied by the enemy and the enemy wished to use them for making shells. The proprietor might have refused. While the factory was out of work the owners might have done their best to give an allowance to the workers. Surely it was justifiable that recompense should be given to the employers who had paid the employment benefit in these conditions. Of course, however, it would be necessary to be very sure of the facts.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed with Mr. Lloyd George that it opened the gates to abuses.

M. KLOTZ agreed to drop Article 2 (b).

Article 2 (a) was retained.

Clause 3 was adopted subject to some re-drafting required as a consequence of the omission of Article 4, see below.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had been given to understand the meaning of this Article to be that reparation would not only have to be paid for the actual destruction of non-military property but also for the consequent loss of business.

Article 4 The instance of a farm had been given to him. If a farm was destroyed, not only would the farmer get the value of the destruction inflicted but also the loss incurred owing to the farm not being in operation. He himself was very familiar with farmers' accounts. When it was a question of preparing an Income Tax Return their profits were very low, (M. Clemenceau interjected that this is the case in France also) but for a claim in this connection their profits would be very high. Consider the case of shipping. The British Government proposed to put in a claim for the many millions of tons lost, but they had not hitherto proposed to put in a claim for compensation for all the consequential loss owing to the stoppage of business due to the loss of ships, loss of wages to the crews, loss of wages at the docks, etc., etc. These could be claimed

under this clause. Consider yet another instance. The enemy had bombarded the East Coast of England and destroyed many lodging houses. Under this could be claimed not only the damage to the lodging houses but equally the loss of business. Yet another case. The colonial trade has been greatly interfered with by the submarine warfare. Australia had suffered greatly. Under this clause Australia could claim compensation for all the grain eaten by rats. If this clause was to stand we should have to revise our claims and he himself had understood that both he and M. Clemenceau had agreed not to include demands for loss of trade and business, but only compensation for life and property.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

M. LOUCHEUR suggested that at least we ought to permit interest to be paid between the date of the Armistice and the date of payment.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if this was applied to ships also, it would be very favourable to us. Personally, however, he was opposed to these small claims that could be so easily forced up to a big bill.

M. LOUCHEUR pointed out that it would be 10 years before the mines in North France would be fully repaired. Surely interest ought to be provided for these.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE admitted that large claims like this were on a different footing.

It was agreed:—

1. To omit Clause 4

2. That M. Loucheur and Lord Sumner should prepare a new draft covering only large items such as the French mines referred to by M. Loucheur.

MR. McCORMICK on behalf of the United States of America made a reservation that Belgium must be properly provided for.

The Supreme Council next considered the two alternative draft paragraphs in regard to the compensation for Belgium.³

MR. LLOYD GEORGE opposed any special articles in regard to Belgium. If these were adopted, there would be a suggestion that Belgium was getting something that was left out in the case of France.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed that there ought to be equal treatment for Belgium and France.

MR. McCORMICK said that on behalf of the United States of America, he reserved the right to see that Belgium was protected as promised in Point 7 of the address of the President of the United States at the Congress made on January 7th [8th], 1918,⁴ and con-

³ See appendix III, p. 58.

⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 12.

curred in by the Allied and Associated Governments.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that Belgium must be protected but objected to the suggestion in this clause that there was something special being provided for Belgium and not for France. The proper course was when all the clauses had been provided to let Belgium see them and state her case.

M. KLOTZ wished to put in a clause to provide compensation for the reimbursement made for enemy marks left in the occupied territories. The enemy paid for everything he required in marks at the rate of one franc, 25 centimes, consequently Belgium and France were full of marks. The French Government had had to reimburse those who had suffered from the depreciation in the mark. Was it not right to ask that return should be made for this? He suggested that the question should be examined by the same Committee as was going to examine the case of the coalmines.

LORD SUMNER said that the question had been raised at the Sub-Commission, of which he was Chairman. Three cases had been mentioned:—

1. The case of prisoners of war and repatriated prisoners who had had German marks in their possession which the French Government had redeemed.

2. Persons in the invaded territories who had had marks in their possession which have been redeemed.

3. Persons in Alsace-Lorraine.

The view of the Commission had been that the first case was not an unreasonable one for reparation. As regards No. 2, and more especially as regards No. 3, the question of policy had appeared to be raised, namely, that it was the interest of the French Government to put these people in a better position than those who remained under German rule. The Roumanians and the Poles had come forward with suggestions for reparation. The general conclusion that had been reached was that the amount involved was so large that reparation ought not to be adopted on economic grounds and it was really a matter for the Governments to deal with on political grounds.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE raised the question as to whom compensation was to be paid. Was it to those who had the depreciated marks in their possession now? These had received the marks at a depreciated price. The paper had been passing from hand to hand and the mark had gradually gone down in value. The man who held it now was not the man who had lost the money. The man who had lost was the one who had taken the original mark at its face value. Hence, if you compensate people now you would not compensate their loss but other people's loss.

Reparation for
Depreciation
of Marks

M. KLOTZ pointed out that in all Belgium and in all France the first thing the Germans had done on occupying the Country was to put up a notice fixing the value of the mark at one franc, 25 centimes. It had remained at this value until the re-occupation by the Allies when the mark had fallen to 70 centimes. When the mark passed from hand to hand it was Belgium and France who had had to pay the price. It would have been impossible for the King of the Belgians to enter Brussels or for the President of the Republic to enter Lille unless these marks had been redeemed.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he did not claim it for Alsace-Lorraine but he did for North France and Belgium, and proposed the Commission to examine the question.

MR. DAVIS asked how much was involved.

M. CLEMENCEAU said one milliard francs for France alone (£40,000,000).

MR. DAVIS asked how much for Serbia and Poland.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it was a matter obviously for a small Committee.

It was agreed that the question of reparation in regard to the redemption of the mark should be referred to the Committee set up to consider the organisation of the Commission to be formed under the Articles in the Treaty of Peace.

The list of categories of damage as finally agreed to was as follows:

Compensation may be claimed under Clause 2 under the following categories of Damage.

I. (a) Damage to injured persons and to surviving independents [*dependents*] by personal injury to or death of civilians caused by acts of war (including bombardments or other attacks on land, on sea or from the air, and all the direct consequences thereof, and of all operations of war by the two groups of belligerents wherever arising).

(b) Damage caused to civilian victims of acts of cruelty, violence or maltreatment, (including injuries to life or health as a consequence of imprisonment, deportation, internment or evacuation, of exposure at sea or of being forced to labour by the enemy) committed or ordered by the enemy wherever arising and to the surviving independence [*dependents*] of such victims.

(c) Damage caused to civilian victims of all acts of the enemy in occupied, invaded or enemy territory injurious to health or capacity to work, or to honour, and to the surviving dependence [*dependents*] of such victims.

(d) Damage caused by any kind of maltreatment of prisoners of war.

(e) As damage caused to the peoples of the Allied and Associated Powers all pensions and compensations in the nature of pensions to naval and military victims of war, whether mutilated, wounded, sick or invalided, and to the dependence [*dependents*] of such victims, the French scale to be adopted.

(f) Cost of assistance by the State to prisoners of war and to their families and dependents.

(g) Allowance by the state to the families and dependents of mobilised persons or persons serving with the forces. (The French scale to be adopted).

II. Damage caused to civilians by being forced by the enemy to labour without just remuneration.

III. Damage in respect of all property wherever situated belonging to any of the Allied or Associated States or to any of their peoples, with the exception of military works or materials, which has been carried off, seized, injured or destroyed by the acts of the enemy on land, on sea or from the air, or damage directly in consequence of hostilities or of any operation of war.

IV. Damage in the form of levies, fines and other similar exactions imposed by the enemy upon the civilian population.

(The Meeting then adjourned).

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 8 April, 1919.

Appendix I

Reparation

1. The Allied and Associated Governments affirm, the responsibility of the Enemy States for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of the enemy States.

2. The Allied and Associated Governments recognize that the financial resources of the enemy States are not unlimited, and, after taking into account permanent diminutions of such resources which will result from other treaty clauses, they judge that it will be impracticable for the enemy States to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage. The Allied and Associated Governments however, require, and the German Government undertakes that to the extent of her utmost capacity, she will make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied or Associated Powers and to their property by her aggression by land, by sea and from the air.

3. The amount of such damage (as set forth under the specific categories attached hereto) for which compensation is to be made by the enemy States, shall be determined by an Inter-Allied Commission, to be constituted in such form as the Allied and Associated Governments shall forthwith determine. This Commission shall examine into the claims and give to the enemy States a just opportunity to be heard. The findings of the Commission as to the amount of damage defined as above shall be concluded and notified to the enemy States on or before May 1st, 1921, as representing the extent of their obligations. The Commission shall thereupon draw up a schedule of payments providing for the discharge of the entire obligation within a period of 30 years from May 1, 1921. In the event, however, that within the period mentioned, Germany shall have failed to dis-

charge her obligation, then any balance remaining unpaid may, within the discretion of the Commission, be postponed for settlement in subsequent years: or may be handled otherwise in such manner as the Allied and Associated Governments, acting through the Commission, shall determine.

4. The inter-allied Commission shall thereafter, from time to time, consider the resources and capacity of Germany and, after giving her representatives a just opportunity to be heard, shall have discretion to extend the date, and to modify the form of payments, such as are to be provided for in Clause 3: but not to cancel any part, except with the specific authority of the several Governments represented upon the Commission.

5. In order to enable the Allied and Associated Powers to proceed at once to the restoration of their industrial and economic life, pending the full determination of their claim, Germany shall pay in such instalments and in such manner (whether in gold, commodities, ships, securities or otherwise) as the inter-allied commission may fix, in 1919 and 1920, the equivalent of \$5,000,000,000 gold towards the liquidation of the above claims, out of which the expenses of the army of occupation subsequent to the Armistice shall first be met, provided that such supplies of food and raw materials as may be judged by the Allied and Associated Governments to be essential to enable Germany to meet her obligations for reparation may, with the approval of the Allied and Associated Governments, be paid for out of the above sum.

6. The successive instalments paid over by the Enemy States in satisfaction of the above claims shall be divided by the Allied and Associated Governments in proportions which have been determined upon by them in advance, on a basis of general equity, and of the rights of each.

7. The payments mentioned above do not include restitution in kind of cash taken away, seized or sequestered, nor the restitution in kind of animals, objects of every nature and securities taken away, seized or sequestered, in the cases in which it proves possible to identify them in enemy territory.

8. The attention of the four chiefs of the respective Governments is called to the following:—

- (a) That necessary guarantees to ensure the due collection of the sums fixed for reparation should be planned:
and
- (b) That there are other financial clauses which this conference has not been charged to deal with.

Appendix II

Compensation may be claimed under Clause 2 under the following categories of Damage.

I. (a) Damage to injured persons and to surviving dependents by personal injury to or death of civilians caused by acts of war (including bombardments or other attacks on land, on sea or from the air, and all the direct consequences thereof and of all operations of war by the two groups of belligerents wherever arising).

British Text With
Drafting Amend-
ments Under-
lined *

(b) Damage caused to civilian victims of acts of cruelty, violence or maltreatment, (including injuries to life or health as a consequence of imprisonment, deportation, internment or evacuation, of exposure at sea or of being forced to labour by the enemy) committed or ordered by the enemy wherever arising and to the surviving dependents of such victims.

British Text

(c) Damage caused to civilian victims of all acts of the enemy in occupied, invaded or enemy territory injurious to health or capacity for work, or to honour, and to the surviving dependents of such victims.

British Text

(d) Damage caused by any kind of maltreatment of prisoners of war.

British Text With
Words Underlined
Added To Meet
U. S. A. Request

The French
Add This

(e) As damage caused to the peoples of the Allied and Associated Powers all pensions and compensations in the nature of pensions to naval and military victims of war, whether mutilated, wounded, sick or invalided, and to the dependents of such victims, the French scale to be adopted.

British Text

(f) Cost of assistance by the State to prisoners of war and to their families and dependents.

British Text
Note.—The French
Wish To Add "the
French Scale To
Be Adopted"

(g) Allowance by the State to the families and dependents of mobilised persons or persons serving with the forces.

U. S. A. Propose
This (a)
French Propose (b)
I Don't Agree for
These Are Strictly
Outside of the
"Pensions and
Property" Formula
of April 2, but
They Seem Just in
Themselves

II. (a) Damage caused to civilians by being forced by the enemy to labour without just remuneration.

(b) Damage caused to civilians by being compelled to abstain from all work as the only alternative to doing military work for the enemy or employing themselves on his armaments.

* No underlining appears in the file copy. The authorship of the marginal notes is not indicated.

III. Damage in respect of all property wherever situated belonging to any of the Allied or Associated States or to any of their peoples, with the exception of military works or materials, which has been carried off, seized, injured or destroyed by the acts of the enemy on land, on sea or from the air or damaged directly in consequence of hostilities or of any operation of war.

British Text With
Drafting Addition
Underlined

U. S. A. Proposal
Not Agreed; It
Lets in Claims
for Loss of
Businesses

IV. Interference with non-military property directly caused by acts of war on land, on sea or from the air or illegal acts of the enemy or war measures in the nature of requisitions or sequestrations taken by the enemy.

U. S. A. Proposal
Not Agreed Being
Neither 'Pensions
nor Property' but
Just and, I Think,
Politically Wise

V. Damage in the form of levies, fines and other similar exactions imposed by the enemy upon the civilian population.

(VI. The U. S. A. para. 6 is dropped and their note also).

Appendix III

Draft No. 1

Nothing contained in or omitted from, the foregoing schedule shall restrict the restoration of Belgium contemplated by point 7 of the address of the President of the United States to Congress, made January 7 [8], 1918, and concurred in by the Allied and Associated Governments.

Draft No. 2

Nothing contained in, or omitted from, the foregoing schedule shall operate to limit the making of such reparation for that damage done to Belgium as will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the Government of their relations with one another, and without which the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

Notes of a Meeting Held in Mr. Lloyd George's Residence at 23,
Rue Nitot on Tuesday, April 8, at 11 a. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Colonel House
Mr. Auchincloss

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau

BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. Lloyd George
Sir Maurice Hankey

ITALY

M. Orlando
Count Aldrovandi.

Professor Mantoux.

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE read General Smuts' telegram, No. 3 received on April 7th.

Hungary.
General Smuts'
Mission

SIR MAURICE HANKEY stated that a paraphrase of this telegram (Appendix 1) was being prepared and would be circulated in the afternoon.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he hoped that General Smuts would by this time have received the telegram sent on the previous afternoon, and would alter his plans so as to proceed to French and Roumanian Headquarters.

M. ORLANDO read the telegram he had received from Switzerland. The Swiss Government had informed the Italian Government that a Soviet would be declared in Vienna on May 14, and suggested that the best way to avert trouble there was for the Allied and Associated Powers to occupy Vienna.

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE produced a list prepared by Sir Maurice Hankey under his instructions of the subjects awaiting consideration by the Supreme Council (Appendix 2). He suggested that it was desirable if possible to bring the Germans soon to Versailles. For this it had not seemed to him necessary that the whole of the boundaries of the whole of the new states, for example, Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, should be fixed, so long as the boundaries of the enemy states were clearly fixed.

COLONEL HOUSE suggested that the enemy states should be invited now to come to Versailles some few weeks hence. He did not wish to deprive the Peace Conference of sufficient time to complete this

work, but he thought that ample notice should be given to the enemy, and that this might be given now.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it would not alter the situation to get the Germans here now. There was revolution all through Central Europe. We were sending food to Germany, but so far it had made no difference. It must not be hoped that because you induced the Germans here now, you could get people who would still represent Germany later on.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed. He read a telegram he had received from the Secretary of State for War to the effect that all his military advisers reported that the situation in Germany was fast approaching a catastrophe for lack of food and raw material. To-day came the news that Hungary had declared a Soviet. It would be necessary when the Germans came to Versailles to ask whom they represented; for example, did they represent Bavaria?

COLONEL HOUSE asked what ought to be done if the Germans refused to sign.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this was a matter in its military aspects for Marshal Foch, who should be asked to consider it with General Wilson,¹ General Diaz,² and General Bliss, and in its naval aspects for Admiral Wemyss,³ who should consider it with the Allied Admirals in Paris.

(This proposal was agreed to and Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to draft letters to Marshal Foch and Admiral Wemyss respectively.)

The letters attached (Appendix 3) were approved. The letter to Admiral Wemyss was signed by M. Clemenceau. M. Mantoux undertook to communicate the letter to Marshal Foch to the Ministry of War in order that a French translation might be prepared and signed by M. Clemenceau and transmitted to Marshal Foch. (A copy of the letter actually addressed to Marshal Foch is attached herewith).^{3a}

3. It was agreed that the Economic Commission should be asked to send in its report at once.

4. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the report prepared by M. Tardieu, Dr. Haskins, and Mr. Headlam-Morley⁴ on the Saar Valley was to the effect that no really workable scheme could be drawn up on the basis that they had been given.

The Saar Valley

¹ Field Marshal Sir Henry H. Wilson, British Military Representative on the Supreme War Council; member of the Interallied Military and Naval Committee.

² Gen. Armando Diaz, Chief of the General Staff of the Italian Army; member of the Interallied Military and Naval Committee.

³ Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, British First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval General Staff; member of the Interallied Military and Naval Committee.

^{3a} Not printed.

⁴ French, American, and British members respectively of the Special Commission on the Saar Valley.

He thought therefore that it would be necessary to adopt some other scheme. He then read extracts from three alternative schemes which had been submitted to him at an earlier stage by Mr. Headlam-Morley. The scheme which attracted him most was scheme C. which would create a new state in the Saar Valley, somewhat larger than had hitherto been proposed, in customs union with France and for which France would have a mandate from the League of Nations.⁵ He handed copies of these schemes to M. Clemenceau (who undertook to consult M. Tardieu about it) and Col. House. He promised to send a copy to M. Orlando. (Appendix IV).

(The Meeting then adjourned).

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 8.4.19.

Appendix I

Paraphrase of Telegram From General Smuts to Mr. Balfour

Despatched: Buda-Pest, 6.45 p. m. April 6th, 1919.

Received: 10 a. m. April 7th, 1919.

Reference my telegram of April 4th.^{5a}

I spent April 5th also in consultation with Hungarian Government; two important members of Government—the Prime Minister, Garbai, and the Commissary for Education, Kunfy—assisted at the Conferences. As regards the limit to which they should withdraw Hungarian troops I had at one time practically succeeded in securing acceptance of a new armistice line, running further east than Colonel Vix's line, but nevertheless well to the west of the territory which the Roumanian Committee of the Conference assigned to Roumania in their Report.⁶ Draft of agreement was drawn up and ready to be signed, but Hungarian Ministers then consulted their other colleagues again and refused to sign, saying that if they did so civil war would break out in neutral zone and Government would fall at once. They produced an alternative proposal, to the effect that if the Roumanians withdrew their forces behind the line of the Maros river (i. e. the line laid down on November 13 by General Franchet d'Esperey)⁷ and the

⁵ Scheme C actually did not provide that France would have a mandate from the League of Nations for the Saar Basin; such a mandate was provided for in Schemes A and B. See appendix IV, p. 66.

^{5a} *Ante*, p. 41.

⁶ Report No. 1 of the Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions Relating to Roumania and Yugoslavia (Commission on Roumanian and Yugoslav Affairs) was not issued until April 6, 1919, but the proposed frontier between Roumania and Hungary had been discussed at earlier meetings of the Committee, of which minutes had been issued.

⁷ See the military convention between the Allies and Hungary, signed at Belgrade November 13, 1918, vol. II, p. 183.

Great Powers occupied the whole of the neutral zone, Hungarian Government would accept the new armistice lines mentioned above. I rejected this proposal as trouble with Roumania would immediately ensue. Attitude of Hungarian Government is as follows: there is no state of war between the Great Powers and Hungary, who wishes to remain at peace with them, to secure removal of blockade and obtain facilities for importation of commodities most urgently needed such as fats and coal; I had undertaken by the lapsed draft of agreement to recommend this course to the Great Powers; Hungary still adheres to the terms fixed on November 3, 1918, by the Armistice⁸ and to those of the Military Convention concluded on November 13; she has hitherto complied with all demands for further withdrawal to the west, but cannot carry out withdrawal either to the line fixed by Colonel Vix, or even to that which I had proposed as being the only means of satisfying the fair territorial claims of Roumania—the reason being that their Szekler troops on the frontier were opposed to it; if they did accept there would certainly be a nationalist reaction and the Government would fall. Hungarian Government however still declare that as (passage undecypherable) stable Government, territorial questions are of less interest to them than economic questions; they are ready to lay their case, previous to final decision being taken, before any Conference of States bordering on Hungary to be convened and presided over by the Great Powers, and to discuss matters in an accommodating spirit. My conviction is that there is no hostility towards the Great Powers, in the Hungarian attitude. The Government however are weak, they have internal divisions which are likely to lead to their fall at an early date while, except on conditions which would be of an insulting character as regards Roumania they are too frightened to accept line. If we can handle Hungary wisely, I do not think that she is by any means lost to the Allies and I adhere to the view, after consideration of the whole case, that the wisest course for us to take is not to provoke a conflict over the armistice terms which may be unnecessary, but, after hearing the Hungarians' statement in Paris or some other place, to settle the final political frontiers. Economic questions are of such importance to the future of Hungary that, in my opinion, the Great Powers should, as an earnest of their benevolent intentions, at once allow the trainload of fats which, though bought and paid for with the consent of the Allies, are now held up by the Allied authorities at Agram, to proceed to Budapest, without however raising the blockade for the present. I am starting for Prague today in order to exchange ideas there with Professor Masaryk and shall leave for Paris as soon as possible from Vienna.

⁸ See vol. II, p. 175.

Appendix 2

List of Subjects for Consideration by the Council of Four

SUBJECT	PRESENT POSITION	
(a) <i>General Questions.</i>		
Reparations:—	To approve final revise of clause agreed to yesterday.	Mr. Lamont and Mr. Keynes are working on this.
“Categories”.	The British draft is being examined by experts.	
Means of Payment.	Mr. Loucheur is preparing a draft to be examined by experts.	
The Composition of and Instructions to the Commission.		
The Names of the Powers to be allowed to claim on Germany.		
The Division of sums obtained for reparation.		
Breaches of Laws of War	Final report agreed, but not yet issued pending the receipt of reservations by the United States and Japanese Delegations.	
Ports, Railways and Waterways.	Report complete.	
Economic Commission.	Report is in draft but has not yet been passed by the Commission.	
Financial Commission.	Articles for inclusion in the Peace Treaty with Germany are ready.	
Aeronautical Commission.	Report should be ready to-morrow, Monday. April 7th.	
(b) <i>Questions Affecting Peace With Germany.</i>		
The question of a temporary army of occupation West of the Rhine.		
Western Frontier of Germany.	The Saar Valley scheme, based on Mr. Wilson's proposal is ready.	
Dantzig.	The scheme now being worked out is ready.	
Luxemburg (future status).	It is understood that no action has been initiated in regard to this.	
Method of conducting the Negotiations with the Enemy at Versailles.	An early decision on this is desirable. The Secretary-General has put forward a short memorandum on the subject. (Attached) ⁹	

⁹ This memorandum does not accompany file copy of the minutes.

SUBJECT	PRESENT POSITION
Heligoland.	Reserved from the Naval Terms. No reason is seen why this should not be taken up at once unless it is preferred to remit it to the Foreign Ministers.
Northern Frontiers of Germany. (Schleswig)	Reports of Commission and of coordinating Commission have been considered by Committee of Foreign Ministers to March 28th, and approved in principle <i>ad referendum</i> to the Council of Four and subject to reservations by Mr. Balfour. This is ready for consideration.
Boundaries of Belgium.	Reports of Belgium Commission and of Coordinating Commission complete and ready for consideration.
(c) <i>Questions Affecting Peace With Austria.</i>	
The Italian claims as regards the Tyrol, the Adriatic, including Dalmatia and Fiume.	
Montenegro.	No action has been initiated on this.
Czecho-Slovak Frontiers.	Only the German portion of these frontiers have been settled. The remainder of the report has been before the Council of Foreign Ministers but further consideration is postponed pending a joint meeting between experts from the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Boundary Commissions in regard to Teschen. This might come before the Foreign Ministers before being considered by the Council of Four.
Roumanian Boundaries.	Final report of the Commission is not yet ready though nearly finished.
Yugo-Slav Boundaries.	Final report of the Commission is not yet ready though nearly finished.
Albania.	Report of the Greek Commission on Southern Albania is available but not unanimous. The report on the remainder of the Albanian frontiers is not yet ready.
(d) <i>Questions Affecting Peace With Bulgaria.</i>	
Boundary between Bulgaria and Roumania.	Awaits the report of the Roumanian Commission which is nearly ready.
Boundaries between Bulgaria and Serbia.	Awaits the report of the same Commission as above which also deals with Yugo-Slav boundaries outside the Italian claims. A report is nearly ready.
Boundaries between Bulgaria and Greece.	Report of the Greek Commission is ready.
Boundaries between Bulgaria and Turkey.	Report of the Greek Commission is ready.

SUBJECT	PRESENT POSITION
(e) <i>Questions Affecting Peace With Turkey.</i> Greek Claims in Turkey.	Report of the Greek Commission on this subject is ready. NOTE: The first step towards the settlement of the Turkish Question is the nomination of the members of the Syrian Commission. No action has yet been taken with regard to the allocation of mandates and the drafting of the B and C Mandates for the German Colonies. Financial and economic questions in regard to Peace with the above countries are under consideration by the Financial and Economic Commissions. There are a few questions which might usefully be referred to the Foreign Ministers and on this I attach a draft resolution. ¹⁰ Japanese questions as regards Kiauchou and Shantung.
(f) <i>Miscellaneous.</i>	

Appendix 3

From the President of the Supreme Council to Marshal Foch—8 April, 1919

On behalf of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers I am asked to request that in conjunction with General Bliss, General Sir Henry Wilson and General Diaz you will examine and report as soon as possible as to what action you would advise from a military point of view in each of the following contingencies:—

(1) In the event of a refusal by the enemy powers (Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey) to sign the Treaty of Peace.

(2) In the event of such a state of chaos in any of the enemy's countries that there is no Government in existence to sign the Treaty of Peace.

(3) In the event of the German Government being able to sign the Treaty of Peace on behalf of the whole of Germany except Bavaria owing to the fact that its jurisdiction is not recognised in and does not in fact extend to that country.

.(The above draft was approved, and was handed to M. Mantoux, who undertook to arrange at the French Ministry of War for a French text to be prepared and signed by M. Clemenceau.)

M. P. A. HANKEY

8 APRIL, 1919.

¹⁰ This draft resolution does not accompany file copy of the minutes

*From the President of the Supreme War Council to Admiral
Wemyss—8 April, 1919*

On behalf of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, I am asked to request that in conjunction with the Naval Representatives in Paris of the Navies of the United States of America, France and Italy, you will examine and report what action you would advise from a Naval point of view in each of the following contingencies:—

(1) In the event of a refusal by the enemy powers (Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey) to sign the Treaty of Peace.

(2) In the event of such a state of chaos in any of the enemy's countries that there is no Government in existence to sign the Treaty of Peace.

(3) In the event of the German Government being able to sign the Treaty of Peace on behalf of the whole of Germany, except Bavaria owing to the fact that its jurisdiction is not recognised in, and does not in fact extend, to that country.

CLEMENCEAU

Appendix IV

Attached are copies of three schemes for the establishment of a new régime in the Saar Valley:

(a) Leaves the sovereignty of Germany but transfers the administration to France.

(b) which is almost identical, transfers the sovereignty to the League of Nations, but gives the administration to France.

(c) Establishes a separate State which will be under the protectorate of France, which controls the foreign relations and has complete administrative control of the administration, together with the ownership and right of exploitation of the mines.

31. 3. 19.

J. W. H[EADLAM]-M[ORLEY]

A & B

SAAR BASIN

1. Germany renounces in favour of the Allied and Associated Powers, as trustees of the League of Nations, all rights of administration and exploitation over the territory as described in Annex I,¹¹ and herein referred to as the "Saar Basin":—

¹¹ The reference is to a hypothetical annex, which would define the boundaries of the Saar Basin; such an annex did not accompany the text of Schemes A and B.

1. (Alternative) Germany renounces in favour of the Allied and Associated Powers, as trustees of the League of Nations, all her rights and title over the territory as described in Annex I, and herein referred to as the "Saar Basin":—

2. The Allied and Associated Powers confer upon the French Government a mandate to administer the Saar Basin on behalf of the League of Nations.

3. The French Government accepts the mandate to administer the Saar Basin and makes itself responsible for peace, order and good government therein. It will carry out the mandate in accordance with the provisions of this treaty.

4. The French Government will appoint a Governor of the Saar Basin who will be responsible to it for the government of the territory and for the due execution of the provisions of this treaty.

In organising the administration of the territory the Governor will continue, so far as may be possible, the existing system to which the inhabitants of the country are accustomed.

5. There shall be a legislative assembly for the Saar Basin elected by the (male) inhabitants. In all debates in the legislative assembly the members shall be entitled to use their own language.

6. A complete customs union shall be established between France and the Saar Basin.

7. The Governor shall organise a *gendarmerie* for the policing of the Saar Basin, but subject thereto the inhabitants of the Basin will not be permitted to bear arms or receive any military training or to be incorporated in any military organisation either on a voluntary or compulsory basis, and no fortifications, depots, establishments, railway construction or works of any kind adapted to military purposes will be permitted to exist within the territory.

(Nor will the territory be allowed to contribute directly or indirectly in men, money or in material of any description towards the armies of Germany.)

Omit in A

8. The control of the educational system in the Saar Basin will be vested in the Governor in accordance with such laws as may be enacted by the Legislative Assembly.

Facilities shall be afforded for the education of children in the language of their parents.

9. The freedom and outward exercise of all forms of worship shall be assured to all persons in the Saar Basin, and no hindrance shall be offered either to the hierarchical organisation of the different communions, or to their relations with their spiritual chiefs.

10. The property in the Saar Basin formerly belonging to the Imperial German Government, or the Government of any German State will pass to the Administration of the Saar Basin.

11. An exclusive right to the exploitation of the mines in the Saar Basin which were formerly the property of the Imperial German Government or of any German State shall pass to the Government of the French Republic, which will make such arrangements as it may deem necessary for exercising the rights so conferred.

In the exploitation of the mines no distinction will be made in the pay or conditions of employment of the workmen, whatever their nationality.

A fixed sum per ton of coal raised will be paid to the Administration by the French Government as a contribution towards the expenses of the administration.

12. The French Government shall be entitled to the exclusive right of operating the railways and waterways of the Saar Basin. For this purpose it shall be entitled to purchase or lease them from the Administration at such price or rent as may be agreed, or failing agreement, may be decided by arbitration under the supervision of the League of Nations.

The rights conferred by this article shall extend also to the development and improvement of the existing railways and waterways and to the purchase of such land as may be necessary for the purpose.

13. No obstacle shall at any time be placed in the way of any inhabitant of the Saar Basin who wishes to withdraw from the territory.

14. (German nationals inhabiting the Saar Basin will *ipso facto* lose their German nationality and when outside the
Omit in B Saar Basin will be entitled to French diplomatic protection.)

15. All questions other than those dealt with above arising out of the arrangements now made relating to the Saar Basin, including the amount of the payment per ton of coal raised referred to in article 11, will be made the subject of subsequent agreements between the parties concerned.

C

SAAR BASIN

1. The territory comprised within the following limits is hereby constituted an independent state under the name of the Saar Republic (geographical boundaries).

Germany renounces all rights and title over the said territory.

2. Pending the convocation of a constituent assembly charged with the duty of preparing and enacting an organic law for the Saar Republic the League of Nations will appoint a Governor of the Saar Basin who will be responsible to it for the government of the territory until the coming into force of the organic law and the establishment of the administration of the Republic.

In organising the administration of the territory the Governor will continue so far as may be possible the existing system to which the inhabitants of the country are accustomed.

The Governor will also be responsible for the due execution of the provisions of the Treaty.

3. The organic law shall provide for a legislative assembly elected by the (male) inhabitants of the Republic for the establishment of a judicial system, and for the organisation of the administration.

4. A complete customs union shall be established between France and the Saar Republic, and shall not be terminated without the consent of the French Government.

5. There shall be a *gendarmerie* for the policing of the territory of the Saar Republic, but subject thereto the inhabitants of the Republic will not be permitted to bear arms or receive any military training or to be incorporated in any military organisation either on a voluntary or compulsory basis. No fortifications, depots, establishments, railway construction or works of any kind adapted to military purposes will be permitted to exist.

6. The freedom and outward exercise of all forms of worship shall be assured to all persons belonging to the Saar Republic, as well as to foreigners in its territory and no hindrance shall be offered either to the hierarchical organisation of the different communions or to their relations with their spiritual chiefs.

7. The property in the territory of the Saar Republic which belonged to the Imperial German Government, or the Government of any German State, will pass to the Government of the Saar Republic.

8. The French Government shall enjoy an exclusive right to the exploitation of the mines within the territory of the Saar Republic which were formerly the property of the Imperial German Government or of any German State. The French Government will make such arrangements as it may deem necessary for exercising the rights so conferred.

In the exploitation of the mines no distinction will be made in the pay or conditions of employment of the workmen whatever their nationality.

A fixed sum per ton of coal raised will be paid to the Republic by the French Government as a contribution towards the expenses of the administration.

9. The French Government shall be entitled to the exclusive right of operating the railways and waterways in the Saar Republic. For this purpose it shall be entitled to purchase or lease them from the Administration of the Republic at such price or rent as may be agreed, or failing agreement may be decided by arbitration under the supervision of the League of Nations.

The rights conferred by this article shall extend also to the development and improvement of the existing railways and waterways and to the purchase of such land as may be necessary for the purpose.

10. German nationals habitually resident in the territories described in Article 1 will *ipso facto* become citizens of the Saar Republic and will lose their German nationality.

Within a period of (.) from the coming into effect of the present Treaty, German nationals not less than 18 years old and habitually resident in the Saar Republic will be entitled to opt for German nationality. Option by a husband will cover his wife, and option by parents will cover that of their children less than 18 years old.

All persons who have exercised the above right to opt must within the succeeding twelve months transfer their place of residence to Germany.

They will be entitled to retain their landed property in the Saar Republic. They may carry with them their moveable property of every description. No export or import duties or charges may be imposed upon them in connection with the removal of such property.

11. The control of the foreign relations of the Saar Republic will be entrusted to the French Government and all citizens of the Republic will be entitled when outside the limits of the Republic to French diplomatic protection.

12. All questions other than those dealt with above arising out of the arrangements now made relating to the Saar Basin, including the amount of payment per ton of coal raised referred to in Article 8, will be made the subject of subsequent agreements between the parties concerned.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Thursday, April 10, at 4 p. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.
Mr. Lamont.
Mr. Norman Davis.
Mr. Baruch.
Mr. McCormick.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. Bonar Law, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. Lord Sumner.
Lord Cunliffe, G. B. E.
Lt. Col. Sir M. Hankey, K. C. B.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Klotz.
M. Loucheur.
M. Sergent.
M. Jouasset.
M. Cheysson.
M. Lyon.

*French Ministry
of Finance.*

ITALY

H. E. M. Orlando.
H. E. M. Crespi.
M. d'Amelio.

Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. M. KLOTZ, at the request of President Wilson, explained the reason of the Meeting being held. As a result of a Meeting held on the previous Monday,¹ a Committee had been formed to consider a Memorandum by Lord Sumner in regard to the constitution of the proposed Inter-Allied Commission, which was to determine the amount of damage for which compensation is to be made by enemy States under Article 3 of the Articles already agreed to.²

Reparation:
Constitution of
the Commission

LORD SUMNER had proposed a text which he said was open to amendment. The French Delegation wished to raise three points of principle.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that it was premature to bring points even of principle before the Supreme War Council before the full report of the Committee was available, and a final effort had been made by the Committee to settle the points themselves.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that there was some advantage in considering points of principle even before the Commission had reported. It had always been agreed that if the experts could not reach unanimous conclusions the Supreme Council should take the matter up. He understood that the following two points of principle were raised; one, as to whether the United States of America could participate in the Commission at all; two, question of a bond issue.

¹ See IC-170K, p. 44.

² *Ante*, p. 49.

M. KLOTZ added, three, the question of unanimity by the Commission in regard to the manner in which any balance remaining unpaid by the enemy should be dealt with.

2. **PRESIDENT WILSON** said that the first point was not one of principle at all, and he could accept it at once. If the arrangements for the Commission were sound, the United States of America would participate. Otherwise, they would not.

Participation by
the United States
of America in the
Commission

3. **MR. LLOYD GEORGE** said that this settled the first point. As regards the question of unanimity, he reminded the Supreme Council that this had been agreed to at the meeting held at the Rue Nitot on Monday afternoon, April 7th.³ He confirmed his recollection of what occurred by reading the following extract from the Secretary's notes of that Meeting:—

Unanimity of the
Commission

"The principle of unanimity in the instructions by the Allied and Associated Governments to the Commission in regard to the manner in which any balance remaining unpaid by the enemy should be dealt with, was accepted subject to a reservation by Colonel House, who said that he had no authority from the President to settle the matter."

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested it was premature to try and settle questions of this kind before the report of the Committee on the whole subject was available. Already the Supreme Council were being brought into the work for which the Committee had been appointed. He did not consider this a right or wise procedure. On the question of unanimity, what he had previously agreed in consultation with his own experts, although he had not finally decided the point until the report on the whole subject was available, was that unanimity was essential in regard to the cancellation of any part of the enemy debt.

(President Wilson read from a document prepared by the United States experts as a draft for his consideration, but which had not been circulated).⁴

MR. LLOYD GEORGE and **MR. BONAR LAW** said that if this was his view, there was no more to be said, since all were in agreement.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that two of M. Klotz's points had now virtually been settled.

M. LOUCHEUR asked if this decision meant that a majority vote would suffice to decide the means of payment. Supposing for example a majority of the Commission were to decide that half the amount for reparation was to be paid in marks, would a majority vote suffice in such a case?

³ See IC-170K, p. 44.

⁴ Several such drafts are printed in Burnett, *Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference*, vol. I, pp. 877, 893, 896, 903.

MR. BONAR LAW explained that M. Loucheur's suggestion was that in fact by some such decision as he had quoted as an example, the Commission might by a majority remit part of the payment although by their constitution they would be prevented from doing so directly.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the raising of this point illustrated his whole objection to the present discussion. An isolated question of this kind was brought forward and was at once found to possess many ramifications. To a member of the Commission who was fully conversant with all aspects of the subject, these ramifications were familiar. He, himself, however, not being so conversant with the subject was unwilling to express an opinion on an incomplete document. He was prepared to say, however, that with regard to any remission of part of the enemy's debt there must be unanimity. He was not prepared, however, to agree in an incomplete scheme, and as yet, no complete report had been presented.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had had doubts as to whether the question could be settled this afternoon, but he had brought it up because there had been a general desire that it should be raised. As the report was not complete, however, he was prepared to postpone further discussion.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out the advantages of hearing the Experts and deciding in their presence if possible. The Experts he pointed out had been arguing about these questions for months. Eventually, however, they always came up against big questions which they could not take the responsibility of deciding. In the present instance there were one or two such points—for example—the question of a bond issue. If you remit it to the Experts they would be bound to come back and say that questions of principle were raised which they could not decide. He would like the Supreme Council to reach an agreement on points of principle and then give their instructions to the Experts.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had no objection to discussing the Bonds scheme if one was ready to be discussed.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed that the attempt should be made to discuss it.

4. MR. LLOYD GEORGE repeated the suggestion he had made in personal conversation with President Wilson in the morning. His proposal was that instead of fixing in the Treaty of Peace a sum which Germany was to pay, the Commission itself should be instructed, after seeing all the claims, to fix the amount of the Bond issue which should be made by the enemy. The British and French point of view in this matter was identical. If, for example, it was laid down now that there should be a first Bond issue of six thousand millions sterling, critics in Parliament

Question of German
Bond Issue

would at once say "this is all they are to pay". If the amount was left to the Commission to fix, they could be given an indication not of the actual amount but of the principles on which the amount should be assessed. This would surmount some of the parliamentary difficulties which he and M. Clemenceau would have to face. Mr. Bonar Law who had already been confronted with this question in Parliament, was in full agreement with him.

M. KLOTZ said it was not so much a question of making provision for a certain amount as of fixing the first instalment of what would have to be paid later. From a public point of view the Governments would be asked for guarantees. What were their guarantees? At the meeting on Monday at Rue Nitot he had suggested a lien on customs, ports, shipping etc. Mr. Lloyd George had replied "no, not that." The Commission it was now proposed should agree on a figure. What guarantees had we that after two years the enemy would pay? How could Governments prepare their Budgets for 1920 and 1921? The inclusion of a figure of 150 billions of francs (6,000 million Pounds) would give great satisfaction to public opinion. In private transactions where there was no land or other property that could be mortgaged a bond was usually given; similarly that would be an advantage in this public transaction; if no figure was quoted public opinion would say "You have constructed a wonderful machine but you have no coal for it." An issue of bonds would give great satisfaction both to the public and to Parliament.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that his suggestion was that the Commission should immediately, after examining the claim, announce the amount of an immediate issue of bonds to be made by the enemy. He did not think that M. Klotz could have apprehended his proposal.

M. KLOTZ asked whether Mr. Lloyd George considered that a Commission could be constituted soon enough to meet immediately and to announce the amount at the very moment of the signature by the enemy of the Treaty of Peace.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE replied that this depended on how soon the Nations had their claims ready.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked what use it was proposed to make of the bonds.

M. KLOTZ said that the Commission would retain the bonds. It must carefully avoid distributing quantities of bonds at once to different nations. This would lead to great dangers. Each Nation, however, under his scheme, would know how much it would get and could issue the bonds retained by the Commission as a sort of collateral for a part of its financial operations during the next two years. At the end of the two years a distribution of the bonds

would be made. On the date of the signature of the Treaty of Peace Germany would hand over bonds for Six thousand Million Pounds. Although the Commission would not make a distribution Nations could raise credit on the bonds. In a word, the Nations would not receive the bonds to sell but would issue them as collateral for the purpose of getting credit.

MR. LAMONT said that this question had been discussed by a special Committee, which had been very largely in accord on all points except as to M. Klotz's proposed amount, namely, 30 milliards of dollars (6,000 million pounds). He (M. Klotz) had said that this was only a suggestion as a basis for consideration. The only difference that he could see between M. Klotz and Mr. Lloyd George was that the former wanted to name the sum now, and Mr. Lloyd George did not.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that his understanding of his conversation with Mr. Lloyd George was that he had not doubted for a moment the desirability, if not the necessity, of an issue of sufficient bonds to sustain the credit of the nations concerned. What they doubted was the advisability of stating the sum arbitrarily, for it was only arbitrarily that they could do it at the present time. He agreed, however, that the Commission should be empowered to determine the sums of the bonds to be immediately issued by the German Government.

MR. LAMONT said that the United States Delegates had intended to propose that the Commission should meet within a week of the signature of the Treaty of Peace.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if they would meet and decide?

PRESIDENT WILSON said it would decide if it had the data in its hands.

M. ORLANDO suggested it would take six months to collect the claims.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it would not take so long to collect provisional claims.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he was informed that France was the only country that had not yet put in its figures.

M. CLEMENCEAU said the reason of this was partly the extent of the figures, and partly because of the earnest desire of France not to exaggerate.

M. KLOTZ said that France would give a figure very carefully drawn up and without any exaggeration.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that France desired to state a figure that was less than the total amount to be claimed. Because they were doing this, however, they did not wish to disappoint public opinion. If, however, no figure was mentioned, public opinion would not only be dis-

appointed, but would think that Germany was being spared. What inconvenience, he asked, would result from saying that there would be an issue of such and such an amount of bonds? As regards Mr. Lloyd George's remark on the parliamentary point of view, he was not sure, since opinion in the two countries was very different. If, however, no figure should be named, perhaps a date could be given. He was very anxious to reach an agreement, and to do so he would make a concession, provided a date were given by which the Commission should report. To agree without either a figure or a date was further than he could go.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE did not see why the Commission should not be brought together, as Mr. Lamont had suggested, immediately after the signature of the Treaty of Peace, provided that the claims could be put in at once. Many of the figures could be reached by a mere process of addition. For example, pensions, which alone came to thousands of millions, could be established at once. The Commission could then name a sum, so to speak, on account, and decide that Germany should issue bonds for this amount. He did not see why more than 48 hours should be required for this.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he was somewhat mystified by this discussion. Months had been spent in trying to reach a figure, then it had been decided to drop the attempt. Now it was proposed to ask the Commission to name it right away. Were we not agreed, he asked, that the amount of the bonds issued by Germany should be determined by the Commission at the earliest possible date?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the date should be a fortnight after the claims had been put in.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he might accept Mr. Lloyd George's proposal, although he found it difficult. Supposing someone were to steal his watches, his pictures, his statues, his furniture, etc., and the thief was caught. He would not know the value immediately, but he could give an approximate figure for temporary settlement. However, he would agree, provided that President Wilson would agree.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had already expressed his agreement.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether the amount was to be decided unanimously, or by a majority of the Commission.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said, surely by a majority.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would accept.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he could not accept a majority, and must insist on unanimity.

M. CLEMENCEAU made two observations in regard to this. First, it was always possible to take an unanimous decision in a small meeting of statesmen. This, however, was much harder in a large technical Commission. Consequently, if unanimity was essential, the

period of a fortnight proposed by Mr. Lloyd George was an illusion, because the Commission would never agree within that time. Second, it had been suggested by United States experts in the course of the discussion that part of the payment could be allowed to be made in paper marks. This would be disastrous from the point of view of public opinion.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, on the question of unanimity, said that if this was demanded as essential, it would be fatal to the whole scheme, and there would be no alternative but to fix the figure now. He understood that the Commission would consist of representatives of the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Belgium. If any of these powers declined to agree, they could hold the Commission up indefinitely. Belgium, for example, might say:—"We won't agree unless you will agree to so and so". They might say they would not agree unless they themselves were given one or two thousand million bonds. He was only quoting Belgium as an example, but the same might apply to any of the states involved.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the object of the bonds was to provide collateral for borrowing purposes, and some of this borrowing would have to be done in the United States of America. If there was an extravagant issue of bonds, it would upset the credit of the world. Bankers would not lend on a depreciated security. He did not want to be obstructive, but he must state that if this question was to be decided by a majority, it would not be wise for the United States of America to participate.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it was most important for the United States to participate, because they were the only really impartial power in the matter.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the United States would be more than willing to participate, but they must have this safeguard. The initial steps would affect the whole structure of credit of which the United States were a part. Consequently, they could not afford to be outvoted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that the United States was a country to which the other Powers would all have to resort for credit. The British Empire, however, was also affected. Some of the things which Belgium and France needed most come from the British Empire, for example—wool and machinery, which the United States of America would not alone be able to supply. He was unable, however, to see how American or British credit would be affected by too many marks being put on the market. It would merely affect the value of the marks themselves.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that any country that accepted marks as collateral would be affected.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the United States would use its own judgment as to the value of the marks. If bankers were not satisfied that their value as collateral was sufficient, they would not lend. They would only give credit to the extent to which they believed the collateral to be sound.

PRESIDENT WILSON said Mr. Lloyd George had overlooked one point. It was not to the interest of the world that the credit of France or Great Britain should be depressed. If a beginning were made by the issue of a huge sum in bonds, and Great Britain and France sought to borrow, the bankers would say that they were borrowing on the strength of a collateral that had been issued too profusely, and thus the whole structure of credit would be affected.

MR. BONAR LAW agreed, but said that this was exactly what the Commission would have to bear in mind as regards fixing the amount to be issued. If unanimity was insisted on, any State could hold up the Commission either way, whether the amount was not regarded as big enough or as too big.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the Commission should have powers to decide how much of the paper could be put on the market at one time, in order to counter the risk of the market being flooded.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that this should be part of the scheme.

MR. DAVIS said that the Commission should not put loose on the market a larger amount than that for which Germany was in a position to meet the coupons.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE recalled that in previous discussions on fixing the amount that Germany could pay, it had always been assumed that she would not be able to pay for the first two years and that the greater part of the payment would have to begin in the third year. There was no reason why bonds should not be issued to be payable later on.

MR. BONAR LAW pointed out that bonds would be available as credit as long as people thought that ultimately they would be paid. Otherwise they would not be available.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that a non-essential subject was now being discussed. If the question were to be decided by a majority vote but nevertheless the United States of America did not agree and issued a minority report, they would really kill the whole scheme of credit. Consequently, the scheme had to be acceptable to the United States of America. The same applied to Great Britain.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the United States of America was a country where there were great varieties of opinion and was not certain that everyone would accept the decision of the Government.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the Secretary of the Treasury would have a good deal to say.

MR. LAMONT suggested that the Committee might fix a minimum sum for the bond issue to be adopted by the Commission.

MR. DAVIS suggested that the Committee might come together again to consider this question.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed and proposed that, after this preliminary discussion, the experts should resume their meetings and endeavour to fix on a minimum sum.

(This proposal was adopted and the Supreme Council adjourned).

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 10 April, 1919.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday, April 19, 1919, at 11 a. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
Sir Maurice Hankey, K. O. B.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

ITALY

M. Orlando.
Baron Sonnino.
Count Aldrovandi.

Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

ITALIAN CLAIMS

1. M. ORLANDO said that he would consider the whole question of Italian claims from the point of view of the resolutions taken by the Supreme Council on other questions. He recognised that there was one Power represented there to-day, namely, the United States of America, which had not taken any part in the Treaty concluded with Italy by France and Great Britain.¹ Consequently, he proposed at the moment to deal with the subject on the hypothesis that no engagements existed. Italy had formulated three definite and distinct claims. He believed these to be in conformity with the general principles which had been adopted by the Supreme Council in dealing with the Peace Treaty. Consequently, he proposed to make a comparison between the principles underlying Italian claims and the general principles on which the Treaty of Peace was being based.

2. Italy's first claim related to her desire for union with the territories on the Italian side of the natural frontiers of Italy. Italy shared with Spain and Scandinavia the distinction of having boundaries more clearly defined by nature than almost any other country on the continent. More than almost any other country Italy possessed a geographical unity being bounded by the sea and the mighty chain of mountains which encircled her

¹ Great Britain, Cmd. 671, Misc. No. 7 (1920): *Agreement Between France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy, Signed at London, April 26, 1915*. A translation from the *Izvestia* which was transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in Russia on December 5, 1917, is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1917, supp. 2, vol. 1, p. 497.

northern limits. Consequently, the natural boundary was the watershed of the mountains and Italy claimed this line as her natural frontier. It was recognised that peoples not of Italian races were included in this territory. This was not an occasion on which to begin a discussion on the precise numbers and he had not the material with him. He would remind his colleagues, however, that everyone, without exception, who had appeared before them to discuss Austrian statistics had agreed that they were untrustworthy. No one had been more vehement on this subject than the Jugo-Slav delegates. Material could be produced to prove that the Austrians had falsified the figures against Italy. He did not know whether the incorporation of these territories in Italy would bring a hundred thousand, more or less, Slavs under Italian rule. Every time, however, that the Peace Conference had had to determine frontiers, or to fix limits of a new state, it had been recognised that the inclusion of different races was not a reason for overriding strong strategic and economic reasons. He asked that that same principle might be applied to the Italian claims. Pointing to the map, he explained that if the line showing the natural boundary of Istria were adopted, it would be impossible for Trieste, from a strategic point of view, since it would bring Trieste within the range of gun-fire. Even if Italy secured the whole of its claims it would embrace a total population of foreign origin which would be small in comparison with that of other nations. Under the approved scheme, for example, the population [of Poland?] would include from 18 hundred thousand to 2 million Germans as compared with a total population of some 25 million Poles, whereas Italy would only have a foreign population of some 6 hundred thousand as compared with a total of nearly 40 million. The same applied in the case of Roumania, which would include a large Hungarian population, and in the case of Czecho-Slovakia, which would include more than 2 million Germans compared with a total of 10 million Czechs. Hence, Italy considered it within her right to demand the natural frontiers fixed for her by God and the inclusion of certain population of other races should not be a bar. Supposing there had only been 4 or 5 hundred thousand Germans between France and the Rhine, would this, he asked, have been a reason for denying the historical strategic claims of France to the Rhine as a frontier?

3. The second point, M. Orlando continued, related to Fiume. Italy considered that the question of Fiume depended on general frontiers fixed for her. The historic frontier line of Italy passed along the water-shed of the mountains and came down to the sea on the Gulf of Quarnero and would embrace Fiume. For Fiume Italy appealed to the principle of self determination of the people. He referred to a historical fact that was insufficiently remembered, that Fiume itself had, before

Fiume

the conclusion of the Armistice, expressed a desire for incorporation in Italy. On the 18th October, 1918, the deputies of Fiume had in the Hungarian Chamber stated that as the Austro-Hungarian Empire was in a state of dissolution, Fiume being a free city demanded union with Italy. Hence Italy was in the presence of a question that had not been raised in the first instance by Italians, and there was a general demand that the declaration by Fiume should be supported. One objection that might be raised was that the principle of self determination was not applicable to a small community. It might be urged, also, that Fiume was not a part of Italy. Nevertheless, Fiume could not be considered as an isolated unit. The principle of self determination ought to apply just as much to little peoples as to great nations, particularly where there was a historical claim. Fiume had a history relating to liberty over its own destinies dating back many centuries. It constituted a small people which might be compared to the State of San Marino which, if the need arose, ought to have the same right of self determination as the peoples of Russia.

Another objection that had been raised to the inclusion of Fiume in Italy was the economic factor. The precedent he would quote here was that of Dantzic. In the case of Dantzic, the demand for annexation by Poland had not been accepted. It had been decided that the rights of the majority of the population of Germany must be respected. In the case of Dantzic, therefore, economic considerations had not been allowed to prevail over national desires. If it were decided that Fiume was to be constituted as a free state like Dantzic, the Italians would say that a procedure had been adopted which was more favourable to the Germans than to the Italians. In the case of Dantzic it could be argued that it was the sole outlet to Poland. This did not apply in the case of Jugo-Slavia which had several other outlets. It could be shown not only that there were several natural harbours left to Jugo-Slavia, but in addition that that country would have a very long coast line. There were some several ports more accessible to Jugo Slavia than Fiume. Hence he maintained that the concession made to Poland in the case of Dantzic did not apply to Fiume.

Another difference between the two cases was that Dantzic could only serve Poland, whereas only 7% of the capacity of Fiume was used to serve Jugo-Slavia. In fact Jugo-Slavia was only a secondary consideration commercially to Fiume. He had read in the papers that M. Trumbitch² had stated before the Supreme Council that 50% of the port of Fiume was devoted to Jugo-Slavia. He had at once tele-

² Ante Trumbitch, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

graphed to the Chamber of Commerce of Fiume which had telegraphed back detailed figures to show that 7% was the correct figure. Supposing, however, that it was 12% or 15%, the fact would not be altered that Fiume was mainly concerned in serving other territories such as Hungary, Galicia and Bohemia. For the above reasons he supposed that if Fiume were treated on the same lines as Dantzig, public opinion would be justified in saying that Italy was being treated worse than the enemy. There was one point of detail which he would mention, not as a serious argument, but as an interesting illustration of the historical independence of Fiume. It was a point of heraldry which could have no value among the Allied and Associated Powers, but which was of some importance in a country like Austria, which had preserved its aristocratic influences. This point was that the various states forming parts of Austria possessed historic escutcheons and among these Fiume was included with its own coat of arms.

4. Italy's third claim, M. Orlando continued related to Dalmatia and the Islands off the coast—and he would mention here that the case of the Islands applied also to Istria with which must be considered the large Islands of Cherso and Lussin which were largely Italian in character.

Dalmatia and
the Islands

Italy's claims here were of a strategic order. It was not necessary to be a Naval Expert to understand them although they were a question of great interest to Naval Experts. The eastern shores of the Adriatic with their covering Islands and high coast commanding the Adriatic; even if the Naval Forces on the Italian side were reduced to the lowest limits necessary for policing the seas, there would always be the possibility of ships setting out from these recesses reaching and bombarding the Italian coast and then returning with little or no damage behind the screen of Islands. He did not wish to enter into too much detail but if the matter were examined analytically it would be found that ships could come from the North or the South to bombard the coast of Italy in the middle Adriatic and return in safety. The recent war had demonstrated this danger. The bombardments on the Italian coast made the greater impression because while the Entente was absolutely mistress of the seas, it was not mistress of the Adriatic. The Austrians it is true were not able to navigate the Adriatic, neither was Italy. Reinforced by British and French warships, the Italian Fleet had double the force of the Austrians, but nevertheless they were never able to stop these bombardments. The enemy had escaped every time. Italy would never be secure until she had a defensive basis in the middle of the opposite coast.

The strategic argument however, was not the only one on which Italy based her claims. There was a national question as well. In the course of those conversations it had been stated that historical claims

must not be allowed to possess a decisive influence. He, himself, recognized that. There were, however, cases where history must exercise a deep influence. Since historic days right down to the Treaty of Campo Formio³ Dalmatia had been connected with Italy—first as part of the Roman Empire, subsequently as part of Venice. One factor of the case resulted from the dispositions of nature. The mountains divided the coast from the interior. For this reason the whole culture of Dalmatia gravitated inevitably towards Italy. As he had stated, Dalmatia had been connected with Italy until the Treaty of Campo Formio but Italian influence had lasted much longer than this. He could not state the exact date as he had not the documents with him but he believed that it was until 1881 that the majority in the Diet of Dalmatia had been Italian. Hence it could not be said that Italy was dating her historical arguments too far in the past. He had in his possession a document copy of which he had communicated to President Wilson, which had been found at Zara and which was dated 1887, and which purported to determine the official language (*Dienst Sprache*) of the different communes of Dalmatia. This official document ordered that out of 84 communes, nineteen were entitled to speak exclusively Italian; twenty-five were entitled to speak both Italian and Serbo-Croat. This he would point out was information derived not from Italian but from Austrian sources. Some places still preserved an Italian minority, notably Zara, Trau and perhaps Spalato. There still remained in Dalmatia a flourishing Italianism. Was it possible, he asked, after all the sacrifices of the war for Italy to see this Italianism devoted to destruction. What Italy demanded was only a small part of Dalmatia leaving to Yugo-Slavia Spalato, Ragusa and Cattaro. He considered that this was a very modest demand, and he only asked that the existing agreement in regard to Dalmatia should be adhered to.

5. PRESIDENT WILSON recalled that it had been agreed that he should confer with M. Orlando and through him with his colleagues and he would now state the substance of what he had said. His Italian friends would bear witness that throughout the conversations he had insisted on the same point of view. It had been his privilege as the spokesman of the Associated Powers to initiate the negotiations for peace. The bases of the Peace with Germany had then been clearly laid down. It was not reasonable—and he thought his Italian friends would admit this—to have one basis of Peace with Germany and another set of principles for the Peace with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. He must assume that the principles

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³ Treaty between France and Austria, October 17, 1797, G. F. de Martens, *Recueil des Principaux Traités d'Alliance, de Paix, de Trêve, de Neutralité, de Commerce, de Limites, d'Echange, etc.* (2d edition), vol. vi, p. 420.

in each case would be the same. The whole question resolved itself into this: we were trying to make peace on an entirely new basis and to establish a new order of international relations. At every point the question had to be asked whether the lines of the settlement would square with the new order. No greater question had ever been asked in any negotiations. No body of statesmen had ever before undertaken to make such a settlement. There was a certain claim of argument which must be brushed aside, namely, the economic and strategic argument. Within certain limits he agreed that natural boundaries such as existed in the cases of Spain or Scandinavia (which M. Orlando had referred to) must be taken into consideration. The whole course of life in these regions was determined by such natural boundaries. The slope of the mountains not only threw the rivers in a certain direction but tended to throw the life of the people in the same direction. These, however, were not strategic nor economic arguments. On these grounds he felt no difficulty in assenting to that part of the Italian claims included in M. Orlando's first point. Nature had swung a great boundary round the north of Italy. It included Trieste and most of the Istrian Peninsula on which Pola lies. He had no great difficulty there in meeting the Italian views.

Outside of these, however, further to the South all the arguments seemed to him to lead the other way. A different watershed was reached. Different racial units were encountered. There were natural associations between the peoples and this brought him to the question of Fiume.

6. From the first it had seemed to him plain that on the side of the Alps on which Fiume lay there was not only a difficult but an entirely new problem. Hitherto Fiume had been linked up with the policy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

That Empire had been governed by men who were in spirit very similar to the former rulers of Germany and who had been more or less under their domination. In fact they had become their instruments. If the Austro-Hungarian Empire had not gone to pieces the question could not have been difficult to deal with. Now, however, it had disappeared. Hence part of the wisdom of the present situation seemed to build up new States linked in their interest for the future with the new order. These States must indeed become partners in the new order and not be regarded as States under suspicion but as linked in the new international relationship. M. Orlando would remember that at the time that we were trying to detach the Jugo-Slavs from Austria we spoke of them as friends. We could not now speak of them as enemies. By separating from Austria-Hungary they had become connected with the new and disconnected from the old policy and order. M. Orlando had argued the case of Fiume as though it were purely an Italian and Jugo-Slav in-

terest. Fiume was undoubtedly important to Jugo-Slavia whatever the proportion of the Jugo-Slav trade to the whole might be. But above all its importance was that of an international port serving Roumania, Hungary, and Czecho-Slovakia. In the past Hungary had had the principal interest in Fiume. Hence, it had been the policy of Hungary to encourage the Italian element and to use it to check the Slav population round about Fiume. He conjectured that Hungary had encouraged the idea of the autonomy of Fiume as a check to the surrounding Slovak population. This did not lead to the natural conclusion that Fiume should be joined to Italy.

Neither did the analogies mentioned by M. Orlando in their application to Fiume lead to such a conclusion. It had been decided to separate Dantzic from Germany. Yet M. Orlando proposed to extend Italian sovereignty to Fiume where it had never existed. If we followed the precedent of Dantzic, therefore, we could not give what Italy desired. All the economic and strategic arguments had been in favour of uniting Dantzic with Poland, yet, in order to give effect to the general principles on which the peace was being based an unscientific method had been adopted and a rough line had been drawn and the principle of plebiscite had been accepted which would probably result in a line of railway connecting Dantzic with Poland traversing German territory. The strategic and economic reasons had therefore been ignored. M. Orlando would recall M. Jules Cambon's powerful arguments in defending the conclusion of the Polish Commission.⁴ He would also recall M. Hyman's demand for the inclusion of a strategic railway in Belgium involving a slight modification of the frontier.⁵ Both these claims had been rejected because it would have involved the inclusion of Germans in Polish and German [*Belgian*] territory respectively. To put Fiume inside Italy would be absolutely inconsistent with the new order of international relations. What should be done was a totally different question. The essential point to be borne in mind was that Fiume served the commerce of Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, Roumania as well as Jugo-Slavia. Hence, it was necessary to establish its free use as an international port. The Italian population at Fiume was not connected with Italy by intervening Italian population. Hence, to unite it with Italy would be an arbitrary act, so inconsistent with the principles on which we were acting that he for one could not concur in it.

7. In regard to Dalmatia, President Wilson continued, the argument most dwelt upon, the argument which Baron Sonnino had most

⁴ See BC-53, vol. iv, p. 404.

⁵ The request for such a frontier adjustment was discussed by the Commission on Belgian and Danish Affairs at meetings on April 4 and 5, 1919 (Paris Peace Conf. 181.21801/12, 13).

forcibly expressed to him when he first arrived was mainly strategic, that is to say the necessity, from the point of view of naval defence, of giving Italy control of part of the eastern shores. In this case also the new order must either be accepted or not. Under the new order of international relations we united influence with policy to protect territory and to give independence of life. He could not imagine that a Jugo-Slav navy,—under the regime of the League of Nations, could ever be a menace to Italy. The only possible risk was an alliance between Jugo-Slavia and some other state and its only possible motive would be to attack Italy.

In his view, one of the essentials of the new order was that the control of the Great Powers should be withdrawn from the Balkans. In the past this had furnished the seeds of war. Germany had sought to plant out sovereigns in the Balkans to be used, as occasion required, for her own purposes. Most of the intrigues against the peace of the world in the Balkans had arisen from this cause. There had been no real independence in the Balkans for these states had been under constant pressure from the Great Powers, and especially from Berlin. Consequently, he was opposed to the lodgment of any great Power in the Balkans. Our rule must be not to interfere in the internal affairs of these states and one of his primary objects was to withdraw the hand of the Great Powers from the Balkans. He regarded this as of capital importance. Hence the strategic argument must be rejected. Military men with their strategic, military, economic arguments had been responsible for the Treaty of 1815.⁶ Similarly, military men had been responsible for Alsace-Lorraine. It was military men who had led Europe to one blunder after another. It would be quite detrimental to the peace of the world if Italy insisted on a lodgment on the east coast of the Adriatic. We were now engaged in setting up an international association and Italy would have a part of the leadership therein. If this did not suffice, then two orders would exist—the old and the new. In the right hand would be the new order and in the left hand the old order. We could not drive two horses at once. The people of the United States of America would repudiate it. They were disgusted with the old order. Not only the American people but the people of the whole world were tired of the old system and they would not put up with Governments that supported it. We sometimes spoke in those conversations as though we were masters of Europe. We were not so in reality. If the new order of ideas was not correctly interpreted a most tragical disservice would be done to the world. Hence, he urged his Italian colleagues to remember that they were in the hands of true friends. He would not be serving their in-

⁶ Treaty of Vienna, June 9, 1815, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. II, p. 3.

terests if he consented to their claims to Fiume and Dalmatia. He was prepared to leave it to history to judge whether he or they were serving Italian interests best. He had been brought up in America, 3,000 miles away, and had passed most of his life there. There had been a time when he had not cared a snap of the fingers what happened in Europe. Now, however, it was his privilege to assist Europe to create a new order. If he should succeed, he could bring all the resources of his people to assist in the task. The claim for Fiume was a recent one put forward only within the last few months. As far as self-determination was concerned, Fiume was only an island of Italian population. If such a principle were adopted generally, we should get spots all over the map. In the case of Bohemia and the Polish frontiers, there was a preservation of historical frontiers; but this was not so in the case of Fiume. There was no analogy here that attached Fiume to Italy.

He could not conclude his remarks without stating the profound solemnity with which he approached the question. He fully recognised its gravity for the Italians. He tried to approach the subject in the most friendly spirit. His conclusion was that of one who wished to serve Italian interests and not of one who wished to oppose them.

8. BARON SONNINO reverted to President Wilson's remarks on the strategic reasons that he, himself, had given to the President for the incorporation of Dalmatia with Italy. The President had said that he could not admit the claim of strategic advantage in establishing the new order. He must point out that Italy had never asked for any strategic advantage from an offensive point of view. All that they had demanded was the necessary and indispensable conditions of defence. He had never even thought of obtaining any possible advantage for offence in the Balkans. All he wished to avoid was the continuance of the tragic history of Italy as open to attack from across the Adriatic. Without this the east coast of Italy was helpless. The League of Nations could not intervene in time. Any fleet established behind the island could defy the fleets of the League of Nations when they arrived, just as in the late war the Austrians defied the fleets of the Entente, which were two or three times their size. The Allied fleets would have destroyed the Austrian fleet, if they could have reached them, but they were unable to. The present situation provided a temptation to war, or at least, to the menace of war. It was perhaps a temptation even to Italy to profit by any favourable situation that might arise to get rid of the danger. The League of Nations might be compared to any civilised community which possessed a police force, but in every town people had to shut their door at nights. Italy could not do without this.

Referring to President Wilson's remarks on the Balkans, Baron Sonnino said that Italy had no desire to mix herself there. Dalmatia,

Dalmatia
Baron
Sonnino's
Views

and especially its Northern part, was entirely outside the Balkans. All its economic and commercial relations were on the Italian side of the Adriatic. This was why, in spite of every effort by the Austrians to prevent it, the Italian interest had survived and was still maintained in Zara, Sebenico and Spalato. Until 1859 or 1860 the Italian element in Austria had been numerous enough for Austria to have an interest not to smash it. After the loss of Lombardy, however, and later on in 1866, after the loss of Venetia, all the parliamentary interests in Austria had been Slavonic.

In spite of all sorts of adverse influences, falsification of statistics, etc., Italianism had maintained itself.

After a successful war, in which Italy had lost 500,000 killed and some 900,000 badly wounded; to revert to a worse situation—for Austria had offered Italy the Adige and the islands—would not be explainable to the Italian people. They would not understand why Italy had entered the war. It would be a crime against the Italian people, and he himself would feel remorse towards his people, for whom he was ready to give up everything.

He fully recognised the importance of the League of Nations and the general sentiment that was maturing towards a better state of things, but the League of Nations was a new institution and had many difficulties to face. He would like to know how tomorrow the League of Nations was going to adjust the Russian situation for example? How could it be relied on until it was fully established? In the present state of affairs it would be a crime for Italy to give this up, and it could not be done. Italy was asked to assume great responsibilities in guaranteeing the position of others, and received nothing herself.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that Italy herself received these guarantees.

M. SONNINO said they were not sufficient. On the other side of the Adriatic they were close to the Balkanic races who were excitable peoples, much given to intrigue and falsification of documents, etc.

Moreover, the League of Nations had no forces under its direct control.

PRESIDENT WILSON said Baron Sonnino was speaking of a time when the Balkan states were being used by the Great Powers for their own purposes.

M. SONNINO said he mistrusted the Balkan peoples most. Who would say that economic relations would not again link up the Balkans with Central Europe? He was very sorry, and deeply pained with the attitude he had to take. If Italian claims were not satisfied he, who had always sought completely to do his duty, would feel that he had done something contrary to the interests of his people.

(9) M. CLEMENCEAU said that, in listening to President Wilson's speech, he felt we were embarking on a most hazardous enterprise, but with a very noble purpose. We were seeking to detach Europe and the whole world from the old order which had led in the past to conflicts and finally to the recent War which had been the greatest and most horrible of all. It was not possible to change the whole policy of the world at one stroke. This applied to France just as much as to Italy. He would be ready to make concessions to his Allies. They were a people which has merited well of humanity and of civilisation and he felt it right to recall it in this tragic hour. To the powerful arguments given by President Wilson he would add one other. Great Britain and France were bound in advance. The Treaty with Italy had not been signed by him, but it bore the signature of France. In that Treaty Dalmatia had been given to Italy, and this was a fact he could not forget. In the same Treaty, however, Fiume was allotted to Croatia. Italy had at that time no pretensions to Fiume. They had granted it as a gift to the Croats. M. Barzilai had told him that since that time Austria had disappeared, which altered the situation. This was true, but, nevertheless, Italy had signed a document allotting Fiume to Croatia. He was astonished that Italy, while claiming Dalmatia under the Treaty, also claimed Fiume, which had been given to the Croats. Signatures counted no longer. It was impossible for Italy to claim one clause of the Treaty and to cancel another clause. It would be deplorable if his Italian friends on such a pretext should break away from their Allies.

He believed they were making a great mistake. It would serve neither their own use nor the cause of civilisation. We French, as he had often said, had had to deplore the treatment given to the Italians in the Adriatic. But these moments were past. Now it will be necessary to traverse another critical period. He hoped his Italian friends were not counting too much on the first enthusiasm which would greet this action. Later on the cold and inevitable results would appear when Italy was alienated from her friends. He could not speak of such a matter without the gravest emotion. He could not think of one of the nations who helped to win this War separating from their Allies. We should suffer much, but Italy would suffer even more from such action. (M. ORLANDO interjected "without doubt"). If the Italian plenipotentiaries should leave, he hoped that after consulting their people the forces of reason would bring them back. He hoped they would make one last effort to come to an agreement. His heart was always with Italy with its great and noble history and its immense services to civilisation. Nevertheless, he must listen to the voice of duty. We could not abandon the principles we had worked for for

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Views on the
Italian Claims

the good of civilisation. It was impossible for France to adhere to one clause of the Treaty and to denounce another.

M. ORLANDO recalled that the [*at*] the beginning of his statement he had declared that, since he was discussing the demands of Italy in the presence of a Power which was not bound by the Treaty, he would examine them on the hypothesis that the Treaty did not exist. If he were only asking his Allies to carry out their engagements, he would not ask for Fiume. In regard to what M. Clemenceau had said, he must express profound anguish in his heart at the suggestion that he was animated by any consideration of popularity or enthusiasm among the people of Italy at the course he was taking. He fully understood the tragic solemnity of the moment. Italy had to choose between two methods of death according as they limited their demands solely to the Treaty or separated themselves from their friends and became isolated from the world. If he had to choose he would prefer death with honour. He recalled that when Henry III had been assassinated the Duke of Guise looked at the body of his friend and said he had not believed he was so tall.⁷ He anticipated that Italy would prove so great a corpse that [he only hoped] there would not arise a poison which would threaten the whole world.

(10) MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that as the representative of a Power which had signed the Treaty of London, he must express his views.

Mr. Lloyd George's
Views on the
Italian Claims

He had not much to add to what M. Clemenceau had said, but in the present grave situation he must express the British point of view, since Great Britain had also been a signatory of the Treaty. His personal

position was much the same as M. Clemenceau's, since he had not been a signatory to the Treaty. He realised the strength of President Wilson's arguments, but he thought he was entitled to say that if we felt scruples about the Italian claims they should have been expressed before Italy had lost half a million gallant lives. He did not think we were entitled to express these doubts after Italy had taken part in the war. He wished to say that Great Britain stood by the Treaty, but that she stood by the whole of the Treaty. The map which he had in his hand attached to the Treaty showed Fiume in Croatia. This was known to Serbia. We could not break one part of the Treaty while standing by the other. On merits he did not understand how the principle of self-determination could be applied. If it was applied at all, it must be applied to the whole area. There must be a plebiscite

⁷ The report of Orlando's remarks given in the minutes at this point appears to be incorrect. It was the Duke of Guise who was assassinated by order of King Henry III. The remark as reported in Count Aldrovandi's diary was "Non credevo egli fosse sì grande," involving a play upon the two meanings of *grande*, "tall" and "great." (See L. Aldrovandi Marescotti, *Guerra diplomatica* (Milan, 1937), p. 235.)

from Trieste to Spalato. This, however, was not the proposal, which was merely to take the views of the inhabitants of Fiume. It was only proposed to apply it to the ancient town of Fiume itself. If the suburb across the river—a narrow river as he was informed—were included, his information was that the majority would be Jugo-Slav. (BARON SONNINO interjected that the majority would still be Italian) If M. Orlando's argument in regard to the strategic position of Trieste and its danger from the guns in the hills were applied to Fiume, the Jugo-Slav majority would be overwhelming. The population of the valley was some 100,000 people, of whom only 25,000 were Italians. He could not see that any principle could be established for giving Fiume to Italy. If Fiume were included in Istria, exactly the same would apply. The Italian claim was only valid if applied to a little ancient town where an Italian population had grown to a majority of some 8,000. To give Fiume to Italy would break faith with the Serbs, would break the Treaty on which Italy entered the war, and would break every principle on which the Treaty of Peace was being based. He admitted that the Italian losses had been very heavy, and even appalling. But the French losses had also been very heavy. M. Clemenceau could no doubt evoke a great demonstration by announcing that the French frontier was to rest on the Rhine. Moreover, this was a strategic frontier, and would fulfil long-standing ambitions of France. There were very powerful elements in France which favoured this solution, and M. Clemenceau had to force [*face?*] these. They would urge that France had lost 1,500,000 dead in support of the justice of the claim. As regards the strategic arguments, British towns had also been bombarded. Like the Italians, the British Fleet had not been able to catch the enemy. The Germans, however, had not been able to transport troops across the North Sea. Neither could the Austrians transport them across the Adriatic. In France, however, with the exception of the Rhine, which was merely a military obstacle, there was land all the way between their boundaries and Germany. If our principles were to be extended we should have to re-cast the whole of the principles on which the Treaty of Peace was based and to begin with France. (PRESIDENT WILSON interjected that France had foregone the principle). How could we apply a different principle to Italy to what we had applied to France and Poland?

M. Clemenceau had spoken of Italy going out of the Conference. This was a very grave decision which he had not been made aware of. What was the reason for it? It was that a population of 25,000 people in a single town had an Italian majority; it was a case where the majority was doubtful if the suburbs were taken into consideration, and where, if the surrounding country were taken into

consideration, the population was overwhelmingly against Italy. He asked his Italian friends to consider the position they would create by such action. What would their population do? What would our position be? We thought Italy was in the wrong and was making an indefensible claim. If war and bloodshed should result, what would the position be? Surely, there must be some sanity among statesmen! To break an Alliance over a matter of this kind was inconceivable. If Italy should do so, however, the responsibility would not be ours. We stood by our Treaty and the responsibility would rest with those who broke the Treaty.

BARON SONNINO pointed out that President Wilson did not accept the Treaty.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was speaking for Great Britain only. He recalled that some time ago he had told M. Orlando that the British Cabinet had decided that they would stand by the Pact.

M. ORLANDO again recalled that at the outset of the meeting he had stated that he would discuss the question as though the Treaty did not exist. If what Mr. Lloyd George said meant that the Conference would take its decision on the basis of the Treaty of London, leaving Fiume to be settled as the Conference might think fit, then a new situation would be created, and he would be prepared to discuss it with his colleagues on the Italian Delegation and return to give his reply.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this solution would place a burden on him that was quite unfair. He did not know and did not feel at liberty to ask whether France and Great Britain considered the Treaty as consistent with the principles on which the Peace Treaty was being based. He was at liberty to say, however, that he himself did not. To discuss the matter on the basis of the Pact of London would be to adopt as a basis a secret treaty. Yet he would be bound to say to the world that we were establishing a new order in which secret treaties were precluded. He could not see his way to make peace with Germany on one principle and with Austria-Hungary on another. The Pact of London was inconsistent with the general principles of the settlement. He knew perfectly well that the Pact of London had been entered into in quite different circumstances, and he did not wish to criticise what had been done. But to suggest that the decision should be taken on the basis of the Treaty of London would draw the United States of America into an impossible situation.

BARON SONNINO said he only asked the Supreme Council to accept the merits of the Pact of London.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he was willing to state, and might have to state, to the world the grounds of his objections. He could not draw the United States into principles contrary to those which now animated them and which had brought them into the War.

BARON SONNINO drew attention to President Wilson's statement of the 21st [23d] May, 1918, in which he had admitted the principle of security for Italy.⁸

PRESIDENT WILSON said he did not admit that Dalmatia was essential to the security of Italy. Great Britain was in exactly the same position as Italy. He could not allow the argument, and he had said so frankly at his first interview with Baron Sonnino. It was inconceivable to him that Italy should draw apart from her friends, and he begged that the Italian plenipotentiaries would not decide the question in a hurry. He asked them to take every element into consideration and not tear the country apart from the sacred associations of the present Conference and of the past. He appealed to them with confidence to reconsider the question, and not to think of action which would be one of the most tragic results of the War.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked that the Italians would remember one factor. If they were not present on Friday when the German delegates arrived, the Allies would have no right to put forward a claim for compensation for Italy. This was a matter that they ought to take into consideration.

M. ORLANDO said that this was a matter that could be corrected at the last moment if Italy did not separate herself.

PRESIDENT WILSON concluded by a final appeal to Italy to take time to consider.

M. ORLANDO undertook to do so, but said that he was most anxious to have the question settled before he returned to Italy.

(The Meeting was adjourned until Sunday, April 20, 1919, at 10 a. m.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, April 19, 1919.

⁸ Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd (eds.), *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace*, vol. I, p. 211.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the
Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Easter Sunday, April 20, 1919,
at 10 a. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. Lloyd George.

ITALY

M. Orlando.
Baron Sonnino.

Count Aldrovandi
Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. } *Secretaries.*

Prof. P. Mantoux, *Interpreter.*

(1) M. ORLANDO read the following declaration:—

Italian Claims “I must maintain all the declarations which I have made so far as the question of Fiume is concerned. In reducing the matter to its minimum terms I must observe to President Wilson that, from the point of view of his noble intention of maintaining peace in the world, he is too eminent a politician not to realise that an essential condition for arriving at this object is that of avoiding between peoples the sentiment of reaction against injustice, which will form, without doubt, the most fatal germ of future wars. But I affirm here that if Fiume is not granted to Italy there will be among the Italian people a reaction of protest and of hatred so violent that it will give rise to the explosion of violent contrasts within a period that is more or less close. I think, then, that the fact that Fiume may not be given to Italy would be extremely fatal just as much to the interests of Italy as to the peace of the world. Nevertheless, since the British and French Allies have declared yesterday that they do not recognise the right of Italy to break the Alliance in the event of her being accorded only what the Treaty of Alliance guarantees her, I am so convinced of my responsibility towards the peace of the world in the event of a rupture of the Alliance to consider it necessary to safeguard myself against every possible accusation in this respect. I declare in consequence formally that, in the event of the Peace Conference guar-

anteeing to Italy all the rights which the Treaty of London has assured to her, I shall not be obliged to break the Alliance, and I would abstain from every act or deed which could have this signification." (The original of this statement in French is attached.) (Appendix I).

After a pause, PRESIDENT WILSON said it was incredible to him that the representatives of Italy should take up this position. At the centre of the War there stood three Powers—France, Great Britain, and Italy—which undoubtedly had borne the brunt of the War, especially the two first engaged. Undoubtedly, however, the whole world perceived that the War had been largely undertaken to save these Powers from the intentions of the Central Powers. These Powers, however, had not brought the war to an end. Other Powers had come in which had nothing to do with the Alliance, and were not bound by the Pact of London. These Powers had rendered indispensable assistance; for example, the material and financial assistance of the United States of America had been essential to the successful conclusion of the War. (M. CLEMENCEAU and MR. LLOYD GEORGE interrupted to express agreement in this). As soon as the United States of America entered the War they declared their principles. These were acclaimed particularly by those peoples to whom they gave a new assurance of peace, namely, the smaller Powers. They were also greeted with acclamation by the peoples of the Great Powers. When he wrote these principles he knew that he was not writing merely his own conscience, but the point of view of the people of the United States of America. These principles were found to be identical with the sentiments of all the great peoples of the Allied and Associated Powers. Otherwise, these principles would have no effect. The world did not ask for the opinions of individuals. What it did ask was that individuals should formulate principles which called to consciousness what every man was feeling. The opinions expressed first by Mr. Lloyd George, and a few days afterwards by himself, had accomplished this. On these principles the United States of America and some other Powers had entered the War. This world conference must, in formulating the peace, express the conclusions of the whole world and not those of a small group, even though he hastened to add the most influential group who had entered earlier into a Treaty. The object of our principles was not to exclude any legitimate natural aspiration. In this connection President Wilson read the following extracts from his Fourteen Points:—

"XI. Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into."

“IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognisable lines of nationality.”

This, he said, was what we had been attempting to do. If we did not do what M. Orlando had so eloquently referred to and carry out our principles, but were to base ourselves on the Treaty which Italy invoked, we should be raising antagonisms which would never be stamped out until what we were now doing was rectified. Hence, the result of M. Orlando's proposal, namely, that other Powers than those bound by it should adhere to the Treaty of London, and if Italy insisted on the carrying out of this Treaty she would stand in the way of peace. The United States of America were not bound, and besides they regarded it as unsuited to the circumstances of the day. If the Austro-Hungarian Empire had survived, his attitude would have been entirely different. For then Italy would have been entitled to every outpost of security. Those dangerous circumstances, however, did not now exist, and though the signatories of the Pact of London did not consider themselves relieved of their undertaking, other Powers need not regard the Pact as binding. He asked his Italian brethren whether they were determined to take action which would result in reducing the chance of peace with Germany, of increasing the risk of the resumption of the War, and of alienating people who had been enthusiastically friendly to Italy. Would they refuse to enter the new circumstances of the world because they could not renew the old circumstances? Without the Pact of London Italy would receive her natural boundaries; the redemption of the Italian population; a restoration of her old glory, and the completion of her integrity. A dream would be realised which, at the beginning of the War, would have seemed too good to be true. The dream had come true by the gallantry of the Italian armies and the force of the world. It was incredible to him, even though he had actually heard it, that Italy should take up this attitude. It was the supreme completing tragedy of the War that Italy should turn her back on her best friends and take up a position of isolation. He deplored it as one whose heart was torn. But as representative of the people of the United States of America he could not violate the principles they had instructed him to carry out in this settlement.

M. ORLANDO said that he ought to declare to President Wilson that if he spoke of the Pact of London it had only been at the last moment and in spite of himself. He had only done so in order to reply to remarks made by Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau. They had said that he would take too great a responsibility in breaking an Alliance towards a people who say that they are ready to honour their signature and to fulfil their obligations. He had made all possible efforts to demonstrate that the rights of Italy rest within the bounds

of reason and remain in the field of argument. No one more than he would regret to rely on the text of a Treaty instead of applying reason. Italy had not been, and was not, intransigent. No way to conciliation had yet been offered to her. In regard to the Fourteen Points, he asked the President to recognise that those relating to Austria-Hungary were obsolete because Austria-Hungary had ceased to exist. Yesterday President Wilson had recognised this himself. The President had interpreted the Fourteen Points as if Serbia had a right to Fiume. As a matter of fact, however, Serbia's extreme ambitions in regard to a sea port had extended to St. Jean de Medua, Alessio, and they had never even dreamed of Ragusa. Now they were assured of far more. He asked President Wilson to bear two things in mind, first, that although those parts of the Fourteen Points applying to Austria-Hungary ceased to be valid after the fall of Austria-Hungary, those relating to Italy remained; and second, that he had made a definite reservation at the beginning of the Peace Conference with the United States of America, through Colonel House, in regard to their application to the Austro-Hungarian Treaty. Consequently, he was not bound by them in the Austro-Hungarian Treaty. President Wilson had said with emotion that the War had been waged for justice and right. Italy also considered that she had fought for justice. There, Italy was on the same ground as President Wilson. He deeply objected to President Wilson's suggestion to the contrary, for Italy also had made war in good faith, and he himself could say that he could sign no peace contrary to justice and right. He had said this not to criticise President Wilson, but to explain his own point of view. President Wilson had concluded that his heart was torn by the separation of Italy. He expressed his deep thanks for this, and he declared that his heart was still more torn. He felt exactly the same sentiment of friendship, loyal and mutual affection and esteem, not only between the two peoples, but between the two men. But he also experienced sentiments of anguish when he thought of his own country. As he had said on the previous day, if he must face death, it must be for a just cause.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that M. Orlando might rest assured that he himself had no misconception as to the Italian motives. It was merely a fundamental difference of policy between them. He fully realised that Italy was not bound by the Fourteen Points in making peace with Austria. He was not inclined to insist on any particular principle in the Fourteen Points, but his position was that he could not make peace with Germany on one set and with Austria on another set of principles. Throughout their consultations the drawing of frontiers had been based on ethnic lines as a principle.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE regretted that the Supreme Council found itself confronted with the most difficult situation that had faced it since

the beginning of the Conference. The question was a very troublesome one, and he could not see a way out. We were first confronted with the possibility that Italy was feeling she could not continue her association with her Allies in making peace, because of this troublesome Austrian question. Another alternative was that the United States of America could not assent to a Treaty based on principles involving a grave departure from those for which she had entered the War. Either way it was a very serious matter. Personally, he did not feel free to discuss the question of merits, because he must respect his bond. It had been honoured by Italy in blood, treasure, and sacrifice. He would tarnish his country's honour if he receded from it, though no one more than he recognised the President's powerful plea. He realised that it was a very serious matter for Italy to antagonise two of the most powerful races in Europe, the Germans in the Tyrol, and the Slavs in Austria. He, however, was not entitled to discuss that. He wished to put to President Wilson the reason why Italy found it difficult to recede from the Treaty. He had been profoundly impressed by M. Orlando's reasoning, but he had also been greatly moved by what Baron Sonnino had said. Baron Sonnino had been in the War from the very outset, and had taken upon himself a very heavy responsibility in rejecting Austria's terms. What could he say to the people of Italy? If he returned to Italy without the Treaty, he would almost have to leave the country. After incurring heavy losses and large debts he had only got little more than what he could have had without risking a single life. His suggestion was that the representatives of the Powers signatories to the Treaty of London should meet separately to consider President Wilson's grave decision. If, however, Italy could not modify her attitude, he was bound to take his stand by his bond. Anything he could say would be by way of suggestion and appeal only. He asked if President Wilson agreed to this course?

PRESIDENT WILSON assented. He said he felt it to be his duty to mention any counsel of accommodation that had been made to him. He, therefore, asked the question as to whether, supposing Fiume were conceded to the Serbo-Croats, as provided in the Pact of London, and if the lines of the Pact and all within it were, for the time being, handed over to the five Great Powers as trustees to determine its disposition, would the Italian representatives then say they could not consent—always on the assumption of no guarantee of ultimate cession to Italy of what lay within the line. There was one point on which he had said that he would make an exception to Italy, that was in the case of the island of Lissa. He recognized, however, that this was only a very small part of the Pact of London. He would not be

frank if he held out to the Italian representatives any hope of the assent of the United States of America to the ultimate cession of the islands and other territory involved in the Pact of London to Italy. The proposal he had made, however, would relieve the present difficulty and give the Great Powers further time to consider the matter. As the suggestion had been made to him he would like to know if it had any weight at all with the Italian representatives.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he would like time to think the matter over, and he suggested that the signatories of the Treaty should meet on the following day.

BARON SONNINO agreed. He thanks Mr. Lloyd George for his exposition of the Italian point of view. His own responsibility towards his conscience made it necessary—the responsibility of those present towards their own consciences made it necessary that everything possible should be done to try to see a way out. Perhaps he himself was too agitated and pre-occupied to see the whole of the picture. He and M. Orlando consented to meet and examine every point of view and to try to find a way out. It was his duty to do all he could to find a settlement. It had been said that it involved death, moral death to him. He did not care a pin about that. He only thought of his country. It would be said that he had ruined his country, and nothing could trouble a man more than that.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it was really an essential element in the case. Italy had rejected one (the Austrian) offer and accepted another and was now threatened with not having that made good.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he fully realised that Italy had no imperialistic motives and gave her entire credit for that. He also fully appreciated the tragic personal position in which Baron Sonnino was placed. He honoured him for his steadfastness, which merely verified the steadfastness he had shown throughout the War. If Italy could see a way out consistent with permanent peace, he would like to assist if it were only for personal reasons. He hoped that Baron Sonnino would never think he had ruined his country. He would really have given it a more glorious record and no one could say that he had ruined it.

BARON SONNINO thanked President Wilson for what he had said. The word "imperialistic" had been used. Italy, however, had never had any intention to damage others. She only sought security at home. She asked for no positions from which she could menace her neighbours. In other matters referred to in the London Convention in regard to Greece, Italy had made it clear that she would not take an overbearing position. She merely wished to keep out of dangers. She wanted to keep out of Balkanism, for example. She wanted full freedom to her own commerce, culture, and influence, but not to be

drawn into the confluence of Balkan States. She wanted a safe basis for keeping out of these questions. If Italy were to do what President Wilson wanted, she would inevitably be drawn in. Her reasoning might be wrong about this island or that island, but the whole political basis of the Pact of London was Italy's desire to keep out of the danger of being attacked or of the temptation to attack herself in order to forestall a danger. For centuries of her history Italy had been overrun by barbarians—Germans, Austrians, Spaniards, &c. (MR. LLOYD GEORGE interjected that Italy had herself overrun Britain). The reason was that Italy had fair lands. Now she desired to keep in her own corner of Europe outside it all and President Wilson wanted to stop her.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that if he thought this would be the result he would help.

BARON SONNINO continued that even Fiume, which was outside the Pact of London was not asked for as a means of aggression. Other considerations prevailed here. There had been a movement by Fiume itself that had brought it up. The War undoubtedly had had the effect of over-exciting the feeling of nationality. This was not Italy's fault. Perhaps America had fostered it by putting the principles so clearly. In the discussions about the Pact of London M. Sazonoff¹ had insisted on the names of places being put in, and Italy had conceded without discussion a number of big islands and the port of Segna, in order to give Jugo-Slavia means of defense. He could not see that anything that Italy had done contravened the principles. It was very easy to make principles, but enormous differences arose in their application. It was their application that created differences between people who were agreed on the principles themselves. Even in the settlement of the German Treaty concessions of principle had repeatedly to be made.

(2) M. CLEMENCEAU read a telegram he had received from the German Foreign Office in reply to the invitation to the Germans to come to Versailles on April 25. The gist of this reply was that Germany would send, on the 25th April, Minister Von Haniel, Councillor Von Keller, and Councillor Ernst Smitt. These delegates would be provided with the necessary powers to receive the text of the proposed Preliminaries of Peace which they would bring back to the German Government. A list was then given of the functionaries and servants who would accompany them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said we could not deal with messengers. He was altogether opposed to it. He then invited his colleagues to read a dis-

¹ Sergel Dmitrievich Sazonoff, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, September 1910–July 1916.

patch he had just received from Berlin which threw some light on this question. (Appendix II).

After Prof. Mantoux had read the document in French, Mr. Lloyd George said that it had a most important bearing on the German reply. The suggestion to send more [*mere*] messengers to Versailles was a foolish one, because if not intended as insolent, it was purely futile. If circumstances were such as the British agent suggested in the Paper that had just been read, it might be desirable to force the Germans to choose a Government that could represent them.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed in Mr. Lloyd George's suggestion that we could not receive mere messengers and must insist on plenipotentiaries.

At M. Clemenceau's request he drafted a reply to be sent to the German Government somewhat on the following lines:—

The Allied and Associated Powers cannot receive envoys merely authorised to receive the terms of peace. They must require that the German Government shall send plenipotentiaries fully authorised to deal with the whole question of peace as are the plenipotentiaries of the Allied and Associated Powers.

(The discussion was then adjourned).

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, April 20, 1919.

Appendix I to IC-174A

[This appendix consists of the French of Orlando's statement printed on page 95.]

Appendix II to IC-174A

BERLIN, 17.4.19.

1. It is becoming increasingly clear that the Ebert-Scheidemann Government cannot long continue in its present form.

Reasons:—

a) Great numbers of the rank and file of the Government supporters are going over to the left and joining either the "Independents" or (though to a less extent) the "communists". Both Government and National Versammlung have lost the confidence of the country. The working classes believe that the failure to carry out a socialistic programme is due, not to the inherent difficulties of the problem, but to the presence in the government of bourgeois elements whose sole object is obstruction.

b) The strikes and disturbances throughout the country are no longer merely food riots or "unemployed" riots but have taken on a definitely political, i. e. anti-Scheidemann, character (Scheidemann is

of course merely regarded as the personification of bourgeois-socialist Government in league with capitalism).

c) The idea of the "Räte" or Soviet system has spread to such an extent and taken such a hold on the popular imagination that it has become impossible to leave it out of consideration. Scheidemann's attitude on this question is one of the chief causes of his unpopularity.

d) The food that is being sent and such raw materials as there might be a possibility of sending, are not sufficient in quantity, so to change the outward circumstances of the working man's life as to make him forget his dissatisfaction at the incompetence of the Government, whom he makes responsible for all his troubles.

2. Unless the government [is] modified or remodelled in some way either

a) it will be overthrown before peace is signed—by a general strike or Spartacist *coup de main*. In this case the Entente is faced with a Germany without any constituted government that can sign the Peace Treaty;

or b) on learning the terms on which the Allies consent to make peace. Scheidemann and Brockdorff-Rantzau² will do their best to make a virtue of necessity and leave the stage with the "grand geste" of outraged dignity. It is becoming daily more evident that this government does not intend to sign the peace they will be offered. And the National Versammlung is already practising the gestures of sympathy with which it will accompany the exit of its cabinet.

3. If then the Government is overthrown before peace or retires in a body on refusing to sign, there only exist two alternatives for the succession

(i) a military dictatorship backed by the Right wing—such a regime could not sign peace on behalf of the country even if it wanted to. It is questionable whether the troops would support it in any large numbers. The result will be civil war and complete anarchy, with sooner or later the necessity of military intervention by the Entente.

(ii) A soviet government probably leading to a Spartacist (or Bolshevik) dictatorship. The result in this case would equally be anarchy and the probable necessity of Entente intervention and occupation.

4. There is one possibility of avoiding either of these extreme results.

Negotiations are being carried on with great energy between the right wing of the "Independents", the majority socialists and the military men who stand behind Noske³ and constitute his force. The objects are as follows:—

1. to remodel the cabinet (retaining Ebert as Reichspräsident) on a purely Socialistic basis including "majority" and "independents".

² Ulrich Brockdorff-Rantzau, German Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

³ Gustav Noske, German Minister of Defense.

2. to secure for such a government the support of the troops even supposing Noske himself were removed. It is stated that Captain von Papst, the moving spirit of the present military organisation, is in favour of the plan and would support the government if reconstituted on these lines.

3. to persuade the "Independents" to abandon that part of their programme which involves the disbanding of the troops. The majority of their leaders have, it is said, now realised the necessity for this.

4. to form a second chamber of the Räte or councils which should have the right of initiative and of veto in legislation. It is argued that the Räte system has developed into a genuine political ideal among the proletariat and unless a far-reaching concession of this kind is made to them there will be no possibility of avoiding the worst evil of a Soviet dictatorship.

5. The two strong arguments in favour of such a reconstitution of the government are as follows:—

(1) It would start with the confidence of the country. The proletarians will feel that "their men" are at the helm and the bourgeois and capitalists have nothing to say. If "their men" cannot do all the workmen expect, they will realise it cannot be done.

(2) They will be inclined to sign the peace treaty and the second (or Räte) chamber will be likely to bring pressure to bear on the National Versammlung to do so too. If a deadlock ensues, there must be a referendum to the country.

The present government (at any rate Scheidemann and Rantzau) quite evidently do not intend to sign the peace treaty. A purely socialist government on these lines would be much more likely to do so.

6. If the Entente does not desire to see the whole country thrown into anarchy there remain only these two possibilities:—

1. A military occupation of all Germany by Entente troops. If this were done at once it would not be necessary to send more than 10 or 12 divisions—provided the action were accompanied by skilful propaganda. If it is done only when anarchy has spread further, it will need several armies.

[2.] A purely socialist Government, regarded as a remodelling of the present government and supported by the Entente in respect of still further supplies of food, concessions as to the independent purchase of food by Germany from Neutrals and the importation of the most necessary raw materials such as cotton, wool, iron-ores etc.

With regard to raw materials, the entente is in a position to control the supply so that only such amounts are imported as a [are] necessary for Germany's internal needs, so as to avoid any conceivable danger of dumping.

7. Should the Entente Governments decide that such a modification of the present Government is desirable, it is suggested that a hint might be given to Ebert in the form of a confidential note through, say, the Swiss Minister to the effect that "The Associated Governments are inclined to form the opinion, on the basis of information received,

that the government in its present form does not enjoy the confidence or represent the feelings of the people, that under the circumstances they feel that its signature to the peace treaty does not afford a sufficient guarantee for its execution, and that though the Associated Governments are far from having any desire to interfere in Germany's political affairs, they feel they are entitled to the assurance that the position of the government with which they are to negotiate is perfectly clear."

8. A reconstitution of the Government on the above lines would certainly clear the political atmosphere, and would make it possible that peace be signed. It could not however stand more than a month, unless its position were strengthened by an immediate announcement from the Entente that the necessities of the industrial situation were realised and raw materials in considerable quantities were introduced.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House at the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Monday, April 21, 1919, at 4 p. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson

BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. Lloyd George

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B., *Secretary*
Prof. P. Mantoux, *Interpreter*.

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE told President Wilson the suggestion he had made at the end of the meeting in the morning,¹ namely, that, in order to give Italy the strategical requirements for her defence, which was the principal case on which the claim for Dalmatia was based, she should be allowed to have the islands off the coast, but not the mainland. Mr. Philip Kerr,² he said, had met a Jugo-Slav, who had told him that if the Italians held Fiume the Jugo-Slavs would fight them. If they held Dalmatia there would be sniping. But that he had not expressed any strong views about the islands.

Italian
Claims

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he himself had talked about the island of Cherso with M. Trumbitch, who had pointed out that, owing to its position across the Gulf of Fiume, the Italians, if they held it, would make trouble up and down the Gulf.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that, if the Italians held Cherso, there ought to be a stipulation that the channel between that island and Istria should not be regarded as territorial waters. There should be some clause providing for free access through the channel except in time of war.

PRESIDENT WILSON said even then there should be free access if the Jugo-Slavs were neutral.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said M. Clemenceau, to whom he had spoken, was convinced that the Italians would not accept his proposal. He suggested, therefore, that perhaps Baron Sonnino could be induced to agree by some offer in Asia Minor.

¹ Minutes of this meeting not found in Department files.

² Secretary to Lloyd George.

At Mr. Lloyd George's request, M. CLEMENCEAU produced a map^a giving a new scheme for the distribution of mandates in Turkey, whereby Italy would secure a mandate over a considerable part of Anatolia touching territory mandated to Greece in the region of Smyrna, and the territory mandated with Constantinople, and Armenia.

PRESIDENT WILSON said the real trouble was that the Greeks and everyone else appeared to dread the Italians as neighbours. The Patriarch of Constantinople had called on him the other day and had expressed strong objections to having the Italians as neighbours. He felt great care would have to be exercised in this matter for inasmuch as we were endeavouring to secure the peace of the world we could not enter into any arrangement that would not make for peace.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested there should be an Italian sphere of influence such as the British had in various parts of the world.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the British Empire, through a long experience, had learned all sorts of lessons and gained all sorts of ideas in administration of this kind, and did not interfere unduly. The Italians, however, had no such experience. The Italians also had no ethnological claim to this territory, such as the Greeks had. In the case of the Greeks, we only desired to make them comfortable masters in their own home. The Italians had not inherited any traditions of colonial administration.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the Italians should merely have a sphere of influence and it should be made clear that their authority was limited to commercial and railway development, and that they were not to interfere with the people more than necessary.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out the trouble was that the Turks could not govern anyone.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Turks did not interfere much in railways; they were a quiet docile people except towards Armenians and those whom they did not like.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed with this.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that he did not like, as it were, paying the Italians for something they had no right to.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that there was some strength in the Italian case that they had come into the war on the basis of a certain agreement and that Baron Sonnino's position would be extremely difficult if it were not fulfilled.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out the inaccuracy of statements that had been made to the effect that the Italians could have obtained almost as much from Austria without fighting as they were going to obtain in

^a No map accompanies the file copy of the minutes.

the Treaty as at present contemplated. He had consulted the Green Book⁵ on the subject and found that in fact they had been offered very little.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that perhaps the Italians might take the line their position being what it was they must go home and report to their Parliament and ask for instructions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that it was better politically for them to present Parliament with an accomplished fact. Supposing he were to go and ask the British Parliament for instructions about indemnities, the position would not be very satisfactory. It was better to give Parliament a lead in matters like this.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the Italians would not be in the position of having to say to their Parliament: We have surrendered. On the contrary, they could say: We refused to surrender, but we now want your advice.

There was some further discussion at this point on the subject of the Italian Parliamentary position and generally as to the attitude to be taken towards the Italians in the existing position. It was eventually agreed that Sir Maurice Hankey should be sent to deliver a verbal message to M. Orlando and Baron Sonnino, reminding them of Mr. Lloyd George's proposal made at the end of the morning meeting, which they had now had some time to consider, and asking if they would consider it worth while to meet their colleagues and discuss the question on this basis.

SIR MAURICE HANKEY reported that he had seen M. Orlando, Baron Sonnino and Count Aldrovandi. He had delivered his message in the very words that President Wilson had used. After recalling Mr. Lloyd George's proposal made at the morning meeting, which they had had some hours to consider, he had asked whether they would consider it worth while to discuss the question of the Italian claims on the basis of the cession of a series of strategic islands off the coast. M. Orlando had asked him if he could give the proposal in writing, but he had replied that he had only authority to deliver a verbal message. The proposal had not commended itself to M. Orlando and Baron Sonnino, who had absolutely rejected it as a basis for discussion. They had said that, of course, they were always prepared to discuss anything with their colleagues if asked to do so, but they would be in the wrong if they encouraged any hopes that this could be a basis for a solution. M. Orlando had elaborated his objections to the proposal a little. He had explained that even from the point of view of defence in its narrower strategic aspects the proposal did not commend itself.

⁵ Italy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Diplomatic Documents Submitted to the Italian Parliament by the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Sonnino), Austria-Hungary, Session of the 20th May, 1915* (London, 1915).

He had, however, always regarded defence in the wider aspect of the defence of the Italian populations in the towns on the east of the Adriatic. He mentioned in this connection especially Fiume, but also referred to Zara and Sebenico. Questioned as to the precise terms of Mr. Lloyd George's suggestion, Sir Maurice Hankey said he had been given to understand that it did not include islands such as Pago, which were almost part of the mainland, but would doubtless include the other islands allotted to Italy in the Treaty of London. Sir Maurice Hankey mentioned that M. Orlando had said that the question had rather retrograded within the last two days, owing to the proposal for the establishment of a free port and city at Fiume similar to that to be established at Dantzic having been dropped.

On the conclusion of Sir Maurice Hankey's statement there was some discussion as to the desirability of President Wilson publishing a statement on the subject which he had prepared.

M. CLEMENCEAU and MR. LLOYD GEORGE urged that he should not do so. Their grounds for this were that the statement rather assumed that Italy had closed the door to an agreement and would be regarded as a final act. It would make it difficult for Italy to recede from her position.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that his statement was [*as?*] drafted did not close the door to negotiations, but in deference to his colleagues he agreed not to publish immediately.

2. PRESIDENT WILSON reported a conversation he had had that morning with Baron Makino and Count Chinda.⁶ He had made the suggestion that Mr. Lansing had already made at the Council of Foreign Ministers, namely, that all claims in the Pacific should be ceded to the Allied and Associated Powers as trustees leaving them to make fair and just dispositions.⁷ He had, at the same time, reminded the Japanese Delegates that it had been understood that Japan was to have a mandate for the islands in the north Pacific although he had made a reserve in the case of the island of Yap, which he himself considered should be international. He had suggested that, similarly, in the case of Kiau-Chau, where there was a definite Treaty relating to Kiau-Chau and Shantung,^{7a} Japan should place the question in the hands of the 5 Powers. He had asked whether there could not be some modification of the Treaty with the consent of both parties. The Powers had no right to force Japan but they had the right to try and persuade her to make some agreement with China on the subject. The Japanese had been very stiff about it. They had said that they would return Kiau-Chau to China, the only reservation being the

Japanese
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Shantung and
Kiau-Chau

⁶ Japanese Ambassador in Great Britain; plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.

⁷ See FM-4, vol. iv, p. 556.

^{7a} Of May 25, 1915; *Foreign Relations*, 1915, pp. 171, 197.

retention of a residential section and a free port for China [*sic*]. In regard to the railway, they surrendered all control except the joint interest with China in the railway and certain concessions. He had pointed out that China had no capital and had asked whether in that event China could take advantage of this position. They had replied that she could and quoted another instance where they had for 10 years shared some concern of the kind with China, which was run on the same lines. They were absolutely set on obliging China to carry out the bond. They insisted that Germany should resign the whole of her interests in Kiau-Chau to the Japanese and that the Powers should trust Japan to carry out her bargain with China.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked why Japan should have a different treatment in regard to Kiau-Chau to what other Powers had in respect to German colonies.

PRESIDENT WILSON said the reason was because in the Treaty it had been made clear that the transfer was to precede the retrocession of the territory to China.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that it ought to be ceded by the League of Nations.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the Japanese were too proud to accept this solution. He had then repeated to the Japanese the proposal he had already made to his colleagues that the spheres of influence in China should be abrogated. They had replied that they were ready to do this. They had defined spheres of influence to include the right of putting in troops and extraterritoriality. He thought it would be a great thing if we could get rid of the right of Japan to maintain troops in Kiau-Chau.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he thought it was very important that in the Treaty with Germany all the Powers should be put on the same footing. Japan should not have a special position.

PRESIDENT WILSON then read the notes which had been exchanged between China and Japan. The first note from Japan to China⁸ had been sent before the entry of China into the war and had been to the effect that when, after the war, the leased territory had been left to the free disposal of Japan the latter would restore it to China under conditions which included a free port in Kiau-Chau Bay: a concession for Japan; the disposal of property was to be effected by mutual arrangement between the two countries. China's answer had merely been to take note and President Wilson did not think the Government had accepted. Another declaration had been made by Japan on September 24th, 1918.⁹ Japan then proposed to adjust the questions in Shantung on the following lines:—

⁸ *Foreign Relations*, 1915, pp. 177 and 198.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 1919, vol. I, p. 571.

1. All Japanese troops, except those at Chinan Fu the terminus of the line, to be withdrawn to Tsingtau.
2. The Chinese Government to be allowed to organise a police force for the railway.
3. The railway to pay for this police.
4. The Japanese to be represented at the headquarters of the police, at the various stations, and at the training establishments for the police.
5. Part of the staff of the railway to be Japanese.
6. The railway to become a Chino-Japanese enterprise.
7. The Japanese civil administration to be abolished.

The Chinese reply¹⁰ had been that she was "pleased to agree in the above mentioned articles." Thus it was not a Treaty but an exchange of notes.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he could see no ground for differentiating in the case of Japan. This territory should be placed on exactly the same footing as all other German territory.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that to be perfectly fair to the Japanese he thought they would interpret this as a challenge of their good faith. He had put it to the Japanese representatives that the peace of the Far East depended more on Chino-Japanese relations than on anything else. China was full of riches. It was clearly to the advantage of Japan to take the most generous position towards China and to show herself as a friend. The interest of the world in China was the "open door". The Japanese had assented and expressed benevolent intentions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that it was the triumph of the Great Powers in the west that enabled Japan to make this arrangement. He felt strongly that Japan should be in the same position as other States. Otherwise other nations could insist on the same right.

(It was arranged that the next meeting should take place on the following morning at 11 a. m. M. Clemenceau said that he hoped by that time he would have a reply from the Germans. It was agreed that this was a question which would properly be discussed with the Japanese. As, however, M. Clemenceau had certain questions relating to the Western Front to raise, Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to invite the Japanese for 11:30 a. m. He was also authorised to telephone to Count Aldrovandi to let him know of the Meeting that had been arranged.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 21 April, 1919.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 572.

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Tuesday, April 22, 1919, at 11 a. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BRITISH EMPIRE

President Wilson

Mr. Lloyd George

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau

Secretary—Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.
Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. It was agreed that:—

Draft Articles prepared by the French Government in regard to
Alsace-Lorraine should be examined in the first
instance by a Committee composed as follows:—

**Alsace-
Lorraine**

Dr. Haskins, for the United States of America.
Mr. Headlam-Morley, for the British Empire.
M. Tardieu, for France.

2. PRESIDENT WILSON informed his colleagues that M. Orlando had
Italian Representation sent word that he was unable to be present.

3. M. CLEMENCEAU handed Mr. Lloyd George a copy of a letter
he had written to the Emir Feisal. (Appendix I.) The Emir Feisal
had replied that he was satisfied and that he expected
soon to be back in Paris. M. Clemenceau undertook
to give Mr. Lloyd George a copy of the Emir Feisal's
letter. He asked what was to be done about the

Commission
to Syria,
Palestine,
etc. Emir
Feisal

Commission.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he thought the Commission should soon
start. It was settled so far as he was concerned.

4. M. CLEMENCEAU handed round copies of the German official
reply to the last communication in regard to their coming to Ver-
sailles. (Appendix II.) He said that he could not
undertake to guarantee to the Germans entire free
intercourse.

Arrangements
for Meeting
the Germans

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that they must have communication
with their Government at Weimar.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that was all they asked for.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would have to take precautions that they should not have free movement at Versailles as there would be a serious danger of their being mobbed. He was responsible for their safety. At M. Clemenceau's request President Wilson drafted the following note on which the reply should be based:—

"The Allied and Associated Powers will, of course, grant to the German Delegates full freedom of movement for the execution of their mission and unrestricted telegraphic communication with their Government."

(This was agreed to.)

5. M. CLEMENCEAU handed round the attached draft representing the agreement reached as regards the demilitarization of the west bank of the Rhine. (Appendix III.)

Demilitarization
of the West
Bank of the
Rhine

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had already communicated it to Sir Maurice Hankey.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that it was comprehensive enough.

Appendix III was approved and Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to send it to the Secretary-General for the Drafting Committee.

6. M. CLEMENCEAU handed round the attached document headed "Articles concerning Guarantees of Execution of the Treaty", which had already been agreed to by President Wilson on April 20th. (Appendix IV.)

Guarantees of
Execution of
the Treaty

MR. LLOYD GEORGE commented on the length of the period contemplated for occupation, namely, 15 years, which seemed considerable. He supposed that the British Government was not asked to keep troops there so long.

M. CLEMENCEAU said all he asked was a battalion with the flag.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he must insist on the difficulty which the British Government would have in maintaining any larger number of troops. The people of England insisted on the disappearance of compulsory service immediately the war was over. He had had considerable difficulties at home since the election owing to the extension of compulsory service for 12 months.

M. CLEMENCEAU drew attention to the words "by International forces" in Article I, which apparently had not been included in the copy he had left with President Wilson. He said he could not go to his people and say that there were no forces of the Allied and Associated Powers. He only asked for a flag to be shown.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if 15 years was the maximum. He hoped it was not conditioned by the extension of the Treaty. Indemnities,

for example, could not be paid within 15 years. He hoped he understood correctly that there would not be any question of retaining forces after that.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that was not the intention.

Appendix IV was agreed to and Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward it to the Secretary-General for the Drafting Committee.

Treaty Between
France and
the United States
of America

7. M. CLEMENCEAU handed round a document entitled "Treaty between France and the United States", which had been approved by him and President Wilson on April 20th. (Appendix V.)

PRESIDENT WILSON explained to Mr. Lloyd George that he had made a point that it was not wise in this matter to have a tripartite agreement but a Treaty between the United States of America and France and another Treaty between Great Britain and France.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he thought that would do for Great Britain and instructed Sir Maurice Hankey to show it to Mr. Balfour.

Subject to Mr. Balfour's agreement, this was accepted.

(Note by the Secretary.)

(Mr. Balfour agreed to it after the Meeting.)

8. M. CLEMENCEAU handed round an Article concerning the independence of German-Austria. (Appendix VI.)

This was accepted and Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward it to the Secretary-General for the Drafting Committee.

9. M. CLEMENCEAU reminded President Wilson that he had undertaken to complete the Articles in regard to Dantzic in accordance with certain alterations that had been agreed.

PRESIDENT WILSON then produced the document in Appendix VII and proposed that it should be sent direct to the Drafting Committee.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed and Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward Appendix VII to the Secretary-General for the Drafting Committee.

10. PRESIDENT WILSON asked Mr. Lloyd George if the British Government were sending additional troops to Archangel. He had had a communication from General Bliss which seemed to indicate that the local British Command instead of contemplating withdrawal intended to take steps to link up the Russian forces in the north with those in Siberia, which would involve an advance to Kotlas and Viatka. General Bliss's communication had also suggested that 12,000 British reinforcements were being sent.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he thought there must be some misunderstanding. Great importance was attached to secrecy in regard to the

withdrawal from north Russia and possibly this was some local bluff to convey the impression that no withdrawal was intended. He did not think that the reinforcements contemplated were nearly so large. He undertook to enquire into the matter.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 22 April, 1919.

Appendix I to IC-175B

[Translation ¹]

Copy of Letter From M. Clemenceau to the Emir Feisal

YOUR HIGHNESS: I am happy, on the occasion of your return to the East, to confirm what I said to you in our conversation of Sunday, April 13.

The French Government, desirous of assuring to Syria, as well as to Armenia, Mesopotamia and the other countries of the Orient which have been liberated by the victory of the Entente, a regime of liberty and progress in conformity with the principles by which it has always been inspired and which are the basis of the deliberations of the Peace Conference, declares that it recognizes the right of Syria to independence in the form of a federation of autonomous local communities corresponding to the traditions and wishes of their populations.

France is prepared to give material and moral assistance to this emancipation of Syria.

In referring to the needs of the country and the interests of its people as well as to the historic role which France has played Your Highness recognized that France is the Power qualified to give Syria the assistance of the various advisers necessary to establish order and bring about the progress which the peoples of Syria desire.

When the time comes to work out more detailed plans to assure the collaboration of France with Syria, they should be in conformity with the spirit of our arrangements. I take pleasure, on the occasion of parting from Your Highness, to confirm to you in writing and to testify to the harmony which will not fail to inspire the representatives of France in Syria.

Accept [etc.]

G. CLEMENCEAU

PARIS, April 17, 1919.

¹Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

Appendix II

SPA, April 21, 1919, 18 h. 30.

From General Nudant, President of the C. I. P. A.² to Field Marshal Foch, and Prime Minister, Paris

No. 802 [892?]

1. German Government supposing that, after the remittance of the project of the preliminaries, it is intended to negotiate on their contents, has appointed as delegates with all the necessary powers: Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Doctor Landsberg Minister of Justice, Mr. Giesberts General-Post-Master, Mr. Leinert President of the Prussian National Chamber, Doctor Melchior, Professor Shücking.

Names of the persons who will accompany the delegates will be given later.

2. The German Government is ready to send to Versailles the above-mentioned persons if they will be granted their liberty of movement and free use of Telegraph and Telephone for communications with the German Government. The German Government keeps the right of appointing later on experts for certain questions of Peace.

3. Delegates will probably not be able to leave before April 27 or 28.

Continuation of wire 892 of April 21st, 893.

1. The total number of German delegates and suite will be of about 75.

2. Besides, the delegation will be accompanied by a telegraphic personnel of about 40 men, who will organise and use a "central" whose installation has been promised by the French Telegraphical Mission in Berlin as reciprocity for the installation of a Special Allied "Central" in Berlin.

3. German Government asks for immediate dispatch to Versailles for the preparation of the installation of the German Delegation, an advanced party composed of Mr. Von Wachendorf, Conseiller d'Ambassade, Mr. Walter, Inspector of Postal Services and Mr. Dunker, Food Official. This personnel is actually at Spa and ready to leave at first notice.

Appendix III

Instructions to Drafting Committee for the [De]militarization of German Territory West of the Rhine

The maintenance or building of fortifications west of a line drawn fifty kilometers east of the Rhine forbidden to Germany.

² Abbreviation for Commission Interalliée Permanente d'Armistice (Interallied Permanent Armistice Commission).

The maintenance of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, forbidden within the area defined above, as well as all military manoeuvres of every kind and the maintenance of physical facilities for mobilization.

Any violation of these conditions to be regarded as an hostile act against the signatories to the treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world.

As long as the present treaty remains in force a pledge by Germany to respond to any enquiry that the Council of the League of Nations may deem necessary.

Appendix IV

Articles Concerning the Guarantees of Execution of the Treaty

(As Approved by President Wilson and M. Clemenceau on April 20th)

1. As a guarantee of the execution by Germany of the present treaty, German territories west of the Rhine, including the Bridgeheads, are to be occupied by international forces during fifteen years from signature of the present treaty on.

2. If the conditions of the treaty are executed by Germany, occupation to be successively reduced according to following schedule :

a) to be evacuated after 5 years: the bridgehead of Cöln and the territories north of a line running along the Roer then along the railroad: Jülich, Düren, Euskirchen, Rheinbach, then the road Rheinbach to Sinzig, and reaching the Rhine at the confluence with the Ahr river (the roads, railroads and localities above mentioned included in the occupied territory).

b) to be evacuated after ten years: the bridgehead of Coblenz and the territories north of line to be drawn from the intersection between the frontiers of Belgium, Germany and Holland, running about 4 Kilometres South of Aix-la-Chapelle, then to and following the crest of Forst Gemünd, then east of the railroad of the Urft Valley, then along Blankenheim, Valdorf, Dreis, Ulmen to and following the Mosel from Bremm to Nehren, then passing along Kappel, Simmern, then following the ridge of the heights between Simmern and the Rhine and reaches the river at Bacharach (all localities, valleys, roads and railroads above mentioned included in the occupied territory).

c) to be evacuated after fifteen years the bridgehead of Mains, the bridgehead of Kehl and the remainder of German territories still occupied.

3. In case, either during, or after this fifteen years delay, the Interallied Commission of Reparations recognise that Germany refuse to execute the whole or part of the conditions agreed upon by her

according to the present treaty, the international re-occupation of part or the whole of the areas defined by Article 2, will take place immediately.

4. If, before fifteen years, Germany meets all the engagements taken by her according to the terms of the present treaty, the withdrawal of the international troops would immediately follow.

Appendix V

Treaty Between France and United States

(As Approved by President Wilson and M. Clemenceau on April 20th)

Between the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of France it is agreed:—

1) Any violation by Germany of the engagements taken by her according to articles N^r N^r and N^r of the present treaty to be regarded as an hostile act against the signatories to the treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world.

2) A pledge to be taken by the United States of America to come immediately to the assistance of France as soon as any unprovoked movement of aggression against her is made by Germany.

3) This pledge to be subject to the approval of the Executive Council of the League of Nations and to continue until it is agreed by the Contracting Powers that the League itself affords sufficient protection.

Appendix VI to IC-175B

Article Concerning the Independence of German Austria

(As Approved by President Wilson and M. Clemenceau on April 20th)

Germany recognizes the independence of German Austria within the frontiers as defined by the present treaty.

Appendix VII to IC-175B

Draft of Articles to be included in the treaty with Germany agreeing

- 1) To establish the "Free City of Danzig".
- 2) To include the Free City of Danzig within the Polish Customs frontiers and make it in fact the port of Poland.
- 3) To hold a plebiscite in a certain district East of the Vistula.
- 4) To effect agreements granting to Germany and Poland certain rights to, on and over railways needed by them respectively.

(1. Map attached.)³

³ No map accompanies the file copy of the minutes.

N. B. If this draft is approved, the treaty articles submitted by the Committee on Polish Affairs, and concurred in by the Central Committee, will have to be revised accordingly.

ARTICLE 1. The German Government renounces all rights and title over the following territory in favor of the Five Allied and Associated Great Powers:

Take a line from—

- (a) position latitude $54^{\circ} 22' 25''$ N; longitude $19^{\circ} 22' 05''$ E;
- (b) in a direction 159° for a distance of one sea mile;
- (c) thence to the Light Beacon at the bend of the Elbinger Channel approximately in latitude $54^{\circ} 19\frac{1}{2}'$ N. longitude $19^{\circ} 26'$ E.
- (d) from this Light Beacon to the easternmost mouth of the Nogat River bearing approximately 209° .

Keep to the *thalweg* of this river up to its junction with the main stream of the Vistula north of Pieckel, and thence follow the *thalweg* of the main stream northward to a point 5 miles below the railway bridge at Dirschau. Thence continue in a general westerly direction leaving the village of Mühlbanz on the south, and Rambeltsch on the north, and touching at Klein Golmkau the tip of the salient formed by the boundary of Kreis Dirschau. Thence westwards along that boundary to the salient formed west of Boschpohl.

From the tip of the salient west of Boschpohl continue westward, leaving the villages of Neu Fietz and Schatarpi on the south. At a point north of Schatarpi turn north-west to the mid-point of the lake west of Lonken leaving the village of Lonken to the north. Thence continue north and northwest to the northern end of the lake. From there continue almost due north to the southern end of the lake. From there continue almost due north to the southern end of the lake immediately north-east of Pollenschin. Thence pass north-east along the median line of the lake to the northern end of it. From this point continue north to the Stangenwalder forest leaving the village of Kamehlen on the west and Neuendorf on the east. Where the line reaches a point due north-west of the village of Neuendorf turn north-eastward to the Lappinet lake north of Gross Czapielken leaving Krissau on the northwest and Marschau on the south-east. Thence continue to the north-eastern end of the lake and from there north-eastwards as far as the westernmost point of Lake Ottomin leaving the village of Fidlín on the north-west. Thence continue in a north-north-easterly direction between the villages of Klein Kelpin and Mattern. Thence continue northward through the Olivaer forest leaving the villages of Pelonken, Pulver Mühl and Renneberg on the east to a point one kilometre north of the road between Renneberg and Wittstock. From this point continue north-

north-east to the Baltic coast crossing the railway north of Steinfliess.

In delimiting this line on the spot existing Gemeinde boundaries should be followed as far as is practicable.

ARTICLE 2. The Five Allied and Associated Great Powers undertake to establish the town of Danzig, together with the rest of the territory described in Article 1 as an (independent) Free City (under the title of *Freihansestadt Dansig*).

ARTICLE 3. A Constitution for the Free City of Dansig shall be drawn up by the duly appointed representatives of the Free City in agreement with a High Commissioner to be appointed by the League of Nations, and shall be placed under the guarantee of the said League. The High Commissioner will also be charged with the duty of dealing, in the first instance, with all differences arising between Poland and the Free City of Danzig of this Treaty, or any arrangements or agreements made thereunder. The High Commissioner shall reside at Danzig.

ARTICLE 4: The Five Allied and Associated Great Powers undertake to negotiate (a treaty)* between the Polish Government and the Free City of Danzig which shall come into force at the same time as the establishment of said Free City.

This agreement will include provisions with the following objects:

(a) To effect the inclusion of the Free City of Danzig within the Polish customs frontiers † always provided that there may be clauses in the agreement establishing a free port area therein.

(b) To ensure to Poland the full and unhampered use and service of all waterways, docks, basins, wharves, and other instrumentalities within the territory of the Free City necessary for Polish import and export.

(c) To ensure to Poland the control and administration of the Vistula and of the whole railway system within said Free City except such street and other railways as serve primarily the needs of the Free City; and of postal, telegraphic and telephonic communication between the port of Danzig and Poland.

The rights conferred in Article 4 (c) shall extend also to the development and improvement of the existing railways and other means of communication therein mentioned, and to the lease or purchase through appropriate processes of such land and other property as may be necessary for these purposes.

(d) To provide against any discrimination within the Free City of Danzig to the detriment of citizens of Poland and other persons of Polish origin or speech.

(e) Such foreign relations as may be necessary for the Free City of Danzig will be conducted by the Polish Government; and citizens

* Substitute: an agreement. [Sidenote in the original.]

† Insert: with the right in Poland of police and protection on land and water against smuggling. [Sidenote in the original.]

of the Free City of Danzig when abroad will be entitled to the diplomatic protection of Poland.

ARTICLE 5: On the coming into force of the present Treaty German nationals ordinarily resident in the territory described in Article 1 will *ipso facto* lose their German nationality and become citizens of the Free City of Danzig.

ARTICLE 6: Within a period of two years from the coming into force of the present Treaty German nationals, more than eighteen years old, ordinarily resident in the territory described in Article 1, will have the right to opt for German nationality. They must during the ensuing two years transfer their place of residence into Germany.

Option by a husband will cover his wife and option by parents will cover their children less than eighteen years old.

All persons who exercise the right of option referred to above will be entitled to preserve the immovable property which they possess in the territory described in Article 1.

They may carry with them their movable property of every description.

No export or import duties may be imposed upon them in connection with the removal of such property.

ARTICLE 7: All property situated within the territory described in Article 1 belonging to the German Government or to the Government of any German State will pass to the Five Allied and Associated Great Powers for transfer to the Free City of Danzig or to the Polish State, as may be equitably determined by the said Five Allied and Associated Great Powers.

ARTICLE 8: In a zone including Kreise Stuhm and Rosenberg, and those parts of Kreise Marienburg and Marienwerder which lie to the East of the Vistula, the inhabitants will be called upon to indicate by a vote by commune (Gemeinde) whether they wish the several communes (Gemeinden) within the territory to belong to Poland or East Prussia.

From the time when the present Treaty takes effect, and within a period which shall not exceed a fortnight, the zone delimited above shall be placed under the authority of an International Commission composed of five members, appointed by the Five Allied and Associated Great Powers, and shall be evacuated by German troops.

This Commission, accompanied by the necessary forces should occasion arise, shall have general powers of administration and shall take whatever measures it may deem proper for holding the plebiscite and assuring the liberty, fairness and secrecy of the vote, following the provisions of this treaty regulating the plebiscite to be held in Allenstein as nearly as may be. All decision[s] of the Commission shall be taken by a majority vote.

All of the expense incurred by the Commission, whether in the exercise of its own functions or in the administration of the zone subjected to the plebiscite, shall be levied upon the local revenues.

At the conclusion of the vote, the Commission shall communicate to the Five Allied and Associated Great Powers a detailed report of the manner in which the vote was conducted, and a proposal for the line which should be adopted as the frontier of East Prussia in this region, taking account of the desires of the inhabitants as expressed by the vote as well as of the geographic and economic situation of the locality. The Five Allied and Associated Great Powers shall then determine the frontier between East Prussia and Poland in this region, leaving to Poland as a minimum for any section of this river the full and complete control of the Vistula, its east bank included, as far east of the river as may be necessary for its regulation and improvement. The said Great Powers shall at the same time formulate regulations securing to the population of East Prussia equitable access to and use of the Vistula for themselves and their goods and for craft controlled by them or owned by them as may best serve their interests. These determinations of frontier, as well as the regulations just mentioned, are accepted in advance as binding by all parties hereto.

As soon as the administration of the portion of the zone assigned to it shall have been assumed by the authorities of East Prussia and of Poland respectively, the powers of the International Commission shall be terminated.

ARTICLE 9. A Commission composed of three members, including the High Commissioner, who shall be Chairman, one member named by Germany, and one member named by Poland, shall be constituted with[in] six months after the time when the present Treaty takes effect, to delimit in the field the lines provided for in the foregoing articles.

The decisions taken by a majority vote of the said commission shall be binding on both parties concerned.

ARTICLE 10. The Five Allied and Associated Great Powers agree to negotiate agreements between Poland and Germany by which, whether under the form of a general railroad convention to which both States are partners, or in the form of a special agreement between the two States, there shall be secured, on the one hand to Germany, full and adequate railroad facilities for communication between the rest of Germany and East Prussia over the intervening Polish territory, on the other hand there shall be secured to Poland, in the same way, full and adequate railroad facilities for communication between Poland and the City of Danzig over any German territory that may, on the right bank of the Vistula, intervene between Poland and the City of Danzig.

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Tuesday, April 22, 1919, at 11:30 a. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

JAPAN

H. E. Baron Makino
H. E. Viscount Chinda
M. Saburi
M. Kimura

Secretary—Lieut.-Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.
Interpreter—Professor P. J. Mantoux.

PRESIDENT WILSON explained that M. Orlando had written to say that he was unable to be present.

(1) BARON MAKINO read the following state-

Japanese Claims
in Regard to Kiau-
chau and Shantung ment:—

In January last I had the privilege to present and explain before the Supreme Council Japan's claims which we deemed as just and fair in the light of the circumstances which led Japan to take part in the war and of the actual situations created or found in the regions to which the claims related.¹ I wish to take advantage of the opportunity now offered me to explain more fully that part of our claims which relates to the leased territory of Kiaochow and Germany's rights in respect of Shantung province. As will be remembered the Japanese Government sent an ultimatum to Germany on the 15th of August 1914, inviting her to unconditionally hand over the territory to Japan which she intended to restore to China.² Germany failed to give answer within the specified time limit and this obliged Japan to have recourse to military and naval forces. In all those steps we acted in consultation and co-operation with England.

The German stronghold at Kiaochow was captured on the 7th of November, 1914, and has, together with the Shantung Railway, remained to this day under Japanese occupation.

Looking to the eventual termination of the war, Japan approached China in January, 1915, with a view to reaching beforehand an agreement as to the basis of the restitution to China of the leased territory

¹ See BC-12, vol. III, p. 738.

² See telegram of August 15, 1914, from the Ambassador in Japan, *Foreign Relations*, 1914, supp., p. 170.

of Kiaochow and of disposing other German rights in relation to Shantung, so that Germany might find no pretext to refuse acquiescence in Japan's demands at the final peace conference and that she might not find it possible to recover her influence in China, thereby becoming again a grave menace to the peace of the Far East.

As a result of the negotiations that ensued, a treaty respecting the Province of Shantung, accompanied by an exchange of notes, was signed on the 25th of May, 1915.³ In that treaty China engaged to recognise all matters that might be agreed upon between the Japanese Government and the German Government respecting the disposition of all the rights, interests and concessions, which Germany possessed vis-a-vis China in relation to the Province of Shantung.

By the exchange of notes, Japan declared to China her willingness, in case she acquired the rights of free disposal of the leased territory of Kiaochow, to restore it to China on the following conditions:—

1. Opening of the whole of Kiaochow as commercial port;
2. Establishment of a Japanese settlement in the locality to be designated by the Japanese Government;
3. Establishment, if desired by the Powers, of an international settlement;
4. Arrangement to be made, before the return of the said territory is effected, between the Japanese and Chinese Governments, with respect to the disposal of German public establishments and properties and with regard to the other conditions and procedures.

These terms explain themselves, but a few words on some of the points may be found useful. The Japanese settlement, or concession, whose establishment is provided for under condition 2, refers to only a part of urban District to be set apart from the settling of Japanese as well as other nationalities, including Chinese, under a special system and jurisdiction that are found in many of the principal open ports or marts of China.

In reference to the words "the other conditions and procedures", found in condition 4, I may state that they refer to those minor working conditions and procedures to be determined and observed in effecting the restitution of the Leased Territory to China.

Early in the year 1917, Japan began, in conjunction with her Allied Powers, to direct her efforts in inducing China to sever relations with, and if possible to declare war against Germany. China severed her diplomatic relations with Germany on the 14th of March, 1917, and finally on the 14th of August of the same year, she declared war against the latter; that was more than two years after the signing of the aforementioned treaty between Japan and China had taken place.

Later, on the 24th of September, 1918, more than one year [after] the declaration of war by China and more than three years after the conclusion of the agreement of the 25th of May, 1915, the Chinese Minister at Tokyo exchanged with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan a series of notes, the translations of which have already

³ *Foreign Relations*, 1915, pp. 171 and 197.

been presented to the Supreme Council.⁴ The notes provide, among other things, for the withdrawal of the Japanese Civil Administration, the management of the Tsingtao-Chinan Railway as a joint Sino-Japanese undertaking upon determination of its ownership, and the guarding and policing of the Railway.⁵ The Chinese Minister also solicited the aid of the Japanese Government in the matter of arranging for loans for building two railway lines connecting with the Tsingtao-Chinan Railway and practically coinciding with the lines projected by Germany. To this, the Japanese government consented. The preliminary contract covering these loans was made between the Chinese Government and the Japanese bankers,⁶ and the Chinese government actually received from the bankers an advance of twenty million yen according to the terms of this contract.

From the afore-mentioned facts which I have attempted to lay out as clearly as possible, it will be seen:

First,—That Japan has undertaken to restitute Kiaochow to China on conditions, none of which can be regarded in any sense as unjust or unfair, considering the part Japan took in dislodging [*dislodging?*] Germany from Shantung.

Secondly,—That the declaration of war by China against Germany could have no relation whatever to the validity of the treaty and the appended agreement which was concluded between Japan and China more than two years prior to the declaration of war, nor could it alter or affect in any wise the situation in connection with which the aforesaid treaty and agreement were made.

Thirdly,—That the arrangements of September 1918, which were made more than one year after China's declaration of war, could not have been entered into without presupposing the existence and validity of the treaty of May 1915. Some of the provisions of the former dealt with the subject-matters or furthered the aims, set forth in the latter. In fact, the arrangements of 1918 were intended to be, and are, a supplement and sequel to the treaty of 1915. It is to be noted that China has actually received the advance of twenty million yen according to the terms of the above arrangements.

To those summaries and deductions, I may add that as between Japan and China there is a well-defined course laid out, for effecting the restitution. Any other course, could be against the definite arrangement which has been agreed to between the two governments concerned. What Japan now seeks is to obtain from Germany the rights of free disposal of the leased territory and Germany's rights, privileges and concessions in relation to Shantung for carrying out the provisions of the treaty of 1915 as well as of the arrangements of 1918.

It is claimed that the declaration of war abrogates *ipso facto* treaties of lease of territory. Such a claim can not be regarded as warranted

⁴ These notes are printed in *The Claim of China for direct restitution to herself of the leased territory of Kiaochow, the Tsingtao-Chinan railway and other German rights in respect of Shantung province* (Paris, 1919), pp. 78-84; and David Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris* (New York, 1924) vol. vi, pp. 202-209.

⁵ *Foreign Relations*, 1919, vol. i, pp. 571-572.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 574.

by the established rules of International Law. From the very nature of the Lease Convention,⁷ which provides for the exercise by Germany of rights of Sovereignty within the territory the lease of Kiaochow may be regarded as a cession pure and simple with the exception of the time limit of 99 years. And it is commonly accepted principle that a declaration of war does not abrogate a treaty of cession or other territorial arrangements.

I feel firmly convinced that full justice will be done to the claims of Japan based upon her sacrifices and achievement and upon the fact of actual occupation, involving the sense of national honour.

I now beg to submit to you a draft containing the clauses to be embodied in the Preliminary Peace Treaty with Germany. (Appendix I.)

BARON MAKINO then handed round a draft of the clauses which the Japanese Delegation wished to have included in the Peace Treaty with Germany. He said it has been based on similar clauses inserted in other treaties.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether the following cables, mentioned in Article I were referred to in the original concession by China of Kiauchau to Germany, viz:—

Tsingtao-Shanghai and Tsingtao-Chefoo.

BARON MAKINO replied they were German concession, though not in the original concession. He said they were Government cables.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if they were submarine all the way to Shantung.

BARON MAKINO said they were the same line—a continuation of the same line.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he had already taken the liberty of describing as well as he could to M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George what happened in his conversation with Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda. Their minds, therefore, were in the midst of the subject. He had laid what was in his own mind before all present. He did not know what was the impression formed by Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that so far as Great Britain was concerned they were in the same position towards Japan as towards Italy. They had a definite engagement with Japan, as recorded in the Note of the British Ambassador at Tokio, dated 16th February, 1917. (Appendix II.) Hence, so far as Great Britain was concerned, there was a definite engagement. The only doubt he felt was as to whether the ultimate destination of Kiauchau was a matter for inclusion in the Treaty with Germany.

⁷ Convention between China and Germany respecting the lease of Kiaochow, March 6, 1898, *American Journal of International Law*, supp., vol. 4, p. 285; *The Claim of China for direct restitution to herself of the leased territory of Kiaochow*, etc., p. 25. Text in part in *Foreign Relations*, 1900, p. 383.

In the case of the other German possessions in the Far East the Japanese Government had undertaken to support the British claims South of the Equator, and the British Government had undertaken to support the Japanese claims in the islands North of the Equator. So far as Great Britain was concerned, it was not proposed to press for the immediate allocation of the mandates for these islands, but only for their surrender by Germany to the Allied and Associated Powers. The allocation was left for settlement afterwards.

When the time came, we should have to press the claims of Australia and New Zealand to the islands South of the Equator.

BARON MAKINO said that Japan had expressed her willingness to support the British claims.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that if the Japanese claims for the surrender of Kiauchau by Germany were put in the Treaty, Australia might demand the same treatment as regards the islands South of the Equator, and South Africa might make the same claim as regards German South-West Africa. There was hardly time to settle all these details before the treaty with Germany.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that he did not know if Mr. Lloyd George had in mind that the leased territory of Kiauchau should be put on the same basis of the mandatory system as the South Pacific Islands. In that case the Japanese Delegation thought that Kiauchau ought to be on a definite basis. The mandatory system rested on the basis that those islands were in a state of civilisation which necessitated their being taken care of by other people. This did not apply to the case of Kiauchau.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that was true.

VISCOUNT CHINDA, continuing, asked if it was merely proposed to postpone this question: to put it in abeyance? The Japanese Delegation were under an express order for the case that the question was not settled. The Japanese Government had a duty to perform to China in this matter, and they could not carry out their obligation to China unless Kiauchau was handed over to them. The Japanese Delegates were under an express instruction from their Government that unless they were placed in a position to carry out Japan's obligation to China, they were not allowed to sign the Treaty. Consequently, they had no power to agree to a postponement of this question.

BARON MAKINO said that if the Treaty were ignored, it would be a very serious matter for Japan.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said it seemed to them to be a very simple question in its nature. No long deliberations were involved. They could not persuade themselves that the question was one that ought to be postponed.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if it would be possible for the Japanese Government more particularly to define the arrangements she would expect to maintain with China in the Shantung Province. In the paper he had been given, the statements were sufficiently explicit as regards the town of Kiauchau and the bay of Kiauchau, but not so explicit in regard to the railway and the administration.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that the notes explained that the administration of the railway would be a joint undertaking.

PRESIDENT WILSON said it was not very explicit. Some further definition was required of the term "joint administration". The document was explicit about the establishment of a police force by China towards the cost of which the railway would make a contribution. He understood that at each station, by which he supposed was meant railway station, as well as at the training school, there would be Japanese. The document did not explain the position to be taken by these Japanese.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said he thought they were only intended to be instructors. He pointed out that there were many foreign instructors in the Chinese administrations.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said there were, in the Customs, for example.

PRESIDENT WILSON said this was part of a series of things which had been imposed on China.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said they had asked for the Customs officials.

PRESIDENT WILSON said they had done so after a certain experience. He was fairly clear about the railway concession. He asked if there were not included in the lease to Germany certain concessions about exploitations.

VISCOUNT CHINDA suggested mines.

BARON MAKINO said the mines were amalgamated into the railway.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said there were three mines.

BARON MAKINO said that the mines had not paid, and had therefore been amalgamated in the railway, mainly for the use of the railway. The coal was not of very good quality. Germany had given up their concessions. One of the mines was not of much value.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if there were any great iron deposits.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested they had not been made much use of.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed, not up to the present.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he feared that if this arrangement was included in the Treaty, the question of mandatories would have to be settled. This might create difficulties and delays. Other interested parties might complain if this were not done when the Treaty handed over Kiauchau to Japan.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that Viscount Chinda's answer to this had been that the islands were in such state of development as to require

someone to look after them, whereas Kiauchau was the case of a concession in a self-governing country. He asked Viscount Chinda if the railway was a joint enterprise with China.

VISCOUNT CHINDA replied in the affirmative.

BARON MAKINO said that Japan had already worked joint undertakings very well with China. In the case of the Sino-Japanese Timber Company, for example, where Japan and China had the same number on the Directorate and where the dividends were paid in equal proportions. There were several similar concerns, the directorates always consisting of equal numbers of both nationals.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if there were any restrictions on these railways? His interest was to keep open the door with China.

BARON MAKINO said there was nothing in the agreement with China against the open door.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that, as had happened in many instances, he was the only one present whose judgment was entirely independent. His colleagues were both bound by Treaties, although perhaps he might be entitled to question whether Great Britain and Japan had been justified in handing round the islands in the Pacific. This, however, was a private opinion.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that there [*they*] were only the German islands.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that in the circumstances he was the only independent party present. He would like to repeat the point of view which he had urged on the Japanese Delegation a few days before. He was so firmly convinced that the Peace of the Far East centered upon China and Japan that he was more interested from this point of view than any other. He did not wish to see complex engagements that fettered free determination. He was anxious that Japan should show to the world as well as to China that she wanted to give the same independence to China as other nations possessed; that she did not want China to be held in manacles. What would prejudice the peace in the Far East was any relationship that was not trustful. It was already evident that there was not that relationship of mutual trust that was necessary if peace was to be ensured in the Far East. What he feared was that Japan, by standing merely on her treaty rights, would create the impression that she was thinking more of her rights than of her duties to China. The world would never have peace based on treaty rights only unless there were also recognised to be reciprocal duties between States. Perhaps he was going a little too fast in existing circumstances but he wished to emphasise the importance in future that States should think primarily of their duties towards each other. The central idea of the League of Nations was that States must support each other

even when their interests were not involved. When the League of Nations was formed then there would be established a body of partners covenanted to stand up for each other's rights. The position in which he would like to see Japan, already the most advanced nation in the Far East with the leadership in enterprise and policy, was that of the leader in the Far East standing out for these new ideas. There could be no finer nor more politic role for her. That was what he had to say as the friend of Japan. When he had seen the Japanese Delegates two days ago he had said that he was not proposing that Kiauchau should be detached from the treaty engagements but that it should be ceded to the Powers as trustees with the understanding that all they were going to do was to ask how the treaties were to be carried out and to offer advice as to how this could best be done by mutual agreement. The validity of treaties could not be called in question if they were modified by agreements between both sides. What he was after was to attain a more detailed definition as to how Japan was going to help China as well as to afford an opportunity for investment in railways etc. He had hoped that by pooling their interest the several nations that had gained foothold in China (a foothold that was to the detriment of China's position in the world) might forego the special position they had acquired and that China might be put on the same footing as other nations, as sooner or later she must certainly be. He believed this to be to the interest of everyone concerned. There was a lot of combustible material in China and if flames were put to it the fire could not be quenched for China had a population of four hundred million people. It was symptoms of that which filled him with anxiety. Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda knew how deep-seated was the feeling of reverence of China towards Shantung which was the most sacred Chinese Province and he dreaded starting a flame there because this reverence was based upon the very best motives and owing to the traditions of Confucius and the foundations of intellectual development. He did not wish to interfere with treaties. As Mr. Lloyd George had remarked earlier, the war had been partly undertaken in order to establish the sanctity of treaties. Although he yielded to no-one in this sentiment there were cases he felt where treaties ought not to have been entered into.

BARON MAKINO, referring to President Wilson's remarks in regard to the larger ideas of international relationship, said that the best opinion of Japan was at that point of view. For China, the best opinion in Japan wanted equal opportunities or the "open door". He had convinced himself of this and was very glad of it, for he felt it would be to the advantage of both countries. He recalled, however, that international affairs in China had not always been conducted on very just lines.

(MR. LLOYD GEORGE interjected that this was undoubtedly the case.)

He did not want to go into past history or to enquire where the responsibility lay, but this had been the source of the present situation. Once the unjust methods had been begun other nations followed. The best opinion, however, in Japan based itself on fairness and justice. Before he left Japan he had had a conversation with one of their older statesmen, who had remarked to him that Japan would have to enter into a good many joint undertakings with China and must content herself to share equally, half in half, in them. This had been one of the most influential men in Japan and he himself shared his views.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he was satisfied on that point and he hoped Baron Makino would not interpret him to have expressed any doubts. He wanted that principle, however, to be shown in a concrete way to China.

BARON MAKINO then referred to the President's remarks on Shantung. There, Japan had only entered into an agreement, whereas Germany had assumed almost complete sovereignty. All Germany's concessions over and above the agreement between Japan and China would now fall through. There remained only the concession mentioned in the Treaty which had already been discussed. Reverting to the larger views expressed by President Wilson he said that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, in a speech made at the opening of the session (in January he thought), had sketched the line of policy which was proposed towards China. He had said that the Japanese Government was ready to help and contribute towards anything just that was proposed in China. As regards more concrete matters by which he meant such matters as extraterritoriality, maintenance of foreign troops, spheres of influence and the Boxer Indemnity—the four principal points which China had most at heart—on these matters he gathered from the speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the Japanese Government was ready to discuss them with the Great Powers. These were concrete matters which could be worked out with the Great Powers. If this could be done it would do much to allay the feelings of injustice and bad tradition that still were lurking in China. Japan would be glad to discuss these questions. Extra territoriality was a matter which would take some time. Japan had accomplished it and China could follow her footsteps. In the matter of prisons, for example, considerable progress had already been made in China. As soon as the Powers felt that they could trust Chinese Courts there need be no delay in rectifying matters.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked what was the idea of Japan as to extra territoriality in the settlement contemplated at Kiaochow.

BARON MAKINO said that as matters stood extraterritoriality was

considered as an established principle all through China. If, however, the principle changed, Kiaochow would form no exception.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he felt that he realised the situation in a fuller light than ever before. He asked whether the Japanese representatives would prefer to draw the Chinese representatives into conference in which they would take part or would they prefer that their colleagues should see them separately, as China was a full member of the Peace Conference final judgment could not be passed without seeing them.

BARON MAKINO said that he did not in the least object to China being heard but he did not want to enter into discussion with them. It was difficult to discuss with people who had preconceived [ideas: to remove these needed time and it was difficult] to dispel them in one or two conversations. He greatly regretted that they should exist.

VISCOUNT CHINDA represented that Japan had the right to be present when the Chinese Delegates attended although her Delegates did not wish to be drawn into discussion.

After some further discussion it was agreed that:—

Japan would not exercise her right to be present and that the best plan would be for the discussion with the Chinese representatives to take place in their absence.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the opportunity of the presence of the Japanese delegates should be taken to refer to some of the general questions relating to the Treaty with Germany in which Japan was interested. Up to now the Supreme Council had concerned itself almost entirely with questions of European interest, such as the boundaries of Germany and related questions, the Saar Valley and Dantzig. Other more general questions, such as the League of Nations and Labour had been discussed outside in Commissions. Japan had been consulted about the question of breaches of the laws of war. The great outstanding question was compensation and indemnity.

M. MAKINO said that Japan was interested in this question. She had lost ships and would have a considerable claim. She had representatives on the Reparation Commission.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Reparation Commission have found great difficulty in reaching agreement; these questions were now being discussed by a special Committee.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the Japanese Delegation should place themselves in communication with Mr. Norman Davis, who was the American representative on a Committee which also included Loucheur, Lord Sumner and M. Crespi.⁸

⁸ French, British, and Italian representatives, respectively, on the Commission on Reparation of Damage.

M. MAKINO undertook to do this.

A few further explanations were given of the progress made in the Treaty of Peace.

M. MAKINO said that before the end of the Meeting, he wished to say one word about the form of restitution of Kiau Chow to Japan. The Japanese Government attached supreme importance to the form which had been submitted that morning. To-day, fresh instructions from Government have been received and he could not lay too much stress on the matter.

(The Japanese representatives then withdrew.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 22 April, 1919.

Appendix I to IC-175C

Special Conditions Relative to Shantung Province

ARTICLE I

Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all the rights, titles, or privileges—particularly those concerning the territory of Kiaochow, railways, mines and submarine cables—which she acquired, in virtue of the treaty concluded by her with China on the 6 March, 1898, and of all other arrangements relative to Shantung Province.

The Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway, including its branch lines together with its accessories of all kinds, stations, shops fixed materials and rolling stocks, mines, establishments and materials for exploitation of the mines, [are], and shall remain, acquired by Japan, together with the rights and privileges appertaining thereto.

The submarine cables of the State of Germany, from Tsingtao to Shanghai and from Tsingtao to Chefoo, with all the rights, privileges and properties appertaining thereto, shall equally remain acquired by Japan.

ARTICLE 2

The rights of movable and immovable properties possessed by the State of Germany in the territory of Kiaochow, as well as all the rights which she is entitled to claim in consequence of the works or equipments set up, of the expenses disbursed, or of the contracts concluded by her, either directly or indirectly, and concerning the territory, are, and shall remain, acquired by Japan.

Appendix II to IC-175C

[*The British Ambassador in Japan (Greene) to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Motono)*]

BRITISH EMBASSY, TOKYO, 16 February, 1917.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE: With reference to the subject of our conversation of the 27th ultimo, when your Excellency informed me of the desire of the Imperial Government to receive an assurance that, on the occasion of a Peace Conference, His Britannic Majesty's Government will support the claims of Japan in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in the Islands North of the Equator, I have the honour, under instructions received from His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to communicate to your Excellency the following message from His Britannic Majesty's Government:—

His Majesty's Government accede with pleasure to request of Japanese Government for an assurance that they will support Japan's claims in regard to disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in Islands North of Equator on occasion of Peace Conference, it being understood that Japanese Government will, in eventual peace settlement, treat in same spirit Great Britain's claims to German Islands South of Equator, I avail myself of this opportunity Monsieur le Ministre, to renew to your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

CONYNGHAM GREENE
H. B. M. Ambassador

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Tuesday, April 22, 1919, at 4 p. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson

BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. Lloyd George

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B., *Secretary*
Professor P. Mantoux, *Interpreter*.

(1) MR. LLOYD GEORGE reported that, on his return from the morning meeting he had found M. Orlando's Chef de Cabinet awaiting him. He had arranged to see M. Orlando in the afternoon and had just come from the interview. M. Orlando had had the intention of writing a letter saying that Italy could not be represented at Versailles when the Germans came unless the Italian claims were conceded. Mr. Lloyd George had said that in that event Italy's claim for reparation could not be put forward. M. Orlando had said that this was a settled matter. Mr. Lloyd George had pointed out that this was not the case, and that a number of questions were outstanding. He asked to whom M. Orlando proposed to entrust Italy's claim against Germany—France, or England, or the United States? He had told him he thought that he was in a very serious situation. He himself and M. Clemenceau stood by their Treaty, but he had told him that if the Treaty was signed without the United States of America it meant disaster. He had pointed out to him that President Wilson was immovable. Moreover, he wanted to present his case to the public immediately. M. Orlando must realize that once President Wilson had done that he could not go back on it, and there would be no chance of conciliation. He had also told him it was only with the greatest reluctance that President Wilson would consider the idea of handing over the islands to Italy. After that he had asked M. Orlando what he thought about the establishment of a free city in Fiume instead of handing it over to Croatia. M. Orlando had then harked back to Zara, Sebenico, and Spalato.

The Italian Claims
in the Adriatic

PRESIDENT WILSON said that Italy would never get these.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had one last suggestion to make, that

Fiume should be a free city and that Zara and Sebenico should also be free cities with provision for a plebiscite at the end of three years to ascertain whether they would wish to join the mainland.

PRESIDENT WILSON doubted whether this would help the peace of that coast.

M. CLEMENCEAU feared collisions between the Italians and the Jugo-Slavs.

PRESIDENT WILSON feared that the Slavs would crowd into the free cities and there would be a constant agitation in Italy that this was being done to prejudice the plebiscite.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would not stand in the way of the proposal if President Wilson would accept.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that a better plan would be for him to publish the statement which he had prepared, to which he proposed to put a preamble in some such words as the following:—

“All aspects of this question should be known before the decision is arrived at.”

Those who knew Italian public opinion well thought that this would for the moment inflame Italian public opinion, but that this would be followed by a reaction in which the people would see that it was to their own interest to accept the cooperation of the United States of America rather than to stand out for the Treaty. Italy, he pointed out, had sent very large numbers of emigrants to the United States of America and every year thousands of these returned to visit their native land. There was a stream of many millions of dollars every year from America to Italy. When the people realized the dangers of the position, as they might in the course of a week or two, opinion would probably change.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out the danger of bringing back a Giolitti Government in Italy.

At this point, the discussion was adjourned to enable the Chinese plenipotentiaries to develop their case on the question of Shantung, which was recorded separately.¹ After the interval, however, there was a further discussion as to the action to be taken in regard to the Italian claims. As a result of this discussion, it was agreed that:—

Mr. Lloyd George should be authorized to see M. Orlando at once and to ascertain from him whether Italy would discuss the following conditions:—

- (1) Fiume, together with the surrounding territory, to be a free city:
- (2) The islands of strategical importance to Italy to be ceded to her, excluding islands such as Pago, which are almost an extension of the mainland;

¹ See IC-175E, *infra*.

(3) Zara and Sebenico to be free cities without any definite provision for a plebiscite, but with the power that all countries have under the League of Nations to appeal to the League for an alteration of their boundaries.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, April 22, 1919.

**Notes of a Meeting Which Took Place at President Wilson's House,
Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Tuesday, April 22, 1919, at 4:30
p. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.

CHINA

Mr. Lou Tseng-Tsiang.
Mr. V. K. Wellington Koo.
Accompanied by :—
Mr. Chuan Chao.
Mr. William Hsieh.

Secretary
Interpreter

Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K.C.B.
Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. **PRESIDENT WILSON** said that the Chinese Plenipotentiaries knew the interest he felt in the Kiauchau-Shantung settlement. On the previous day he had a Conference with the Japanese representatives, and this morning they had come to confer. M. Orlando, unfortunately, could not be present. Since he had last seen Mr. Koo, he had carefully read the documents, from which he gathered the following was the chain of events.

Kiauchau and Shan-
tung. The Chinese
Case

Before China entered into the war, there had been an exchange of Notes. He thought in 1915 (Mr. Koo said it was the 25th May). In that exchange of Notes, the Japanese Government had said that when the German rights in Kiauchau were transferred after the war to Japan, Japan would return them to China. The Chinese Government had taken note of this. Subsequently, there had been a further exchange of notes, and he believed, also a treaty although he had only seen Notes, in which the Japanese Government laid down certain conditions. The Chinese Government had accepted these conditions. Great Britain and France (MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this had occurred between the two exchanges of Notes between China and Japan) had entered into a similar but not identical agreement with Japan to the effect that they would support the claims of the Japanese Government on the Continent and in the islands North of the Equator. In the case of the British Government it had been on

the understanding that Japan supported her claim to German islands South of the Equator. Hence, Great Britain and France were in much the same position in the matter.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE explained that at that time the submarine campaign had become very formidable. Most of the British torpedo-boat-destroyers were in the North Sea, and there was a shortage of those craft in the Mediterranean. Japanese help was urgently required, and Japan had asked for this arrangement to be made. We had been very hard pressed, and had agreed.

PRESIDENT WILSON then read extracts from the exchange of Notes printed on page 62 of the official *Claim of China for direct restitution to herself of the leased territory of Kiauchau, etc.*, circulated by the Chinese Delegation:—

“When, after the termination of the present war, the leased territory of Kiauchau Bay is completely left to the free disposal of Japan, the Japanese Government will restore the said leased territory to China under the following conditions.”

He then read the following reply of the Chinese Foreign Minister, in which, after rehearsing the whole of the Japanese Note, he had said “In reply, I beg to state that I have taken note of this declaration”. He then read an extract from page 82, namely, exchange of Notes dated September 24, 1918.

“The Japanese Government, mindful of the amiable relations between our two countries and out of a spirit of friendly co-operation, propose to adjust all the questions relating to Shantung in accordance with the following articles.

1. Japanese troops along the Kiauchow-Chinan railway, except a contingent of them to be stationed at Chinanfu, shall be withdrawn to Tsingtau.

2. The Chinese Government may organise a Police Force to undertake the policing of the Kiauchow-Chinan railway.

3. The Kiauchow-Chinan Railway is to provide a reasonable amount to defray the expense for the maintenance of the above mentioned Police Force.

4. Japanese are to be employed at the Headquarters of the above-mentioned Police Force, at the principal railway stations, and at the Police Training School.

5. Chinese citizens shall be employed by the Kiauchow-Chinan Railway Administration as part of its Staff.

6. The Kiauchau-Chinan Railway, after its ownership is definitely determined, is to be made a Chino-Japanese joint enterprise.

7. The Civil Administration established by Japan and existing now is to be abolished.

The Japanese Government desires to be advised of the attitude of your Government regarding the above-mentioned proposal.”

To this the Chinese Minister replied:—

“In reply I have the honour to state that the Chinese Government are pleased to agree to the above articles proposed by the Japanese Government.”

The Chinese Delegation would see, President Wilson continued, the embarrassing position which had been reached. Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau were bound to support the claims of Japan. Alongside of them the Chinese had their exchange of notes with Japan. He reminded Mr. Koo that when urging his case before the Council of Ten at the Quai d'Orsay, he had maintained that the war cancelled the agreement with the German Government.¹ It did not, however, cancel the agreement between China and the Japanese Government, which had been made before the war. What he had himself urged upon the Japanese was that, as in the case of the Pacific Islands, the leased territory of Kiauchau should be settled by putting it into the hands of the Five Powers as Trustees. He did not suggest that Treaties should be broken, but that it might be possible, in Conference, to bring about an agreement by modifying the Treaty. He also proposed to them that all Governments should renounce the special rights they had acquired in China, so as to put China in a position free from the special limitations which had been imposed upon her. The Japanese were not willing to have Kiauchau handed over to the Five Powers, and the British and French Governments were embarrassed by their Treaties. When he pressed the Japanese for explanations of the meaning of their agreement, they had replied that the exploitation of two coal-mines and one iron-mine had not proved a successful venture, and were now bound up with the railway. They stated, however, that they would withdraw the civil administration; that they would maintain troops only on the termini of the railway; and that if a general agreement was reached, they would withdraw their extraterritoriality. They urged that they wanted a community of interest with the Chinese in the railway, and the only reserve they made was for a residential district in Kiauchau.

Mr. Koo said that the Treaties of 1915 and the subsequent exchange of Notes were the outcome of the 21 demands which Japan had made on China and were all part and parcel of one transaction. He hoped he had made this clear before the Council of Ten. He felt that the Treaties and Notes which had been exchanged after Japan had delivered an ultimatum stood outside of the regular procedure and course of Treaties. They dealt with matters arising out of the war.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what ultimatum he referred to.

¹ See BC-13, vol. III, pp. 755-757.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if Mr. Lloyd George had never heard of the twenty-one points.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had not.

MR. KOO said that in January 1915 after the capture of Kiau Chau that port had been opened up to trade; China then asked Japan to withdraw her troops from the interior of the province. The Japanese took occasion to treat this note as though it were an unfriendly act and shortly after sprung on China twenty-one demands divided into five groups—for example, that China should accept Japanese advisers; that they should give up railway concessions in which Western Powers were concerned, and he would draw Mr. Lloyd George's attention to the fact that Great Britain was concerned. China was put in an extremely embarrassing position. She resisted and resisted and only gave up when she was absolutely compelled to. On the 7th. May the Japanese sent China an ultimatum in regard to the majority of demands giving China only 48 hours within which to accept; otherwise Japan would consider herself free to take such steps as she thought fit to enforce them. This caused absolute consternation to the Chinese Government which eventually had to submit to *force majeure*.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if they had not appealed to the United States of America.

PRESIDENT WILSON said they had and the United States had intervened in regard to the infringement of sovereignty and political independence. The whole transaction, however, had been kept extremely secret and the United States only learnt of it in a roundabout way.

MR. KOO said that secrecy had been imposed upon China by Japan under severe penalties. It had been said that Japan had informed the Allied Governments and the United States Government that there had been only 11 Demands; but actually 21 Demands had been made on China. The Chinese Government felt that the Treaties and Notes exchanged as a result of these demands followed by an ultimatum were on a different footing from the ordinary. China had always endeavoured to carry out to the letter all engagements made in good faith. These, however, had been made against China's free will, and the same applied to the notes exchanged in the previous year. For the last four years since they had captured Kiauchau, Japanese troops had penetrated far into the Province of Shantung, where there was a population of 36,000,000 people. This had been very uncomfortable for the general population, and the results had been disturbance and trouble. The Chinese Government had protested, and asked Japan to withdraw her troops who were stationed 250 miles up the railway, but they had refused and had established civil administration bureaux in the interior of Shantung and extended their control even over the Chinese people by levying taxes on Chinese people and asserting judi-

cial power over them. The feelings of the Chinese people against the extension of Japanese control were so strong that the Chinese Government felt constrained to take some immediate step to induce Japan to withdraw her troops and remove the civil administration bureaux, the object being to relieve the tense situation until the question could be finally settled at the Peace Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it looked that by the Treaty with China, the Japanese Government would get more than the Germans had had. He asked Mr. Koo which he would prefer—the Treaty with Japan, or the transference to Japan of the German rights?

MR. KOO said that the situation was so difficult that he felt he must speak very frankly. The Japanese position was so close to China; especially in Manchuria, where they occupied a railway which was connected with Peking; that merely to transfer German rights would create a very serious situation. With the Japanese on the Manchurian railway, and the Shantung railway, Peking would be—as it were—in a pincers.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the Japanese claimed that the administration of the Shantung railway would be a joint one, and they proposed to withdraw the Japanese administration.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Mr. Koo had not quite answered his point. Supposing the Great Powers had to decide (and this really was his position since he was bound by a Treaty) between Japan inheriting Germany's rights in Shantung or exercising the rights under the treaty with Japan, which would China prefer? He pointed out that Great Britain was only bound by the rights which Japan inherited from Germany.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that if Japan inherited the German rights, it would involve her retaining the leased territory. He thought Mr. Lloyd George's point was that possibly Japan was claiming greater rights than Germany had exercised. As the British and French Governments had to support the Japanese claim to what Germany had had, they wanted to know whether China would be better off according as Japan could exercise the rights that Germany had or those that she obtained by her Treaty.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that this was the point, and said the real question was whether the Treaty with Japan was better for China than Germany's rights.

(At this point there was an interval to permit the Chinese plenipotentiaries to confer.)

MR. KOO said that he had now consulted his colleague. He could make no choice, because both alternatives were unacceptable; he would merely compare them. The Treaty and Notes with Japan provided for restoration of the Leased Territory to China on certain condi-

tions, but such restoration would be only nominal. Between the two, he thought that the German rights were more limited than the rights claimed by Japan under her Treaty and Notes with China. Even mere succession to the German rights, however, would create a grave situation for China's future. In claiming direct restitution of German rights, he was not asking for any compensation or remuneration for China as a result of her entry into the war, but only for what was necessary for peace in the Far East. The experience of the last three years made it so clear what the Chinese position would be if Japan was allowed either to succeed to the German rights in Shantung or to retain the rights she claimed under her treaty with China. It was an uncomfortable position both to the Chinese people and the Government. He was not in the least exaggerating, but only saying what was necessary to explain the situation.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George would bear witness that he had put the Chinese case as well as he could to the Japanese Delegation in the morning. He had emphasised the great need of trust and friendship between Japan and China, which he regarded as essential to peace in the Far East. He had urged that China should be free and unfettered to carry out her development. What he asked now was only a means of getting out of a position that was extremely difficult. In this Conference the United States of America was the only power that was entirely unbound. Great Britain, France, China and Japan were all bound by Treaties. They were bound to keep these Treaties because the war had largely been fought for the purpose of showing that Treaties could not be violated.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that in the exchange of notes of September 1918, China might have stood out.

MR. KOO said that the exchange of notes in 1918 was the result of the Shantung Treaty, made in consequence of the 21 demands. It was part of the same transaction.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the exchange of notes had grown out of the previous agreement. He looked for the Shantung Treaty.

MR. KOO said that it was on page 59 of *China's Claim for Direct Restitution of Kiaochow*, etc.

PRESIDENT WILSON read the following extracts from the treaty and said that China had then had to accept and had had no other choice:

“Art. 1—The Chinese Government agrees to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests and concessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.

"Art. 2.—The Chinese Government agrees that as regards the railway to be built by China herself from Chefoo or Lungkow to connect with the Kiaochow-Chinanfu railway, if Germany abandons the privilege of financing the Chefoo-Wehsien line China will approach Japanese capitalists to negotiate for a loan."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he would like to have the two positions examined by British, French and American experts, and to learn their views as to which course would be best for China.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had no objection.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it was also only fair that China should be given more time to consider this question. This seemed to be the only alternative there was to acquiescing in the Treaties between China and Japan. Great Britain and France, however, were not bound by this latter Treaty, but only by their own arrangements with Japan.

PRESIDENT WILSON then read the following extracts from the 21 Demands on page 52 and 53 of the Chinese Document.

Group IV

The Chinese Government engages not to cede or lease to a third Power any harbour or bay or island along the coast of China.

Group V

"Art. 1.—The Chinese Central Government shall employ influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial, and military affairs.

"Art. 3.—Inasmuch as the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government have had many cases of dispute between Japanese and Chinese police which caused no little misunderstanding, it is for this reason necessary that the police departments of important places (in China) shall be jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese or that the police department of these places shall employ numerous Japanese, so that they may at the same time help to plan for the improvement of the Chinese Police Service.

"Art. 4.—China shall purchase from Japan a fixed amount of munitions of war (say 50% or more of what is needed by the Chinese Government) or that there shall be established in China a Sino-Japanese jointly worked arsenal. Japanese technical experts are to be employed and Japanese material to be purchased."

PRESIDENT WILSON recalled that there were other demands designed to exclude other Powers from the commercial and industrial development; (Mr. Koo said, on page 52).

PRESIDENT WILSON read Article I of the Group III as follows:

"The Two Contracting Parties mutually agree that when the opportune moment arrives the Hanyehping Company shall be made a joint concern of the two nations and they further agree that without the previous consent of Japan, China shall not by her act dispose of the rights and property of whatever nature of the said Company nor cause the said Company to dispose freely of the same."

MR. KOO pointed out that the Hanyehping Company was the largest coal and iron mining Company of China, situated in the Yangtze Valley. He requested the reading of Article 2 which, he said, was even more serious.

PRESIDENT WILSON read the following:

"Art. 2—The Chinese Government agrees that all mines in the neighborhood of these owned by the Hanyehping Company shall not be permitted, without the consent of the said Company, to be worked by other persons outside the said Company; and further agrees that if it is desired to carry out any undertaking which, it is apprehended, may directly or indirectly affect the interests of the said Company, the consent of the said Company shall first be obtained."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether China had agreed to this Article.

MR. KOO said that the Chinese Government had had to accept most of the 21 Demands with slight modifications. That was why China was seeking some redress.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if the following point of view would make any appeal to the Chinese Plenipotentiaries? Hereafter whatever arrangements were made both Japan and China would be members of the League of Nations, which would guarantee their territorial integrity and political independence. That is to say, that these matters would become the concern of the League and China would receive a kind of protection that she had never had before and other nations would have a right which they had never had before to intervene. Before it had been, comparatively speaking, none of our business to interfere in these matters. The Covenant, however, laid down that whatever affected the peace of the world was a matter of concern to the League of Nations and to call attention to such was not an hostile but a friendly act. He, himself, was prepared to advocate at the Council of the League and at the Body of Delegates that the special positions occupied by the various nations in China should be abandoned. Japan declared that she was ready to support this. There would be a forum for advocating these matters. The interests of China could not then be overlooked. He was stating this as an element of security for China in the future if the powers were unable to give her what she wanted now, and he asked the Chinese Delegates to think the matter over. While there was doubt as to the Treaty and Notes between China and Japan, there was no doubt whatsoever as to the agreements entered into by France and Great Britain. Hence, even if the agreements between them and Japan were abandoned, these two Governments were bound to support Japan in getting whatever rights in Shan Tung Germany had had. Hence, the question which the Chinese Plenipotentiaries had to con-

sider was, would they prefer to retain the rights which Japan had secured in their treaty with her or would they prefer that Japan should inherit the German rights in Shan Tung.

MR. KOO said that he could not lay too much emphasis on the fact that the Chinese people were now at the parting of the ways. The policy of the Chinese Government was co-operation with Europe and the United States as well as with Japan. If, however, they did not get justice, China might be driven into the arms of Japan. There was a small section in China which believed in Asia for the Asiatics and wanted the closest co-operation with Japan. The position of the Government, however, was that they believed in the justice of the West and that their future lay there. If they failed to get justice there, the consequential re-action might be very great. Further, he wished to suggest that the validity of the arrangements was questionable owing to the following facts: (1) They arose out of the war: (2) China had subsequently come into the war herself: (3) New principles had now been adopted by all the nations as the basis of the peace and the agreements with Japan appeared to be in conflict with them. Consequently, in thanking the Supreme Council for hearing the views of the Chinese Delegation, he wished to state the great importance of attaining a peace which could be relied on to endure for 50 years instead of a peace so unjust that it would only sow the seeds of early discord.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that these were serious considerations, but he would not like Mr. Koo even personally to entertain the idea that there was injustice in an arrangement that was based on treaties which Japan had entered into. The sacredness of treaties had been one of the motives of the war. It had been necessary to show that treaties were not mere scraps of paper. If treaties were inconsistent with the principles on which the peace was being formed, nevertheless we could not undo past obligations. If that principle were accepted, we should have to go back and France would have the treaty of 1815 and there would be no end to it. He would not like to feel that because we were embarrassed by a treaty we were disregardful of justice. Moreover, the unjust treatment of China in the past had not by any means been confined to Japan. He hoped that the quandary in which the Powers were would be stated to the Chinese people. He hoped that it would be shown to them that the undoing of the trouble depended on China uniting in reality with other nations, including the Western Nations. He felt absolute confidence that the opinion of the world had the greatest sympathy for the realm of China. The heart of the world went out to her 400 millions of people. Much depended on the state of mind of these 400 million people. Any statesmen who ignored their fortunes were playing a dangerous game.

But it would not do to identify justice with unfortunate engagements that had been entered into.

MR. KOO said he believed prevention to be better than cure. He thought that it would be better to undo unfortunate engagements now, if they endangered the permanence of the future peace.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said the object of the war was not that. The war had been fought as much for the East as for the West. China also had been protected by the victory that had been won. If Germany had won the war and had desired Shan Tung or Peking, she could have had them. The very doctrine of the mailed fist had been propounded in relation to China. The engagements that had been entered into with Japan had been contracted at a time when the support of that country was urgently needed. He would not say that the war could not have been won without this support. But he could say that Kiau Chau could not have been captured without Japanese support. It was a solemn treaty and Great Britain could not turn round to Japan now and say "All right, thank you very much. When we wanted your help, you gave it, but now we think that the treaty was a bad one and should not be carried out." Within the treaties he would go to the utmost limits to protect the position of China. On the League of Nations he would always be prepared to stand up for China against oppression, if there was oppression. China was a nation with a very great past and, he believed, with a still greater future. It would, however, be of no service to her to regard treaties as Von Bethmann Hollweg had regarded them, as mere scraps of paper to be turned down when they were not wanted.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Mr. Koo could take every word that Mr. Lloyd George had said as his also.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether assuming for the sake of argument that the engagements were unfortunate nevertheless they had been entered into for the salvation of China, because they had been entered into for the salvation of the world, of which China was a part. In fact, it would be said that the very engagements were instruments for the salvation of China.

MR. KOO said they had been designed apparently to meet a situation in Europe and not in the Far East.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that if Germany had won the war in Europe, she would have won it in the Far East also. The world would have been at her feet.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the German project was not only domination from Hamburg to Bagdad but also the control of the East. Germany knew China to be rich. Her objects were mostly material. The Kaiser had been the great exponent of what was

called the "Yellow Peril". He had wanted to get France and Great Britain out of the way and afterwards to get everything else he could. One result of the war undoubtedly had been to save the Far East in particular, since that was an unexploited part of the world.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he wished to consider the question further before arriving at a decision.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked the Chinese Delegates also to give further consideration to the question and hoped that it could be taken up soon again.

(The Chinese Representatives then withdrew.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 23 April 1919.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House, in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Wednesday, April 23, 1919, at 11 a. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson

BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. Lloyd George

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B., *Secretary*
Professor P. Mantoux, *Interpreter*.

(1) MR. LLOYD GEORGE produced a communication he had received from M. Orlando giving the latest Italian proposal (Appendix I).

The Italian
Claims

He felt this offered no basis for negotiation. He suggested it might be desirable to ask the Italian delegates whether they intended to meet the Germans

when they came to Versailles.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought it was a good idea.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that when we came to deal with Austria, if the Italians were standing out of the Conference the boundaries should be settled as fairly as though Italy were in. Italy should be treated on absolutely fair lines and shown that their interests were taken care of.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that if Italy was not present in the negotiations with Germany it would be difficult for the Allied and Associated Powers to put forward claims on their behalf for reparation, for example.

PRESIDENT WILSON referred to a report which he had received from a M. Pupin, a scientist of Yugo-Slav nationality, who was working in Columbia University. The memorandum was by no means of a menacing character, but it did convey the impression that the result of a peace unsatisfactory to the Yugo-Slavs would be to drive them into the hands of the Bolsheviks. They would unite with the rest of the Slav peoples. One interesting point in M. Pupin's memorandum was a reference to an Italian Socialist meeting which had been held at Rome at which Italian claims, as recognised by the Socialists, had been outlined. No mention was made of Dalmatia, Fiume, Gorizia, or of Carinthia.

After some further discussion on this subject, which was taken up after other subjects had been discussed, President Wilson said that it was his intention to publish his memorandum on the Italian question this evening.¹

MR. LLOYD GEORGE read a memorandum which Mr. Balfour had prepared at his request and which presented the point of view of France and Great Britain.^{1a} In the course of the reading of Mr. Balfour's memorandum the following corrections were suggested:—

(1) An alteration in certain phrases which conveyed the impression that Fiume was not mentioned in the Treaty of London. It was pointed out that Fiume was mentioned in a note to Article 5.

(2) Fiume, it was pointed out, was not on the Dalmatian but on the Croatian coast.

(3) The addition, after a sentence in which it was mentioned that Fiume was one town and not two, of the following words "and that is Slav."

(4) That it would be better to omit a passage on the last page referring to the forthcoming withdrawal of Italy from the Conference. It was pointed out that although Italy had withdrawn from these conversations they had not formally withdrawn from the Preliminary Peace Conference. It was suggested it would be better to prepare the memorandum to deter Italy from doing so rather than to suggest that it was a probable contingency.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE and M. CLEMENCEAU agreed on the following:

(1) That the letter should be revised on the above lines.

(2) That copy should be sent to M. Clemenceau for him to have translated and examined.

No decision was taken as to when the letter should be forwarded to the Italian representatives.

There was some discussion as to the difficult position which would arise if Italy persisted in her present attitude. It was pointed out that if Italy should insist on holding on to Fiume, this would be itself a breach of the Treaty which definitely allotted Fiume to Croatia. If, on the other hand, Italy should abandon her position in Fiume, the situation would be very difficult, because then France and Great Britain would be bound by their Treaty to sign a Treaty with Austria which President Wilson did not feel himself in a position to sign, since Italy could insist on the portion of Dalmatia comprised in the Treaty being transferred to her sovereignty. It was generally agreed that anything which caused a difference between Great Britain and France on the one hand, and the United States of America on the other, would be most deplorable, since the future peace of the world depended so much on these three nations standing

¹ The text of the manifesto of April 23, 1919, is printed in Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, (Garden City, N. Y., 1922), vol. III, p. 287.

^{1a} The text of the memorandum as delivered to M. Orlando on April 24 appears as appendix I to IC-176C, p. 223.

together. The danger of uniting the whole of the Slavs in a possible Bolshevik regime was also commented on.

Attention was also drawn to the fact that Italy had, on the 26th April 1915, adhered to the Pact of London of the 5th September 1914,² thereby engaging herself mutually with Great Britain, France, and Russia, not to conclude a separate peace in the course of the War, and that when there was a question of discussing the terms of peace none of the Allied Powers should propose conditions of peace without previous agreement with each of the other Allies.

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had just seen Captain Gibson, an officer who had returned from Berlin and who had given us consistently very valuable information. Captain Gibson said that the best of the German Delegates was named Melchior, who desired peace. Melchior was very much in with the industrialists, who desired peace. Rantzau, whom he did not think very much of, was, he believed, opposed to peace.

M. CLEMENCEAU doubted if the present German Government could make peace.

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Captain Gibson had explained that the most important factor inducing the Germans to sign peace was their desire to re-start their national life. This brought him to the question of a scheme for re-starting Europe. No trade was at present moving anywhere in Europe. In Belgium there were many unemployed, and the same was true of other countries and particularly of Germany. Mr. Keynes had prepared a scheme, the broad outline of which was that the first thousand million pounds which Germany had to pay should be taken and guaranteed by all the Powers. Cash should be raised on it in order to enable all countries, including Germany, to get raw material and re-start their industries. Unless something of the kind was done, Melchior would not be able to make peace.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had given Captain Gibson's paper to Mr. Hoover, who had some 40 agents travelling about in Europe in connection with relief work. Mr. Hoover had said that the paper was extraordinarily correct, but he thought nothing could be done unless the people could get food and start their industrial life. At present, they were in a hopeless position. The ordinary life could not grow on the present soil and Bolshevism was the only system it could. Hence, he thought that the blockade ought to be raised.

² Great Britain, Cd. 7737, Treaty Series (1915) No. 1: *Declaration Between the United Kingdom, France, and Russia, Engaging Not To Conclude Peace Separately During the Present European War, Signed at London, September 5, 1914.*

Attitude of
German
Delegates

Credit Scheme
for Re-starting
Industry.
Raising of
Blockade

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that there was the same paralysis in countries that had no blockade.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought it would be a great mistake to raise it.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that it could be reimposed.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the moment was bad for raising the blockade. The Germans were about to arrive for the purpose of signing peace and we must not appear to be weakening.

4. M. CLEMENCEAU read information which showed that the German Delegation contemplated bringing journalists to Versailles. He asked whether the French ought to allow them to come to Versailles. His own view was strongly opposed, and he would like authority not to admit them. His information was more and more in the direction that Rantzau was coming to cause a breakdown in the negotiations.

Admission of
Enemy Journal-
ists to the Peace
Conference

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that Melchior was not coming with this object.

5. PRESIDENT WILSON considered that, in view of Melchior's presence, the attitude of the Germans would depend largely upon the economic terms. If the Germans found that chains were to be imposed on them, they would not sign, but if a fair basis were offered, they would. He had talked to the United States experts on the subject and the attitude they took was that the Allied and Associated Powers should only require that there should be no discrimination by Germany against any particular belligerent. That is to say, all should have the most favoured nation terms.

Economic
Terms

6. M. CLEMENCEAU read a telegram from the Chief of the Military Mission at Warsaw to Marshal Foch, reporting that by midnight of the 20th, 12 trains had passed through Warsaw conveying a portion of General Haller's Army. He reported a number of incidents where the Germans had molested the trains and broken open wagons and taken foodstuffs, such as biscuits, preserved meat and sacks of oats and clothing. These incidents had mainly taken place at Glogau.

The Transport
of General
Haller's Army
to Poland:
German Inter-
ference

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was surprised that the troops had got through with so little trouble. He thought the attention of Marshal Foch ought to be called to the matter and that he should be directed to make representations.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed.

(It was agreed that M. Clemenceau should instruct Marshal Foch to call the attention of the Germans to the molestation of trains conveying General Haller's Army to Poland and should insist on their carrying out their engagements.)

7. **PERSIA** **PRESIDENT WILSON** said he had received an appeal from Persia, who had sent a Delegation to the Peace Conference, and complained that [not] only had she not been admitted or heard at the Peace Conference but that no reply had even been made to communications addressed to the Bureau of the Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was informed by Sir Maurice Hankey that Mr. Balfour was opposed to the admission of Persia to the Conference, though he did not know the reasons. He asked that the matter might be postponed until he had consulted Mr. Balfour.

8. **PRESIDENT WILSON** said the time had come for holding a Plenary Conference. Lord Robert Cecil had written to him about the desirability of discussing the League of Nations Covenant there. He proposed that the Covenant should be laid before the Plenary Conference without any further speech making, although he would make a statement to the effect that the last revision which had been made to consider such criticisms as had been offered only clarified certain points. After this, anyone who wanted to discuss the question could do so. There would probably be only a few speeches. There were also several other reports which had been called for by the Plenary Conference which should be laid before them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that there must be a meeting.

M. CLEMENCEAU also agreed.

(After some further discussion, it was decided:—

(1) That a plenary meeting of the Preliminary Peace Conference should be held on Monday, April 28th, when the following reports should be considered:—

The League of Nations Covenant

The Labour Clauses

Responsibility and Breaches of the laws of War.

(2) That the clauses being drafted by the Drafting Committee to give effect to the conclusion of the Supreme Council on the subject of the Responsibility and Breaches of the laws of war should be circulated for the meeting.

(3) That a second plenary meeting of the Conference should be held on the day preceding the night on which the Germans were due to arrive at Versailles. The object of this meeting would be to communicate the contents of the Peace Treaty.)

9. The question of publicity was discussed several times during this meeting.

M. CLEMENCEAU strongly urged that the Treaty should be published when it was communicated to the Germans. It would not be fair to our own people to let the Germans see the Treaty and to conceal it from them. His

**Publicity of the
Peace Treaty**

own position would be an impossible one if the Treaty were not published. It was absolutely certain that the Germans would publish it, particularly if they wished to make mischief for us and it would make a very bad impression in the countries of the Allied and Associated Powers if the public first learnt of the terms of the Treaty of Peace from the German wireless.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the Germans might not want to publish the Treaty and that negotiations would be easier for all concerned without publicity.

Both MR. LLOYD GEORGE and PRESIDENT WILSON laid the utmost stress on the preparation of a good summary for publication.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the reception of the Peace Treaty would depend largely on the first impression made.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he was preparing a summary for communicating to the Preliminary Meeting and he thought this might also serve for the Press. He undertook to communicate it to and to discuss it with his colleagues.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that a notice ought to be issued to the Press of the Allied and Associated Powers to the effect that the moment for publication would be after the communication of the Treaty to the Germans and that premature publicity might have very serious effects.

(M. CLEMENCEAU undertook to draft a preface notice on the subject.)

Appendix I

Italian Proposals

I

The line of the Alps (Brenner) to the sea, East of Volosca.

II

Fiume under the sovereignty of Italy.

Italy will establish in the port of Fiume free zones in accordance with the terms of articles 8, 9 and 10 of the Peace clauses drawn up by the Commission of Ports, Waterways, and Railways and will extend to Fiume those facilitations which may be arranged for later on in a general convention with reference to free ports.

III

Italy will have all the islands mentioned in the Pact of London except Pago.

IV

Zara and Sebenico will be placed under the League of Nations with Italy as Mandatory Power.

**Notes of a Meeting Which Took Place at President Wilson's House
in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Wednesday, April 23,
1919, at 4 p. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson
Mr. Norman Davis
Mr. Baruch
Mr. Lamont
Mr. McCormick
Mr. Dulles
Mr. Whitney

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. Lloyd George
Lord Sumner
Lord Cunliffe
Mr. Keynes
Mr. Dudley Ward

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Klotz
M. Loucheur
M. Jouasset
M. Cheysson
M. Lyon.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B., *Secretary*
Prof. P. J. Mantoux, *Interpreter*.

REPARATION

The Council had before it a printed Memorandum on the various documents prepared by the Committees in connection with Reparation.¹

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE doubted the expediency of only having one representative for each nation on the Commission. He thought the number should be two as it might be desirable to have two types of men, for example, a financial and judicial expert.

MR. DAVIS pointed out that substitute members were provided for.

MR. LAMONT said the point had been carefully considered and provided for by means of coadjutor delegates. It had been considered that if there were two delegates for each of the five nations the Commission would become unwieldy and it would hamper progress. In any case delegates would require experts and sub-commissions would have to be appointed.

¹ Appendix I, *infra*. The text of appendix I printed *infra* is that of a printed draft of April 21, 1919, and has been substituted for a later revision, probably that of April 29, 1919, which accompanies the minutes of this meeting in the Department files.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that it was the difference between the Quai d'Orsay Council of Ten and the recent conversations of the Council of Four.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed this was a very substantial difference.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the coadjutor delegates practically provided what Mr. Lloyd George asked for.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he would not press the matter.

2. Attention was next drawn to a clause prepared by the American Delegation providing for the right of withdrawal upon six months notice by any nation on the Commission. (This will be found annexed to Clause 23 on page 11 of the Appendix, having been inserted here by a drafting error instead of in Clause 5 of Annex 2.)

The Right of
Withdrawal

PRESIDENT WILSON explained that, in his opinion, no nation ought to withdraw from a Commission but his legal advisers had informed him that no Treaty can be withdrawn from, or even renounced, unless there was a provision to that effect. He thought that public opinion in the United States would demand that there should be such a clause, although he hoped it would never be necessary to use it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked for the substitution of 12 months notice instead of 6.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed to accept this substitution.

(It was agreed that the clause providing for the right of withdrawal should be adopted with the substitution of 12 months notice instead of 6.)

3. MR. DAVIS said that the American Delegation considered that the secrecy provision should be withdrawn. The feeling was that to set up a secret clause in a public Treaty would make a bad public impression. If the delegates on the Commission were honest, they would not give out information; if they were dishonest, they would do so whether the clause were there or not.

Secrecy.—Ap-
pendix: Annex 2,
Article 8

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the object of the clause was not to exclude Governments from making announcements but to prevent the officials on the Commission from doing so. He pointed out that it was vital in matters of finance that information which might affect the money markets should not be allowed to leak out.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that their objections were not to the actual secrecy but they wished to protect the Peace Conference against the attacks of those who declared that everything should be public. He agreed with Mr. Davis that if discreet people were put on the Commission they would not give information away.

MR. LAMONT suggested that every Government would give its own instructions to its own Delegates.

It was agreed that Article 8 should be deleted.

4. MR. DAVIS said that the French and Italian Representatives were in agreement with the American proposal.

Arrangements for
Determining the
Amount and
Conditions of
Bonds, etc.—
Appendix:
Annex 2, Article
(10), Clause (b)

LORD SUMNER said that the Italians had agreed with the British Delegates; the United States and French Delegates were opposed to the British and

Italian Delegates.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE explained that the British experts apprehended that if one Power was in a position to veto an issue of Bonds, it might be able to use this power to extort special terms. They might refuse to agree to an issue of Bonds, unless some special conditions were agreed to.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he agreed with the United States proposal.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that as he was alone in this matter, he would not press the objection.

The American proposal for Clause (b) was adopted.

5. M. LOUCHEUR said that a point affecting the rate of interest had been overlooked from Article 20 [16]. He then read the following extract from an Article prepared on the subject:—

Determination of
the Rate of
Interest

“La Commission déterminera périodiquement, à la majorité, le taux de l'intérêt (au maximum 5 p. 100) dont sera débitée l'Allemagne sur sa dette, telle que l'aura fixée la Commission, et aussi les dates à partir desquelles l'intérêt sera débité sur les montants respectifs de la dite dette.”²

This, M. Loucheur said, was an American proposal. He said that originally a different text had been proposed based on the principle that a rate of 5% should be fixed leaving the Commission the right to fix a lower rate. Mr. Norman Davis had objected to this. M. Loucheur's recollection was that Mr. Lloyd George had supported Mr. Norman Davis on the ground that he considered it better from a political point of view to determine the rate of interest on the lines now proposed. The original proposal would appear to make concessions to the Germans and would create a bad impression from a political point of view.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if the Germans were given a lower rate than 5% when the Allied and Associated Governments had to pay 5% themselves, public opinion would ask why the Germans should be allowed to pay less. On the other hand, if the general rate of interest should fall, he thought that Germany should have the

² Translation: “The Commission shall determine periodically, by majority vote, the rate of interest (to a maximum of 5 percent) to be debited to Germany in respect of her debt as determined by the Commission and also the dates from which interest will be debited upon the respective amounts of the debt.”

benefit thereof and that the Commission should have the right to fix a lower rate of interest. So long as we pay 5%, the Germans should pay 5%. The Commission should not have the power to give the Germans any preferential rate of interest. He thought that it was more a question of form than of substance. Did not the American delegates agree that if we paid 5% the Germans should do the same?

PRESIDENT WILSON said that they all did. The only question was as to who should have power to lower the rate.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed to leave this to the Commission. He would rather regulate the payment of interest altogether than the rate.

M. CLEMENCEAU and M. LOUCHEUR said that they agreed.

(On Mr. Lloyd George's proposal, the drafting of a revised paragraph was left to the Expert Committee.)

6. M. LOUCHEUR read the following clause which was a continuance of the clause quoted in the preceding section and which it was proposed should be added to Article 10:—

Interest on
Pensions

“L'intérêt sera débité: (1) sur le montant des dommages matériels (pour la fraction correspondant à la valeur d'avant guerre), à partir du 11 novembre 1918; (2) pour les pensions, à partir du jour où elles sont payées par chaque pays intéressé.”³

MR. LLOYD GEORGE considered a proposal as regards interest on material damage to be a mistake. If repairs were made in kind, it would mean interest was being paid on things rebuilt and it would be very difficult to assess the value. He did not, however, press the point. He did object strongly, however, to the arrangement for pensions under Clause (2). He explained that he only wanted equal treatment for damage of all kinds. He could not acknowledge that damage to houses was more important than damage to human life. The latter was irreparable. No fair interest on this could be paid unless the value of the pensions was capitalised. The same thing should be done whether it referred to a house or to a man. Supposing by May 1st, 1921, the Commission had established that the Bill for Housing was five thousand million pounds and for pensions three thousand million pounds. Both ought to be in the same category. He then called attention to Annex I, Article I, Clause (e) and suggested that a clause based on the following words should be substituted for M. Loucheur's proposal:—

“The amount due to the Allied and Associated Governments to be calculated for all of them as being capitalised cost of such payments

³ Translation: “Interest shall be debited: (1) upon the amount of material damages (for the fraction corresponding to the pre-war value) from November 11, 1918; (2) for pensions, from the day on which they are paid by each country concerned.”

on the basis of the scales in force in France at the date of the signature of this Treaty”.

This, he pointed out, would provide that Germany should not be responsible to go on paying for 60 years. The sum would be capitalised as arranged by the Commission.

M. LOUCHEUR said that French delegates would agree.

(Mr. Lloyd George's proposal was accepted.)

7. M. LOUCHEUR pointed out that the original date for the calculation of pensions, namely, November, 1918, did not take into account the fact that pensions had been paid by the various Governments long before that date. He suggested that some provision should be made for this.

The Date From
Which Pensions Are
To Be Calculated

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that this would be covered if the words “at the date of the signature of this Treaty” were added in the above clause after the words “capitalised cost”.

(The addition of these words was approved.)

8. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he did not like the proposal that the Germans should not have power to challenge any proposal of the Commission. He agreed that they should not be able to prolong the discussion for years. Nevertheless, they ought to be able to make representations on any subject.

Participation of Ger-
many in the Proceed-
ings of the Commis-
sion—Appendix: An-
nex 2, Article 13

(At this moment Mr. Lloyd George withdrew to keep another appointment.)

LORD SUMNER said that Mr. Lloyd George's proposal was to leave out the following words: “in the discussion of the general rules as to the measure of damages only”.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that this clause contravened the original bases laid down in Clause 3 of the Reparation Provisions. He proposed to cut the whole clause out.

(After some discussion, it was agreed that the Clause should read as follows:—

“The Commission shall examine into the claims and give to the German Government a just opportunity to be heard but not to take part in any decision of the Commission whatever”.)

9. PRESIDENT WILSON drew attention to the article the American Delegation proposed to substitute.

LORD SUMNER said that the fact was that at present the burden of taxation was heavier in Allied countries than in Germany. Yet Germany might plead her poverty, and say she could not pay. It was common ground that the actual taxation was a related matter that must be taken into account. (PRESIDENT WILSON agreed.)

Basis for Estimating
Germany's Capacity
To Pay.—Appendix:
Annex 2, Article 15 (b)

What the British Delegation submitted, and thought it was not too much to ask, was that the Commission should not have the right to relieve Germany until Germany had made an attempt to raise her taxation to the amount borne by the most heavily taxed of the Allied Powers represented on the Commission. They recognised that additional taxation would not necessarily bring in money which could be used to pay outside Germany. They recognised also that such taxation might even depreciate Germany's capacity to pay. That was the reason why they said that if the taxation was too high the Commission should be permitted to accept the plea of poverty. The British Delegation felt that it was not right that the Commission should be able to remit, unless German taxation was proportionately as high as that of the most heavily taxed Allied country. He agreed it was certainly necessary to trust the Commission, but the whole of these arrangements would be subjected to very close criticism, and it would be difficult to convince public opinion if it thought that Germany could be relieved of taxation on the ground of its poverty, whilst we ourselves were more heavily taxed and had equally heavy engagements to meet. If the Commission exercised great wisdom, he agreed that the difficulty would be avoided.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that under the American scheme the Commission would not be able to admit the plea of poverty unless Germany had taxed herself to an extent at least equal to the taxation of other Powers. He agreed that the Commission must be given some standards of taxation by which to judge of Germany's ability to pay. It might be, however, that an additional burden would not give a greater yield of power to pay. He felt, however, that it was making a mistake to try to foresee situations too far in advance. If this were done, only second-rate men would be induced to serve on the Commission. He wished to get the biggest men possible, since the financial arrangements of the world would depend on its operations. Hence, he would deprecate definite and rigid instructions, and his French colleagues agreed with him. He thought that the standard of justice was as distinctly laid down in one draft as in the other.

M. LOUCHEUR said he agreed with the American draft.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE (who had meanwhile returned) said he would withdraw his objections.

(The American proposal with the French additions was adopted.)

Issue of Certificates
by the Commission
Regarding Bonds Held
for the Benefit of Dif-
ferent Governments.—
Appendix: Annex 2,
Article 16

10. MR. LLOYD GEORGE accepted the French proposal.

11. PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the United States repre-

sentatives had accepted the principle of Sanctions, but were not prepared to approve the form of words proposed in the draft. He then read a simpler and shorter formula.

Sanctions.—Appendix: Annex 2, Article 18

M. KLOTZ said that he would accept, with the addition of the words (underlined below) “or financial” after “economic”. The following substitute for the second and third sub-paragraphs of this Article was adopted:—

“The measures which the Allied and Associated Governments shall have the right to take, and which Germany hereby agrees not to consider as acts of war may include economic *or financial* prohibition and reprisals, and in general such other measures as the respective Government may determine to be necessary in the premise”.

NOTE Just as the Meeting was breaking up, it was agreed in addition to omit the last paragraph of Article 18.

12. MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that this Article was too stiff. It would give the Commission power practically to take any property or material to which it took a fancy.

Form of Payments.—Appendix: Annex 2, Article 19

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed with Mr. Lloyd George. He had seen this clause for the first time. What he wanted was to avoid even the appearance of a Brest-Litovsk forced Treaty.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that his objections would be surmounted by omitting in line 3 “demanded or”. He had no objection to the Commission accepting payment in the forms proposed, but they should not have power to demand it.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed.

(It was agreed to omit in line 3 the words “demanded or”, and in addition, to omit the second sub-paragraph of Article 19.)

13. PRESIDENT WILSON drew attention to amendments proposed by the United States Delegation, (see Commission on Reparation Supplementary Interim Report of the second Sub-Committee, dated April 18th, 1919, Appendix 2).

Merchant Shipping—(Appendix, Annex 3)
German Ships in American Ports

President Wilson said that the claim for the German ships seized in United States ports was almost the only reparation claim put forward by the United States of America. Other powers, with their full acquiescence, were to be reimbursed for pensions. In the course of the war, the United States of America had taken over the German ships in their ports and had secured their title to them by law. The ships had been so damaged that millions of dollars had had to be spent on their repairs and new methods that had to be devised. Throughout, these ships had been used for the indispensable transport of the

American armies to France. It would not be tolerable to public opinion in the United States if their title to these ships was not recognised. This had nothing to do with the payment of owners which the United States contemplated, but only to their title. It would be intolerable if anyone questioned the title which had been legally established under full process of their rights as a belligerent.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if he went into the whole case, he would show there were serious grounds which made it impossible for the British Government to accept. If he accepted it would not be merely a matter affecting the United States of America. This was an easy matter which he would not contest. It would, however, affect neutrals and other belligerents. Neutrals would benefit by this to the extent of 794,000 tons of shipping. Brazil to the extent of 216,000 tons. This meant a loss not [only?] of cash but of ships which were even more important. Brazil lost 25,000 tons and had seized 216,000 tons in her ports and would consequently profit enormously by the transaction. France lost 950,000 tons and would only be able to keep 45,000 tons; that is to say, France would only get less than $\frac{1}{20}$ th of her loss. The United States lost 389,000 tons and would get 628,000 tons. The British Empire lost 7,740,000 tons and would only get 400,000 tons. During the war Great Britain after allowing for shipbuilding had lost a balance of 4,500,000 tons. There was a great difference between the value of ships to Great Britain and the United States. It was like the value of ships to a fisherman compared with ships to a swell yachtsman. Great Britain lived on ships and it was a very serious matter to her. There was first the case of the neutrals who would walk off with 800,000 tons. In reply to President Wilson's suggestion that this could be avoided he thought it would be difficult. The German ships in American ports had been driven to take refuge there by the action of the Navies of France and Great Britain. They only escaped capture because they took refuge in United States' ports. He could not help thinking that the whole of shipping should be put in "hotchpot". The United States would then certainly get all that she had lost.

PRESIDENT WILSON said they had lost not only ships but thousands of lives. In other countries such lives were being provided for by reparation arrangements, but that America was making no such claim and it would be intolerable to public opinion if it were not agreed that the United States should retain these ships.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he would be glad to enter into an arrangement but objected to the participation of Brazil, who had no claim for walking off with so many ships. Brazil's whole trade was protected by our Fleet.

PRESIDENT WILSON said this argument did not apply to the United States, who had made an invaluable contribution to the war. The

United States did not mean to take over the ships without payment.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he did not object to some arrangement whereby the United States would retain all of the enemy ships which they had taken over, but that he did object to the proposed American clauses being put into the Peace Treaty which would permit other countries whose rights were not the same as those of the United States, to retain the enemy ships taken over by them.

Mr. Lloyd George proposed, therefore, that Annex III should stand as at present for insertion without alteration in the Peace Treaty, but that an agreement be made by the Allied Governments with the United States, providing for the retention by the United States of enemy ships now in its possession, against payment.

PRESIDENT WILSON stated this would be acceptable to him provided a satisfactory agreement in accordance with the American amendment is drawn and executed by the Allies with the United States prior to the execution of the Treaty.

(The following alterations were made during the interval when the Conference had broken up into groups. The Secretary was unable to follow the precise reasons for the decision.)

Payment in Kind
(Appendix 1, Annex
4)

14. After some discussion it was agreed to omit para 2 (c) and (d) and the last para of 6.

Legislation by Ger-
many. (Main Clauses
Para. 10)

15. (It was agreed to omit the following words at the end of para. 10:—"and to the decisions and orders of the above named Commission from time to time." The para. therefore reads as follows:—"Germany undertakes to pass any legislation and to issue any orders and decrees that may be necessary to give complete effect to these clauses".)

[16.] MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what would be the position of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland.

PRESIDENT WILSON considered that these would not be entitled to claim reparation since they had been part of enemy countries.

Powers Entitled To
Receive Reparation

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what would be the position of Roumania and Serbia, which had annexed very large territories in Transylvania and Jugó-Slavia respectively. These countries would not only escape the debts of the Austrian Empire to which they had formerly belonged, but would also escape the burdens imposed on the Allies. He thought the best plan was that proposed by M. Orlando, that there should be a sort of ledger account in relation to these territories. On one side of the account would be the liability that the annexed territories would have had for a share of the Austrian debt and indemnity and on the other side of the account would be their share in the claim of Roumania and Serbia respectively for indemnity.

This would be set off one against the other and their [*they?*] would be credited with the balance.

MR. NORMAN DAVIS asked what would happen if the balance was a debit instead of a credit.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said in that case there would be no claim.

(The above arrangement was agreed to.)

17. M. KLOTZ asked what would be the position of the subjects of Allied and Associated countries established in a country like Poland whose property had been destroyed. They would not claim compensation from Poland; ought it not to be provided that they should claim against Germany?

Claims by the Sub-
jects of Allied and
Associated Powers
Resident in Poland
and Czecho-Slovakia

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that they were provided for by Annex I, Article I (a).

It was also pointed out that they were provided for by Article 3, where the words used were "wherever situated".

18. After a somewhat prolonged discussion, the following arrangements were agreed to for consultation with the Powers with special interest on the subject of the reparation clauses. The Expert Committee, which had been advising the Supreme Council, should divide itself into groups and each group should see a group of nations of the Powers with special interests. M. Loucheur undertook to organise this arrangement. Those States which had observations to make should subsequently have the right of consulting the Supreme Council.

Consultation With the
Smaller Powers

19. M. LOUCHEUR proposed the following addition to Article 7 of the reparation clauses:—

The Return of Ani-
mals Taken From
Invaded Territories

"Si une moitié au moins des animaux pris par l'ennemi dans les territoires envahis ne peut être identifiée et restituée, le reste, jusqu'à concurrence de la moitié du nombre enlevé, sera livré par l'Allemagne à titre de restitution."⁴

(After considerable discussion, it was agreed that M. Loucheur's proposed addition to Article 7 should not be inserted in the Treaty of Peace; his proposal should, however, form the subject of a separate agreement between the Allies, a draft text of the agreement to be prepared and submitted by M. Loucheur.)

20. M. KLOTZ proposed the addition of the following new category of damage:—

Categories of
Damage

"h) Dépenses engagées par l'Etat, ou pour son compte et avec son autorisation, pour ravitailler, transporter ou secourir la population

⁴Translation: "If a half at least of the animals taken by the enemy in the invaded areas cannot be identified and restored, the remainder, up to half of the number removed, shall be delivered by Germany under the heading of restitution."

civile des territoires occupés et la population civile réfugiée ou évacuée.”⁵

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if new categories were put in, the British Government would have a number of new categories which it would wish to introduce.

(It was agreed that the addition proposed by M. Klotz related to a question of the interpretation to be given to the categories already accepted and should be referred without delay for consideration to the Commission on Reparations.)

Valuation 21. M. KLOTZ made a proposal for putting a valuation clause in the Treaty in regard to property for which reparation was to be given. This was necessary owing to the change of value between 1914 and the present time.

(It was agreed that the Expert Committee should meet to prepare a text.)⁶

The Conclusions, as revised by the Expert Drafting Committee, will be forwarded later.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 23 April 1919.

Woodrow Wilson Papers

[Appendix I to IC-176A]

REPARATION

[NOTE.—Drafting and other minor changes are printed in italics.]^{6a}

1. The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and *Germany* accepts the responsibility of *herself and her Allies* for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of the enemy States.

2. The Allied and Associated Governments recognise that the financial resources of *Germany* are not adequate after taking into account permanent diminutions of such resources which will result from other treaty clauses to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage. The Allied and Associated Governments, however, require, and the German Government undertakes that she will make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied or Associated Powers and to their property by *such** aggression by land, by sea and from the air, as defined in the annexed Schedule 1.

⁵ Translation: “*h*) Expenses incurred by the State, or for its account and with its authorization, to feed, transport, or relieve the civilian population of the occupied territories and the refugee or evacuated civilian population.”

⁶ For this text, see appendix III, p. 201.

^{6a} Brackets appear in the original.

*The French text reads “German aggression.” [Footnote in the original.]

3. The amount of such damage (as set forth under the specific categories attached hereto) for which compensation is to be made by *Germany* shall be determined by an Inter-Allied Commission, to be constituted in *the form and with the powers set forth hereunder and in the Annexes hereto*. This Commission shall examine into the claims and give to the *German Government* a just opportunity to be heard. The findings of the Commission as to the amount of damage defined as above shall be concluded and notified to Germany on or before the 1st May, 1921, as representing the extent of their obligations. The Commission shall concurrently draw up a schedule of payments prescribing the time and manner for securing and discharging the entire obligation within a period of thirty years from the 1st May, 1921. In the event, however, that within the period mentioned, Germany shall have failed to discharge her obligation, then any balance remaining unpaid may, within the discretion of the Commission, be postponed for settlement in subsequent years: or may be handled otherwise in such manner as the Allied and Associated Governments, acting through the Commission, shall determine.

4. The Inter-Allied Commission shall thereafter, from time to time, consider the resources and capacity of Germany and, after giving her representatives a just opportunity to be heard, shall have discretion to extend the date, and to modify the form of payments, such as are to be provided for in Clause 3: but not to cancel any part, except with the specific authority of the several Governments represented upon the Commission.

5. In order to enable the Allied and Associated Powers to proceed at once to the restoration of their industrial and economic life, pending the full determination of their claim, Germany shall pay in such instalments and in such manner (whether in gold, commodities, ships, securities or otherwise) as the Inter-Allied Commission may fix, *before the 1st May, 1921*, the equivalent of 20,000,000,000 gold marks and pending payment of this sum she shall deposit bonds as security in the manner prescribed in Clause XV (c) (1) of Annex 2 attached hereto. Out of this sum the expenses of the army of occupation subsequent to the armistice shall first be met, provided that such supplies of food and raw materials as may be judged by the Allied and Associated Governments to be essential to enable Germany to meet her obligations for reparation may also, with the approval of the Allied and Associated Governments, be paid for out of the above sum, and the balance shall be reckoned towards liquidation of the above claims for reparation. She shall further deposit bonds as prescribed in Clause XV (c) of Annex 2 attached hereto.

Ships shall be handed over by Germany to the Commission at the time and in the manner stated in Annex III and in all respects in compliance therewith.

6. The successive instalments including the above sum paid over by the enemy States in satisfaction of the above claims will be divided by the Allied and Associated Governments in proportions which have been determined upon by them in advance, on a basis of general equity, and of the rights of each.

7. *In addition to the payments mentioned above Germany shall effect restitution in cash of cash taken away, seized or sequestered, and also restitution in kind of animals, objects of every nature and securities taken away, seized or sequestered, in the cases in which it proves possible to identify them in enemy territory.*

8. The German Government undertakes to make forthwith the restitution contemplated by Article 7 and to make the payments contemplated by Articles 3, 4 and 5.

9. The German Government recognises the Commission provided for by Article 3 as the same may be constituted by the Allied and Associated Governments *in accordance with Schedule II attached hereto*, and agrees irrevocably to the possession and exercise by such Commission of the power and authority given it by Articles 3, 4 and 5. The German Government will supply to the Commission all the information which the Commission may require relative to the financial situation and operations *and to the property, productive capacity and stocks and current production of raw materials and manufactured articles* of the German Government, its States, Municipalities and other governmental subdivisions *and of its nationals and corporations*, and accords to the members of the Commission and its authorised agents the same rights and immunities as are enjoyed in Germany by duly accredited diplomatic agents of friendly Powers. The German Government further agrees to provide for the compensation and expenses of the Commission and of such staff as it may employ.

10. Germany undertakes to pass any legislation and to issue any orders and decrees that may be necessary to give complete effect to these clauses and to the decisions and orders of the above-named Commission from time to time.

11 †. *These shall be reckoned as a credit to the German Government in respect of the payments due from it under the above clauses, the following items arising out of other Articles of this Treaty and its Annexes:—*

- (i.) *Any final balance in favour of Germany under Article of Part IV of the Economic Terms.*

†Note to Drafting Committee:—This may not be a complete reference list. [Footnote in the original.]

- (ii.) *Any sums due to Germany in respect of property or material delivered under the Armistice Terms or its extensions.*‡
- (iii.) *Any sums due to Germany in respect of transfers under Article XIII of the Financial Terms.*
- (iv.) *Any sums due to Germany in respect of transfers under Articles 19, 37 and 51 of the Ports, Waterways and Railways Terms.*

Annex 1

Compensation may be claimed under Clause 2 above under the following categories of damage.

I

(a.) Damage to injured persons and to surviving dependents by personal injury to or death of civilians caused by acts of war (including bombardments or other attacks on land, on sea, or from the air, and all the direct consequences thereof, and of all operations of war by the two groups of belligerents wherever arising).

(b.) Damage caused to civilian victims of acts of cruelty, violence or maltreatment (including injuries to life or health as a consequence of imprisonment, deportation, internment or evacuation, of exposure at sea or of being forced to labour by the enemy), committed or ordered by the enemy wherever arising and to the surviving dependents of such victims.

(c.) Damage caused to civilian victims of all acts of the enemy in occupied, invaded, or enemy territory injurious to health or capacity to work, or to honour, and to the surviving dependents of such victims.

(d.) Damage caused by any kind of maltreatment of prisoners of war.

(e.) As damage caused to the peoples of the Allied and Associated States, all pensions and compensations in the nature of pensions to naval and military victims of war, whether mutilated, wounded, sick or invalided, and to the dependents of such victims, *the amount due to the Allied and Associated Governments being calculated for all of them as being the capitalised cost of such payments on the basis of the scales in force in France at the date of the signature of this Treaty.*

(f.) *The actual cost of assistance by the Governments of the Allied and Associated States to prisoners of war and to their families and dependents.*

‡Note to Drafting Committee:—Apparently there are at present no clauses in the Treaty dealing with the status of material "surrendered," "delivered" or "left in situ" under Clauses 4, 6, 7, 22 and 28 of the Armistice, in particular whether Germany is to receive a credit in respect of the whole or any part of this material. [Footnote in the original.]

(g.) Allowances by the *Governments of the Allied and Associated States* to the families and dependents of mobilised persons or persons serving with the forces, *the amount due to them for each calendar year in which hostilities occurred being calculated for all of them on the basis of the average scale for such payments in force in France during that year.*

II

Damage caused to civilians by being forced by the enemy to labour without just remuneration.

III

Damage in respect of all property wherever situated belonging to any of the Allied or Associated States or to any of their peoples, with the exception of military works or materials, which has been carried off, seized, injured or destroyed by the acts of the enemy on land, on sea or from the air, or damage directly in consequence of hostilities or of any operation of the war.

IV

Damage in the form of levies, fines and other similar exactions imposed by the enemy upon civilian population.

Annex 2

I

The Commission referred to in Articles 3 and following of the *above clauses* shall be called "The Reparation Commission" and is hereinafter referred to as "the Commission."

II

The Commission shall consist of five Delegates nominated by the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Belgium. Each of these Powers will appoint one Delegate and also one coadjutor Delegate, who will take his place in case of illness or of necessary absence, but at other times will only have the right of

being present at all proceedings without taking any part therein.

III

Such of the other Allied Powers as may be interested shall have the right to appoint a Delegate to be present and act as assessor only while their respective claims and interests are under examination or discussion, but without the right to vote.

IV

In case of the death, resignation or recall of any Delegate, coadjutor Delegate or assessor Delegate, a successor to him shall be nominated as soon as possible.

V

The Commission will have its principal permanent Bureau in Paris and will hold its first meeting in Paris as soon as practicable after the signature of the Preliminaries of the Treaty of Peace, and thereafter will meet in such place or places and at such time as it may deem convenient and as may be necessary for the most expeditious discharge of its duties.

VI

At its first meeting the Commission shall elect two of the said five Delegates, one as Chairman and the other as Vice-Chairman, who shall hold office for one year and shall be eligible for re-election. If a vacancy in the Chairmanship or Vice-Chairmanship should occur during the annual period, it shall

be forthwith filled by the Commission for the residue of the said period.

VII

The Commission is authorised to appoint all necessary officers, agents and employees who may be required for the execution of its functions, and to fix their compensation; to constitute Sub-Committees, and to take all executive steps necessary for the purpose of discharging its duties; and to delegate authority and discretion to officers, agents and Sub-Committees.

VIII

All Delegates and all officials and persons appointed by the Commission shall be bound to observe secrecy concerning the business and proceedings of the Commission and concerning their duties (communications to the Governments, in conformity with their instructions, being always excepted).

IX

All proceedings of the Commission shall be private, unless, on particular occasions, the Commission shall otherwise determine for special reasons.

X

As to voting, the Commission will observe the following rules:—

When a decision of the Commission is taken, all the Delegates, or in the absence of any of them their coadjutor Delegates, ought to be present. Their votes will be recorded. Abstinance from voting

is to be treated as a vote against the proposal under discussion. Assessors have no vote.

On the following questions unanimity is necessary:—

(a.) Any question involving the sovereignty of any of the Allied and Associated Powers, including the cancellation of the whole or any part of the debt or obligations of Germany.

(b.) The Commission will from time to time issue for negotiation or sale to third parties, bonds of the hereinafter-mentioned issues delivered by Germany. In doing so, it will have regard both to the financial requirements of the Allied Powers and to the necessity of avoiding depreciation of the bonds still unissued by negotiating excessive amounts. Up to four thousand millions of marks per annum, it may decide upon such issues by a majority, but for the amounts in excess of that sum unanimity shall be required.

(c.) Any postponement, total or partial, of the payment of instalments falling due between the 1st May, 1921, and the end of 1926 inclusive for a period extending beyond 1930.

(d.) Any postponement, total or partial, of any instalment falling due after 1926 for a period exceeding three years.

The Commission is not to apply in any particular case a method of measuring damages different from that which has been previously applied in a similar case except by a unanimous vote.

In case of any difference of opinion among the Delegates, which cannot be solved by reference to their Governments, upon the question whether a given case is one

(b.) *American Proposal.*

In all questions of determining the amount and conditions of bonds or other obligations to be executed by Germany, and of fixing the time and manner for selling, negotiating or distributing such bonds, a unanimous vote of the Commission shall be required.

which requires a unanimous vote for its decision or not, the Allied and Associated Powers agree to refer such difference to the immediate arbitration of some impartial person to be agreed upon by their Governments, whose award the Allied and Associated Governments agree to accept.

All other questions shall be decided by the vote of a majority.

XI

Decisions of the Commission, in accordance with the powers conferred upon it, shall forthwith become binding and may be put into immediate execution without further proceedings.

XII

The Commission shall be required to hear, within a period which it will fix from time to time, evidence and arguments on the part of Germany on any question connected with her capacity to pay, if she so desires.

XIII§

The Commission shall be at liberty, but shall not be bound, to allow Germany to take such part, if any, as the Commission may think right, in the discussion of the general rules as to the meas-

§This article appears to be inconsistent with the following in No. 3 of the main clauses—"This Commission shall examine into the claims and give the German Government a just opportunity to be heard," inasmuch as Clause 3 does not limit the questions on which Germany is entitled to be heard. [Footnote in the original.]

ure of damages only, but not in any decision of the Commission whatever.

XIV

The Commission shall not be bound by any particular code or rules of law or by any particular rules of evidence or of procedure, but shall be guided by justice, equity and good faith. Its decisions must follow the same principles and rules in all cases where they are applicable. It will establish rules relating to methods of proof of claims. It may act on any trustworthy modes of computation.

XV

The Commission shall in general have wide latitude as to its control and handling of the whole reparation problem, and shall have the powers referred to in Clauses III and IV of the Treaty. Subject to the provisions of the Treaty and of its annexes, the Commission is constituted by the several Allied and Associated Governments as the exclusive agency of the said Governments respectively for receiving, selling, holding, and distributing the payment of reparation to be made by Germany pursuant to Articles of the Treaty. The Commission must comply with the following conditions and provisions:—

(a.) Whatever part of the full amount of the proved claims is not paid in gold, or in ships, securities, and commodities or otherwise, Germany shall be required, under such conditions as the Com-

mission may determine, to cover by way of guarantee by an equivalent issue of bonds or obligations or otherwise, in order to constitute an acknowledgment of the said part of the debt.

(b.) In exercising the powers given by Clause IV to the Commission, Germany shall be considered as able to pay the amount of the proved claims and the amount of any annual instalment fixed by the Commission in full as they fall due—

1. As long as her internal taxation for the service of the debt due to the Allies in respect of their proved claims is not at least equal per head of the population of Germany to the amount borne per head of the population by the most heavily taxed of the Allied Powers represented on the Commission as taxation for the service of its public debt, unless the Commission is unanimously of opinion that the German taxation has reached an amount which cannot be increased without diminishing Germany's capacity to pay.

2. As long as any sums are paid, either by way of principal and interest or otherwise, for the service of any part of the German war debt 1914-19, or any subsequent debt, or of any debt contracted by her previously to that date, which is held by her nationals.

The sums payable for reparation which Germany is required to pay shall become a charge upon all her revenues prior to the service or discharge of any domestic loan, and the Commission shall make an order to that effect.

(b.) *American Proposal.*

In estimating Germany's periodical capacity to pay, the Commission shall examine the German system of taxation, first to the end that the sums for reparation which Germany is required to pay shall become a charge upon all her revenues, prior to that for the service or discharge of any domestic loan, and, secondly, so as to satisfy itself that, in general, the German scheme of taxation is fully as heavy proportionately as that of any of the Powers represented on this Commission.

French addition to American clause.

The decision of the Commission relative to the total or partial cancellation of the capital or interest of any verified debt of Germany must be accompanied by a statement of the grounds for its action.

The Commission shall study the German system of taxation from time to time, with a view of ascertaining its relation to the systems of the Powers represented on the Commission, for which purpose Germany will furnish it with all information for which it asks.

(c.) In order to facilitate and continue the immediate restoration of the Allies' economic life, the Commission, *as provided in clause 5 above*, will take from Germany by way of security for and acknowledgment of her debt a first instalment of gold bearer bonds *free of all taxes or imposts of every description leviable by the Government of Germany or its States, or by any authority subject to them*, on account, in three portions, as follows, the Mark being taken as equivalent to 0.358425 grammes of fine gold :—

(Note.—Not at present definitely agreed.)

1. To be issued forthwith, 20,000,000,000 M. in gold bearer bonds, payable *not later than the 1st May, 1921*, without interest. There shall be specially applied towards the amortisation of these bonds the payments which Germany is pledged to make in conformity with Article 5 of the Treaty after deduction of the sums used for the reimbursement of expenses of the armies of occupation and for payment of food-stuffs and raw materials. Such bonds as have not been redeemed by the 1st May, 1921, shall then be exchanged for new bonds of the same type as those provided for in 2 below.
2. To be issued forthwith, further 40,000,000,000 M. gold

bearer bonds, *bearing interest at 2½ per cent. between 1921 and 1926, and thereafter at 5 per cent., with an additional 1 per cent. on the whole amount of the issue beginning in 1926 for amortisation.*

3. To be issued when, but not until, the Commission is satisfied that Germany can meet her interest obligations to the Allied and Associated Governments (a covering bond for the amount having been delivered by Germany at once), a further instalment of 40,000,000,000 M. gold bearer bonds, *bearing interest at 5 per cent. with an additional 1 per cent. on the whole amount of the issue for amortisation.*

The due interest dates, the manner of applying the amortisation fund, and all similar questions relating to the issue, management, and regulation of the bond issue shall be determined by the Commission from time to time.

Further issues by way of acknowledgment and security may be required as the Commission subsequently determines from time to time.

In the event that bonds, obligations, or other evidence of indebtedness issued by Germany by way of security for or acknowledgement of her reparation debt, are disposed of outright, not by way of pledge, to persons other than the several Governments in whose favour Germany's original reparation indebtedness was

Partial extinguishment of Obligation.

created, then such reparation indebtedness shall be deemed to be extinguished in an amount corresponding with the nominal value of such evidences of indebtedness as have been distributed; and the obligation of Germany in respect to such amount shall thereupon be confined to its obligations expressed in the evidences of indebtedness.

XVI

The Commission will issue to each *Allied and Associated Government* interested, in such forms and in such denominations as it may fix, certificates stating that it holds for the benefit of such *Government* bonds of the above-mentioned issues, *and presenting payments to which such Government is entitled.*

When bonds are issued for sale or negotiation, a corresponding amount of certificates will be retired.

XVII ¶

The Commission will formulate and carry out a scheme for drawing and cancelling the said bonds in proportion to the amounts received on account of *amortisation* from time to time. The Commission shall also have power to apply the said *amounts* in purchasing the said bonds in the open market below par from time to time.

¶ This Article appears to be unnecessary in view of Article XV. above.
[Footnote in the original.]

(*French Proposal.*)

The Commission will issue to each of the interested Powers, in such form as it will fix:—

1. A certificate stating that it holds for the account of the said Power bonds of the issues mentioned above, the said certificate, on the demand of the Power concerned, being divisible in a number of parts not exceeding five:
2. From time to time, after May 1921, certificates stating that it holds for the account of the said Power all other goods delivered by Germany on account of her reparation debt.

When bonds are issued for sale or negotiation, and when goods are delivered by the Commission, an equivalent number of certificates must be withdrawn.

The Commission will establish and put into execution a scheme of drawing and amortisation of the said bonds in proportion to the sums received on account of payments made from time to time and destined for the sinking fund. The Commission will also have the right to employ from time to time the said payments destined for the sinking fund in purchase of the said bonds on the open market below par.

XVIII

In case of voluntary default by Germany in the performance of any obligation, of whatever kind, to comply with and satisfy its decisions, the Commission will forthwith give notice of such default to each of interested Powers and may make such recommendations as to the action to be taken in consequence of such default as it may think necessary.

These measures, which the Allied and Associated Powers shall have the right to take, and which Germany agrees not to regard as acts of war, may be in particular the following:—

The United States Representatives accepted the principle of sanctions, but were not prepared to approve the form of words proposed above.

1. Prohibition against German vessels entering ports situated in the territory of the Allied and Associated States or of their possessions and dependencies and from utilising any coaling stations belonging to the said States.
2. Seizure whether in the ports of the Allied and Associated States, whether on the high sea, of all German vessels, under reserve of

the rights of neutrals, which should be safeguarded.

3. Prohibition from entry into the territories of the Allied and Associated States or of their possessions and dependencies to all German subjects and all goods of German origin.
4. Prohibition of the negotiation on the territories of the said States of German securities of any kind.
5. Suspension of all postal, telegraphic, and telephonic communication with Germany.
6. Seizure on the territories of the said States of all German goods.

These rights shall not be exclusive of the exercise of any others.

The engagement of the German Government in the financial protocol^{6b} in the Armistice signed at Trèves on the 13th December, 1918, shall be maintained until Germany has paid the first 20,000,000,000 M. bonds referred to in Article , unless the Commission should previously accept some other guarantee in lieu thereof.

XIX

Payments required to be made in gold or its equivalent on account of the proved claims of the Allies may at any time be demanded or accepted by the Commission in the form of properties, chattels, commodities, businesses, rights, and concessions in German territories or in territories other than the territories of Germany, ships, bonds, shares, *or* securities of any kind, currencies or bonds

^{6b} Vol. II, p. 541.

of Germany or of other States, the value of such substitutes for gold being fixed at a fair and just amount by the Commission itself.

The German Government proposes and undertakes to take any necessary measures to acquire, in cases where it is not already the owner, and to transfer to the Commission all goods, rights, and interests of German nationals which the said Commission may find acceptable.

XX

The Commission, in fixing or accepting payment in specific property, shall have due regard for any legal or equitable interests of nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers or of neutral Powers in such property.

XXI

When all the amounts due from the enemy States under the Treaty of Peace or the decisions of the Commission have been discharged and all sums received, or their equivalents, shall have been distributed to the Powers interested, the Commission shall be dissolved.

XXII

No member of the Commission shall be responsible, except to the Government appointing him, for any action or omission as such member. No one of the Allied or Associated Governments assumes any responsibility in respect of any other Government.

XXIII

(American Proposal)

Subject to the provisions of the Treaty this Annex may be amended by the unanimous decision of the Governments represented from time to time upon the Commission.

Each Government represented upon the Commission shall have the right to withdraw from representation upon the Commission upon six months' notice filed with the Commission.

Annex 3¹*Articles relating to Merchant Shipping*

I

1. The enemy Powers recognise the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to the replacement, ton for ton (gross tonnage) and class for class, of all merchant ships and fishing boats lost or damaged owing to the war.

Nevertheless, and in spite of the fact that the tonnage of enemy shipping at present in existence is much less than that lost by the Allied and Associated Powers, the right thus recognised will be enforced on enemy ships and boats under the following conditions:—

The enemy Powers on behalf of themselves and so as to bind all other persons interested, cede to the Allied and Associated Governments the property in all the enemy merchant ships which are of 1,600 tons gross and upwards; in one-half, reckoned in tonnage, of the ships which are between 1,600 tons and 1,000 tons gross; in one-quarter, reckoned in tonnage, of the steam trawlers; and in one-quarter, reckoned in tonnage, of the other fishing boats.

2. The enemy Powers will, within two months of the signature of the Preliminaries of Peace, deliver to a representative of the Allied and Associated Governments, duly authorised by them for this purpose, all the ships and boats mentioned in Article I.

3. The ships and boats mentioned in Article I include all ships and boats which (a) fly, or may be entitled to fly, the enemy merchant flag; (b) are owned by any enemy subject, company or corporation or by any neutral company or corporation which is under the control or direction of enemy subjects; (c) which are now under construction in enemy or in neutral countries.

4. For the purpose of providing documents of title for the ships and boats to be handed over as above mentioned, the enemy Powers will:

(a.) Deliver to the representative of the Allied and Associated Governments in respect of each vessel a bill of sale or other document

¹ This Annex is not accepted in its present form by the United States Delegation. [Footnote in the original.]

of title evidencing the transfer of the entire property in the vessel, free from all encumbrances, charges and liens of all kinds, to that officer;

(b.) Take all measures that may be indicated by the said representative of the Allied and Associated Governments for ensuring that the ships themselves shall be placed at his disposal.

II

As an additional part of reparation, the German Government agrees to cause merchant ships to be built in German yards for Allied account as follows:—

(1.) Within three months of the signature of the Preliminaries of Peace, the Allied and Associated Powers will notify the German Government of the amount of tonnage to be laid down in German shipyards in each of the two years next succeeding the three months mentioned above;

(2.) Within twenty-four months of the signature of the Preliminaries of Peace, the Allied and Associated Governments will notify to the German Government the amount of tonnage to be laid down in each of the three years following the two years mentioned above;

(3.) The amount of tonnage to be laid down in each year will not exceed 200,000 tons, gross tonnage.

(4.) The specifications of the ships to be built, the conditions under which they are to be built and delivered, the price per ton at which they are to be accounted for in the reparation account, and all other questions relating to the accounting, ordering, building and delivery of the ships, shall be determined by a Commission nominated by the Allied and Associated Powers.

III

The enemy Powers undertake to restore in kind and in normal condition of upkeep to the Allied and Associated Powers, within two months of the signature of these preliminaries, any boats and other movable appliances belonging to inland navigation which since the 2nd August, 1914, have by any means whatever come into their possession or into the possession of their nationals, and which can be identified.

With a view to make good the loss in inland navigation tonnage, from whatever cause arising, which has been incurred during the war by the Allied and Associated Powers, and which cannot be made good by means of the reparation in kind prescribed in the above paragraph, the enemy Powers agree to cede to the Allied and Associated Powers a portion of the enemy river fleet up to the amount of the reparation in kind mentioned above, provided that such cession shall not exceed 20 per cent. of the river fleet as it existed on the 11th November, 1918.

The conditions of this cession shall be settled by the same arbitrators as are charged with the settlement of difficulties relating to the

apportionment of river tonnage resulting from the new international régime applicable to certain river systems or from the territorial changes affecting those systems.

IV

1. The enemy Powers undertake to take any measures that may be indicated to them by the Allied and Associated Governments for obtaining the full title to the property in all ships which have during the war been transferred, or are in process of transfer, to neutral flags, without the consent of the Allied and Associated Governments.

2. The enemy Powers abandon in favour of the Allied and Associated Governments all claims of all descriptions against the Allied and Associated Governments and against subjects or citizens of Allied and Associated countries in respect of the detention, employment, loss or damage of any enemy ships or boats.

3. The enemy Powers abandon in favour of the Allied and Associated Powers any claim to vessels or cargoes sunk by or in consequence of enemy naval action and subsequently salvaged, in which any of the Allied or Associated Governments or their citizens or subjects may have any interest either as owners, charterers, insurers or otherwise, notwithstanding any decree of condemnation which may have been made by an enemy Prize Court.

4. The enemy Powers will within three months of the signature of the Preliminaries of Peace take all necessary legislative and administrative measures to enable them to carry out the provisions of this chapter.

Annex 4

1. The Allied and Associated Governments require, and the German Government undertakes, that Germany, in part satisfaction of its obligations above expressed, will, as hereinafter provided, devote her economic resources directly to the physical restoration of the invaded areas of France, Italy and Belgium, to the extent that these Powers shall judge it useful to avail thereof.

2. The Governments of the several Allied and Associated Powers may file, with the Inter-Allied Commission, schedules showing :—

(a.) Animals, machinery, rolling-stock, equipment, tools and like articles of a commercial character, which have been seized, consumed or destroyed by the enemy, or destroyed in direct consequence of military operations, and which such Governments desire, for the purpose of meeting immediate and urgent needs (in the devastated areas and without re-export) to have replaced by animals and articles of the same nature which are in being in German territory;

(b.) Reconstruction materials (stones, brick, tile, lumber, window-glass, steel, lime, cement, &c.), machinery, heating apparatus, furniture, and like articles of a commercial character which the said Governments desire to have produced and manufactured in Germany and delivered to them to permit of the restoration of the invaded areas;

(c.) The number and character of workmen which the said Governments desire to have engaged in clearing the fields of battle and performing reconstruction work in the invaded areas, and the proposed period of employment;

(d.) Objects of notable artistic, historic or literary value, of a character not susceptible of reproduction which have been seized or destroyed by the enemy or destroyed in direct consequence of military operations, and which the said Governments may desire to have replaced by similar objects which are in being in Germany.

Neither rolling-stock in actual industrial use, nor more than 30 per cent. of the tools and machinery in any one factory in actual industrial use, are to be demanded of Germany.

3. Schedule "A" shall be filed within sixty (60) days after the date of the signature of this Treaty. Schedule "B" shall be filed on or before the 31st December, 1919. Schedule "C" shall be filed within one hundred and twenty (120) days after the date of the signature of this Treaty. Schedule "D" shall be filed on or before the 31st December, 1919. The Schedules shall contain all such details as are customary in commercial contracts dealing with the subject matter, including specifications, acceptable dates, but within four years, and places of delivery, &c., but not price or value, which shall be fixed by the Commission as hereinafter provided.

4. Immediately upon the filing of said Schedules with the Commission, the Commission shall consider what of the labour, materials, animals, &c., mentioned in said Schedules shall be required of Germany. In reaching a decision on this matter the Commission shall take into account such domestic requirements of Germany as it deems essential for the maintenance of Germany's social and economic life, the prices and dates at which similar articles can be obtained in the Allied and Associated countries as compared with those to be paid for German articles, and the general interest of the Allied and Associated Governments that the industrial life of Germany be not so disorganised as to affect adversely the ability of Germany to perform the other acts of reparation stipulated for. The Commission shall give representatives of the German Government an opportunity and a time to be heard finally as to their capacity to furnish the said labour, materials, articles, animals, &c. The decision of the Commission shall thereupon and at the earliest possible moment be communicated to the German Government and to the several interested Allied and Associated Governments. The German Government undertakes to deliver, and the interested Allied and Associated Governments severally agree to accept the labour, materials,

articles, animals, &c., as specified in said communication, provided they conform to the specifications given, or are not, in the judgment of the Commission, unfit to be utilized in the work of reparation.

5. The Commission shall determine the value to be attributed to the labour, materials, articles, animals, &c., to be delivered in accordance with the foregoing, and the Allied or Associated Power receiving the same shall, and hereby agrees, to be charged with such value and the amount thereof shall be treated as a payment by Germany to be divided in accordance with Article 6 (of General Reparation Clauses). The Commission shall have regard to ensuring an equitable correspondence between the value attributed to such acts of reparation and the pecuniary measure of the damage which such acts repair.

6. In the event that Germany shall supply labour in accordance with the foregoing, the work shall be performed under the supervision and direction of engineers or architects selected by the Government of the country in which the work is to be performed, and in accordance with plans and specifications approved by such Government.

The maximum number of workmen that Germany may be required at any one time to provide shall be 500,000 for all Powers. The said workmen shall be subject to rules of discipline and conduct formulated by the Inter-Allied Commission, and it shall be the duty of the country employing such workmen under regulations made by and to the satisfaction of the Commission to ensure to said labourers proper working and living conditions. The Government of any country in which said workmen shall be employed undertakes to abide by and give effect to the rulings of the Commission applicable to said workmen.

Annex 5

The German Government undertakes to accord to the French and Italian Governments the following options for the delivery of coal to France and Italy respectively. The amount of coal to be delivered each calendar year shall be determined and notified to Germany not later than the 1st September of the preceding year.

1. Germany is required to deliver to France 7,000,000 tons per year for ten years. In addition, Germany is required to deliver to France an amount of coal equal to the deficit between the production before the war of the mines of the north and Pas de Calais destroyed by the Germans, and the production of the same mines during the years in question—but not longer than ten years—not to exceed 20,000,000 tons in any one year of the first five years, and 8,000,000 tons in any one year of the succeeding five years.

2. For the delivery to Italy of not more than the following quantities of coal:—

In period	July 1919	to	June 1920	4½	million tons.
"	"	1920	"	1921	6 " "
"	"	1921	"	1922	7½ " "
"	"	1922	"	1923	8 " "
"	"	1923	"	1924	}	8½ " "
and the following five years						

At least two-thirds of the actual deliveries to be land-borne.

The prices to be paid for such coal delivered under these options to be as follows:—

(a.) For overland delivery, including delivery by barge, the German pithead price to German nationals, plus the freight to French or Italian frontier, provided that the pithead price does not exceed the pithead price of British coal for export.

(b.) For sea delivery, the German export price f. o. b. the German ports, or the British export price f. o. b. British ports, whichever may be lower. Railroad tariffs shall not be higher than lowest similar rates.

(c.) All matters regarding procedure, qualities of coal, times and mode of delivery and payment, and all other details will be regulated by the Inter-Allied Commission.

It is understood that due diligence will be exercised in the restoration of the destroyed Lens and Pas de Calais properties.

[Appendix II to IC-176A]

Commission on Reparation

SUPPLEMENTARY INTERIM REPORT OF THE SECOND SUB-COMMITTEE ON
REPARATION**

Since presenting its first interim report, the Second Sub-Committee has held three meetings in order to conclude its discussions of the enemy merchant fleet considered as a means of reparation, and on other matters. In these meetings the Committee has had the advantage of the advice of experts.

MERCHANT SHIPPING

The Committee started from the principle that the enemy should be required to recognise the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to the replacement, ton for ton and class for class, of all the

**This Report was adopted by the Commission on Reparation on the 19th April, 1919. [Footnote in the original.]

merchant ships and fishing-boats which they have destroyed or damaged during the war. The Allied merchant tonnage destroyed by the enemy is, in round figures, 10,750,000 tons, and the total enemy merchant shipping tonnage available about 5,500,000 tons. There is, therefore, only enough enemy merchant tonnage to meet about half the Allied claim, and yet it has been deemed necessary to leave the enemy the major portion of his coasting and fishing fleets as being essential to his economic needs.

The Committee agree that the enemy Powers should be required to cede the whole of their merchant tonnage over 1,600 tons gross, half of the vessels between 1,600 and 1,000 tons, and one-quarter of the steam trawlers and of the other fishing craft. This leaves to Germany the greater portion of her coasting and fishing vessels.

An additional means of securing reparation in kind for the merchant ships destroyed during the war is to require Germany to undertake to build merchant ships for the Allies over a period of five years. The maximum amount to be built in any one year is fixed at 200,000 tons, this being about one-third of the total output of all German shipyards before the war.

In addition, the Committee consider it essential that the enemy Powers should be bound to cede to the Allies a certain proportion of the river craft now in their possession. The craft taken by force or otherwise acquired from the Allies during the war, which can be identified, should be restored, and in addition a further amount of river tonnage should be ceded by way of reparation. The total amount to be surrendered is so calculated as not to impair seriously the economic life of the enemy Powers.

Draft clauses for giving effect to these proposals are appended (see Clause C in the Annex), and it is recommended that these clauses should be referred to the Inter-Allied Drafting Committee in order that any necessary amendments of form may be made, so as to enable the clauses to be embodied in the Peace Treaty.

On the main principle, viz., that the enemy should be required to relinquish all title in the merchant shipping and fishing tonnage, the Committee were unanimous. The Commission generally were of opinion that the enemy should be required to cede the tonnage to the Allies as a whole. The American Delegation proposed that the enemy should be required to acknowledge the validity of the seizures made by each individual Allied or Associated Power, and to recognise the title of that Power to the ships which it had seized.

This question is so important and so far-reaching that the Committee consider it desirable to set out the arguments on each side at some length.

AMERICAN CONTENTION AND AMENDMENT

The amendment which is offered by the American Delegation for the purpose of validating the title to the seized ships is offered for the reasons following:—

(a) That no question of title may be raised by any of the enemy Powers or by any of their nationals, or by anyone interested in any manner in such seized ships.

(b) That no Allied or Associated Power should question the validity of the title to the ships seized by any other Associated or Allied Power.

The amendment relating to the payment of compensation for such seized ships is for the purpose of determining the value and the application of the payment for such ships at the value so determined.

In making these reservations and presenting the amendments, the United States Delegation submits the following:—

(a) That it does not admit the right of any enemy Power or Allied or Associated Power to question the title to the enemy ships seized during the war under the authority of the Congress of the United States approved the 12th May, 1917, and the proclamation of the President of the United States based thereon.⁷

(b) That the amendments are submitted in view of the interpretation made by the British Delegation as set out in the *procès-verbal* for the twenty-sixth meeting to the effect that paragraph 3 of Clause C (see Annex) is intended to exclude from delivery under the general provisions of Clause C only such enemy ships as have been "captured and definitely condemned by prize courts," and that prize court condemnations were made only in the cases of ships taken by Great Britain and Portugal.

The United States Delegation further submits that as the title to the seized enemy ships should be accepted as valid by the enemy Powers and by the Allied and Associated Powers, the suggestion to transfer such ships to a "pool" for redistribution on the basis of losses, ton-for-ton and category-for-category, is tantamount to asking for a contribution on the part of certain of the Allied and Associated Powers.

The principle involved in such a request would compel a complete analysis and consideration of the causes and progress of the war and the relations of various Allied and Associated Powers to the war and, in addition, a complete survey and determination of the relations of the Allied and Associated Powers to each other.

BRITISH AND FRENCH CONTENTION

The British and French Delegations pointed out that the American proposal was open to the following objections:—

⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1917, *supp.* 2, vol. II, p. 1257.

1. It substituted individual for collective action, Germany being bound to recognise as valid the seizures made by each State, instead of ceding the ships to the Allies collectively.

2. It is based frankly and implicitly on physical possession, not on justice, and establishes the doctrine that the disposal of enemy ships after a war is decided not by international law or agreement, but by the accident of ships having taken refuge in certain ports to escape capture. In the present war the very large numbers of German and Austrian ships which took refuge in North and South American ports on the outbreak of war fled to these ports and remained there in order to escape capture by the British and French naval forces.

3. If this principle is admitted in the case of an Ally, it will be difficult in practice to prevent the neutrals from adopting it and keeping for their own use, in satisfaction of their claims against Germany, the enemy tonnage in their ports. As this amounts to 794,000 tons, the loss to the Reparation Fund will be considerable.

4. It would cause great injustice, for some of the States which have suffered least from the war, such as the United States and Brazil, will gain most under this proposal, while the States which have suffered most from the war would be seriously injured.

The United States and Brazil would have an absolute priority in the payment of their claims over anyone else, including Belgium, for they would be able to pay themselves.

Under the most favourable circumstances there are not enough enemy ships to replace half the Allied losses, there being only 5,500,000 tons of enemy shipping to meet claims in respect of Allied losses amounting to 10,750,000, but under this arrangement the United States would get nearly twice as much tonnage as they have lost, for they have lost 389,000 tons and would get 628,000. Brazil would get nearly ten times as much as she had lost, for she has lost 25,000 tons and would get 216,000. Great Britain, on the other hand, which has lost 7,746,000 tons, would only be able to keep 480,000, and France, who has lost 950,000 tons, would only be able to keep 45,000.

5. The proposal cannot be made a general rule, because it is obviously impossible to grant to, say, Brazil and Spain, the special right which is now claimed by the United States.

6. The American proposal, if agreed to, would insert in the Treaty of Peace with Germany a clause prescribing the method by which some of the enemy ships are to be allocated amongst the Allied and Associated Powers. The enemy have nothing to do with this allocation, which is a matter for the Allies to settle amongst themselves, and the Treaty should be confined to compelling the enemy to cede the ships to the Allies as a whole.

The Committee approved reporting the clause drafted by the British Delegation (Annex, Clause C) subject to the reservation of the United States Delegation, whose amendment was also to be reported.

Reservations were also made by some of the Delegations, including some representing new countries, who claimed that their nationals were entitled to the property in some of the enemy ships. The Committee felt that they were not competent to consider or decide the

claims of this kind, and that they could only deal with the facts as they existed in August 1914. It was understood that a Special Committee had been appointed to investigate claims of this kind.

METHODS OF VALUING SHIPS

With respect to the enemy merchant fleet, the Committee agreed that the actual value should be estimated at the date of surrender to the Allies.

The Committee is of the opinion that the work connected with such valuation should be entrusted to an Inter-Allied Commission of Experts.

SUPPLY OF LABOUR

In considering means of payment which might be imposed on the enemy, the Committee discussed the desirability of requiring the enemy to supply labour for the reconstruction of the devastated regions. The imposition of such a requirement was found likely to give rise to numerous difficulties and complications which were accordingly exhaustively examined by the Committee. On the one hand, representatives of those countries which had suffered greatly at the hands of the enemy during the war felt strongly that the restoration of destroyed towns and ravaged land should be a burden upon the enemy States. They were not, in view of the many attendant difficulties, anxious to avail themselves of enemy labour but, in view of the shortage of labour in their own countries, felt that they had no alternative but to call for it. On the other hand, it was pointed out that the difficulties involved in the utilisation of such labour would be such as really to outweigh any advantage that could be derived from it. The employment of large bodies of enemy workmen in an Allied country might give rise to endless industrial complications in that country in regard to conditions of work, pay, employment, &c. There was considerable ground for thinking that, notwithstanding the most careful safeguards, the quality of this labour might be very unsatisfactory. Further, though under the circumstances the employment of enemy labour in this manner might be completely justified, yet there was a great danger that public opinion might at no very distant date, come to regard it as indistinguishable from forced labour and refuse to tolerate its continuance. After prolonged discussion of the subject and consideration of various detailed proposals for the organisation of such labour, the Committee regrets that it was not possible to arrive at any agreement, and consequently is unable to make any recommendations on the matter.

IMPOSITION OF TAXES

Other means of payment which were discussed included calling upon the enemy to levy certain taxes; the total sum derived therefrom to be applied in reduction of the debt to the Allied and Associated Powers. The Committee considered various forms of new tax that might be imposed, including monopolies and capital taxes, and also whether it might not be preferable to force the enemy to increase taxes already in existence without creating new ones. But the Committee came to the conclusion that it was wiser to leave it to the enemy Powers to devise the means of meeting the liabilities they would assume by the signature of the Peace Treaty.

LIQUID ASSETS

A Sub-Committee of the Financial Commission submitted to the Second Sub-Committee for Reparation two proposals for the control and assurance of the payment of a great part of the liquid assets. The Sub-Committee approved these proposals, which it submits in the form of clauses to be inserted in the Preliminary Peace Treaty (see Annex, Clause D), with the intention that they shall also be applied with regard to the other enemy countries.

CHEMICAL AND ELECTRICAL PRODUCTS

The Sub-Committee recommend that the Allied and Associated States should claim an option to require delivery at fair prices to be fixed by the Inter-Allied Commission and credited against reparation a proportion of all and any chemical and electrical products of Germany as follows:—

Present stocks	Any or all—subject to the approval of the Inter-Allied Commission.
Stocks of 1920 and 1921	25 per cent. of output
Stocks of 1922 and 1923	20 “ “
Stocks of 1924 and 1925	15 “ “

For the benefit of the Allies jointly.††

WORKS OF ART

As to works of art carried off or destroyed, the Committee is unanimously of the opinion that the Clauses A and B to be inserted in the Preliminary Treaty of Peace are applicable to the reparation of this class of damage.

†† The French Delegation considers that, as it is difficult to determine at present the production of the electrical and chemical industries in Germany, the percentages given should not be regarded as a maximum. [Footnote in the original.]

Having concluded the first consideration of the financial capacity of the enemy States and their means of payment and reparation, the Sub-Committee adopted the following Resolution:—

“It is understood that in adopting the principles and resolutions which have already been adopted, the Sub-Committee does not exclude the adoption of additional resolutions subsequently, or regard those already adopted as exhaustive of all cases.”

The President of the Second Sub-Committee.

CUNLIFFE

APRIL 18, 1919.

Annex

Clauses Proposed for Insertion in the Treaty of Peace

CLAUSE A—*Article Governing Restitution*

(See the First Interim Report under “Restitution.”)

The enemy States must make immediate restitution of all property, generally, and of whatsoever kind, belonging to the Allied Powers of which they have possessed themselves for any purpose, and which is now to be found on their territory.

Annex No. of the Treaty provides conditions according to which restitution shall be made.

ANNEX

In accordance with Article No. of the Treaty, the enemy States shall return to the Allied Powers all effects, whether movables or fixtures, public property or that of artificial or natural persons, which enemy nationals have carried off and which are now in enemy territory. This clause applies to each and every object thus carried off which may now be situated in the enemy States.

Accordingly those States shall execute a solemn undertaking immediately to collect from their nationals returns setting forth the whereabouts of effects now in the possession of the said nationals drawn from territories of the Allied and Associated Powers.

Laws shall immediately be enacted which shall provide that every person who fails to make a return will be regarded as a receiver of stolen goods and will be liable to severe penalties to be determined by agreement with the Allied and Associated Powers.

An interval of one month from the signing of the Preliminary Treaty of Peace will be allowed for the making of these returns.

A comprehensive return, setting forth the sources from which objects have been drawn, if they have been identified, the nature of the

objects and their present location, shall be made to the Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers within a period of two months after the signature of the Preliminary Treaty of Peace.

The provisions hereinafter recited show broadly what measures are to be adopted to the end that complete restitution shall be made with the least possible delay. It is the purpose of the High Contracting Parties, however, that all necessary measures shall be taken to assure, in the fullest degree, complete restitution of objects carried off (subject to reservations hereinafter stated in the interest of the Allied and Associated Powers). The enemy Governments formally undertake to do all in their power to facilitate search and return.

The Plan of Procedure that follows is applicable to objects of all sorts; furniture, securities, objects of art, &c.

Plan of Procedure

I

Machines, machine-parts, machine tools, agricultural implements, and necessities of every sort and industrial or agricultural equipment of every kind, including cattle, beasts of burden, &c., which were taken from the territory occupied by the enemy armies under any pretence whatsoever, by military or civil authority of the enemy, or by private citizen of enemy's countries, shall be at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers for return to the places from which they were taken, if the interested Government so determines.

II

In order to prepare for this restitution, the enemy Government shall, with the utmost expedition, supply the duly appointed representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers with all records, official or private, relating to the objects in question; also with all contracts for sale, lease or other purposes, all correspondence thereto pertaining, all declarations and all useful indications as to their existence, source, change of form, present state and place of deposit.

III

Delegates of the Allied and Associated Governments shall, in their discretion, take steps to make in the enemy countries surveys and examinations on the spot of the objects indicated.

IV

Reshipments shall be made according to special instructions given under the authority of the nation to which the particular objects belong.

V

Particularly, declarations shall be made with a view to an immediate restitution of all accumulations in yards, on the rails, in boats, or in factories, of belting, electric motors, motor parts, accessories, &c., that have been taken from the invaded territories.

VI

The retaking of an object of any kind that may be found or identified shall in no case be obligatory upon the Allied and Associated Powers, which shall be in no wise bound to take back objects. They shall have the right to declare without assigning cause, that they waive claim to the restitution of particular objects and require reparation in lieu thereof by any other method contemplated by the Treaty.

VII

All expenses incurred in searching for, return and completely reinstalling objects that are restored shall be borne by the enemy Power concerned. The restoration of objects as herein required shall in no case affect the right to recover compensation for what has not been so restored.

VIII

It is formally stipulated that no argument drawn whether from the law or from the interpretation of any text whatsoever shall be invoked by the enemy Powers in order to suspend or delay the execution of any measure of restitution prescribed by the Representatives of the Allied or Associated States. The execution of such a measure shall always be immediate, a right to claim damages accruing only in case it is subsequently adjudged that the measure in question was contrary to the provisions of the Treaty.

CLAUSE B—*Article providing for Reparation by Equivalents*

(See the First Interim Report.)

In every case where it is a matter of satisfying immediate needs, the Allied States may take away objects in the enemy countries, whether in actual use or not, especially rolling-stock, equipment and tools, timber, live-stock, &c.; these to be the equivalent of similar objects removed, consumed, or destroyed by the enemy or worn out as the result of acts of war.

Objects found in enemy countries which have been previously taken from the territory of the Allied States cannot be taken as equivalents, except upon condition that their owners do not claim them in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article of the Treaty of Peace.

In order that the renewals herein provided for may be effected, an Inter-Allied Commission of members shall be constituted with the duty of deciding the claims of each one of the Allied States in regard to its immediate needs of the objects falling under various categories, and to determine the quantities of those objects which the enemy countries are to deliver, the same to be apportioned in accordance with the recognised needs of each one of the interested parties.

Each allied country shall name Commissions, to be presided over by Delegates of the Inter-Allied Commission, who shall proceed to the enemy countries in order to select and take the objects falling under various categories, within the authorised limitations.

The Chairman of the different National Commissions operating in the same enemy country will be expected to confer together with a view to co-ordinating the work of the Commissions.

CLAUSE C—*Articles relating to Merchant Shipping*

I

1. The enemy Powers recognise the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to the replacement, ton for ton (gross tonnage) and class for class, of all merchant ships and fishing boats lost or damaged owing to the war.

Nevertheless, and in spite of the fact that the tonnage of enemy shipping at present in existence is much less than that lost by the Allied and Associated Powers, the right thus recognised will be enforced on enemy ships and boats under the following conditions:—

The enemy Powers on behalf of themselves and so as to bind all other persons interested, cede to the Allied and Associated Governments the property in all the enemy merchant ships which are of 1,600 tons gross and upwards; in one-half, reckoned in tonnage, of the ships which are between 1,600 tons and 1,000 tons gross; in one-quarter, reckoned in tonnage, of the steam trawlers; and in one quarter, reckoned in tonnage, of the other fishing boats.

2. The enemy Powers will, within two months of the signature of the Preliminaries of Peace, deliver to a representative of the Allied and Associated Governments, duly authorised by them for this purpose, all the ships and boats mentioned in Article I.

3. The ships and boats mentioned in Article I include all ships and boats which (a) fly, or may be entitled to fly, the enemy merchant flag; (b) are owned by any enemy subject, company or corporation or by any neutral company or corporation which is under the control or direction of enemy subjects; (c) which are now under construction in enemy or in neutral countries.††

†† NOTE.—See below for amendment proposed by United States Delegation. [Footnote in the original.]

4. For the purpose of providing documents of title for the ships and boats to be handed over as above mentioned, the enemy Powers will:

(a.) Deliver to the representative of the Allied and Associated Governments in respect of each vessel a bill of sale or other document of title evidencing the transfer of the entire property in the vessel, free from all encumbrances, charges and liens of all kinds, to that officer;

(b.) Take all measures that may be indicated by the said representative of the Allied and Associated Governments for ensuring that the ships themselves shall be placed at his disposal.

II

As an additional part of reparation, the German Government agrees to cause merchant ships to be built in German yards for Allied account as follows:

(1.) Within three months of the signature of the Preliminaries of Peace, the Allied and Associated Powers will notify the German Government of the amount of tonnage to be laid down in German ship-yards in each of the two years next succeeding the three months mentioned above;

(2.) Within twenty-four months of the signature of the Preliminaries of Peace, the Allied and Associated Governments will notify to the German Government the amount of tonnage to be laid down in each of the three years following the two years mentioned above;

(3.) The amount of tonnage to be laid down in each year will not exceed 200,000 tons, gross tonnage.

(4.) The specifications of the ships to be built, the conditions under which they are to be built and delivered, the price per ton at which they are to be accounted for in the reparation account, and all other questions relating to the accounting, ordering, building and delivery of the ships, shall be determined by a Commission nominated by the Allied and Associated Powers.

III

The enemy Powers undertake to restore in kind and in normal condition of upkeep to the Allied and Associated Powers, within two months of the signature of these preliminaries, any boats and other movable appliances belonging to inland navigation which since the 2nd August, 1914, have by any means whatever come into their possession or into the possession of their nationals, and which can be identified.

With a view to make good the loss in inland navigation tonnage, from whatever cause arising, which has been incurred during the war by the Allied and Associated Powers, and which cannot be made good by means of the reparation in kind prescribed in the above

paragraph, the enemy Powers agree to cede to the Allied and Associated Powers a portion of the enemy river fleet up to the amount of the reparation in kind mentioned above, provided that such cession shall not exceed 20 per cent. of the river fleet as it existed on the 11th November, 1918.

The conditions of this cession shall be settled by the same arbitrators as are charged with the settlement of difficulties relating to the apportionment of river tonnage resulting from the new international régime applicable to certain river systems or from the territorial changes affecting those systems.

IV

1. The enemy Powers undertake to take any measures that may be indicated to them by the Allied and Associated Governments for obtaining the full title to the property in all ships which have during the war been transferred, or are in process of transfer, to neutral flags, without the consent of the Allied and Associated Governments.

2. The enemy Powers abandon in favour of the Allied and Associated Governments all claims of all descriptions against the Allied and Associated Governments and against subjects or citizens of Allied and Associated countries in respect of the detention, employment, loss or damage of any enemy ships or boats.

3. The enemy Powers abandon in favour of the Allied and Associated Powers any claim to vessels or cargoes sunk by or in consequence of enemy naval action and subsequently salvaged, in which any of the Allied or Associated Governments or their citizens or subjects may have any interest either as owners, charterers, insurers or otherwise, notwithstanding any decree of condemnation which may have been made by an enemy Prize Court.

4. The enemy Powers will within three months of the signature of the Preliminaries of Peace take all necessary legislative and administrative measures to enable them to carry out the provisions of this chapter.

AMENDMENTS TO CLAUSE C PROPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION (BUT NOT ACCEPTED BY ALL DELEGATIONS)

(For explanation, see text of the Second Interim Report, above p. 2.)^s

The Enemy Powers recognise as valid :—

1. The seizure during the war of enemy merchant ships by the Allied and Associated Powers respectively.

2. The legality and sufficiency of the title to such ships acquired through such seizures irrespective of the process of means used to effect such seizures.

^s *Ante*, p. 187.

3. The full divesting of the enemy Powers and of each and every national thereof, and of each and every other party interested in such ships, of any right, title or interest in such seized property.

The enemy Powers on behalf of themselves and so as to bind all other persons interested in such ships, hereby acknowledge the divesting of all and every right, title, property and interest of such enemy Power, and/or of their nationals or others interested in the ships so seized and taken possession of during the War by the Allied and Associated Governments respectively, and further confirm the vesting of such right, title, interest and property in such ships in the Allied and Associated Governments respectively.

The reasonable value of such ships shall be determined and such value shall be charged against the Government holding such ships and at the option of such Government shall be credited to the respective enemy Power which either itself or through its nationals or others formerly owned the same, on all such claims as are finally allowed respectively to such Allied or Associated Power as a result of the Treaty of Peace, and/or shall be credited and paid to any subject, citizen or other national of any enemy Power and/or others having or claiming to have any interest in any such ships as their respective interests may appear.

In the latter event, the balance, if any, shall be credited to such enemy Power which through itself or its subjects, citizens, nationals or others formerly owned such ships.

If such final credit so established in favour of any particular enemy Power, when taken together with other credits that may be allowed such Power under the terms of the Treaty of Peace, exceeds the aggregate of claims allowed in the case of any Allied or Associated Power establishing such credit, the excess shall be used and applied in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Peace in respect to such excess credits.

CLAUSE D—*Articles providing for control and assurance of the payment of part of their liquid assets by enemy Powers*

(Approved by the Second Sub-Committee, subject to the modification that provisions applying to Germany shall be made applicable to the other enemy Powers also.)

ARTICLE 1

The German Government shall convey to the Allied and Associated Governments, within three months, and along with such details as may be called for, the following information which shall be supplied as of the date of the signature of this Convention:—

(a.) The total gold reserve in the Reichsbank; in the other banks of issue; and in public treasuries.

(b.) Whether situated in Germany §§ or outside of Germany.

1. All Foreign securities and obligations of foreign States held by Germany or its nationals.
2. All foreign bank notes or other foreign paper currency held by Germany or its nationals.
3. All foreign bills of exchange held by Germany and its nationals.

(c.) All property and interest of whatsoever nature belonging to Germany and its nationals and situated in foreign territory such as:—

1. Immovable property.
2. Movable property of every kind.
3. Merchandise.
4. Cash not included in (b.) 2 above.
5. Participations and credits of every kind not included in paragraph (b.) 1, 2 or 3 above.
6. Options and contracts for work or materials, orders unexecuted or incompletely executed that involve products, merchandise, tools, and materials of every kind, and concessions of whatever sort.

ARTICLE 2

The German Government undertakes to adopt all measures necessary to acquire, if it does not own them already, and to transfer to the Allied and Associated Governments all property and effects above mentioned, for which it may be called upon by the aforesaid Governments. Notice stating the effects to be transferred shall be given within six months from the date of the report which the German Government is to furnish under the terms of Article 1. The transfer is to be effected by the German Government with the least delay possible, and at most within six months of the date of the notice.

Property and effects shall be valued by an Inter-Allied Financial Commission, and the total shall be credited on account of reparation due from Germany to the Allied and Associated Powers.

The provisions of this article shall not apply to property and effects of the German Government or its nationals that, at the date of this Convention, have already been sequestered by the Allied and Associated Powers, nor to what is situated on territory ceded by Germany.

CLAUSE E

From the date of bringing into force the present Treaty all the concessions, privileges and favours enjoyed on German territory by the subjects of Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and Turkey, as the result

§§ NOTE.—As her boundaries shall have been established by this Treaty. [Foot-note in the original.]

of any act of a German Public Authority after the 1st August, 1914, are assigned and transferred by Germany to the Allied and Associated Powers under conditions which shall be determined by the said Powers.

The same shall apply in respect of the concessions, privileges and favours granted since the 1st August, 1914, and enjoyed on German territory by German subjects as the result of an act of an Austrian, Bulgarian, Hungarian or Turkish Public Authority.

Germany undertakes to cancel any sale, cession, or other measure of disposal of the said concessions, privileges or favours which might interfere with the assignment and transfer of these rights.

For this purpose Germany shall, as from the coming into force of the present Treaty, take all necessary preservative measures, such as requisition, sequestration, seizure, &c.

The Allied and Associated Powers shall not be liable on their part for any claim for compensation or indemnities arising out of the present stipulation.

APRIL 18, 1919.

ADDITIONAL NOTE

In the case of ships, as in the case of other property in kind ceded by the Germans to the Allies, there may be cases in which there are claims on the part of the Governments, or citizens, or subjects of Allied and Associated States against the ships or property. These claims should be considered on their merits before the ships or property are distributed or otherwise dealt with by the Allies in the event of the Germans not having satisfied the claims themselves and before credit is given to Germany on account of these ships or other property.

The Committee recommend that the Allied Drafting Committee should have their attention called to these cases and should be asked to formulate a clause for inclusion in the Peace Treaty providing that cases of this kind shall be considered and that provisions be inserted to safeguard the legal and equitable interests of the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals.

Appendix III

Valuation Clause

Clause (D). The damage for repairing, reconstructing and rebuilding property in the invaded and devastated districts, including reinstallation of furniture, machinery and other equipment, will be measured by the cost at the dates when the work is done.

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Thursday, April 24, 1919, at 11 a. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. Lloyd George

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B., *Secretary*.

Prof. P. J. Mantoux, *Interpreter*.

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE reported a conversation that he had had with M. Orlando that morning, in which he had pointed out the whole of the difficulties in which M. Orlando was placed. The Situation
With Italy M. Orlando had said that he was contemplating a reply to President Wilson's manifesto.¹ Publication of President Wilson's manifesto had been held up and it would only be published together with M. Orlando's reply. This reply M. Orlando had promised would be couched in moderate language and would not close the door to further negotiations. Mr. Lloyd George had specially pressed that it should not commit the Italians in regard to Fiume. M. Orlando had agreed on this point. M. Orlando had said that he was willing to leave Baron Sonnino in Paris. Mr. Lloyd George's impression, however, was that M. Orlando would like to stay. He had intimated that it would help him if a communique could be issued in the Press to the effect that at the request of M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George, as representing the countries signatory to the Treaty of London, he had agreed to defer his departure.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that this would place him in an invidious position. The issue was fundamental to him as to whether the United States could take part in any part of the Treaty of London referring to districts south of Istria. The impression had already been conveyed in the Press that the Signatories of the Treaty of London were divided from the United States of America. It had not been possible for him to let the Italian people get their version of what had occurred from a poisoned Press; consequently, he had been

¹ Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, vol. III, p. 287.

bound to issue his manifesto. It was a friendly message to set out the case to the Italian people. If only some time were gained, he thought that the Italian people would realise their position and that the present ferment would settle down. Hence, he would be glad if M. Orlando could remain in Paris at least a week.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked M. Clemenceau whether he were satisfied with Mr. Balfour's draft letter to M. Orlando.^{1a}

M. CLEMENCEAU said that with a few verbal alterations he was satisfied. He said he would bring these in the afternoon.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had not seen the latest version of the draft.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE promised him a copy.

After some further discussion, the following conclusions were reached:—

1. Mr. Lloyd George should ask M. Orlando if he would issue the following communique:—

At the request of President Wilson, Monsieur Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George, Signor Orlando has agreed to defer his departure to Italy with a view to seeing whether it is not still possible to accommodate the difficulties which have arisen about Fiume and the Dalmatian coast.

2. Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau should arrange for the final draft of the letter to M. Orlando and sign it jointly.

3. Mr. Lloyd George should send President Wilson a copy of the proposed letter to M. Orlando.

Mr. Philip Kerr was sent by Mr. Lloyd George with the draft communique to M. Orlando but the latter did not consider publication desirable. At the very end of the meeting, at the moment of adjournment, Count Aldrovandi arrived with a message from M. Orlando to the effect that he and his colleagues had come to the conclusion that the best plan would be for them to meet the Supreme Council that afternoon at President Wilson's house.

This was agreed to.

2. M. CLEMENCEAU said that since the discussion of the previous day the Germans had announced officially that seven journalists would accompany their Delegation. He asked what attitude he was to take.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that although he did not much care to have the journalists present, nevertheless, they would be confined by the same restrictions as the Plenipotentiaries.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he could not have them free to move about in Paris.

^{1a} The text of the letter as delivered to Orlando on April 24 appears as appendix I to IC-176C, p. 223.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that, so long as they were restricted in the same manner as the Plenipotentiaries, the German papers were entitled to receive such information as they could obtain from them.

It was agreed that:—

Journalists should be allowed to accompany the German Delegation but should be confined by the same restrictions as the Delegation itself.

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE again reverted to the question of publicity on which he said he felt very strongly, so strongly, indeed, that he would almost have to make a protest. Since the
 Publicity previous discussion, he had seen Captain Gibson, an Officer just returned from Berlin, who had expressed the view that if the terms were published it might be impossible for the Germans to sign, as publication would strengthen the hands of the extremists. He himself felt that it would make it difficult, if not impossible, for the Allied and Associated Powers to give way on points that really were not of very great importance. There was a long discussion on this subject, which followed much the same lines of the discussion on the previous day, and it is only very briefly summarised below.

M. CLEMENCEAU's point of view was that publication was quite unavoidable. If the Allied and Associated Powers did not publish the Germans would. He had had to grant them free telegraphic and telephonic facilities; the German Delegation would be accompanied by 40 telegraphists; and it was certain that within three days the whole Peace Treaty would be published by the enemy. The Allied peoples ought not to learn the contents of the Peace Treaty first from enemy sources. Public opinion would, in a few days, compel publication of the Peace Treaty. In any cases there would be leakages.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE's view was that leakages were not of very material consequence. In Great Britain the public did not attach much importance to leakages. Once everything was announced officially they knew it to be true and it would be extremely difficult to recede from any position taken up.

PRESIDENT WILSON's point of view was that although publication was undesirable it was, he believed, also unavoidable. He quoted some information that he had received from an Officer in the United States 3rd Army, who had had a talk with Brockdorff Rantzau. The latter expressed surprise at receiving an invitation to Versailles and assumed that it meant that Germany would be asked to sign practically an imposed Peace. He had considered the terms, as published, to amount to slavery for Germany and had referred particularly to the Saar Valley and Silesia. He said that he should never consent to a Peace giving up these districts, even temporarily, and that the German Ministry could not agree to such terms. He had believed that the German people would support them in not signing

such terms. When asked as to how Germany could continue to exist without outside relief, in the event of her not signing, he had given no reply, though he had thrown out the suggestion that they might turn towards Russia. The American Officer had gathered that there would be no strong protest against the provisions as regards Alsace-Lorraine and Indemnity, although some difficulty would be made over Danzig. The serious points of the Treaty, however, would be the Saar Valley and Silesia. Brockdorff Rantzau had appeared very depressed. The same informant had stated that the idea of a plebiscite was being discussed a good deal in Germany and might be carried out. The independent socialists would accept it. President Wilson interpreted this telegram to mean that Brockdorff Rantzau typified the extreme point of view. In the background he believed there was a more submissive body of opinion. His informant had suggested that the German people ought to know that a certain amount of discussion would be permitted. He himself was inclined to agree in the proposal that the discussion should take place in writing. As regards publicity, he inclined towards Mr. Balfour's view that a summary rather than the actual text should be published in the first instance. The preparation of the summary was a matter of the very first importance.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would consult M. Tardieu in regard to this. He asked how long the summary should be.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought it should be as short as possible.

4. PRESIDENT WILSON read a report from the Ports and Waterways Commission, which had been asked to consider the question of the Kiel Canal. (Appendix 1.) The only controversial point was Article 7. in regard to which two versions had been submitted, one by the United States of America, British, Italian and Japanese Delegations, and one by the French.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he was particularly anxious that Admiral de Bon² should be heard on the subject of the fortification of the Canal.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that his feeling on this matter was that if Germany had no fortifications, she might be unable to carry out her obligation to keep the canal open if she ever became involved in war with any power. The provision for no fortification was not consistent with the provision for keeping the Canal open.

(It was agreed that Admiral Hope,³ Admiral Benson,⁴ and Admiral de Bon should be seen that afternoon.)

² Chief of the French Naval General Staff; representative on the Interallied Military and Naval Committee.

³ Deputy First Sea Lord, at times British representative in place of Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss on the Interallied Military and Naval Committee.

⁴ United States representative on the Interallied Military and Naval Committee.

NOTE: This was subsequently cancelled in consequence of the receipt of a communication from M. Orlando. (Minute 1.)

5. MR. LLOYD GEORGE read a memorandum which had been presented to him by Mr. Headlam-Morley on the subject of the Saar Valley. (Appendix 2.)

(After a short discussion, it was agreed that the United States, British, and French experts should be authorised to visit the Saar Valley, in order to advise on the question.)

6. SIR MAURICE HANKEY stated that the report of the Economic Commission had been circulated. He learned by telephone from Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith that some of the principal delegates on the Commission, namely; M. Clémentel, M. Crespi, Mr. Baruch, and himself, had met on the previous evening, and after a very long discussion, had agreed to four out of the five outstanding points.

(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to summon the Economic experts for 4.30 p.m. in the afternoon.)

NOTE: This was subsequently cancelled, owing to the receipt of a communication from M. Orlando, (see minute 1).

Appendix I

Draft Articles Concerning the Kiel Canal for Insertion in the Preliminary Treaty of Peace With Germany

ARTICLE I

The Kiel Canal and its approaches shall be maintained free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations at peace with Germany on terms of entire equality.

ARTICLE II

The nationals, property and vessels of all States shall, in respect of charges, facilities, and in all other respects, be treated on a footing of perfect equality in the use of the Canal, no distinction being made to the detriment of nationals, property and vessels of any State, between the latter and the nationals, property and vessels of Germany or of the most favored nation.

No impediment shall be placed on the movement of persons or vessels other than those arising out of the police customs, sanitary, emigration or immigration regulations, and those relating to the import or export of prohibited goods.

Such regulations must be reasonable and uniform, and must not unnecessarily impede traffic.

ARTICLE III

Only such charges may be levied on vessels using the canal or its approaches as are intended to cover in an equitable manner the cost of maintaining in a navigable condition, or of improving, the canal or its approaches, or to meet expenditures incurred in the interests of navigation. The schedule of such charges shall be calculated on the basis of such expenses and shall be posted up in the ports. These charges shall be levied in such a manner as to render any detailed examination of cargoes unnecessary, except in the case of suspected fraud or contravention.

ARTICLE IV

Goods in transit may be placed under seal or in the custody of customs agents; the loading and unloading of goods, and the embarkation and disembarkation of passengers, shall only take place in the ports specified by Germany.

ARTICLE V

No charges of any kind other than those provided for in the present regulations shall be levied along the course or at the approaches of the Kiel Canal.

ARTICLE VI

Germany shall be bound to take suitable measures to remove any obstacle or danger to navigation and to ensure the maintenance of good conditions of navigation. Germany shall not undertake any works of a nature to impede navigation on the canal or its approaches.

ARTICLE VII

(English, American, Japanese
and Italian Proposal)

(French Proposal)

In the event of violation of any of these conditions, or of disputes as to the interpretation of the present Convention, any interested State can appeal to the jurisdiction instituted for the purpose by the League of Nations and can demand the formation of an International Commission.

The Kiel Canal and its approaches shall be under the control of an International Commission which shall include:—

2 representatives of Germany.
1 representative of Great Britain.
1 representative of France.
1 representative of Poland.
1 representative of Denmark.

In order to avoid reference of small questions to the League of Nations, Germany will establish a local authority at Kiel qualified to deal with disputes in the first case and to give satisfaction so far as possible to complaints which may be presented through the Consular representatives of the Interested Powers.

This International Commission shall meet within three months from the signature of the Preliminary Peace Treaty and shall proceed immediately to prepare a project for the revision of the existing regulations; this project shall be drawn up in conformity with the General Convention on International Navigable Waterways should such Convention have been previously concluded. In the absence of such Convention, the project for revision shall be in conformity with the provisions of the preceding Articles.

ARTICLE VIII—(French and Italian Proposal)

The following shall be demobilised or suppressed under the direction of the Allied and Associated Powers and within the period fixed by such Powers:—

All fortified works situated within fifty kilometres of either bank of the Canal or of the mouth of the Elbe, and of all means of obstruction the object or effect of which might be to interfere with the liberty and the entire security of navigation.

Germany shall be prohibited from erecting any new fortifications, from installing any battery within the zones specified above and from placing any obstruction in the approaches or in the canal.

Appendix II

Memorandum by the American and British Representatives in the Matter of the Saar Basin

Our attention was yesterday called to new information which had reached our French colleague bearing on the proposed frontier of the Saar Basin. It appears that the proposed north-west frontier in the Valley of the Saar itself does not extend quite to the natural geographical and economic boundary which is formed by the narrows of the river and the hilly district extending to the north and west. In order to rectify this, it would be necessary to add a district comprising about 32 square kilometres (12 square miles) with a population of

slightly over 5,000. The district has its natural centre in the adjoining towns of Mettlach and Keuchingen with a joint population of 2,500. The population of these towns is industrial and they are connected by daily workman's trains with the Saar Basin; on the other side they are partially cut off from any easy connection with the German territory lying towards Trèves.

The American and British Representatives are agreed that it is beyond their power to accept proposals for an extension of the frontier which has been definitely accepted by the Council of Four; they consider it however their duty to call attention to this new information.

The members of the Committee are prepared to pay a visit to the spot on Sunday next. Meanwhile, an alternative description of the frontier has been prepared for insertion in the text of the Treaty if the proposed modification were approved either before or after an inspection on the spot.

(Intd.) $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{C. H. H[ASKINS]} \\ \text{J. W. H[EADLAM-] M[ORLEY]} \end{array} \right.$

23.4.19.

Notes of a Meeting Held at Mr. Lloyd George's Residence, 23 Rue Nitot, Paris, on Thursday, April 24, 1919, at 4 p. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. Lloyd George

ITALY

M. Orlando
Baron Sonnino

Secretaries

Mr. Close, for the United States of America.
Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B., for the British Empire.
M. Mantoux, for France (also *Interpreter*).
Count Aldrovandi, for Italy.

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked M. Orlando to put his view.

The Italian Position M. ORLANDO said that he must declare that he had most carefully reviewed the situation, which was undoubtedly very serious. Already he had had two conversations with his colleagues at Rome and he must declare the situation to be a very painful one. There was one very difficult aspect of the situation which came before the territorial difficulty, namely, the effect produced by President Wilson's declaration. He must state at once that his esteem and admiration and personal friendship towards President Wilson, to which he had always given testimony, had not been in the least altered by the declaration. Before he heard what President Wilson had to say he wished to assure him that he realised his intentions towards M. Orlando, himself, and his country to be only that of a friend. In politics, however, the public impression of circumstances often had an importance surpassing their actual substance. Thus the impression of this document, which he himself declared had nothing in it that was not friendly and courteous, nevertheless was that of an appeal to the people of Italy and to the people generally. The consequence of this was that it put in doubt M. Orlando's own authority, as representative of the Italian people. That was the impression that he had received and, consequently, it was necessary for him to return to consult the source of his authority, that is to say, the Italian Parliament. The situation, therefore, was a very delicate one

and it was only after much reflection that he had decided to return to Rome; his doing so had no connection with the territorial arrangements. There was no rupture of negotiations but his conscience compelled him to return to his people, and to call Parliament together within 48 hours so as to consult as to his position and establish his authority. For the moment the territorial situation was, for him, in the background. If his colleagues were to repeat to him the proposals that had been suggested yesterday, even so, it would be necessary for him to reply "I must return to Italy". His difficulty was as to the plenitude of his powers.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that M. Orlando had made a very frank and, if he might say so, an admirable statement of the position. The feelings expressed towards himself were most heartily reciprocated. He felt nothing but respect and consideration for him and his motives. Nothing should mar their relations and he felt it a very gracious act of M. Orlando to express himself as he did. There was one aspect of the question that had not been in his mind. He had never thought of his statement as going behind the back of M. Orlando and appealing to the Italian people. If that were the effect, he, personally, regretted it. He welcomed this opportunity to say why he had published the statement. He would remind M. Orlando that his attitude in this matter had been the same from the first. Through all these months there had been a misunderstanding in the public mind as to the nature of the controversy and its basis. Things had been said, not once only, but often, in the Press both of France and Italy that put the attitude of himself and his Government in so false a light that it had become necessary to let his own people know, not only the position that the Government took up, but the basis of its attitude. It was necessary to state the grounds of the principles on which all the attitude of the United States Government was based. It was necessary to clear the mists which had arisen concerning the conditions of the Conference. The state of mind of other nations also was affected (as he had had evidence of this very day) in regard to the position of the Government of the United States of America. He was reassured by M. Orlando's statement that he was going back to Italy to seek instructions from his people and that there would be no rupture from the Conference. It would not only be serious, but perhaps fatal, if Italy were to withdraw and he was very happy to have M. Orlando's assurance on this point. He hoped that M. Orlando would make it evident to the world that his errand was to seek the instructions of Parliament, and not what the public believed a withdrawal from the Peace Settlement.

M. ORLANDO said he owed his thanks to President Wilson for his noble declaration for what he had spontaneously said that he rec-

ognised that M. Orlando excluded every intention and thought that was not kindly towards him. He felt that President Wilson would appreciate the reasons why he had to go to Rome. In the circumstances, it was absolutely essential for him to seek contact with his people and he recalled the moment when President Wilson himself had suggested that he (M. Orlando) ought to return and explain the situation to the Italian people. It was the more necessary since it had appeared not only in these conversations but was realised by the masses of the people that there had been some differences. It was necessary, therefore, to explain this situation to his people. He would explain to Parliament the result of these conversations, namely, the choice that Italy had to make. Speaking among friends, the fact was that Italy had made Fiume a national question. On that point not only the United States of America but also Italy's allies had declared quite specifically that they could not consent. In these circumstances to continue the conversations was useless. The people must decide when he explained the situation to them.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he would ask M. Orlando to be kind enough in explaining the situation to call attention to the fact that, in the view of the United States of America, the Treaty of London was not in the interest of the relations that ought to prevail between Italy and the Yugo-Slavs, nor to the peace of the world.

M. ORLANDO said that, in making his declaration to Parliament, he would explain openly the reasons put forward by President Wilson not only in his published statement but also in the memorandum he had sent him and which President Wilson had authorised him to read to the Italian Parliament and which accordingly he intended to read.¹

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Orlando to explain his point of view which he thought was also Mr. Lloyd George's point of view about Fiume. This was that the same treaty which bound the Allies to Italy also granted Fiume to the Slavs. If they could not fail in their word to Italy, neither could they fail in their word to the Slavs.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed, but said that beyond this there was no use in pretending that a new element had not been introduced since the signature of the Treaty of London. There was the advent of the United States of America into the war unbound and free not only from treaties but from the necessity that had compelled us to sign treaties and covenants all the world over. He would not say that this modified his views in regard to the Treaty of London, but, in certain circumstances, it would necessitate a reconsideration in regard to Fiume as well. In the circumstances, he felt justified in

¹ Text in Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, vol. III, p. 274.

modifying the Treaty in regard to Fiume. The treaty gave Fiume to the Croatians. If it was modified in part with the assent of Italy in regard to Dalmatia, we should be free to make a modification also in regard to Fiume. This modification would be to make Fiume a free port controlled by its own population, Italians, Hungarians and Slavs, with free and equal access to all parts served by the port. To that extent he felt free to assent to a modification of the treaty if his Allies agreed. He did not feel free to challenge the decision of M. Orlando to go to Rome. He, himself, had felt it necessary to go to London in much less serious circumstances, so he could understand M. Orlando's position. Meanwhile, he asked what was the position of Italy? If this were an ordinary week, the absence of M. Orlando would not be so very serious. But on Tuesday next, the Germans would most likely be coming to Versailles. Would Italy be represented there? M. Orlando could hardly reach Rome before Saturday. When could he meet the Italian Parliament?

M. ORLANDO said on the 28th.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked when the Germans would be at Versailles? He presumed it would be on Tuesday. Between today and Tuesday was Italy not to be consulted? Only yesterday very important questions had been discussed on which the British and Italian experts had taken the same view, but the Italian experts had not attended. He referred to the question of indemnities. This afternoon, the economic question ought to have been under consideration. He thought that the people as a whole were more interested in economic than in territorial questions, which mainly concerned the newspapers and special persons who interested themselves in foreign politics. Then there was the question of coal. Would M. Crespi be here? Was Italy to be unrepresented altogether? There were great questions regarding the export of German coal. Had the Allies the right to put forward demands on behalf of a country that was not represented? Or was Italy ready to put herself in the hands of the Allies? Would she agree to what they accepted for her or would she say that they had no right to accept? Was Italy to be present when questions affecting her own economic life were under consideration? There was also the question of a joint credit for re-establishing life in Europe. Would Italy be in or out of this scheme? Who was to discuss it on Italy's behalf? Were we to put forward Italy's demands? Because Italy was not satisfied about the prospective peace with Austria, was she to have no peace with Germany? These were practical questions on which he wanted to have an answer.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he wished to add that after the events of the last few days, the Germans would say that there was a schism among the Allies and, if the Italians were not represented at Versailles,

the situation would be very serious. This would make peace much less probable.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he hoped that the Italian Delegation would remain and he understood that to be the object of what Mr. Lloyd George had said.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that was the object.

M. ORLANDO said he took note of the declarations of M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George in regard to the Treaty of London. This was, however, not a moment to enter into a detailed discussion of it. He would expose to the Italian Parliament the different points of view. In regard to Mr. Lloyd George's observations on the practical side, there seemed to him two questions. The first question related to the days between now and the discussions with Germany. During the last few weeks the Treaty had been discussed, and Italy was satisfied at the decisions taken, and had no objection to accepting. Without doubt many questions remained to be settled, including some of grave importance. Nevertheless, he felt confidence in his Allies that Italy's interests would be considered all the more fairly because she was not represented. He trusted them as a judge, who is on his guard to be just in the case of a prisoner who has no advocate. He would discuss this matter with his colleagues, and find some practical way of settling it. He would leave M. Crespi, who could be consulted by the Allied experts on technical questions. The second question, which was a graver one, was that of the presence of Italy when the Germans came. He had read in the papers that the Germans were endeavouring to secure delay.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had no official news of this. They said they could not leave Berlin before May 28th at the earliest.

M. ORLANDO said he hoped he would be back before then. While accepting Mr. Lloyd George's and M. Clemenceau's remarks that we must not give the Germans the impression that the Allies were less solid than before, the fundamental questions at stake were so vital to Italy that he considered it preferable to encounter the difficulties that Mr. Lloyd George mentioned rather than to stay away.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether Italy would be represented at the meeting with the Germans or not.

M. ORLANDO said it would depend on the decisions taken in Italy.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that, strictly speaking, the decisions in regard to the Italian frontiers did not affect the peace with Germany, but only with the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Hence, personally, he could see no inconsistency between Italy's taking part in the Treaty with Germany and reserving the Treaty with Austria.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he still maintained that if Italian representatives were not present, however much they might trust their

Allies, their claims could not be put forward. If they were not present at the meeting on May 1st, and M. Orlando had not obtained the consent of his Parliament to participate, how could their claims be put forward?

M. CLEMENCEAU said that we could hardly meet the Germans, for it would involve a change in the whole drafting of the Treaty.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Germans would ask who were the representatives of Italy. We could not put forward claims for Italy unless they were present or unless M. Orlando wrote and asked the Allies to put in a claim on Italy's behalf.

M. ORLANDO said that in his view if Mr. Lloyd George's objection was considered by itself, he was right. He agreed that it was impossible to propose conditions on behalf of a Power that was not present. This question would have to be carefully examined and a decision would have to be taken according to the circumstances. He agreed with Mr. Lloyd George that if Italy was not present, she would not be entitled to make any claims on Germany. He did not agree with M. Clemenceau that the drafting of the articles would be much affected, because Italy was only concerned in a few questions in the German Treaty, mainly in regard to Reparation. Mr. Lloyd George's objection, however, must be considered in relation to the suggestion that President Wilson had made,—that Italy could make peace with Germany and postpone the Treaty with Austria. To this he had two answers. The first was that the general interpretation of the Pact of London of April, 1919 [1915], and the Treaty of September, 1915 [1914],—in fact, that the spirit of these two Pacts—was that there ought to be a general Peace. It would not be general, however, if the rest of the world were at peace and Italy still remained at war. Although President Wilson was not bound by these Pacts, he would put it to him that the question was one that must be regarded from the point of view of general equity, not only between the Allies, but also between the Associated Powers, that the peace ought to be a general Peace. On the other hand, he would remark to President Wilson that in signing the Treaty of Peace with Germany, the League of Nations Statute would also be signed. One clause of the League of Nations Covenant provided for mutual and reciprocal guarantees of territory among the signatories. The effect of this would be that Italy would engage herself to guarantee the territories of other countries without being guaranteed herself. Another difficulty was that the League of Nations Covenant included an arrangement for avoiding future wars, and for resolving difficulties between nations. If Italy adhered to the League of Nations, that would mean that the question of frontiers between Italy and the Yugo-Slavs would have to be resolved through the League of Nations

instead of as the direct result of the war which had been won. This was a reason of grave difficulty in signing the peace with Germany, if questions affecting the peace with Austria-Hungary—that is to say, the question of the frontiers—was not also settled.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if M. Orlando left, a very carefully drawn communique would have to be sent to the press.

BARON SONNINO, starting from the basis of M. Orlando's statement, said that it was proposed that M. Orlando should present to the Italian Parliament a statement of the question in general terms. It was difficult, however, to state the question if he had no clear idea of the intention of the other parties. He had thought that when they were invited to come here this afternoon, they would receive some suggestion of the latest point of view of the Allied and Associated Powers. Up to now this had not been given. President Wilson had made a statement as though the position was where it was a few days ago before certain additional proposals had been made. Mr. Lloyd George, in regard to Fiume for example, had said that he would not refuse to change in some degree the elements of the Treaty of London provided that concessions were made by Italy. M. Clemenceau did not take the same point of view, and said that Fiume had been promised to Croatia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he never went beyond what his colleagues had agreed to. The Treaty of London gave Fiume to Croatia. He now proposed that it should be a free port, or rather he should say a free city. He would take it from the Croats and give it to its own inhabitants of all races. This was a serious modification of the Treaty from his point of view, but he would agree to it if Italy would modify the Treaty of London.

BARON SONNINO asked if M. Clemenceau agreed.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he did. Mr. Lloyd George's point of view was his own.

BARON SONNINO asked if that was President Wilson's view also.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that in his memorandum he had expressed his readiness to the erection of Fiume into a free city, and he had accompanied his memorandum with a map.

BARON SONNINO said that in President Wilson's memorandum other frontiers, for example in Istria, were not the same as in the Treaty of London. Did President Wilson consent to leave these frontiers as in the Treaty? He only asked the question to clear the situation.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that in his memorandum he had stated what he felt to be the position of the United States of America. From that he did not care to depart. He hoped that in any statement to the Italian Parliament, M. Orlando would limit himself to that memorandum.

BARON SONNINO said that that raised a new difficulty.

M. ORLANDO said he would like to resume briefly Baron Sonnino's idea. He himself was under the necessity of explaining the position to the Italian Parliament. His explanation must be a very clear one. He had the memorandum of President Wilson and the declaration of the Governments which adhered to the Treaty of London. Then, he thought, Baron Sonnino asks:—Can we tell Parliament what is the middle situation in which all parties are agreed? He would like to be able to state that. If his colleagues could not tell him this tonight, perhaps they could tell him tomorrow. He could say at present that his Allies adhered to the Pact of London. Then he would be asked: Have you the signature of President Wilson?

PRESIDENT WILSON said that if he agreed to any middle course, it would be contrary to what his people expected and had given him authority for.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that his impression was not that President Wilson had proposed a middle course, but the exact contrary. He himself and M. Clemenceau had suggested a middle course, which did not commend itself to President Wilson, but which, as he understood the matter, President Wilson was prepared to accept if his Italian colleagues would agree. He himself had taken the liberty to tell the Italians that this was the position. If he had been wrong in this, he regretted it. He put it to the Italian representatives that if they would be prepared to abandon their rights in Dalmatia, leaving Zara and Sebenico as free cities, and would content themselves with the islands other than those which form practically part of the mainland, he thought an agreed basis might be arranged.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had never committed himself in this arrangement. All he had done was to ask Mr. Lloyd George to ascertain if the Italians would be ready to discuss on this basis, and the reply he had received was that they were not. He had reserved his judgment in every case. He regretted if there had been any failure on his part to make his position clear.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had understood that if the Italians saw their way to assent, President Wilson would not have stood in the way.

PRESIDENT WILSON said his point of view was that he did not want his Italian friends to think that he would not discuss any aspect of the question. He was willing to go over the ground a hundred times if necessary.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he thought from the way that President Wilson had pressed for Spalato and the inner islands to be left out, that he would have been willing to agree.

BARON SONNINO recalled the course of events.* On the previous afternoon, the Italians had sent proposals which would have given the line of the Alps to the Sea east of Volosca to Italy, and would have put Fiume under the sovereignty of Italy, and provided for the establishment by Italy in the port of Fiume of free zones. Italy would also have received all the islands mentioned in the Pact of London except Pago; and Zara and Sebenico would have been placed under the League of Nations with Italy as Mandatory Power. If that had been accepted, Italy would have had some assurance. An answer was received in regard to the sovereignty of Fiume, namely:—that this could not be a basis of discussion, but, as regards the rest, it had been understood that if Italy gave up Fiume, it would form a basis of acceptance in a general way. This had been the impression received.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if it was an impression of a joint agreement.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had understood this to be the case, except as regards the question of Mandates, which was a point that he had overlooked. He understood, however, that the remainder was generally agreed.

BARON SONNINO said the reply had been that Fiume was not acceptable, but that the rest might be acceptable. The Italian Delegation had sent word to say that if Italian sovereignty over Fiume could not be accepted, no explanation was available as to what would be substituted for it. He then asked Count Aldrovandi if any answer had been received.

COUNT ALDROVANDI said that the Marquis Imperiali² had seen Mr. Lloyd George, who had informed him that the League of Nations would take the place of Italy.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that Mr. Lloyd George had returned to the room where they were discussing with the experts the question of Reparation, and had told him what the message meant. He had, however, not consulted him as to any reply to be given to the message.

BARON SONNINO said that the impression that he had formed was that Fiume was to be a free city with a wide contour.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that that was the proposal contained in President Wilson's document.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that Baron Sonnino's contention was that a message had been sent to them during the afternoon when they were consulting with the experts on Reparation. All that he could remember was that Mr. Lloyd George had left the room to see the Marquis Imperiali, and had returned and merely told M. Clemenceau

* The Secretary was out of the room during a portion of this statement. [Footnote in the original.]

² Italian Ambassador in Great Britain.

and himself what the Marquis had said. Baron Sonnino, however, said that he had received a message.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had never agreed to any message.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in the morning the question had been discussed at great length, and he himself had said nothing that was not in accordance with what had then been agreed to. The only point of difference was in regard to Mandates, and on this there had been a misunderstanding. It had not been Count Aldrovandi's fault, but he himself had overlooked the mention of Mandates in connection with Zara and Sebenico. Everything else that he had said resulted from the conversation of the morning. All that had happened with the Marquis Imperiali was that he had asked where the sovereignty of Fiume would lie if it was not vested in Italy. He himself had replied: In the League of Nations. The other question raised had been one of the diplomatic responsibility in regard to Fiume.

BARON SONNINO said that on the Marquis Imperiali's return he and his colleagues had just begun to discuss the question, when they had received a copy of President Wilson's statement. They had then felt that the whole position was changed, and it was no use discussing details any more. He expressed his thanks for Mr. Lloyd George's intervention. He had narrowed the gulf between them to some extent, and he had hoped that they might learn to what extent their three colleagues could agree on a basis for discussion. If they had such a basis, things could be stated in a clear way. It was no use telling Parliament that two of the Allies would do one thing, and the third another.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was in his usual disagreeable role of trying to effect a conciliation when both sides were inclined to refute him. Nevertheless, he would again endeavour to make a suggestion. He understood, however, that whatever was suggested the Italian Delegates were not in a position to accept it.

BARON SONNINO said that they were in a very difficult position. If they only knew the gulf that separated them it would be better.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he fully understood the difficulty President Wilson was in to say that he agreed when he could not reconcile agreement with his principles. The Italian representatives might return to Italy with a proposal agreed to by their three colleagues, but they might then find themselves in an entirely different atmosphere where only one point of view was understood. He therefore fully understood President Wilson's difficulty in telling the Italian representatives before hand what he could agree to. He, himself, had a good deal of experience of industrial disputes. He always said "Will you, the workmen, take the responsibility of recom-

mending this proposal if the other party will do the same?" He now said the same to the Italian representatives. Would they take the responsibility of recommending an arrangement?

BARON SONNINO said if it were acceptable they would.

M. ORLANDO said he would not have the power to accept any proposition whatever it was. To do so would be contrary to his original declaration at the beginning of the meeting. He had to put his position before Parliament. He had asked the three Powers, two of whom were allied and the other associated, whether they were agreed. The reply was in the negative. This was all he wanted to know. In their latest proposal, as he understood it, they had spoken of making Zara and Sebenico free cities and of handing over the islands to Italy and making Fiume a free city, but they had overlooked one point, namely Istria. It was essential to Italy that the frontiers should go right down to Volosca.

BARON SONNINO recalled that Mr. Lloyd George had asked whether the Italian Delegation would be prepared to accept a proposal if the three were in accord. He had asked if they were in a position to recommend acceptance. He had replied that if the proposals were acceptable they would recommend them to Parliament. Mr. Lloyd George had explained President Wilson's difficulties in making a precise proposal. The chance, however, was not great if the whole case had to be presented to the Italian Parliament without receiving a detailed proposal.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that unless the Italian Ministers were prepared to take the responsibility of recommending the proposal to Parliament, it was idle to discuss the matter further.

BARON SONNINO said that if proposals could be made to them that were acceptable they would undertake to recommend them with all their weight. Up to the present, however, he had not received an offer.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that M. Orlando would explain the difficult position of the several nations. Great Britain and France were bound by the pact and the United States by principles. He would put this position to the Italian Parliament and say to them "Have I authority to go back and settle as best I can?" He did not think it would be right to make a proposal for M. Orlando to present to Parliament.

BARON SONNINO asked what would happen if they asked Parliament for authority to find a settlement between the two positions, and should obtain the necessary authority and then go back and fail? Our position would be quite hopeless. They would then come back with a mandate and would have no chance of success. Their position

would be much better if they had some idea of an acceptable middle course now.

M. ORLANDO said that he agreed with President Wilson that the best course was to go back and explain the situation to Parliament and ask for a general authority. Why, he asked, should we exercise this pressure on President Wilson to make a proposal that he was not prepared to make? He, himself, remained in the same position as he had been at the beginning. He would go back to Parliament and ask them to take their decision. He realised, however, that he must give Parliament his own opinion. If Parliament would not accept it, the Government would be confided to other hands. He hoped, however, that the generous feelings of the Italian people would enable him to find a solution. At any rate the result would be a clear cut situation.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he thought this was an admirable position to take up. Supposing M. Orlando were to say that President Wilson, having published his statement, was now ready to abate it, what would be the opinion in Italy?

BARON SONNINO asked what was the danger of attempting some application of principles? He could not go as President Wilson suggested and simply say "Give us confidence for any plans we like to adopt". It would be much harder to make a compromise after going before Parliament. If only a compromise could be agreed to now, Parliament could be asked to accept it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that unfortunately there was a conflict of principles in this case. There were President Wilson's principles, in which he agreed to and which he had defended in spite of a certain amount of opposition. There was also the principle of International engagements and standing by the signature of treaties. He could not see the danger of a compromise. In such a case it was best to make the best arrangement and the best compromise possible. The proposal he had made did not give way on any of the principles. If the Dalmatian coast were free, President Wilson's principles were not impugned. He did not know the best way of getting things through the Italian Parliament, but he knew the British Parliament, having been 30 years a member, and there he would want to know where he stood and what to make for in dealing with such a question.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in the question of reparation for example, he could not have gone to Parliament and asked for a free hand.

BARON SONNINO said that was exactly what he had maintained.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that as a matter of fact this was what Mr. Lloyd George had done.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said this was not the case. He had been able to reassure Parliament exactly as to where he stood. If it had been otherwise Parliament would not have given him its confidence. They would not have done so unless he had confidence in himself.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the Italian representative could go to the Italian Parliament and tell them that neither the Allied nor Associated Powers could consent to give them Fiume. The British and French felt bound to stand by their agreement as allies. In regard to the agreement they could state that he, himself, understood the difficulty of his colleagues and was ready to agree with anything consistent with his principles, although he had no proposal to make.

M. ORLANDO re-stated what President Wilson had said in almost identical terms.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that President Wilson's position seemed to be that he was unwilling to propose any arrangement but that he insisted that it must be made clear that Fiume was not to go to Italy.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he must remind his colleagues that the Italian Parliament has never known the position of the United States Government which had been set forth in his Memorandum. His proposals in that Memorandum had been not merely negative, they had also been positive. It included measures necessary for providing the security of the eastern coasts of Italy in the Adriatic. It called attention to the necessity of providing for this and included the limitation of armaments, the destruction of fortifications, etc. to meet these difficulties. Hence it was constructive as well as negative. He wanted the Italian Parliament to know what he did say in this respect.

At this moment M. ORLANDO said it was time for him to go as he had to catch his train.

Before leaving Sir Maurice Hankey, on behalf of Mr. Lloyd George, handed M. Orlando a letter signed by M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George. (Appendix I.)

A Press
Communique

2. A Press communique was agreed to in regard to the afternoon's meeting.

Kiachow and
Shantung

3. PRESIDENT WILSON read the report of the Committee that had been set up to consider the Chinese position in regard to Shantung.³ (Appendix II.)

SIR MAURICE HANKEY was instructed to ascertain from the Chinese Delegation whether any written note was being sent in regard to the question that had been put to them by the Supreme Council.

³ Appointed on April 22 and consisting of Jean Gout, E. T. Williams, and Ronald Macleay as French, American, and British representatives respectively.

The Meeting adjourned until 4 p. m. on the following day when the Economic and Financial Clauses were to be considered.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, April 24, 1919.

Appendix I

[The Heads of the French and British Delegations (Clemenceau and Lloyd George) to the Head of the Italian Delegation (Orlando)]

FIUME AND THE PEACE SETTLEMENT

We learn with a regret which it is difficult to measure that, at the very moment when Peace seems almost attained, Italy threatens to sever herself from the company of the Allied Nations, through whose common efforts victory has been achieved. We do not presume to offer any opinion as to the effects which so momentous a step would have upon the future of Italy herself. Of these it is for the Italian people and its leaders to judge, and for them alone. But we, who have been Italy's Allies through four anxious years, and would gladly be her Allies still, are bound to express our fears as to the disastrous effects it will surely have upon us, and upon the policy for which we have striven.

When in 1915 Italy threw in her lot with France, Russia, and the British Empire in their struggle against the Central Powers, Turkey and Bulgaria, she did so on conditions. She required her Allies to promise that in case of victory they would help her to obtain in Europe the frontier of the Alps, the great ports of Trieste and Pola, and a large portion of the Dalmatian coast with many of its adjacent islands. Such accessions of territory would enormously strengthen Italy's power of defence, both on land and sea, against her hereditary enemy, and would incidentally result in the transfer of over 200,000 German-speaking Tyrolese and over 750,000 Southern Slavs from Austrian to Italian rule. Under this arrangement Fiume was retained by Great Britain, France and Italy herself for Croatia.

Such was the situation in April, 1915. In November, 1918, it had profoundly changed. Germany was beaten; the Dual Monarchy had ceased to exist: and side by side with this Military revolution, the ideals of the Western Powers had grown and strengthened. In 1915 the immediate needs of self-defence, the task of creating and equipping vast Armies, the contrivance of new methods for meeting new perils, strained to the utmost the energies of the Allies. But by 1918 we had reached the double conviction that if the repetition of such calamities was to be avoided, the Nations must organise themselves

to maintain Peace, as Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey had organised themselves to make war; and that little could be expected, even from the best contrived organisation, unless the boundaries of the States to be created by the Conference were framed, on the whole, in accordance with the wishes and lasting interests of the populations concerned.

This task of re-drawing European frontiers has fallen upon the Great Powers; and admittedly its difficulty is immense. Not always, nor indeed often, do race, religion, language, history, economic interests, geographical contiguity and convenience, the influence of national prejudice, and the needs of national defence, conspire to indicate without doubt or ambiguity the best frontier for any State:—be it new or old. And unless they do, some element in a perfect settlement must be neglected, compromise becomes inevitable, and there may often be honest doubts as to the form the compromise should take.

Now as regards most of the new frontier between Italy and what was once the Austrian Empire, we have nothing to say. We are bound by the Pact of London, and any demand for a change in that Pact which is adverse to Italy must come from Italy herself. But this same Pact gives Fiume to Croatia, and we would very earnestly and respectfully ask whether any valid reason exists for adding, in the teeth of the Treaty, this little city on the Croatian coast to the Kingdom of Italy? It is said indeed, and with truth, that its Italian population desire the change. But the population which clusters round the port is not predominantly Italian. It is true that the urban area wherein they dwell is not called Fiume; for it is divided by a narrow canal, as Paris is divided by the Seine, or London by the tidal estuary of the Thames, and locally the name, Fiume, is applied in strictness only to the streets on one side of it. But surely we are concerned with things, not names; and however you name it, the town which serves the port, and lives by it, is physically one town, not two: and taken as a whole is Slav, not Italian.

But if the argument drawn from the wishes of the present population does not really point to an Italian solution, what remains? Not the argument from history; for up to quite recent times the inhabitants of Fiume, in its narrowest meaning, were predominantly Slav. Not the arguments from contiguity; for the country population, up to the very gates of the city, are not merely predominantly Slav, but Slav without perceptible admixture. Not the economic argument; for the territories which obtain through Fiume their easiest access to the sea, whatever else they be, at least are not Italian. Most of them are Slav, and if it be said that Fiume is also necessary to Hungarian and Transylvanian commerce, this is a valid argument for making it a free port, but surely not for putting it under Italian sovereignty.

There is one other line of argument on this subject about which we would ask leave to say a word. It is urged by some, and thought by many, that the task of the Great Powers is not merely to sit down and coldly re-arrange the pieces on the European board in strict, even pedantic, conformity with certain admirable but very abstract principles. They must consider these great matters in more human fashion. After all (so runs the argument), the problems to be dealt with arise out of a Great War. The conquerors in that War were not the aggressors: their sacrifices have been enormous; the burdens they have to bear seem well-nigh intolerable. Are they to get nothing out of victory, except the consciousness that State frontiers in Europe will be arranged in a better pattern after 1918 than they were before: and that nations who fought on the wrong side, or who did not fight at all, will have gained their freedom through other people's losses? Surely the victors, if they want it, are entitled to some more solid reward than theoretical map-makers, working in the void, may on abstract principles feel disposed to give them.

There is something in this way of thinking which at first sight appeals to us all; and where no interests are concerned but those of the criminal aggressors, it deserves respectful consideration. But in most cases of territorial redistribution it is at least as important to enquire what effects the transfer will have on the nations to whom the territory is given, as upon those from whom it is taken: and when, as in the case of Jugo-Slavia, the nation from whom it is taken happens to be a friendly State, the difficulty of the problem is doubled.

We do not presume to speak with authority on the value of the strategical gains which Italy anticipates from the acquisition of the islands and coastline of Dalmatia. They seem to us to be small; though, small as they are, they must greatly exceed the economic advantages which will accrue to Italian trade from new opportunities, or to the Italian Treasury from new sources of revenue. We cannot believe that the owners of Trieste have anything to fear from Fiume as a commercial rival, or the owners of Pola from Fiume as a Naval base.

But if Italy has little to gain from the proposed acquisition, has she not much to lose? The War found her protected from an hereditary enemy of nearly twice her size by a frontier which previous Treaties had deliberately left insecure. Her Eastern sea-board was almost bare of harbours, while Austria-Hungary possessed on the opposite side of the Adriatic some of the finest harbours in the world. This was her condition in 1914. In 1919 her Northern and Eastern frontiers are as secure as mountains and rivers can make them. She is adding two great ports to her Adriatic possessions; and her

hereditary oppressor has ceased to exist. To us it seems that, as a State thus situated has nothing to fear from its neighbours' enmity, so its only interest must be to gain their friendship. And though memories belonging to an evil past make friendship difficult between Italians and Slavs, yet the bitterest memories soften with time, unless fresh irritants are frequently applied; and among such irritants none are more powerful than the constant contemplation of a disputed and ill-drawn frontier.

It is for Italy, and not for the other signatories of the Pact of London, to say whether she will gain more in power, wealth and honour by strictly adhering to that part of the Pact of London which is in her favour, than by accepting modifications in it which would bring it into closer harmony with the principles which are governing the territorial decisions of the Allies in other parts of Europe. But so far as Fiume is concerned the position is different. Here, as we have already pointed out, the Pact of 1915 is against the Italian contention; and so also, it seems to us, are justice and policy. After the most prolonged and anxious reflexion, we cannot bring ourselves to believe that it is either in the interests of Jugoslavia, in the interests of Italy herself, or in the interests of future peace—which is the concern of all the world—that this port should be severed from the territories to which economically, geographically and ethnologically it naturally belongs.

Can it be that Italy on this account is prepared to separate herself from her Allies? The hope that sustained us through the perilous years of War was that victory, when it came, would bring with it, not merely the defeat of Germany, but the final discredit of the ideals in which Germany had placed her trust. On the other hand, Germany, even when she began to entertain misgivings about the issues of the campaign, felt sure that the union of her enemies would never survive their triumph. She based her schemes no longer on the conquest of Europe, but on its political, and perhaps also on its social disintegration. The Armistice might doubtless produce a brief cessation of hostilities; but it would bring no repose to a perturbed and over-wrought world. Militant nationalism would lead to a struggle between peoples; militant internationalism to a struggle between classes. In either event, or in both, the Conference summoned to give us peace would leave us at war, and Germany alone would be the gainer.

This, or something like this, is the present calculation of a certain section of German politicians. Could anything more effectually contribute to its success than that Italy should quarrel with her Allies, and that the cause of quarrel should be the manner in which our common victory may best be used? We are calling into being a

League of Nations; we are daily adding to the responsibilities which, under the approaching Treaty, it will be called upon to assume; yet before the scheme has had time to clothe itself in practical form, we hasten to destroy its credit. To the world we supply dramatic proof that the association of the Great Powers, which won the War, cannot survive Peace: and all the world will ask how, if this be so, the maintenance of Peace can safely be left in their hands.

For these reasons, if for no other, we beg our Italian colleagues to reconsider their policy. That it has been inspired by a high sense of Patriotism we do not doubt. But we cannot believe either that it is in Italy's true interests, or that it is worthy of the great part which Italy is called upon to play in the Councils of the Nations.

G. CLEMENCEAU

D. LLOYD GEORGE

PARIS, 23.4.19.

Appendix II

Report of Committee on Shantung and Kiachow

We are directed to express an opinion as to whether it would be more advantageous for China if Japan were merely to inherit the rights possessed by Germany in Shantung and Kiachow or if she were to accept the position created by the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Agreements of 1915 and 1918.

We find that either course presents serious disadvantages for China.

In the first case China would not recover her rights of sovereignty over Kiachow Bay and the leased territory until the termination of the lease in 1997, i. e. for another 78 years.

Under the terms of the lease the Japanese would have the right to erect fortifications, to use the port as a naval base and to exercise rights of administration in the ceded territory. The rights in the railways, mines and presumably the other ex-German concessions in the Province of Shantung would persist after the termination of the lease of Kiachow.

In the second case China would recover from Japan possession of the leased territory of Kiachow but not of the railway and mining rights in the Province of Shantung. It is presumed that the restoration of the leased territory to China would take place immediately after the ratification of the Treaty of Peace, provided that that Treaty gives Japan the free disposal of the German rights. The retrocession of the leased territory to China by Japan is, however, made dependent upon certain conditions and especially upon the establishment of an exclusive Japanese residential Concession in the town and port of Tsingtao. This Concession presumably would be

permanent and if, as is understood to be the case, it is intended that this exclusive Japanese area shall include the greater part of the business portion of the town of Tsingtao, the docks, quay, and the railway terminus, its effect, in our opinion, will be to diminish to a great extent the value of the immediate restoration to China of the leased territory. Moreover the Sino-Japanese Agreement of the 24th September 1918 gives Japan the right to maintain a contingent of Japanese troops at Tsinanfu, which is in the centre of the Province of Shantung and is a place of strategic importance as the junction of the Kiachow-Tsinan and Tientsin-Pukow Railways. The Agreement further provides for the employment of Japanese at the headquarters of the Chinese police force charged with the policing of the Kiachow-Tsinanfu railway. Japanese are also to be employed at the principal railway stations and at the police training school. We venture to call attention to the fact that these rights, which would appear to constitute an infringement of China's sovereignty and independence, were not enjoyed or exercised by Germany under the 1898 Convention or any subsequent Agreement with China.

In these circumstances we are of opinion that it would be more advantageous for China to accept the first alternative and to agree to Japan succeeding to the rights and the position which Germany possessed in Kiachow and in the Province of Shantung in 1914 on the outbreak of the war, provided that Japan's rights, both in the leased territory and in the Province, are confined strictly to those secured to Germany by the Treaty of March 6th, 1898, and by subsequent Sino-German Agreements in regard to mines and railways.

We desire to call special attention to the fact that these Sino-German Treaties and Agreements did not confer upon Germany the right to establish outside the leased territory any form of civil administration in the Province of Shantung, or to maintain troops in any district or town of the Province, or to employ German troops or police to guard the Kiachow-Tsinanfu railway. It is further to be noted that, in accordance with the terms of the Agreement concluded between Germany and China on the 31st December 1913,⁴ the two railways in the Province of Shantung, which Germany obtained the concession to build in place of the lines originally contemplated in the 1898 Convention, were to be constructed as Chinese Government railways, i. e., they would become the property of the Chinese State and not of the Concessionaires.

JEAN GOUT
E. T. WILLIAMS
RONALD MACLEAY

⁴ John V. A. MacMurray (ed.), *Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1894-1919* (New York, 1921), vol. II, p. 1094.

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's Residence, Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Friday, April 25, 1919, at 4 p. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.
Mr. Lamont.
Mr. Baruch.
Mr. Taussig.
Mr. Anderson.
Mr. Palmer.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Borden,
G. C. M. G., K. C.
Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith, K. C. B.
Mr. H. A. Payne, C. B.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Clémentel.
M. Loucheur.
M. de Serruys,
Director at the Ministry
of Commerce and Industry.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. *Secretary*
Professor P. J. Mantoux. *Interpreter.*

1. M. LOUCHEUR said that he and Lord Cunliffe¹ and Mr. Lamont, in accordance with the decision taken the previous day, had interviewed the representatives of Belgium, Serbia, Portugal and Brazil, and had explained to them the reparation clauses. The results of the interview had been set forth in a memorandum which M. Loucheur had prepared,² but might be summarised as follows:—

Belgium had demanded the costs of the war, provisions as regards certain works of art and certain new categories of damage.

Serbia had demanded to be represented on the Commission and had made some small demand in regard to categories.

Brazil had claimed the same treatment as the United States of America in regard to captured enemy ships.

Portugal claimed the costs of the war and reparation for shipping. All had asked to be heard by the Supreme Council.

M. LOUCHEUR suggested that, as Belgium was the most important, her representatives should be heard separately.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought this was quite right.

¹ Governor of the Bank of England, 1913-18; president of the Subcommission on the Financial Capacity of Enemy States, Their Means of Payment and Reparation (Second Subcommission).

² See appendix IV to IC-177A, p. 322.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had received a letter from Lord Sumner describing the interview which he and some of his colleagues had had with the representatives of Roumania, Greece and Japan. Roumania had said nothing, but had given the impression of being not very contented. Greece had been satisfied. The Japanese representative had been enigmatic and they had not been able to judge of his attitude.

No complaints nor demands had been made. This was a matter that would have to be dealt with by the Supreme Council. In regard to the ships, he had always felt that Brazil would take this attitude.

PRESIDENT WILSON remarked that the difference between the case of Brazil and that of the United States was very great.

2. The Supreme Council had before them the articles prepared by the Economic Commission.³

Economic Commission: Articles To Be Inserted in the Treaty of Peace With Germany

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the differences between the experts were now very few and he proposed that they should only discuss those articles to which his colleagues wished to draw attention.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that one of the points in which the United States of America were especially interested was raised in Part I, Chapter D, Article I. Although it was a matter of policy, it did not directly affect the United States of America. The point he wished to raise referred to the limitation to be imposed on the duration of these clauses. What the United States were particularly interested in was a uniform provision as to the length of time for which these articles were to be applicable. They desired an automatic application of a term of 5 years, at the end of which the articles should cease to be operative except under some action by the League of Nations. The alternative proposal was that they should remain operative until they were terminated by some affirmative action by the League of Nations. The United States' view was that they ought to terminate automatically unless renewed.

(a) Part I,
Chapter D,
Article I

SIR ROBERT BORDEN said that the discussion at the British Empire Delegation had centered on this point. The general view had been that the articles should be terminated unless renewed by the League of Nations.

PRESIDENT WILSON said this was precisely his view.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked how the matter stood in the report.

MR. BARUCH said that the articles would continue until terminated by the League of Nations.

³The text of these articles does not accompany the minutes.

M. CLÉMENTEL said that there were two classes of articles to be considered. The first class dealt with customs and the second class dealt with the treatment of nationals of Allied and Associated Powers in ex-enemy countries, etc. and shipping. In regard to customs, it had been generally accepted that the provisions should terminate automatically at the end of 5 years, unless renewed by a decision of the League of Nations, which, he remarked, was rather difficult and uncertain, because a unanimous decision was necessary and any one party was at liberty to refuse assent. He asked that it should be remembered what Germany had done not only during the war but before the war. Countries like France, for example, had suffered very much from Germany's action before the war, in her attempts to capture the iron trade; to obtain control of such articles as bauxite in order to get the aluminum trade under control; and in regard to dyestuffs, where she had checked competition. To this must be added what had happened during the war, when prodigious damage had been inflicted by Germany, both of a material and personal character. When this was borne in mind, the difficulty would be realised for peoples who had so suffered to forget within so short a term as 5 years. If the provisions came to an end at the end of 5 years, those countries would be obliged to receive the Germans in the same position as before the war. If they refused, they would, of course, be exposed to reciprocal treatment by Germany. It had been suggested that the invaded countries should receive separate treatment, and that the provisions should continue automatically unless stopped.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that M. Clémentel's argument proved too much. If the League of Nations could not extend the period because it would not be able to reach a unanimous decision, it would equally be unable for the same reason to terminate the operation of the provisions. He, himself, thought that it was a mistake to suppose that the League of Nations would not be able to reach unanimity.

M. CLÉMENTEL said that it was realised that the system could not be permanent. What was proposed was a maximum period within which the provisions should operate. The first proposal was for 20 years. Now, however, this had been reduced to 10 years. Five years was, in his opinion, too short a period. The result of fixing only 5 years would be that France would have to shut the Germans out, in which case they would receive reciprocal treatment in Germany.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would accept the demand for 10 years as a maximum for countries that had been ravaged.

MR. BARUCH said that the United States Delegates on the Commission had thought five years too long. He hoped, therefore, that five years would be accepted as the maximum unless the League of Nations decided to prolong it. His personal view was that five years was too long.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it should be taken into account that the different nations had not been affected during the War in the same manner. In France damage had been done which would be perceptible for more than a century. Nations which had taken part in the War and had not been exposed to the same terrible suffering as France naturally had not the same mentality as a country which could not be completely repaired for more than a century. In his view, five years might be adopted for all countries but a special provision should be made for countries like France which were in a different position.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN suggested that the five years which had already been fixed should be adopted as a minimum and ten years should be taken as the maximum period. The League of Nations should have power to appoint a Commission which should, by majority, fix a period for which in particular cases an extension should be granted, such extension not to go beyond a maximum of ten years from the original date.

M. CLEMENCEAU said France would accept that proposal.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE also agreed in the proposal.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that one aspect was constantly in his mind in regard to the whole of the Treaty with Germany. When the German plenipotentiaries came to Versailles they would be representatives of a very unstable Government. Consequently, they would have to scrutinize every item, not merely to say that it was equitable, but also as to whether it could be agreed to without their being unseated. If the present Government were unseated, a weaker Government would take its place. Hence the question had to be studied like a problem of dynamics concerning the action of forces in a body in unstable equilibrium. Any special restrictions on their nationals which they could not meet by corresponding restrictions would place them in difficulties. The Treaty would hit them very hard since it would deprive them of their Mercantile Marine; would affect their international machinery for commerce; would deprive them of their property in other countries; would open their country by compulsion to enterprising citizens of other countries without enabling their enterprising citizens to try and recover their position in foreign countries. He did not think that the fact had been sufficiently faced that Germany could not pay in gold unless she had a balance of trade in her favour. This meant that Germany must establish a greater foreign commerce than she had had before the war if she was to be able to pay. Before the war the balance of trade in Germany's favour had never equalled the amounts which she would now have to pay. If too great a handicap was imposed on Germany's resources we should not be able to get what Germany

owed for reparation. Moreover, if the business world realised that this was the case the securities on which the payment of reparation would depend would have no value. If this reasoning was sound it provided a formidable argument. He only looked towards reaching a peace and in doing so putting Germany in the position to build up a commerce which would enable her to pay what she ought to pay in order to make good the robbery and destruction she had perpetrated. But if the robber was to be in such a position that he could not pay the penalties would be inoperative. These penalties ought to be operative and real. We ought to see that Germany could put herself in a position where she could be punished. At the present time we were sending food to Germany but she would not be able to pay for that for more than about two months.

M. CLÉMENTEL said he thought there was some misunderstanding. There was perfect agreement as far as customs clauses were concerned, namely, that they should terminate at the end of five years or that at the end of four years the League of Nations should consider whether there was to be any extension. As regards persons it was not desirable from Germany's point of view that it should be automatically terminated too soon, as if it were, Germans in countries like France would be exposed to violence. He would be quite satisfied if Sir Robert Borden's proposal were adopted. The countries concerned would then have a right to state before the Commission set up by the League of Nations whether public opinion would enable them to terminate the provisions at the end of five years or would render it desirable to extend the term of their operation. Nothing would be gained by Germany by unduly shortening the period. In accepting Sir Robert Borden's proposal France was making a considerable concession when it was remembered that 20 years had been the period originally proposed.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he did not much like Sir Robert Borden's proposal and he thought it was a mistake. He thought it would be quite safe to decide that the provisions should terminate in five years unless continued by the League of Nations. He would point out that the term used should either be 'Council of the League' or 'Body of Delegates'.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this was the case.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he wanted in every possible case to yield to the desire of his French colleagues. He realised to the full the position of the French Government and people and the suffering which France had undergone. Although it was a serious matter for the treaty as a whole, therefore, he would accept Sir Robert Borden's suggestion but he urged that the clauses should be very precisely drawn.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN said he would be glad to cooperate with the Drafting Committee.

Sir Robert Borden's proposal was accepted, namely that the period during which the provisions should apply should be fixed at five years unless extended by the League of Nations. The maximum period to which the extension could be made should be ten years from the original date. The League of Nations should by majority vote set up a Commission which by majority vote should decide the length of any extension within the total period of ten years.

The Drafting Committee of the Commission should formulate the necessary amendments to be forwarded to the Drafting Committee of the Peace Conference.

**Part IV.
Reparations Y**

[3.] PRESIDENT WILSON asked Dr. Taussig to explain points which arose on these clauses.⁴

DR. TAUSSIG illustrated the point raised by this Article in the following manner:—Supposing a German subject possessed property in Italy, the Article provided that such property could be utilised towards the payment of amounts due to subjects of the Allied or Associated Powers in regard to property which they had in German territory. The question was whether, in the event of there being a surplus on the German property, it could be used to make good debts owed to Allied and Associated subjects in Austria or other enemy territory. The Italian Delegation had taken the view that it could be so used, but the United States Delegation had reserved their adhesion.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he agreed with the Italian view. The principle of joint liability by enemy powers had been accepted in regard to reparation, and he thought it would be difficult to avoid applying the principle here also.

SIR HUBERT LLEWELLYN SMITH pointed out that compensation to the enemy subjects in such case was provided for, but would have to be paid by the enemy Government concerned.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he did not much like the Article, but he would not press his objections.

**Part IV., Article
C (a) b. Footnote**

(The Article was accepted.)

(It was agreed that the foot-note should be deleted.)

Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward the Report of the Economic Commission to the Secretary General for communication to the Drafting Committee of the Preliminary Peace Conference as soon as the expert Drafting Committee had completed the necessary alterations in the Articles.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 25 April, 1919.

⁴The text of these articles does not accompany the minutes.

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's Residence, Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Friday, April 25, 1919, at 5:30 p. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.
Admiral Benson.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
Rear-Admiral G. P. W. Hope, C. B.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
Admiral de Bon.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. *Secretary*
Professor P. J. Mantoux *Interpreter.*

The Supreme Council had before it the draft of articles concerning
the Kiel Canal for insertion in the Preliminary Treaty
of Peace with Germany. (Appendix.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the French and Italian dele-
gates had put forward a proposal for the destruction of the fortifi-
cations of the Kiel Canal. He understood that the subject of forti-
fications was dealt with in the Naval Terms, which
only permitted Germany to retain works of a defensive
nature. The result of the application of this principle
was that no works of defence would be allowed at the Kiel end of
the Canal, because these would have an offensive character since they
would threaten the entrances to the Baltic.

ADMIRAL BENSON said that the object in prohibiting these defensive
works at the Kiel end was not connected with the Kiel Canal at all,
but was to prevent interference with the natural waterway into the
Baltic.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that against the proposal to destroy
the defensive measures at the Elbe end of the Canal was the argu-
ment that in 15 minutes the Canal could be rendered unnavigable
by dropping mines in it.

ADMIRAL DE BON said the reason for which the French and Italian
Admirals had proposed the destruction of the defences at the Elbe
end of the Canal was because, if the navigation of the Kiel Canal
was to be free at all, it must be absolutely free. As regards the
argument that the Canal could be rendered unnavigable by laying

mines, he pointed out that by doing so the Germans would deprive themselves of the use of the Canal. Nothing could suit us better than that. The Kiel Canal doubled the efficiency of the German Fleet, and if they deprived themselves of it, nothing could be better. From a commercial point of view, the traffic through the Kiel Canal might become very important. It was capable of carrying 11,000,000 tons a year, and might become as important a waterway as the Belts. As regards the argument which had been used in informal conversation while the Council was assembling, that fortifications could be rapidly improvised, this was equally true as regards the Belts. Fortifications could be improvised here also. Hence, there was no argument in regard to the Belts that could not be equally applied to the Elbe.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in the Naval Terms it had been decided that Germany should be in a position to defend her ports against the enemy. We could not deprive the Kiel Canal of its fortifications without leaving the Elbe unfortified.

ADMIRAL BENSON raised the question of the removal of the fortifications at the Kiel end. He was inclined to question whether we were not going too far. This would leave a large part of the Baltic coast totally undefended. The British representative had suggested that Germany might be allowed some fortification at the Kiel end of the Canal. The general principles to which we were working was that natural waterways should not be fortified. There should be free communication through them both in Peace and in War. It had been decided to remove the defences at the Kiel end because the range of modern guns placed to command the approaches to the Belts happened to take in the Kiel Canal and Baltic Coast of Germany.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he hoped the French Delegation would not press for the inclusion of this Article.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that as a matter of fact the provisions it was proposed to impose for the Kiel Canal were practically identical with the United States arrangements for the Panama Canal, which had been arranged between the United States of America and Great Britain. These provisions were based on the principle of the Canal being available for use on the same terms by ships of all countries, except in time of war. The Panama Canal, however, was very vulnerable to attack, and provision had had to be made for its defence. Consequently, it had been very heavily fortified.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that the Suez Canal had no fortifications, and these were prohibited.

ADMIRAL HOPE pointed out that we could not use the Canal if we were at war with Germany.

ADMIRAL BENSON said that nothing could suit the enemy better than to get ships into the Canal in the event of war, and then to block them in there.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Admiral De Bon's point was that such arrangements ought to be made that if we could not use the Kiel Canal in time of war, neither should Germany be able to.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the Kiel Canal was entirely within German territory and sovereignty. This was not true of the Suez Canal, which was not in the body of any single country.

ADMIRAL BENSON said that his feeling was very strong that it was a mistake to touch the Kiel Canal at all. It established a precedent of a very dubious character. If it was regarded as a purely punitive measure, then he would have nothing to say. But to go into a country and make special provision for a Canal was very similar to going in and taking its railways. The Kiel Canal had been a German national enterprise, and was no concern of the outside world.

ADMIRAL HOPE pointed out that we had Bismarck's declaration that the Kiel Canal had been built solely for strategic purposes. It was for this reason that Admiral de Bon went so far as to say it ought to be destroyed. In these provisions, however, Germany had been treated more leniently.

PRESIDENT WILSON said the Canal had some commercial importance.

ADMIRAL HOPE said that this was not great. The greatest distance saved between the nearest Dutch port and the nearest Baltic port was only 200 miles as compared with the route through the Belts.

ADMIRAL DE BON pointed out a certain inconsistency between our attitude with regard to the Kiel Canal and the other provisions that had been made for internationalising the course of the Elbe and many other waterways. If these waterways were to be internationalised, why not the Kiel Canal also? Surely it ought to be on the same basis!

(It was decided to omit Article 8.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether it was worth while setting up an International Commission to control a purely German Canal.

Article 7 This Canal had no very great value from a commercial point of view. Most ships would still prefer to use the Belts, and only a few ships trafficking between Dutch and Baltic ports were likely to use the Canal. The reason for this was that there were no dues in the Belts, and there must be dues in the Canal. He asked if it was worth while to hurt German pride and add to our own difficulties for so small a matter.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed that it was not, and withdrew the French draft of Article 7.

(The British, American, Japanese and Italian proposal for Article 7 (Appendix), was adopted.)

2. ADMIRAL HOPE said that the first question raised was as to whether surface ships enumerated in the Article were to be sunk.¹

Naval, Military
and Air Terms.
Reserve Clauses.
Article 25. Sinking
of Surface Ships

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether after these ships had been handed over, Germany would retain any surface ships.

ADMIRAL HOPE replied that they would.

ADMIRAL BENSON considered that too much was at stake to settle this Article in a hurry. He pointed out that the ships now lying in the British Port of Scapa Flow had not been surrendered but were merely interned.

ADMIRAL HOPE pointed out that by Article 24, the ships interned in compliance with the Armistice were to be definitely surrendered. This Article had already been accepted.

ADMIRAL BENSON pressed that the disposal of the surface ships should be definitely dealt with in the Peace Terms. What, he asked, would happen if it had not been decided before the Peace Terms were signed, what should be done with these ships now in German ports. Were the British or French Navies prepared to take them into British and French ports, and look after them? To decide this question now would ease the situation as far as Germany was concerned. To leave it unsettled was to risk misunderstandings.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that no prolonged discussion on this should be embarked on, as there were still many questions to be settled before the Germans arrive at Versailles. A discussion on this point might last a day or two. In the meanwhile, he proposed that the terms should simply state that the ships were to be surrendered to the Allied and Associated Powers. He was desirous of reaching some arrangement; for example, it might be agreed to sink some of the German ships.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that a promise might be given to Germany that a decision would be reached on the subject before the Treaty of Peace was actually signed. The question could be discussed while the Peace Treaty was being examined by the Germans.

ADMIRAL BENSON asked what would happen if a decision had not been reached.

PRESIDENT WILSON said his proposal was to say definitely that a decision would be reached, and then it would have to be reached.

ADMIRAL BENSON pointed out that any decision, except to sink the ships, meant an increase of armaments.

¹ The draft articles under consideration do not accompany the minutes.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he could give Admiral Benson his proposal for stopping the increase of armaments, and even bring about a decrease, but he doubted if the Admiral would accept it. The British Government did not want these ships and were ready to discuss even the decrease of Navies, provided all would agree. This, however, was a very big question.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he understood the French had made a reservation in regard to this Article. He asked for the reason.

ADMIRAL DE BON said the reason was, first, that by sinking the ships, valuable property would be destroyed, and there would be an increase in the general losses of the war. French public opinion was strongly against this. A more especial reason was, however, that if the ships were divided among the Allied and Associated Powers, it would make a considerable addition, perhaps not of great fighting value, but nevertheless, a useful addition to the peace strength of the French Navy. During five years, owing to the immense efforts of French industries in supplying the armies, it had not been possible to complete any capital ships. These ships would be very useful to show the French flag and spread the national influence in the world. France's naval strength was greatly reduced, especially as compared with other nations. For no aggressive desires of any kind, France did not want to lose this opportunity for repairing her losses.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Admiral De Bon was also well aware that the French taxpayer would not be content to pay for more ships. He fully agreed that the French position in this matter ought to be considered. His idea was that France should have some of these ships, and sink a corresponding number of old ships, or if unwilling to sink them, she might break them up, which Admiral Hope told him would be a business proposition.

PRESIDENT WILSON proposed that if the German Peace delegates should raise the question, a promise should be given them that the question would be settled for the signing of the Peace Treaty.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE and M. CLEMENCEAU agreed in this.

(Article 25 as finally revised is as follows:—

Within a period of two months from the coming into force of the present stipulations, the German surface warships enumerated below will be surrendered to Allied and Associated Governments.

These warships will have been disarmed as provided in Article 23 of the Armistice date[d] the 11th November, 1918. Nevertheless they must have all their guns on board.

BATTLESHIPS

Oldenburg	Posen
Thüringen	Westfalen
Ostfriesland	Rheinland
Helgoland	Nassau

LIGHT CRUISERS

Stettin	Strassburg
Danzig	Augsburg
München	Kolberg
Lübeck	Stuttgart

and, in addition, forty-two modern destroyers and fifty modern torpedo boats, as chosen by the five Allied and Associated Governments.)

3. ADMIRAL HOPE said that the reserved portion of this Article related to the question of whether surrendered submarines were to be destroyed and broken up.

Article 28. Destruction of Submarines

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what objection there was.

ADMIRAL DE BON said it was the same objection as before, namely, the destruction of material.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE demurred to the idea that any nation should add to its submarines.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he himself was opposed to submarines altogether, and hoped the time would come when they would be contrary to International Law. In his view, they should be regarded as outlaws.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that many of the submarines that had been handed over by the Germans had been broken up altogether. A decision to this effect had been taken earlier.²

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this had been agreed to, but when he had discovered it, he had intervened.³

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that M. Clemenceau's objection was to the destruction of material. If the submarines were broken up, the material would not be wasted.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked Admiral De Bon what was his policy towards submarines.

ADMIRAL DE BON said that his policy was to keep the German submarines, of which France had received some 50. France had very few of her own.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he did not think that Navies ought to be strengthened by submarines.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if ever France had another war with Germany they might be useful, although he hoped long before that they would be obsolete.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he would like to destroy all the German submarines.

² See BC-6, vol. III, p. 643.

³ See BC-24, *ibid.*, p. 888.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that France had very few, whereas Great Britain had very many.

ADMIRAL DE BON said the question had never been discussed by experts.

(It was agreed:—

1. That the words in the second clause of Article 28 “there to be destroyed or broken up” should be struck out.

2. That the Admirals of the Allied and Associated Powers should further consider the question of the disposal of the German submarines.)

4. ADMIRAL HOPE suggested that the following words in Article 32, which had been reserved, “such arms, munitions, and war material will be destroyed or rendered useless” should be omitted, as a corresponding article had been inserted in the Military clauses.

Article 32. Destruction of War Material

(This was agreed to.)

Article 35. Heligoland

ADMIRAL HOPE pointed out that the question of Heligoland had already been dealt with.

Article 38. Kiel Canal

6. This question was dealt with earlier in the meeting.

Article 40. Submarine Cables

7. PRESIDENT WILSON said that this was not a matter for the Naval Terms.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 25 April, 1919.

Appendix

Draft Articles Concerning the Kiel Canal for Insertion in the Preliminary Treaty of Peace With Germany

ARTICLE I

The Kiel Canal and its approaches shall be maintained free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations at peace with Germany on terms of entire equality.

ARTICLE II

The nationals, property and vessels of all States shall, in respect of charges, facilities, and in all other respects, be treated on a footing of perfect equality in the use of the Canal, no distinction being made to the detriment of nationals, property and vessels of any state, between the latter and the nationals, property and vessels of Germany or of the most favored nation.

No impediment shall be placed on the movement of persons or vessels other than those arising out of the police customs sanitary,

emigration or immigration regulations, and those relating to the import or export of prohibited goods.

Such regulations must be reasonable and uniform, and must not unnecessarily impede traffic.

ARTICLE III

Only such charges may be levied on vessels using the canal or its approaches as are intended to cover in an equitable manner the cost of maintaining in a navigable condition, or of improving, the canal or its approaches, or to meet expenditures incurred in the interests of navigation. The schedule of such charges shall be calculated on the basis of such expenses and shall be posted up in the ports. These charges shall be levied in such a manner as to render any detailed examination of cargoes unnecessary, except in the case of suspected fraud or contravention.

ARTICLE IV

Goods in transit may be placed under seal or in the custody of customs agents; the loading and unloading of goods, and the embarkation and disembarkation of passengers, shall only take place in the ports specified by Germany.

ARTICLE V

No charges of any kind other than those provided for in the present regulations shall be levied along the course or at the approaches of the Kiel Canal.

ARTICLE VI

Germany shall be bound to take suitable measures to remove any obstacle or danger to navigation and to ensure the maintenance of good conditions of navigation. Germany shall not undertake any works of a nature to impede navigation on the canal or its approaches.

ARTICLE VII

(English, American, Japanese
and Italian Proposal)

(French Proposal)

In the event of violation of any of these conditions, or of disputes as to the interpretation of the present Convention, any interested State can appeal to the The Kiel Canal and its approaches shall be under the control of an International Commission which shall include:—
2 representatives of Germany.

jurisdiction instituted for the purpose by the League of Nations and can demand the⁴ formation of an International Commission.

In order to avoid reference of small questions to the League of Nations, Germany will establish a local authority at Kiel qualified to deal with disputes in the first instance and to give satisfaction so far as possible to complaints which may be presented through the Consular representatives of the interested Powers.

1 representative of Great Britain.

1 representative of France.

1 representative of Poland.

1 representative of Denmark.⁴

This International Commission shall meet within three months from the signature of the Preliminary Peace Treaty and shall proceed immediately to prepare a project for the revision of the existing regulations. This project shall be drawn up in conformity with the General Convention on International Navigable Waterways, should such Convention have been previously concluded; in the absence of such Convention, the project for revision shall be in conformity with the provisions of the preceding articles.

ARTICLE 8

French and Italian Proposal

The following shall be demolished or suppressed under the direction of the Allied and Associated Powers and within the period fixed by such Powers:—

All fortified works situated within 50 kilom. of either bank of the Canal or of the mouth of the Elbe, and all means of obstruction the object or effect of which might be to interfere with the liberty and the entire security of navigation.

Germany shall be prohibited from erecting any new fortifications, from installing any battery within the zones specified above and from placing any obstruction in the approaches or in the Canal.

⁴File copy ends at this point; remainder of this appendix has been supplied from the printed report (Paris Peace Conf. 181.15302/4).

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's Residence, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Friday, 25 April, 1919, at 6.30 p. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. Lloyd George

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.
Professor P. J. Mantoux.

Secretary.
Interpreter.

Guarantees for the
Execution of the
Peace Treaty

1. M. CLEMENCEAU handed to Mr. Lloyd George a new set of articles concerning the guarantees for the execution of the Peace Treaty with Germany. (Appendix I.) President Wilson, he said, had agreed to these.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he considered Clause 2 (c) to be a very dangerous one. although he realised M. Clemenceau's difficulties. He undertook to examine the question.

2. SIR MAURICE HANKEY said that Mr. Hurst, the British Representative on the Drafting Committee, had told him that the Drafting Committee was now waiting for more material on which to work. Mr. Hurst had represented to him that a decision in regard to the language of the Peace Treaty was urgently required. In reply to President Wilson, he said that the Italian representative had throughout pressed strongly that Italian, as well as French and English, should be the official languages in the Peace Treaty. On the previous day, however, M. Orlando had stated that he could not say definitely whether Italy would be present at Versailles to meet the Germans. Moreover, Mr. Hurst informed him that the Italian representative had withdrawn from the Drafting Committee and there was no one on that Committee who could put the clauses into Italian. In view of the uncertainty as to whether the Italians would be at Versailles at all; in view of the withdrawal of the Italian representative from the Drafting Committee; and in view of the very short time available for printing and setting up the Peace Treaty, he said the Drafting Committee urgently required a decision.

The Language of the
Peace Treaty

(It was agreed that the Peace Treaty should be printed in the French and English languages, which should be the official languages of the Treaty.)

3. The Supreme Council had before them the following documents:—

Kiauchau and
Shantung A letter from the Marquis Saionji to M. Clemenceau,
asking him to press on the settlement of this question.
(Appendix II.)

A Report by the Expert Committee appointed by
the Supreme Council. (Appendix III.)

A Statement by the Chinese Delegation. (Appendix IV.)

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this question was almost as difficult as the Italian question. After calling attention to the reports mentioned above, he asked if the British and French were bound to transfer Kiauchau and Shantung to Japan.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that sooner or later they were.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that, on a previous occasion, Mr. Lloyd George had said that he was in a position to insist in common that the islands south of the Equator, Kiauchau and Shantung should be transferred in trust to the Allied and Associated Powers.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had discussed the question with Mr. Balfour, who had made a useful suggestion. His suggestion had been that we were bound to transfer the German rights in Shantung and Kiauchau to Japan, but we should like to talk over the terms on which Japan would hand them back to China. That proposal would meet the Japanese sentiments of pride, which compelled them to insist on the transfer of Kiauchau and Shantung to them and not to the Allied and Associated Powers. There was something to be said for Japan in this respect, since the Far East was the only sphere in which Japan was greatly concerned. She was not much concerned in the Western settlement. Then there was a suggestion which had been made by the Chinese and excepting for their first proposal, Mr. Balfour thought the Japanese might accept it and he thought there was something to be said for starting on that basis.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the treaty between China and Japan gave to Japan more and not less than Germany had had. In fact, Japan would practically hand back nothing to China. In the meantime, if his information was correct, Japan had gained possession of the foreshore of Kiauchau bay.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that we ought to discuss with Japan the conditions in which she would cede the territory to China. Undoubtedly, we should get the conditions which were best for China. He felt that he must point out that, if it had not been for Japanese intervention, the Germans would still have been in Shantung. The

Chinese did nothing to help get rid of them. We must not forget that Japan had rendered considerable assistance in the war.

SIR MAURICE HANKEY, at Mr. Lloyd George's request, explained the naval assistance that Japan had given. By capturing Kiauchau, she had deprived Germany of her naval base in the Far East and her ships had had to leave the Pacific and had eventually been brought to action and sunk off the Falkland Islands. Japan, after helping to clear the seas and to escort the troops from Australia and New Zealand, had continued to police the Far East, thus setting free cruisers for operations elsewhere and particularly in the North Sea. She had also sent 12 or more destroyers to the Mediterranean.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that, but for the assistance of Japan, it would have been difficult to transport the Australian and New Zealand troops.

PRESIDENT WILSON doubted if the Germans would have remained in possession of Kiauchau even if Japan had not captured it. The representatives of Japan had said they were willing to discuss with the other Powers the renunciation of the unusual rights which the Powers possessed in China. This would be a great relief to China, although these rights possessed no practical importance to the Powers. If China [*Japan?*] would agree to discuss with us the terms on which these rights could be ceded to China, then we could agree as an inducement to liberal terms to allow Kiauchau and Shantung to be ceded direct to Japan.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the British Government could not agree to Japan having a special position in Shantung as well as a general position in the Yangtse Kiang. The Japanese, however, wanted special powers for exploitation in the territories they occupied.

PRESIDENT WILSON said his object was to take the chains off China.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the difficulty was that we could not allow other nations to co-operate in the Yangtse Kiang, although we should like to, since we had not sufficient capital ourselves for development. The reason we could not do so was because we should have to allow the Japanese in.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he understood this and that the Japanese were apt to make special arrangements, which excluded other people.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that when the British built railways they handed them over to China. The Japanese, however, were apt to keep the railways and exploit them.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the larger part of Japanese territory was barren and consequently they required room for their population. They had found some space in Korea and Manchuria but they were now seeking more in China.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested the best plan to be for someone to sound the Japanese before they saw the Supreme Council.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that they should be told that the Allied and Associated Powers could not consent to the return of Kiauchau and Shantung to the Japanese on the terms on which they had agreed with China. He suggested that Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour should see Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda.

(Mr. Lloyd George undertook that Mr. Balfour should see the Japanese Representatives, and instructed Sir Maurice Hankey to inform Mr. Balfour accordingly.)

4. MR. LLOYD GEORGE informed President Wilson that he had now ascertained the numbers of British troops sent to Archangel, which reached a total of 5,000.

5. There was some discussion on the question as to whether the Syrian Commission should start.

The following decisions were reached:—

(1) The French Government should immediately nominate their representatives.

(2) The Commission should start as soon as possible.

(3) No announcement should be made until the Germans had come to Versailles.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 25 April, 1919.

Appendix I to IC-176F

24 APRIL, 1919.

Articles Concerning the Guarantees of Execution of the Treaty

1. —As a guarantee of the execution by Germany of the present treaty, German territories west of the Rhine, including the bridgeheads, are to be occupied by allied and associated forces during fifteen years.

2. —If the conditions of the treaty are executed by Germany, occupation to be successively reduced according to following schedule:

a) —to be evacuated after 5 years: the bridgehead of Cöln and the territories north of a line running along the Roer, then along the railroad: Jülich, Düren, Euskirchen, Rheinbach, then the road Rheinbach to Sinzig, and reaching the Rhine at the confluence with the Ahr river (the roads, railroads and localities above mentioned included in the occupied territory.)

b) —to be evacuated after 10 years: the bridgehead of Coblenz and the territories north of line to be drawn from the intersection between the frontiers of Belgium, Germany and Holland, running about 4 kilometres south of Aix-la-Chapelle, then to and following the crest of Forst Gemünd, then east of the railroad of the Urft

Valley, then along Blankenheim, Valdorf, Dreis, Ulmen to and following the Mosel from Bremm to Nehren, then passing along Kappel, Simmern, then following the ridge of the heights between Simmern and the Rhine and reaches the river at Bacharach (all localities, valleys, roads and railroads above mentioned included in the occupied territory.)

c) —to be evacuated after fifteen years the bridgehead of Mainz, the bridgehead of Kehl and the remainder of German territories still occupied. If at that time the guarantees against unprovoked aggression by Germany are not considered satisfactory by the present allied and associated Governments, Germany consents to accept such similar guarantees as they may require.

3. —In case, either during or after this fifteen years delay, the Interallied Commission of Reparations recognise that Germany refuse to execute the whole or part of the conditions agreed upon by her according to the present treaty, the reoccupation by Allied and Associated forces of part or the whole of the areas defined by article 2 will take place immediately.

4. —If, before fifteen years, Germany meets all the engagements taken by her according to the terms of the present treaty, the withdrawal of the Allied and Associated troops would immediately follow.

Appendix II to IC-176F

[Translation ¹]

*Marquis Saionji to the President of the Peace Conference
(Clemenceau)*

PARIS, April 25, 1919.

MR. PRESIDENT: The Chiefs of Government of the Great Powers having already heard the Delegates of China on the subject of the question of the Province of Shantung, I wish to express in the name of the Japanese Delegation, the desire to see as soon as possible a further meeting to expedite the definitive settlement of this question.

Considering the peculiar importance of this question for Japan, I would be grateful, Mr. President, if you would keep us, so far as possible, informed of all steps in its furtherance.

Accept [etc.]

SAIONJI

¹ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

Appendix III

Report of Committee on Shantung and Kiachow

[Same as appendix II to IC-176C, printed on page 227.]

Appendix IV to IC-176F*Chinese Statement*

In regard to the Kiaochow-Shantung settlement, the Chinese Delegates have carefully considered the question which the Council of Four put to them at its meeting of April 22nd,² namely, Which China would prefer—the treaty with Japan, or the transfer to Japan of the German rights? If they find neither alternative acceptable, it is only because they see difficulties in both. To hold China to the treaty and notes of 1915 would be to give countenance to serious encroachments on Chinese sovereignty committed without provocation and consummated only after the delivery of an ultimatum on China; while to substitute Japan for Germany in Shantung would be to create a graver situation because of Japan's propinquity to China, and because of her domination of Manchuria, which lies closely to the north of Shantung.

As regards the notes of 1918, they grew out of treaty and notes of 1915. They were made by China out of a desire to relieve the tense situation in Shantung Province. The presence of the Japanese troops along the railway and the establishment of Japanese civil administration offices in the interior of Shantung evoked such opposition from the people thereof that the Chinese Government were obliged to take some step to induce Japan to withdraw her troops and remove her civil administration establishments, pending a settlement of the whole question by the Peace Conference.

The Chinese Delegates regret that there exist certain secret agreements between France and Japan, and between Great Britain and Japan, pledging to support Japan's claims to the German rights in Shantung. China was not consulted when they were made; nor was she informed of their contents when she was invited to join the War. But she, on her part, has been a loyal co-belligerent on the side of the Allies. Is it just that her rights and her future welfare should be thus sacrificed to the policy of aggrandizement of Japan?

The Chinese Delegates desire to point out that since the said agreements were made, France, Great Britain and Japan as well as China and other Allied and Associated Powers have all accepted, as the basis of the peace now being made, certain principles with which

*See IC-175E, p. 142.

the said agreements appear to be in conflict. As it is an established principle that a subsequent act supersedes a previous one in case of their incompatibility, the agreements in question would appear to be no longer applicable to the claims of Japan.

The Chinese Delegates are in full accord with the desire of the Council to uphold, as a principle, the sanctity of accepted obligations, but they question themselves whether there is not a higher obligation resting on the Council now to remove serious obstacles to the maintenance of a durable peace in the Far East as elsewhere. The Council now has the solution of the Kiaochow-Shantung question in its hands; if it makes a settlement compatible with justice, it means peace in the Far East at least for half a century; and if it declines to make a just settlement merely because of the existence of certain obligations either imposed on China by threat of force or contracted by France and Great Britain in circumstances since entirely changed, it may be sowing seeds of a grave discord in the years soon to come.

Besides, China is now at the parting of the ways. She has come to the West to ask for justice. If she should fail to get it, her people would, perhaps, attribute the failure not so much to Japan's insistence on her own claims as to the attitude of the West, which declined to lend a helping hand to China merely because some of its leading Powers had privately pledged to support Japan.

Appreciative, however, of the sympathetic interest of the Council of Four in this question and desirous to aid it in every way possible in its earnest effort to find a solution at once compatible with China's welfare and conducive to peace in the Far East, the Chinese Delegates beg leave to submit the following four propositions as a settlement thereof:

I. Germany renounces to the Five Allied and Associated Powers her holdings, rights and privileges in Shantung for restoration to China.

II. Japan, being in possession of the said holdings, rights and privileges, engages to effect the said restoration to China within one year after the signature of the treaty of peace with Germany.

III. China agrees to make a pecuniary compensation to Japan for the military expenses incurred in the capture of Tsingtao, the amount of the said compensation to be determined by the Council of Four.

IV. China agrees to open the whole of Kiaochow Bay as a commercial port, and to provide a special quarter, if desired, for the residence of the citizens and subjects of the treaty powers.

HOTEL LUTETIA, PARIS, April 23, 1919.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's Residence, Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday, April 26, 1919, at 11 a. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.
The Hon. Henry White.
Dr. D. H. Miller.
Dr. Manley O. Hudson.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, O. M.,
M. P.
The Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Borden,
G. C. M. G., K. C.
The Hon. A. L. Sifton.
Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith, K. C. B.
Brig-General H. O. Mance, C. B.,
C. M. G., D. S. O.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Albert Claveille.
M. A. Weiss.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.
Professor P. J. Mantoux.

Secretary.
Interpreter.

REGIME OF PORTS, WATERWAYS & RAILWAYS

The Council had before it a revised Report of the Commission on the International Régime of Ports, Waterways and Railways (Appendix).¹

NOTE:—A few manuscript alterations had been introduced in the copy as attached.

(1) PRESIDENT WILSON said that the United States Delegation had no remarks to make on the Report.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN said that the British Empire Delegation had examined this report with great care. The first point they wished to know was whether the Commission was to continue its work and report on the question of a general Treaty applicable to all countries. This report might be furnished to the League of Nations. The Commission had set out to do this, but, owing to the necessity of speeding up the Treaty of Peace with Germany, had devoted its main

Continuation of the
Work of the Com-
mission on Ports,
Waterways and
Railways

¹ The appendix referred to here does not accompany the file copy of the minutes. The report under consideration at this meeting, reproduced as the appendix to the minutes, is filed separately under Paris Peace Conf. 181.1502/5.

attention to the preparation of clauses for inclusion in the Peace Treaty. The British Empire Delegation had recommended that the Commission should now complete its work with a view to a report to the League of Nations. A good deal of the preliminary work had already been done.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this was very desirable.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN said that was the view of the British Empire Delegation.

(It was agreed that the Commission on the International Régime of Ports, Waterways and Railways should prepare a report on the question of a general treaty applicable to all countries.)

(2) SIR ROBERT BORDEN said that the next observation of the British Empire Delegation referred to Article 38, namely, the question of the transfer to France of the riparian rights on the Rhine between Strassburg and Basle. By this article France obtained the right to carry out all works of regulation including the construction of weirs and other works which she might consider necessary for the production of power. France was to be entitled to the power thus produced. The plans of all proposed works for this purpose must be laid before the

The Transfer to France of Germany's Riparian Right to One Half of the Rhine Water. The Question of Giving Germany Credit for the Value of the German Share of the Power Rights. Article 38

Control Commission in order that the Commission might assure itself that the navigability of the river itself or of any substituted Canals would be fully maintained. Subject to the approval of the Commission France had the right to construct works both in the bed of the river, including the German half of the river, and to construct whatever works were necessary on the German bank. The Commission had thought that only one Power could effectively carry out such works, and that for physical reasons France should have that right. The view of the British Empire Delegation was that if the works referred to were carried out, credit for the value of the German share of the power rights should be given to Germany.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he thought this quite right.

M. CLAVEILLE said he did not quite understand the point.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN pointed out that it was proposed to use the German half of the river and to construct works on the German bank. Credit should be given to Germany for her share of the power produced by the rights exercised. The British Empire Delegation had not gone into details, but it had been thought that some tribunal should be set up to decide the amount of compensation to be given to Germany.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he would prefer that the rights should be paid for as and when used.

M. CLAVEILLE said that what France had desired was the right to construct whatever barrages were necessary on the Rhine for the

purpose of obtaining water power. They also required the right to support those barrages as necessary, on the German bank. The only rights they would infringe would be those of private owners, and in this event compensation would be given to the individual owners concerned. Whatever works Germany required on the right bank, whether for navigational reasons or for the construction of ports, would be left to Germany after taking the views of the International Commission to be set up.

MR. WHITE asked whether Sir Robert Borden meant that Germany's rights in the water power ought to be paid for.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN said this was the case. Similar questions would arise on those portions of the St. Lawrence where the development could only take place by agreement between the two Governments.

GENERAL MANCE pointed out that Article 38 provided for compensation to be paid by France to German owners for the disturbance of private property caused by the construction of these works. The Commission had considered it technically desirable that the power should be in the hands of only one nation. For technical reasons, owing to the conformation of the banks, it was considered that, except for the barrages, the power works should be on the French side. Sir Robert Borden's point was that the German share of the water power ought to be compensated either by payment or by some share in the power.

PRESIDENT WILSON said the case seemed to be that Germany was excluded from the use of water for power purposes without any compensation.

M. CLAVEILLE said that the situation had been carefully explained. At the present moment all the electrical energy in Mülhausen and Alsace was derived from Germany, and principally from the Black Forest. As that supply might now be cut off, it was considered necessary to compensate for this loss of energy by putting this portion of the Rhine at the disposal of the French. Germany had studied the question before, and had drawn up schemes which appeared to be good and would probably be adopted. Barrages would be erected on the Rhine, and a canal would be constructed on the left bank. The whole expense would fall on the French Government. Hence, France was entitled to some compensation from the water power that would be obtained. The canal in question would be superior to the existing waterway on the Rhine, and would result in an increase to the navigability of the Rhine. All the Powers interested in this navigation would benefit on a footing of equality. Hence, it was equitable that France should get the power.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that nevertheless there would be a transfer of the sovereignty over the German share of the water without compensation.

GENERAL MANCE pointed out that the value of the power rights depended upon the expense of the necessary works. The value of the right would be reduced by the extra cost of the works due to the necessity for maintaining navigability.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN said it was a question of estimating the value to Germany after making necessary allowance for the cost of the works.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that this might prove to be nothing at all.

GENERAL MANCE said that the amount could not be determined until the canal was actually built.

M. CLAVEILLE asked if it was agreed that France alone should have the right to decide on the exclusive construction of the canal on her bank.

PRESIDENT WILSON replied in the affirmative, subject, of course, to the approval of the Commission to the schemes.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out this was provided for in the report.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether if, on the calculation of the net values, the balance was found to be in Germany's favour, the report provided that she should be paid.

MR. SIFTON said that this was not provided for, and that was Sir Robert Borden's point.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE read the following draft clause which had been prepared by Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith:—

"The British Empire Delegation proposes the following points in para. (b), line 2:

After "river", insert: "subject to the payment to Germany of the value of her natural share of such right as and when the right is exercised by France, the amount of such payment being in default of agreement determined by arbitration".

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this did not make clear the subtraction of the cost of construction.

GENERAL MANCE thought that the words "natural share of such right" implied that technically.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the phrase ought to be "share of such natural right".

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this did not enable the Commission to have the right to give Germany some share of the water power. Germany would probably prefer power to payment.

M. CLAVEILLE said the phrase was not sufficiently explicit. He did not know legally what "natural right" would mean.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the phrase should be "either payment or right to use water."

M. CLAVEILLE pointed out that the power must be created by costly works. What was to be cleared up with Germany was the difference between the cost of the works and the value of the power.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this was perfectly fair. The Commission should have the right to provide compensation either in money or in power.

M. CLAVEILLE said he agreed.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he agreed.

(It was agreed that Germany should have the right to compensation either in money or power. The drafting of this decision was left to the experts on the Commission.)

(3) SIR ROBERT BORDEN said that the British Empire Delegation had agreed to a draft Article in regard to a time limit to certain articles in this Treaty.

Time Limit for
the Operation
of the Clauses

SIR HUBERT LLEWELLYN SMITH said that the Article had now been included in the Treaty. Some consequential alteration, however, would be required in this report, in consequence of decisions reached on the previous evening by the Supreme Council when the report of the Economic Commission was under consideration. The decision in regard to the Economic report had related more particularly to clauses dealing with the position of nationals and had rather left in uncertainty the time limit to be given to the shipping clauses. It would either be necessary to transfer Articles 3 and 7 of this report to the Economic clauses,—or, vice versa, to transfer the shipping clauses from the Economic report to this report. The British view was that the Economic clauses should be transferred to this report. He suggested the matter might be referred to the Drafting Committee.

PRESIDENT WILSON said this was his view.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

M. CLAVEILLE agreed.

(It was agreed that the question as to whether the shipping Articles in the Economic Report should be transferred to the Articles dealing with Ports and Waterways, or whether the relevant Ports and Waterways Articles should be transferred to the Economic Articles, was referred to the Drafting Committee.

Dr. Miller undertook to see that the Drafting Committee was notified.)

(4) MR. LLOYD GEORGE drew attention to Article 39, which reads as follows:—

Works Carried Out
on the Rhine Outside
the Franco-German
Boundary.
Article 39

“Subject to the preceding provisions, no works shall be carried out in the bed or on either bank of the Rhine without the previous approval of the Central Commission or of its agents.”

He asked, if this did not only apply to the Rhine between France and Germany, surely it would not apply to Holland.

M. CLAVEILLE said that this would suffice for France but the Belgian representatives wanted to construct a canal to connect the Rhine and the Meuse. For them it was important to prevent Germany from doing anything at the Rhine end of the canal which would affect the navigation of the approaches. Consequently, it was necessary that the Commission should have power to control the German works.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the present Treaty would only bind its signatories.

SIR HUBERT LLEWELLYN SMITH said this was the case unless Holland adhered to the Treaty, which was important, as Holland was a party to the Mannheim Convention.² Holland, however, had said with no uncertain voice that she would not come in if this Clause stood.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if Belgium would adhere if this clause were amended.

SIR HUBERT LLEWELLYN SMITH said that Belgium was protected by the Mannheim Convention, Article 30. This had been explained to the Belgian Representatives, and he thought that they now understood the matter and were satisfied.

GENERAL MANCE said he thought the Belgians were satisfied with an explicit assurance which he had given them at the last meeting,—that they were covered by Article 30 of the Mannheim Convention.

M. CLAVEILLE said that if Belgium was satisfied, he would have nothing to say, but, in his view, the Mannheim Convention did not cover the point. It only provided for the prevention of artificial obstacles to navigation, such as bridges, mills, barrages, etc., but it did nothing to compel the Germans to keep the river dredged. The Belgians were afraid of this, and this could best be prevented by giving the International Commission the powers proposed in this Article.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether, as a matter of right, we were not obliged to confine the Treaty to the portions of the river over which the Allies would have jurisdiction.

M. CLAVEILLE drew attention to Article 34 of the Treaty, which, subject to certain reservations, continued the Treaty of Mannheim. This provision also reserved the right of Holland to agree or not to agree.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he thought Article 39 was a very stiff claim to put forward. He understood France wanting to protect herself, but why should she say that Germany could not construct works in a portion of the river running through the middle of German territory, without the approval of an International Commission. It

² Convention concerning Rhine navigation signed at Mannheim, October 17, 1868, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LIX, p. 470.

seemed to him an intolerable claim which in no way protected France, and only interfered with Germany.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested the difficulty would be met if the Article were confined to works that would interfere with navigation.

M. CLAVEILLE agreed.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he supposed that the phrase would be: No works "that will cause material impediment to navigation."

SIR HUBERT LLEWELLYN SMITH asked whether the Article was now confined to the part of the river between France and Germany.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE and PRESIDENT WILSON replied that it was.

M. CLAVEILLE said there was no French objection, but he thought Belgium would object.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the question should be decided, and Belgium should be left to raise the question if necessary.

SIR HUBERT LLEWELLYN SMITH said he thought the Belgians might be got to agree.

(It was agreed that Article 39 should be confined to the portion of the Rhine where it forms the boundary of France and Germany.)

(5) SIR HUBERT LLEWELLYN SMITH drew attention to Article 47 which had been inserted with the object of providing facilities for railway communication with inland States like Czecho-Slovakia. Among other provisions it was laid down that Germany should forward trains with a speed at least equal to that of their best trains on the same lines. This would mean that if Germany were to put on some very fast trains between two business centres, she would have to run the traffic on the lines referred to in this Article as fast as these special rapid trains. As the distances might be very long this was obviously undesirable and impossible. He suggested that the phrase: "long distance trains" should be inserted.

Through Trains to
Inland States.
Article 47

(The above proposal was accepted.)

(6) SIR HUBERT LLEWELLYN SMITH pointed out that the first paragraph of this Article gave the right to any Allied State for the next 25 years to require Germany or Austria to construct lines for through communication. The State making the demand had to defray the cost. The demands might be unjust, but no tribunal was contemplated. When the line was completed, there was no power after five years to make Germany or Austria work it. At the end of five years it might become a useless, derelict line. Either the first paragraph should be struck out, or some provision should be made under the League of Nations for supervision.

Railway Construc-
tion for Inland
States. Article 53

M. CLAVEILLE said this provision did not interest France, but had been put in for the benefit of the Czecho-Slovaks and Yugo-Slavs.

The fact, however, that these small states would have to pay the cost of the lines limited it to such as would have practical use. These countries would not face the expense unless there was some important object to be gained. If, however, there was a desire to have each case tested by the League of Nations, he had no objection.

(It was agreed that the construction of lines under this clause should be subject to the authority of the Council of the League of Nations.)

(7) PRESIDENT WILSON said that although the Italians were not represented, attention ought to be given to their reservation to Article 45.

Italian Reservation
to Article 45

SIR MAURICE HANKEY said that the Italian technical representatives had been invited to attend.

GENERAL MANCE said that this Article had only been agreed to by the British and United States Delegates on the understanding that it came within a time limit. M. de Martino had agreed to this. At a subsequent meeting a subordinate Italian official had reserved this clause for further instructions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if they wanted to strike it out.

PRESIDENT WILSON said they did not.

GENERAL MANCE said that the Italian objection was that they wanted it to be a permanent provision.

PRESIDENT WILSON said this was impossible, and suggested that it should be agreed that the clause should be a temporary provision.

(President Wilson's proposal was accepted.)

(8) SIR HUBERT LLEWELLYN SMITH drew attention to a new type-written Article, relating to an eventual Rhine-Danube Canal. In the report, provision had been made for an International Commission in regard to the Rhine, and another for the Danube. Many States were represented on both.

Rhine-Danube
Canal. Article 33 A

In 25 years' time the question of connecting the Rhine and the Danube might become important, and it was proposed to provide for the establishment of a connection. The Clause provided that if all the Allied and Associated Powers on either the Rhine Commission or the Danube Commission considered within 25 years' time that a canal ought to be built, the German Government or its successors would not be able to oppose its construction. The tribunal provided for allocating the cost was not, in his view, very satisfactory, and he thought that the League of Nations would be more satisfactory. The tribunal proposed was to be composed of the Rhine Commission, enlarged by the addition of a representative of each of the Allied and Associated Powers represented on the Danube Commission but not represented

on the Central Commission for the Rhine. He would prefer an arbitral tribunal nominated by the League of Nations.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that this would be better.

M. CLAVEILLE said he would accept.

(It was agreed that an arbitral Commission set up by the League of Nations should be substituted for the Commission proposed in draft Article 33 A.)

(9) MR. WHITE drew attention to the recommendation contained on page 4 of the report for the establishment of a provisional régime in regard to the Danube, and, more particularly, to the following passage:—

Régime of the
Danube: Forthcom-
ing Conference

“The Commission, moreover, is unanimous in its desire that this provisional régime be replaced, with the shortest possible delay, by a definite statute governing the river, and proposes—at the same time without expressing this wish in the form of a peace clause binding the Allied or Associated Powers—that a Conference composed of representatives in equal number of each of the following States—United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Greece, Roumania, Serbia, and the Tchecho-Slovak Republic—should meet within three months after the ratification of the Preliminary Peace Treaty for the purpose of drawing up a definite statute governing the Danube.”

He asked if this proposal was accepted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the British Delegation agreed.

(The proposal quoted above was accepted.)

(10) SIR ROBERT BORDEN said that the British Empire Delegation favoured a suggestion that provision should be made for the application of the general convention to all territories the sovereignty of which would be transferred from the Enemy States as a condition of such transfer.

Application of
the General Con-
vention to Terri-
tories Transferred
From Enemy
States

SIR HUBERT LLEWELLYN SMITH suggested that the best plan would be to refer this to the Commission when it re-assembled.

MR. SIFTON said that the Commission as now formed would not agree to a clause applicable to the enemy being applied to territory which was being separated from the enemy.

SIR HUBERT LLEWELLYN SMITH said that there was little doubt that the Smaller States would not agree to the proposal. Poland did not disguise her intention to adopt a policy of separate discriminatory bargains with other States in regard to commercial matters. It would be a great advantage if she could be persuaded to agree to equal treatment with all nations.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Poland would be making a great mistake if she started her new career with the policy Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith anticipated.

(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to notify the Secretary-General of the above decisions for the information of the Drafting Committee.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, April 26, 1919.

Revised—April 20 [29th], 1919.

[Appendix to IC-176G]

First and Second Reports Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference by the Commission on the International Régime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways

The Commission on the International Régime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways was entrusted by the Preliminary Peace Conference at its Plenary Session on the 25th January, 1919, with the duty of "enquiring into and reporting upon the international régime of ports, waterways, and railways."³

MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION

United States of America—

Hon. Henry White (former United States Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Paris and Rome).

Mr. David Hunter Miller.

Mr. Manley O. Hudson (*alternate*) (Professor of Law at the University of Missouri).

British Empire—

The Hon. Arthur L. Sifton (Minister of Customs and Inland Revenue of Canada).

Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith (Permanent Secretary to the Board of Trade).

Brigadier-General H. O. Mance (*alternate*).

France—

Mr. Claveille (Minister of Public Works and Transport).

Mr. André Weiss (Jurisconsult of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Italy—

Mr. S. Crespi (Minister of Food).

Mr. G. de Martino (Minister Plenipotentiary, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Japan—

Mr. Adatei (Japanese Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Brussels).

Colonel Sato (Military Attaché of Japanese Legation at Berne).

Belgium—

Mr. Segers (Minister of State).

Mr. de Visscher and Mr. Hostie (*alternates*).

³ See annex 5 to protocol of plenary session of January 25, 1919, vol. III, p. 203.

China—

Mr. Chengting Thomas Wang (former Minister of Commerce and Agriculture).

Mr. Chin-Chun Wang (Managing Director of the Peking-Hankow Railway) (*alternate*).

Greece—

Mr. Coromilas (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Greece at Rome).

Poland—

Mr. C. Kasperski (Professor at College of Commerce at Warsaw).

Portugal—

Count de Penha Garcia (former President of the Chamber of Deputies and former Minister of Finance), subsequently replaced by

Colonel Norton de Mattos (former Minister for War).

Roumania—

Mr. N. Misu (Roumanian Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at London).

Mr. N. Stefanescu (Engineer-Inspector-General, former Director of River Navigation of the Roumanian State) (*alternate*).

Serbia—

Mr. Ante Trumbić (Minister of Foreign Affairs).

Tchecho-Slovak Republic—

Mr. C. Kramar (President of the Council of Ministers).

Uruguay—

Mr. Juan Carlos Blanco (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Uruguay at Paris, former Minister of Public Works).

The bureau of the Commission was as follows:—

Mr. Crespi, *President*;

Hon. Arthur L. Sifton, *Vice-President*;

Mr. Chargueraud (Councillor of State, Vice-President of the Superior Council of Public Works), *Secretary-General*.

Mr. Christian A. Herter (United States of America)

Mr. W. T. Turner (British Empire)

Mr. Mosca (Italy)

Mr. Horiuchi (Japan)

} *Secretaries*

First Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference by the Commission on the International Régime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways

The Preliminary Peace Conference at its session on the 25th January, 1919, decided that the study of questions relating to the international régime of ports, waterways, and railways should be entrusted to a special Commission.

This Commission was composed of nineteen members, ten belonging to the Great Powers (United States of America, British Empire,

France, Italy, Japan), each of which has two representatives, and nine appointed respectively by the following Powers: Belgium, China, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Serbia, Tchecho-Slovak Republic, Uruguay.

The members of the Commission (which began its work on the 3rd February, 1919) were at first unanimously of the opinion that, before examining and drawing up special conditions to which specified rivers, ports, or railways, should be submitted, it was desirable to lay down the general principles relating to freedom of transit and rules for the general regulation of all international waterways, all international railways and free ports.

This method of procedure was specially recommended by the British Delegation. Its adoption led to the setting-up of two Sub-Commissions, one (consisting of ten members) charged with the duty of drawing up a draft relating to freedom of transit, and the other (consisting of nine members) with the duty of drawing up draft regulations regarding rivers, ports, and railways.

The two Sub-Commissions carried on their work simultaneously, and, after thorough discussions and a detailed examination by drafting committees, were in a position to present drafts relating respectively to freedom of transit and to international rivers.

After some weeks a change occurred in the original ideas, even on the part of those who had up till then recommended or supported the method of procedure adopted.

The members of the Commission were unanimously led to modify the order of their procedure, as the result, in the first place of certain considerations brought out by a study of the drafts drawn up, and in the second place by the invitation addressed to the Commission to formulate at the earliest possible moment proposals for clauses to be inserted in the Preliminary Peace Treaty.

The Commission now offers for insertion in the Preliminary Peace Treaty the clauses submitted herewith dealing with the general régime of transportation, and particularly with certain ports, railway lines, and river systems of Central Europe. Efforts have been made to secure for the Allied and Associated Powers, in a text as short as the complexity and multiplicity of the technical problems permitted, the guarantees which in the judgment of the Commission are necessary for the free exercise of their rights of equal competition—rights which before the war were encroached upon and menaced by the constant practices of the enemy States.

Certain of these guarantees which, under existing conditions, are indispensable to the economic security of the nations injured by the war, may cease to be necessary as those conditions change. The Commission unanimously proposes therefore that the League of Na-

tions shall have power to recommend the revision of these guarantees at any time in accordance with the provision made in Article 61. The Commission has considered also a definite time limit of five years to be placed upon the continued application of certain of its proposals which are justified by needs which may prove to be transitory. Some members of the Commission thought that after a period of five years, or such longer period as the Council of the League of Nations may decide, the obligations imposed on "B" States by any of these clauses should only continue to apply in relation to those territories of "A" States in which reciprocal treatment is accorded in respect of the subject matter of that clause. Other members thought that they should continue until the admission of enemy States to the League of Nations, if that admission should be delayed more than five years. The commission reached no agreement on these alternatives, but in view of the general policy involved decided to draw the attention of the Conference to the necessity of a definite clause on the matter being inserted in the Preliminary Peace Treaty.*

The Commission has refrained from enumerating the Allied and Associated Powers and the enemy Powers forming party to the Treaty, at least in those portions of the text which have a general character, believing that such an enumeration might have some bearing on the solution of territorial and political problems outside its jurisdiction. It has referred provisionally to "the A States," meaning the Powers regarded as Allied or Associated Powers at the time of signature of the Preliminary Peace Treaty, and to "the B States," meaning the remaining signatory Powers. It is understood that the proper authorities will substitute in place of these provisional terms the explicit enumeration of the Powers.

In regard to the river systems of Central Europe, the Commission has provided a definite and permanent régime of administration and exploitation for the Rhine, the Elbe, the Oder, and the Niemen, reserving the possibility of the future application to these river systems of whatever regulations may later be imposed by a General Convention drawn up by the Allied and Associated States, and approved by the League of Nations, dealing with rivers regarded as international. In regard to the Danube on the other hand it has not been thought possible or necessary to determine in the Preliminary Peace Treaty the definite statute for a river in which so many different interests, at times perhaps divergent, are involved. The Commission has satisfied itself with ensuring a provisional régime, at the same time stipulating for the acquiescence of the enemy Powers in the definitive régime. The Commission, moreover, is unanimous in its

* See, however, the second paragraph of the Supplementary Report of 25th April (page 6). [Footnote in the original. For the supplementary report of April 25, see *infra*.]

desire that this provisional régime be replaced, with the shortest possible delay, by a definite statute governing the river, and proposes—at the same time without expressing this wish in the form of a peace clause binding the Allied or Associated Powers—that a Conference composed of representatives in equal number of each of the following states—United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Greece, Roumania, Serbia, and the Tchecho-Slovak Republic—should meet within three months after the ratification of the Preliminary Peace Treaty for the purpose of drawing up a definite statute governing the Danube. The enemy Powers, on the other hand, may not demand the meeting of this Conference, in conformity with Article 29 of the attached clauses, except within a maximum period of one year.

On the question of the Rhine, the Commission has had the views of the Swiss and Netherlands Governments placed before it by special Delegations. In the opinion of the Swiss Delegation the Commission of riparian States provided for by the Convention of Mannheim should be replaced by a Commission which was really international. The Netherlands Delegation, on the other hand, stated that the working of the Central Commission provided for by the Mannheim Convention was quite satisfactory, and expressed the opinion that this Commission should continue to work in the same way without any State other than riparian States taking part therein. The present Commission, which had already come to the conclusion that an International Rhine Commission was necessary, maintains its decision. It desires to draw attention to the high importance of obtaining at the earliest possible moment the adhesion of the Netherlands Government, one of the States signatory to the Mannheim Convention of 1868, to the provisions involving modifications of that Convention. The proposal of the Commission calls for the representation of Switzerland on the new Central Rhine Commission, and the Swiss Government should be so informed in due time.

The special needs of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic arising out of her peculiar geographical position have been taken care of by provisions for according to that State special rights in the ports of Hamburg and Stettin and over designated railway lines leading towards the Adriatic.

It appears unnecessary to submit any further comments in explanation or justification of the attached clauses. The minutes of the meetings would seem to furnish sufficient explanation in each case of the terms finally adopted.

The Commission has completed its examination of the clauses to be inserted in the Preliminary Peace Treaty which were before it. It proposes to take up immediately the investigation of General Con-

ventions, the purpose of which is to establish in the League of Nations an international statute governing transport routes.

PARIS, April 7, 1919.

CRESPI,
President

United States of America:—

HENRY WHITE

British Empire:—

ARTHUR L. SIFTON

France:—

A. CLAVEILLE

Italy:—

G. DE MARTINO

Japan:—

M. ADATCI

Belgium:—

JEAN HOSTIE

China:—

CHENGTING T. WANG

Greece:—

COROMILAS

Poland:—

C. KASPERSKI

Portugal:—

J. NORTON DE MATTOS

Roumania:—

N. P. STEFANESCU

Serbia:—

Signed by Dr. Ante Trumbić as Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of the Serbians, Croats, and Slovenes, on the explicit condition that the whole of the Kingdom thus designated will be regarded as an A State by the Peace Conference:—

DR. ANTE TRUMBIĆ

Tschecho-Slovak Republic:—

CHARLES KRAMAR

Uruguay:—

J. C. BLANCO

A. CHARGUERAUD,
Secretary-General

Supplementary Report Presented by the Commission on the International Régime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways to the Peace Conference

Since the presentation of the previous Report by the Commission on the International Régime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways, certain members of this Commission have proposed various drafting amendments in, and additions to, the text of the Articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace which were submitted by the Commission on the 7th April. These amendments and additions appeared to the Commission particularly desirable owing to the fact that it seemed that the text of these Articles would have to be inserted no longer in the mere Preliminaries but in the actual Treaty of Peace. The Commission decided therefore to undertake a fresh consideration, as the result of which the annexed amendments† were unanimously adopted.

Among the additions proposed, three new Articles may be mentioned particularly. One‡ anticipates the possible construction of a Rhine-Danube navigable waterway, to be placed under an international régime analogous to that already contemplated for the Rhine-Meuse navigable waterway. Two other Articles of a more general character have for object, the one§ of securing the adhesion of the enemy Powers to General Conventions still to be made on the International Régime of Transit, Railways, Ports and Navigable Waterways; the other|| of submitting certain stipulations in the present Treaty to limitations in the period of application and to conditions of reciprocity in the future. The text of this latter Article had already given rise to discussions by the Commission before the transmission of the previous Report, in which it was expressly mentioned that the Commission had been unable to arrive at an agreement on this question; complete agreement has now been arrived at on the new text. As regards, however, the application of the revised Article, the Italian Delegation which had reserved the inclusion of the last paragraph of Article 45 (maintenance of the régime of tariffs for the benefit of the ports of the Adriatic and of the Black Sea) was not present at the last meeting to give or to withhold its definite acceptance.

Lastly, without being in a position to insert in their own text a stipulation which does not affect only articles dealing with means of transport, the Commission is anxious to call the attention of the Conference to the advantage there would be in inserting at the end of the whole Treaty the following provision:—

†The amendments in question are incorporated in the text of the Articles as printed on pages 9–22. [Footnote in the original. For the text of the articles, see *infra*.]

‡ Article 33A (and final paragraph of Article 11.) [Footnote in the original.]

§ Article 61B. [Footnote in the original.]

|| Article 61A. [Footnote in the original.]

"The Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to specify in a final Treaty of Peace such additional provisions as may be necessary further to define the intentions of the preceding Articles or to facilitate their execution."

The Commission on the International Régime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways urges that no modification other than the appended amendments¶ be made in the text of the Articles which it submits. The Commission points out that even minor points in the expressions employed have a technical import and precise signification, arrived at after mature consideration by the experts of the Powers. In the event of future differences of interpretation or of application, the exact meaning would be brought out clearly by the actual discussions, recorded with this object in the minutes of the meetings. Any changes made in the text without the consent of the Commission by an authority in no way qualified for the examination of the special problems dealt with would involve the risk of endangering seriously the interests of the Powers represented at the Peace Conference.

The Commission is equally convinced that there would be the greatest technical difficulty in cutting up the text of the Articles into portions, affecting on the one hand all the enemy States, on the other only this one or that one of them. It is in the very nature of Articles dealing with the régime of means of communication to be inter-connected among themselves and to be such that they cannot be entirely localised as regards their effects or the conditions of their application. To quote a single example, chosen among the stipulations which yet seem to involve consequences most clearly limited from a territorial point of view, namely, the stipulations concerning the Rhine, it is impossible not to insert in the Treaty with Bulgaria the Articles prescribing the régime of the Rhine, Bulgaria being interested in the Rhine-Danube navigable waterway and this waterway being one which under certain eventualities is to be placed under the same régime as the Rhine. Similarly with the majority of the other stipulations.

It is therefore the unanimous opinion of the Commission that the best solution would be to insert in each of the Treaties concluded with the enemy Powers the following Article:—

"Germany (Austria) undertakes to assure as far as she is concerned the application of the Articles included in the appended annex,"

and to introduce as an annex to each of the Treaties the whole of the clauses dealing with means of communication.

ARTHUR L. SIFTON,

Vice-President

PARIS, April 25, 1919.

¶ The amendments in question are incorporated in the text of the Articles as printed on pages 9-22. [Footnote in the original.]

United States of America :—

HENRY WHITE

British Empire :—

ARTHUR L. SIFTON

France :—

A. CLAVEILLE

Italy :—

Japan :—

M. ADATCI

Belgium :—

JEAN HOSTIE

China :—

C. C. WANG

Greece :—

COROMILAS

Poland :—

C. KASPERSKI

Portugal :—

J. NORTON DE MATTOS

Roumania :—

N. P. STEFANESCU

Serbia :—

Signed by Dr. Ante Trumbić as Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of the Serbians, Croats, and Slovenes, on the explicit condition that the whole of the Kingdom thus designated will be regarded as an A State by the Peace Conference :—

DR. ANTE TRUMBIĆ

Tchecho-Slovak Republic :—

CHARLES KRAMAR

Uruguay :—

J. C. BLANCO

ROBERT HAAS,

Acting Secretary-General

*Clauses Concerning Ports, Waterways and Railways To Be Inserted
in the Preliminary Peace Treaty*

(Including the Modifications and Additions Adopted by the
Commission)

CHAPTER I.—*General Provisions*

ARTICLE 1

The B States undertake to grant freedom of transit through their territories on the routes most convenient for international transit, either by rail, navigable waterway, or canal, to persons, goods, ships, carriages, wagons and mails coming from or going to the territories of any of the A States (whether contiguous or not); for this purpose the crossing of territorial waters shall be allowed. Such persons, goods, ships, carriages, wagons and mails shall not be subjected to any transit duty or to any undue delays or restrictions, and shall be treated, as regards charges, facilities, and all other matters, on the same footing as the persons, goods, ships, carriages, wagons and mails of the B States.

Goods in transit shall be exempt from all Customs or other similar duties.

All charges imposed on transport in transit shall be reasonable, having regard to the conditions of the traffic. No charge, facility or restriction shall depend directly or indirectly on the ownership or on the nationality of any ship or other means of transport on which any part of the through journey has been, or is to be, accomplished.

ARTICLE 2

The B States undertake neither to impose nor to maintain any control over transmigration traffic through their territories beyond measures necessary to ensure that passengers are bona fide in transit; nor to allow any shipping company or any other private body, corporation or person interested in the traffic to take any part whatever in, or to exercise any direct or indirect influence over, any administrative service that may be necessary for this purpose.

ARTICLE 3

Subject to the special engagements contained in these articles, the B States undertake to make no discrimination in the charges and conditions of transport of goods and persons entering or leaving their territories based on the frontier crossed, or on the kind, ownership or flag of the means of transport employed, or on the route of or places of transshipment on the journey.

The B States particularly undertake not to establish against the ports and ships of the A States any surtax or any direct or indirect bounty for export or import by their ports or ships, or by those of another State, for example as by combined tariffs. They further undertake that persons or goods passing through a port or using a ship of an A State shall not be subjected to any formality or delay whatever to which such persons or goods would not be subjected should they pass through a port or use a ship of the B State itself or of any other State.

ARTICLE 4

All necessary administrative and technical measures shall be taken to shorten, as much as possible, the transmission of goods across the frontiers of the territories of the B States, and to ensure their forwarding and transport from such frontiers, whether such goods are coming from or going to the A States or are in transit from or to those States, under the same material conditions in such matters as rapidity of carriage and care en route as are enjoyed by other goods of the same kind carried on those territories under similar conditions of transport.

In particular, the transport of perishable goods shall be promptly and regularly carried out, and the Customs formalities shall be effected in such a way as to allow the goods to be carried straight through by trains which make connection.

ARTICLE 5

The B States undertake not to take any measures the effect of which would be to divert traffic of any kind from its normal itinerary for the benefit of their own transport routes.

ARTICLE 6

The seaports of the A States are entitled to all favours and to all reduced tariffs granted on the railways or navigable waterways of the B States for the benefit of ports of the B States or of a port of any other State.

No B State shall refuse to participate in the tariffs or combinations of tariffs intended to secure for ports of an A State advantages similar to those granted by any of the B States to the traffic of its own ports or of the ports of any other State.

CHAPTER II.—*Navigation*

SECTION A.—FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION

ARTICLE 7

Under reserve of restrictions concerning the exercise of maritime coasting trade, the subjects, property and flags of the A States shall, in respect of charges, facilities, and in all other respects, be treated on a footing of perfect equality in the ports and on the inland navigation routes of the B States, no distinction being made to the detriment of subjects, property and flags of the A States, between the latter and the subjects, property and flags of the B State itself or of the State whose subjects, property and flag enjoy the most favourable treatment.

There shall be no impediment to the movement of persons or ships other than those arising from prescriptions concerning police, Customs, sanitation, emigration or immigration, or the importation or exportation of prohibited goods. Such reasonable and uniform prescriptions shall not unnecessarily impede traffic.

SECTION B.—FREE ZONES IN PORTS

ARTICLE 8

Free zones existing in ports of the B States on the 1st August, 1914, shall be maintained. These free zones, and any other free zones which may be established in the territories of the B States by the Peace Treaty shall be subject to the régime set out in the provisions of the following articles.

Goods entering or leaving a free zone shall not be subjected to any import or export duty, other than those provided for in Article 10.

Ships and goods entering a free zone may be subjected to the tolls established to cover expenses of administration, upkeep and improvement of the port, as well as to the charges for the use of various installations, provided that these charges shall be reasonable having regard to the expenditure incurred, and shall be levied in the conditions of equality provided for in Article 7.

Goods shall not be subjected to any other charge except a statistical duty which shall not exceed 1 per mille ad valorem, and which shall be devoted exclusively to defraying the expenses of compiling statements of the traffic in the port.

ARTICLE 9

The facilities granted for the erection of warehouses, for packing and for unpacking goods, shall be in accordance with trade require-

ments for the time being. All goods allowed to be consumed in the free zone shall be exempt from duty, whether of excise or of any other description, apart from the statistical duty provided for in Article 8 above. There shall be no discrimination in regard to any of the provisions of the present article between persons belonging to different nationalities or between goods of different origin or destination.

ARTICLE 10

Import duties may be levied on goods leaving the free zone for consumption in the country on the territory of which the port is situated. Conversely, export duties may be levied on goods coming from such country and brought into the free zone. These import and export duties shall be levied on the same basis and at the same rates as similar duties levied at the other Customs frontiers of the country concerned. On the other hand, the B States shall not levy, under any denomination, any import, export or transit duty on goods carried by land or water across their territory to or from the free zone from or to any other State.

The B States shall draw up the necessary regulations to secure and guarantee such freedom of transit over such railways and waterways in their territory as normally give access to the free zone.

SECTION C.—CLAUSES RELATING TO THE ELBE, THE ODER, THE NIEMEN (RUSSTROM-MEMEL-NIEMEN), AND THE DANUBE

(1) General Clauses

ARTICLE 11

The following rivers are declared international :—

The Elbe (Labe) from its confluence with the Vltava (Moldau), and the Vltava (Moldau) from Prague;
the Oder (Odra) from its confluence with the Oppa;
the Niemen (Russtrom-Memel-Niemen) from Grodno;
the Danube from Ulm;

and all navigable parts of these river systems which naturally provide more than one State with access to the sea, with or without transshipment from one vessel to another; together with lateral canals and channels either to duplicate or to improve naturally navigable sections of the specified river systems, or to connect two naturally navigable sections of the same river.

The same shall apply to the Rhine-Danube navigable waterway, should such a waterway be constructed under the conditions laid down in Article 33A.

ARTICLE 12

On the waterways declared to be international in the preceding Article, the subjects, property and flags of all States shall be treated on a footing of perfect equality, no distinction being made to the detriment of the subjects, property and flags of any of these States between them and the subjects, property and flags of the riparian State itself, and of the State whose subjects, property and flag enjoy the most favourable treatment. Vessels of the B States, however, shall not be entitled to carry passengers or goods by regular services between the ports of a riparian A State without special authority from the latter.

ARTICLE 13

When such charges are not precluded by existing Conventions, charges varying on different sections of the rivers may be levied on vessels using the navigable channels or their approaches provided that they are intended solely to cover equitably the cost of maintaining in a navigable condition, or of improving, the rivers and their approaches, or to meet expenditures incurred in the interests of navigation. The schedule of such charges shall be calculated on the basis of such expenses and shall be posted up in the ports. These charges shall be levied in such a manner as to render any detailed examination of the cargoes unnecessary, except in cases of suspected fraud or contravention.

ARTICLE 14

The transit of vessels, passengers and goods on these waterways shall be effected in accordance with the general conditions prescribed for transit in Chapter I above.

When the two banks of an international river are within the same State goods in transit may be placed under seal or in the custody of Customs agents. When the river forms a frontier goods and passengers in transit shall be exempt from all customs formalities; the loading and unloading of goods, and the embarkation and disembarkation of passengers, shall only take place in the ports specified by the riparian State.

ARTICLE 15

No dues of any kind other than those provided for in the present regulations shall be levied along the course or at the mouth of these rivers.

This provision shall not prevent the fixing by the riparian States of customs, local octroi or consumption duties, or the creation of reasonable and uniform charges levied in the ports, in accordance

with public tariffs, for the use of cranes, elevators, quays, warehouses, &c.

ARTICLE 16

In default of any special organisation for carrying out the works connected with the upkeep and improvement of the international portion of a navigable system, each riparian State shall be bound to take suitable measures to remove any obstacle or danger to navigation and to ensure the maintenance of good conditions of navigation.

If a State neglects to comply with this obligation any riparian State or any State represented on the International Commission, if there is one, may appeal to the tribunal instituted for this purpose by the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 17

The same procedure shall be followed in the case of a riparian State undertaking any works of a nature to impede navigation in the international section. The tribunal mentioned in the preceding article shall be entitled to enforce the suspension or suppression of such works, making due allowance in its decisions for all rights in connection with irrigation, water-power, fisheries, and other national interests, which, with the consent of all the riparian States or of all the States represented on the International Commission if there is one, shall be given priority over the requirements of navigation.

Appeal to the tribunal of the League of Nations shall not be suspensive.

ARTICLE 18

The régime set out in Articles 12 to 17 above shall be superseded by one to be laid down in a General Convention drawn up by the A States, and approved by the League of Nations, relating to the waterways recognised in such Convention as having an international character. This latter Convention shall apply in particular to the whole or part of the above-mentioned river systems of the Elbe (Labe), the Oder (Odra), the Niemen (Russtrom-Memel-Niemen), and the Danube, and such other parts of these river systems as may be covered by a general definition.

The B States undertake to adhere to the said General Convention and to all projects drawn up as set out in Article 23 below for the revision of existing international agreements and regulations.

ARTICLE 19

The B States shall cede to the A States concerned, within a maximum period of three months from the date on which notification shall be given to them, a proportion of the tugs and vessels remain-

ing registered in the ports of the river systems referred to in Article 11 after the deduction of those surrendered by way of restitution or reparation. They shall in the same way cede material of all kinds necessary to the A States for the utilisation of those river systems.

The amount and distribution of the tugs, boats and material so ceded shall be determined by an arbitrator or arbitrators nominated by the United States of America, due regard being had to the legitimate needs of the parties concerned, and particularly to the shipping traffic during the five years preceding the war.

All craft so ceded shall be provided with their fittings and gear, shall be in a good state of repair and in condition to carry goods, and shall be selected from among those most recently built.

The cessions from State to State provided for in the present article shall entail a credit of which the total amount, settled in a lump sum by the arbitrators, shall not in any case exceed the value of the capital expended in the initial establishment of the material ceded, and shall be set off against the total sums due from Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria; in consequence, the indemnification of proprietors shall be a matter for Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria to deal with.

(2) Special Clauses regarding the Elbe, the Oder and the Niemen
(Russtrom-Memel-Niemen)

ARTICLE 20

The Elbe (Labe) shall be under the administration of an International Commission which shall include—

- 4 representatives of the German States bordering on the river;
- 1 representative of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic;
- 1 representative of Great Britain;
- 1 representative of France;
- 1 representative of Italy;
- 1 representative of Belgium.

Whatever be the number of members present each delegation shall have the right to record a number of votes equal to the number of representatives allotted to it. If certain of the representatives provided for above cannot be appointed at the time of the signature of the Preliminary Peace Treaty, the decisions of the Commission shall nevertheless be valid.

ARTICLE 21

The Oder (Odra) shall be under the administration of an International Commission which shall include—

- 1 representative of Poland;
- 1 representative of Prussia;

- 1 representative of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic;
- 1 representative of Great Britain;
- 1 representative of France;
- 1 representative of Denmark;
- 1 representative of Sweden.

If certain of the representatives provided for above cannot be appointed at the time of the signature of the Preliminary Peace Treaty, the decisions of the Commission shall nevertheless be valid.

ARTICLE 22

On demand being made to the League of Nations by any riparian State the Niemen (Russtrom-Memel-Niemen) shall be placed under the administration of an International Commission which shall include one representative from each riparian State and three representatives of other States specified by the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 23

The International Commissions referred to in Articles 20 and 21 shall meet within three months of the date of the signature of the Preliminary Peace Treaty, and the International Commission referred to in Article 22 within three months from the date of request made by a riparian State, and shall proceed immediately to prepare a project for the revision of the existing international agreements and regulations, drawn up so as to apply the General Convention on waterways referred to in Article 18, should such Convention have been previously concluded. In the absence of such Convention, the project for revision shall be in conformity with the principles of Articles 12 to 17 herein.

ARTICLE 24

The projects referred to in the preceding Article shall, *inter alia*:—

- (a.) designate the headquarters of the International Commission, and prescribe the manner in which its President is to be nominated;
- (b.) specify the extent of the Commission's powers, particularly in regard to the execution of works of maintenance, control, and improvement on the river system, the financial régime, the fixing and collection of charges, and regulations for navigation;
- (c.) define the sections of the river or its tributaries to which the international régime shall be applied.

ARTICLE 25

The international agreements and regulations at present governing the navigation of the Elbe (Labe), the Oder (Odra), and the Niemen (Russtrom-Memel-Niemen) are provisionally maintained in force until the ratification of each of the above-mentioned projects. Never-

theless, in all cases where such agreements and regulations in force are in conflict with the provisions of Articles 12 to 17 above or of the General Convention to be concluded, the latter provisions shall prevail forthwith.

(3) Special Clauses Regarding the Danube

ARTICLE 26

The European Commission of the Danube reassumes the powers it possessed before the war. Nevertheless, as a provisional measure, only representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Roumania shall constitute this Commission.

ARTICLE 27

From the point where the competence of the European Commission ceases, the Danube system included in Article 11 shall be under the administration of an International Commission composed as follows:—

- 2 representatives of German riparian States;
- 1 representative of each other riparian State;
- 1 representative of each non-riparian State represented in the future on the European Commission of the Danube.

If certain of the representatives provided for above cannot be appointed at the time of the signature of the Preliminary Peace Treaty, the decisions of the Commission shall nevertheless be valid.

ARTICLE 28

The International Commission provided for in Article 27 shall meet as soon as possible after the signature of the Preliminary Peace Treaty, and shall undertake provisionally the administration of the river in conformity with the provisions of Articles 12 to 17, until such time as a definitive statute regarding the Danube is concluded by the Powers nominated by the A States.

ARTICLE 29

The B States agree to accept the régime which shall be laid down for the Danube by a Conference of the Powers nominated by the A States, which shall meet within one year after the signature of the Preliminary Peace Treaty.

ARTICLE 30

Hungary shall deliver to the States bordering on the section of the Danube between Turnu-Severin and Moldova, within three months from the date on which notification shall be given, the equipment, buildings and installations used for carrying out and maintaining works on this section.

ARTICLE 31

The mandate given by Article 57 of the Treaty of Berlin of 13th July, 1878,⁴ to Austria-Hungary, and passed by her to Hungary, to carry out works at the Iron Gates, is abrogated. The Commission entrusted with the administration of this part of the river shall lay down provisions for the settlement of accounts subject to any financial provisions which may be contained in the Preliminary Peace Treaty. Charges which may be necessary shall in no case be levied by Hungary.

ARTICLE 32

Should the Tchecho-Slovak Republic, Serbia or Roumania, with the authorisation of or under mandate from the International Commission, undertake maintenance, improvement, weir, or other works on a part of the river which forms a frontier, these States shall enjoy on the opposite bank, and also on the part of the bed which is outside their territory, all necessary facilities for the survey, execution and maintenance of such works.

ARTICLE 33

Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey shall be obliged to make to the European Commission of the Danube all restitutions, reparations and indemnities for damages inflicted on the Commission during the war.

ARTICLE 33A

In the event of all the Allied and Associated Powers, either on the Central Commission for the Rhine or on the International Commission charged with the administration of the Upper Danube, deciding within 25 years from the coming into force of the present Treaty upon the creation of a deep-draught Rhine-Danube navigable waterway, the German Government, or the Government of the State which may have been substituted therefor, shall be bound to construct such waterway in accordance with plans to be communicated to it by the said Powers.

⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1878, pp. 895, 906.

For this purpose the Central Commission for the Rhine shall have the right to undertake all necessary surveys.

Should the German Government or the Government of the State which may have been substituted therefor fail to carry out all or part of the works, the Central Commission for the Rhine shall be entitled to carry them out instead.

For this purpose the Commission shall be qualified to decide upon and fix the limits of the necessary sites and to occupy the ground after a period of two months after notification, subject to the payment of indemnities to be fixed by the Commission and paid by Germany.

This navigable waterway shall be placed under the same administrative régime as the Rhine itself, and the distribution of the initial cost of construction, including the above indemnities, among the States concerned, shall be made by the Central Commission for the Rhine, enlarged by the addition of a representative of each of the Allied and Associated Powers represented on the International Commission charged with the administration of the Upper Danube but not represented on the Central Commission for the Rhine.

SECTION D.—CLAUSES REGARDING THE RHINE AND THE MOSELLE

ARTICLE 34

As from the signature of the Preliminary Peace Treaty, the Convention (and its Final Protocol) of 17th October, 1868,^{4a} shall continue to govern navigation on the Rhine, subject to the following reservations. The A States reserve to themselves the right to arrive at an understanding in this connection with the Netherlands Government, and Germany hereby agrees to adhere to any such understanding.

In the event of certain provisions of the above-mentioned Convention of 1868 being in conflict with those laid down by the General Convention mentioned in Article 18 above the latter provisions shall prevail. It is agreed that the Rhine shall be covered by this General Convention.

Within a maximum period of six months from the signature of the Preliminary Peace Treaty, the Central Commission referred to in Article 35 below shall meet to draw up a project of revision of the above-mentioned Convention of 1868 to be submitted to the Powers represented on the Central Commission, being guided by the provisions of the General Convention, should the same have been concluded by that time. Germany hereby undertakes to adhere to the project drawn up in the manner just described.

In addition, the alterations set out below shall be introduced forthwith into the Convention of 1868.

^{4a} *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LIX, p. 470.

ARTICLE 35

The Central Commission provided for in the said Convention shall consist of nineteen members, viz. :—

- Two representatives of the Netherlands;
- Two representatives of Switzerland;
- Four representatives of German riverain States;
- Four representatives of France, which in addition shall appoint the President of the Commission;
- Two representatives of Great Britain;
- Two representatives of Italy;
- Two representatives of Belgium.

The headquarters of the Central Commission shall be at Strasburg.

Whatever be the number of members present each delegation shall have the right to record a number of votes equal to the number of representatives allotted to it. If certain of the representatives provided for above cannot be appointed at the time of the signature of the Preliminary Peace Treaty, the decisions of the Commission shall nevertheless be valid.

ARTICLE 36

Vessels of all nations, and their cargoes, shall have the same rights and privileges as those which are granted to vessels belonging to the Rhine navigation and to their cargoes.

None of the provisions contained in Articles 15 to 20 and 26 of the above mentioned Convention of 1868, and in Article 4 of its Final Protocol, or in later Conventions, shall impede the free navigation of vessels and crews of all nations on the Rhine and on waterways to which such Conventions apply, subject to compliance with the regulations concerning pilotage and other police measures drawn up by the Central Commission.

The provisions of Article 22 of the Convention of 1868 and of Article 5 of its Final Protocol shall be applied only to vessels registered on the Rhine. The Central Commission shall decide on the steps to be taken to ensure that other vessels satisfy the conditions of the general Rhine regulations.

ARTICLE 37

Within a maximum period of three months from the date on which notification shall be given, Germany shall cede to France tugs and vessels from among those remaining registered in German Rhine ports after the deduction of those surrendered by way of restitution or reparation, or shares in stock in German navigation companies.

When vessels and tugs are ceded, such vessels and tugs, together with their fittings and gear, shall be in good state of repair, shall be in condition to carry on commercial traffic on the Rhine, and shall be selected from among those most recently built.

The same procedure shall be followed in the matter of the cession of—

(1) the installations, berthing and anchorage accommodation, platforms, docks, warehouses, plant, &c., which German subjects or German companies owned on the 1st August, 1914, in the port of Rotterdam, and

(2) the share or interests which Germany or German subjects possessed in such installations at the same date.

The amount and specifications of such deliveries shall be determined within one year of the coming into force of the present Treaty by an arbitrator or arbitrators appointed by the United States of America, due regard being had to the legitimate needs of the parties concerned.

The cessions provided for in the present article shall entail a credit of which the total amount, settled in a lump sum by the arbitrators mentioned above, shall not in any case exceed the value of the capital expended in the initial establishment of the ceded material and installations, and shall be set off against the total sums due from Germany; in consequence, the indemnification of proprietors shall be a matter for Germany to deal with.

ARTICLE 38

Subject to the obligation to comply with the provisions of the Convention of 1868 or of the Convention which may be substituted therefor, and to the stipulations of the present instrument, France shall have on the whole course of the Rhine included between the two extreme points of the French frontiers—

(a) the right to take water from the Rhine to feed navigation and irrigation canals (constructed or to be constructed) or for any other purpose, and to execute on the German bank all works necessary for the exercise of this right;

(b) the exclusive right to the power derived from works of regulation on the river. For this purpose France alone shall have the right to carry out in this part of the river all works of regulation (weirs or other works) which she may consider necessary for the production of power. Similarly, the right of taking water from the Rhine is accorded to Belgium to feed the Rhine-Meuse canal provided for below.

The exercise of the rights mentioned under (a) and (b) of the present article shall not interfere with navigability nor reduce the facilities for navigation either in the bed of the Rhine or in the

derivations which may be substituted therefor, nor shall it involve any increase in the tolls formerly levied under the Convention in force. All proposed schemes shall be laid before the Central Commission in order that that Commission may assure itself that these conditions are complied with.

To ensure the proper and faithful execution of clauses (a) and (b) above, Germany, on her own behalf and on behalf of the Grand Duchy of Baden or any State which may be substituted therefor on the right bank of the Rhine—

(i) binds herself not to undertake or to allow any lateral canal or any derivation on the right bank of the river opposite the French frontiers;

(ii) recognises the possession by France of the right of connection with and right of way on all lands situated on the right bank which may be required in order to survey, to build, and to operate weirs which France, with the consent of the Central Commission, may subsequently decide to establish. In conformity with such consent, France shall be entitled to decide upon and fix the limits of such sites, and she shall be permitted to occupy such lands after a period of two months after simple notification, subject to the payment by France to Germany of indemnities of which the global amount shall be fixed by the Central Commission. Germany and the Grand Duchy of Baden, or any State which may take the place of the latter, shall make it their business to indemnify the proprietors whose property will be burdened with such servitudes or permanently occupied by the works.

Should Switzerland so demand, with the approval of the Central Commission, the same rights shall be accorded to Switzerland for the part of the river forming the frontier between Switzerland and other riverain States;

(iii) shall hand over to the French Government, during the month following the signature of the Preliminary Peace Treaty, all projects, designs, drafts of concessions and of specifications concerning the regulation of the Rhine for any purpose whatever which have been drawn up or received by the Governments of Alsace and of Lorraine or of the Grand Duchy of Baden.

ARTICLE 39

Subject to the preceding provisions, no works shall be carried out in the bed or on either bank of the Rhine without the previous approval of the Central Commission or of its agents.

ARTICLE 40

France reserves the option of substituting herself as regards the rights and obligations resulting from agreements arrived at between

the Government of Alsace and Lorraine and the Grand Duchy of Baden concerning the works to be carried out on the Rhine; she may also, should she so desire, denounce such agreements within a term of five years dating from the signature of the Preliminary Peace Treaty.

France shall also have the option of causing works to be carried out which may be recognised as necessary by the Central Commission for the upkeep or improvement of the navigability of the Rhine above Mannheim.

ARTICLE 41

Should the Belgian Government, within a period of 25 years from the signature of the Preliminary Peace Treaty decide to create a deep-draught Rhine-Meuse navigable waterway, in the region of Ruhrort, the German Government or the Government which may have been substituted therefor shall be bound to construct, in accordance with plans to be communicated to them by the Belgian Government, after agreement with the Central Commission, the portion of this navigable waterway situated within their territory.

The Belgian Government shall, for this purpose, have the right to carry out on the ground all necessary surveys.

Should the German Government or any Government which may have been substituted therefor fail to carry out all or part of these works, the Central Commission shall be entitled to carry them out instead; and, for this purpose, the Commission shall be qualified to decide upon and fix the limits of the necessary sites and to occupy the ground after a period of two months after simple notification, subject to the payment of indemnities to be fixed by it and paid by Germany.

This navigable waterway shall be placed under the same administrative régime as the Rhine itself, and the division of the cost of initial construction, including the above indemnities, among the States crossed thereby shall be made by the Central Commission of the river.

ARTICLE 42

The B States will offer no objections to any proposals of the Central Rhine Commission for extending its jurisdiction—

(1) to the Moselle below the Franco-Luxemburg frontier down to the Rhine, subject to the consent of the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg;

(2) to the Rhine above Basle up to the Lake of Constance, subject to the consent of the Government of the Swiss Confederation;

(3) to the lateral canals and channels which may be established either to duplicate or to improve naturally navigable sections of the Rhine or the Moselle, or to connect two naturally navigable sections of these rivers, and also any other parts of the Rhine river system which may be covered by the General Convention mentioned in Article 18 above.

SECTION E.—CLAUSES GIVING TO THE TCHECHO-SLOVAK REPUBLIC THE USE
OF NORTHERN PORTS

ARTICLE 43

In the ports of Hamburg and Stettin the German Government shall lease to the Tchecho-Slovak Republic for a period of 99 years areas which shall be placed under the general régime of free zones for the direct transit of goods coming from or going to the Tchecho-Slovak Republic.

ARTICLE 44

The delimitation of these areas and their equipment, their exploitation, and in general all conditions for their utilisation, including the amount of the rental, shall be decided by a Commission consisting of one delegate of Germany, one delegate of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic and one delegate of Great Britain. These conditions shall be susceptible of revision every ten years in the same manner. Germany declares in advance that she will adhere to the decisions so taken.

CHAPTER III.—*Railways*

SECTION A.—CLAUSES RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT

ARTICLE 45

Goods coming from the A countries and going to the B countries, or in transit through territories of the latter from or to the A countries, shall enjoy on the railways of the B countries, as regards charges to be collected (rebates and drawbacks being taken into account), facilities, and all other matters, the most favourable treatment applied to goods of the same kind carried on any lines on such territories, either in internal traffic, or for export, import or in transit, under similar conditions of transport, for example as regards length of route. The same rule shall be applied, on the request of one or more of the A States, to goods specially designated by such A States coming from territories of the B States and going to the country or countries making the request.

International tariffs established in accordance with the rates referred to in the preceding paragraph and involving through way-bills shall be established when one of the A States shall require it from one of the B States.

However, without prejudice to the provisions of Article 6, the B States undertake to maintain on their own lines the régime of tariffs existing before the war as regards traffic to Adriatic and Black Sea ports, from the point of view of competition with North German ports.

ARTICLE 46

From the date of bringing into force of the present Treaty the High Contracting Parties shall renew in so far as concerns them and under the reserves indicated in the second paragraph of the present article the Conventions and arrangements signed at Berne on the 14th October, 1890,⁵ the 20th September, 1893,⁶ the 16th July, 1895,⁷ the 16th June, 1898,⁸ and the 19th September, 1906,⁹ regarding the transportation of goods by rail.

If within five years from the date of the coming into force of this Treaty a new Convention for the transportation of passengers, luggage and goods by rail shall have been concluded to replace the Berne Convention of the 14th October, 1890, and subsequent additions referred to above, this new Convention and the supplementary provisions for international transport by railway which may be laid down on the basis of such Convention shall bind the B States even if the B States shall have refused to take part in the preparation of the Convention or to subscribe to it. Until a new Convention shall have been concluded, the B States shall conform to the provisions of the Berne Convention and subsequent additions referred to above and to the current supplementary provisions.

ARTICLE 47

The B States shall be bound to co-operate in the establishment of through ticket services (for passengers and their luggage) which shall be designated by the A States, to ensure communication by rail of the A countries with each other and with all other countries by transit across territories of the B States; in particular they shall, for this purpose, accept trains and carriages transmitted to them by the A countries and shall forward them with a speed at least equal to that of their best trains on the same lines. The rates applicable to such through services shall not in any case be higher than the rates collected on internal services of the B countries for the same distance, under the same conditions of speed and comfort.

The tariffs applicable under the same conditions of speed and comfort to the transportation of emigrants going to or coming from ports of the A countries, using the railways of the B countries, shall not be at a higher kilometric rate than the most favourable tariffs (drawbacks and rebates being taken into account) enjoyed on the said railways by emigrants going to or coming from any other ports.

⁵ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXXXII, p. 771.

⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. LXXXV, p. 750.

⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. LXXXVII, p. 806.

⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. XCII, p. 433.

⁹ *Archives diplomatiques, recueil mensuel de diplomatie, d'histoire et de droit international* (Paris, 1909), 3^e série, vol. cx, p. 137.

ARTICLE 48

The B States shall not apply specially to such through services or to the transportation of emigrants going to or coming from ports of the A countries any technical, fiscal or administrative measures, including measures of customs examination, general police, sanitary police, and control, the result of which would be to impede or delay such transportation services.

ARTICLE 49

In case of transport partly by rail and partly by internal navigation, with or without through way-bill, the preceding articles shall apply to the part of the journey performed by rail.

SECTION B.—ROLLING STOCK

ARTICLE 50

The B States undertake that their wagons shall be fitted with apparatus allowing of their inclusion in goods trains on the lines of such of the A countries as are parties to the Berne Convention, without hampering the action of the continuous brake which may be adopted within ten years of the coming into force of this Treaty in such countries, and allowing also of the acceptance of wagons of such A countries in all goods trains on the lines of the B countries.

The rolling stock of the A countries shall enjoy on the lines of the B countries the same treatment as that of the B countries as regards movement, upkeep and repairs.

SECTION C.—CESSIONS OF RAILWAY LINES

ARTICLE 51

Subject to the settlements made in the definitive Peace Treaty concerning the cession of ports, waterways and railways situated in a territory the sovereignty of which is withdrawn from a B State, and subject to the financial conditions relating to the expropriation of the concessionaires and the pensioning of the personnel, the following stipulations as regards railways in such territories are hereby made:—

1. The works and installations of all the railroads shall be handed over complete and in good condition.

2. When a railway system possessing its own rolling stock is handed over in its entirety by a B State to an A State, such stock shall be handed over to the A State complete in accordance with the last inventory preceding the armistice, and in a normal state of upkeep.

3. As regards lines without any special rolling stock, Commissions of experts designated by the A States, on which the B States concerned shall be represented, shall fix the proportion of the stock existing on the system to which those lines belong to be handed over, regard being had to the amount of the material registered on those lines in the last inventory before the armistice, to the length of track (sidings included), to the nature and to the amount of the traffic. These Commissions shall also specify the locomotives, carriages and wagons to be handed over in each case; they shall decide upon the conditions of their acceptance, and shall make the provisional arrangements necessary to ensure their repair in workshops of the B States.

4. Stocks of stores, fittings and plant shall be handed over under the same conditions as the rolling stock.

The provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 above shall be applied to the lines of former Russian Poland converted by the Germans to the German gauge, such lines being regarded as detached from the Prussian State System.

ARTICLE 52

When as a result of the fixing of new frontiers a railway connection between two parts of the same country crosses another country, or a branch line from one country has its terminus in another, the conditions of working, if not specifically provided for elsewhere in this Treaty, shall be laid down in a convention between the railway administrations concerned. If the administrations cannot come to an agreement as to the terms of this convention, the points of difference shall be decided by commissions of experts composed as provided in the preceding article.

SECTION D.—PROVISIONS REGARDING CERTAIN RAILWAY LINES

ARTICLE 53

In the absence of special agreements the B States shall be bound to allow the construction or improvement of lines and connections situated on their territories which might be needed for the establishment of good through services or for the improvement of communication between the A countries and any other country, should the A country within a period of 25 years so require, undertaking at the same time to defray the initial cost of construction.

Reservation is made as regards payment of the initial cost of construction in the case of the new trans-alpine lines of the Col de Reschen and the Pas de Predil, of the improvement of the Bratislava (Pressburg)—Nagy-Kanisza line, and of other lines specified in the provisions supplementing this Treaty as having to be constructed or improved on the basis of the division of expenses in proportion to the advantages derived by the interested States. Such division, in

the absence of agreement, shall be made by an arbitrator appointed by the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 54

Germany undertakes to accept within ten years of the coming into force of this Treaty, on request being made by the Swiss Government, after agreement with the Italian Government, the denunciation of the International Convention of the 13th October, 1909, relative to the St. Gothard Railway.¹⁰ In the absence of agreement as to the conditions of such denunciation Germany agrees to accept the decision of an arbitrator designated by the United States of America.

ARTICLE 55

In view of the importance to the Tchecho-Slovak Republic of free communication between that State and the Adriatic, the B States recognise the right of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic to run its own trains over the sections included within the B States of the following lines:—

- (1) from Bratislava (Pressburg) towards Fiume *viâ* Mura Keresztur, and a branch from Mura Keresztur towards Pragerhof;
- (2) from Budejovic (Budweiss) towards Trieste *viâ* Linz, S. Michael, Klagenfurt, and Assling, and the branch from Klagenfurt towards Tarvisio.

On the application of either party, the route to be followed by the Tchecho-Slovakian trains may be modified either permanently or temporarily by mutual agreement between the Tchecho-Slovakian Railway Administration and those of the B States.

ARTICLE 56

The trains for which the running powers are used shall not engage in local traffic, except by agreement between the territorial State and the Tchecho-Slovak Republic.

Such running powers will include, in particular, the right to establish running sheds with small shops for minor repairs to locomotives and rolling stock, and to appoint representatives where necessary to supervise the working of Tchecho-Slovakian trains.

ARTICLE 57

The technical, administrative and financial conditions under which the rights of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic shall be exercised shall be laid down in a Convention between the Railway Administration

¹⁰ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cv, p. 639.

of the Tchecho-Slovak Republic and the Railway Administrations of the systems concerned of the B States. If the Administrations cannot come to an agreement on the terms of this Convention, the points of difference shall be decided by an arbitrator nominated by Great Britain, and his decisions shall be binding on all parties.

ARTICLE 58

In the event of disagreement as to the interpretation of the Convention or of difficulties arising unprovided for in the Convention, the same form of arbitration will be adopted until such time as the League of Nations may lay down some other procedure.

SECTION E.—TRANSITORY PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 59

The B States shall carry out the instructions given them, in regard to transport, by an authorised body acting on behalf of the A States:—

1. for the carriage of troops under the provisions of the clauses of the Preliminary Peace Treaty, and of material, ammunition and supplies for army use;

2. as a temporary measure, for the transportation of supplies for certain regions, as well as for the restoration, as rapidly as possible, of the normal conditions of transport and for the organisation of postal and telegraphic services.

CHAPTER IV.—*Disputes and Revision*

ARTICLE 60

Disputes which may arise between interested States with regard to the interpretation and application of the preceding articles shall be settled in accordance with provisions which may be laid down by the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 61

At any time the League of Nations may recommend the revision of such of these articles as relate to a permanent administrative régime.

ARTICLE 61A

The stipulations in Articles 1 to 10, 12, 45, 47 to 49 shall be subject to revision by the Council of the League of Nations at any time after five years from the coming into force of this Treaty.

Failing such revision, no A State can claim after the expiration

of this term of five years the benefit of any of the stipulations contained in the articles enumerated above, on behalf of any portion of its territories in which reciprocity is not accorded in respect of such stipulation. The period of five years for the application of reciprocity may be prolonged by the Council of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 61B

Without prejudice to the special obligations imposed in this Treaty on the B States for the benefit of the A States, the B States undertake to subscribe to any General Conventions regarding the international régime of transit, waterways, ports, or railways which may be concluded by the A States with the approval of the League of Nations within five years of the coming into force of this Treaty.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's Residence, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday April 26, 1919, at 12.15 p. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, O. M., M. P.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.
Professor P. J. Mantoux.

Secretary,
Interpreter.

1. (Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith who had remained on from the previous Meeting and Commandant Aron¹ were present during the short discussion of this subject.)
The Articles having been agreed by the British and United States Experts and Commandant Aron having assured M. Clemenceau that M. Loucheur had accepted them, the Articles in Appendix I were approved and Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward them to the Secretary General for a Drafting Committee.

Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith and Commandant Aron then withdrew.

2. Attention was drawn to reports of the movements of Italian troops towards Fiume apparently from Austria and of Italian naval movements towards Fiume.

3. PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that Roumania should be asked to cease their aggressive action towards Hungary. Roumania had had considerable assistance from the Allies and was pressing her advantage of numbers and equipment. Her action was distinctly aggressive and might constitute a danger to the Peace. He recalled General Smuts' suggestion that the Austrians should be invited to come to Paris. He suggested that an invitation might be sent giving a date a short time in advance to quiet things in Austria. This might arrest the danger to the Hungarian ferment extending to Austria. If Austria were put on a footing of respect this danger might be checked. This suggestion, President Wilson said, came from Mr. Hoover who had very good sources of information

¹ Of the office of the French Minister for Industrial Reconstruction.

through his Relief Agencies. Mr. Hoover was afraid of a collapse in Austria. He asked if General Franchet D'Esperey commanded the armies in that region.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that General Graziani² was now in command there.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that M. Bratiano might be invited to attend and asked to stop the Roumanian aggressive movement.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that in view of the pressure of time it might be better to send him a joint letter.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought it would be best to hear M. Bratiano for ten minutes after which a letter might be sent.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the Austrians might be invited for the 15th May.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said there was not a great deal to be settled now with the Austrian Treaty.

PRESIDENT WILSON said it was particularly confined to questions of boundaries, which were in process of settlement and the proportion of Austria's debt to be borne by the States formerly constituting the Austro-Hungary Empire.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was not sure if the proportions could not be fixed. His view was that general principles should be stated first, and then a Commission should be set up to work out details. The calculation was a very difficult one involving not only the population but also the wealth of the country.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that the best plan would be to get a Commission set up.

This question was then dropped without any actual decision being taken.

4. The Council had before them a document prepared by the Secretary General assisted by the United States, British and Japanese Secretaries (Appendix II).

A Communication
of the Preliminary
of Peace to the
German
Delegates

Examination of
Credentials

5. The first proposal for an examination of credentials by an Examining Commission presided [over] by M. Jules Cambon was approved.

The proposal that the President of the Conference should determine the date and hour of the examination as soon as the German Delegates arrived was also agreed to.

6. It was pointed out that the question of the recognition of the Jugo-Slavs was raised by the suggestion that the Germans might ask for an examination of the Allies credentials.

Recognition of
Jugo-Slavs

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the United States had already recognised Jugo-Slavia.

² Gen. J. C. Graziani, of the French Army.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE and M. CLEMENCEAU said that Great Britain and France had not.

(It was agreed that a provisional decision should be taken for the British and French Governments to recognise the Jugo-Slavia Government before the Germans arrived at Versailles but that action should be suspended pending M. Orlando's return. Unless some reason was shown to the contrary however, the Jugo-Slavs would be recognised before the arrival of the Germans.)

7. It was agreed that the Germans should submit their observations on the Treaty of Peace in French and English.

Written Procedure. Germans Communicate Their Observations in Writing

The Time Allowed to the Germans To Make Their Observations

8. (1) It was agreed that the maximum time limit to the Germans to make their observations on the Peace Treaty should be fifteen days.

(2) That they should be required to make their observations on particular subjects within such shorter period as might be determined.

(3) That M. Clemenceau should instruct the Secretary General to place himself in communication with the groups which had considered the different subjects and invite their suggestions as to how long a time should be permitted to the Germans for the consideration of each of the subjects mentioned in his list.

It was pointed out that the League of Nations was not included in the Secretary General's list.

9. The Secretary General's proposal that the President should hand over the Treaty to the German Delegation in the presence of the Plenipotentiaries of the Five Great Powers and of the Belgian Delegation only was not approved.

Powers To Present

It was agreed:—

1. That the full number of the Plenipotentiaries of all Belligerents should be present when the Treaty was handed over.

The question of the inclusion of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Delegation as belligerents was discussed but not decided.

10. MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY stated that in a conversation on Thursday the 24th with M. Paderewski ³ he had explained to him the proposed arrangement for Danzig. M. Paderewski had obviously been seriously disturbed, but had recognised that the matter had been decided in principle. He had asked, however, that two points should be provided for to which he attached the greatest importance:—

Danzig

(1) That there should be secured to Poland not only the use and service of the docks, etc., but the actual ownership, especially of those situated at the mouth of the Vistula and outside the walls of the city.

³ Ignace Jan Paderewski, Polish President of the Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs; plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.

(2) He suggested that the Polish control over Danzig would be secured by the disarmament of Germany, and that in order to help the general principle of disarmament it would not be desirable that Poland should make any display of military force in Danzig. While acquiescing in this idea he still wanted the power of protection against unorganised attacks by German "free-booters".

Mr. Headlam-Morley had then said he would try and secure something giving to Poland the right if required for the protection of Danzig against external attack.

Mr. Headlam-Morley said he had not been able to ascertain who were the present owners of the docks.

PRESIDENT WILSON did not consider that either of these requests by M. Paderewski could be acceded to.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that M. Paderewski would be satisfied with power of development of the Port of Danzig.

(This proposal was agreed to, and Mr. Headlam-Morley was instructed to draft the final clauses on this assumption.

It was also agreed that the protection of Danzig against external attack would be vested in the League of Nations.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 26 April, 1919.

Appendix I to IC-176H

DYE STUFFS AND CHEMICAL DRUGS

(a) The German Government agrees to give to the Commission representing the Allied and Associated Governments an option to require the delivery as part of reparation of such quantities and kinds of dye stuffs and chemical drugs as they may designate, not exceeding 50 per cent of the total stock of each and every kind of dye stuff and chemical drugs in Germany or under German control at the date of signature of this Treaty. This option shall be exercised within sixty days of the receipt by the Commission of these particulars as to stocks considered necessary by the Commission.

(b) The German Government further agrees to give an option to the Commission to require delivery during the period from the date of signature of this Treaty until January 1, 1920, and during each period of six months thereafter until January 1, 1925, of any specified kind of dye stuff and chemical drugs up to an amount not exceeding 25 per cent of the German production of such dyestuff and chemical drugs during the previous six months period, or in any case when production during such previous period was less than normal, said option may require delivery of 25 per cent of the normal production; such option to be exercised within four weeks after the receipt of

those particulars as to production considered necessary by the Commission, which particulars the German Government shall give immediately after the expiry of such period.

(*c*) For dyestuffs and chemical drugs delivered under Paragraph (*a*) the price shall be fixed by the Commission having regard to pre-war net export prices and to subsequent increases of cost. For dyestuffs and chemical drugs delivered under Paragraph (*b*) the price shall be fixed by the Commission having regard to pre-war net export prices and subsequent variations of cost or the lowest net selling price of similar dyestuffs and chemical drugs to any other purchaser.

(*d*) All details, including mode and times of exercising the options, and making delivery, and all other questions arising under this arrangement shall be determined by the Commission to whom the German Government will furnish all necessary information and other assistance required by the Commission.

(*e*) For the purpose of this arrangement "dye stuffs and chemical drugs" include all synthetic dyes and drugs and intermediate or other products used in connection with dyeing, so far as they are manufactured for sale.

SCHEDULE E

The German Government undertakes to accord to the French, Belgian and Italian Governments the following options for the delivery of coal to France, Belgium, and Italy respectively. The amount of coal to be delivered each calendar year shall be determined and notified to Germany not later than September 1st of the preceding year.

1. Germany is required to deliver to France seven million tons per year for ten years. In addition, Germany is required to deliver to France an amount of coal equal to the deficit between the production before the war of the mines of the Nord and Pas de Calais and the production of the same mines during the years in question—but not longer than ten years—not to exceed twenty million tons in any one year of the first five years and eight million tons in any one year of the succeeding five years.

2. Germany is required to deliver to Belgium over a period of ten years an amount of coal which shall not be less than the amount of coal exported to Belgium from Germany in the year 1913, or a total amount of eight million tons per annum.

3. Germany may further be required by the Allies to deliver to Luxembourg a quantity of coal equal to the pre-war consumption of German coal in Luxembourg.

4. For the delivery to Italy of not more than the following quantities of coal:—

In period	July 1919–June 1920	. .	41½	million tons
“ “ “	1920– “ 1921	. .	6	“ “
“ “ “	1921– “ 1922	. .	71½	“ “
“ “ “	1922– “ 1923	. .	8	“ “
“ “ “	1923– “ 1924	. .	81½	“ “

and the following five years.

At least two thirds of the actual deliveries to be land-borne.

5. The prices to be paid for such coal delivered under these options to be as follows:—

a. For overland delivery, including delivery by barge, the German pit-head price to German nationals, plus the freight to French, Belgian or Italian frontiers, provided that the pit-head price does not exceed the pit-head price of British coal for export, or in the case of Belgian bunker coal, the price shall not exceed the Dutch bunker price subject to the regulations of the Inter-Allied Commission. Railroad and barge tariffs shall not be higher than lowest similar rates.

b. For sea delivery, the German export prices, f. o. b. the German ports, or the British export price, f. o. b. British ports, whichever may be lower.

6. All matters regarding procedure, qualities, quantities of coal, time and mode of delivery and payment, and all other details will be regulated by the Inter-Allied Commission.

It is understood that due diligence will be exercised in the restoration of the destroyed Nord and Pas de Calais properties.

7. The foregoing provisions are subject to the approval of the Inter-Allied Commission and if the demands for export coal above provided for interfere unduly with the industrial requirements of Germany, the Inter-Allied Commission shall finally determine all questions of priority, but the coal to replace coal from destroyed mines should receive priority over other deliveries.

Derivatives of Coal

I. The German Government agrees to furnish the French Government on demand and to transport to the French frontier by rail or by water the following products:

<i>Products</i>	<i>Maximum Annual Quantity</i>	<i>Duration</i>
Benzoil	35,000 tons	3 years
Coal Tar	50,000 tons	3 years
Sulphate of Ammonia	30,000 tons	3 years

All or part of the coal tar may be replaced at the option of the French Government by corresponding quantities of products of distillation, such as light oils, heavy oils, anthracene, or naphthalene,

upon proper and sufficient notice being given to the German Government.

II. The price paid will be the same as the price to the German nationals under the same conditions of shipment to the French frontier, or to the German ports, and shall be subject to any advantages which may be accorded similar products furnished to German nationals.

III. All of the products furnished as above, including details of the contracts, quantities, products furnished, exercise of option, mode of delivery and payment, shall be subject to the Inter-Allied Commission, and if the demands for the export of the above products interfere unduly with the industrial requirements of Germany, the Inter-Allied Commission shall finally determine all questions of priority.

Appendix II to IC-176H

APRIL 25, 1919.

Communication of the Preliminaries of Peace to the German Delegates

(Draft by the General Secretary, Assisted by MM. Harrison, Norman and Saburi.⁴)

I. Examination of Credentials by the Examining Commission presided [over] by M. Jules Cambon.

a) Credentials of the Germans:

The President of the Conference determines the date and hour of the Examination as soon as the German Delegation arrives.

b) Credentials of the Allies:

It is possible that the Germans [may] ask for an examination of the Allies' credentials. In that case it would be a matter of urgency to come to a decision concerning the recognition of the Kingdom of the Serbians, Croates and Slovenes (up to now opposed to by Italy.)

II. Written Procedure.

When the President hands over the Treaty to the German Delegates he will point out to them that they must within a period of submit both in French and English their written observations.

⁴Leland Harrison, Diplomatic Secretary of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace; Herman C. Norman, Secretary of the British delegation; and Sadao Saburi, Secretary of the Japanese delegation.

These periods are:

For:	of:
Geographical frontiers of Germany days
Political clauses for Europe (Belgium, Luxembourg, Sarre, Alsace-Lorraine, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Eastern Prussia, Denmark Helgoland, clauses concerning Russia and the Russian States, recognition of new European States) days
Political clauses for countries outside Europe (General clause of renunciation colonies, Siam, Liberia, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey and Bulgaria, Schantung) days
Military, naval and aerial clauses days
war prisoners days
Responsibilities and punishments days
Reparations and restitutions days
Financial clauses days
Economic clauses days
Ports, waterways, rivers and railways days
League of Nations days
Organisation of Labour days
Guarantees and occupation of territories days
Final clauses (Execution of the armistice, and of the war state of Peace) days

III. Handing Over of the Treaty.

The President will hand over the Treaty to the German Delegates in the presence of the Plenipotentiaries of the 5 Great Powers and of the Belgian Delegation.

Should the Polish and the Czecho-Slovak Delegations be also admitted?

IV. Decision of the Allies.

After having examined the observations presented within the aforementioned periods, the Supreme Council will send their answer in writing to the German Delegation, and determine a period of within which a final global answer must be given by this Delegation.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House at the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday, April 26, at 3 p. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

Sir Maurice Hankey—*Secretary*.

The Drafting Committee of the Preliminary Peace Conference, consisting of Mr. Brown Scott, Mr. House [*Hurst*], and M. Fromageot were present.

1. The question was raised as to whether the Treaty of Peace with Germany should be "agreed" or "imposed".

The Form
of the Treaty
of Peace

(After a short discussion it was decided that it should be an "agreed" peace and should be prepared in this form.)

The question was raised as to whether the preamble of the Peace Treaty should state the principles on which peace was being made.

MR. BROWN SCOTT said it was extremely difficult when attempted in detail, and it was also pointed out that the Covenant of the League of Nations contained a preamble stating principles.

(It was decided not to state the principles on which peace is being made in the preamble.)

(The project for the Treaty of Peace attached in the Appendix was approved, subject to the addition of a reference to the effect that Germany had declared war on France.)

Naval,
Military &
Air Terms

2. PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that it would make the Naval, Military, and Air terms more acceptable to the enemy if they were presented as preparing the way for a general limitation of armaments for all nations.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would like to see the formula before agreed.

(The following formula was accepted:—

With the object of rendering possible the preparation of the general limitation of armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes to observe strictly the Naval, Military, and Aerial Clauses laid down below.)

**Date of
Arrival of
the Germans**

these Powers being described in the present treaty as the Five Allied and Associated Powers,

these Powers forming with the five mentioned above, the Allied and Associated Powers.

WHEREAS on the request of the then Imperial German Government an armistice was granted on November 11, 1918, to Germany by the Five Allied and Associated Powers in order that a treaty of peace might be concluded with her, and

For this purpose the High Contracting Parties represented as follows:—

The Honourable Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, etc., etc.
His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Em-
peror of India,

The Right Honourable

The Right Honourable

And for the Dominion of Canada,

The Right Honourable

The Right Honourable W. M. Hughes, etc. etc.

The Right Honourable

For the Union of South Africa,
 The Right Honourable
 The Right Honourable
 For the Dominion of New Zealand,
 The Right Honourable W. F. Massey,
 For India,
 The Right Honourable
 The Right Honourable
 The President of the French Republic
 Monsieur Georges Clemenceau, President of the Council, Minister
 of War, etc. etc.

 The President of the Republic of Uruguay,
 Monsieur Juan Antonio Buero, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
 formerly Minister of Labour, and formerly Deputy.
 The of Germany

 Who having communicated their full powers found in good and due
 form have agreed as follows:—

From the coming into force of the present treaty the state of war
 will terminate. From that moment and subject to the provisions of
 this treaty official relations with Germany will be resumed by the
 Allied and Associated Powers.

SECTION I.—*League of Nations*

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House, at the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday, April 26, at 3.15 p. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson,
Mr. Norman Davis,
Captain Smith.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
Mr. J. M. Keynes,
Mr. O. T. Falk,
Mr. H. A. Siepmann.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Klotz
M. Luquet
M. de Lasteyrie
M. Jouasset
M. Cheysson
M. Lyon.

Sir Maurice Hankey—*Secretary*.
Professor Mantoux—*Interpreter*.

FINANCIAL CLAUSES

The Council had before them the French and English Texts of the Financial Clauses as revised by a special Committee appointed to consider the Report of the Financial Commission.¹

1. PRESIDENT WILSON said that he had one alteration to propose at the end of Clause 2. of the English Text (Clause 1. (a) of the French Text). This Clause provides that certain payments to be made by Germany to the Allied & Associated Governments in the occupied territories themselves shall be paid by the German Government in Marks. These payments include sums due to the Allies for the up-keep of the Armies of Occupation, and the practice is for Marshal Foch to agree a rate from time to time at which these Mark payments shall be calculated. The text would consequently be clearer if it were made plain that Germany will pay at the current or agreed rate of exchange.

M. KLOTZ was at first doubtful as to the precise significance of this addition, but MR. DAVIS explained that the words were only intended to mean that until there is an actual current rate for Marks

**Mark Payments
Made by Germany
in Occupied
Territory**

¹ These draft texts do not accompany the minutes.

the agreed rate as established from time to time under the present system will govern the payments made by Germany in the occupied territories.

It was agreed that Clause 2. (Clause 1. (a) in the French Text) should be amended by the insertion of the words "at the current or agreed rate of Exchange" at the end of the penultimate sentence.

2. PRESIDENT WILSON proposed that the definition of payments which the Allied & Associated Governments might judge to be essential to enable Germany to meet her obligations in respect of reparation, should be made somewhat less rigid. As defined in the text these payments must be either for supplies of food or for raw material, but there might be other payments which it would be of advantage to allow Germany to make in advance of reparation.

Payments
Essential To
Enable Germany
To Meet Her
Obligations in
Respect of
Reparation

M. KLOTZ thought that all necessary payments were covered by the definition as it stood in the text, and enquired what other payments it might be desired to include in the priority.

MR. DAVIS said that in certain circumstances it might be desirable to allow Germany to pay a debt due to a neutral country, and he thought that in any event it would be a mistake to close the door against any possible extension by limiting the Allied and Associated Governments to the strict terms of the proposed text.

It was agreed that the last sentence of Clause 4. (Clause 2. in the French Text) should read as follows:—

"The payment of such supplies of food and raw materials for Germany, and such other payments as may be judged by the Allied & Associated powers to be essential to enable Germany to meet her obligations in respect of reparation will have priority to the extent and upon the conditions which have been or may be determined by the Allied & Associated Governments."

3. M. KLOTZ said that it was only just and reasonable that in cases where the Germans had stolen locomotives or rolling stock, for example, from France, they should be required to make good those losses to France, not only where the identical locomotive could be discovered, but also by the restitution of similar material.

Crediting to
Germany of the
Armistice
Material

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was quite prepared to accept this principle, but that if it were accepted it must be applied all round. If a German railway wagon is to be handed over to France in substitution for a stolen wagon, apart from the general reparation pool, then the same principle must apply to a ship, and the Germans must make good to the United Kingdom in a similar manner the losses suffered as a result of the Submarine warfare.

M. KLOTZ maintained that there is no comparison between the two cases because ships have been sunk, whereas the identical locomotives could presumably be discovered in Germany in course of time.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE replied that this was not at all necessarily the case, and that even if this were so the French Government would be entitled to obtain them under the Reparation clauses.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that the case is covered by the Reparation clauses of the Treaty, and that since it is not too late to identify the stolen material, there is no necessity for providing that similar material shall be restored without payment.

It was agreed that the Clause should be allowed to stand as drafted in the text.

4. M. KLOTZ said that in Clause 9 (Clause 6 (*a*) in the French Text) there was a British and a French proposal as between which no agreement had been reached.

The French proposal is to apply a uniform system to all territory changing hands. In the first place the State that takes possession or assumes a Mandate over the territory should also take the responsibility for such portion of the debt of the German Empire as can properly be attached to that territory: at the same time the Mandatory State, or the State to whom the territory is ceded should take over all German State properties within the territory. It would be difficult, in the first place, to make Germany pay coupons on the joint debt of several German Colonies, or be responsible for the administration of the local debts attached to the territories not in her control; and, in the second place, it was necessary that if the Mandatory States took over a portion of the debt they should also take over the State property without payment, since otherwise they would be paying twice over, once for the property, and again for the debt to which the property was attached.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would have the greatest difficulty in defending the principle that the Allies should assume liability for the debts attaching to the German Colonies; for example, General Smuts would naturally and rightly object to paying the debt of S. W. Africa which is largely a war debt for expenditure incurred by Germany for military purposes and directed against the Allies. At the same time he would be prepared to make a concession by admitting liability for the purely commercial portion of the debt. It was perhaps right that we should pay for railways that were not strategic railways, and for buildings and undertakings which were the result of German enterprise which would benefit the Mandatory Power. He proposed, therefore that a valuation of such property should be made

Payment for
Debt and
Government
Property in
Territories No
Longer Under
German
Control

and that liability should be acknowledged for the present value of this property. This was the only fair measure of the actual advantage acquired by the State under whose control the territory would be.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that it might be extremely difficult to know whether the money borrowed by the Germans on the assets of a Colony had been spent within the Colony or for its advantage.

M. KLOTZ said that he was prepared to leave the whole question to the Reparation Commission.

PRESIDENT WILSON replied that the Reparation Commission might determine the items but that it was necessary now to lay down the general principle which should be applied in all these cases.

M. KLOTZ said that Alsace-Lorraine was altogether in a special position. The Germans had taken over everything in 1871 without payment except the Railways.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that for the Railways he would be prepared to return the money which had been received from Germany, but that France had a right to have everything else restored to her which the Germans had forcibly taken in 1871.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that since 1871 the Germans, by their enterprise, had greatly added to the value of Alsace-Lorraine, and that it was therefore not entirely a question of restoring what had been wrongfully taken. Similarly in Africa the Germans might have built a railway for opening up a new part of the country. In such a case he thought it right that some sort of compensation should be made, but that he would sharply distinguish between military value and commercial value.

MR. KEYNES proposed the following clause:—

“Cedee and Mandatory Powers shall pay the present economic, commercial and administrative value of Government property in territory taken over by them, except that in the case of Alsace-Lorraine property taken over by Germany in 1871 and not paid for shall be returned to France without payment of any kind.”

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he could not accept this text.

The Representatives of the French Government withdrew to prepare an alternative proposal.

As eventually drafted this proposal made an exception in the case of Alsace-Lorraine on the ground that the principles applying elsewhere do not there hold good in view of the past history of the country.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the important thing was that there should be no exceptions, but that a principle should be found which covered all cases alike. In spite of the serious objections which could reasonably be made from the point of view of the British Dominions, he had proposed that, after valuation, some payment should be made

to Germany for commercial improvements. If this concession could not be accepted and applied all round he would prefer that there should be no payment at all, and that what property there is should be taken as a contribution to the costs of the war. It was impossible to suppose that Mandatories should be required to pay when no payment at all was made for ceded territories.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that the case of the Colonies was somewhat different from that of Alsace-Lorraine, seeing that the Colonies had not been wrongfully taken away. The whole world had felt for 48 years that Alsace-Lorraine had been wrongfully torn from France. German S. W. Africa, New Guinea, and even the ceded parts of Posen were not in the same position.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he did not press for payment in Alsace-Lorraine, but he did press for the acceptance of a general principle. The British interpretation of the Armistice terms was that a claim might rightfully be made for injury to civilians in respect of the injury done by the Submarine warfare to the business of civilians. In that case he had agreed not to press the British claim but to fall in with the general principles proposed. It was very harsh that in this case, where the general principle happened not to suit another country, an exception should be made in their favour, even though the British Government had agreed not to lodge the whole claim to which they were entitled.

PRESIDENT WILSON stated that he had been assuming that the case of Alsace-Lorraine was an accepted exception in the thought of the world. The difficulty on the other side was the inequity of taking over property without paying for it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Alsace-Lorraine was an exception as regards territory, but not as regards expenditure. He could not defend such discrimination. He could not go to the Dominions and press upon them the acceptance of a German debt when their expenditure had been so gigantic in relation to their population. Australia had a population of $4\frac{1}{2}$ million and three hundred million pounds of war debt. She had lost as many dead in the war as the United States, and was now to be required to pay for New Guinea, even although she could not obtain the whole of her just claims against Germany. The only thing that the British Colonies could hope to get was a pension on the French scale when they were paying twice as much from their own resources, and now it was proposed to discriminate against the British Dominions and in favour of Alsace-Lorraine.

MR. KEYNES suggested that in respect of Mandatories, the British text should be accepted, and that the new French text should be accepted for ceded territories.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the Mandatory States would be acting in the capacity of Trustees, and that he thought it was therefore reasonable that they should not pay for the territories taken over; at the same time Alsace-Lorraine was in a special position, and France should not be required to pay for what had been taken from her.

It was agreed that except in the case of Alsace-Lorraine, Government property in all ceded territories should be paid for, but that Mandatory States, being Trustees, should take over the property without payment.

5. PRESIDENT WILSON stated that he thought it would be difficult to accept the principle of Clause 13. (Clause 11. in the French text) under which any alienation of property or securities in violation of the financial conditions of the Armistice becomes null and void. It would in any event be quite impracticable to track down the securities which had been alienated.

M. KLOTZ said that he was quite prepared to abandon the chase after securities in Turkey, for the sake of which the clause had been inserted.

It was agreed to delete Clause 13. (Clause 11. in the French Text).

6. PRESIDENT WILSON thought that this Clause also should be omitted.

Priority of
Allied Nationals
Holding German
Public Loans

M. KLOTZ said that it had certain importance for the protection of French interests in Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria and Turkey.

It was agreed that the Clause should be deleted but that this would not prejudice eventual consideration on their merits of the particular cases mentioned by M. Klotz.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 26 April, 1919.

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's Residence, in the
Place des Etats-Unis, on Monday, April 28, 1919, at 11 a. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. Lloyd George.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

Sir Maurice Hankey : *Secretary.*
M. Mantoux : *Interpreter.*

**Report of
the Labour
Commission**

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Sir Robert Borden had drawn his attention to the additional protocol to Article 7 of the Report of the Commission on International Labour Legislation,¹ (page 22 of the report), in which it was stated that "no High Contracting Party together with its Dominions and Colonies whether self-governing or not, shall be entitled to nominate more than one member". Sir Robert Borden had pointed out that the effect of this was to exclude any Dominions from representation on the Council, notwithstanding that within the British Empire, at any rate, the Labour conditions of the Dominions were entirely different from those of the Mother Country. Sir Robert Borden had thought that the amendments he had moved at the last Plenary meeting² surmounted this difficulty, but the Drafting Committee said that this was not the case, and consequently, Sir Robert Borden wished to move another amendment.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that his difficulty was that Mr. Gompers³ had gone home to the United States. He thought that probably there had been a tussle on the point on the Commission, and he did not feel justified in assenting without expert advice.

After some discussion, it was agreed :—

¹ The reference is to the protocol to article 7 of the draft convention creating a permanent organization for the promotion of the international regulation of labor conditions, which accompanied the report of the Commission on International Labor Legislation. It is printed as annex II to the minutes of the plenary session of April 11, 1919, vol. III, p. 270.

² See the minutes of the plenary session of April 11, 1919, vol. III, p. 257.

³ Samuel Gompers, American representative on and chairman of the Commission on International Labor Legislation.

(That Sir Robert Borden should be supported in moving an amendment on this matter, provided he could first obtain the assent to it of Mr. Robinson for the United States of America, Mr. Barnes for the British Empire, and Mr. Colliard for France.⁴)

2. SIR MAURICE HANKEY said he was informed by Mr. Hurst, the British Member of the Drafting Committee, that there were a certain number of outstanding questions relating to China for which no provision had been made. The following resolution was adopted.

Outstanding
Chinese
Questions in
the Treaty
of Peace

"It is agreed that a Special Committee, composed of Mr. E. T. Williams for the United States of America, Mr. Ronald Macleay for the British Empire, and Mr. Jean Gout for France, shall meet to prepare draft articles as the basis of instructions for the Drafting Committee of the Preliminary Peace Conference in regard to any outstanding questions affecting China outside of Shantung and Kiauchau.

The Committee has authority to consult and secure the agreement of China and any other interested party".

Sir Maurice Hankey at once forwarded the above resolution to the Members of the Committee with a letter notifying them to take immediate action.

3. SIR MAURICE HANKEY said that he had been informed by Mr. Hurst, the British Member of the Drafting Committee, that no instructions had been issued to the Drafting Committee about Luxembourg, although there were important questions relating to the abrogation of the Customs Union⁵ and the Railway Federation with Germany.⁶

The following resolution was agreed to:—

"It is agreed that a special Committee composed of Dr. Mezes for the United States of America, Sir Eyre Crowe for the British Empire, and M. Tardieu for France, and a Belgian representative, shall meet to prepare draft articles as an instruction to the Drafting Committee of the Preliminary Peace Conference, in regard to the position of the Customs and Railways of Luxembourg, and any other outstanding questions of the same order in regard to Luxembourg."

Sir Maurice Hankey immediately sent letters to the Members of the Committee and to M. Hymans, informing them of this decision, and asking them to take immediate action.

⁴ American, British, and French representatives respectively on the Commission on International Labor Legislation.

⁵ Treaty of February 8, 1842; *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. xxxi, p. 1352; treaty of April 2, 1847, *ibid.*, vol. xxxvii, p. 806; treaty of October 20-25, 1865, P. Ruppert, *Le Grande-duché de Luxembourg dans ses relations internationales, recueil des traités, conventions et arrangements internationaux et dispositions législatives diverses concernant les étrangers* (Luxembourg, 1892), p. 367; treaty of November 11, 1902, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. xcv, p. 780.

⁶ Treaty of June 11, 1872, Ruppert, *op. cit.*, p. 105; treaty of November 11, 1902, *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. xcv, p. 780.

4. SIR MAURICE HANKEY drew attention to questions relating to Prisoners of War, which had been presented by the Council of Foreign Ministers.⁷ (See attached note, Appendix I.)

Prisoners
of War

M. CLEMENCEAU said he was not prepared to discuss this matter today.

(The question of Prisoners of War was postponed until the following morning.)

5. SIR MAURICE HANKEY drew attention to a Clause providing for the prevention of the employment of German military, naval, or air instructors in foreign services, which had been passed by the Council of Foreign Ministers, subject to a reservation by M. Pichon (for details see Appendix II).

Employment of
German Instruc-
tors in Foreign
Military, Naval
and Air Services

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the French objection in regard to this clause was that it would prevent France from recruiting Germans for the Foreign Legion, and was contrary to French law.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the position of the French Foreign Legion was quite unique, and no other nation had anything corresponding.

(After a short discussion, the following decisions were taken: 71)

1. That the Article should be approved in principle and amended by the Drafting Committee as required to carry out the following proposal by M. Clemenceau:

"Toutefois la présente disposition ne porte aucune atteinte [*atteinte*] au droit de la France de recruter la Légion Etrangère conformément aux lois et règlements militaires français en vigueur".⁸

2. That the clause should be applicable to the naval and air, as well as to military services.

3. That Sir Maurice Hankey should notify the Secretary General accordingly for the information of the Drafting Committee.)

6. MR. LLOYD GEORGE drew attention to a discussion which had taken place at the Council of Foreign Ministers on a proposal to introduce in the military terms of peace an additional article designed to compel the German Government to disclose the means employed for the manufacture of poison gases. (I. C. 171, para. 6)⁹ It had been decided that if the British Government wished to press the inclusion of this article, the question should be raised at the Council of Four. The British military authorities, who were confirmed in their view by scientific experts, considered that there was a real danger that Germany might discover some new gas, and, without any considerable armaments, might employ this as

Poison Gases.
Article for the
Treaty of Peace

⁷ See FM-9, vol. iv. pp. 631-639.

⁸ Translation: "However the present provision shall not interfere with the right of France to recruit the Foreign Legion in accordance with French laws and military regulations now in force."

⁹ FM-4, vol. iv, p. 560.

a means for attacking the Allied and Associated Powers, thus frustrating the provisions made for disarmament. He then read the following proposal for an article to be incorporated in the military terms:—

“The German Government will disclose to the Allied Governments the nature and mode of manufacture of all explosives, toxic substances or other like chemical preparations used both in the war or prepared by them for the purpose of being so used, including the mode of manufacture of the synthetic and nitric acids used in the making of such explosives. As a part of such disclosure the Allied Governments shall have the right to inspect all plant used for the manufacture, and shall receive from the German Government full particulars of the processes of manufacture in such plant.”

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the objection to this proposal was that the Germans could not reveal this information without also revealing trade secrets. He was advised by his experts that nearly every chemical used for the war was related to commercial chemistry, and it was impossible to ascertain one secret without ascertaining others. Moreover, he did not think the proposed clause would prove efficacious. His own university experience enabled him to judge how jealously discoverers concealed their secrets, and he did not think that the German chemists would allow their true secrets to be discovered. What he wanted to avoid was an article which could be used in a round about way for irritating investigation of all possible secrets. Such matters did not come within the purview of the military terms.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it was a matter of great military importance, and that the Allies had suffered very severely owing to the advantage the Germans had had in chemical knowledge. He was advised by Lord Moulton¹⁰ that the Germans were three years ahead of the Allies in these matters.

(After some discussion it was agreed that the following article should be inserted in the military terms:

“The German Government will disclose to the Allied Governments the nature and mode of manufacture of all explosives, toxic substances or other like chemical preparations used by them in the war or prepared by them for the purpose of being so used.”)

(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward this to the Secretary-General for communication to the Drafting Committee.)

7. The Supreme Council had before them the revised memorandum prepared by the Secretary-General on the subject of the communication of the preliminaries of peace to the German delegates. (Appendix III.)

In regard to paragraph 1, PRESIDENT WILSON asked who were the examining commission referred to.

Arrangements
for Communicating
the Preliminaries
of Peace to
the German
Delegates

¹⁰ British Director General of Explosive Supplies in the Ministry of Munitions.

M. CLEMENCEAU said they were the same Commission has [*that?*] had been examining the credentials of the Allied and Associated Powers.

In regard to paragraph 1 (*b*). M. Clemenceau said he did not know what to advise as to the recognition of the Jugo-Slavs.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what the Jugo-Slavs had to do with the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that Serbia was at war with Germany, and Serbia had made herself inseparable from the Jugo-Slavs.

SIR MAURICE HANKEY reported that Mr. Balfour on that very morning had told him that in present circumstances he thought the recognition of the Jugo-Slavs would produce a deplorable effect on the Italians.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the Allied and Associated Powers were still at war with the Jugo-Slavs. He asked whether the Germans were likely to demand to see the credentials of the Allied and Associated Powers. He pointed out that they did not ask for Marshal Foch's credentials when the armistice was signed.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that everyone knew Marshal Foch, but they were sure to ask for the credentials of the Allied and Associated Powers. If it was not for the Italian situation, he would gladly vouch for the Jugo-Slavs, but he did not want to do anything to irritate the Italians.

PRESIDENT WILSON said if the Jugo-Slavs were not recognised, the Germans would at once question the validity of their credentials, and say that they were not a legally constituted party to the Treaty. They would say that somebody who was nobody was trying to sign the Treaty. Serbia had, he believed, in some legal form or other, merged herself with the Yugo-Slavs; the Montenegrins had not.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that M. Vesnitch, the Serbian Ambassador, might be invited to confer with them on the matter.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that in order to save the time of the Supreme Council, the Foreign Ministers might see M. Vesnitch.

(It was agreed that the Foreign Ministers of the United States of America, Great Britain, France and Japan, should confer with M. Vesnitch on the subject.)

Written Procedure. Para. II.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that in the third line the word "oral" should be substituted for "verbal" discussion.

(This was agreed to.)

Date of First Meeting with the Germans.

(It was agreed that the first meeting with the German Delegation should be on Thursday, May 1st.)

Para. III. Powers to be present when the Treaty is handed to the Germans.

(It was agreed on President Wilson's suggestion to add Brazil to the list of effective belligerents who would be present when the Treaty was handed over to the German Delegates.)

In regard to Poland and Czecho-Slovakia

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the Czechs had been technically opposed to the Allied and Associated Powers in the war. The Poles had been divided.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that on the whole it was desirable that the Czechs and Poles should be present, as they had fought for the Allied and Associated Powers.

(It was agreed that the Czechs and Poles should be added to the list, and that the complete list should be as follows:—

Belgium	Poland
Brazil	Portugal
Czecho-Slovakia	Roumania
Greece	Serbia

as well as plenipotentiaries of the five great powers.)

Para. IV.

(It was agreed that the period of 48 hours should be deleted from this paragraph which should run as follows:—

“After having examined the observations presented within the afore mentioned periods, the Supreme Council will send their answer in writing to the German Delegation, and determine the period in which the final global answer must be given by this Delegation.”)

The discussion was then resumed on para. III.

(The following alterations were agreed to:—

“That the period of 15 days should apply to

- (a) Economic Clauses;
- (b) Ports, Waterways, Rivers and Railways;
- (c) Geographical frontiers of Germany;
- (d) Political clauses for Europe, (as given in the Memorandum.”)

(The following periods were agreed to for the other subjects mentioned in the Memorandum:—

Organisation of Labour	5 days
League of Nations	5 days
Political clauses for countries outside Europe (as in the Secretary-General's list.)	8 days
Military, Naval and Aerial clauses	10 days
Prisoners of War	5 days
Responsibilities and Punishments	5 days
Reparations and Restitutions	10 days
Financial clauses	10 days
Guarantees and Occupation of Territories	10 days
Financial clauses (as in Secretary-General's list)	5 days.)

(The above decision, however, was superseded.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE raised the question whether it was really desirable to assign different periods for the different items in the Peace Treaty. It was true that it was to some extent inconvenient not to get the answers as they were ready, and it might be suggested to the Germans that they should give their answers earlier in cases where they could do so, or that they should ask any necessary questions. He thought, however, that they should be allowed to decide the Peace Treaty as a whole. For example they would certainly desire to decide the question on indemnities in conjunction with other questions, such as territorial settlements. He thought it would be better to say to them, you have 15 days in which to give your answer, but if you like to send in written answers on particular subjects earlier you can do so.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed that this would be the better plan.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed.

(It was agreed that the Germans should be given a total period of 15 days within which to give their decision in writing in regard to the Treaty of Peace, but that they should be informed they were entitled to send their reply on particular headings in the Treaty of Peace earlier, or to ask any question in regard to them. Sir Maurice Hankey to communicate the above decisions to the Secretary-General.)

9. M. CLEMENCEAU read the demands that had been made by Serbia, Belgium, Portugal and Brazil, at the meeting which their representatives had had with M. Loucheur on the subject of Reparation. The memoranda of their claims which he read (which M. Loucheur had already summarised at a meeting held on Friday afternoon, April 25th, I.C. 176D) are attached in Appendix IV.

Reparation
Communications
With the
Smaller States

10. PRESIDENT WILSON said that it was difficult to see any practical argument in support of Serbia's claim to be represented on the Commission, but there was likely to be a considerable public sentiment in the world in favour of it.

Serbia's Claim

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the position was somewhat anomalous. Serbia had no real interest in the indemnity since she was acquiring a country which was entirely free from war debt. Belgium's claim was of quite a different order; moreover the question arose as to whether Roumania could be kept out if Serbia was admitted.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that if a distinction was drawn between Roumania and Serbia it would have to be by an arbitrary decision.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the Commission would have to decide very important questions, and these questions would have to be decided by a majority. The question arose therefore as to whether it was desirable to introduce additional Powers. He thought the

Experts of the Allied and Associated Powers ought to be consulted before a decision was taken.

It was agreed:—

1. That Sir Maurice Hankey should ask the Experts of the Allied and Associated Powers to consult together as to the advisability of Serbia being represented on the proposed Commission.

2½. That Belgium representatives should be heard by the Council of Four.

The question was raised as to the attitude to be adopted with the Belgian Plenipotentiaries on the subject of Reparation.

PRESIDENT WILSON said they should be told that it was impossible to admit claims on a different basis to those granted to other countries. He thought, however, it might be agreed in principle for some system of credit to enable Belgium to start her national life again.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed in this view.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked what was to be done about Brazil's claim in respect of shipping.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE considered that this claim ought not be allowed. If it was, Brazil would positively make a net gain of over 200,000 tons of shipping although she had only made a very small contribution to the war.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if Brazil should come into the common pool in regard to shipping.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE replied that she should and that the same applied to Portugal.

(It was agreed that M. Loucheur should be asked to reply to the Brazilians and to the Portuguese that it was not feasible to meet their claims in regard to shipping and that they would share in the common pool in this respect.)

11. PRESIDENT WILSON read a series of Resolutions which, with the approval of his colleagues, he proposed to move at the Plenary Meeting to be held that afternoon.^{10a} (Appendix V.)

League of Nations (This was agreed to.)

President Wilson then gave an outline of the remarks he proposed to make in the afternoon.

12. With reference to the decision taken on April 16th that an Inter-Allied Commission should be sent to the Baltic to study conditions in Livonia, Esthonia, Finland, etc., (I. C. 171 B. Para. 3),¹¹ President Wilson said that as each Government had its own observers in the Baltic provinces, it had been suggested to him that the Commission should sit in Paris instead of proceeding to the Baltic.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was informed by Sir Maurice Hankey that similar advice had been given by the British experts.

^{10a} Minutes of the plenary session of April 28 are printed in vol. III, p. 235.

¹¹ The minutes of this meeting are not in the Department files.

(It was agreed that the Baltic Commission should be nominated at once and should meet in Paris and not proceed to the Baltic.)

13. PRESIDENT WILSON read a letter he had received from Mr. Hoover pleading for the recognition of the Finnish Government.¹² This letter

gave very powerful reasons in support of the proposal, pointing out that Finland at the present time had ships which could not sail the seas because they had no flag to sail under; that they had need of credit but no banker would give it to a Government that was unrecognised; that they were subjected to severe censorship and had no means of issuing recognisable passports. (The remainder of the Letter was not heard as the Secretary was called out of the room.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the attitude of the Finnish Government up to very recently had been very dubious. One of the reasons for the Murmansk expedition had been to prevent the Finns with the help of the Germans from getting possession of the Murman coast. Until the collapse of Germany Finland had, on the whole, been hostile. After that he had for a time been very doubtful whether Finland would be Bolshevist or Anti-Bolshevist. Now she had put on white gloves and was demanding recognition.

PRESIDENT WILSON admitted that it would be agreed to recognise Finland as this was the equitable course.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that personally he had no objection, but he would wish to consult the Foreign Secretary.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would have to consult M. Pichon.

14. MR. LLOYD GEORGE handed round a memorandum which Mr. Balfour had prepared as a result of his conversation with the Japanese undertaken at the request of the Supreme Council on Saturday [*Friday*] last.¹³ (Appendix VI.)

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this was not sufficiently explicit but showed a decided approach in the Japanese attitude.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Baron Makino had, on behalf of the Japanese Delegation, accepted Mr. Balfour's memorandum.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked what the effect would be of saying to the Japanese—"We transfer to you the German rights but we do not confirm any arrangement you made with the Chinese earlier in the war and we do this provided that you give a definite assurance that you will not exercise your provisional rights for employing military forces in Shantung". There was nothing on which the public opinion of the United States of America was firmer than on this question that China should be not oppressed by Japan. Public opinion expected him to take the same line for Japan as he had taken for Italy. There

¹² Printed as appendix I to IC-177E, p. 357.

¹³ See IC-176F, p. 247.

was certainly some difference between the two cases inasmuch as there was a definite undertaking by China to transfer territory to Japan.

(After an interval during which other subjects were discussed, Mr. Balfour was introduced and the discussion was continued.)

MR. BALFOUR said that by the instructions of the Supreme Council he had seen Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda on Saturday. The Supreme Council had his memorandum in their hands. Baron Makino had come again to see him on Sunday evening. With great delicacy but perfect clearness he had indicated that Japan wanted a decision on the Japanese claims as a whole. He had pointed out that Japan was asked to agree to the League of Nations although she could not obtain recognition of her claims for equality of treatment. He did not want to make trouble, but public opinion in Japan was very much concerned on this question. If Japan was to receive one check in Shantung and another check as regards the League of Nations the position would be very serious. Consequently, it was very important to obtain a decision on the question of Shantung before the Plenary Meeting to be held the same afternoon on the subject of the League of Nations. He understood that if Japan received what she claimed in regard to Shantung, her representatives at the Plenary Meeting would content themselves with a survey of the inequality of races and move some abstract resolution which would probably be rejected. Japan would then merely make a protest. If, however, she regarded herself as illtreated over Shantung, he was unable to say what line the Japanese delegates might take.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if they would go to the length of refusing to adhere to the League of Nations. His difficulty was that he could not possibly abandon China. He had told the United States' delegation that his line was this:—"If Japan will return Kiauchow and Shantung to China and relinquish all sovereign rights and will reduce her claims to mere economic concessions foregoing all military rights, I would regard it as returning these possessions to China on better terms than Germany had held them."

MR. BALFOUR said that there was no doubt whatsoever that Japan was returning these territories to China on incomparably better terms than Germany had held them.

PRESIDENT WILSON said his experts did not agree.

MR. BALFOUR said that the United States' experts had not heard the Japanese case. The same had applied to his expert, Mr. Macleay, who had signed the expert Report furnished at the request of the Supreme Council.¹⁴ After hearing the Japanese representatives and cross-examining them for an hour he had been entirely satisfied.

MR. BALFOUR, continued that the Japanese Government now in power was not the same Government as had made the Treaty of 1915

¹⁴ Appendix II to IC-176C, p. 227.

with China. He honestly believed that this Government intended adopting a more liberal policy and had been influenced by what the Japanese representatives had learned in Paris. He said that Baron Makino had arrived on Sunday evening just after he had dictated his memorandum. His shorthand-writer had read it out to Baron Makino who had accepted it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it showed a very considerable improvement in the position.

PRESIDENT WILSON drew attention to the fact that Japan retained the right to keep troops in Shantung and Germany had had no such rights, even temporarily.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Japanese representatives had made it clear that this right would only be exercised temporarily during the period of transfer, from Japan to China.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that if the Japanese would concede all military rights and make their agreement a purely economic one, he would agree to what they desired. He referred to a subject he had mentioned at previous meetings, namely, that when the League of Nations was set up he would make a proposal for the cession by all the Powers concerned, including Japan, of their rights of extra-territoriality.

MR. BALFOUR thought that Japan would be willing to limit herself to purely economic claims. He suggested that he should be authorised to write a letter to Baron Makino.

(After a short discussion as to the line to be taken in the letter, it was agreed that Mr. Balfour should do as he had proposed and he accordingly sent the letter attached in Appendix VII.)

It was also agreed that the Japanese representatives should be asked to meet the Supreme Council on the following day at 11 a. m.)

15. M. CLEMENCEAU drew attention to the military engagements to be imposed upon Germany, which had been approved at a meeting held on April 22nd. (I. C. 175.B. Minute 5, and Appendix 3.¹⁵) The last paragraph of this he pointed out was as follows:

Military Engagements Imposed Upon Germany. Majority and Not Unanimous Vote of the Council of the League of Nations

“As long as the present Treaty remains in force the pledge by Germany to respond to any enquiry that the Council of the League of Nations may deem necessary.”

He pointed out that according to Article 5 of the League of Nations Covenant decisions, except as provided in the Covenant, would require the agreement of all the members of the League represented at the meeting. It might, however, he pointed out, be difficult to obtain a unanimous decision, and he suggested that in these matters the Council of the League ought to be able to decide by majority.

¹⁵ *Ante*, pp. 113 and 116.

PRESIDENT WILSON reminded his colleagues that a decision had been taken within the last few days with [regard to?] the Council of the League of Nations, and decided certain economic question by majority vote not by unanimity. Mr. Miller, his legal adviser on the League of Nations Covenant pointed out that this was not consistent with the Covenant, and had proposed to insert in Article 5, line 1, after the word "Covenant" the following words "or accept as otherwise provided in this Treaty". If this was decided upon action ought to be taken in the matter in the afternoon.

M. CLEMENCEAU considered it very necessary in this case.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that it might be supposed that there would be unreasonable persons on the Council.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that sooner or later Germany or Austria might enter the League of Nations and be represented on the Council, and in this case it would be impossible to get a unanimous vote on this subject.

(The following alterations were agreed to:—

(1) In the League of Nations Covenant, Article 5, the first clause should run as follows:—

"Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant *or in the terms of this Treaty* decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or the Council shall require the agreement of all the members of the League represented at the meeting.

(2) In the document entitled military engagements imposed upon Germany, Clause 3 should be as follows:—

"As long as the present Treaty remains in force, a pledge to be taken by Germany to respond to any enquiry *that will be deemed necessary by the Council of the League of Nations, which, in this matter, will act by a majority vote.*"

N. B. The new passages are underlined ¹⁶

(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to notify these decisions to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 28 April, 1919.

Appendix I to IC-177A

Prisoners of War

Note for the Council of Four (prepared by Sir Maurice Hankey)

[Same as appendix I to IC-177C, printed on page 339.]

¹⁶ The underlined passages are printed in italics.

Appendix II to IC-177A

Military Terms of Peace

The draft of an additional article to the Military Terms of Peace which is reproduced below was passed by the Council of Foreign Ministers on Monday, April 21st, subject to a reservation made by M. Pichon.¹⁷

According to the Procès-Verbal of the Meeting, M. Pichon only accepted the Clause under reserve for the following reasons:—

“Firstly, recruitment for the French Foreign Legion constituted a military question which the President of the Council, as Minister for War, would alone be competent to decide.

“Secondly, the employment of any German nationals in foreign armies constituted a political question, which he thought would have to be submitted to the Council of Four for final decision. Subject to these reservations, he was prepared to accept the draft clause.”

In the following reproduction of the Clause, words have been inserted in brackets and underlined,¹⁸ to apply it to the naval and air Services as well as to military Service.

This has been asked for by the British Naval and Air Delegations.

“Germany hereby agrees from and after the signature of the present Treaty, not to accredit to any foreign country or to send or to allow any military [*naval or air*] mission to leave its territory for any foreign country, and Germany further agrees to take appropriate measures to prevent German nationals from leaving its territory to become enrolled in the army [*navy or air service*] of any foreign Power or to be attached to such army [*navy or air service*] for the purpose of assisting in the military [*naval or air*] training thereof, or otherwise for the purpose of giving military, naval, or air instruction in any foreign country.

The Allied and Associated Powers agree, on their part, from and after the signature of the present Treaty, not to enrol in their armies, or to attach to their armies, or naval or air forces, any German national for the purpose of assisting in the military training thereof, or otherwise to employ any such German national as military, naval, or aeronautic instructor.”

A decision of the Council of Four is asked for on the following points:—

1. Is the Clause to be passed.
2. Shall it be applied to the naval and air services, as well as to military service.

(Sd) M. P. A. HANKEY

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 27 April, 1919.

¹⁷ See FM-7, vol. iv, p. 596.

¹⁸ The underlined words are printed in italics.

Appendix III

Communication of the Preliminaries of Peace to the German Delegates

(Draft by the General Secretary assisted by MM. Harrison, Norman and Saburi, as modified on instructions of the Supreme Council)

I.—Examination of Credentials by the Examining Commission presided [over] by M. Jules Cambon.

a) Credentials of the Germans:

The President of the Conference determines the date and hour of the examination as soon as the German Delegation arrives.

b) Credentials of the Allies:

It is possible that the Germans may ask for an examination of the Allies credentials. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes will be recognised by the British and French Governments before the Germans arrive at Versailles. This decision to be postponed for the next few days in the hope that an opportunity may arise to discuss it with M. Orlando.

II. Written Procedure.

The President will inform the German Delegates as to the procedure which will be adopted by the Conference. He will let them know that no verbal discussion will take place and that their observations will have to be submitted in writing. The President will further point out to the German plenipotentiaries that they must within a maximum period of fifteen days present in English and French their written observations on the whole of the treaty. An earlier limit will be fixed for particular subjects.

The period of fifteen days will apply to:

a)—Economic clauses.

b)—Ports, waterways, rivers and railways.

c)—Organization of labour.

The period will be cut down:

	For:	to:
Geographical frontiers of Germany		5 days.
Political clauses for Europe (Belgium, Luxemburg, Sarre, Alsace-Lorraine, Austria, Czech-Slovachia, Poland, and Eastern Prussia, Denmark, Heligoland, clauses concerning Russia and the Russian States, recognition of new European States)		8 days.
Political clauses for countries outside Europe. (General clause of renunciation colonies, Siam, Liberia, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey and Bulgaria, Shantung)		8 days.
Military, naval, and aerial clauses		6 days.
War prisoners		10 days.
Responsibilities and punishments		5 days.
Reparations and restitutions		10 days.

Financial Clauses	10 days.
Guarantees and occupation of territories	5 days.
Final clauses (Execution of the Armistice, and of the war, state of Peace)	5 days.

NOTE.—Sir Maurice Hankey draws attention to the fact that the draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations is not included in the list of subjects. Should it be included, and if so, what limit should be given?

III.—Handing Over of the Treaty.

The President will hand over the Treaty to the German delegates in the presence of the Plenipotentiaries of the 5 Great Powers and of the plenipotentiaries of the other effective belligerents, namely:

Belgium
Greece
Portugal
Roumania
Serbia

The question of the Poles and Czecho-Slovaks was discussed without a decision being reached.

Paragraph IV was not yet discussed by the Supreme Council.

After having examined the observations presented within the aforementioned periods, the Supreme Council will send their answer in writing to the German delegation, and determine a period of 40 hours within which a final global answer must be given by this delegation.

APRIL 26, 1919.

Appendix IV to IC-177A

[Translation ¹⁹]

[*Memorandum by M. Loucheur*]

(A) Serbian Claim

The Council of Four has decided upon the creation of a permanent commission charged with pronouncing upon all questions concerning the reparation of damages caused by the war.

On this commission all the great powers will be represented. Belgium also will be represented thereon.

Other states, among them the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes will have the right to take part in the work of the commission when questions interesting them are discussed. However, these states will have only the right of discussion without that of voting.

¹⁹ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

Serbia, for the reasons explained at length in the memorandum, asks the right to be represented on the commission by a delegate having the right to vote.

(B) Belgian Claim

Plan for reparations.

Belgium claims the sum total of the costs and of the damages she has suffered as a result of the war.

Belgium asks for the insertion in Annex No. 1 of the Treaty of provisions which would allow her to receive reimbursement for:

- (1) The costs of the war.
- (2) The expenses necessitated by the provisioning of the people.
- (3) The expenses of the Government compelled to take refuge in France.
- (4) The expenses necessitated by the redemption of German money introduced into the country at a compulsory exchange rate of 1 fr. 25.

The memorandum asks also that Belgium be reimbursed at least to a certain extent for literary and artistic losses and proposes the insertion in the treaty of clauses to that effect.

(C) Belgian Claim

Belgium having been completely ruined from the industrial point of view by the occupation asks that she receive in the division of the first installment from Germany at least 2½ milliards.

Belgium should be empowered to dispose of this sum for reconstruction purposes without restriction. The engagement to refund credits advanced to her should not apply to this installment.

(D) Portuguese Claim

Portugal asks for payment of the costs of the war.

Portuguese economic losses resulting from the war amount to 225,550,000 l. representing 37% to 47.5% of the public wealth.

If these costs were not repaid the country would find economic recovery impossible.

In regard to ships, the delegation agrees with the decision relating to German vessels considered lawful prizes.

As for ships requisitioned or used by an allied country, the delegation considers that they can be returned taking account of their value in sum total of the indemnity assigned to Portugal.

(E) Brazilian Claim

The memorandum discusses the legal aspects of the requisitioning of ships, which is actually an act of expropriation.

The state which engages in the requisitioning acquires *ipso facto*, the ownership of the vessel with, however, the requirement of paying indemnity.

The conventions or agreements with France and the United States have established this principle.

The Brazilian Delegation hopes that it will also be adopted definitively by the Conference and that the right to retain requisitioned enemy property, subject to payment of indemnity, will be upheld.

Appendix V

Resolutions for the Plenary Conference on the Covenant of the League of Nations

The Conference, having considered and adopted the amended Covenant presented by the Commission on the League of Nations, resolves:—

1. That the first Secretary-General of the League shall be Honourable Sir James Eric Drummond, K. C. M. G., C. B.

2. That until such time as the Assembly shall have selected the first four members of the League to be represented on the Council in accordance with Article IV of the Covenant, representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Greece and Spain shall be members of the Council.

3. That the Powers to be represented on the Council of the League of Nations are requested to name representatives who shall form a Committee of nine to prepare plans for the organisation of the League and for the establishment of the Seat of the League, and to make arrangements and to prepare the Agenda for the first meeting of the Assembly. This Committee shall report both to the Council and to the Assembly of the League.

APRIL 27, 1919.

Appendix VI

[Memorandum by Mr. Balfour]

The result of my conversations with the Japanese may, I think, be summarized somewhat as follows:—

In the first place, the Japanese strenuously deny either that they intended to modify in their own favour the conditions which the Germans had imposed upon the Chinese in connection with the Shantung Peninsula, or that, in fact, their treaties with China would have had that effect.

They say, on the contrary, that they propose surrendering all military control over the Peninsula, including the 50-kilometre zone round Kiaochow within which German troops were allowed but not Chinese, and all interference with the civil administration of the territory. Their intention is fully to restore Chinese sovereignty within the leased territory.

The provisions that appear in the Treaty of 1918, with regard to maintaining a garrison at Tsinan and guarding the railway with

Japanese troops, are purely provisional, and refer only to the period of transition immediately following peace, and this period it is their intention to make as short as possible. No date was named, however, for the determination of this transitory arrangement.

In these circumstances, the German rights which the Japanese propose still to retain are economic in their character. They consist in:—

1. A right to claim a concession at Tsingtau, which, however, does not exclude, and was not intended to exclude, the right also for other countries to organise an international concession, if that is desired;

2. The German rights in the railways already built, and the mines associated with them. The railways are built on land which is in full Chinese sovereignty, and subject to Chinese law.

3. Concessions granted to the Germans for building two other railways. These railways are to be built with Japanese capital, and the Japanese capitalists are at this moment negotiating with the Chinese Government as to the terms on which the necessary money will be provided. The Chinese Government will be able to secure the same position in regard to these railways as it has over other railways constructed by foreign capital.

The Japanese Plenipotentiaries, for reasons of national dignity which are easy to understand, are unwilling to modify the letter of the treaties which they have made with China, but they are ready (if I understand them rightly) to give explicit and binding assurances—

(a) That any concession which China gives them at Tsingtau will not exclude other foreign enterprise from the Fort.

(b) That the economic control of the railway, which the possession of the majority of the shares gives them will not be used in any way to discriminate between the trade facilities of different nations.

APRIL 27, 1919.

Appendix VII

[*Letter From Mr. Balfour to Baron Makino*]

APRIL 28, 1919.

DEAR BARON MAKINO, Through no fault of mine, there has, I fear, been some misunderstanding with regard to to-day's Meeting, and the business of Shantung in which you are particularly interested.

I was not myself present at the Meeting until I accidentally heard that the question of Shantung was deferred until to-morrow, when they propose asking you to give them the honour of your presence. As soon as I heard of this decision I went over to President Wilson's house, and again explained that you thought it due to you to

have the Shantung question settled one way or the other before the discussion on the League of Nations came on this afternoon at the Plenary Conference. It was unfortunately then much too late to ask you to discuss the matter with your colleagues from America, France, and England. But after hearing what I had to say in supplement of the paper which I read to you yesterday, I was authorised to tell you that if—which they did not doubt—the view which I represented to them as being yours was held by you, they were quite satisfied as regards the permanent arrangements come to between Japan and China on the question of Shantung. The essence of these arrangements, as I repeated to them, is that after German rights have been ceded to Japan, Japan will hand back to China the whole of the leased territory in complete sovereignty; that the only rights which Japan will retain are the economic rights enumerated in my Memorandum; and that Japan proposes to take every precaution to prevent undue discrimination in matters of railway rates, or port and harbour dues, or other cognate matters between nation and nation; in fact, that the policy of the open door should be fully carried out in the spirit as in the letter.

The only points on which your colleagues expressed anxiety were the temporary arrangements with regard to guarding the line and garrisoning Tsinan. These, as they pointed out, were not merely interferences with Chinese sovereignty, but interferences in excess of anything which the Germans could claim under their Shantung arrangements. They hoped you would consent to discuss this relatively unimportant aspect of the Shantung problem to-morrow at 11 o'clock. They quite recognise, and greatly regret, the inconvenience to which you may have been put owing to the fact that the Plenary Conference will, under this arrangement, precede the Shantung discussion; but they hoped that, inasmuch as the main doubts and difficulties connected with the surrender of the German lease appear to be already satisfactorily disposed of, you will forgive the inevitable postponement of conversations upon the purely temporary arrangement which still in their view seem to raise questions of difficulty.

Yours &c.

A. J. B.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's Residence in the
Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Tuesday, April 29, 1919, at 11
a. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

JAPAN

H. E. Baron Makino.
H. E. Viscount Chinda.
M. Saburi.
M. Kimura.

Secretary
Interpreter

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.
Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

(1) PRESIDENT WILSON said that he had taken the liberty of inviting the Japanese representatives to an hour's conversation before the Meeting. At the moment at which M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George had joined them, the discussion had reached this point: he himself had said that he understood that the Japanese were willing to re-cede to China the lease and rights in the leased territory, retaining their rights only in the leased district of Shantung and Kiauchow. He understood that it was contemplated that there should be a joint Chino-Japanese control of the railway, which would be controlled by a corporation. The latter he proposed should have some control in the police also. But to give this right of police control to the Government would convey the same impression to the world as the German control of the Turkish army.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that Japan's claims regarding police did not in his opinion exceed the rights actually exercised by Germany. The railway was really German-owned property. As German property the railway and its German personnel had the right to extra-territoriality, and this included the rights of policing, as it was the case with the foreign settlements in China.

MR. BALFOUR said he had thought that Viscount Chinda had on Saturday told him that the railway ran on Chinese territory and outside of German jurisdiction.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that the territory was Chinese, but the railway had in fact been German-owned, and consequently the railway and its personnel enjoyed extra-territoriality.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked why, because the railway was German-owned, it should enjoy extra-territorial rights? If, for example, the United States of America conceded the property in a railway in its own country to Germany, it would not have the right of extra-territoriality.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that it was because in China foreigners have the right of extra-territoriality. As a matter of fact the Germans had employed Chinese as police, but had had an official of great importance not merely as instructor but as an adviser, and the whole police force had in fact been in his hands, consequently Japan, in asking for instructors, claimed less rights than Germany had exercised.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he did not mind Japan asking for these rights, but what he objected to was their imposing them. He was not arguing as to what rights Germany actually obtained by one act or another, but he was only concerned in what Germany's rights had been to which Japan succeeded.

MR. BALFOUR asked if he was not right in saying that on Saturday Viscount Chinda had made the point that Japan became the heir of the German rights—that as Germany had owned the majority of the shares in the railway, Japan would inherit the same. That, however, surely did not give Japan the right of extra-territoriality. The remainder of the shares, he understood, were owned by the Chinese. It was certainly news to him that a commercial property of this kind covered extra-territorial rights, including control of police.

BARON MAKINO said he did not think it was contended that the majority of shares gave the right to extra-territoriality.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if it was contended that the fact that the Government was the owner gave this right.

BARON MAKINO said that it was a fact that Germany actually established the state of things which had been criticised.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that territorial sovereignty belonged to China. Extra-territoriality applied not to the territory but to the people.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he could not admit this. He did not understand the first part of the settlement, namely, that referring to the control of life. He did not admit by inference that extra-territoriality applied to the personnel administering the railway. He was not

contesting the facts of the situation that Germany had brought about, but he did contest what Germany had had the right to bring about if China had opposed it.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that Germany had in fact enjoyed these rights. The police, however, had no right to interfere with the regions outside the railway.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in the United Kingdom the police of railways and docks was very often in the hands of the Company concerned. The Company would arrange with the Home Office to hand over to it a section of the police, but it would remain under the control of the Directors of the Company. It seemed to him that some use might be made of this analogy. Control through the Directors would not be derogatory to the sovereignty of China any more than control of the London & North Western Railway police was derogatory to the sovereignty of Great Britain.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out the difference that the London & North Western Railway was not owned by a foreign Government. The police arrangements in the United States of America were somewhat similar, and State or City Commissioners often gave the control of railways to the Companies who paid the wages and were permitted to deal direct with these police. In law, however, the police were the employees of the municipalities, counties, etc. of the Central Government. What he contended was that if the majority of the shares was held by the Japanese which would give a Japanese majority on the Board of Directors, they could in fact control the persons by whom the police were chosen. Why, he asked, should we compel a foreign Government to control what a majority of Directors could control in an administrative manner? If the Japanese Government insisted on Government control, and on Japanese instructors, they would offend the sovereignty of China, and get no more in fact than they could obtain through a majority of Japanese Directors. He remarked that there was no stipulation in the German lease concerning the right of police.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that the matter might not be founded on an express understanding between Germany and China. It might be inferred from the fact of the ownership of the railway by Germany. The Japanese claim in this respect was a matter of precaution to obtain the necessary rights in China for safeguarding the railway. Practically it might work out all right if Mr. Lloyd George's proposal were adopted.

PRESIDENT WILSON objected to the form of this claim, which he regarded as an unwise one. It would give the impression of offending Chinese sovereignty. He himself was trying to get away from anything that would do this.

VISCOUNT CHINDA pointed out that China had accepted the arrangements voluntarily. In that case there would be no infringement of China's rights.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the Chinese maintained that it was not voluntary.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said it was necessary to draw a distinction between the so called twenty-one points, and the September agreement of last year.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that circumstances and the temper of the parties had altered by 1918, but nevertheless the 1918 agreement had grown out of the 1915 agreement. One had been the supplement of the other.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that the 1918 agreement, was far from having been made under pressure. It had in fact been initiated by the Chinese Government. There had been no question of pressure.

BARON MAKINO said that the question of police instructors was related to the policy adopted in regard to these instructors. If the instructors were entered on a political basis and took part in the administrative part of their police duties, this would be going too far. The term instructors was rather a vague one. It might be abused as the Germans had done. In their case it had been a matter of a policy of vindication. If such intrusion was carried out it was a misuse. But if the arrangement was voluntarily entered into it would be regarded simply as a police arrangement.

PRESIDENT WILSON said it was extremely difficult for him in the face of public opinion in the United States of America to assent to any part of the arrangement.

He was seeking a way to make it possible for him to agree, and it was not a simple matter. Public opinion in the United States did not agree to the transfer of the concession. He was bound to tell the Japanese representatives that. He was trying to see all views and to find a way out. In these circumstances it greatly increased his difficulty, if there were even an appearance of unusual control insisted on, particularly if the transfer of rights to Japan was greater than those exercised by Germany. He could not possibly justify in the United States his assent to a transfer on such terms. Public opinion would say it did not believe in the transfer of the claims at all and that he had actually given Japan more than Germany had had. He must say frankly that he could not do this. He asked the Japanese representatives to cooperate with him in finding a way out. He wanted to support the dignity of Japan, but he thought that Japan gained nothing by insisting on these leased rights being vested in the Government.

MR. BALFOUR referred to his conversations with the Japanese representatives on the previous Saturday and Sunday. In view of these he was rather surprised at the tone of the present conversation. He understood and had stated in his memorandum that the intention of Japan was fully to restore Chinese sovereignty within the leased territory, and only to retain rights which were economic in their character. He had shown this memorandum to Baron Makino, who had expressed himself satisfied with it. Hence he was surprised this morning to find the question being discussed as to whether Japan did intend to exercise some rights of sovereignty. He had thought that that was not in dispute. He had thought that there was only a question of temporary and transitional arrangements, which did indeed transgress sovereignty, but only for a short time.

BARON MAKINO said he thought that the question of police instructors had been mentioned in their conversation. The conditions of the transfer arranged in 1918 had surely been discussed.

MR. BALFOUR said he did not deny this, but the broad issue was as to whether Chinese sovereignty was to be restored in its entirety. If this was to be done Japan would be within her rights in regard to her position in connection with the railway and the concession to negotiate was reasonable. Her position would be analogous with that of other powers which had concessions in China, although no doubt the whole system deserved to be reconsidered and was in need of revision. These concessions, however, would then only be of an economic character. He thought it was agreed that Japan should retain economic rights, and the only outstanding question related to the transitional period. Hence he had felt a good deal of surprise at the line of conversation this morning.

BARON MAKINO said he was sorry if there had been any misunderstanding. All this, however, was part of the arrangement of 1918.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that if Baron Makino relied on the agreement with China in regard to the police, he must also remind him that this agreement also provided for the maintenance of a military force by Japan in China. Japan did not insist upon that. Why should she insist upon the police?

BARON MAKINO said that in the conversation that he and Viscount Chinda had had with Mr. Balfour, they had felt considerable surprise at the interpretation that Mr. Balfour placed on the proposed concentration of troops at Chinan and Tsingtau, which he had apparently regarded as indefinite. The reason for his surprise was that the idea had never entered into his head, nor he believed into the heads of the Japanese military experts. The troops hitherto had been lined out along the railway at a number of points, and this con-

centration had been regarded as a mere step towards the final withdrawal of the troops. That being their standpoint he had been surprised when Mr. Balfour had assumed that it was intended to be for an indefinite period. In regard to the police, the question was of a somewhat different nature to the disposition of the troops. He was not entering into the wisdom of the arrangement, but according to his interpretation one of the stipulations was for the employment of instructors.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that no limit was imposed in regard to troops there.

BARON MAKINO agreed that on re-reading the article he had found that it might be construed in that sense. This had surprised him and he believed it to be merely a matter of wrong drafting. He admitted the phrase had been ambiguous, but the correct interpretation was the one he had given.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that one of the worst features in the whole of these transactions had been the unfortunate 21 demands and this had included a demand for police instructors, although, of course, on a much wider basis. This had caused the greatest irritation, as it was an invasion of Chinese political and administrative independence. It was impossible to divorce transactions of this kind from the public impression they made. The present arrangement was, in public estimation, tied up with the impression made by the 21 demands. He admitted that the police point in itself was a minor one, but in its implications, both in China and the United States, it was very unfortunate.

VISCOUNT CHINDA pointed out the difference that in the case of the 21 demands the idea had been to employ Japanese officers in entire regions. Here, however, it was only proposed to confine the police to the railway itself.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this was a very important point. As the representative of one of the countries bound to support the transfer he was nevertheless very anxious that Japan should reach an agreement with the United States which was not signatory. Was it not possible, he asked, to reach an agreement on the basis of the practice in the United States of America and Great Britain, to which he had already referred? He could quite see that the Japanese did not wish to leave the railway entirely to Chinese administration. They wished to ensure the security of their property and they had not their direct or indirect control. The same applied in the United Kingdom where, as elsewhere, some police administrations were better than others. He asked if this could not be done as President Wilson had proposed earlier in the discussion by putting the police under the directors? His suggestion would be to insert a clause in the agreement putting the police in the hands of the railway company, and

providing that China would also do what was necessary to establish that police force. This would even give the right to the directors to employ Japanese instructors and no doubt instruction was a very important element. By these means, Japan would obtain all she wanted. She would substantially obtain the administration of the police of the railway, but the Chinese status would not be damaged.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that the practical result of this arrangement might perhaps be adequate and satisfactory. The difficulty, however, was that it would involve a revision of the treaty or else a statement which would be regarded in Japan as of the same effect.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked why Japan should not merely give an interpretation of the treaty in this sense.

VISCOUNT CHINDA asked if this would be a mere transitory measure.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it would be as a permanent measure, namely, that the arrangement was to be interpreted by Japan as one that would be worked through the directors. He quoted Article 2 of the exchange of notes of September 24th, 1918:—

“The Chinese Government may organise a police force to undertake the policing of the Kiauchau-Chinan Railway.”

He asked if it could not be stated that the police force would be chosen by the directors.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that as a practical arrangement this would perhaps do very well, as long as it did not alter the agreement or involve a public statement tantamount to a reversal of the agreement.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he and the Government of the United States could not admit that the agreements were consistent with the terms of the German concession. What he was asked to do was contrary to the great volume of opinion in his own country, namely, to extend the German rights.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said he could not agree to this interpretation. That was the difference between them. The Japanese contended that the policing of the railway had nothing to do with the sovereignty.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had examined it on the basis of the text of the transfer to Germany and the notes exchanged between China and Japan. These notes certainly contained more than the German concession.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that the German concession carried with it the right of policing.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he was willing to admit the policing being in the hands of a number of directors, the majority of which might be Japanese and he was willing to admit administrative control by

them, but he was not willing to admit the right of the Japanese Government to exercise supervision over the police force.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE read the note of September 24th, 1918, and said he could not find those rights. It did not say that the Japanese would have supervision of the police force. It merely said that they were to be employed at the headquarters of the police, on the principal railway stations and at the police training school. It did not even mention instructors.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that the right of having instructors employed was the Japanese interpretation of the clause.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there was nothing in these clauses which could bear the interpretation of putting the Japanese in the position of repudiating the treaty. It merely said that Japanese were to be employed. He again suggested that there would be no departure from the terms of the treaty if the Japanese said that the Japanese chosen would be selected by the directors of the railway. He had no doubt that in fact the directors would have to apply to the Japanese Government. There would not be many suitable people in China and the Japanese Government would be the only source from which they could be obtained.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the point was that in the treaty with Germany, we should impose the transfer of the German rights to Japan. His interpretation of the Chino-Japanese agreement was that in handing it back to China Japan would, in fact, extend her rights beyond those exercised by the Germans. The Japanese demanded that these rights should be transfer[red] with this extension.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the only extension was in respect of police. He asked if the instructors of the police had not, in fact, been Germans?

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that they had been termed advisers, but had undertaken the whole of the management. He considered that Japan was asking for less than this.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that Germany had not had any such right, although she had exercised it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked Viscount Chinda to consider his proposition for leaving it to the directors to control the police.

(There was a considerable adjournment, during which Viscount Chinda conferred with his colleagues.)

After some further discussion, MR. BALFOUR made certain proposals, which, in the course of the discussion were slightly amended, and eventually reached the following form:—

1. The declared policy of Japan is to hand back to China in full sovereignty the Shantung Peninsula and to retain only the economic privileges possessed by Germany.

2. (The intention of the clauses relating to the*) police on the railway is merely to give the owners of the railway security for traffic and will be used for no other purpose.

3. Such Japanese instructors as may be required to assist in policing the railway may be selected by the company.

PRESIDENT WILSON made the following proposal:—

“Surrender to China of all rights of sovereignty and retention with regard to the railway and the mines only of the economic rights of a concessionaire, retaining, however, the privilege of establishing a non-exclusive settlement area at Singtau.”

BARON MAKINO and VISCOUNT CHINDA undertook carefully to consider the above two formulae and to let the Supreme Council know as soon as possible whether they could accept them or not. If they were unable to accept them or to make any public announcement in regard to them, they undertook to continue the discussion on the following day.

(2) The attached report from Mr. Headlam-Morley and Dr. Saar Valley Haskins was approved. (Appendix I.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to communicate it to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)

(3) MR. LLOYD GEORGE mentioned a speech by the Burgomaster of Cologne which had been brought to his attention intimating the possibility of the establishment of a separate Republic for the Rhenish Provinces and Westphalia. He undertook to communicate a copy to his colleagues.

4. SIR MAURICE HANKEY said that the British Admiralty had sent a telegram, asking that the Treaty of Peace should provide for the surrendered German ships to be handed over at such Allied ports as might be designated. The reason for this was that otherwise the Allies would have to go and fetch the ships.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he believed the ships were already dismantled.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the ships would be able to steam.

(It was agreed that the first clause of Article 25 should read as follows:—

“Within a period of two months from the coming into force of the Present Treaty, the German surface warships enumerated below will be surrendered to the Allied and Associated Governments at such Allied ports as those Governments may direct.”

* To meet a criticism by President Wilson, Mr. Balfour suggested substituting the following words:—“Any employment of special”. [Footnote in original.]

Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to communicate this decision to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)

(5) M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had been advised by M. Jules Cambon that the German plenipotentiaries for Saxony and Bavaria and other States of the German Empire ought to possess credentials not only from the German Central Government but also from their State Governments. The opinion of the French juriconsults was that we could not proceed otherwise.

Credentials of
the German
Representatives

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that otherwise the Treaty might be signed by the representatives of the Central Government and yet be repudiated by the State Governments.

PRESIDENT WILSON felt some doubt as to the necessity of this.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested the question should be remitted to an expert Committee to advise.

(It was agreed that the question should be examined by a Committee composed of Mr. Lansing for the United States of America, Lord Hardinge for the British Empire, and M. Jules Cambon for France.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 29 April, 1919.

Appendix I

Memorandum by the American and British Representatives in the Matter of the Saar Basin

In accordance with the request of the Council of Four, we have examined on the spot the question of a slight modification in the northwestern boundary of the Saar Basin. We are clearly of the opinion that the economic and other interests of the southern portion of the canton of Mettlach require its incorporation in the territory of the Saar Basin, and that the proposed boundary should be modified accordingly. This would involve the addition of about ten square miles with a population of about five thousand which is in daily contact with the Basin.

We also recommend, in conjunction with M. Tardieu,¹ that a clause be added to the final article concerning the Saar Basin so as to give the League of Nations power fifteen years hence to make an equitable apportionment of any obligations of the Government of the Basin of the Saar arising from loans raised by the Commission or otherwise.

J. W. HEADLAM-MORLEY
CHARLES H. HASKINS

APRIL 29, 1919.

¹ French representative on the Special Committee on the Saar Basin.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's Residence in the
Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Tuesday, April 29, 1919, at
4 p. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd
George, M. P., Prime
Minister and First Lord
of the Treasury.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B., *Secretary.*
Professor P. J. Mantoux *Interpreter.*

1. M. M. G. Cahen was present for this discussion.

The Supreme Council had before them a Note by Sir Maurice
Hankey setting forth the questions referred by the
Prisoners of War Council of Foreign Ministers.¹ (Appendix I.)

2. M. CAHEN said that what the French members of the Commis-
sion had had in mind was that, in case the Germans were asked, as
part of the Clauses on Reparation, to supply labour for the purpose
of restoring the devastated regions, a combined system
of railway trains should be worked out. The same
Article 1 trains that brought the workmen might return with
prisoners. The French representatives had felt it necessary to post-
pone the decision, in order that the two questions might be considered
together.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the prisoners of war ought to be returned
immediately after the conclusion of Peace. Why should we mix up
the question of trains with the question of prisoners?

M. CAHEN said that the only reason was that the two questions
were intimately connected.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that to keep the prisoners would amount to
slavery. The question of the supply of labour was another question
that might be arranged at Versailles.

M. CAHEN asked if it was not proposed to enforce the supply of
labour on the Germans.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that it was not. It would be arranged.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he entirely agreed with M. Clemenceau.

¹ For discussion, see FM-9, vol. iv, pp. 631-639.

Forced labour would be unprecedented, unless one went back thousands of years.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE also agreed with M. Clemenceau.

(It was agreed:—

That the new Article referred to in Article 1 on the subject of Prisoners of War, should provide for the repatriation of Prisoners of War as soon as possible after the signature of the Treaty of Peace, and should be carried out with the utmost rapidity.)

3. PRESIDENT WILSON said that the proposal in Article 6 was practically to take hostages for the surrender of persons believed to have been guilty of breaches of the laws of war. It would be necessary to go back some hundreds of years to find a precedent for this also.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it was not as though we were dealing with the former German Government. He doubted whether it would be any use to take hostages in dealing with the present Government.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked what it was proposed to do with the hostages. In the end you would have to return them, and they would constitute no effective threat.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that all these should be kept against whom there was a presumption of personal guilt.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this was provided for. (Article 5.)

M. CAHEN said that this had been a British proposal. The argument in favour of it was that we had evidence of crimes against the laws of war by persons in Germany. If our sanctions proved insufficient, there would be great popular discontent. We had many officer prisoners of the military caste, which was collectively guilty. We proposed that some of these officers should be kept if the accused persons were not delivered to justice. Mr. Lansing said that there must be no hostages. This was not in our minds. It was merely proposed to give Germany an inducement to hand over the accused persons. If this proposal was rejected offenders against discipline who otherwise would be released as an act of grace, might be kept.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he did not agree in this.

M. CLEMENCEAU and PRESIDENT WILSON were of the same view.

(It was agreed:—

That Article 6 should be entirely suppressed.

Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to communicate this decision to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)

4. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the question of the recognition of the

The Recognition of the Jugo-Slavs

Jugo-Slavs had been cleared up. It had been ascertained that the mere acknowledgment of their credentials was equivalent to recognition, and would give

occasion to no special declaration by the Allied and Associated Governments.

5. The attached Articles, prepared by Dr. Mezes, Sir Eyre Crowe, Baron de Gaiffier and M. Tardieu, in regard to Luxembourg, were approved, subject to the agreement of Belgium. (Appendix II.)

(NOTE. M. Hymans, who was present a few minutes later at the meeting on reparation, was shown the Articles by Sir Maurice Hankey, and expressed his concurrence.)

Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward the Articles to the Secretary-General, for communication to the Drafting Committee of the Preliminary Peace Conference.

6. SIR MAURICE HANKEY, at the conclusion of the meeting, consulted President Wilson as to his recollection of the decision taken in regard to Heligoland on April 15th, 1919 (I. C.-171. A.),^{1a} when no Secretary had been present. The Drafting Committee, he pointed out, had received conflicting accounts.

PRESIDENT WILSON supported Mr. Balfour's recollection of the decision, namely that the naval harbour, as well as the fortifications, was to be destroyed, and that the island was not to be re-fortified.

Sir Maurice Hankey undertook to report this to the Drafting Committee.

(The meeting then adjourned upstairs to the meeting with the Belgian representatives on Reparation.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, April 29, 1919.

Appendix I to IC-177C

Prisoners of War

Note for the Council of Four (Prepared by Sir Maurice Hankey)

The attached articles prepared by the Special Committee appointed by the Council of Four on the subject of Prisoners of War were agreed to on Saturday, April 25th [26th], by the Council of Foreign Ministers, with the exception of Article 1 and Article 6, which were reserved for decision by the Council of Four.

1. In regard to Article 1, the outstanding point is the nature of the Article referred to in the third line. This Article has not yet been drafted. The American, British and Japanese delegations were of opinion that the Article should provide for the repatriation of Prisoners of War as soon as possible after the signature of the Peace Treaty and be carried out with the utmost rapidity. The French Delegation could not agree to draft on these lines, for fear of forestalling a possible decision on the question of demanding from Germany a supply of labour for the purpose of restoring the devastated regions.

^{1a} Not found in Department files.

What is required, therefore, is a decision from the Council of Four as to the basis on which the new article is to be drafted.

2. The other Article, namely, No. 6, was reserved on the question of whether the Allied and Associated Governments ought to reserve to themselves the right to detain in custody such Prisoners of War of the rank of officer as they may select, to ensure the surrender of persons alleged to be guilty of offences against the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity.

M. P. A. HANKEY

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 27 April, 1919.

[Annex]

It was agreed to adopt the following Articles, with the proviso that Article 1, relating to the repatriation of German prisoners, and Article 6, relating to the detention of hostages, should be referred to the Council of Four for decision:—

(1) The repatriation of German prisoners of war and interned civilians shall, in the conditions fixed by Article — of the present Treaty, be carried out by a Commission composed of representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments on the one part and of the German Government on the other part.

On the part of each of the Allied and Associated Powers a Sub-Commission, composed exclusively of representatives of the respective Power and of delegates of the German Government, shall regulate details of execution for the return of prisoners.

(2) From the time of their delivery into the hands of the German Authorities, the prisoners of war and interned civilians are to be returned without delay to their house by the said Authorities.

Those amongst them whose pre-war domicile was in territory occupied by the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers are likewise to be sent to their homes, subject to the consent and control of the Military authorities of the Armies of Occupation of the Allied and Associated Governments.

(3) The whole cost of repatriation from the outset shall be borne by the German Government who shall also provide such land or sea transport, including working personnel, as may be considered necessary by the Commission referred to in paragraph (1).

(4) Prisoners of war and interned civilians awaiting disposal or undergoing sentence for offences against discipline shall be repatriated without regard to the completion of their sentence or of the proceedings pending against them.

The foregoing paragraph shall not apply to prisoners of war and interned civilians punished for offences committed subsequent to May 1st, 1919.

During the period pending their repatriation all prisoners of war and interned civilians shall remain subject to the existing regulations, more especially as regards work and discipline.

(5) Prisoners of war and interned civilians who are awaiting disposal or undergoing sentence for offences other than those against discipline may be detained.

(6) Until the German Government has taken all the measures required by Clause of the present Treaty (providing for the surrender of prisoners alleged to be guilty of offences against the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity), the Allied and Associated Governments reserve to themselves the right to detain in custody such prisoners of war of the rank of officer as they may in their discretion select.

(7) *a.* The German Government undertakes to receive on its territory all individuals liable to repatriation without discrimination.

b. Prisoners of war, or other German nationals, who do not desire to be repatriated, may be excluded from repatriation, but the Allied and Associated Governments reserve to themselves the right either to repatriate them, or to send them to a neutral country, or to allow them to reside in their territories.

The German Government undertakes to take no special proceedings against such individuals or their families, and to exercise no repressive or vexatious measures of any kind whatsoever on this account.

(8) The Allied and Associated Governments reserve the right to make the repatriation of German subjects or adherents in their hands conditional on the immediate notification and release by the German Government of any prisoners of war, subjects or adherents of the Allied and Associated Governments, who may still be in Germany.

(9) The German Government undertakes:

(i) to give every facility to Commissions of Enquiry into the cases of the missing: to furnish them with all necessary means of transport: to allow them access to all such places as camps, prisons, hospitals, etc., and to place at their disposal all documents, whether public or private, which would facilitate their enquiries.

(ii) to impose penalties upon any German officials or private persons who shall have concealed the presence of any Allied . . . or Associated subjects or adherents, or neglected to reveal the presence of any such after it had come to their knowledge.

(10) The German Government undertakes to restore without delay, from the time that the present Treaty comes into force all articles, cash, securities and documents which have belonged to Allied or Associated subjects and adherents and which have been taken possession of by the German authorities.

(11) The graves of prisoners and interned civilians, subjects or adherents of the respective belligerents, who have died in captivity shall be properly maintained as provided for by Clause of the present Treaty.

The Allied and Associated Governments on the one hand and the German Government on the other hand, mutually undertake furthermore:

(i) to furnish a complete list of the dead, together with all information useful for identification.

(ii) to furnish all information as to the number and location of graves of all those who have been buried without identification.

Appendix II to IC-177C

[Translation ²]

[*Letter From M. Tardieu to M. Clemenceau*]

PARIS, April 29, 1919.

MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to transmit to you the text concerning the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, which the meeting held this morning by Messrs. Mezes (United States), Sir Eyre Crowe (British Empire), Baron de Gaiffier (Belgium) and myself unanimously decided to recommend for the decision of the Chiefs of Governments.

Accept [etc.]

TARDIEU

• [Enclosure—Translation ³]

With regard to the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, Germany renounces the benefit of all the provisions inserted in her favour in the Treaties of February 8, 1842,⁴ April 2, 1847,⁵ October 20-25, 1865,⁶ August 18, 1866,⁷ February 21 and May 11, 1867,⁸ May 10, 1871,⁹ June 11, 1872,¹⁰ and November 11, 1902,¹¹ and in all Conventions consequent upon such Treaties.

Germany recognizes that the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg ceased to form part of the German Zollverein as from January 1, 1919, re-

² Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

³ The text of the translation is that which appears as article 40 of the Treaty of Versailles.

⁴ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. xxxi, p. 1352.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. xxxvii, p. 806.

⁶ Ruppert, *Le Grande-duché de Luxembourg dans ses relations internationales, recueil des traités, etc.*, p. 367.

⁷ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. lvi, p. 1038.

⁸ Ruppert, *op. cit.*, p. 547 and p. 600.

⁹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. lxii, p. 77.

¹⁰ Ruppert, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

¹¹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. xcv, p. 780.

nounces all rights to the exploitation of the railways, adheres to the termination of the régime of neutrality of the Grand Duchy, and accepts in advance all international arrangements which may be concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers relating to the Grand Duchy.

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Tuesday, April 29, 1919, at 4.30 p. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.
Mr. Norman H. Davis.
Mr. T. W. Lamont.
Mr. V. McCormick.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Klotz.
M. Loucheur.
M. de Lasteyrie.
M. Jouasset.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
Mr. J. M. Keynes, C. B.
Mr. O. T. Falk.
Mr. H. A. Siepmann.

BELGIUM

M. Hymans.
M. Vandervelde.
M. Van den Heuvel.

Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.
Professor P. J. Mantoux

Secretary.
Interpreter.

The Council had before it the claim of Belgium to receive absolute priority in regard to Reparation and to be repaid the whole costs of the war.

**The Belgian
Claim**

1. M. HYMANS said that he would begin by reading two letters which had been addressed on April 24th to M. Clemenceau and which summarised the Belgian claim.

The first of these letters refers to previous correspondence on the 18th and 22nd February and asks for the insertion in Annex 1¹ of clauses which will allow Belgium to obtain from Germany the repayment (1) of her war expenses, (2) of the expenses required for feeding her population, (3) of the expenses required for the maintenance of Government services abroad. These expenses have been covered by loans which Belgium has contracted in England, France and the United States.

**Costs of
the War**

Belgium further requests that a clause should be inserted in the Peace Treaty to oblige Germany to take back at the price of F. 1. 25 all the Marks introduced into the occupied region at a compulsory fixed rate.

**Redemption
of Currency**

The second letter, referring to clause 6 of the Reparation Draft,

¹ Annex 1 to the draft reparation clauses. See annex 1 to appendix I to IC-176A, p. 168.

proposes that in the allotment of the first instalment of Indemnity paid by Germany Belgium should receive at least 2½ milliards of francs, and that this amount should not be made available for the repayment of credits which have been opened to Belgium on the understanding that they will be repaid out of the first sums received from Germany by way of Indemnity. It is further proposed that the Belgian share of further instalments to be received from Germany should be determined in such a manner that the whole amount due to Belgium should be discharged by Germany within a period of 10 years.

M. Hymans said that all these claims were based upon the special position of Belgium which, unlike any other country, was forced into the war through the violation of a Treaty. Belgium relied upon a declaration of Sainte Adresse of the 16th [14th] February, 1916² in which the French British and Russian Governments declared that they would not lay down their arms until Belgium had been largely indemnified for the damages which she had suffered; and she relied also upon point 2 [7] of President Wilson's 14 points.

M. Hymans said that if he were to speak quite frankly he must admit that the Belgian Government had come to the conclusion that they could not accept the responsibility of taking home to Belgium a Treaty which provided for no preference in regard to Indemnity. Immediate help was necessary to restore the industrial life of the country.

In regard to the redemption of German currency forcibly introduced into Belgium at the price of F. 1.25, M. Hymans read a note detailing the purposes to which these sums would be applied if they were obtained. They are required for (1) the payment of about 3 milliards of francs constituting the principal and interest of the German war tax imposed upon Belgium and represented by short dated inter-provincial bonds which the Belgian banks have been forced to accept; (2) the repayment of one million francs of debt contracted by the municipalities to meet the necessities of the civil population during the occupation; (3) the repayment of 2,200,000,000 Francs of Treasury bonds created for the restoration of the currency and the redemption of Marks.

M. Hymans said that the payment of these sums by Germany was not only intimately bound up with the restoration of Belgium, but was also indispensable to the credit of the economic restoration of Germany.

The Belgium Government had come to the conclusion that if the requests presented in these letters were not agreed to and if no defi-

² See *Foreign Relations*, 1916, supp., p. 17.

nite assurance were given as to the percentage reserved to Belgium out of the Indemnity, they would feel it their duty to refer the matter to their Parliament.

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE replied that M. Hymans had raised two very different questions: one of them easy and the other extremely difficult. As regards the claim of Belgium to be allotted a substantial share out

Mr. Lloyd
George's
Reply.
Priority in
Indemnity
Payments

of the first instalment to be received from Germany, he was in entire agreement and thought that the amount asked for was moderate and reasonable. He agreed that it might be necessary for the Allies to give some kind of guarantee for the first one thousand million pounds

to be paid by Germany if this instalment was to be available in time to be of use to anybody. But as regards the second point raised by M. Hymans, Mr. Lloyd George asked whether he was to understand that Belgium pressed for the repayment of the costs of the war by Germany to all the Allies equally or was asking for a discriminatory clause under which the whole war costs of Belgium should be recovered out of the Indemnity in spite of the fact that no other Ally was putting in such a claim or would have any chance of obtaining the full costs of the war even if the claim were put in.

Costs of
the War

M. HYMANS replied that he was asking for a discrimination in favour of Belgium.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he could not see how any case could be made out for such a discrimination. All statesmen have their Parliamentary difficulties, and he had himself returned to London in order to explain to the British Parliament that Germany could not pay the whole costs of the war to all the Allies. He was sure that M. Hymans would not want to get rid of his own Parliamentary difficulties at the expense of other countries. He was emphatically of the opinion that Belgium should have, so to speak, the first cut out of the German sausage, and that the priority of Belgium's claim should be recognized, but he could not admit the payment of Belgian war costs—even though there might be some advantage to the United Kingdom if such costs were met by Germany, seeing that the money spent by Belgium on the war had been advanced to her by England, France and the United States. He must oppose the Belgian claim on principle, and he believed that the public in France and in England would not be able to understand the proposed discrimination in favour of Belgium. Moreover Serbia was in the same position: Roumania also had been overrun and had only a corner of her country free from the occupation of the enemy. If the categories were to be reopened they must be reopened all round; for example, France had made a concession in the matter of Alsace Lorraine on the ex-

press condition that if such preference were given to Belgium the whole question would have to be reopened.

3. M. VAN DEN HEUVEL said that the term "costs of the war" required definition. All the Allies were receiving some costs of the war seeing that they were to be reimbursed on account of pensions.

The costs of the war for Belgium fell into three different categories. First the Military expenses in strict sense, which amounted to three milliards; second, incidental expenses, including the cost of removing the Government to Le Havre, and the administrative expenses of the Government while in France; third, the expenses of feeding the population. Only about half a million Belgians left the country. It was the duty of Germany to feed the remaining seven millions who stayed in Belgium, but Germany did not fulfil this duty and the cost to Belgium amounted to $2\frac{3}{4}$ milliards. Belgium had consequently been compelled to borrow in all 5,493 million francs from her Allies and she now claimed to be repaid the whole costs of the war on account of her altogether exceptional position. There was no comparison between the position of Belgium and the position of Serbia, but quite apart from the differences which arose out of the causes and the beginning of the war, Belgium was also in a special position in that the Allies had bound themselves by specific obligations over and over again. The declaration of Sainte Adresse had already been referred to and he would quote further a passage from Mr. Lloyd George's speech on the 5th January, 1918³ in which it was said that the first condition necessary to Great Britain if she were to be prepared to lay down her arms was that Belgium should be, so far as possible, guaranteed complete restoration.

Military
Expenses.
Administrative Ex-
penses. Ravaille-
ment

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that here, as elsewhere, the indemnification promised to Belgium was expressly stated to be within the limits of what proved to be possible: in other words within the limits of Germany's capacity to pay. He asked what the Belgian Representative on the Reparation Commission had estimated that Germany could pay.

Germany's
Capacity
To Pay

M. LOUCHEUR said that the Belgian Representative had fully agreed on this subject with his colleagues on the Commission.

4. M. VAN DER VELDE said that he wished to draw attention to the exceptional gravity of a refusal of the Belgian demands which were strictly moderate and had been reduced to the minimum necessary if the Government of the country were to survive.

Unemployment
in Belgium

The King of the Belgians had stated that there were at this moment 800,000 unemployed in the country. These unemployed drew from 7 to 14 francs a head a week at a cost

³ *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 4.

of from 30 to 40 million francs a month to the Belgian Government. There had been an increase in the cost of living amounting to 300 per cent; yet in spite of all these difficulties the country was quiet and the working classes were maintaining order. Two things and two things only made it possible to maintain this order, namely first the good organization of the labour party and second the fact that the Government was committed to obtain for the Belgian people a full measure of Reparation and Indemnity. The working classes were quiet because they relied upon the Government to ensure that Belgium would be completely restored. If satisfaction were not given to this expectation the very existence of the Belgian Government would become impossible.

M. Van der Velde said that he could not be suspected of not belonging to the party of moderation. He represented the working classes of Belgium and he was no supporter of exaggerated claims, but he demanded the fulfilment of the solemn promises which had been given to Belgium by her Allies. He protested against the comparison of the position of Belgium with that of Serbia or Roumania. The Allies rendered a great service to Serbia when they came into the war, whereas Belgium, by defending her neutrality, had rendered a great service to the Allies. Belgium came into the war unconditionally, but Roumania came in only on stipulated terms and on condition that she should obtain a reward which was now assured to her. The other Allies were all receiving territorial compensation and it would be an intolerable conclusion if Belgium were deprived of her just claims as the result of her magnanimity in trusting only to the essential justice of her cause.

M. Van der Velde said that in 1917, just after the Russian revolution, he was speaking to the most extreme revolutionaries who objected to the payment of an Indemnity of any sort, but even they made an exception to their rule in favour of Belgium. Even the German Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg admitted that Germany must make compensation for the wrong which had been done to Belgium. How then could the Allies now refuse, seeing that the Belgian claims were not so much for a privileged position as for the very existence of their country. Mr. Lloyd George had said the other day that he felt a thrill of pride at the distinction which had been drawn by M. Van der Velde himself between the English and the Russian methods. If Belgium were to continue to apply and develop the English method of social reconstruction it was essential that the expectation of her working classes should not be disappointed.

Comparison of
Belgium With
Serbia and Roumania

5. After some informal discussion M. HYMANS said that it had been proposed to him that the claim of Belgium to receive 2½ milliards francs out of the first instalment of the Indemnity should be recognized and that the expenses of feeding the civilian population should be included under the heading of "dommages de guerre," but at the same time he had not been able to obtain any definite undertaking as to the percentage of the total payments from Germany which would be allotted to Belgium, nor as to the duration within which the whole amount due to Belgium would be paid. This was an arrangement which the Belgian Delegates could not accept on behalf of their Government: the matter would therefore have to be referred to the Belgian Government who would probably feel that they must lay the question before their Parliament.

6. PRESIDENT WILSON asked what M. Hymans precisely meant by this procedure. The Allies were on the eve of attempting to arrive at a settlement with the Germans and a refusal of the Belgian Government to accept the terms of the Reparation agreement might involve their not being represented at the Peace negotiations. This would be an extremely grave and serious situation and it was to be hoped that the Belgian Representatives would reconsider their decision. They were requesting what had been unanimously decided at the Council to be impossible for any Government. They were well aware that on all hands there was a cordial desire to meet to the utmost every obligation which had been entered into towards Belgium, but the Armistice had been based upon certain statements which he had been authorised to make to the German Government and one of those statements interpreted the liability of Germany as being limited to the damage caused to the civilian population and to their property. Having once defined Reparation as falling within these limits the Allies were bound by their decision and could not depart from it in favour of any particular Government. All the categories included in the Reparation claim to be presented to the Germans fall within the limits of that definition and if any departure from the accepted principles were now made it would mean that the Allies had misled those who they were now bringing to the Peace table.

7. M. HYMANS replied that the Government could not accept the responsibility of telling the Belgian people that they were now to receive nothing or next to nothing and that the matter must therefore be referred to the Belgian Parliament. What would then happen it was not possible to say, but seeing that Belgium is a small country it might be necessary for them to bow to the forces of necessity.

Proposed
Compromise

Consequences
of Refusal

The Limits
of Reparation

Reference to
the Belgian
Parliament

8. M. CLEMENCEAU protested against the statement of M. Hymans that the Belgian people would, under the proposed arrangement, receive next to nothing. They would in fact receive precisely the same treatment as the rest of the Allies.

9. M. CLEMENCEAU said that his thoughts were not only of the necessities of the moment, but that here, as always, he was thinking of the necessities of the future. Peace had not merely to be signed: it had to be lived. It must be made of such a kind that it would mould the social life of the future.

Considerations of sentiment might be left aside since they counted for little in political life, and it was necessary to approach all these problems in a spirit of conciliation and not to insist too strictly on a full measure of concessions or to propose as an alternative a definite breach between those who were charged with arriving at a solution that would guide the tendencies of the future. He himself might often have broken off negotiations if he had insisted on what he conceived to be his rights. Everyone had had to give way on points which appeared to be vital, and everyone must be prepared to take painful decisions and to bear the bitter reproaches of his own supporters. Parliaments were all alike: each of them wanted everything for themselves. Newspapers clamoured for the impossible and the best thing was to pay no attention to them whatever. It would be a fatal mistake if the Belgian Delegates forced an issue on a question of principle on which all sides were only too anxious to come to an

The Cost of
an Irreconcilable
Attitude

arrangement. It would have been preferable if the Belgian point of view had been expressed not in the form of a protest but in the form of an appeal. Belgium would not have found that she was met by men who were indifferent to her claims, for there was a

need of solidarity which bound the Allies one to another. It would be well if the Belgian Delegates were to consider rather what position their country must take up among the great peoples of tomorrow.

10. M. HYMANs interrupted M. Clemenceau at this point and said that he was prepared to be reasonable and that all he claimed was five milliards of francs and a good percentage of Reparation.

11. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would have liked to have finished what he had to say, but that since the Belgian case was put forward in a spirit of recrimination and complaint he preferred to add nothing to what he had said already.

12. MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether this meant that the Belgians proposed to negotiate a separate Peace.

The Tone
in Which the
Belgian
Claim Is Put
Forward

M. HYMANS said it meant that before signing the Treaty the Belgian Government intended to get into contact with its Parliament which was now sitting.

Representa-
tion of Belgium
at the Peace
Negotiations

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether the Belgians would be present on Thursday at the first meeting with the Germans.

M. HYMANS replied that he could not say for certain that they would.

13. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if Belgian Representatives were not there the Allies would have no right to put forward any claim on behalf of Belgium. It would merely mean that Belgium would be left to make her own terms, seeing that she repudiated the claim which the Allies put forward on her account.

14. M. CLEMENCEAU said that there was a necessity for an immediate decision seeing that within two days the credentials of all parties would be examined. It would therefore be necessary to know within 24 hours what were the powers of the Belgian Delegates in the representation of their Government.

Credentials

15. M. HYMANS said that the Belgian Government was not responsible for the fact that these questions had arisen at the last moment. They had written immediately to M. Clemenceau on receipt of the letter from M. Loucheur notifying them of the decisions which had been arrived at with regard to Reparation.

Urgency of
the Decision

16. M. CLEMENCEAU said that M. Hymans need not assume that every remark which was made was intended to be a personal reproach directed against himself. Whoever was responsible for the urgency of the situation the fact remained that the Council must be informed within the next 24 hours of the position which Belgium took up in the matter.

17. After further informal discussion the original proposal by which the expenses of *ravitaillement* for the civilian population were to have been included among "dommages de guerre" was withdrawn, and it was decided that the Belgian Delegates would recommend an alternative arrangement by which the Peace Treaty would include provision for the reimbursement by Germany to the Allied Governments of all sums which Belgium had been obliged to borrow from the Allied Powers as a consequence of the violation of the Treaty of 1839.*

* *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. XXVII, p. 1000.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Wednesday, April 30, 1919, at 11 a. m.

PRESENT

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. Lloyd George.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.
M. Mantoux

*Secretary
Interpreter*

**Military Terms
of Peace.
Article 46**

1. **PRESIDENT WILSON** said that Mr. Lansing had drawn his attention to Article 46 of the Military Terms which provided that "the Armistice of November 11th, 1918 and the subsequent Conventions thereto remain in force so far as they are not inconsistent with the above stipulations". He doubted the expediency of this.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed.

(President Wilson undertook to send word to General Bliss and ask him to give a statement as to the precise signification of this Article.)

2. (It was agreed that Mr. Hoover's letter on the subject of the recognition of Finland should be sent for examination and report by the Council of Foreign Ministers, Appendix I.)¹

Finland

**The Credentials
of the German
Delegates**

3. **M. CLEMENCEAU** said that M. Jules Cambon was sending word to Herr Brockdorff Rantzau, asking him to meet him on Thursday afternoon at the Hotel Trianon, with the credentials of the German Plenipotentiaries.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE urged that the meeting should be held in the morning and not in the afternoon, and that M. Jules Cambon should be accompanied by other Members of the Credentials Committee.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that M. Cambon should be telephoned for.

(The discussion of this subject was adjourned, pending the arrival of M. Jules Cambon.)

**Air Terms in
the Treaty of
Peace.
Article 41**

4. **M. CLEMENCEAU** said that Article 41 had been reserved.

SIR MAURICE HANKEY read the Article, which relates to the establishment by Germany of landing places and dirigible sheds, prohibiting their establishment within 150 kilometres of any frontier.

¹ For previous discussion of this letter, see IC-177A, p. 316; for the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers, see vol. iv, pp. 662-665.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had protested against this clause and considered 50 kilometres sufficient.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the whole Article was ridiculous.

(It was agreed that Article 41 should be struck out of the Air Terms.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said he was informed that Article 51 was reserved. This Article states that "the upkeep and cost of the Commissions of Control and the expenses involved by their work shall be borne by Germany".

Article 51

(It was agreed that this Article should be retained.)

Letter From
Japanese
Delegation

5. The Council had before them a letter from the Japanese Delegation, asking:—

1. That Japan should be represented on the Commission for Reparations, since Reparations is a question of general interest, and
2. To see inserted in Article 16 of the Financial Clauses a particular disposition concerning Japan, which has 4,000 German prisoners while Germany has only a few civil Japanese prisoners. (Appendix II)

The discussion of this letter at once gave rise to a discussion on the letter addressed by M. Loucheur to President Wilson on the question of the application by Serbia for a seat on the Reparations Commission. (Appendix III.)

(6) After some discussion, the following proposal submitted by M. Loucheur, Mr. Norman Davis, M. Baruch, Mr. Lamont, and Mr. Keynes, was approved:—

Representation
of Belgium,
Serbia and Japan
on the
Reparations
Commission

"Belgium shall sit, as originally proposed, as one of the five members of the Commission for all general discussions and for all other questions except those relating to damage by sea, for which Japan shall take her place, and those relating to Austria-Hungary, for which Serbia shall take Belgium's place. The Commission will thus always be limited in number to five, and the Japanese and Serbian representatives on the occasions on which they are entitled to sit will have the same power of voting as the delegates of the other four Powers."

Italy and
the Treaty of
Peace With
Germany

(7) The discussions on M. Loucheur's letter gave rise to a discussion on the attitude to be taken if the Italian Delegation did not return to meet the Germans.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if the Allied and Associated Powers were to put in a claim on Italy's behalf.

PRESIDENT WILSON replied that we could not do so.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether it would not be advisable to let M. Orlando know that the Germans had arrived, and that the Allied and Associated Powers would meet them in a day or two.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE advocated taking no action. They had been offered a definite proposal.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that as far as he was concerned, Italy could have any district in Austria, provided she could secure it by a majority of votes in the plebiscite. This of course, would only apply to a clearly defined district, and not to a small spot on the map. If the Italians alleged that a particular island was Italian in character, they could have a plebiscite.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that their claim to the islands was based on security.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that argument was not a valid one. If Italy insisted on her claims to Dalmatia under the Treaty of London, it would upset the whole peace of the world and especially of the Slavonic world.

M. CLEMENCEAU said there was news this morning that an Italian dreadnought had been sent to Smyrna.

SIR MAURICE HANKEY reminded the Council that M. Clemenceau at the last meeting with MM. Orlando and Sonnino had asked a direct question, whether the Italians would be present to meet the Germans at Versailles, and M. Orlando had replied that this depended on what happened at Rome.

(There was then some short discussion as to the inferences to be drawn from MM. Orlando's and Sonnino's speeches, and as to the awkward situation which would arise if the Italians returned and insisted on France and Great Britain carrying out the Treaty of London, which President Wilson was unable to support.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE reminded his colleagues that he had asked M. Orlando if they would be justified in putting forward claims on Italy's behalf, if Italy was not present at Versailles to meet the Germans. M. Orlando had recognized that this was impossible.

PRESIDENT WILSON recalled a conversation he had had with M. Orlando in which the latter had shown quite clearly that he realized that if the Italian Delegates did not return, they could not sign the Treaty with Germany; they would be outside the League of Nations; and he had said some words which indicated that he considered they would be, in a sense, outcasts.

President Wilson had then pointed out that they were quarrelling with their best friends and M. Orlando had replied in some phrase to the effect that Italy would rather die with honour than compromise.

(No action was decided on as to making any communication.)

Reparation;
the Question
of Joint and
Several
Liability

8. Attention was then drawn to the last paragraph of M. Loucheur's letter (Appendix III) in which was raised the question of the joint and several liability of the enemy States.

President Wilson asked if that had been decided.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he thought it had been, subject to a book-keeping arrangement proposed by M. Orlando.

SIR MAURICE HANKEY said that this had been discussed before he was introduced as Secretary. The only intimation on the subject that he had had was that M. Orlando had undertaken, that the Italian financial expert (M. Crespi) should discuss the question with the experts of the other Allied and Associated Powers. He had heard from Lord Sumner² that a preliminary discussion had taken place, but after that, the Italian Delegates had left, and he thought, no more had been done.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE considered that the question was very important. Roumania and Serbia were absorbing great slices of former Austrian territory which was entirely free from war debt, and it would seem desirable that this asset should be balanced against other liabilities.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the question was too complicated for an off-hand decision. He saw Mr. Lloyd George's point, but it would work both ways. Germany would have to take her share of the Austrian, Bulgarian and Turkish liabilities, and to that extent, the direct indemnity obtained from Germany would be lessened.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the matter should be settled at once.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that a decision should be taken that Germany should be jointly liable with her Allies.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed in this, but suggested that in addition the following questions should be referred to expert examination:—

1. To work out the Austrian bill of reparations on the same principle as had been adopted in the case of Germany.

2. To work out the proportion of the Austrian War debt to be borne by Jugo Slavia, Transylvania and other parts of the former Austrian Empire transferred to other nationalities.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would first like to consult his experts, but would inform them of his views on the following morning.

(9) The Council next took up the question raised in paragraph (a) of M. Loucheur's letter.

The Proportions
in Which
Sums Paid for
Reparation Will
Be Divided

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was prepared to accept the principle that the proportions in which the successive instalments paid over by Germany in satisfaction of the claims against her should be divided by the Allied and Associated Governments, should be determined by the Permanent Commission set up under the Reparations Articles, in proportion to the claims allowed by the Commission. It was true that these would not be known before May 21st, 1919, but he was prepared to accept this principle.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this seemed obviously fair.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

² British Lord of Appeal in Ordinary; president of the Subcommittee on Valuation of Damage (First Subcommittee) of the Commission on Reparation of Damage.

(10) The Council had before them the draft Articles in Appendix IV, relating to China. These had been prepared by a Committee composed of:—

China
Articles To
Be Inserted
in the Pre-
liminary
Peace Treaty

Mr. E. T. Williams for the United States of America.

Mr. Ronald Macleay for the British Empire.

M. Jean Gout for France.

The Articles were agreed to, subject to a reservation by Mr. Lloyd George in Article VI, as he wished to enquire as to why the German renunciation was in one case in favour of the British concessions, and in the other, in favour of the French and Chinese Governments jointly. (NOTE: After inquiry, Mr. Lloyd George accepted the Articles.)

(11) PRESIDENT WILSON said that he was informed that the Allied and Associated journalists were very anxious to see the Treaty of Peace handed to the Germans. He understood that under present arrangements they were only to be permitted to view the approach of the Germans from behind a hedge. He was informed that there was a room separated from the Conference room by a glass screen, and that a number of journalists could be accommodated in this room, and view the proceedings.

Press
Arrangements
at the Meet-
ing With the
Germans

(M. Jules Cambon entered during this discussion. This room was entered by a side door so that the Conference would in no way be inconvenienced.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this description was correct. He thought that the journalists might be admitted to this room for this particular meeting.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that it was very undignified and improper to admit the journalists and to treat the meeting almost as though it were a menagerie. He did not mind so much the presence of two or three. But it had to be borne in mind that the Germans were in a very delicate and disagreeable position and might have just cause to complain at descriptions being given of the precise manner in which they received the Treaty. He had no bowels of compassion for the Germans, but he thought that the admission of journalists on such an occasion would be unprecedented.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that at any rate, they might be admitted to be present at the end of the corridor in order to witness the arrival and departure of the Delegates.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he did not agree in this decision as he considered on principle that the journalists should be present, but he did not press his objection.

(It was agreed that the journalists should be permitted to witness the arrival of the Delegates from the end of the corridor in the Trianon Hotel.)

(12) It was agreed:—

1. That the credentials of the German Delegates should be examined on the following morning at 11 a. m.

2. That M. Jules Cambon should be accompanied by the Members of the Committee appointed at the Peace Conference for the examination of credentials.

3. That the Committee for the examination of credentials should report the result of their interview to M. Clemenceau, President Wilson, and Mr. Lloyd George the same afternoon at President Wilson's house at 4 p. m.

(13) MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked how this matter stood.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he understood it had been decided provisionally to publish a summary when it was handed to the Germans, although that depended on the nature of the summary.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested it would be desirable to ascertain from the Germans how they regarded the matter. He suggested that M. Cambon should be asked to ascertain this on the morrow.

M. CLEMENCEAU undertook to consult M. Cambon on the point.

(14) The Secretary and Interpreter were asked to withdraw from the room during this discussion. After their return, M. Clemenceau handed to Sir Maurice Hankey the following sentence to be added to Article 2 (c) of the clauses approved on April 22nd (I. C. 175B).

“Si, à ce moment, les garanties contre une agression non provoquée de l'Allemagne n'étaient pas considérées comme suffisantes par les Gouvernements Alliés et Associés, l'évacuation des troupes d'occupation pourront être retardée dans la mesure jugée nécessaire à l'obtention des dites garanties.”⁴

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 30 April, 1919.

Appendix I to IC-177E

[*The Director General of Relief (Hoover) to President Wilson*]

FINLAND

Supreme Economic Council
Office of
The Director General of Relief

51, AVENUE MONTAIGNE,
PARIS, 26 April, 1919.

³ For previous discussion of this subject, see IC-175B, p. 113. For the text of the draft articles concerning the guarantees of execution of the treaty, see appendix IV thereto, p. 117. The draft articles also appeared as appendix V to the minutes of this meeting, but are not reprinted here.

⁴ Translation: “If at that date the guarantees against unprovoked aggression by Germany are not considered sufficient by the Allied and Associated Governments, the evacuation of the occupying troops may be delayed to the extent regarded as necessary for the purpose of obtaining the required guarantees.”

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am wondering if there is not some method by which the recognition of the full independence of Finland could be expedited. They have now had a general election, they have created a responsible ministry; this ministry is of liberal character. There are many reasons why this matter should be undertaken, and at once.

1. The United States has always had a great sentiment for the suffering of the Finnish people, and their struggle of over a century to gain independence.

2. By lack of recognition, they are absolutely isolated from a commercial point of view from the rest of the world. They are unable to market their products except by the sufferance of special arrangements with governments at every step. They have ships without flags, and have no right to sail the seas. They are totally unable to establish credits, although they have a great deal of resource, as no bank can loan money to a country of unrecognised government. They are isolated by censorship. Their citizens are not allowed to move as their passports do not run.

3. The most pressing problem is their food supply. In January last the Finns were actually starving in hundreds. Order in the country was preserved by sheer military repression. By one measure and another, and altogether out of Finnish resources without the cost of a dollar to us, we have for the last three months fed Finland. Order has been restored. The populations are rapidly recovering nutritional conditions. They have begun to take hope of the future. They have prepared large quantities of materials for export. All through these operations, they have shown the most sturdy independence and have asked for nothing but the facilities to make their own solutions. Their resources are now practically exhausted. Unless they can have immediate recognition, so that they can create further commercial credits and can sell their products, they are either doomed or we must support them on charity.

If ever there was a case for helping a people who are making a sturdy fight to get on a basis of liberal democracy and are asking no charity of the world whatever, this is the case. I am convinced from our reports that unless Finland is recognised within a very short time that the present government cannot survive the difficulties with which it is faced. One instance would show the utter paralysis under which they are suffering. Their banks have deposits of upwards of ten millions of dollars in the United States, but, so long as their government is unrecognised, our American banks must refuse to honour the drafts of the Finnish banks, as they can secure no legal assurance that the control and ownership of these banks is the same as that which existed at the time the deposits were made. It is purely a technical question, but it, amongst numerous other instances of this

character, threatens absolutely to destroy the Finnish Government.

Nor do I see why any half measures need to be taken in this matter. They have gone through every cycle that the world could demand in political evolution, to the point of an independent people, and I feel that they would long since have been recognised had it not been for the terrible cloud of other questions that surrounds the world. I realise that there are a lot of people who consider that General Mannheim [*Mannerheim*]⁵ casts a sinister shadow over the present government, but the very fact that under this same shadow Finland has established democratic institutions should be enough of an answer.

Faithfully yours,

HERBERT HOOVER

Appendix II to IC-177E

[*The Japanese Delegation to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)*]

[Translation⁶]

PARIS, April 29, 1919.

The Japanese Delegation has the honor to express to the President of the Peace Conference the desire

(1) That Japan should be represented on the Commission for Reparations, since Reparations is a question of general interest, and

(2) That there be inserted in Article 16 of the Financial Clauses a particular disposition concerning Japan, which has 4,000 German prisoners, while Germany has only a few civil Japanese prisoners.

Appendix III

[*M. Loucheur of the French Delegation to President Wilson*]

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:—In accordance with the letter of Sir Maurice Hankey of April 28th (copy of which was also transmitted to Mr. Davis), I convened a meeting this noon, at which were present Messrs. Davis, Baruch, and Lamont, of the American Delegation; Mr. Keynes, of the British Delegation, and myself.

We considered, as requested, the application of Servia for a seat upon the Reparation Commission.

At the same time, there was presented to us a letter from the Japanese Delegation, of which I attach a copy.⁷ From this letter you will note that Japan also requests a seat upon the Reparation Commission.

⁵ Regent of Finland.

⁶ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

⁷ Appendix II, *supra*.

Our Committee, after discussion, unanimously agreed to recommend to the Council of Four, the following solution covering both requests:

"Belgium shall sit, as originally proposed, as one of the five members of the Commission for all general discussions and for all other questions except those relating to damage by sea, for which Japan shall take her place, and those relating to Austria-Hungary, for which Serbia shall take Belgium's place. The Commission will thus always be limited in number to five, and the Japanese and Serbia[n] representatives, on the occasions on which they are entitled to sit, will have the same power of voting as the Delegates of the other four Powers".

The recommendations which our Committee reached took into account certain political conditions, and we deemed that the solution suggested would in no way retard the work of the Reparation Commission, and at the same time would serve to meet the views of the two countries in question. We anticipate no similar requests from any of the other lesser Powers.

As to the other point which the Japanese Delegation made, as to cost of maintenance of prisoners of war, that we think is already satisfactorily covered in the Reparation agreement, and we will take occasion to point this out to the Japanese Delegation.

May our Committee take this occasion to recall to you that the following two points, so far as we are aware, have not as yet been determined by the Council of Four:

(a) Clause 7 of the Reparation Agreement reads as follows:

"The successive instalments including the above sum paid over by Germany in satisfaction of the above claims will be divided by the Allied and Associated Governments in proportions which have been determined upon by them in advance, on a basis of general equity, and of the rights of each.

For the purpose of this division the value of property transferred and services rendered under Clause 12, and under Annexes 3, 4 and 5, shall be reckoned in the same manner as cash payments affected in that year".

An early decision upon this matter should be reached.

(b) The question of the joint and several liability of the Enemy States.

Mr. Baruch and Mr. Lamont were under the impression that the Council of Four had already established the principle of joint and several liability, or solidarity, as it is sometimes termed, but the other members of the Committee had not the same recollection. This matter, of course, also should be cleared up.

With great respect.

[File copy not signed]

M. 94.

Appendix IV to IC-177E

Draft Articles in Regard to China To Be Inserted in the Preliminary Peace Treaty With Germany

ARTICLE I

Germany renounces in favour of China all claims to all benefits and privileges under the provisions of the final protocol signed at Peking on the 7th September, 1901,⁸ as well as under all Annexes, Notes and Documents supplementary thereto, and she likewise renounces in favour of China all claims to all indemnities accruing under the said protocol and supplementary annexes, notes and documents subsequent to the 14th March, 1917.

ARTICLE II

Germany cedes to China all the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, arms and munitions of war, vessels of all kinds, wireless installations and other public property belonging to the German Government, which are situated or may be found in the German Concessions in Tientsin and Hankow and in other parts of Chinese territory except in the leased territory of Kiaochow.

It is understood, however, that buildings and establishments used as diplomatic or consular residences or offices are not included in the above act of cession and, furthermore, that no steps shall be taken by the Chinese Government to dispose of the German public and private property situated within the so-called Legation Quarter at Peking without the consent of the Diplomatic Representatives of the Powers which on the signature of this Treaty remain Parties to the Final Protocol of the 7th September, 1901.

ARTICLE III

Germany engages to restore to China within twelve calendar months, from the date of the ratification of the present Treaty, all the astronomical instruments which her troops removed in 1900-1901 from China without the latter's consent; and to defray all expenses which may be incurred in effecting such restoration, including the expenses for dismounting, packing, transporting, insurance and installation in Peking.

ARTICLE IV

Germany agrees to the abrogation of the leases from the Chinese Government under which the German residential Concessions at Hankow and Tientsin are now held.

⁸ *Foreign Relations*, 1901, appendix (Affairs in China), p. 312.

China, restored to the full exercise of her sovereign rights in the above areas, declares her intention to open them to international residence and trade. She further declares that the abrogation of the leases under which the concessions are now held shall not affect the property rights of citizens of allied and associated countries who are individual holders of lots in the concessions.

ARTICLE V

Germany waives all claims against the Chinese Government or against any allied or associated Government arising out of the internment of German citizens in China and their repatriation. She equally renounces all claims arising out of the liquidation, sequestration or control of German properties, rights and interests in that country, since the 14th August, 1917. This provision, however, shall not affect the rights of the parties interested in the proceeds of any such liquidation, which shall be governed by the other provisions of this treaty.

ARTICLE VI

Germany renounces in favour of the Government of His Britannic Majesty German state property in the British Concession at Shamun [*Shameen*]. She renounces in favour of the French and Chinese Governments conjointly the property of the German school situated in the French Concession at Shanghai.

Appendix V to IC-177E

Articles Concerning the Guarantees of Execution of the Treaty

(As Approved by President Wilson and M. Clemenceau on April 20)

[Same as appendix IV to IC-175B, printed on page 117.]

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Wednesday, 30 April, 1919, at 12:30
p. m.

PRESENT

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K.C.B.
M. Mantoux.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

JAPAN

Baron Makino
Viscount Chinda

Secretary.
Interpreter.

I. In reply to questions by President Wilson—the Japanese Delegates declared that:—

“The policy of Japan is to hand back the Shantung Peninsula in full sovereignty to China retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany and the right to establish a settlement under the usual conditions at Tsingtao.”

The owners of the Railway will use special Police only to ensure security for traffic. They will be used for no other purpose.

The Police Force will be composed of Chinese, and such Japanese instructors as the Directors of the Railway may select will be appointed by the Chinese Government.”

(At this point there was a more or less prolonged conversation between President Wilson and the Japanese Delegates which at a certain point developed into a general discussion. It is only possible to record the salient features of the general discussion.)

VISCOUNT CHINDA made it clear that in the last resort, if China failed to carry out the agreements—if for example, she would not assist in the formation of the Police Force or the employment of Japanese Instructors, the Japanese Government reserved the right to fall back on the Agreements of 1918.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that by that time Japan and China would be operating under the system of the League of Nations and Japan would be represented on the Council of the League. In such an event, he asked why should not the Japanese voluntarily apply for the mediation of the Council of the League of Nations.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that even if the case was sent to the League

of Nations, nevertheless Japan must reserve her right in the last analysis to base her rights on her special Agreements with China. If the Chinese Government acted loyally, such case would not arise, but if the Chinese Government refused to do so, the only course left to Japan would be to invoke the agreement.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that what he wanted to urge was this; he did not want a situation to arise which would prove embarrassing. As the Japanese representatives knew, the United States Government had been much distressed by the twenty-one demands. These negotiations were based on the Notes of May 1915, and this exchange of Notes had its root in the negotiations connected with the twenty-one demands. In the view of his Government, the less the present transactions were related to this incident, the better. He would like, as a friend of Japan, to see no reference to the Notes of the last few years. If an occasion such as Viscount Chinda had postulated should arise, he hoped that the Japanese Government would not bring it before the Council of the League of Nations with a threat of war, but merely for friendly council, so that the Council of the League might make the necessary representations to China.

BARON MAKINO said that this was a possible eventuality but that so far as Japan was concerned, if the Chinese people co-operated with goodwill, he thought no such eventuality would arise. So far as Japan was concerned, she looked to the engagement with China, but hoped that no difficulty would arise.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that the difficulty was that President Wilson on his side did not admit the validity of these Agreements but Japan did. He only mentioned the fact so as not to be morally bound not to invoke these Agreements. In the meanwhile he hoped that there would be no occasion for the refusal of the Chinese to carry out the Agreements.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that frankly he must insist that nothing he said should be construed as any admission of the recognition of the Notes exchanged between Japan and China.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said he had mentioned the point in order to remove any moral engagement on behalf of Japan not to invoke the Agreements in question.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the Japanese representatives proposed to make public the policy declared at the outset of this discussion by means of an interview. He supposed he was at liberty to use the part of the declaration that most concerned him as he understood it.

BARON MAKINO said that the Japanese representatives attached the greatest importance to no impression being given that this decision was forced. They wished it to be clear that this was a voluntary expression of the Japanese Delegates' interpretation of the policy of their Government in regard to the restitution of the Province of Shantung. He hoped that this would be made quite clear.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the following point had occurred to him. He had not appreciated from the map which had been shown him whether the Forts which Germany had built were taken over in the area of the settlement.

VISCOUNT CHINDA drew a sketch to illustrate the exact position and showed that the settlement would be part of the Town of Tsingtao and would not include the fortifications.

In reply to President Wilson, BARON MAKINO and VISCOUNT CHINDA gave an assurance that the Japanese troops would be withdrawn as soon as practicable.

SIR MAURICE HANKEY asked what he was to send to the Drafting Committee.

VISCOUNT CHINDA produced a revised draft of the clause to be inserted in the Treaty of Peace which included the alterations agreed to on the previous day. (Appendix I.) He gave the following explanation as to the reasons of the various alterations that had been made:—

“The instructions of the Japanese Government state expressly that the surrender of the German public property should be unconditional and without compensation. Compliance with the above instruction makes it absolutely necessary to modify the Articles I and II of our claims by adding at their ends the phrase: ‘free of all charges and encumbrances’, in order to exempt them from the general application of Article IX Financial Clauses.

As regards our claim upon the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway, the Japanese Government regard the railway as German public property, but contention may possibly be advanced claiming it to be private property. In case the contention should be well established, the Japanese Government would be willing to pay for the same. In the meantime, the question is left open. This explains why the addition of the same phrase as above is not proposed in respect to the second paragraph, Article I of our claim.”

(The Articles in the Appendix relative to Shantung Province were approved. Sir Maurice Hankey was directed to forward them to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)

II. MR. LLOYD GEORGE handed to the Japanese representatives the following proposal which had been made by an Expert Committee, to which the question had been referred:—

“Belgium shall sit, as originally proposed, as one of the five members of the Commission for all general discussions and for all other questions except those relating to damage by sea, for which Japan shall take her place, and those relating to Austria-Hungary, for which Serbia shall take Belgium’s place. This Commission will thus always be limited in number to five, and the Japanese and Serbian representatives, on the occasions on which they are entitled to sit, will have the same power of voting as the delegates of the other four Powers.”

Japanese
Representation
on the Repa-
rations Com-
mission

M. MAKINO said that the arrangement should be altered to provide that the Japanese should be represented on the Commission (wherever their interests were concerned). There were a certain number of Japanese interned in Germany.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this was not a matter for the Reparation Commission.

VISCOUNT CHINDA pointed out that the necessity for such provision arose in connection with Article 13 in the Financial Clauses.

(After some discussion, it was agreed that Japan should be represented on the Permanent Reparation Commission whenever questions relating to damage by sea were under consideration (as already provided) and in addition whenever Japanese interests under Article 13 of the Financial Clauses were under consideration.)

Cost of
Maintaining
Prisoners

III. VISCOUNT CHINDA drew attention to Article 16 of the Financial Clauses which is as follows:—

“The High Contracting Parties waive reciprocally all claims on account of the expenses of all kinds incurred by them in connection with enemy prisoners of war.”

He pointed out that there were between 4,000 and 5,000 German prisoners in Japan. These have not been used for any sort of work as had been possible in European countries, but had been maintained at the expense of Japan under the provisions of the Hague Convention.¹ It had been entirely a one-sided expense. In view of the fact that in the case of most other countries, the numbers of prisoners had been fairly well balanced, Japan stood in an unique position and was therefore entitled to an exceptional treatment in this respect.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this was not the case in regard to civilian persons interned. The British had had four or five Germans to maintain for one British maintained in Germany.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that German prisoners in Japan had been military. They had constituted the garrison of Kiaochow and had been in Japanese hands ever since the early stage of the war.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that Japan had inherited the German rights in Kiaochow which might be set off against the cost of maintaining these Germans.

M. MAKINO said that that had not been taken into the calculation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that everytime one country or another brought up some new point difficulties arose. The sums mounted up and up and Germany would not be able to pay for reparation. Hence it had been decided hitherto to stick rigidly to the principles. Japan would, of course, receive a share of reparation for pensions.

¹ Convention respecting the laws and customs of war on land, October 18, 1907, *Foreign Relations*, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1204.

M. MAKINO said that Japan had lost less than 2,000 lives and would not receive much on this account.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it was very awkward to put in a special claim for one country as then all other countries would wish to put in their claims.

M. MAKINO said that if great difficulties would be created, Japan would not press her demand.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, PRESIDENT WILSON and M. CLEMENCEAU thanked M. Makino for this declaration.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 30 April, 1919.

Appendix I to IC-177F

(Corrected for Drafting Committee)

Special Conditions Relative to Shantung Province

ARTICLE 1

Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all her rights, titles, or privileges—particularly those concerning the territory of Kiaochow, railways, mines and sub-marine cables—which she acquired, in virtue of the treaties concluded by her with China on the 6th March, 1898, and of all other arrangements relative to Shantung Province.

All German rights in the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway, including its branch lines, together with its accessories of all kinds, stations, shops, fixed materials and rolling stocks, mines, establishments and materials for exploitation of the mines, are, and shall remain, acquired by Japan, together with the rights and privileges appertaining thereto.

The sub-marine cables of the State of Germany, from Tsingtao to Shanghai and from Tsingtao to Chefoo, with all the rights, privileges and properties appertaining thereto, shall equally remain acquired by Japan, free of all charges and encumbrances.

ARTICLE 2

The rights of movable and immovable properties possessed by the State of Germany in the territory of Kiaochow, as well as all the rights which she is entitled to claim in consequence of the works or equipments set up, or of the expenses disbursed by her, either directly or indirectly, and concerning the territory, are, and shall remain, acquired by Japan, free of all charges and encumbrances.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Wednesday, April 30, 1919, at 4 p. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd
George, M. P.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

Secretary
Interpreter

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.
Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

(1) MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had learnt that at the Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Mr. Lansing had made a very powerful statement,¹ in which he had said that the German Constitution provided that the Central Government had full powers to make peace and war.

Credentials of the
German Delegates

M. CLEMENCEAU said that had not been the case in 1871.

PRESIDENT WILSON said it was a long time since he had studied Constitutional history, but he felt fairly sure that the Constitution of the German Empire had been drawn up since 1871, and that in it had been included the powers of making peace and war.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that great care ought to be exercised lest we should make a peace, and find a few minutes after that the German States had not accepted it.

(2) MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed that during the following week while the German Delegates were studying the peace treaty, the Supreme Council should study the question and get a general idea of the line they were going to take in regard to the re-arrangement of the old Austrian-Hungarian Empire. He proposed that in the following week the Delegates of Austria and Hungary should be invited to Paris.

The Peace
With Austria

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

SIR MAURICE HANKEY asked who would be responsible for sending the invitation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in case of the Germans, Marshal Foch had sent the invitation. Consequently, if the Italians had still been in the Conference, it would have been General Diaz's duty.

¹This statement has not been identified.

SIR MAURICE HANKEY said, as he was the only official present he thought he ought to put the point of view of the officials. The Drafting Committee was so overworked in bringing out the German Treaty that he felt confident they could not possibly prepare the Austrian Treaty in so short a time.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that it was only proposed to discuss the lines of the Treaty with the Austrians. It would not be necessary to present them with a complete Treaty. He pointed out that the Hungarian *de facto* Government was hardly more than a local Government. By inviting them we should run the risk of our publics regarding them as a people in close intercourse with the Russian Soviets.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said they had committed no atrocities. He was reminded, however, by Sir Maurice Hankey of a recent telegram to the effect that 200 Bourgeois had been killed in Buda Pest, though he could not vouch for its truth.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that many people had been rather alarmed at General Smuts' visit. He thought that the boundaries could be determined without consulting the Hungarians. They would not be on quite the same footing as the Austrians.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked what was to be done with the Austrians and Hungarians after their views had been heard? Were they to be left free to move about in Paris? Meanwhile, the Germans might give a good deal of work.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the Austrians and Hungarians should be sent somewhere outside Paris. For example, Fontainebleau.

M. CLEMENCEAU said Chantilly would be the best place.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that this would be more prudent than Paris. He said that the immediate object of this proposal was the moral effect that would be produced on the Austrian people by inviting their representatives for consultation. He read a letter from his four colleagues on the American Delegation urging this course.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE urged that there should be no differentiation between Austrians and Hungarians. He did not see why because the Hungarians were called the Soviet they should not be met. A workmen's Government had just as much right to be dealt with as any other.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that as the Hungarians and Austrians were somewhat hostile to one another, it would be necessary to house them separately.

(It was agreed that M. Clemenceau, as President of the Preliminary Peace Conference, should invite the representatives of the Austrian and Hungarian Governments to come to Chantilly on May 12th.)

(3) There was a short discussion in regard to the position in North Russia, in the course of which MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that he and his colleagues should see Mr. Tchaikowski, the head of the Archangel Government, who was very hopeful that the Russians at Archangel might, by their own efforts, establish contact with General Kolchak.² His information in regard to the Bolsheviks did not correspond with that in the possession of the French Government. He undertook to distribute a memorandum prepared by the British Intelligence Department in regard to the situation in Russia. He suggested that a similar document should be prepared by the French and the United States Military Departments.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he thought little good would be served by seeing Mr. Tchaikowski. His views had been received by telegram. The United States only had one regiment at Archangel, and United States public opinion would not tolerate sending any more troops.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the British Government had called for volunteers, and had received more offers than they could accept. The lists had had to be closed because they were full.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought perhaps experts might hear Mr. Tchaikowski's views.

(It was agreed that as the basis for discussion, the United States, British and French Military Departments should prepare memoranda for circulation.)

(4) SIR MAURICE HANKEY said that in consultation with Mr. Dutasta,³ he had prepared a scheme for dealing with questions raised by the Germans in connection with the Treaty of Peace. (Appendix.)

(The scheme was approved.)

(5) SIR MAURICE HANKEY recalled the decision that had been taken in the morning⁴ that the proportions in which the successive instalments paid over by Germany in satisfaction of claims against her should be divided by the Allied and Associated Powers should be determined by the Reparation Commission set up in the Reparation Articles, in proportion to the claims allowed by the Commission. He asked for instructions as to what action should be taken to give effect to this decision. It was not a matter which would affect any clause in the Treaty of Peace, and as these Minutes were not circulated, he felt some doubt as to the best method of placing it on record so that it

Procedure in
Replying to
Questions Put
by Germans

Reparation. Di-
vision by the
Allied and
Associated
Powers

² Admiral Alexander Vasilevich Kolchak, leader of anti-Soviet Russian forces in Siberia; proclaimed at Omsk, on November 18, 1918, Supreme Governor of Russia.

³ Paul E. Dutasta, French Ambassador in Switzerland; Secretary General of the Peace Conference.

⁴ See IC-177E, p. 355.

should not be overlooked. He had contemplated writing a letter to M. Loucheur, Mr. Norman Davis and Mr. Keynes, so that the experts of France, the United States of America, and Great Britain, might be apprised of the decision.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the matter was one of so great importance that he thought it should take the form of a letter or a formal minute signed by M. Clemenceau, President Wilson and himself.

(This was agreed to and Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to draft the letter.)

Military Terms
of Peace.
Article 46

(6) (It was decided provisionally and subject to possible revision in the event of good reason being shown to the contrary that Article 46 of the Military terms of Peace should be suppressed.)

NOTE: Article 46 is as follows:—

“The Armistice of November 11th 1918 and the Convention subsequent thereto, remain in force so far as they are not inconsistent with the above stipulations.”

Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to communicate this decision to the Secretary General for the information of the Drafting Committee.

Military Terms.
Article 45

(7) SIR MAURICE HANKEY pointed out that Article 45 was reserved.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked how the Allied and Associated Powers could change the German laws.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that if the German Military Service Law was not abolished, military recruits would automatically be called up for service.

(It was agreed that the form of the Article should be altered so as to provide that the German Government should undertake within a period not exceeding three months from the ratification of the Treaty to modify their law.)

Sale of a Floating
Dock at Hamburg

(8) MR. LLOYD GEORGE read a telegram from the British Admiralty urging that an alteration should be made in Article 32 of the Naval Clauses, specially providing for the surrender of Floating Docks, and calling attention to the sale of a large Floating Dock now at Hamburg to an Engineering and Slipway Company at Rotterdam which was not prevented by the Armistice terms.

(It was agreed that no alteration should be made in the Treaty in this respect.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 30 April, 1919.

Appendix to IC-178A

Scheme Approved by M. Clemenceau, President Wilson, and Mr. Lloyd George for Dealing With Questions Referred by the German Delegates

ARTICLE I

In order to deal with questions of detail, requests for explanations, and the like referred by the German Delegates during the 15 days which intervene before they furnish their global reply to the Treaty of Peace to be handed to them, the Secretary-General is empowered to refer to the following Committees, each of which will be composed of one representative each of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, and Italy (in the event of the Italian Delegation returning).

1. Committee on the League of Nations.
2. Committees on the Geographical Frontiers of Germany.
3. Committee on Political Clauses affecting Europe.
4. Committee on Political Clauses outside Europe.
- 5(a) Committee on Military Clauses.
- 5(b) Committee on Naval Clauses.
- 5(c) Committee on Air Clauses.
6. Committee on Prisoners of War and Graves.
7. Committee on Responsibilities and Punishment.
8. Committee on Reparation and Restitution.
9. Committee on Financial Clauses.
10. Committee on Economic Clauses.
11. Committee on Ports, Waterways, and Railways.
12. Committee on Labour.
13. Drafting Committee for the Final Clauses.

ARTICLE II

The Secretary-General will refer all questions of policy to the Supreme Council but will use his discretion to refer all questions of detail to the above Committees, who should themselves, in addition, exercise their judgment if they consider questions of policy are involved to refer the questions to the Supreme Council.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 30 April, 1919.

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Wednesday, April 30, 1919, at 4.30 p. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.
Dr. C. H. Haskins.
Dr. A. A. Young.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley.
Dr. O. T. Falk.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Klotz.
M. Tardieu.
M. de Lasteyrie.
M. Lyon.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.
Professor P. J. Mantoux.

Secretary.
Interpreter.

The Council had before it Articles prepared by the experts present, with others, on the subject of Alsace-Lorraine. (Appendix.)

M. TARDIEU said that the only points in dispute were Articles 12, 24 and 30.

After M. Tardieu had explained the object of Article 12, MR. LLOYD GEORGE withdrew the reservation which had been made
Article 12 by the British Representatives.

Article 12 was accepted.

M. TARDIEU, in explanation of Article 24, said that the balance of the property in Alsace-Lorraine under the general economic clauses of the Peace Treaty ought to be used for satis-
Article 24 fying the economic claims of the pre-war period.

This balance, according to the general rule, should be part of the general fund for reparation.

The French Government asked for a special privilege in the case of Alsace-Lorraine, because of the economic situation of the German private properties which was the result of the systematic germanisation of Alsace-Lorraine. They asked that the balance of the property should be attributed to Alsace-Lorraine itself.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this was not the proposal. It was that the balance should be handed over to the French claim for reparation.

MR. KLOTZ did not admit this.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was afraid he must contest this clause very strongly. Its effect was to give priority to special claims in Alsace-Lorraine, which, though of low category, were in reality general claims. He only asked for the application of the usual rule that the surplus should go into the general pool. The balance should go into the pool and be distributed according to the principles of distribution adopted. Under the present proposal the Alsace-Lorraine claims, though of low category, would have priority over our reparation. M. Tardieu had spoken of germanisation. This was true to the extent that German skill and brains had greatly increased the wealth of these provinces. Nevertheless, the balance ought to go into the general pool. He was informed that one effect of this clause would be that pensions would be given to German officials in front of pensions to Allied soldiers.

M. CLEMENCEAU withdrew the proposal.

It was agreed that Article 24 should be suppressed.

M. TARDIEU said that Article 30 referred to reparation to Alsatians and Lorrainians. France asked that they should be treated in the same way as other French citizens under Annex I of the Reparation Clauses. The first article of the Reparation clauses declared Germany to be responsible for losses. Article 2 provided for reparation for the civilian population. It was impossible to say that Alsatians and Lorrainians were not French citizens and part of the French population. He felt he was entitled to put forward claims for them on the same ground as for other French citizens. Otherwise, France would have two classes of citizens. It was a matter of sentiment for France, and he asked that these people should be put on the same footing as other French citizens.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the principle had already been considered and decided in respect to Poland and Czechoslovakia.

There had been considerable devastation in Poland, but Poland had nominally been at war against us, even though it had been against the will of the Polish people. Poles had actually taken part in the devastation of France. Similarly, soldiers from Alsace-Lorraine had taken part in the devastation of France. It had been decided against the Polish claim. If, however, it were now granted to Alsace-Lorraine, it must be granted to the Czechs, Poles and Yugo-Slavs.

The French Government stood to lose a good deal by this.

The second point was that the destruction in Alsace-Lorraine had been mainly wrought by the French armies when redeeming these provinces. He doubted if much destruction had been done by the German Armies. In these circumstances, he felt the claim was not one that could be justified.

M. TARDIEU said that the material devastation in Alsace-Lorraine was insignificant. What they wanted was pensions for widows, orphans and mutilated.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that these were due to French bombardments and British bombing. It was rather difficult in these circumstances to allow any claim.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that many of them would be widows and orphans of German soldiers. He said his advisers took the same view as Mr. Lloyd George. He could see the sentimental importance of the matter for France, but to agree would be to upset the general principles of reparation.

The French Representatives withdrew the proposal, and it was decided that Article 30 should be suppressed.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he was informed that the missing Article VII affected Belgium and the redemption of marks.
Article VII Its object was to provide for the redemption of German marks.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he understood it had been only discussed on the possible assumption that the Belgian claim in regard to the redemption of marks was accepted. That claim had been refused.

MR. TARDIEU said that the Article had only been adopted on that assumption.

MR. YOUNG said the Germans only acknowledged by this clause their mark debt. By it they would have to agree to redeem the marks at some future time under a convention to be concluded between France and Germany.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that if this Article was passed, it ought to be applied to Belgium also.

MR. FALK pointed out that the Belgians could sell marks on the market. This clause provided little more than this for France. France was entitled either to sell marks on the market, or to make an arrangement with Germany.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this Article would make the public impression that it authorised the French Government to secure a redemption of the marks at a better rate than the market rate. The same advantage would have to be provided for Belgium.

MR. FALK suggested that it would be better to suppress the Article altogether.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the Article did not really amount to anything. It would give the impression to the Germans of some advantage being given to France, and make difficulties in their signing the Treaty of Peace without corresponding advantage.

M. KLOTZ said that the Article merely contained a statement of fact. It would be an advantage to Germany that France should not

keep marks in hand, otherwise they were in a position to destroy the exchange. It merely provided for a Convention between the German and French Governments. In the course of the armistice discussion, the Germans had told M. Lasteyrie that they were afraid to let so many marks remain in French possession, and they had offered to buy them back at the rate of 70 centimes. The Belgians would not agree, in which they made a mistake, and the plan had fallen through.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that France could enter into a Convention with Germany on this subject at any time, there was no need to authorise it in the Treaty of Peace. What was the object of inserting a clause that really added nothing to France's power, but gave the impression of something disadvantageous to the Germans?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed and pointed out that it would also cause difficulties with the Belgians.

(It was agreed that Article VII should be dropped except the last paragraph.)

NOTE. Article VII will be found in the French printed copy of these Articles.¹

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 30 April, 1919.

M. 97

Appendix to [IC-] 178B

Alsace-Lorraine

The High Contracting Powers, recognising the moral obligation to redress the wrong done by Germany in 1871 both to the rights of France and to the wishes of the population of Alsace and Lorraine which were separated from their country in spite of the solemn protest of their representatives at the Assembly of Bordeaux, have agreed upon the following articles:

¹ The French text of article VII is:

"Le Gouvernement allemand s'impose de ne prendre aucune disposition tendant, par un estampillage ou par toutes autres mesures légales ou administratives qui ne s'appliqueraient pas au reste de l'Allemagne, à porter atteinte à la valeur légale ou au pouvoir libératoire des instruments monétaires ou monnaies allemandes ayant cours légal à la signature du présent Traité et se trouvant à la dite date en la possession du Gouvernement français." (Paris Peace Conf. 185.1135/34.)

Translation:

"The German Government undertakes not to take any action, either by means of stamping or by any other legal or administrative measures not applying equally to the rest of Germany, which may be to the detriment of the legal value or redeemability of German monetary instruments or monies which, at the date of the signature of the present Treaty are legally current, and at that date are in the possession of the French Government."

ARTICLE 1

The territories which were ceded to Germany in accordance with the preliminaries of peace signed at Versailles on the 26th February 1871² and the Treaty of Frankfurt of the 10th May 1851 [1871]³ are restored to French sovereignty from the date of the armistice of the 11th November 1918.

The provisions of the Treaties establishing the delimitation of the frontiers before 1871 shall be restored.

ARTICLE 2

The German Government shall hand over without delay to the French Government all archives, registers, plans, titles and documents of every kind concerning the civil, military, financial, judicial or other administrations of the territories restored to French sovereignty.

If any of these documents, archives, registers, titles or plans have been misplaced, they will be restored by the German Government on the demand of the French Government.

ARTICLE 3

Separate agreements shall be made between France and Germany to deal with the interests of the inhabitants of the territories referred to in Article 1, particularly as regards their civil rights, their business and the exercise of their profession, it being understood that Germany undertakes as from the present date to recognise and accept the regulations laid down in Annexe 1 hereto regarding the nationality of the inhabitants of or natives of the said territories, not to claim at any time or in any place whatsoever as German nationals those who shall have been declared to be French on any ground, to receive all others in her territory and to conform, as regards the property of German nationals in the territories indicated in Article 1, with the provisions of Chapter III (?) Article B. b. of the economic clauses.

Those German nationals who without acquiring French nationality shall receive permission from the French Government to reside in the said territories shall not be subjected to the provisions of the said Chapter IV (?) article B. b. of the economic clauses.

For the purposes of this Chapter persons who have recovered French nationality by virtue of Article I of Annex I shall be held to be Alsace-Lorrainers.

Similarly the persons referred to in Article 2 of the said Annex shall be held to be Alsace-Lorrainers with a retroactive effect to the

² *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. LXII, p. 59.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

11th November 1918, from the date on which they may have claimed French nationality until the moment when this privilege is refused to them.

ARTICLE 4

Those persons who have regained French nationality in virtue of Article 1 of the Annexe attached hereto, will possess the quality of Alsace-Lorrainers for the purposes of the present Chapter.

The persons referred to in Article 2 of the said Annex will from the day on which they have claimed French nationality be held to be Alsace-Lorrainers with retrospective force as from the 11th November 1918. For those whose request is rejected, the privilege will terminate at the date of the refusal. Those fictitious personalities will also be held to be Alsace-Lorrainers who have been recognised as possessing this quality, whether by the French administrative authorities or by a judicial decision.

ARTICLE 5

The territories referred to in Article 1 shall return to France free and quit of all public debts under the conditions laid down in part of the present treaty.

ARTICLE 6

In conformity with the provisions of article of part of the present treaty France shall enter into possession of all property and estate of the German Empire or German States situated within the territories referred to in Article I without incurring any payment or credit on this account to any of the States ceding the territories.

This provision applies to all movable or immovable property of public or private domain together with all rights belonging to the German Empire or States or to their administrative areas whatsoever.

Crown property and private property of the ex-Emperor or of ex-German sovereigns shall be assimilated to property of the public domain.

ARTICLE 7

[No text for article 7 is given in these draft articles. For discussion of this article, see page 375; and concerning its text, see footnote 1, page 376.]

ARTICLE 8

A special Convention will determine the conditions for repayment in marks of the exceptional war expenditure advanced during the course of the war by Alsace-Lorraine or public bodies in Alsace

Lorraine on the account of the Empire according to the terms of German legislation such as payment to the families of those who have been mobilised, requisitions, billeting of troops, assistance to those who have been expelled.

In fixing the amount of these sums Germany will be credited with that portion which Alsace Lorraine has contributed to the Empire for the expenses resulting from these payments, this contribution being calculated according to the proportion of the imperial tax paid by Alsace Lorraine in 1913.

ARTICLE 9

The French Government will collect for its own account the taxes, duties and dues of every kind of the Empire which being leviable in the territories referred to in Article I have not been recovered at the time of the armistice of 11th November, 1918.

ARTICLE 10

The German Government shall without delay restore to Alsace-Lorrainers (individuals, associations and public institutions) all property, rights and interests belonging to them on the 11th November, 1918, in so far as these are situated in German territory.

ARTICLE 11

The German Government undertakes to continue and complete without delay the execution of the financial clauses regarding Alsace-Lorraine contained in the Armistice Conventions.

ARTICLE 12

The German Government engages to bear the expense of all civil and military pensions which had been acquired in Alsace Lorraine on the date of 11th November, 1918, and the maintenance of which was a charge on the budget of the German Empire, with the exception of military pensions due to these Alsace-Lorrainers who have acquired or regained French nationality.

The German Government will furnish each year the funds necessary for the payment in francs at the average rate of exchange for that year of the sums to which persons resident in Alsace Lorraine would have had the right in marks if Alsace Lorraine had remained under German jurisdiction.

ARTICLE 13

For the purposes of the obligation assumed by Germany in part of the present treaty to give compensation for damages caused in the form of fines to the civil populations of the Allied and Associated countries, the inhabitants of the territories referred to in Article I shall be assimilated to the above-mentioned populations.

ARTICLE 14

The regulations concerning the control of the Rhine and of the Moselle are laid down in part of the present treaty.

ARTICLE 15

[No text for article 15 is given in these draft articles.]

ARTICLE 16

The railway bridges and other bridges now existing within the limits of Alsace Lorraine upon the Rhine shall, as to all their parts and their whole length, be the property of the French State, which shall ensure their upkeep.

ARTICLE 17

The French Government succeeds to all the rights of the German Empire over all the railways which were worked by the Imperial railway administration and which are actually working or under construction.

The same shall apply to the rights of the Empire with regard to railway and tramway concessions within the territories referred to in Article I.

This substitution shall not entail any payment on the part of the French State.

The frontier railway stations shall be established by a subsequent agreement, it being in anticipation stipulated that on the Rhine frontier they shall be situated on the right bank.

ARTICLE 18

In accordance with the provisions of Article 6 (a) of Part I of the economic clauses of the present Treaty, for a period of five years from the coming into force of the present Treaty, natural or manufactured products which both originate in and come from the territories of Alsace and Lorraine reunited to France shall, on importation into German Customs territory, be exempt from all Customs duty.

The French Government shall fix each year, by decree communicated to the German Government, the nature and amount of the products which shall enjoy this exemption.

The amount of each product which may be thus sent annually into Germany shall not exceed the average of the amounts sent annually in the years 1911-1913.

Further, during the period above-mentioned, the German Government shall allow the free export from Germany, and the free re-importation into Germany, exempt from all Customs duties and other charges (including internal charges), of yarns, tissues, and other textile materials or textile products of any kind and in any condition, sent from Germany into the territories of Alsace or Lorraine, to be subjected thereto any finishing process, such as bleaching, dyeing, printing, mercerisation, gassing, twisting or dressing.

ARTICLE 19

During a period of ten years dating from the entry into force of the present Treaty those Central Electric Supply Works situated in German territory and formerly furnishing electric power to the territories referred to in Article I or to any establishment the working of which passes definitely or temporarily from Germany to France shall be required to continue this supply up to the amount of consumption corresponding to the undertakings and contracts current on the 11th November 1918.

This supply shall be effected according to the contracts in force and at a rate which shall not be higher than that paid to the said works by German nationals.

ARTICLE 20

It is understood that the French Government preserves its right to prohibit in the future in the territories restored to French sovereignty all new German participation:

1. In the management or exploitation of the public domain and the public services, such as railways, navigable waterways, water works, gas works, electric power, etc.

2. In the ownership of mines and quarries of every kind and the enterprises connected therewith.

3. In metallurgical establishments, even though their working may not be connected with that of any mine.

ARTICLE 21

As regards the territories referred to in Article I Germany renounces on behalf of herself and her nationals as from the 11th Novem-

ber 1918, all rights under the law of the 25th May 1910, regarding the trade in potash salts, and generally, under any stipulations for the intervention of German organisations in the working of the potash mines. Similarly, she renounces on behalf of herself and her nationals all rights under any agreements, stipulations or laws, which may exist to her benefit with regard to other products of the aforesaid territories.

ARTICLE 22

The settlement of the questions relating to debts contracted before the 11th November 1918 between the German Empire and the German States or their subjects residing in Germany on the one part and Alsace-Lorrainers residing in Alsace-Lorraine on the other part shall be effected in accordance with the provisions of Chapter of the present Treaty, the expression "before the war" therein being replaced by the expression "before the 11th November 1918".

There shall be established in the territories referred to in Article I for the settlement of the afore-said debts under the conditions laid down in Chapter of the present Treaty, a special clearing office, it being understood that this office shall be regarded as a "central office" under the provisions of Article 1 of the regulation in Chapter

ARTICLE 23

The property, rights and interests of Alsace Lorrainers in Germany will be regulated by the stipulations of Chapter of the present treaty.

ARTICLE 24

The French Government reserves the right to retain and liquidate all the property, rights and interests which German nationals or societies controlled by Germany possessed in the territories referred to in Article I on November 11, 1918, subject to the conditions determined in the first clause of Article 3 above.

Germany will directly compensate its nationals who have been dispossessed by the aforesaid liquidations.

The French Government will apply the product of these liquidations to the settlement of the private debts referred to in Article 20 [22].

ARTICLE 25

Notwithstanding the stipulations of Chapter of the present Treaty all contracts made before the date of the promulgation in Alsace-Lorraine of the decree of 30th November, 1918, between Alsace Lorrainers (whether individuals or companies) and others resident

in Alsace Lorraine on the one part and the German Empire and German States and their nationals resident in Germany on the other part, the execution of which has been suspended by the armistice or by subsequent French legislation, shall be maintained. Nevertheless any contract of which the French Government shall notify the cancellation to Germany in the general interest within a period of six months from the date of coming into force of the present Treaty shall be annulled except in respect of any debt or other pecuniary obligation arising out of any act done or money paid thereunder before the 11th November, 1918.

With regard to prescriptions, limitations, etc., in Alsace Lorraine, the provisions of Articles E and F of Chapter 4 of the Economic Clauses, shall be applied with the substitution for the expression "outbreak of the war" of the expression "the 11th November 1918" and for the expression "duration of the war" of the expression "period from the 11th November 1918 to the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty".

ARTICLE 26

Questions concerning the rights of industrial, literary or artistic property of Alsace-Lorrainers shall be regulated in accordance with the general stipulations of Chapter . . . of the present Treaty, it being understood that those Alsace-Lorrainers who hold rights of this nature under German legislation will preserve full and entire enjoyment of these rights on German territory.

ARTICLE 27

The German Government undertakes to pay over to the French Government such proportion of all reserves accumulated by the Empire or by public or private bodies dependent upon it for the purposes of the invalidity-old-age insurance as would fall to the invalidity-old-age insurance office at Strasburg.

ARTICLE 28

With regard to the execution of judgments and orders the following rules shall be applied:

1. All civil and commercial judgments which shall have been given since the 3rd August 1914 by the Courts of Alsace-Lorraine between Alsace-Lorrainers, or between Alsace-Lorrainers and foreigners, or between foreigners, and which shall not have been appealed against before the 11th November, 1918, shall be regarded as final and capable of being fully executed. When the judgment has been given between

Alsace-Lorrainers and Germans or between Alsace Lorrainers and subjects of the Allies of Germany, it shall only be capable of executing after an "exequatur" has been issued by the corresponding new tribunal in the restored territory referred to in Article 1.

2. All judgments given by German Courts since the 3rd August 1914, against Alsace-Lorrainers for political crimes or misdemeanours shall be regarded as null and void.

3. All sentences passed since the 11th November 1918 by the Imperial Court of Leipzig on appeals against the decisions of the Courts of Alsace-Lorraine shall be regarded as null. The papers in regard to the cases in which such sentences have been given shall be returned to the Courts of Alsace-Lorraine concerned.

All appeals to the Imperial Court against decisions of the Courts of Alsace-Lorraine shall be suspended. In the cases referred to above the papers shall be returned in the following conditions for transfer without delay to the French Court of Appeal which shall be competent to decide them.

4. All proceedings in Alsace Lorraine for offences committed during the period between the 11th November 1918 and the coming into force of the present Treaty will be conducted under the German laws except so far as these have been modified by decrees duly published on the spot by French authorities.

ARTICLE 29

All other questions concerning Alsace-Lorraine which are not regulated by the present Chapter and its Annex or by the general stipulations of the present Treaty, will form the subject of further conventions between France and Germany.

ARTICLE 30

Alsace Lorrainers will for the purpose of the reparation of damages
 of the classes dealt with in Annexe I to the Chapter
 Reserved on Reparations be assimilated to the nationals of the
 Allied and Associated Powers.

Annexes

1. *Nationality*

(Annex to Article 3)

ARTICLE 1

The following persons are reinstated in French nationality as of full right from the 11th November 1918:

(1) Persons who lost French nationality by the application of the Franco-German Treaty of the 10th May 1871, and who have not since that date acquired nationality other than German nationality:

2. The legitimate or natural descendants of the persons referred to in the immediately preceding paragraph, with the exception of those whose ascendants in the paternal line include a German who immigrated into Alsace-Lorraine after the 15th July, 1870:

3. All persons born in Alsace-Lorraine of unknown parents, or whose nationality is unknown.

ARTICLE 2

Within the period of one year from the signature of the Preliminaries of Peace, persons included in any of the following categories may claim French nationality:

(1) All persons not restored to French nationality whose ascendants include a Frenchman or French woman who lost French nationality under the conditions referred to in Article 1:

(2) All foreigners, not nationals of a German State who acquired the status of a native of Alsace-Lorraine before the 3rd August, 1914.

(3) All Germans resident in Alsace-Lorraine, if they have been so since a date previous to the 15th July, 1870, or if one of their ascendants was at that date domiciled in Alsace-Lorraine:

(4) All Germans born or domiciled in Alsace-Lorraine, who have served in the Allied or Associated armies during the present war, and the descendants of such Germans:

(5) All persons born in Alsace-Lorraine before the 30th May, 1871, of foreign parents, and the descendants of such persons:

(6) The husband or wife of any person whose French nationality may have been restored under Article 1, or who may have claimed and obtained French nationality in accordance with the preceding provisions.

The legal representative of a minor may exercise, on behalf of that minor, the right to claim French nationality; and if that right has not been exercised, the minor may claim French nationality within the year following his majority.

Except in the cases provided for in No. 6 of the present Article, the French authorities reserve to themselves the right, in individual cases, to reject the claim to French nationality.

ARTICLE 3

Subject to the provisions of Article 2, Germans born or domiciled in Alsace-Lorraine shall not acquire French nationality by reason of the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, even though they may have the status of a native of Alsace-Lorraine.

They may only acquire French nationality by naturalisation, on condition of having been domiciled in Alsace-Lorraine from a date previous to the 3rd August, 1914, and of submitting proof of unbroken residence within the restored territory for a period of three years from the 11th November, 1918.

France will be solely responsible for their diplomatic and consular protection from the date of their application for French naturalisation.

ARTICLE 4

The French Government shall determine the procedure for establishing the reinstatement as of right, and the conditions under which decisions shall be given upon claims to French nationality and upon applications for naturalisation under the present Treaty.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, Wednesday, April 30, at 5:30 p.m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Klotz
M. Lasteyrie
M. Lyon

GREAT BRITAIN

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd
George, M. P.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.
Professor Mantoux.

Secretary.
Interpreter.

1. M. KLOTZ pointed out that the first part of the reparation clauses laid down that Germany acknowledges liability to pay. The question arose as to whether in drafting this should be stated as "Germany" or "Germany and the enemy States." The most important instance was that if joint liability was admitted, Italy might be in a position to claim the total of the damage inflicted on her against Germany. If this was accepted without qualification, it would reduce what France and Great Britain could obtain for reparation. One plan would be to state that joint liability should be *pro rata* with the military effort. For example, in applying the case of Germany's liability to Italy, it might be said that Germany had sent divisions corresponding to, say, one-tenth of the total number of divisions used, thus Germany would only be responsible for one-tenth of the damage inflicted. Without some such qualification the acceptance of the principle was very dangerous.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this point had always puzzled him. All he wanted to do was the fair thing. As a matter of fact the German forces had not been anything like one-tenth of the total on the Italian front. He believed only five German divisions had been employed out of a total of about sixty, and these for only a very short time. Moreover, Italy had never declared war on Germany for thirteen months after she entered the war with Austria, consequently, when claiming pensions, she would be claiming them for the time when Germany was at peace with Italy. There would be no justice in this.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that there would be other complications. He remembered that in conversations with the Italian repre-

sentatives they always claimed that they identified more German divisions on their front than other nations did. He remembered they claimed there had been six divisions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in Serbia Germany had taken a leading part. Under M. Klotz's principle, Serbia could make out a substantial claim for reparation. The same applied to Roumania, but it would not apply to Italy, except in the case of the battle of Caporetto.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that Italy would have a good claim in the case of submarines against Germany.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed, and suggested that the basis should be the relation of the military and naval effort. The Italians could not complain at this.

M. KLOTZ proposed the following draft:—

“Les dommages de guerre, conséquences des hostilités sur l'un des fronts de combat, sont réparés par l'Allemagne et ses Alliés au *pro rata* de l'effort militaire et navale fourni par chacun d'eux sur ce front. Les proportions seront déterminées par la Commission des Réparations.”¹

(This was accepted.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 30 April, 1919.

¹ Translation: “War damages resulting from hostilities on any one of the fronts shall be compensated by Germany and her allies *pro rata* with the military and naval force supplied by each of them on that front. The proportions will be determined by the Reparations Commission.”

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Thursday, May 1, 1919, at 11 a. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

Secretary
Interpreter

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D.
Lloyd George, M. P.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.
Professor P. J. Mantoux.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon.

1. It was agreed that:—

Mr. Balfour should communicate the decision taken on this subject to the Chinese Delegation.

(An immediate message was sent to Mr. Balfour, communicating this decision.)

Kiauchau
and
Shantung

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE brought to note certain criticisms that had been made by the British Solicitor-General and Attorney-General against the articles on this subject, (Appx IV) drafted by the Drafting Committee on the basis of the instructions given to them. In regard to Article 1, attention had been drawn to the words in line [2?]: "not for an offence against criminal law but". It had been pointed out that the draft as it stands might possibly be construed as an admission on the part of the Allied and Associated Powers that the German Emperor had not committed any offences against criminal law. He proposed the omission of these words.

Responsibility
of the Authors
of the War &
Enforcement of
Penalties

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed.

(It was agreed that:—

The first clause, Article 1, should read as follows:—

"The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties." []]

In regard to Article 2, Mr. Lloyd George said that criticisms had been made against this Article on the ground that it might be construed to enable the German Government to secure immunity to persons who are accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war by trying them in a German Court and passing a nominal sentence.

(It was agreed that:—

The Drafting Committee should be instructed to devise some means of avoiding this interpretation and the following draft of the first clause of Article 2 was suggested:—

“The German Government engages that the persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war shall be brought before military tribunals by the Allied and Associated Powers and if found guilty sentenced to the punishment laid down by military law.”)

(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to communicate these alterations to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)

3. M. CLEMENCEAU asked if there was any news from the Belgians about Reparation.

Belgium and
Reparation

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had received none.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Belgian financial experts had asked to see Mr. Keynes, but he did not know on what subject.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that Mr. McCormick¹ had told him that the Belgian Delegation wished M. Cartier, who was the Belgian Minister at Washington, to see President Wilson, in order to place before him certain aspects of the question with which he was not familiar. He, himself, had refused to see them, as he did not think it was right to conduct, as it were, a separate negotiation. Mr. McCormick had also had conveyed the impression that the Belgians were alleging that the French and British Governments had in some special way granted them the value of the German marks in Belgium. He emphasised that this was only a general impression and not an exact statement.

4. M. CLEMENCEAU reported that the Credentials Committee would see the German Delegates at 3 p. m. The German Delegates had asked for the credentials of the Allied and Associated Powers. There had been some delay in regard to those of the Czecho-Slovaks and Poland.

Credentials of
the German
Delegates

5. M. PICHON said that there would certainly be an incident when the Germans asked for the Italian Credentials and M. Jules Cambon was unable to produce them. It should be made clear, in his opinion, to the world and to the Italians that Italy was responsible for this state of affairs. Re-calling the Pact of London, to which Italy adhered, whereby France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia had agreed not to make a separate peace, M. Pichon said that we must show clearly that it was Italy who had separated. He proposed, therefore, that the incident

Italian
Credentials

¹ Vance C. McCormick, Chairman of the War Trade Board; United States representative on the Commission on the Reparation of Damage.

should be notified by telegram to Italy through the President of the Conference and that Italy should be allowed to hear of it only through the Press. The message should not contain any invitation to the Italians to return. The responsibility for this should be left to the Italians themselves. The message should merely show that the absence of the Italian Credentials was their fault and not ours. In reply to President Wilson he said he contemplated that the message should consist merely of a simple relation of the incident. For example, that credentials had been exchanged with the German Delegates; that Germany had asked for the Italian credentials. And that M. Jules Cambon had replied that we had not got them. If the Germans did not ask for the Italian credentials, then no incident would arise.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE doubted if the Germans would ask for the Italian credentials.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in their case he would certainly ask for them. M. Jules Cambon would certainly make no answer today about the Italian credentials, beyond merely stating that he had not got them. The Germans might raise this when they met the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers. But M. Jules Cambon would simply say he had no power to discuss.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what attitude should be taken if the Germans pressed the question when they met our plenipotentiaries.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that we should simply reply that we were ready to make peace and leave on Italy the responsibility for breaking the Treaty.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that Italy had broken the Treaty or was contemplating breaking the Treaty in a most peculiar way. They said they would not agree to sign the Treaty with Germany because the Treaty with Austria was not settled, which was an irrelevant matter.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that they represented that the League of Nations was their difficulty in the circumstances.

M. CLEMENCEAU said the Italians had promised to him, in front of his colleagues, to telegraph from Rome if they were coming back. They had not done so.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he thought it inadvisable to send any message, even of the most formal character. By implication, it would constitute an invitation to the Italians to return. His interpretation of the news from Rome was that in reality they were anxious to come back and he thought if they were left alone they might come back in 10 days' time.

In the course of the discussion, Mr. Lloyd George read the following message from M. Poincaré to Italy (published in the *Temps*):—

“L’Italie et la France, étroitement unies dans la guerre, resteront unies dans la paix. Rien ne les séparera. Le refroidissement de leur amitié serait une catastrophe pour la civilisation latine et pour l’humanité. La France, fidèle à ses engagements, à ses sympathies et à ses traditions, gardera les mains jointes aux mains de l’Italie.”²

There was some discussion on this subject, in the course of which it was pointed out that this message might be construed as a declaration on behalf of the French Government. Under ordinary circumstances the message was perfectly beyond criticism, but at the present juncture it was susceptible of misinterpretation.

M. PICHON said he attached no importance to it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that to some extent it might be taken as confirming the impression conveyed in the Italian newspapers to the effect that French public opinion was rather rallying to the side of Italy.

(After some further discussion, it was agreed that:—

No message in regard to what might occur at Versailles on the subject of the Italian credentials should be sent to Italy.)

6. After a short discussion, it was agreed that:—

**Submarine
Cables** The question of submarine cables should be discussed with the Foreign Ministers at the Quai d’Orsay at 4 p. m. in the afternoon.

7. M. PICHON asked for a re-consideration of the decision taken on the previous day to invite the representatives of Austria and of Hungary to Paris on the 12th May. (I. C. 178 A. Minute 2.^{2a}) He observed that, at Vienna, there was a Government with which the Allied and Associated Powers could negotiate. In regard to Hungary, however, the news was to the effect that the Government was tottering and that the country was not behind it. This made it desirable to wait some days before sending an invitation. This would also have the advantage of giving a few more days to see what happened on the side of Italy and it must be remembered that the great question in the Austrian settlement was the frontier of Italy. Hence, it would be better not to act too soon. If something was to be done immediately, it would be a good plan to bring the Hungarians to Paris by the middle of May. The Treaty could be ready for them, but it was not desirable to have the Austrians and Hungarians before we were ready.

**The Peace
With Austria
& Hungary**

² Translation: “Italy and France, closely united in the war, remain united in peace. Nothing shall separate them. A cooling of their friendship would be a catastrophe for Latin civilization and for humanity. France, faithful to her engagements, to her sympathies and to her traditions, will keep her hands joined with the hands of Italy.”

^{2a} *Ante*, p. 368.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the principal reason for inviting the Austrians was to steady the Government at Vienna by showing to Austrian public opinion that we were ready to deal with it. According to his information, no delay in this matter was possible. The case of Hungary was different, and, as Mr. Lloyd George had said, perhaps stronger. Even there, we might help to prevent constant changes of Government. Our expectation of [omission] was less strong. He hoped, however that the invitation would not be delayed and he, himself, would like to have it sent in 6 hours.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed and said he would discuss the details with M. Pichon later.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed with President Wilson.

(M. Pichon withdrew.)

New States.
Conditions To Be
Accepted by
Them. Protec-
tion of Jews
and Religious
Minorities

(8) PRESIDENT WILSON said it had been brought to his attention that the Jews were somewhat inhospitably regarded in Poland. In Roumania also they depended only on statutory rights. While we could not deal with Roumania, we could deal with their position in Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. Certain safeguards had been suggested to him.

(He then read the following two clauses, one of which he had drafted himself, while the other had been prepared by a United States legal draftsman:—

(1) The State of covenants and agrees that it will accord to all racial or national minorities within its jurisdiction exactly the same treatment and security, alike in law and in fact, that is accorded the racial or national majority of its people.

(2) The State of covenants and agrees that it will not prohibit or interfere with the free exercise of any creed, religion or belief whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals, and that no person within its jurisdiction shall be molested in life, liberty or the pursuit of happiness by reason of his adherence to any such creed, religion or belief.”)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was going to propose that some similar provisions should be introduced in the Mandates.

PRESIDENT WILSON then read a draft of clauses for the Treaty of Peace which had been prepared by Dr. Miller³ concerning the protection of minorities in Poland, (Appendix I.) He said that the draftsman had consulted the representatives of smaller nations and of the Jews in preparing this draft.

. ³ David Hunter Miller, Technical Adviser on International Law to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this really formed part of a bigger subject. He himself had received a note on the subject from Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith,⁴ which opened up some wider aspects of the conditions which should be accepted by the new nations. He asked why some such provision should not be laid down as a condition for admission to the League of Nations.

PRESIDENT WILSON said these States were already admitted to the League.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that M. Paderewski had made to him a very able defence of the attitude of Poland towards the Jews, and had pointed out that the Jews had themselves to blame to a considerable extent.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the reason the Jews had caused trouble was because in those countries they were not really welcome citizens. They did not care for any country where they were badly treated. In the United States of America, Great Britain or France, those questions did not arise. They were only disloyal in countries where they were not treated properly.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE and M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Jews were very good citizens in their countries.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in Poland he understood the Jews were really more efficient men of business than the Poles.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in Poland a Pole who wanted to carry out any transaction—for example, to buy a horse—would send for a Jew.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that in England the Jews had been bad citizens before they were properly treated.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that Cromwell was the first person to recognise the importance of treating the Jews properly.

PRESIDENT WILSON proposed that a body of experts should be got together to draw up clauses, if not for the present Treaty, at any rate for subsequent Treaties.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought the matter should be put in hand at once.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that his documents should be sent to this Committee as a basis for their enquiry. His draft about the protection of religious minorities would probably be sufficient.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there were other more mundane matters referred to in Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith's memorandum. He pointed out that the new States ought to assume the same obligations

⁴Appendix II, *infra*. Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith was Permanent Secretary of the British Board of Trade; British representative on the Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways and on the Economic Commission.

as other States in regard to matters adhering to general Conventions such as the Postal & Telegraph Convention; Industrial, Property and Copyright Conventions; and International Transit Conventions. He suggested that Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith's memorandum should also be sent to the Committee.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the Committee should examine how these questions were to be fitted into the Treaty.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said the difficulty was that the new States had already been recognised, but they had not been created.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked what was the act of creating a new State?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Treaty would be the act of creation, since, until the Treaties were signed, they would be part of Germany or Austria.

(It was agreed that a Committee composed as follows:—

Dr. Miller for the United States of America;

Mr. Headlam-Morley for the British Empire;

A French Representative to be nominated by M. Clemenceau;

should meet immediately to consider the International obligations to be accepted by Poland and other new States created by the Treaties of Peace, including the protection of racial and religious minorities and other matters raised in the following documents:—

(a) The two drafts produced by President Wilson and quoted above;

(b) The clauses forwarded by Dr. Miller (Appendix I);

(c) Memorandum by Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith (Appendix II all of which should be regarded as an indication to the Committee of the subjects they were to consider.)

(9) MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that no arrangements had been made to regulate the post-bellum occupation of German territory.

It was important that provision should be made for the relations between the Army and the civil authorities, etc. He was informed that General Woygene [Weygand?] was discussing this with General Thwaites and General Bliss, but, in the meantime, some provision had to be made in the Treaty of Peace. He suggested the following clause:—

“All matters regarding occupation not provided for by the present Treaty shall be regulated by a subsequent Convention or Conventions which shall have the same force and effect as if embodied in the present Treaty.”

(This was agreed as a basis for the preparation of an Article by the Drafting Committee.)

(10) MR. LLOYD GEORGE urged that the conditions of the Mandates should be fixed. He asked if they ought not to be inserted in the Treaty with Germany.

Mandates

M. CLEMENCEAU said this was unnecessary.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that at any rate there ought to be a clear understanding on the matter. The British Dominions laid great stress on this.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that there was a tacit agreement as to the assignment of the Mandates.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it was rather the conditions of the Mandates he was referring to.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the Supreme Council was too much pressed to take up that matter.

(11) M. CLEMENCEAU said he did not think that the Treaty of Peace would be ready before Monday. He suggested that the Plenary Conference at which he would read the summary to the States with special interests should be held on Sunday.

Plenary
Conference

PRESIDENT WILSON and MR. LLOYD GEORGE both demurred to a Sunday meeting.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it would have to be held on Saturday.

Enemy Ships
in United
States Ports

(12) There was a short discussion on this subject, which was postponed for further consideration.

(13) There was a short discussion in regard to the opinions expressed by the United States, British and Italian Delegations on the Supreme Economic Council in favour of relaxation of the blockade.

Blockade

PRESIDENT WILSON said that if the blockade was not removed until the Peace had been ratified, Germany would go to pieces.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the real difficulty in revictualling Germany was not so much the blockade as the fact that Germany had no financial resources wherewith to pay for food or raw material, hence it was necessary to provide some means for supplying credit. He had put forward a scheme which he understood was not acceptable to the United States experts. He did not attach any special importance to any particular scheme, but he felt sure it was necessary to have some scheme, and the subject ought to be discussed. All his information tended to show that Germany's signature to Peace would depend mainly on her prospects of getting food and raw materials.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that it would not be necessary to propound any particular scheme. It would be sufficient to say that effective co-operation would be given.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he did not think this would suffice. The Germans would say that promises of the kind were held out to them in the Armistice discussions, but that nothing had resulted. It was necessary to propound a definite scheme which would be acceptable to the Germans.

(The Subject was adjourned.)

(14) The formal Minute in Appendix I [III] was signed in triplicate by M. Clemenceau, President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George as giving effect to the decision taken on the previous day as to the proportions in which the receipts paid by Germany for reparation were to be divided between the Allied and Associated Governments.

One copy was kept by President Wilson, one by M. Clemenceau and one by Mr. Lloyd George.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 1 May, 1919.

Appendix I to IC-178D

DRAFT CLAUSES FOR THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES IN POLAND

[*Mr. David Hunter Miller to Col. Edward M. House*]

No. 1

29 APRIL, 1919.

MY DEAR COLONEL HOUSE: Herewith are the proposals of draft clauses for the protection of minorities in Poland, in which some very slight changes have been made since they were previously submitted to you.

In the enclosed draft it will be observed that Article VI is in two forms; that in the left-hand column is the one preferred by the Jewish representatives, and that in the right-hand column is the one which I think is preferable as I believe it allows more liberty to minorities in the future even if it would make no practical difference at present.

These clauses to be effective would have to be inserted in the Treaty of Peace if the cession of German territory to Poland is to be contained in that Treaty. If, however, the territory which Germany relinquishes is ceded temporarily to the Allied and Associated Powers the insertion of these clauses could perhaps be made in the paper subsequently granting the territory to Poland. My own view, however, is that their insertion in the Treaty of Peace is preferable.

It is my opinion that these clauses or their substance should be inserted in the Treaty if minorities in Poland are to receive proper protection.

Doubtless, if these clauses are accepted for Poland, similar clauses will be adopted for the protection of minorities in other countries, such as Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania, varying somewhat according to the circumstances therein.

If these clauses are to be inserted in the Treaty of Peace it seems to me essential that they should have the immediate approval of the Council of Four.

Yours faithfully,

DAVID HUNTER MILLER

[Enclosure]

*Clauses for the Treaty of Peace Concerning Protection of
Minorities in Poland*

Poland undertakes the following obligations to each of the other Allied and Associated Powers, and recognizes them to be obligations of international concern of which the League of Nations has jurisdiction.

1. Without any requirement of qualifying or other proceedings, Poland admits and declares to be Polish citizens (*a*) all persons born in the territory recognised to be Polish in this Treaty, who have not heretofore been naturalized in some other country, and who were resident or domiciled in such territory at any time since August 1st, 1909, or who have maintained their relation to such territory within such period by passport issued by the present or the former sovereignty; (*b*) all persons who were inhabitants of such territory on August 1st, 1914; (*c*) all persons hereafter born in Poland and subject to the jurisdiction thereof. Any person belonging to classes (*a*) or (*b*) may however within two years after the coming into force of this treaty opt his former citizenship.

2. Poland agrees that all citizens of Poland shall enjoy equal civil, religious, and political rights without distinction as to birth, race, nationality, language, or religion.

3. Poland assumes and will perform the following obligations:

(*a*) To protect the life, liberty and property of all inhabitants of Poland:

(*b*) To assure to all inhabitants of Poland freedom of religion and of the outward exercise thereof:

(*c*) To allow to all inhabitants of Poland the free use of any language, particularly in business transactions, in schools and other educational instruction, in the press, and at public meetings and assemblies; and,

(*d*) To make no discrimination against any inhabitant of Poland on account of birth, race, nationality, language, or religion.

4. Poland recognises the several national minorities in its population as constituting distinct public corporations, and as such having

equally the right to establish, manage, and control their schools and their religions, educational, charitable or social institutions.

Any person may declare his withdrawal from such a national minority.

Within the meaning of these articles the Jewish population of Poland shall constitute a national minority.

5. Poland agrees that to the extent that the establishment and the maintenance of schools or religious, educational, charitable or social institutions may be provided for by any state, department, municipal or other budget, to be paid for out of public funds, each national minority shall be allotted a proportion of such funds based upon the ratio between its numbers in the respective areas and the entire population therein.

6. Poland agrees that each national minority shall have the right to elect a proportion of the entire number of representatives in all state, departmental, municipal and other public elective bodies based upon the ratio of its numbers in the respective electoral areas to the entire population therein.

6. Poland agrees to adopt and enforce the principle of proportional minority representation by means of cumulative voting in all state, departmental, municipal or other public elective bodies, conducted on a basis of justice and equality, the several electoral areas being subdivided into electoral districts which shall consist of compact, contiguous territory, and the population of the several electoral districts being equal as nearly as practicable.

7. Poland agrees that the foregoing obligations are hereby embodied in her fundamental law as a bill of rights, with which no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere and as against which no law, regulation or official action shall have validity or effect, and which shall not be amendable except with the consent of the League of Nations.

Appendix II to IC-178D

Note by Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith

The Chapters in the Treaty of Peace dealing with Territorial changes are supposed to provide for all the obligations which it is necessary to impose on Germany, Austria, etc. in relation to the new States or the ceded territories.

In some cases (e. g. Poland) they provide to some extent for obligations of the new States towards Germany, etc. But they are necessarily silent as to the obligations of the new States towards the Allies, and before the Treaties are signed compelling the Enemy States to recognise the new States and to accept obligations towards them, it seems only prudent to impose by separate instruments on the new States and ceded Territories such obligations *inter se*, towards the Allies and also towards the Enemy States as may be thought essential. If we miss this opportunity, we may never succeed in getting some of these obligations accepted.

Naturally nothing oppressive or one-sided ought to be imposed, but the Allies whose efforts and sacrifices have created the new States and compelled the cession of territory have an undoubted right and duty to see that the general interests and their own special interests are not prejudiced thereby, and they have also a moral obligation to secure to the transferred populations the rights which they formerly enjoyed (e. g., under such laws as the German Insurance Laws).

As an example, it would be desirable to require the new States to adhere to such general Conventions as the Postal and Telegraphic Conventions, the Industrial Property and Copyright Conventions. It would also be desirable to require them to accept some such clause as the following :—

“The provisions of any general Conventions relating to the international regime of Transit, Waterways, Ports and Railways, which may be concluded before the expiration of five years from the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and which may be accepted as applicable to all the European States represented on the Council of the League of Nations shall apply to”

It would also be very desirable, if practicable, to insist on the following stipulation :

“Pending the conclusion of a general Convention regulating the commercial relations among the States members of the League of Nations, the undertake to treat the commerce of the Allied and Associated States on a footing of absolute equality both among themselves and as compared with any other foreign country. Provided that no Allied or Associated State can claim the benefit of this provision on behalf of any part of its territories in which reciprocal treatment is not accorded.”

If this is agreed to in principle, it would seem desirable for a Drafting Committee to prepare a model draft of instrument which should begin by setting out the boundaries of the new State and recognising the State within these boundaries. It would go on to impose the above obligations and any others which may be thought necessary.

There might, if preferred, be only one instrument with several Annexes setting out the various boundaries, the whole being signed by all the Allies including the new States.

It may be added that the clauses relating to Free Transit and the maintenance of Insurance privileges should probably go also into the instruments relating to ceded territories (e. g., Schleswig, Alsace-Lorraine, etc.) but the commercial and treaty provisions would only be applicable to new States.

27 APRIL, 1919.

Appendix III to IC-178D

[Memorandum by M. Clemenceau, Mr. Lloyd George, and President Wilson]

At a Meeting held between M. Clemenceau, President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George on the morning of the 30th April, 1919,⁵ it was agreed that:—

The proportions, in which receipts from Germany are to be divided between the Allied and Associated Governments in accordance with Article 7 of the Reparation chapter of the Draft Treaty with Germany, shall be those which the aggregates of the claims of each against Germany which are established to the satisfaction of the Reparation Commission, in accordance with Annexes 1 and 2 of the Reparation chapter, bear to the aggregate of the claims of all against Germany which are established to the satisfaction of the Commission.

G. CLEMENCEAU
D. LLOYD GEORGE
WOODROW WILSON

PARIS, May 1, 1919.

Signed in triplicate. Copies to United States, British and French Treasuries.

Appendix IV to IC-178D

Draft Clauses Prepared by the Drafting Committee of the Peace Conference, on instructions received from the Council of the First Delegates of the Powers With General Interests After Consideration of Report of the Commission

PENALTIES

ARTICLE I

The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, not for an offense against

⁵ See IC-177E, p. 355.

criminal law, but for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.

A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring him the guarantees essential to the right of defence. It will be composed of five judges, one appointed by each of the following five Powers: namely, the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan.

In its decision the tribunal will be guided by the highest principles of international policy, with a view to vindicating the solemn obligations of international undertakings and the validity of international morality. It will be its duty to fix the punishment which it considers should be imposed.

The allied and Associated Powers will address a request to the Government of the Netherlands for the surrender to them of the ex-Emperor in order that he may be put on trial.

ARTICLE 2

The German Government not having ensured the punishment of the persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war, such persons will be brought before military tribunals by the Allied and Associated Powers, and if found guilty, sentenced to the punishments laid down by military law.

The German Government shall hand over to the Allied and Associated Powers, or to such one of them as shall so request, all persons accused of having committed an act in violation of the laws and customs of war, who are specified either by name or by the rank, office or employment which they held under the German authorities.

ARTICLE 3

Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of one of the Allied and Associated Powers will be brought before the military tribunals of that Power.

Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of more than one of the Allied and Associated Powers will be brought before military tribunals composed of members of the military tribunals of the Powers concerned.

In every case the accused will be entitled to name his own counsel,

ARTICLE 4

The German Government undertakes to furnish all documents and information of every kind, the production of which may be considered necessary to ensure the full knowledge of the incriminating acts, the discovery of the offenders, and the just appreciation of the responsibility.

Notes of a Meeting Held in the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday,
May 1, 1919, at 5:45 p. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.
Hon. R. Lansing.
Hon. H. White.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. Lord Hardinge of
Penshurst.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Pichon.
M. Jules Cambon.

JAPAN

H. E. Baron Makino.
H. E. Viscount Chinda.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B., *Secretary*.
M. Mantoux, *Interpreter*.

1. M. JULES CAMBON gave an account of his interview with the German Delegates. Having been charged with the verification of their credentials, and having invited them to meet him at Versailles, he received a telegram stating that the German representatives would be presided over by Herr Lanisberg, the German Minister of Justice, and would include Herr Simons, the Commissary-General for Judicial Questions, and Director of the Department of Justice, Foreign Office, the Advocate Counsel, Counsellor of Legation Gauss, who would be at the Trianon Palace to bring the German credentials and would ask to receive in exchange the credentials of the Allied and Associated Powers. He had then sent a message to suggest that Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau as Head of the German Commission, should accompany the delegates. He had addressed a few words to the German delegates, and had asked for their credentials, which had been handed over. They had then asked that [*for*] the Allied and Associated credentials and he had handed them over. He had told them that if they had any observations to make on the credentials of the Allied and Associated Powers, they would meet again. After that they separated. He had received the impression that Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau and his colleagues were profoundly moved and that their attitude towards the Allied and Associated Powers was what it should be. Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau, who knows and speaks

Verification of
the Credentials
of the German
Delegates

French fluently, as well as his officials, had said what they had to say in German, and had brought an interpreter. He felt it his duty to submit to the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers that it was within the right of those Governments to decide whether the Germans should be permitted to speak German or should have to speak French or English.

M. CLEMENCEAU said you could not forbid them speaking in their own language. He said that in the negotiations of 1871, Bismarck had spoken French when he was pleased, and German when he was not.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out the inconvenience of having the interpreter for speech into two languages.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the exchange of views would be in writing and that there would be very little speechmaking.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if M. Cambon had ascertained anything as to the German views of publicity of the Peace Treaty.

M. CAMBON said the question had not been raised. In reply to Mr. Lansing, he said that the credentials of the Allied and Associated Powers were in the hands of the Germans for determination and vice versa.

In reply to M. Clemenceau, he said he had not fixed the date of the next meeting. Knowing the Germans as he did, he felt sure it would take them some time to examine all the credentials of the Allied and Associated Powers. The same applied to his own Commission, which he proposed should meet the following afternoon. He asked for 48 hours for examination of the German credentials, and would not be prepared to make any report before Saturday.

PRESIDENT WILSON said it had just been learnt that the Drafting Committee would probably require until Tuesday, as the date for handing the Treaty to the Germans. He suggested, therefore, that M. Jules Cambon's Committee should make a careful scrutiny of the German credentials.

(This M. Cambon undertook to do.)

(Mr. White, M. Cambon, Lord Hardinge and M. Kimura withdrew.)

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE raised the question of whether some communication should not be made to the Italians. He suggested that a message should be sent to the Ambassador to the effect that for drafting reasons the handing over of the Treaty had been put off until Tuesday.

MR. BALFOUR suggested the communication should be made to the Marquis Imperiali. When the Italian Delegation left, Baron Sonnino had written him a civil note to say that the Marquis Imperiali was left in charge.

Communication
to the Italians

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that the Marquis Imperiali was the person to address with any communication or approach we might have to make. This, however, in his view, should not be a communication from the Conference, but merely a communication from M. Pichon to the Italian Ambassador in Paris.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked what exactly M. Pichon should say.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested he should say that as a mere matter of opinion, the Drafting Committee did not expect to be ready with the Treaty until Tuesday.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested he should add that we expected to meet the Germans on Tuesday.

(It was agreed that:—

(1) M. Pichon should inform the Italian Ambassador in Paris that the Drafting Committee did not expect to have the Treaty ready for the Germans until Tuesday, and that the Allied and Associated Powers expected to meet the Germans on Tuesday.

(2) That this should merely be a message from M. Pichon to the Italian Ambassador and not a formal message from the Conference to the Italian Government.)

3. M. PICHON said he had some information to the effect that there was a certain movement against the Italian Government, from the Socialist side on the part of M. Lussati and from the opposite side on the part of M. Tittoni.

The Political
Situation
in Italy

(At this point M. Pichon and Mr. Lansing withdrew.)

4. PRESIDENT WILSON communicating [*communicated?*] a number of reports he had received about the attitude towards the Peace Treaty of the various members of the German Government including Herren Brockdorff-Rantzau, Ebert, Scheidemann, Bernsdorff, and others.

Attitude of
the German
Delegates

5. PRESIDENT WILSON read a letter he had had from General Bliss describing the conversation with Marshal Foch on the subject of the elimination of Article 46 from the Military Terms.

Article 46
of the Military
Terms of Alsace
[Peace]

(This is the Article keeping the Armistice in force so far as not inconsistent with the Treaty.)

The tenour of Marshal Foch's replies had rather been that he did not know enough of the stipulations of the Peace Treaty to judge of the matter.

PRESIDENT WILSON recalled the previous provisional decision to eliminate this Article and proposed that it should now be regarded as settled.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had no objection.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed, unless his experts should raise any objection.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had been seeking the formula for his communication to the Austrian and Hungarian Delegates.

The Peace
With Austria
and Hungary

The following is a rough translation of the Note as agreed to:—

“The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers has decided to invite the ^{Austrian} Hungarian Delegates furnished with full powers, to come to St. Germain on the 15th May in the evening, in order to examine the conditions of ^{Austrian} Peace. The Hungarian Government is therefore invited to communicate forthwith the number and quality of the Delegates they propose to send to St. Germain, as well as the number and quality of the persons who will accompany them. The Mission will have to remain strictly confined to its role, and should include only persons qualified for their special tasks.”

NOTE. The reason for inviting the Austrians and Hungarians on different dates is that the two Governments are not friendly.

(It was agreed—

1. That M. Clemenceau should, on behalf of the Preliminary Peace Conference, despatch a Note on the above lines to the Austrian and Hungarian Governments.

2. That M. Pichon should be authorised to notify this to the Italian Ambassador at the same time as the information referred to in Minute 2 above.)

Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to ask the Secretary-General to speed up various Commissions dealing with subjects affecting Peace with Austria, and to inform them that their reports should all be complete not later than May 12th.

(M. Dutasta entered the room.)

Requests From
the Belgians for
Information

M. DUTASTA read a communication from the Belgian Delegation, asking for—

1. The text of the Articles in the Treaty of Peace, which they would have to submit to the King of the Belgians.

2. A wording of the Articles in regard to the surrender of the German Colonies.

3. That the summary of the Peace Treaty might be communicated in advance to the Belgian Delegation, in order that it might be published in Brussels at the same time as in Paris.

(It was agreed to discuss this question on the following morning.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 1 May, 1919.

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Friday, May 2, 1919, at 11 a. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BRITISH EMPIRE

FRANCE

President Wilson.

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd
George, M. P.

M. Clemenceau

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B., *Secretary.*
Professor P. J. Mantoux, *Interpreter.*

1. PRESIDENT WILSON said that the representatives of Azerbaijan were anxious to come to Paris. They had had a deputation at Constantinople for a long time, waiting for permission to come to Paris. He understood that the French Government had not given the necessary authorisation. The Georgians and other representatives of the Caucasus republics were all in Paris, and there seemed to be no reason for this exception.

M. CLEMENCEAU and MR. LLOYD GEORGE undertook to look into the matter.

2. M. CLEMENCEAU urged that the letter signed by Mr. Lloyd George and himself, and handed to M. Orlando on April 24th (I. C.-176. C)¹ should be published. He suggested that it should be published with a preamble somewhat as follows:—

“In order that there may be no misunderstanding about the attitude of Great Britain and France in regard to Fiume, M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George have authorised the publication of the following letter to M. Orlando in regard to these matters:—”

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had received a letter from the Marquis Imperiali, which he proceeded to read. The gist of it was that M. Orlando thought it better that the memorandum presented by M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George should not be published, as it would not help public opinion in Italy in its attitude towards Great Britain and France. M. Orlando had been begged by a very able French diplomatist in Rome not to read the memorandum. He felt sure that this was right, as it had made a very painful impression on the Parliamentary Commission to whom he had read it. The Marquis Imperiali urged, in these circumstances, that the memorandum should not be published.

¹ Appendix I to IC-176C, p. 223.

PRESIDENT WILSON urged that it should be published.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Drafting Committee did not know whether to insert Italy or not.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he understood that the Drafting Committee had been instructed on this subject.

SIR MAURICE HANKEY said that he had not been authorised to make any formal communication to the Drafting Committee on the subject. Under Mr. Lloyd George's instructions, however he had asked Mr. Hurst, the British member of the Drafting Committee, to try and arrange throughout the Treaty to avoid mentioning either the word "Italy", or the words "The five Allied and Associated Powers". At an interview he had had with the Drafting Committee yesterday, however, he had gathered that they had not been able to do this.

He had one other item of information he ought to mention, namely, that it had come to his knowledge that one of the Commissions, either the Economic Commission or the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways had sent a telegram warning the Italian representative that Austrian questions would be considered on Monday.

(The view was generally expressed that this ought not to have been done in the present situation with Italy, without authority.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that M. Pichon had carried out his instructions the previous evening to see the Italian Ambassador, and had told him that the Germans were to be met next Tuesday, and that the Austrians and Hungarians were being asked to Paris. M. Bonin did not like it at all.

Reverting to Sir Maurice Hankey's information about the communication by a Commission to Italy, he said that M. Klotz had reported the receipt of a letter from M. Crespi, dated April 30th (which M. Clemenceau proceeded to read), in which he had made a number of criticisms about the reparation decisions, and had made unqualified reservations in the name of the Italian Government. Was this sort of thing to continue? M. Clemenceau asked.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked how M. Crespi had received word of those decisions. He wondered whether he had yet learnt of the decision that in reckoning claims for reparation against Germany, account should be taken of the proportion of the German effort on the particular front.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked what was to be done regarding M. Crespi's letter.

PRESIDENT WILSON said it would be sufficient if M. Klotz's secretary were to acknowledge receipt. He would not do more than this.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he would ask him the straight question as to whether he was a member of the Conference or not. He should say he wished to know because other decisions affecting Italy were being taken.

SIR MAURICE HANKEY mentioned that whenever he had known that reparation, economic, or ports, railways and waterways, or financial questions were to be considered he had sent a telephonic communication to M. Crespi, just as he had done to the other experts. M. Crespi had usually replied that he was unable to be present. This did not apply, however, to the meeting at which the decision referred to by Mr. Lloyd George had been taken, because that had not been a meeting specially organised for the subject. The experts had been present in connection with another question, namely, that of Alsace-Lorraine, and advantage had been taken of their presence to settle this question.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it was necessary to be very careful over this matter; if a break—and by break he did not mean hostilities—occurred with Italy it would be a very serious matter. In these moments small matters and the methods in which things were done were apt to tell. We must avoid even the appearance of incivility. He would give an air of over-courtesy. He thought that M. Klotz was entitled to write and say that other amendments were being made to the reparation clauses which affected Italy, and that he thought he ought to afford an opportunity to M. Crespi to be present.

PRESIDENT WILSON fully agreed as to the importance of courtesy. He thought, however, under all the circumstances, the only proper course was for M. Klotz's secretary to send a courteous acknowledgment of the receipt of the letter. At the present time M. Klotz's relations with the Italian representative were undefined. It would be as irregular for M. Klotz to make an official communication as undoubtedly it had been for M. Crespi to do so.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that nevertheless M. Klotz was entitled to ask if M. Crespi was a member or not.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he would not answer.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would at once telegraph to the Italian Government.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had not been feeling comfortable about the decision on the subject of joint and several responsibility which had been taken in the absence of Italy, though it was to the detriment of Italian interests. He thought undoubtedly that both France and Great Britain would make a good deal out of this decision at Italian expense; France twice as much as Great Britain, and the decision had been taken the moment the Italians left.

PRESIDENT WILSON said we ought not to be too soft-hearted about the Italians, who had withdrawn from the negotiations with Germany because they could not get what they wanted about the negotiations with Austria, which were a separate matter.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought the decision looked rather like sharp practice.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that a letter should be drafted for M. Klotz to send.

(Mr. Philip Kerr was then invited into the room, and was given an outline of the question, and asked to draft a reply. Mr. Kerr retired.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that before a decision was taken as to the publication of his and M. Clemenceau's memorandum to M. Orlando, it should be carefully studied.

(Sir Maurice Hankey handed him the memorandum, which he proceeded to read.) (I. C.-176.C., Appendix I.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said he thought we could not abstain from publishing the letter.

PRESIDENT WILSON reminded that the original understanding was that some document was to be published by Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau on the morning following the publication of his own statement. The impression had been created that the United States of America stood alone, in their attitude and M. Poincaré's declaration had rather heightened the impression that Great Britain and France were not with him. In these circumstances he felt that the memorandum ought to be published.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said the effect must be very carefully considered. If the Italians did not want to come back, they would be glad of some excuse which would throw the blame on to their Allies.

PRESIDENT WILSON felt sure they wanted to come back.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that might be the case, but you did not want to put them in a position of saying President Wilson drove them away from the Conference, and M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George prevented them from coming back.

PRESIDENT WILSON said it was not fair to the world to abstain from publishing. The idea had been put about that Italy was expecting some arrangement to be offered them about Fiume, such as some form of independence under the League of Nations. The world needed some assurance that the Allied and Associated Powers collectively intended to do the right thing.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the first thing was to patch up an arrangement with Italy if it could be patched up honourably. He would like Italy to be represented at the Council if this could be arranged without any sacrifice of principle. (President Wilson agreed.) The second point was that if they did not come back the responsibility must not be with the Allied and Associated Powers. He was afraid that publication would prejudice the position. He was not sure that publication would not make it impossible for the Italians to return. It was well known that a letter had been written, and he and his colleagues, with whom he had discussed it, took the view that the longer the declaration was withheld, the greater would be the effect.

British public opinion was not with the Italians in this matter, but it really had no great interest in it. It wanted it patched up. It was not indifferent to principle, but it really did not know the question or understand it.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that public opinion in the United States was intensely interested. It could not understand why the United States was apparently left in isolation. United States public opinion was much more important than Italian. If the United States again became isolated it would break up the whole scheme on which the Peace Conference was working. He himself had less contact than Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau with Italian opinion, but his experts, with whom he had discussed the matter, assured him that the only way was to show Italy that she was in an impossible position. Once Italy realised that, a result was much more likely. If Italy was kept in a state of hope as regards Fiume, she would go on scheming, and putting her views in the Press, and would get no further. M. Clemenceau's and Mr. Lloyd George's memorandum was unanswerable. It would show clearly to Italian public opinion that Italy was in an impossible situation and must get out of it if she wanted to be in the great world movement. In the meanwhile, if nothing were done, work would have to be continued on the same difficult basis, that is to say, one of constant embarrassment in taking decisions adverse to Italy in the absence of its representatives, and not knowing whether Italy was in or out of the Peace Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he would put some considerations on the other side. He thought President Wilson was wrong in assuming that the United States was regarded as standing alone. His opinion was that Italian public opinion regarded Great Britain as more hostile than she really was. They really thought that the British representatives had acted against them. This was undoubtedly a good deal due to the attitude of *The Times*, which was still regarded as an official or semi-official organ in Italy. Only the previous evening a British soldier had told him that British officers were insulted in the streets in Italian cities, and the feeling was running strong against us. It was assumed that Great Britain had stood with the United States of America. He thought that the contrary opinion had been disseminated in the United States mainly by Mr. Hearst's papers, which were always trying to make trouble between Great Britain and the United States. It was assumed that Great Britain was pro-Jugo-Slav, but as a matter of fact British opinion knew and cared very little about the Jugo-Slavs. If he thought that public opinion would bring matters to a head and force Italy to take a decision, he would agree to it. But he feared it might only prolong the crisis by making it difficult for Italy to come in. Sooner or later, Italy must come in,

and must do so voluntarily. Publication might cause a ministerial crisis in Italy, and bring back M. Giolitti and M. Tittoni, which would not be at all desirable. Moreover, to publish in the face of the Marquis Imperiali's letter, which was based on information from M. Orlando, would, he thought, be a very serious matter.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he thought he was the best judge of opinion in the United States of America, and the impression there he had no doubt from daily communications was that the United States were getting no support.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested the publication of some semi-official communique that was obviously inspired.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that we should prolong the present situation longer by the present method of leaving matters alone than by a drop in the test tube which was to produce precipitation. (Mr. Lloyd George interjected that he was afraid it might produce an explosion.) He believed that the only way to get the Italians back would be to make a declaration. We had now sent to the Austrians, and we should show them that if they did not come back they would be out of it altogether. He understood that they had sent a ship to Fiume and that they were increasing the number of troops in Fiume. He had learnt that very morning from Mr. Lloyd George that they had sent a battleship, two cruisers and a destroyer to Smyrna. This confirmed what M. Orlando had told the United States ambassador in Rome that they would not go into the League of Nations unless they got what they wanted. At Brest there was one of the latest United States battleships waiting to take him home, but this could be sent to Smyrna or Fiume.

M. CLEMENCEAU and MR. LLOYD GEORGE said they would send it to Fiume.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that of course the danger was if a force was sent, some incident might happen. The Italians seemed to be sending forces to several places.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had sent Lieut. Harmsworth to M. Venizelos with a telegram that he had received from the Central Committee of unredeemed Hellenes at Athens, to the effect that recent events, especially in the Smyrna district, indicated that the Turks, stimulated by some outside power (this, no doubt, was Italy) were continuing their policy of oppression and massacre; and the telegram concluded by asking for forces to be sent. M. Venizelos had replied that the Italians were undoubtedly stirring up the Turks, and no doubt there was an understanding between them. This strengthened the view that an Inter-Allied force should be sent to Smyrna.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the Italians would probably say they were sending battleships to Smyrna to protect their compatriots in Turkey.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the three nations should all send forces. Great Britain had a battleship in the Black Sea.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that France had battleships in the Black Sea also.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he would see Admiral Benson about it at once.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this was the application of the principle of the League of Nations. What he asked were we going to do about the Italians at Versailles.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Germans knew the position.

M. CLEMENCEAU said his information was that the Germans did not take much interest in the Italian position.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this confirmed the information he had read yesterday.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the peace of the world really depended upon the United States of America, France and Great Britain hanging together.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Italian policy was clearly to lead the Allied and Associated Powers to the point where they could not make peace in common because Great Britain and France were bound by the Treaty of London which President Wilson could not recognise. We ought to let them know beforehand that by not coming to Versailles they had broken the Pact of London to which they had adhered, and by which it was agreed not to make peace separately. We should show that if they broke the Pact of London we were not bound.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that it depended upon how the promise not to make a separate peace was interpreted. The Italians had been a party to the Armistice, they had been a party to the preliminary peace, a party (as Mr. Lloyd George pointed out) to the basis of the peace, and a party to the discussions on the peace. On the very eve of the negotiations with the Germans, they had withdrawn on a matter that had nothing to do with those negotiations.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that we should let them know that if they withdraw they are breaking the Pact of London, and we are not bound by the Treaty. We must let them know that if Italy breaks it, she must take the consequences.

PRESIDENT WILSON said it must be made clear that it was Italy and not France and Great Britain that were breaking the Treaty.

M. CLEMENCEAU said the day was coming when this must be made known.

PRESIDENT WILSON doubted if it was necessary to let it be known before next Tuesday when the Germans came.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought it should be made known before.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought it would be sufficient to say that we had signed the Treaty of Peace whereby Italy not signing had broken the Pact of London.

M. CLEMENCEAU recalled that when the decision had been taken to invite the Germans to Versailles, President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George had agreed, but M. Orlando had written to him making all reservations. He had that correspondence. The communication had not been sent to the Germans with M. Orlando's consent.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that except as regards certain matters of detail, the main elements of the Treaty with the Germans had been urged with the co-operation of the Italians. They now refused to sign this Treaty unless another Treaty was settled first.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the Italians ought to be informed if the Drafting Committee were instructed to leave Italy out of the Treaty.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that if some communication was sent every day to Italy in this sort of way, she would only be encouraged in her attitude. Surely M. Klotz's reply to M. Crespi was enough.

At this point SIR MAURICE HANKEY, under instruction, read extracts from the previous Minutes showing that Mr. Lloyd George had asked M. Orlando whether, in the event of Italy's absence from the meeting with the Germans, the Allied and Associated Powers were entitled to put forward demands on Italy's behalf, and that M. Orlando had made it clear that they were not. ([I. C.] 176 C.)²

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had told the Marquis Imperiali that if Italy abstained from being present it would be an end to the Pact of London. Unfortunately there was no note of this conversation.

PRESIDENT WILSON recalled that Mr. Lloyd George had told him.

1. (It was agreed that the question should be studied by M. Clemenceau and his advisers, and by Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour, and that a form of communication to Italy should be prepared for consideration.

2. (The draft of a letter from M. Klotz to M. Crespi prepared by Mr. Philip Kerr was read and approved (Appendix I).

M. Clemenceau took the letter to communicate to M. Klotz.)

German Ships in
American Ports

2 [bis]. There was a short discussion on this question, in which reference was made to a scheme that had been drawn up between British and United States Experts.

Belgium and
Reparation

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE read the following telephone message from Mr. Keynes:—

"Mr. Keynes said that there had been a meeting with the Belgians at which were present M. Loucheur, an American representative and

² *Ante*, p. 210.

himself. The Belgians had made a number of new demands, the following being the most important:—

- (1) To waive all claims for repayment of loans to Belgium on the ground that we were going to get them out of Germany.
- (2) Out of the first £100,000,000 sterling that we were going to get as priority, we should make no claim for repayment of certain reconstruction loans which we and the United States (? French) had made to Belgium since the Armistice on condition that they were repaid out of the first money received by Belgium from Germany.
- (3) The Belgians wanted to get after the first £100,000,000, 15 per cent. of any monies paid over by Germany until their total reparation demand was satisfied.

In the end, the Americans, M. Loucheur and Mr. Keynes had agreed to recommend to their respective authorities one concession, namely, that in regard to number (2)."

PRESIDENT WILSON said that M. Lamont had given him rather a more hopeful message to the effect that an understanding might be reached.

Plenary Meeting.
Powers to Whom
Peace Terms Are
To Be Communicated

4. The Note from the Secretary General of the Conference, dated May 1st, 1919 (Appendix II) was read and the following decisions were taken:—

1. To hand over to the Germans the credentials of the Delegations of Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay.

2. To place the aforesaid four Powers among the Powers to which the Treaties are to be communicated before being delivered to the Germans.

5. MR. LLOYD GEORGE handed to M. Clemenceau a memorandum by General Sir Henry Wilson, criticising the scheme of gradual withdrawal at intervals of five years from the German provinces west of the Rhine. General Wilson had considered that the scheme was worked out on a wrong basis, and the first withdrawal should be from the south and not from the north.

Guarantees

The Meeting then adjourned until 4 p. m. at the Quai d'Orsay.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 2 May, 1919.

Appendix I to IC-179B

Copy of Letter To Be Sent by M. Klotz to M. Crespi

2 MAY, 1919.

DEAR SIGNOR CRESPI: I have much pleasure in acknowledging receipt of your letter of April 30th in which you suggest certain amend-

ments in the draft of the clauses of the Treaty with Germany relating to reparation. I feel somewhat at a loss as to how to deal with your request, because, as you remind me, the Italian representatives withdrew from our deliberations on April 22nd and have taken no part in them since. I am, however, very glad to note your criticisms and suggestions and have communicated them to the American and British representatives.

I should like further to take this opportunity to inform you that the representatives of America, the British Empire and of France have been obliged to take very important decisions in regard to the draft Treaty with Germany since they have been deprived of the advice and assistance of the Italian delegation. In particular I wish to bring to your notice the following important decision regarding the question of reparation:—

“Les dommages de guerre, conséquences des hostilités sur l’un des fronts de combat, sont réparés par l’Allemagne et ses Alliés au *pro rata* de l’effort militaire et navale fourni par chacun d’eux sur ce front. Les proportions seront déterminées par la Commission des Réparations.”^a

I am anxious to communicate this decision to you because it specially affects Italian interests.

Appendix II to IC-179B

[*Note From the Secretary General of the Conference*]

MAY 1, 1919.

NOTE:

Guided by the preamble of the Treaty providing the “resumption of official relations” with Germany, the Drafting Committee have been of opinion that

Bolivia
Ecuador
Peru
Uruguay

should be included in the Allied and Associated Powers which are to resume those relations.

The above mentioned Powers, as is well known, did not declare war upon Germany but merely severed diplomatic relations with her. It will be noticed, however, that Uruguay has performed acts of war (Germany ships).

^a For translation, see footnote 1, p. 388.

According to Article I of the Regulations those Powers have been admitted to the work of the Conference and have since the beginning taken a part in it.

If the view of the Drafting Committee is correct it will be expedient:

1.—to hand over to the Germans the credentials of those four Delegations.

2.—to place the aforesaid four Powers among the Powers to which the Treaty is to be communicated before being delivered to the Germans.

Notes of a Meeting Held at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday,
May 2, 1919, at 4 p.m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

Sir Maurice Hankey
M. Mantoux*Secretary.*
Interpreter.

New States.
Conditions To
Be Accepted
by Them

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had nominated M. Berthelot of the French Foreign Office as the French member of the Committee, which it was on the previous day decided to set up on this subject. (I. C. 178.B. [178D] Minute 8.)¹

Military, Naval &
Air Terms of
Peace. Article 46

2. The previous decision that Article 46 should be suppressed. (It was agreed that the Articles should be redrafted so as to indicate the actual Articles of the Armistice of November 1918, and of the Convention subsequent thereto, which were to remain in force.

The following was approved as the basis of an Article to be prepared by the Drafting Committee:—

“The following portions of the Armistice of November 11th, 1918:—
Article VI; the first two and the sixth and seventh paragraphs of Article VII;

Article IX; Clauses I, II and V of Annex 2; and the Protocol dated 4th April 1919,² to the terms of the Armistice of Nov. 11th, 1918 remain in force so far as they are not inconsistent with the above stipulations.”

(M. Loucheur was present during the following discussions.)

Reparation.
Annex IV.
Para. 6.

3. A revised version of Annex IV, para. 6, to the Reparation clauses was approved. (Appendix I.)

Belgian
Reparation

4. M. Loucheur rehearsed the claims made by Belgium for reparation. (See this morning's meeting, I. C. 179.B.)³

¹ *Ante*, p. 393.

² Printed as Bulletin No. 150 in Miller, *My Diary*, vol. xvii, p. 420.

³ *Supra*.

M. LOUCHEUR urged the acceptance of the claim for the Belgians that after the first hundred million pounds, they should receive 15% of any monies paid by Germany until their total reparation demand was satisfied.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that in the case of Belgium we were dealing as it were with a sick person. The sum involved was not large, and it was hardly worth contesting.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he could not agree, Belgium must come in on the same terms as everyone else. Great Britain had a debt of some 8 or 9 thousand million pounds. Belgium was a very near neighbour and the greatest competitor of Scotland, which had an enormous debt. He could not accept any specially favourable system for the Belgians.

M. LOUCHEUR urged that it should be taken into consideration that the Belgian claim for the redemption of the mark had been refused. Belgium would lose 3 milliard of marks by this.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that after the armistice, Belgium had taken 4½ millions of marks and she expected to make a profit on them.

M. LOUCHEUR said that 7 millions of marks had been gathered in Belgium, and Belgium would lose about half their value.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said they had not been forced on Germany.

M. CLEMENCEAU said not since the Armistice.

M. LOUCHEUR said that this was a veritable loss to Belgium.

Note. The Secretary had not been furnished with any document indicating the nature of the Belgian claims, which were highly technical and was unable to follow exactly the other points.

It was understood that some proposal was accepted in principle that the Belgians should not be compelled to repay immediately an advance of 2½ billion francs that had been made to her by the Allied and Associated Powers.

5. The attached Article IV. dealing with the ports of Strasburg and Kehl was approved for incorporation in the Articles of the Treaty of Peace dealing with Alsace-Lorraine. (Appendix 2.)
(M. Loucheur withdrew.)

6. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received a letter from M. Hymans asking for an alteration in the text of the Peace Treaty Articles concerning the German Colonies. The alteration he proposed was that the rights of Germany instead of being transferred to the five great Allied and Associated Powers, should be transferred to the United States of America, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Belgium and Portugal. M. Hymans had drawn his attention in the letter to the fact that Belgium had taken an important part in the military operations in Africa, notably, in German East Africa, and that Belgium had conquered there the territories which she occupies and administers.

Alsace-
Lorraine

German Colonies.
Belgian Repre-
sentation in
Regard to

SIR MAURICE HANKEY reported that the Secretary-General of the Belgian Delegation had approached him on the same subject.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought it was a most impudent claim. At a time when the British Empire had millions of soldiers fighting for Belgium, a few black troops had been sent into German East Africa.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the present draft of the Articles had not shut Belgium out. The German colonies would be held by the Allied and Associated Powers as Trustees until the distribution of mandates.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this question was one to be considered in allotting the mandates.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that a reply should be sent in the sense that the Belgian interests would be in the hands of the Council of the League of Nations, on which Belgium would be represented.

M. CLEMENCEAU undertook to answer in this sense.

(M. Fromageot, who was shortly followed by the other members of the Drafting Committee, entered.)

7. There was a considerable discussion as to the action to be taken in drafting the Peace Treaty in view of the uncertainty as to whether the withdrawal of the Italians from the Peace Conference was permanent or temporary.

(It was agreed:—

(1) That the preamble to the Peace Treaty should contain a definition of the "principal powers" in which should be included the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Japan, and Italy only if Italy was represented in all other parts of the Treaty, except the preamble, these Powers would not be mentioned by name, but only collectively as the "principal powers." Almost the only part of the Treaty where the name of Italy would appear would be in the preamble, and if the Italian delegates should return, the alteration required would be a small one.

(2) In cases where boundaries commissions are set up by the Treaty of Peace, provision should be made for four instead of five members.)

(8) The question of the date by which the Treaty of Peace with Germany would be ready was discussed with the Drafting Committee, and it was decided:—

(i) That the Drafting Committee should aim at handing over the Treaty of Peace to the printer by the evening of Sunday, May 4th.

(ii) That the Drafting Committee should be authorized to reject all corrections except those sent from the Supreme Council.

(The Drafting Committee withdrew.)

(9) Later in the afternoon a letter was received from the Drafting Committee asking whether mention of Italy should be removed in the Covenant of the League of Nations as well as elsewhere in the Treaty.

Italy and the
Peace Treaty

Date by Which
the Peace Treaty
Should Be Ready

League of
Nations

It was pointed out that there was already one non-signatory State, namely, Spain, provided for in the Council of the League, so that Italy could be left out without difficulty.

(After some discussion it was decided that Article IV of the Covenant of the League of Nations should be redrafted, instead of appearing as at present, namely:—

“The Council shall consist of representatives of the United States of America, of the British Empire, of France, of Italy, and of Japan, etc.[”]

it should take the following form:

“The Council shall consist of representatives of the principal powers, together with, etc.”)

PRESIDENT WILSON undertook to discuss this matter with Lord Robert Cecil and others, with a view to the introduction of the necessary amendments at the next Plenary Meeting of the Preliminary Peace Conference.

(The latter decision was communicated to the Drafting Committee verbally by Sir Maurice Hankey. At the same time the drafting Committee informed him that in the Covenant of the League of Nations they proposed to remove Italy from the list of signatory to the list of non-signatory powers.)

(10) MR. LLOYD GEORGE drew attention to the fact that if Italy did not sign the Treaty with Germany, she would not be a member of the League of Nations, and would not be represented on the Council of the League. The result would be that there would be eight instead of nine members, and that the smaller Powers would have as many members as the Great Powers. The Chairman might be a member of one of the smaller Powers, and might have the casting vote in cases where a decision was by a majority. He pointed out that this might have great inconvenience in some questions, particularly those of Mandates.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the question of the allocation of Mandates would not be dealt with by the League of Nations, but would be settled by the Great Powers.

(11) The attached Article submitted by M. Clemenceau in regard to Russia was agreed to for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace. (Appendix III.)

Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward it to the Drafting Committee.

(12) After some discussion, the attached revised Article, based on a draft submitted by M. Clemenceau, was approved for incorporation in the Treaty of Peace. (Appendix IV.)

The Effect of the
Withdrawal of
Italy on the
Covenant of the
League of Nations

Article in Regard
to Russia in the
Treaty of Peace

Article in Regard
to Austria in the
Treaty of Peace

(13) PRESIDENT WILSON said that he had arranged for an American battleship of the latest type to proceed from Brest to Smyrna.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had also ordered a ship there. M. Venizelos had wanted to do the same, but he had advised him to wait until the ships of the Allied and Associated Powers had arrived there.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that France had already a battleship at Smyrna.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if any announcement should be made that these naval movements were taking place in consequence of the massacres of Greeks by Turks.

M. CLEMENCEAU deprecated any announcement, and the proposal was dropped.

(The experts on the subject of Cables were then introduced, and the subsequent discussion is reported as a separate Meeting.)⁴

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 2 May, 1919.

Appendix I to IC-179C

Reparation

ANNEX 4⁵

(Amended Article approved by M. Clemenceau, President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George on May 2nd, 1919)

6. As an immediate advance on account of animals referred to in paragraph 2 (a) above.

Germany undertakes to deliver in equal monthly installments in the three months following the coming into force of the present Treaty, the following quantities of live stock:—

I. To the French Government:

- 500 stallions (3 to 7 years).
- 30,000 fillies and mares (18 months to 7 years) Type: Ardennois, Boulouanaise or Belgian.
- 2,000 bulls (18 months to 3 years).
- 90,000 milch cows (2 to 6 years).
- 1,000 rams.
- 100,000 sheep.
- 10,000 ewes.

⁴ See minutes of meeting of the Council of Ten, BC-60, vol. iv, p. 493.

⁵ To the Reparations Clauses. For the text of this annex as previously discussed in the Supreme Council, see annex 4 to appendix I to IC-176A, p. 184; and for changes introduced at that time, see p. 163.

II. To the Belgian Government:

200 stallions (3 to 7 years).	}	—Large Belgian type.
5,000 mares (3 to 7 years).		
5,000 fillies (18 months to 3 years).		
2,000 bulls (18 months to 3 years).		
50,000 milch cows (2 to 6 years).		
40,000 heifers.		
200 rams.		
20,000 sheep.		
15,000 pigs-sows.		

The animals delivered shall be of average health and condition.

To the extent that animals so delivered cannot be identified as animals taken away or seized, the value of such animals shall be credited against the reparation obligations of Germany in accordance with Paragraph 5 of this Annex.

Appendix II to IC-179C

ARTICLE IV

Within a period of three weeks after the coming into force of the present Treaty, the port of Strasbourg and the Port of Kehl shall be constituted, for a period of seven years, a single unit from the point of view of exploitation.

The administration of this unit will be carried on by a manager named by the Central Rhine Commission which shall also have the power to remove him. He will be of French nationality. He will reside in Strasbourg and will be subject to the supervision of the Central Rhine Commission.

There will be established in the two ports free zones in conformity with Title of the present Treaty.

A special convention between France and Germany, which shall be submitted to the approval of the Central Rhine Commission, will fix the details of this organisation, particularly as regards finance.

It is understood that by the terms of the present Article the port of Kehl includes the whole of the area necessary for the movements of the port and the trains which serve it, including the harbour, quays and railroads, platforms, cranes, sheds and warehouses, silos, elevators, and hydroelectric plants, which make up the equipment of the port.

The German Government undertakes to carry out all measures which shall be required of it in order to assure that all the making up and switching of trains arriving at or departing from Kehl, whether for the right bank or the left bank of the Rhine, shall be carried on in the best conditions possible.

All rights and property shall be safeguarded, and, in particular, the administration of the port shall not prejudice any property rights of the French or Baden railroads.

Equality of treatment as respects traffic shall be assured in both ports to the nationals, vessels and goods of every country.

In the case that at the end of the sixth year France shall consider that the progress made in the improvement of the port of Strasbourg still requires a prolongation of this temporary régime, it may ask the privilege of such prolongation from the Central Rhine Commission, which may grant an extension for a period not to exceed three years.

Throughout the whole period of any such extension the free zones above provided for shall be maintained.

For all questions concerning this Article the Central Rhine Commission will decide by a majority vote.

At the date of the signature of the present treaty the Allied and Associated Powers may appoint a provisional manager who shall be of French nationality and shall conduct the administration until the manager shall be named by the Central Rhine Commission.

Appendix III to IC-179C

Article in Regard to Russia

(Approved for incorporation in the Treaty of Peace by M. Clemenceau, President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George, on May 2, 1919, at 4 p. m.)

Germany acknowledges and will fully respect the inalienable independence of all the territories which were part of the former Russian Empire.

Germany definitively accepts the annulment of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk⁶ and of all treaties or agreements whatever they might have been which Germany concluded since the Maximalist Revolution (November ?th, 1917) with any Government or political groups formed on the territory of the former Russian Empire.⁷

The Allied and Associated Governments formally reserve all rights for Russia to obtain from Germany the restitutions and the satisfactions based on the principles of the present treaty.

⁶ *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. I, p. 442.

⁷ Treaty of peace between the Ukraine and the Central Powers, February 9, 1918, *ibid.*, vol. II, p. 665.

Supplementary treaty to the treaty of peace between the Ukraine and the Central Powers, February 9, 1918, Great Britain, Cd. 9105, Misc. No. 18 (1918).

Treaty between Finland and the German Government, March 7, 1918, *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II, p. 771.

The Russo-German supplementary treaties, August 27, 1918, *ibid.*, vol. I, p. 598.

Appendix IV to IC-179C

Austria

(Revised Article approved by M. Clemenceau, President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George on May 2nd, 1919)

Germany acknowledges and will fully respect the independence of Austria within the frontiers established by the present treaty as inalienable, except by consent of the Council of the League of Nations.

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday, 3 May, 1919, at 10 a. m.**

[PRESENT]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George,
M. P.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B., *Secretary*.
Professor P. J. Mantoux, *Interpreter*.

1. M. Klotz was introduced by M. Clemenceau and read the letter which was to be sent to M. Crespi, in reply to the latter's letter referred to in the Minutes of the previous day.¹

Italy: The Letter
to M. Crespi

This reply, is identical with the draft approved on the previous day, except for an introduction in the following sense:—

"I already had the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your letter etc."

M. Klotz' letter was approved.)

(M. Klotz withdrew.)

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the Foreign Ministers should be introduced for the discussion on the subject of Italy.

Situation as
Regards Italy

M. CLEMENCEAU said he was willing.

PRESIDENT WILSON said it was not a matter of foreign affairs but rather for the Conference. There was no technical reason why the Foreign Ministers should be present.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the decision to be taken was so important that he would like to have the presence of Mr. Balfour, who had come over under the impression that the question of submarine cables was to be discussed at 10:00 o'clock.

(This was agreed to.)

(Mr. Balfour entered, and M. Pichon was telephoned for.)

PRESIDENT WILSON read a despatch from the United States' Ambassador in Rome, who, he said, was sympathetic to the Italians but thoroughly understood his own point of view. The gist of it was that

¹ See IC-179B, p. 408.

May Day had been quiet in Rome; that excitement had largely subsided; that the Italian Government had realized the dangerous position; that the troops as well as the gendarmes had been removed from the American Embassy; that there was a real desire for a settlement, but that the only possible settlement was a concession by the Allied and Associated Powers in regard to Fiume; if this could be agreed, everything else could be arranged; but that nothing would content Italy which left out Fiume.

He pointed out that the Italian Government had only themselves to blame for this result, as they had worked up public opinion.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Mr. Erskine, the British Chargé des Affaires, had telegraphed that he had seen Baron Sonnino; that the latter had said he was doing his best to quiet excitement; but had ended by saying that the next move ought to be from Paris.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that these telegrams showed that the things that Baron Sonnino had contended were not popular items. What the public wanted [was?] the items Signor Orlando had contended for, namely, those outside the Pact of London. Mr. Baker, who was in charge of the press arrangements for the United States Delegation said that his Italian colleague had not latterly come to see him, but yesterday he had seen him and he had asked when the Italians were going to be invited back to Paris. His reply had been: "Who invited you to go"?

M. CLEMENCEAU was handed a despatch from M. Barrère, the French Ambassador in Rome, which had just arrived. M. Barrère said that he was telegraphing at midnight and had just received a letter from Baron Sonnino, commenting more particularly on the fact that the Delegates of Austria and Hungary had been asked to Paris without consultation with the Italians. This compelled him to give to some observations he had forwarded the character of formal protest.

(At this moment a message was received by Mr. Lloyd George from the Marquis Imperiali, who telephoned to the effect that he had received a cipher despatch from Rome and would postpone his visit to Mr. Lloyd George until it had been deciphered.)

PRESIDENT WILSON said that Baron Sonnino did not state the whole of the facts. The Italians had been informed of what was intended before they left for Rome.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the decision to invite the Austrians and Hungarians had been taken after the Italian Delegation had left. How, he asked, could the Italians have been consulted?

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they had been informed immediately the decision was taken.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if the telegram drafted by Mr. Balfour to which Mr. Lloyd George had alluded in conversation before the meeting, might be read.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE read the first draft, which had been prepared by Mr. Malkin, a legal expert, and did not pretend to give more than a rough outline of the legal position in which Italy would be if she did not sign the Treaty of Peace with Germany (Appendix I). The gist of this was if Italy broke the Pact of London, the Allies were no longer bound by the Treaty of London.

MR. BALFOUR said that his own draft (Appendix II) was based on the idea that there would be great disaster to the world if Italy did not come back to meet the Germans. The breach between Italy and her Allies would become wider. There would be one Power outside the grouping of Great Powers and it might be impossible for that Power to come back. His idea was to give Italy a bridge, or at least the means of coming back.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out the difference between the effect the document would produce if signed simply by the British Government as a friendly warning and its dispatch as a formal warning from France, Great Britain and the United States of America. He then read Mr. Balfour's draft. (Appendix II.)

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the first document (Appendix I) was not adequate since it did not recite Italy's participation in all these transactions. For example (*a*) the Armistice; (*b*) the basis on which the Peace negotiations were undertaken and (*c*) Italy's share in drawing up the Peace Treaty itself, and (*d*) finally, Italy's withdrawal.

M. CLEMENCEAU then produced a document that he had prepared which, at his request, President Wilson read. (Appendix III.)

(During the reading of this document M. Pichon entered.)

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that each step of this kind tended to emphasize the isolation of the United States of America.

M. CLEMENCEAU said the document had been prepared by M. Tardieu under his instructions entirely from the point of view of the signatories of the Treaty of London.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that in effect this document (Appendix III) did indicate that if Italy came back on the basis of the Treaty of London, some agreement might be reached. The world knew, however, that the United States could not be a party to an agreement based on the Treaty of London and he would have to say so. This document amounted to a virtue of [*virtual*] promise to stand with Italy and the isolation of the United States would become more serious than ever. He wished to add that he was saying this in the most friendly spirit.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had put precisely the same difficulty to his colleagues and had pointed out that we were in danger of a quarrel either with the United States or with Italy. The former would be far the more serious of the two. Putting the matter at its

lowest, Germany would not sign the Peace in the former event so that this was a very serious possibility. This made him almost more afraid of the return of the Italian Delegates than if they stayed away.

MR. BALFOUR said that this was his view.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Mr. Bonar Law,² who had been in contact with elements in England that were perhaps less imbued than [with] the principles on which the Peace was being based, was inclined to take a somewhat different view. He asked Mr. Balfour what the feeling was in England according to his information.

MR. BALFOUR said he had shown Sir Rennell Rodd³ the memorandum handed by Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau to M. Orlando. His view had been: "Are you really going to quarrel with Italy over a thing like that?" Sir Rennell Rodd had, however, rather changed his view after their conversation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he did not wish to put M. Orlando in the position of being able to cast the responsibility on his Allies for their remaining away. Unless France and Great Britain said clearly: "We stand by the Treaty of London" M. Orlando could say: "You threw me over."

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that the same object could be secured in a different way although he was not prepared there and then to say exactly how. As he told M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George on the previous day, the whole trend of the Press was to show that France and Great Britain were not acting with the United States and that he had not the support of the Heads of these States. This was why he wanted the memorandum to Mr. Orlando to be published so as to show clearly that their views were similar to his own. This would show United States' opinion that he was not standing in isolation in this matter. It had been stated in Rome that President Wilson's declaration had been inspired by M. Clemenceau. He was informed that the French Embassy had issued an official denial to this. One Italian newspaper had said that M. Clemenceau had neither inspired or knew of his declaration.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Pichon if this was correct.

M. PICHON said he had no information.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that it had only been in one newspaper. Whichever way, however, his statement was taken, it was news to him that his colleagues did not know, or that he had sent out his statement arbitrarily. He wanted to warn his colleagues that if they were not careful an impression would be given that there was a serious rift

² A. Bonar Law, British Lord Privy Seal; plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.

³ British Ambassador in Italy.

between France and Great Britain on the one hand and the United States on the other. The effect of this would be that United States' opinion would say: "We will get out of this."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it was necessary to speak very frankly in the intimacy of these conversations. It must not be forgotten that there was a growing feeling that Europe was being bullied by the United States of America. In London this feeling was very strong and that matter had to be handled with the greatest care. Any such rift would be the saddest possible ending to the present Conference. It would put an end to the League of Nations. He understood that the London Press had behaved extremely well and had not gone as far as British public opinion. The position was one of real danger and wanted to be handled with the greatest care, otherwise we might have the worst catastrophe since 1914.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he did not speak with authority [in?] regard to British public opinion. Nevertheless, he was sure of the fact that the so-called bullying was recognized by the common man as based on the principles which inspired the Peace. In his view, it was indispensable clearly to show Italy that in all essentials Great Britain, France and the United States were united, otherwise the Italians would continue to be troublesome.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in fact they were not completely united. In regard to Fiume they were united. M. Clemenceau and he, however, were not in the same position as President Wilson, owing to the fact that they were bound by the Treaty of London.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau had both signed the memorandum to M. Orlando. This showed that they were united with him in judgment even though not in position.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it was no use being united in judgment when a decision was wanted. France and Great Britain were bound by the Treaty of London. If Italy insisted he was bound to stand by the Treaty. He could not possibly help that. This was the bottom fact of the whole situation.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that this was a position which could not be got out of. Moreover, it was an indefensible position. The Treaty had been entered into when only a little group of nations was at war. Since then half the World had joined in. There could be no right in coercing other Parties to this Treaty which were just as much bound by conscience as Great Britain and France were by the Treaty. It was neither good morals nor good statesmanship.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Great Britain had been brought into the war largely in protest against the breach of a Treaty. She could not contemplate herself breaking a Treaty at the end of the war

when the other partner of the Treaty had lost half a million lives in giving effect to it. This had been worrying him for several days past.

PRESIDENT WILSON said this made it the more important to find some way out. The stage ought to be so set as not to encourage the Italians to come back. M. Clemenceau's document (Appendix III) was more than an invitation for them to return. It was a challenge. He would prefer the first document that had been read (Appendix I) with a recital of the facts added. A clear narration should be given of the facts and a very important statement in M. Orlando's letter to M. Clemenceau dated April 23rd in which he stated that:

"The terms of Peace with Germany may henceforth be considered a settlement in their essential elements" should be referred to. Then the case would be clear that if Italy were to break off the responsibility would be theirs.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Italians would then formulate a long reply, and a controversy would be commenced. He agreed to every word that President Wilson had said but he was really afraid that they might come back.

MR. BALFOUR said that as he understood the matter the policy that we wished to pursue was the same policy as the United States of America wished to pursue, and vice versa. Our difficulty arose from the fact that we were bound by a formal treaty, which, however, it was true, had been concluded in entirely different circumstances from those now applying. The difficulty was how to get a real agreement in conformity with our treaties. The only way seemed to be to get the Italians to admit that they had broken the treaty which they really had done.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that Italy had broken both treaties, because her demands were more than the Treaty of London gave her. He had never for a moment given the smallest indication that he agreed to the Treaty of London.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he could not altogether accept any suggestion that President Wilson's statement voiced the British view. He thought that Italy had a real case connected with her security in demanding the Islands in the Adriatic. President Wilson had agreed that the ethnic principle was not the only one that could be adopted by admitting that Italy should have great part of the Tyrol. He himself would apply the same principle to the Islands, in default of which, Italy's east coast would be seriously menaced.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that against Austria-Hungary this was the case.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said the same applied if Austria-Hungary had allies. If we were to say "you have broken the treaty", there would

be an end of the matter. In M. Clemenceau's document (Appendix III) we said "you will have broken if you do not come back". If there must be a break, a break with Italy would be bad enough, but not a disaster; a break with the United States would be a disaster.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked why the Treaty of London should be mentioned in the Note, Mr. Lloyd George had been almost brutally frank with M. Orlando on this point. He wished that the memorandum to M. Orlando might be published. (M. CLEMENCEAU interjected that this was his view.) All that was now necessary was to show that Italy was breaking the Pact. The first document read (Appendix I), however, did not prove the case sufficiently.

MR. BALFOUR explained that the first document was only a very hasty draft in which his legal adviser had jotted down his view on the legal point.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE adverted to a matter of drafting in M. Clemenceau's document (Appendix III). It called attention to the fact that the Treaty of London assigned Fiume to the Croats. In his view, it was imperative to point out that this meant Serbia—another Ally. He asked if the Serbs had known of this Treaty.

MR BALFOUR thought not.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that that had been argued and set before the Italians sufficiently.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it was not quite sufficient to say that Fiume had been given to the Croats. There was no feeling for the Croats in the United Kingdom, but there was very strong feeling for the Serbs.

M. PICHON said that the Treaty of London had not been communicated to the Croats. At one of the conversations at the Quai d'Orsay, M. Vesnitch⁴ had said that he did not know the Treaty of London, and took no cognizance of it.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would prefer to publish the memorandum signed by Mr. Lloyd George and himself first. If any other document were published first, the public would not understand the situation, which could not be made clear without the memorandum. There were certain objections, but by this means alone could the position be fully explained. He and Mr. Lloyd George had all along approved of the general lines of President Wilson's statement, and it must be made clear that they had not differed from it. On the eve of very serious events, it must be shown that Great Britain and France had always stood with the United States of America, otherwise if some other document were published first, it would be said that they had wavered. It was true that M. Orlando did not want the memorandum published,

⁴ Milenko R. Vesnitch, Minister in France of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State; plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.

but this was a case of a choice between two evils and the least disadvantageous was to publish the memorandum.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he must make it clear that President Wilson had not put the view of the British Government in his statement, and that was why he had wanted a separate document to be sent to M. Orlando. Without it, M. Orlando would not know what the British attitude was.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that memorandum showed clearly what the British and French view was as matter stood. He said that he had to keep his private secretary in the United States reassured that there was no difference between him and Great Britain on this point.

MR. BALFOUR confirmed this by stating that he had received a telegram from Lord Reading⁵ who was about to make a speech in New York, and who had indicated that there was this idea of a separation between the American view and the British and French view. He had telegraphed back that there was not the smallest difference in policy between them.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that his private secretary, Mr. Tumulty, had an almost uncanny appreciation of public opinion in the United States. He himself had had to keep Mr. Tumulty reassured that there was no difference between himself and his British and French colleagues. If this opinion continued to gain ground American public opinion would be asking what he was going to do.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what action was contemplated if Italy did not come back? What would be done if Italy remained in Fiume: Would she be left there? It would be no use sending her letters, in which we should merely have to say that the Austrian Peace had been settled on certain principles and that Fiume was to be a free port. Should we have to say to her, you must clear out?

M. CLEMENCEAU said not at present.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was not shrinking from the results of our policy. The League of Nations, however, would be finished, if the first Power that defied it did so with impunity. Moreover, if Italy was left in Fiume, there would be fighting between her and the Jugo-Slavs. Were we to allow the Italian armies to march to Belgrade? He only said these things to show that we were really determining a great policy at the present time.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that Mr. Lloyd George had been arguing that if the memorandum were published, it would prevent the Italians coming back.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was, because the indications at the present time were that if the Italians came back, they would ask for

⁵ British Lord Chief Justice; High Commissioner and Special Ambassador to the United States.

impossible terms. He, himself, hoped that Italy might still be willing to accept the compromise that he had proposed, namely, that Fiume should remain an absolutely free port; that they should evacuate Dalmatia, perhaps with some provision for free cities; and that they would take the Islands.

M. CLEMENCEAU doubted if this was possible.

(The Meeting then adjourned to the room upstairs for the Meeting on Cables, reported in the other series of Minutes.)^o

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, May 3, 1919.

Appendix I to IC-180A

[Draft by Mr. Malkin, British Legal Expert, of a Communication To Be Sent to the Italian Government]

The French and British Governments have been loyally endeavoring to carry out the provision of the Pact of London under which the signatories agreed not to conclude a separate peace. For several months discussions have been proceeding with the object of reaching an agreement as to the terms on which peace could be made in common. The action of the Italian representatives in withdrawing from these discussions, if persisted in, obviously makes it impossible for peace to be concluded in common; it renders the fulfilment of the promise in question by the French and British Governments impossible, and constitutes a breach by the Italian Government of the Pact of London.

Appendix II to IC-180A

[Draft by Mr. Balfour of a Communication To Be Sent to the Italian Government]

We are not sure that you fully realize the serious effects on the unity of the Allies and the settlement of Europe which must be produced by your absence from Versailles while peace with Germany is being arranged. It is true that we have no suggestion to make about Fiume, and the Adriatic, beyond those with which you are already acquainted. But these problems are not directly connected with the conclusion of peace with Germany, and their solution, if a solution is possible, will certainly not be hindered by the presence of Italian plenipotentiaries at Versailles. On the other hand, if Italy refuses her concurrence and cooperation she will not only be in our opinion violating the Pact of London, but she will be taking a step which will render future unity of action a matter of the extremest difficulty. To us such a result seems little short of disaster to civilization.

^o IC-180B, p. 437.

Appendix III to IC-180A

[Draft Presented by M. Clemenceau of a Communication To Be Sent to the Italian Government]

1. The Governments of Great Britain and France had received no answer to the letter sent on the April by Mr. Lloyd George and Clemenceau to Signor Orlando, in which the Prime Ministers of both countries urged their Italian Colleague to reconsider the situation.⁷ Since then the German Plenipotentiaries, in compliance with the invitation forwarded to them on the 17th April, notwithstanding Signor Orlando's reservations, by the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Governments, have arrived at Versailles. It is therefore necessary, in the common interest, that the situation thus created should be cleared up, and that it be known whether, as the Allies heartily trust, Italy will stand at their side to sign Peace with Germany at the same time as they will.

2. The letter of Signor Orlando to M. Clemenceau dated April 23rd stated that "the terms of Peace with Germany may henceforth be considered as settled in their essential elements." The London agreement of April 26th, 1915 providing that "none of the Allied Powers shall lay conditions of Peace without previous agreement with its Allies," has consequently been complied with, as regards Peace with Germany. The Governments of Great Britain and France therefore like to think that Italy will be ready to sign with them the Treaty which she has had an ample share in preparing, and with which, according to the above-mentioned letter, she has declared herself satisfied.

3. As regards the other agreement of April 26th, 1915 concerning the boundaries between Italy and Austria Hungary, the Governments of Great Britain and France, still prompted by the same spirit which had inspired their conduct in the negotiations of the last few months, recall the fact that the said Treaty, which they constantly declared themselves ready to carry out, assigns Fiume to the Croats. They consequently renew their regret that the claim laid to Fiume by the Italian Government—signatory of the Treaty which ascribes that town to the Croats—should make it impossible to execute an agreement by whose terms the said Governments are bound to abide, with respect to all parties concerned.

4. This being the case, the Governments of Great Britain and France, feeling they have faithfully fulfilled their obligations, on the one hand by preparing together with Italy the terms of peace with Germany, on the other hand by declaring their readiness to stand by their engagements of the 26th April, 1915 as regards Italy as well

⁷ For the text of this letter, see appendix I to IC-176C, p. 223.

as the Croats, are under the obligation to request the Italian Government to acquaint them with their final decision.

Were Signor Orlando, contrary to all their expectations, to come to a negative decision, the two Governments should have to hold the opinion that it would be owing to Italy that the two kinds of engagements taken in London on April 26th, 1915 would lapse.

In the latter case, Italy by withdrawing her consent to the conditions of peace with Germany, settled in agreement with the Italian Delegation, as well as to the arrangements regarding the Adriatic, would, in so doing, renounce being a party to the Treaty which is going to be considered at Versailles and benefiting by the provisions agreed upon in 1915 in the matter of the Adriatic.

5. The Governments of Great Britain and France still fervently hope that the Italian Government will be fully alive, as they are, to the danger of such a solution for that future of peace and justice for which Italy, in full solidarity with the Allied and Associated countries, has sacrificed so much of her blood. The present circumstances and the fact that the German Plenipotentiaries are now in Versailles make it a duty for Great Britain and France to ask Signor Orlando for an answer at the earliest possible moment.

They beg him to forward it to them and while heartily appealing to the high sense of the Italian interests and of the general weal entertained by the Government of Italy, they hereby bear witness to the unfailing affection of Great Britain and France for the Italian Nation.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House at the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday, May 3, 1919, at 11:30 a. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson
Mr. Lansing

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P.
Capt. Fuller, R. N.
The Hon. C. H. Tufton
Mr. Brown

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon
Admiral de Bon.

JAPAN

Baron Makino
Viscount Chinda
M. Yamakawa

Sir Maurice Hankey—*Secretary*
Captain Abraham
Captain Portier
M. Saburi, Japan

1. The following draft resolution was before the Meeting:—

SUBMARINE CABLES

Draft Resolution

1

Germany renounces, on her own behalf and on behalf of her nationals, in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, all rights, titles or privileges of whatever nature in the submarine cables set out below, or in any portions thereof:—

Emden-Vigo: from the Straits of Dover to off Vigo.

Emden-Brest: from off Cherbourg to Brest.

Emden-Teneriffe: from off Dunkerque to off Teneriffe.

Emden-Azores (1): from the Straits of Dover to Fayal.

Emden-Azores (2): from the Straits of Dover to Fayal.

Azores-New York (1): from Fayal to New York.

Azores-New York (2): from Fayal to the longitude of Halifax.

Teneriffe-Monrovia: from off Teneriffe to off Monrovia.

Monrovia-Lome:

from about	lat. 2 deg. 30' N. long. 7 deg. 40' W. of Greenwich.
to about	lat. 2 deg. 20' N. long. 5.30' deg. W. of Greenwich.
and from about	lat. 3 deg. 48' N. long. 0.00.
to Lome.	

Lome-Duala: from Lome to Duala.

Monrovia-Pernambuco: from off Monrovia to off Pernambuco.

Constantinople-Constanza: from Constantinople to Constanza.

Yap-Shanghai, Yap-Guam, and Yap-Menado (Celebes):

from Yap Island to Shanghai,

from Yap Island to Guam Island,

and from Yap Island to Menado.

2

Such of the above-mentioned cables as are now in use, shall continue to be worked in the conditions at present existing; but such working shall not prejudice the right of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to decide the future status of these cables in such way as they may think fit.

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers may make such arrangements as they may think fit for bringing into operation any of the said cables which are not at present in use.

3

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers shall as soon as possible arrange for the convoking of an International Congress to consider all international aspects of communication by land telegraphs, cables or wireless telegraphy, and to make recommendations to the Powers concerned with a view to providing the entire world with adequate facilities of this nature on a fair and equitable basis.

(After some discussion it was decided to accept the first paragraph for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace, and to add to it a second paragraph in the following terms:—

“The value of the above mentioned cables or portions thereof, in so far as they are privately owned, calculated on the basis of the original cost, less a suitable allowance for depreciation, shall be credited to Germany in the reparation account.”

It was further decided that paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft should form the subject of a separate protocol between the principal Allied and Associated powers. The following modification to the second of these paragraphs was agreed upon. Instead of the expression “powers concerned” the expression “principal Allied and Associated Powers” was substituted. The last clause of this paragraph therefore reads:—

“and to make recommendations to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers with a view to providing the entire world with adequate facilities of this nature on a fair and equitable basis.”)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 3 May, 1919.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday, May 3, 1919, at 12.10 p. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson
Dr. D. H. Miller

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.
Mr. J. W. Headlam-Morley
Mr E. H. Carr

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Berthelot

JAPAN

Baron Makino
Viscount Chinda

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B., *Secretary*
M. Mantoux, *Interpreter*

1. The Preliminary Report of the Committee on New States was presented for consideration (Appendix).

Preliminary
Report of the
Committee on
New States

PRESIDENT WILSON proposed that for "the commerce of the Allied and Associated Powers" in the last line of Annex A. the words "the commerce of other nations" should be substituted.

(This was agreed to, and it was decided that this clause should be inserted in the Treaty in substitution of the existing Article 7 of the Chapter relating to Poland.)

The Articles contained in Annex B were then considered.

On the proposal of President Wilson, it was decided that Articles 1 and 2 should be sent to the Drafting Committee with instructions that they should be inserted in the Treaty with Germany, unless the points contained therein were already adequately covered by other articles.

With regard to Article 3, Mr. HEADLAM-MORLEY explained that while accepting in principle the substance of the provisions contained in this Article, he had felt great apprehension as to the acceptance of the provisions as they stood, without a detailed consideration and without consultation with the legal authorities. It had been impossible in the very limited time at the disposal of the Committee either to consider proposals in detail or to consult the legal advisers.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE confirmed this view.

DR. MILLER pointed out that unless Article 3 or some provision of a similar character were inserted in the Treaty, there would be nothing in the Treaty binding Poland to accept provisions safeguarding the rights of individuals in the matter of citizenship.

To meet this objection President Wilson proposed that in the Article contained in Annex A, the inclusion of which in the Treaty had already been agreed to, the word "inhabitants" should be substituted for "communities" in Line 4.

(This was accepted. The Article in Annex A was as amended then sent to the Drafting Committee.)

The Committee on New States was instructed to draft for embodiment in the separate Treaty with Poland clauses giving effect to the general principles of Article 3.

(It was decided that the decisions taken with regard to Poland should apply equally to Czecho-Slovakia, and that the necessary instructions should be sent to the Drafting Committee to this effect.)

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY then raised the question of the proposed Article regarding railway facilities. Some uncertainty appeared to have arisen as to whether this Article should be included or not.

(It was decided that the Article should be included.)

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY then proposed that Articles should be inserted in the Treaty containing provisions (a) to prevent the Germans building fortifications which might threaten the free navigation of the Vistula, (b) to prevent the Germans requisitioning in or otherwise injuring territory ceded by them to Poland during the interval which would elapse before the cession actually took place.

(This was approved and instructions were sent to the Drafting Committee accordingly.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, May 3, 1919.

M. 103

[Appendix]

The Committee on New States

REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF THREE

In the unavoidable absence of M. Berthelot (French Representative), Dr. Miller (American Representative) and Mr. Headlam-Morley (British Representative) met on Friday, May 2nd and considered the instructions contained in Sir Maurice Hankey's letter of May 1st.¹

It was unanimously agreed that the matters raised by Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith concerning the economic and other obligations which

¹ For the discussion in the Supreme Council resulting in the creation of this committee, see IC-178D, p. 393.

it might be necessary to impose on New States, were of so extensive and complicated a nature that it was quite impossible to consider them in time to incorporate them in the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

It was therefore agreed that there must be separate Treaties negotiated between the Five Allied and Associated Powers on the one hand and the new States—for instance, Poland—on the other, in which these and other matters which might arise would be dealt with. A suitable form for those Treaties could be devised without much difficulty for though in most cases the new States have been recognised, in no case has the territory over which the Government has control been specified, and there are many matters consequential on recognition such as the establishment of consular relations, which will have to be dealt with.

Having agreed to this, the Committee then considered the question of the protection of Minorities. It was again agreed that the question, in particular so far as it affects the Jews in Poland, is so contentious and so difficult that it is impossible to come to precise conclusions about it in the short time available before the text of the Treaty with Germany is closed. It was agreed, therefore, that all the detailed clauses dealing with this matter should be placed in the separate Treaties referred to.

It was also agreed, however, that there must be inserted in the Treaty with Germany some general clause referring to the other Treaty, and that this should be made of a binding nature. The text of the clause proposed is annexed (Annex A).

It was agreed that it would be essential at some stage, either in the Treaty with Germany or in the separate Treaty to be negotiated with Poland, to insert clauses defining Polish citizenship and political and religious equality. This is necessary, as the experience of Roumania has shown, for the protection of the Jews and other minorities, and the importance of this has been very strongly pressed upon us by the Jewish representatives whom we have seen; it will be equally important for other minorities. Clauses have been drafted providing for this in such a form that they can be inserted in the Treaty with Germany (See Annex B).

It was agreed that it must be left to the decision of the Council of Three whether those clauses should be inserted in the Treaty with Germany or in the separate Treaty, while all were agreed that if there had been sufficient time it would have been preferable to insert them in the Treaty with Germany, the British Representative feels himself bound to point out that it has been impossible for him to consult the British Legal Advisers.

The American Representative is of the opinion that the insertion in the Treaty of Peace of some clause binding Poland in respect of

the citizenship and rights of those millions of her population which are not German is essential.

The British Representative is inclined to think that the Article given in Annex A gives sufficient scope to enable the clauses in Annex B to be inserted in the separate Treaties.

Both are agreed that if there is time to get the consideration which is necessary from the French and British legal advisers, and if it is possible in the time to get these clauses through the Drafting Committee, they may well be inserted in the Treaty with Germany.

As to procedure, the most convenient arrangement would be that the special Treaty with Poland at any rate, should be prepared as quickly as possible and should be ready for signature at the same time as the general Treaty with Germany. There are advantages in this that Poland would be bound, not as against Germany, but as against her Allies but at the same time the Germans would have cognisance of the separate Treaty which is, as will be seen, specifically referred to in the main Treaty.

In accordance with their instructions, the Committee started with their consideration of the Polish question. It is recognised that the same problems, though in a slightly different form, arise in the case of Czecho-Slovakia, and they are agreed that apart from any detailed modifications of form which may appear necessary, these clauses which have been drafted especially for the case of Poland, should be applied also to Czecho-Slovakia.

They have unfortunately, however, not been able to procure a single copy of the chapter of the Treaty dealing with Czecho-Slovakia in its final form, or to discuss the matter with those immediately responsible for dealing with Czecho-Slovakia, and are therefore not in a position to advise as to whether any alteration in the form or details may be required.

2.5.19

Annex A

Recognition of Poland (and Czecho-Slovakia)

ARTICLE . . .

(Substitute for Article 7 of Chapter relating to Poland)

Poland accepts and agrees to embody in a Treaty with the Five Allied and Associated Powers such provisions as may be deemed necessary by the Five Allied and Associated Powers to protect the interests of inhabitants in Poland who differ from the majority of the population in race, language or religion.

Poland further accepts and agrees to embody in a Treaty with the Five Allied and Associated Powers such provisions as may be deemed necessary by the Five Allied and Associated Powers to protect freedom of transit and equitable treatment of the commerce of other Nations.

Annex B

Recognition of Poland (and Czecho Slovakia)

CHAPTER . . .

ARTICLE 1

Without prejudice to the effect of any previous recognition of Poland, Germany as well as the Allied and Associated Powers recognises Poland as a sovereign and independent State.

ARTICLE 2

The boundaries of Poland not mentioned or determined by the provisions of this Treaty will be subsequently fixed by the Five Allied and Associated Powers.

ARTICLE 3

Poland undertakes the following obligations to each of the other Allied and Associated Powers, and recognises them to be obligations of international concern of which the League of Nations has jurisdiction:

1. Without any requirement of qualifying or other proceedings, Poland admits and declares to be Polish citizens:

(a) all persons habitually resident in territories recognised to be Polish by this or any subsequent Treaty, except those who are citizens or subjects of one of the Allied or Associated Powers or of a Power which was neutral throughout the late war; and

(b) all persons hereafter born in Poland not nationals of another State.

The foregoing provisions shall not limit or affect any provision of Articles 4 and 5 of Chapter . . .

2. Poland agrees that all citizens of Poland shall enjoy equal civil and political rights without distinction as to birth, race, nationality, language or religion.

3. Poland assumes and will perform the following obligations:

(a) To protect the life and liberty of all inhabitants of Poland;

(b) To assure to all inhabitants of Poland the free exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion, or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public morals;

(*c*) To allow all inhabitants of Poland the free use of any language, particularly in business transactions, in schools and other educational instruction, in the press, and at public meetings and assemblies; and,

(*d*) To make no discrimination against any inhabitant of Poland on account of birth, race, nationality, language, or religion.

4. Poland agrees that the foregoing obligations are hereby embodied in her fundamental law as a bill of rights, with which no law, regulation, or official action shall conflict or interfere, and as against which no law, regulation, or official action shall have validity or effect.

ARTICLE 4

Poland accepts and agrees to embody in a treaty with the Five Allied and Associated Powers such provisions as may be deemed necessary by the Five Allied and Associated Powers to protect the interests of communities in Poland which differ from the majority of the population in race, language, or religion.

Poland further accepts and agrees to embody in a Treaty with the Five Allied and Associated Powers such provisions as may be deemed necessary by the Five Allied and Associated Powers to protect the freedom of transit and equitable treatment of the commerce of the Allied and Associated Powers.

4. RAILWAY FACILITIES

Germany and Poland undertake within one year of the conclusion of this Treaty to enter into a Convention of which the terms in case of difference shall be settled by the Council of the League of Nations, with the object of securing, on the one hand to Germany, full and adequate railroad facilities for communication between the rest of Germany and East Prussia over the intervening Polish territory, on the other hand to Poland, full and adequate railroad facilities for communication between Poland and the City of Danzig over any German territory that may, on the right bank of the Vistula, intervene between Poland and the City of Danzig.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday, May 3, 1919, at 12:30 p.m.

PRESENT

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.
Mr. Norman Davis.
Mr. T. W. Lamont.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P.
Prime Minister.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M.P. Secre-
tary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Rt. Hon. Lord Cunliffe.
Mr. J. M. Keynes, C. B.
Mr. H. A. Siepmann.

FRANCE

M. Loucheur.

Sir Maurice Hankey (*Secretary*)

The Council had before it the question of the Indemnity to be paid by Germany to Belgium.

(1) MR. LAMONT said that since the Belgian question was last discussed at the Council various proposals had been made to the Representatives of the Belgian Government, but that negotiations could not now proceed further until the Allied Delegates had received instructions as to the precise limits within which they might make concessions. The first point was that of the priority of the Belgian claim to the first £100 millions to be received from Germany. This had been already agreed.

MR. DAVIS said that the question might arise as to whether the Belgian priority applied only to the first cash receipts from Germany or whether it included, for example, any cessions which Germany might make in the way of ships etc.

It was agreed that the claim of Belgium to receive the first £100 millions is recognised, but applies only to the first cash receipts.

(2) MR. LAMONT said that the Belgian Government had raised the question whether they were released from the lien which the Allied Governments now have on the first payments to be received by Belgium from Germany in respect of
Reparation.

Lien of
the Allies

It was agreed that no concession can be made to Belgium in this respect.

(3) MR. LAMONT said that the Belgian Representatives had attempted to maintain that if the proposal to substitute German for Belgian obligations in respect of loans made to Belgium by the Allies were accepted, it would be applicable to all loans made before the signature of the Peace Treaty and not merely to loans made before the Armistice.

It was agreed that the arrangement would in any event apply only to pre-armistice loans.

(4) MR. LAMONT said that the Belgian Government did not press for the inclusion in the Treaty of a clause binding Germany to reimburse the Allies for loans made by them to Belgium, but that they were content to leave the question to a side agreement.

M. LOUCHEUR said that what they really wanted was to be entirely relieved of all responsibility in regard to these loans.

MR. LAMONT said that the Belgian Delegates had apparently been under the impression that France and England, at any rate, were under an obligation not to look for the repayment of these loans at all.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE protested that this had never been the understanding although we had in fact agreed not to demand interest on these advances until the date of the signature of the Armistice.

MR. BALFOUR thought that the very fact that we had asked for obligations was a sufficient proof that the Belgian suggestion was quite unfounded.

M. LOUCHEUR agreed that M. Hymans knew very well that Belgium was under an obligation to repay.

(5) PRESIDENT WILSON said that he understood the proposition to be that the Allied Governments should accept German for a Belgian obligation for all pre-armistice loans.

MR. KEYNES said that it would in practice be extremely difficult to fit in this proposal with the remainder of the Treaty unless a priority were given to the Allied claim to reimbursement on behalf of Belgium. The next receipts after the first £100 millions should be specifically assigned to the repayment of the loans.

MR. DAVIS objected that this would mean that Belgium would get nothing for some years except the first £100 millions.

MR. KEYNES thought that it would not take years for Germany to pay £350 millions altogether.

MR. DAVIS said that an alternative method was for the Allied Governments to include their claim for this amount among the categories of damage.

Pre-Armistice
Loans to Belgium

Repayment of
the Allies' Loans
to Belgium

Reimbursement
by Germany to
the Allies of
Loans Made by
Them to
Belgium

The Question
of Priority

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he thought Congress would have no difficulty in accepting the principle. The loans made by the United States to Belgium before the Armistice were for Relief and therefore Congress would understand that they were not making any precedent for the remission of a debt, but were voting the money as part of the Relief to Belgium.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the major portion of the British loans to Belgium before the United States came into the war were also for Relief. He was prepared to accept the principle of German liability for these loans.

MR. BALFOUR said that in his opinion Belgium was a rich country considering her population. He thought therefore that when the country was once more in working order she ought to be able to pay her debt. The trouble was that for the time being she could not get to work and therefore he thought it necessary that she should be given money wherewith to start.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he also thought that Belgium was in an extremely favourable position. She would be able to start without any war debt at all, with all her damage repaired, and with a prior claim to whatever might be received from Germany. In fact the whole priority of Belgium was absolutely indefensible. He thought it important to make sure that the claims of the Allies were not postponed until the last so that the £250 millions due to them might not be paid only at the very end.

MR. KEYNES said that that was one of the reasons why it was extremely desirable that a priority for the repayment of the Allied loans should be admitted, that is to say, that Belgium should receive the whole of the £350 millions paid by Germany, of which £100 millions would be for her own purposes and £250 millions would be used to meet her debts to the Allies.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that in negotiation it might be possible to induce the Belgians to accept this priority and that if they refuse to accept it the Allies should then fall back upon the alternative proposal to include the amount among the categories of Reparation.

(6) MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would propose another possible solution, namely that for this £250 millions there should be an altogether separate bond issue.

A Separate
Bond Issue

MR. LAMONT said that this would fit in very well with Germany's special undertakings as regards Belgium.

MR. KEYNES said that here again the important question would be how this issue would rank in relation to the other issues.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he could not actually bind the United States to accept the proposal, but that he was prepared to lay it before Congress on his own recommendation.

M. LOUCHEUR said that if Great Britain were disposed to accept these bonds in payment of her debt, thus leaving Belgium wholly free, the French Government would also be prepared to fall in with the arrangement.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he thought this was a better suggestion than that the Allied loans should be repaid out of the Belgian percentage of the other issues. There would be three issues—the first of one, the second of two, and the third a contingent issue of two thousand millions. Supposing that the Belgian percentage were ten per cent., this would mean that 300 millions out of the first 3000 millions would go to Belgium. It was difficult to suggest that out of this first 300 millions 250 millions should be taken for the repayment of Allied debt, leaving only 50 millions to Belgium herself for Reparation.

LORD CUNLIFFE agreed with the proposal of Mr. Lloyd George for a special issue of bonds.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that after all this was an additional category of the Allied claims against Germany and that the fact might as well be recognized in this manner.

It was agreed that there should be a separate issue of bonds to the value of the advances made by the Allies to Belgium and that this special issue should be devoted to the repayment of these loans by Germany to the Allied and Associated Governments.

(7) MR. LAMONT said that a further point arose on account of the persistent claim of Belgium to receive a percentage of subsequent Reparation payments.

Subsequent
Reparation
Payments

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he understood Belgium to claim a priority payment of 15 per cent.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in no circumstances could he agree to any such claim.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he did not think that the Belgians would press the point in negotiation.

It was agreed that the Belgian claim to be allotted a percentage of subsequent Reparation payments should be given an unqualified refusal.

(8) MR. KEYNES said that there was an inconsistency between the territorial and financial chapters of the Treaty in regard to the payments to be made to Germany for territory ceded under the Treaty. The only exception to the rule that ceded territory should be paid for was in the case of Alsace-Lorraine and for this specific exception a particular reason was given in the relative clause of the Treaty as drafted. No similar reason could be given in the case of Belgium, and he suggested that the territorial clauses should be brought into conformity with the financial clauses on this subject.

Payment for
Ceded Territory

SIR MAURICE HANKEY said that it was agreed not to be desirable from the political point of view to require payment from Belgium.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he did not wish to quarrel on a point which appeared to be of no very great importance and that he was therefore in favour of allowing exceptional treatment to Belgium in this case.

It was agreed that Clause 9 of the Financial Chapter should be amended so as to make it consistent with the territorial provisions of the Treaty. A letter on this subject is attached to these Minutes.

(9) MR. LAMONT said that Poland put in a claim for Reparation amounting to nine billion dollars.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this claim payment was quite inadmissible and that on the previous day a claim on the part of Alsace-Lorraine had been refused for the express reason that if it were granted there would be no logical reason for excluding Poland from making a similar claim.

MR. DAVIS said that the difficulty was that Poland was an Allied and Associated Government and was therefore included under the Preamble of the Reparation Chapter.

It was agreed that the Reparation Clauses should be so amended as to include only such damage as had been done to any country while a belligerent Ally. A letter on this subject is attached to these Minutes.

[Annex] A

[The Secretary of the Supreme Council (Hankey) to the Secretary General of the Peace Conference (Dutasta)]

3 MAY, 1919.

MY DEAR COLLEAGUE, At a Meeting held this morning between President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George and M. Loucheur, with financial experts, it was decided that the Financial Chapter should be brought into accordance with the provision in the Chapter on Belgium, to the effect that Government property in German territory ceded to Belgium should be transferred, without the obligation on the part of Belgium of making any payment or credit in favour of Germany.

It is suggested therefore, that in Clause 9 of the Financial Chapter, the following words should be added to the last paragraph:—

“Belgium shall also be exempt from making any payment or credit under this Clause for any property or possessions of the German Empire or States situated in German territory ceded to Belgium under this Treaty.”

I am directed to request that your Excellency will forward this letter as soon as possible to the Drafting Committee.

Believe me [etc.]

M. P. A. HANKEY

[Annex] B

[The Secretary of the Supreme Council (Hankey) to the Secretary General of the Peace Conference (Dutasta)]

3 MAY, 1919.

MY DEAR COLLEAGUE: At a Meeting between President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George and M. Loucheur, with Financial experts this morning, the question was raised as to whether the Reparation Chapter as now drafted did not give Poland a claim for damages against Germany.

It was decided that this was not intended, and should be dealt with by the introduction in the appropriate place of words to the effect that the claims against Germany by Allied and Associated Powers should only rank if the damages were incurred at a date at which a given Power had been acknowledged as an Allied and Associated Power belligerent.

It is suggested that the above object would be secured by amending the second paragraph of the second Clause of the main Reparation Chapter to read as follows:—

“The Allied and Associated Governments, however, require, and Germany undertakes that she will make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of each of the Allied or Associated Powers and to their property, during the period of the belligerency of each as an Allied and Associated Power against Germany, by such aggression, by land, by sea, and from the air, as defined in Annex 1.”

I am instructed to ask that your Excellency will forward this letter to the Drafting Committee with the least possible delay.

Believe me [etc.]

M. P. A. HANKEY

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday, May 3, 1919, at 4 p. m.

PRESENT

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.

Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.
Professor P. J. Mantoux

Secretary.
Interpreter.

The Peace Treaty
With Austria
and Hungary

1. M. CLEMENCEAU raised the question of whether the invitation sent to the Austrian and Hungarian Governments to come to St. Germain should not be made public.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was in favour of publication, but he thought it should be discussed as part of the whole question of the situation with Italy.

Denunciation
by Germany
of the Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk

2. SIR MAURICE HANKEY reported that he had had a letter from Mr. Hurst, the British Member of the Drafting Committee in regard to the Article approved on the previous afternoon on the subject of the denunciation of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (I.C. 179.C, Minute 11).¹

In this letter Mr. Hurst pointed out that the clause approved on the previous day had been less far-reaching than the clauses already included in the Financial and Economic Sections of the Peace Treaty. In view of these circumstances and in order to avoid any obvious divergence between the Economic Article (Article O of the Economic Clauses), the Financial Article (Article 12, (vi) of the Financial Clauses) and the new political Article, certain changes had been made. (The new draft submitted by the Drafting Committee was approved.)²

(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward it immediately to the Secretary-General for communication to the Drafting Committee.)

3. SIR MAURICE HANKEY reported that he had received a letter from General Thwaites, the head of the British Military Section, enclosing a copy of the English draft of Clauses in regard to the Baltic States, to be inserted in the Treaty of Peace under Guarantees. The French translation as approved by Marshal Foch was also attached.

Guarantees for
the Execution of
the Peace Treaty.
Article in
Regard to the
Baltic States

¹ *Ante*, p. 421.

² Appendix I, p. 461.

(These Articles were approved as a basis for an Article in the Treaty of Peace—Appendix II.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward them to the Secretary-General for communication to the Drafting Committee with the least possible delay.)

4. MR. LLOYD GEORGE described an interview he had had with the Marquis Imperiali, who had communicated to him the gist of a telegram he had received from Rome. The Marquis had refused to communicate a copy and Mr. Lloyd George had to rely entirely on his memory. No-one else had been present at the conversation, which the Marquis Imperiali had said was a private one, although he had said that he must communicate his impression of it to Rome. The first part of the telegram, so far as Mr. Lloyd George could remember was that M. Orlando had said that there was very little object in returning to Paris. There was no basis for an agreement in regard to Fiume. Moreover, he understood that Great Britain and France were not agreed with the United States. In the second part, M. Orlando had said, "you say you stand by the Treaty of London. How much better off are we? President Wilson will not accept it. What guarantees do our Allies propose to enforce the Treaty?" Mr. Lloyd George had then replied to the Marquis Imperiali, "what guarantees do you want? Do you expect us to declare war on the United States?" The Marquis Imperiali had replied "Oh, no." Mr. Lloyd George had asked him what he would suggest, and he could not suggest anything. The Marquis Imperiali had then made a suggestion which Mr. Lloyd George characterized as an impudent one, that the Allies were not keeping the Pact of London, because they were making a separate peace with Germany, without Italy. Mr. Lloyd George had told him that Italy was already on the point of breaking the Pact, that we would be within our legal rights, and that we were advised by our legal advisers that this was the case, in considering that Italy would break it by not being present to meet the Germans. If Italy was not present on Tuesday then the Allies would no longer be bound by the Pact. The Marquis had replied that this was a very serious situation. Mr. Lloyd George's rejoinder was that it was no more serious than he himself had in that very room warned the Marquis Imperiali that it would be. He had warned M. Orlando in exactly the same sense. He had also reminded him that M. Orlando had acted against the advice of M. Sonnino. The Marquis Imperiali had then said, "Won't you make us some offer?" Mr. Lloyd George had replied, "To whom shall we make it? Can you receive an offer?" The Marquis Imperiali replied that he could transmit one. Mr. Lloyd George then said that it was impossible to deal with people who were hundreds of miles away, and had no responsible person with

The Situation in
Regard to Italy

authority to act for them. If the Italian representatives did not come back, there was no official person with whom negotiations could take place. The Marquis Imperiali then said that the Italian representatives ought to know this. He was afraid that if they came back to Paris, and found that no agreement could be reached, the situation would be graver than ever. Mr. Lloyd George asked, "Why would it be more grave than it is now?" He had warned them a week ago. The Italians were in possession of Fiume contrary to the Treaty of London. He had asked what the position of the Italians would be, and what the general position would be if the Peace about to be secured with Austria gave Fiume to the Croats. The Marquis Imperiali had been somewhat perturbed at this and had said, "I suppose you could put the Germans off for a day or two if the Italian Delegation were returning?" Mr. Lloyd George then told him that the Italian Government would be under an entire delusion if they thought that they could get Fiume. The Allied and Associated Powers were absolutely united on that point. They were united quite apart from the question of principle, because the Treaty of London gave Fiume to the Croats. A compromise that had been suggested was that it might be arranged that Fiume should become a free port, instead of being given to the Croats, on condition that the Italians gave up to the Serbs-Croats the Dalmatian Coast. The Marquis Imperiali had asked Mr. Lloyd George if he would put this in writing, and Mr. Lloyd George had declined.

(In the course of the discussion below, it will be found that Mr. Lloyd George supplemented his statement from time to time, as the course of the discussion brought fresh points to his mind.)

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had had a conversation with the Italian Ambassador, Count Bonin, which had been almost identical with Mr. Lloyd George's, but he had had one opportunity which Mr. Lloyd George did not have. Count Bonin had asked him what his point of view was. He had replied that he certainly would give it, and he had given him a piece of his mind. He had told him that Italy had entered the war with a bargain. This bargain had not been kept yet. Italy had postponed for more than a year going to war with Germany. The bargain had been that Italy was to get the Tyrol, Trieste, and Pola, and that Fiume would go to the Croats. Now Italy asked him to keep his word about their part of the Treaty, and to break it in regard to Fiume. This was a point the Italians did not seem to realise. He had told him that he could see what was the game they were playing, but they could not get a quarrel between the Allies and President Wilson about Fiume. Italy had broken the Treaty, and he had the written opinion of a jurisconsult to that effect, which could be produced if it were wished. Count Bonin had said "Why do you not make a proposal?" M. Clemenceau had replied "we cannot, we

have signed the Treaty." Instead of asking to talk, the Italians wanted their Allies to break the Treaty. Count Bonin had then said "You are not in agreement with President Wilson." M. Clemenceau had replied "I can discuss this with President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George, but I will not discuss it with you." Then Count Bonin had dropped this topic. Finally, Count Bonin had said "If we make a suggestion, would you help?" M. Clemenceau replied "Certainly, if it is a feasible suggestion, but I cannot commit myself in advance." Then Count Bonin said that M. Orlando could not come back and conduct the negotiations, because he could not afford to fail. He added "I suppose we must hurry up". M. Clemenceau replied, "Yes, you had better be as quick as you can". Then Count Bonin said "Then you will help us". M. Clemenceau replied "Certainly, if your proposal is a feasible one". Count Bonin then referred to Fiume, and M. Clemenceau had replied that he had better not refer to that in any proposal, and that was the end of the conversation, as far as he could remember it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE recalled that the Marquis Imperiali had put forward a proposal that had appeared in the newspaper "Temps", but he had answered that he could not look at that.

M. CLEMENCEAU expressed the view that in 24 hours suggestions would come from Italy.

PRESIDENT WILSON then said that Count Cellere, the Italian Ambassador in Washington, who had accompanied him to Europe, just as Lord Reading had done, and who was a man with whom he was personally friendly, had asked for an interview. He had not had time to grant it to him yet, but he had no doubt he would have to do so in the course of the day. He had no doubt that the interview would be on exactly the same lines as those of his colleagues, and he did not anticipate that it would add anything of value.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE recalled that he had impressed on the Marquis Imperiali that the Allied and Associated Powers had every intention of concluding a peace with Germany and Austria. The Marquis then asked whether they were going to do so without consultation with Italy, to which he replied that there was no-one to consult with in Paris. Italy, however, had been told the result of every decision immediately affecting her. Their intention was to press on with making these Treaties of Peace, and they could not delay simply because Italy would not settle on the subject of Fiume. He had impressed strongly on him that peace would be made.

PRESIDENT WILSON believed that the present line that was being adopted was the best. No proposal should be made to Italy. The only question which had to be decided was as to what sort of notice should be given to Italy of our intentions. He suggested that the

two conversations that had been described this afternoon might be sufficient. M. Clemenceau's conversation was more official perhaps than Mr. Lloyd George's, since it had been carried out between the President of the Conference and the Italian Ambassador in Paris. Count Bonin's visit had been an official one, whereas the Marquis Imperiali had described his as a private one. Surely M. Clemenceau's statement gave sufficient notice to the Italian Government.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that even if the Marquis Imperiali's visit was a private one, Mr. Lloyd George had not said that his remarks were private.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE reverted to the fact that he had refused to give anything in writing, but the Marquis Imperiali had said he would report the conversation to his Government. On the whole he thought it could hardly be regarded as being so official as M. Clemenceau's conversation.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that in any case, the two statements were practically identical.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said they were identical except in the respect that the Marquis Imperiali had never said a word about President Wilson. He himself, had had to say that he could not undertake that President Wilson was now prepared to agree to what he (Mr. Lloyd George) had thought he might be willing to agree to last week. The Marquis Imperiali had reminded him of the question of giving mandates to Italy for certain towns on the Dalmatian Coast and he had replied that this was the only point on which, perhaps, he had exceeded his authority from the Council.

PRESIDENT WILSON said the great point was as to whether the Italians had now received sufficient notice of the breach of the Pact of London.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that the Prime Minister would be entitled, if he thought fit, to write a letter to the Marquis Imperiali, somewhat in the following sense:—

My dear Ambassador,

One point was raised at our conversation today which is of immediate importance, and on which there should be no misunderstanding. I write this line not to supersede or alter anything I said, but merely to state that the Allied and Associated Powers intend to meet the Germans next Tuesday, and we are advised that in all the circumstances, the absence of Italy will constitute a breach of the Pact of London.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that such a letter would come better from M. Clemenceau, as President of the Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought it would be better to prepare a document explaining the whole case.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if it would not be sufficient to confirm in writing what M. Clemenceau had already said at his interview with the Italian Ambassador.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought a document putting an end to the Alliance would be a very serious one, and could not be treated in too formal a manner. He was inclined to take M. Clemenceau's document read at the morning meeting. (Appendix III to I.C. 180.B. [180A])³

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this document had been too full of "ifs". It should contain no "ifs". The following phrase occurred to him as a suitable one: "Absence from signing the Treaty will constitute a breach."

M. CLEMENCEAU said the effect of this would be to bring the Italians back.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had made the Marquis Imperiali realise that the Allied and Associated Governments would not give way on the subject of Fiume.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that there was no need to mention Fiume. If you did, it would be an indication that there were other things on which you were prepared to discuss.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Italians would not trouble themselves much about anything except Fiume.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he did not believe a settlement could be reached without giving them Fiume.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that from many points of view he would rather they did not come back.

M. CLEMENCEAU recalled that Count Bonin had said that the only thing Italy could not accept was for Fiume to be Croat.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that if the Italians insisted that Fiume should not be Croat, the British and French Governments would not be bound by the rest of the Pact. They could not free themselves from that part of the Treaty which gave Fiume to the Croats.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said they could only do so as a compromise. He himself had told the Marquis Imperiali that he could only consent to Fiume not being Croat on the condition that the Italians would give up Dalmatia to the Jugo-Slavs.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that if one item of the Treaty was departed from, the whole Treaty was upset.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out however, that the Croats did not sign the Treaty of London.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that, nevertheless, the British and French

³ *Ante*, p. 435.

Governments would not be morally bound if that part of the Treaty was not carried out.

MR. BALFOUR recalled that it was Russia who had made so strong a defence in the interests of the Slavs, when the Treaty of London had been concluded. This defence only broke down in the absence of Sir Edward (now Lord) Grey, when Mr. Asquith had been in charge of the Foreign Office, and had felt that in view of the general situation he must get Italy into the war and he had then forced the hands of the Czar.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this was not the whole story. About that time the Allies had been trying to induce the Serbians to give up to Bulgaria a portion of Serbia which they believed ought to belong to Bulgaria, their object being to bring Bulgaria into the war. They had told the Serbians that they would get the whole of Jugo-Slavia in the end, and Fiume had been inserted in the Treaty in order that Serbia might eventually receive it, since this was part of the inducement to try and get them to make the concession to Bulgaria.

After some discussion on the subject of the attitude of the Germans (in the recent meetings on the subject of credentials) the Italian question was again resumed.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if Mr. Balfour had expanded the note prepared by his legal adviser (Appendix I to I. C. 180A).⁴

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he thought M. Clemenceau's document would be a better basis for a statement (Appendix III to I. C. 180A).

PRESIDENT WILSON considered it too long and argumentative.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would like to make a suggestion. In his opinion the Drafting Committee would not be ready with the Treaty by Tuesday. He did not believe it could be ready to hand to the Germans before Thursday. He thought, therefore, that the best plan would be to leave the Italians alone for 24 hours, during which time they could consider the statements that he and Mr. Lloyd George had made to M. Bonin and the Marquis Imperiali.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed. Their statements, he said, had been very blunt ones.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that M. Klotz had handed the reply to M. Crespi personally to M. Crespi, who had been very annoyed with the letter. He, himself, would try and reconsider the Memorandum he had submitted (Appendix III to I. C. 180A). In his view, any statement sent to the Italians should contain one part which was from Mr. Lloyd George and himself, and one part from the Three. In the meanwhile he suggested that he should be allowed to let M. Bonin know that a decision would be taken on Monday.

PRESIDENT WILSON begged him not to do this. It would be a challenge to the Italians to return.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 434.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE doubted this in view of his statement that it was useless for the Italians to return unless they were ready to give up Fiume. Mr. Lloyd George said there was a good deal to be said for Mr. Balfour's plan of his writing a letter to the Marquis Imperiali confirming what he had said about the intention of the Allied and Associated Powers to meet the Germans next week. Two new factors had entered into the situation; one was that Mr. Orlando had said that it was no use coming back if the Allies would not enforce the Pact, and the second was his own statement that it was no use their coming unless they were prepared to give up Fiume.

PRESIDENT WILSON referred to the Marquis Imperiali's question about guarantees and warranties. Supposing the Italians came back and said: "We will give up Fiume but we insist on the Treaty of London". The British and French Governments had said that they must give it them. Their guarantee was their word.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE recalled that he had also told the Marquis Imperiali that the Italian troops must leave Fiume before they would even discuss the question of Fiume.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that if they agreed to that and came back, they could say: "We have your promise about the Treaty of London"; this was a moral guarantee. In that case it would make it impossible for the United States to sign the Treaty.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that then we could not have peace with Austria.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the Allies could sign the Peace. The Italians had their guarantee that Great Britain and France would fulfil their engagements regardless of what it involved. What better guarantee could they have? The Marquis Imperiali could have replied on the subject of guarantees: "We have your word".

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Marquis had not answered on this point.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that a telegram from the United States Ambassador at Rome had been read to him on the telephone. The gist of it was that, some person of the first authority, not named, had asked if a compromise could not be reached on the following lines:—

1. Fiume to be made independent.
2. Susak, while free from Italian sovereignty, not to be under Slavonian sovereignty.

(At this point President Wilson produced a map of Fiume, showing how very difficult it was to distinguish the suburb of Susak from Fiume itself.)

It was agreed:—

1. That no immediate statement should be sent to Italy warning them that their failure to sign the German Treaty would constitute a breach of the Pact of London.

2. That M. Clemenceau, Mr. Lloyd George, and Mr. Balfour should prepare fresh drafts of statements to be considered at the next meeting.

5. M. MANTOUX said that M. Clemenceau had asked him to arrange for the preparation of a reply regarding the decision of the previous day in regard to the Belgian request that the German colonies should be ceded, not to the Principal Powers, but to a named list of Powers, including Belgium and Portugal. In view of the later discussion about mandatories, he wished to know the precise nature of the reply to be sent. Were the mandates to be granted by the Allied and Associated Powers, or by the League of Nations.

The German
Colonies.
Belgian Claims

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the exact position was that, if the allocation of mandates was postponed until the League of Nations was in operation, the decision would rest with the League. It had been agreed, however, that the mandates should be assigned by the Allied and Associated Powers in the meanwhile.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that to inform M. Hymans of this would be an incitement to him to obstruction. Lord Robert Cecil,⁵ with whom he had discussed the question in the morning, had begged him to get the question of the mandatories, and the nature of the mandates, settled.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked why, after deciding the mandatories, should the mandates also be immediately decided? The general lines of the mandates were provided for in the Covenant of the League of Nations, which contemplated various grades from virtual independence with advice, down to virtual dependence. It added certain provisions about liquor traffic, arms traffic, etc.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was being strongly pressed to insert a new condition, somewhat similar to that that had been discussed in regard to Poland dealing with the question of religious equality. The Missionary Societies were afraid that otherwise certain churches would exclude other churches.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he wanted to decide the question of mandatories, and that he was willing to decide the question of mandates.

MR. BALFOUR said his view was that the mandates should be worked out first.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that this was the opposite view of his own view.

⁵ British representative on the Commission on the League of Nations.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the mandatories was the only controversial part of the question.

SIR MAURICE HANKEY said that he believed that mandates had been discussed a good deal between the experts of the various countries.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the real difficulties would arise in giving mandates to possessions in Turkey.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed, and thought Palestine would be especially difficult, owing to the Zionist question, on which the British and the United States, and he thought also the French, Governments were to some extent committed. There was, however, he pointed out, plenty of time, since the League of Nations would not be in operation until the Peace Treaty with Germany had been ratified, and that would take a long time.

6. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received very serious complaints of the action of the British in Syria. He undertook, at Mr. Lloyd George's request, to send him a paper on the subject.

7. SIR MAURICE HANKEY said that Mr. Balfour had received a request which he had passed on to him (Sir Maurice Hankey) from the Chinese Delegation, for a copy of the Clauses to be introduced in the Treaty of Peace in regard to China, as well as for the proceedings of this Council in regard to them. He presumed that the proceedings, being of a very intimate, personal, and confidential character, would not be communicated. There was no precedent for communicating these proceedings to persons who had not been present. He asked for instructions, however, as to the Articles.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he saw no objection to their receiving the Clauses.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that if they received the Clauses they should certainly receive a copy of the statement which the Japanese intended to make.

8. SIR MAURICE HANKEY read extracts from a letter he had received from the Chinese Delegation, enclosing a letter which had been addressed to the Chairman of the Financial Commission, drawing attention to the omission from the Clauses proposed by that Commission of a Chinese proposal to the following effect:—

“In cases where one of the High Contracting Parties has a silver standard of currency, payments of debts shall be made in the currency stipulated in the contract, and at the rate of exchange on the date of settlement.”

SIR MAURICE HANKEY, after reading further extracts from the letter, stated that Mr. Keynes, who was acting for Mr. Montagu (who had

resigned from the post of Chairman of the Financial Commission) had replied in the sense that the exception could not be made in the case of one country.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he would be very glad if something could be done to meet China in this respect, as China was not coming very well out of the Peace Treaty.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that China was not really so badly treated.

9. PRESIDENT WILSON showed Mr. Lloyd George a draft of an agreement in regard to the disposal of German ships captured in American ports.

German Ships
Captured in
American Ports

In reply to Sir Maurice Hankey he said that this did not affect the Treaty of Peace.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would be prepared to assent, if President Wilson would make an alteration in the Treaty so as to remove a reference to Congress. His objection to this Clause was that the British Parliament might protest against mention being made of the United States Congress and not of the British Imperial Parliament.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he would get over the difficulty by annexing a note to the Clauses on the subject.

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 3 May, 1919.

Appendix I to IC-181A

[Draft Article With Respect to Russia]

Germany acknowledges and agrees to respect as permanent and inalienable the independence of all the territories which were part of the former Russian Empire.

In accordance with the provisions of Article . . . of Part IX and Article . . . of Part X Germany accepts definitely the abrogation of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and of all treaties, conventions and agreements entered into by her with the Maximalist Government in Russia.

The Allied and Associated Powers formally reserve the right of Russia to obtain from Germany restitution and reparation based on the principles of the present Treaty.

Appendix II to IC-181A

Alternative "C"

DRAFT CLAUSE

As a guarantee for the execution of Article by which the German Government undertakes to annul the provisions of the Brest-Litovsk

Treaty, and in order to ensure the restoration of peace and good government in the Baltic Provinces and Lithuania, all German troops at present in the said territories shall return to within the frontiers of Germany as soon as the Allies shall think the moment suitable, having regard to the internal situation of these territories. These troops shall abstain from all requisitions and seizures and from any other coercive measures, with a view to obtaining supplies intended for Germany, and shall in no way interfere with such measures for national defence as may be adopted by the Provisional Governments of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

No other German troops shall, pending the evacuation or after the evacuation is complete, be admitted to the said territories.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House, Place des
Etats-Unis, Paris, on Monday, 5 May, 1919, at 11 a. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

GREAT BRITAIN

FRANCE

President Wilson.

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd
George, M. P.

M. Clemenceau.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. *Secretary.*
Professor P. J. Mantoux *Interpreter.*

1. SIR MAURICE HANKEY read the following communication, which had been received from the Drafting Committee:—

League of Nations

“On account of the important part which the Covenant of the League of Nations plays in the draft Treaty of Peace, the Drafting Committee forward the annexed proof¹ indicating the changes which have been made in the text since Friday, May 3rd. The alteration in Article 22 was made under instructions given personally to M. Fromageot by M. Clemenceau, the President of the Conference.

“See Article 4, p. 11—Italy is omitted.

“ “ 22, p. 17.

“ Annex I, p. 19.—Italy being omitted.

“ “ p. 20.—where Italy is included.”

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it was very important to France that some words should be put in to enable her to utilise native troops for the defence of French territory just as she had done in this war. He was not responsible for the actual wording employed.

PRESIDENT WILSON drew attention to the previous discussion which had taken place on this subject at the Council of Ten on January 30th, (I. C. 128, Minute 1), when it had been agreed that precisely similar wording in the resolutions on the subject of mandates, namely, “for other than police purposes for [and?] the defence of territory,” would cover France's needs.² He asked Sir Maurice Hankey to bring the matter to Lord Robert Cecil's attention and ask him what alteration, if any, there should be in the League of Nations Covenant.

¹ This draft text does not accompany the minutes.

² Vol. III, pp. 803-805.

2. (At this point Colonel Henri was introduced.)

COLONEL HENRI, who is the officer in charge of the arrangements for the security of and communication with the Germans at Versailles, said that on the previous evening the Germans had sent him a message to the effect that they had been kept waiting so long that they proposed to return to Berlin. This morning, a subordinate official had reported to him that 14 persons would be leaving this evening. Colonel Henri had asked for their names, but the subordinate said he did not know them. Colonel Henri had insisted that he could not make the arrangements for motor cars, etc., unless he knew who the persons were, and a reply had been promised by mid-day. He was to see Baron Lassner [*Lersner*]³ in the afternoon.

The Date of
Handing the
Peace Treaty to
the Germans

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that Colonel Henri should be authorised to inform the Germans of the date on which the Treaty would be handed over. This raised the question of the date. He was informed by M. Dutasta that the American Representative on the Drafting Committee thought a meeting was possible on Wednesday afternoon, but the British and French Representatives considered Thursday was the earliest possible date.*

M. CLEMENCEAU, continuing, said that he had just received news that Mr. Orlando was coming back and this would involve altering the first two pages of the Treaty.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it would be better not to alter the Treaty in print but to alter it in writing if they came back, which would show the Germans that we had intended to go on without the Italians.

PRESIDENT WILSON proposed that the Germans should be informed that the Treaty would be handed to them on Wednesday morning.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE preferred Wednesday afternoon.

M. CLEMENCEAU gave Colonel Henri instructions to inform the Germans as follows:—

1. The delay in printing the Peace Treaty was due to the time taken in examining the full powers.
2. The Treaty was now being printed.
3. The Meeting with the Germans would be at 3 p.m. on Wednesday next, May 7th.

(Colonel Henri withdrew.)

(It was decided that no alteration should be made in the first two

³ Commissioner on the German Delegation to Negotiate Peace.

*(Note by the Secretary. Mr. Hurst informs me that he pressed very strongly that the Treaty could be ready by Wednesday afternoon.) [Footnote in the original.]

pages of the Treaty of Peace owing to the fact that the Italians had announced their intention of returning.)

Plenary
Meeting

3. (It was decided to hold a Plenary Meeting on the following day, Tuesday, May 6th, at 3 p.m.)

4. (M. Pichon then entered.)

M. PICHON said he had had a verbal note from M. Bonin, conveying a message from Baron Sonnino. The gist of this was that, having received a vote of complete confidence from the Italian Parliament, and not desiring to complicate the situation at this very serious moment by any

The Position
With Italy

positive or negative act which might be interpreted as putting back the peace, and confident in the assurance by their Allies of their desire to obtain a peace satisfactory to all and in the general interest, the President of the Council and Baron Sonnino had decided to leave for Paris, arriving on Wednesday morning, with the hope of being present when the Treaty of Peace was handed to the Germans.

SIR MAURICE HANKEY again asked definitely whether the Drafting Committee were to alter the printing of the first two pages in view of the return of the Italians.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE replied that they should not do so. Any alteration should be made in writing at the last moment.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed.

(MR. LLOYD GEORGE retired to interview the Marquis Imperiali, but returned very shortly after to say that the Marquis merely had the same message for him as M. Pichon had already received from M. Bonin.)

PRESIDENT WILSON drew attention to the following information, which related to the Italian question:—

1. Additional Italian troops had been sent to Sebenico.

2. There had been serious oppression by the Italians in the Dodecanese and in a village in Rhodes (?) named Alanova (?) a bishop had actually been killed in the church where he was officiating, while a woman had also been killed by the Italians.

This information had been conveyed to him by a Greek named Russes (?).

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had received the same information.

(At this point, General Sir Henry Wilson entered with maps.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had invited General Wilson to come here because he felt that the Italian movements in the East were, when considered in the aggregate, highly suspicious, and he thought his colleagues ought to be made acquainted with them.

GENERAL WILSON explained on a map the general military position in the East as regards the Italians. At the present time, there were about 30,000 Italians in Bulgaria. General Franchet d'Esperey was responsible for making those dispositions. There were two French

divisions in this region, but they were troops who had come from Odessa, very tired and not the best French troops. In Hungary there were four Roumanian divisions, two weak French divisions, and, on the other side opposing the Roumanians, two Hungarian divisions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in Asia Minor the Italians had occupied the harbour of Marmaris, nominally as a coaling station. They had a battalion at Konia, which had been sent there by agreement. They had landed troops at Adalia without consulting the Allied and Associated Powers and other movements were reported.

GENERAL WILSON said there were unconfirmed reports of landings at various places on the coast of Asia Minor, including Alaya.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE re-called that the Italian expedition to Tripoli had been uncommonly well concealed. He was suspicious of a similar expedition now to Asia Minor. According to his information, the Italians were arming the Bulgarians and stirring them up to attack both the Greeks and the Serbians, but especially the latter. They were the only nation not demobilising.

M. CLEMENCEAU said this was a fact.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the situation in the East was not being very well handled by the Allies. The Bulgarians were a most formidable people and were not being disarmed.

M. CLEMENCEAU disputed this. He said he had despatches in regard to the breech blocks of the Bulgarian guns which proved this.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the breech blocks were being taken to Sofia, where there were no Allied troops except Italians.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had ordered them back.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Italians were the only considerable force in this region. He wished General Henrys was in charge, as he thought that for this particular work he was more suited than General Franchet d'Esperey.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked where General Henrys was.

GENERAL WILSON said he was on his way back from Warsaw.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the British had a division and a half in the Caucasus. He would like to have examined the effect of bringing them back from the Causasus.

PRESIDENT WILSON recalled the report of the Military Representatives on the distribution of forces in Turkey.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought the question ought to be re-considered. Any day it might be found that the Italians had captured Anatolia and it would be difficult to get them out of there once they had occupied it. The mandates for Turkey could not be settled now, owing to the decision to send out a Commission. He thought, therefore, that we should fall back on his original proposal of a re-distribution of the forces of occupation. The United States troops ought to go to Constantinople and to provide troops for Armenia. The British would

come out of the Caucasus and the French might put a garrison in Syria, while the Greeks should be allowed to occupied [*occupy?*] Smyrna, since their compatriots were actually being massacred at the present time and there was no one to help them.

M. CLEMENCEAU said the Italians had seven battleships at Smyrna.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he would like to settle the forces of occupation in Turkey before the Italians returned to Paris: this afternoon, if possible.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he could not do it so hastily.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said if they discussed it with the Italians, they would anticipate them.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he did not know where he was to find the American troops. Marshal Foch would be nervous if he withdrew United States' troops from the occupied zone in Germany.

GENERAL WILSON said that one United States' division would be required for Constantinople and the Straits to replace one British division and the few French battalions that were there. He could not estimate the number required for Armenia, as this would depend on how far into the country they had to penetrate. At the present moment, the British were under an agreement to let the Italians go to the Caucasus.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that all he had said was that he would like the British to come out of the Caucasus and the Italians had said they would like to go in, as there was oil there.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he did not approve of the Italians going to the Caucasus.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had made no agreement on the subject.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE recalled the report of the Military Representatives, which, however, he was reminded by Sir Maurice Hankey, had never been formally approved. He understood that, in any event, the British were coming out.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked why any troops should replace the British.

GENERAL WILSON said that unless some civilised Power was in occupation, there would be the most terrible massacres.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed and pointed out that we could not persuade Denikin⁴ from entering Georgia.

GENERAL WILSON said he was most anxious to get the British troops out.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the British troops were the only ones accustomed to this kind of business, although the French had some experience. United States' officers would be quite unaccustomed to it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the United States' troops would be wanted in Armenia and would not meet with difficulties, although it

⁴ Gen. Anton Ivanovich Deniken, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of South Russia.

was not the same in the Caucasus. In reply to President Wilson, he said he feared the effect of the Italians going to the Caucasus would be very serious. He was convinced that the forces of occupation should be settled at once and then the Commission could go out.

PRESIDENT WILSON said this was too important a matter to be settled in a hurry. He must confer with his military advisers first.

GENERAL WILSON said that the British problem was very simple, as it merely involved taking the troops out of the Caucasus.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it had been proposed to put these troops in the region of Constantinople for the present, in order to have them ready to counter any move by the Italians.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he, himself, intended to take action today as regards Bulgaria.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he was not at all sure as to what military troops he could dispose of.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there was a general idea that the British were imperialistic in their desires, but as a matter of fact they were not willing to take any more responsibility.

PRESIDENT WILSON said it did not seem a question of assuming more responsibility but a question of their withdrawing their existing responsibilities.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the Caucasus was very rich, but it would be a big job to look after it and the British Empire could not assume those additional responsibilities.

PRESIDENT WILSON feared that to let the Italians into the Caucasus would prove to be very serious and threaten the peace of the world.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that to take the 1½ British divisions from the Caucasus and put them in Constantinople would safeguard the position against the Italians. Otherwise, the Allied and Associated Powers might find their hands forced. The situation ought to be tackled at once to avert these [*this*] possibility.

(It was agreed :—

1. That General Wilson should at once see General Bliss (to whom President Wilson sent a message by telephone) and should post General Bliss with the whole situation, in order that General Bliss may confer with President Wilson in the afternoon.

2. That the Naval Authorities should be invited to co-operate, when the naval elements entered into the problem.)

(General Wilson withdrew.)

The Return of
the Italians.
Permission
To Publish

5. In reply to a telephone message from M. Pichon, it was agreed that the fact that the Italian Delegation was returning to Paris should be published.

6. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that a few days ago an old friend of his, formerly a Welsh member of Parliament, had called on him in Paris,

and said he was just leaving for Rome. He had told Mr. Lloyd George that he was convinced that the Italians were anxious for an excuse to come back, and had asked if there was anything he could do. Mr. Lloyd George had explained the general situation to him, without, of course, giving him any authority to act. Last night he had received a telegram from his friend in Rome, the gist of which was that he had seen M. Orlando, who had said he was willing to stand by the Pact of London but had intimated that when Italy had got Dalmatia and the Islands, she would go to Croatia and make a bargain for the exchange of Fiume.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that all this fitted in with the naval and military movements that the Italians were making.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Italians had already broken the Treaty by occupying Fiume.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out, however, that the Italians had not occupied it alone: Allied troops were also in Fiume.

PRESIDENT WILSON recalled that the Armistice had given the right to the Allies to advance troops for the maintenance of order, and the Italians had used this excuse to push forward troops to Fiume, in which they had been joined by their Allies. This prevented us from saying that the Italians were outside their rights.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would like to tell the Italians they must withdraw. If they should plead the Armistice as an excuse for staying, we must say: "Then let the Serbians go in; they are Allies."

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the Italians were sending troops to Sebenico. They were not entitled to do that under the Armistice.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said we ought to insist on adherence to the Armistice. They were playing the Pact of London against Great Britain and France, and it was Great Britain and France that must meet them. Our line should be to say: "You must clear out of Fiume and leave it to the Croats, in accordance with the Pact." They could not afford to do that.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had just received a message from Mr. Lansing to the same effect as M. Pichon's and the Marquis Imperiali's messages, namely, that the Italians would be back on Wednesday morning. The message also stated that they were coming in the hope that they could take part in the meeting with the Germans. This meant that they were in the hope that the Allied and Associated Governments would make this possible for them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said this could not be done on Wednesday morning.

7. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Germans had assumed that the

Allied and Associated Powers were going to make a communication of the terms published and had asked that as theirs could not be ready they might be allowed to use the one issued by the Allied and Associated Powers. M. Cambon had given him this information.

Publication of
the Peace Treaty

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had received a message from General Smuts, who considered that the Germans would obtain a considerable diplomatic advantage if the treaty were published. In such a gigantic document there would have to be a good many alterations, and the Germans would claim these to be a diplomatic victory for them. He pointed out that in many parts of the Treaty he himself had had to trust to experts who were not really looking at the Treaty as a whole. He anticipated, when he read the Treaty as a whole, that he might find a good many unexpected clauses, some inconsistent with others, just as had happened to him sometimes in introducing a complicated Bill into Parliament.

M. CLEMENCEAU did not think it possible to keep publication back, but he would only publish a summary.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that the text ought not to be published.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that M. Tardieu's summary was so long that it would occupy three whole sheets of the *Times*.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that Mr. Baker, who was in general charge of the United States Press arrangement, had prepared a summary.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Mr. Baker's summary had been prepared in co-operation with Mr. Mair,⁵ who had done a large part of it, but even Mr. Mair's summary would occupy two sheets of the *Times*.

(It was agreed that M. Tardieu, Mr. Baker and Mr. Mair should be invited the following morning to meet the Council of Three.)

8. M. CLEMENCEAU asked how the question of Responsibilities stood.

Responsibilities
for Breaches, etc.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he understood that it had been held up at a recent Plenary, owing to some objection by the British Dominions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it was too late now to bring it before the Plenary. He understood that General Botha thought that the names of the Germans whom it was proposed to try should be given. He had pointed out that the British had made the same demand in South Africa. General Botha had agreed to all their other demands, but would not give way on that, and had insisted that he should

⁵ George Herbert Mair, director of the press section of the British delegation.

be given the names. General Botha had then asked Lord Kitchener whether, in his place, he would give up men to be tried without knowing their names, and Lord Kitchener had replied that as a soldier, he would not. Consequently, the negotiations had been broken off, and the war had gone on for 17 months. In the end, only three names had been given for trial.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had always felt that this was the weak spot in the Treaty of Peace.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that this depended on the mentality of the Germans.

9. (A memorandum by the Secretary-General was considered with the result that it was agreed to proceed to Versailles that afternoon, and meet the Secretary-General there.)

Arrangements
for Meeting With
the Germans

10. MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the cost of the Army of Occupation was to have precedence over indemnities and reparation. The present Armies of Occupation were costing £300,000,000 a year. At present no limit was placed on the size of the total army to be maintained. Unless some limitation were arranged, there would be nothing left for indemnity.

The Size of the
Army of Occupa-
tion of the Rhine
Provinces

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this did not affect the Treaty of Peace, but was a matter that should be arranged between the Allied and Associated Governments.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that in a previous conversation it had been arranged that the British and United States forces would be very small—only sufficient to show the flag.

(It was agreed that a Committee composed of General Bliss, for the United States of America, General Sir Henry Wilson for the British Empire, and a French Officer to be designated by M. Clemenceau, should meet to consider the size of the Army of Occupation of the Rhine Provinces, after conclusion of the Treaty of Peace.)

11. MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out a difficulty which had arisen about the organisation of the League of Nations. The United States of America could not devote any money to the League until the Treaty was ratified. It was absolutely necessary, however, to get the organisation of the League ready, as certain duties would fall on it very soon after the signature of the Treaty of Peace. It was not considered desirable to proceed at once to Geneva, where sufficient buildings were not available. He asked authority, therefore, on behalf of Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary-General, to establish himself temporarily in London, where he would build up the organisation of the League.

The Period of
Organisation
for the League
of Nations

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had no objection.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had no objection.

(It was agreed that the Secretary-General of the League of Nations should be authorised to establish the temporary and provisional organisation of the League of Nations in London.

12. The Council had before it a memorandum from the Secretary-General, entitled "Free Circulation for the German Delegation". (Appendix.)

**Couriers for
the German
Delegates**

M. CLEMENCEAU considered that the couriers allowed to the German Delegation were quite sufficient.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that the Allied and Associated Powers should be as liberal in these matters as possible.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that there was nothing for the Germans to spy on at the present time.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed to adopt a liberal attitude.

(It was agreed that the German Delegates at Versailles should be permitted to send to Germany and vice versa, in addition to the ordinary couriers bearing the official mail, other persons, including journalists, in such proportion as they may deem necessary.)

13. M. CLEMENCEAU said he had received a protest from the Marquis Saionji against decisions having been taken in regard to affairs in China and Siam without consultation with the Japanese. No complaint was made against the substance of the Articles in the Treaty of Peace that had been agreed on, but as Japan had special interests in the Far East, he considered that the Japanese Plenipotentiaries should have been present at the discussion.

**Decisions
in Regard to
China and Siam.
Protest by the
Japanese
Delegation**

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that as he had no objection to the substance, the matter was not very material. No-one present could recall any decision in regard to Siam, and the clauses in regard to China had been prepared by experts, but had not been discussed at any meeting.

14. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was very anxious to settle the question of the mandates before the Treaty of Peace.

Mandates

PRESIDENT WILSON said that it could hardly be settled in 48 hours. In regard to Turkey in particular, it was impossible for him to give a decision at present as to whether the United States could take a mandate.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that as far as Great Britain was concerned he would make no objection to a settlement of the Turkish mandates, though he realised President Wilson's difficulty. What he was pressing for at present was the German Colonies.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he was ready at any time to discuss the matter.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that to all intents and purposes it had been

agreed that the mandate for German South-West Africa should be given to South Africa, for New Guinea and the adjacent islands to Australia, for Samoa to New Zealand.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there was still the remaining African Colonies.

M. CLEMENCEAU said there was perfect agreement on these too.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE urged early consideration of this question, as he was most anxious to be able to announce the mandates to the Press at the time when the Peace Treaty was issued.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he was very anxious to avoid the appearance of a division of the spoils being simultaneous with the Peace.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 5 May, 1919.

Appendix to IC-181B

Free Circulation for the German Delegation

The Germans' request dated April 21st ran in this way: "The German Government are ready to send their delegation to Versailles, if the latter enjoy liberty of displacement, free use of telegraph wires, etc."

The Allied and Associated Governments sent the following reply on April 22nd:

"The German delegation will enjoy all freedom as regards their movements in the fulfilling of their mission, as well as free use etc".

The German delegation at Versailles have informed our military mission that the above terms were to be interpreted in the broadest sense, and that they consequently considered themselves as authorised to send from Versailles to Germany and vice versa, in addition to the ordinary couriers bearing the official mail, all other persons, *inter alia* journalists, in such proportion as they will deem necessary.

Up to the present, the interpretation given by the Germans has not been admitted and only the couriers have been allowed to travel.

Considering the protest raised by the German delegation, it is expedient that a definite decision should be come to in that matter.

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unit, Paris, on Tuesday, May 6, 1919, at 11 a. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. *Secretary.*
Professor P. J. Mantoux, *Interpreter.*

Arrangements
for Meeting
Germans at
Versailles

SIR MAURICE HANKEY said he had received a communication from the Secretary-General stating that for the indispensable material arrangements, such as protocol drafting, placing of the Delegations, assignment of cards and seats, arrangements with representatives of the Press, etc. one Secretary per Great Power and two Secretaries for the Secretary-General would be insufficient. Mr. Dutasta had therefore asked that the numbers might be raised to two Secretaries each for the United States of America, United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Japan, with one Secretary for each of the other Delegations, and three members of the Secretary-General's Secretariat.

(The above proposal was agreed to.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU pressed very strongly that the guarantee by the British Empire and the United States of America, which it had been agreed should be given to France, should be furnished immediately, as it was important to him to be able to make an announcement on the subject.

Guarantee to
France by the
British Empire
and the United
States

M. TARDIEU said that after discussion with Mr. Frazier,¹ he suggested that the undertaking should be announced simultaneously with the signing of the Treaty of Peace to the Press, but should not form part of the Treaty. He then read the attached form. (Appendix I.)

PRESIDENT WILSON said he did not like this form, which confused the question. It was provided in the Treaty that Germany should not maintain permanent facilities for mobilization west of the Rhine. If that was put in, as M. Tardieu contemplated, it would look as though,

¹ Arthur Hugh Frazier, Counselor of the American Embassy in France; member of the Secretariat of the Conference.

if Germany should do so, the United States would have at once to send troops. This was not what was intended. Troops were only to be sent in the event of an act of aggression. He then read Mr. Balfour's draft, which had been handed to him by Mr. Lloyd George (Appendix II), and which stated the matter perfectly clearly. In Mr. Balfour's draft, however, he detected an error in paragraph 2, where the word "any" should be substituted for "either". He himself would be quite prepared to sign a similar document, the paragraph in regard to Dominions of course being omitted.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would be satisfied with this.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he would be prepared to sign. He said that he had already informed the Imperial War Cabinet of the decision.

M. TARDIEU said he could alter his draft to meet President Wilson's criticisms.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he considered Mr. Balfour's draft sufficient. M. Tardieu's draft gave the impression of a triple agreement, which the United States, of course, would object to. The agreement was triple in effect, but not in form.

M. CLEMENCEAU then raised the question of the form which the announcement should take.

M. TARDIEU proposed a draft in some such words as the following:—"So far as the question of the French frontier on the Rhine is concerned, the United States Government and the British Government are in agreement to submit to their respective legislatures the text of the Treaty according to the terms of which the Republic of the United States of America and Great Britain will immediately bring their assistance in case of an unprovoked German aggression."

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the mention of the approval of the League of Nations had been omitted.

M. TARDIEU proposed to introduce the words "with the approval of the League of Nations" after the words "respective legislatures".

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the mention of the League of Nations would assist him in getting it through Parliament.

PRESIDENT WILSON then proposed the following alternative draft:—

"In addition to the securities afforded in the Treaty of Peace, the President of the United States of America has pledged himself to propose to the Senate of the United States, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain has pledged himself to propose to the Parliament of Great Britain an engagement subject to the approval of the Council of the League of Nations to come immediately to the assistance of France in case of unprovoked attack by Germany."

(It was agreed

(1) That the announcement should be made in the words proposed by President Wilson.

(2) That President Wilson on behalf of the United States of America and Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour on behalf of Great Britain, should respectively send letters to M. Clemenceau, based on Mr. Balfour's draft (Appendix 2).

(At this point the Drafting Committee was introduced.)

3. MR. HURST said that the Drafting Committee had found itself in a difficulty. On Friday, May 2nd, the text of an article had been approved by the Supreme Council in regard to the renunciation by Germany of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and other matters relating to Russia. This had been forwarded to the Drafting Committee (I.C. 171.C. [*I.C. 179C*] Minute 11).² The Drafting Committee, however, had found that this article was less far-reaching than articles already included in the Financial and Economic Sections of the Peace Treaty, and had accordingly submitted a revised draft which was approved by the Supreme Council and duly transmitted to the Drafting Committee to supersede the original draft (I.C. 181.A. Minute 2).³ Today, however, the Drafting Committee had been told that the original clause was to be reinserted.

Renunciation
by Germany
of the Brest-
Litovsk Treaty

In reply to Mr. Lloyd George he said he thought the new instructions had been given to M. Fromageot by M. Pichon.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if the revised draft had been approved by the Supreme Council it ought to stand.

(It was agreed that the revised draft approved on May 3rd should stand and the Drafting Committee was given verbal instructions to carry this out.)

4. MR. HURST said that on May 2nd, the Supreme Council had approved the following Article for incorporation in the Treaty of Peace, which had been duly notified to the Drafting Committee.

Austria

"Germany acknowledges and will fully respect the independence of Austria within the frontiers established by the present Treaty as inalienable except by consent of the League of Nations". (I. C. 179.C. Minute 12.)⁴

The difficulty in which the Drafting Committee found themselves was that the frontiers of Austria had not been fixed. It was true that the frontiers between Germany and that part of the old Austrian Empire which was now comprised in the new Czecho-Slovak State had been fixed, but nothing had been said either about the frontiers between Germany and the new Austria, or about the other frontiers of Austria.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed that the 1914 frontier between Austria and Germany should be adhered to.

² *Ante*, p. 421.

³ *Ante*, p. 451.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 421.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that this only provided for the boundary between Germany and Austria, whereas the Article quoted above referred to "the frontiers established by the present Treaty," and contemplated the whole of the boundaries of Austria.

Mr. HURST said that the Drafting Committee had proposed an amendment to the effect that Germany should recognise Austria within frontiers which might be approved by the Allied and Associated Powers.

(The Drafting Committee's proposal was agreed to, and the Drafting Committee was given verbal instructions to amend the Treaty accordingly.)

5. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had an appeal to make in regard to Canada. Sir Robert Borden had pointed out that Canada was, by the existing wording, ruled out of the League of Nations Council.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that it was not the League of Nations Council but the Labour Convention⁵ to which he understood Sir Robert Borden referred.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Sir Robert Borden's point was not so much that he wanted Canada at present to be represented on the Council, but he wanted the regulation so altered that Canada could be included in the Council. He had pointed out that South American Republics such as Nicaragua, Honduras, etc. could be represented, and he maintained that the United States influence in those countries was greater than the influence of the United Kingdom in Canada.

PRESIDENT WILSON demurred to this, but said he did not want that point to be made in order to convince him of the justice of Sir Robert Borden's contention. This Convention, however, had been drawn up by a Commission which had now dispersed, and passed by the Plenary Conference, and it was difficult to change it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Sir Robert Borden had actually moved and passed a resolution through the Plenary Conference,⁶ which he believed to be adequate, but the Drafting Committee did not consider it adequate. Sir Robert Borden had said that if the Drafting Committee's view was upheld, he would have to raise the question at the Plenary Session in the afternoon, and Mr. Lloyd George wanted to avoid this if possible.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if anyone had the exact terms of the resolution moved at the Plenary.

MR. HURST said the substance of it had been that the Drafting Committee was instructed to bring the Labour Convention into line with the League of Nations Covenant.

⁵ See protocol No. 4, plenary session of April 11, 1919, annex I, vol. III, p. 261.

⁶ See vol. III, p. 260.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if M. Clemenceau would agree to put Canada in the same position in regard to the Labour Convention as it was in regard to the League of Nations Covenant.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that that was his understanding of the situation. He was so anxious not to hold up the printing of the Peace Treaty that he thought alterations of this kind might be put into an errata.

MR. HURST asked that the form in which the correction should be made might be left to the Drafting Committee.

(It was agreed that the necessary alterations should be inserted in the Labour Convention, to place the Dominion[s] in the same position as regards representation on the governing body of the Labour Convention as they were already in as regards representation on the Council of the League of Nations.

2. That the form in which this should be incorporated in the Treaty of Peace should be left to the Drafting Committee.)

The Drafting Committee were given verbal instructions to carry out this decision.*

NOTE:—At the end of the meeting, Sir Maurice Hankey received a note from Mr. Hurst to say that the decision would be carried out by suppressing the following sentence in Article 393 (Labour Convention); “no member, together with its dominions and colonies, whether self-governing or not, shall be entitled to nominate more than one member.”

(M. Loucheur was introduced at this point together with Lord Cunliffe.)

NOTE:—The following passages were extremely difficult to follow, as all present were standing up, and the conversation was very general.

6. M. LOUCHEUR handed in the attached document proposing a drafting alteration in the text of Article 232 of the Treaty of Peace. (Appendix III.)

Reparation.
Article 232 of
the Treaty

(The object of this alteration, as explained by M. Loucheur, was understood to be to prevent the Germans from giving too narrow an interpretation of this Article. Annex 1, to the Reparation Clauses includes among the categories of damage for which compensation may be claimed pensions to naval and military victims of the war, whereas the actual text of this Article, although referring to Annex 1, indicates that it is only damage done to the civilian population that

* Note by the Secretary. At the Plenary Meeting in the afternoon the attached statement (Appendix VI) was signed by M. Clemenceau, President Wilson, and Mr. Lloyd George, the original being retained by the Prime Minister of Canada. [Footnote in the original.]

shall be compensated. This was the reason for inserting the words "and generally for all damage in accordance with the definition contained in Annex 1.")

M. CLEMENCEAU insisted very strongly that this alteration, which was merely a drafting one, was essential to him, as his colleagues pressed very strongly for it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said the question was really a legal one, and he greatly regretted the absence of Lord Sumner. After consulting Lord Cunliffe and Mr. Hurst, he said that so far as he was concerned, he would accept the change.

PRESIDENT WILSON, after consulting Mr. Brown Scott, also accepted it.

(It was agreed that the alteration proposed by M. Loucheur, should be approved, and the Drafting Committee was given verbal instructions to amend the Treaty of Peace accordingly.)

7. M. LOUCHEUR raised a question, which he said had up to now been overlooked in regard to Reparation. It was provided by the terms of the Armistice of November 11th, 1918, and the Conventions renewing it, for certain restitutions, including the surrender of ships, to take place regularly during the Armistice. Unless some provision was made for a continuation of these restitutions, they would come to a stop on the signature of Peace, and would not be renewed until the Treaty was ratified. He said that Mr. Lamont and Mr. McCormick were in agreement with him on the subject. He urged therefore, that some clause should be inserted to provide for this defect.

Provision in
the Treaty of
Peace for Resti-
tutions as Provided
in the Armistice
Continuing Pend-
ing Ratification
of Peace Treaty

(This was agreed to.)

8. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that on the previous evening M. Paderewski had pointed out to him that under the Reparation Clauses, the old Government buildings and forests of Poland, which had during the war been seized by Germany, and had now reverted to Poland, would have to be paid for by the Poles.

Poland and
Reparation

MR. HURST, in reply to a question by Mr. Lloyd George, said that under the Reparation Clauses, all State property would have to be valued and accounted for to the Reparation pool by Poland.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the Reparation Committee had powers to remit in such cases as these.

MR. HURST said it would involve a diminution in Poland's share in the pool.

(On President Wilson's suggestion, it was agreed that the Reparation experts should prepare a clause to provide for this difficulty,

which should be forwarded to the Drafting Committee for insertion in the Treaty of Peace.)

9. M. LOUCHEUR said that M. Crespi had communicated with him to say that the decision as regards the participation of Italy in reparation was contrary to Article 11 of the Treaty of London, namely, "Italy will receive a part corresponding to her efforts and her sacrifices in the eventual war indemnity." M. Crespi had asked that this provision might be withheld.

Reparation. Joint
and Several
Liability

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it was too late.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed. He said it would involve a most elaborate alteration.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it created an awkward situation, but he pointed out that Italy had not declared war against Germany for more than 12 months after she signed the Treaty of London.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that reparation was provided for, but no war indemnity.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that this narrow, interpretation of indemnity would hardly be fair to Italy. Italy's real weak point was that she had not declared war against Germany until nearly two years after the beginning of the war. Her efforts against Germany had been by no means great.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the formula on April 30th (I.C. 178.C. Minute 1)¹ related to the attacks on Italy by Germany, and not Italy's operations against Germany.

MR. BROWN SCOTT suggested that the matter might be settled in the Treaty with Austria.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this meant that Italy would receive nothing. It was a very complicated business, to make a change now.

M. LOUCHEUR read a draft Article which he proposed should be substituted for the present Article.

(The Secretary was unable to obtain this.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the effect of M. Loucheur's proposal would be a protest on behalf of Serbia and Roumania.

M. LOUCHEUR then suggested that the original text should be restored.

(This was agreed to.)

(At this point, the Drafting Committee and M. Loucheur withdrew, M. Tardieu having withdrawn during the discussion.)

M. Dutasta, Secretary-General of the Conference, was introduced.

¹ *Ante*, p. 387.

10. PRESIDENT WILSON asked M. Dutasta which Governments had been invited to attend the Plenary in the afternoon.

M. DUTASTA said the whole of the Plenary Conference had been invited.

States To Be
Represented at
the Meeting With
the Germans

In reply to a further question from President Wilson, he said that in addition to the great powers, the following States would be represented to meet the Germans:—

Belgium, Brazil, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Serbia, and Czecho-Slovakia.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that many other States, including some of the Central and South American States had declared war on Germany and would have to sign the Treaty.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said this was because of the League of Nations. Some neutrals, however, were to join the League of Nations, and these would not be present to meet the Germans.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he hoped at any rate the Chinese would be included.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE and M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

SIR MAURICE HANKEY said he was informed that Siam had sent aviators to the theatre of war.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said in these circumstances it would be difficult to leave Siam out.

(It was agreed that China and Siam should be added to the list of States represented when the Treaty of Peace was handed to the Germans.)

11. M. DUTASTA handed in a Memorandum in regard to the neutral zone of Savoy, of the Free zones of Savoy, and of the Gex district, (Appendix IV) as well as an Article proposed by the French Government for incorporation in the Treaty of Peace, (Appendix 5). He said that the text of this Article had been agreed between the French and Swiss Governments.

The Neutral
Zone of Savoy

PRESIDENT WILSON said he knew nothing about the matter.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he knew nothing of it either. He proposed that the Foreign Ministers should be invited to meet at once, with full powers to decide the question.

(It was agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers should be summoned at once by the Secretary-General, and should meet with full powers to decide the questions raised in the documents presented by the Secretary-General.)

**The Return of
the Italian
Delegation**

12. SIR MAURICE HANKEY was instructed to notify M. Orlando that a meeting of the Supreme Council would be held on the following day at President Wilson's house in the Place des Etats-Unis, at 11 a. m.

**The Position
With Italy**

13. MR. LLOYD GEORGE drew attention to an article in the "Matin", which was generally well informed about Italian affairs. This indicated that Italy would now claim the sovereignty of Fiume under the League of Nations.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked how long it would take the Italians to realise that they could not get Fiume under any circumstances. The only advantage in letting the Italians have Fiume would be that it would break the Treaty of London, which he was disturbed to find allotted the Dodecanese to Italy.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had bad news of Italian military movements.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what the result of President Wilson's enquiries in regard to the proposed Military re-disposition of forces in Turkey had been.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he regretted to have to say that his legal advisers informed him that he had no authority to send troops to Turkey. One result of the United States policy of isolation had been that laws had been placed on the Statute Book restricting the movements of troops outside of the United States. Under existing laws it would not even be possible for him to agree to send troops to Turkey, nor could he send them unless at war with Turkey. He had tried his best to find some way out but could not. The most he could do at present, and though that was not much it might do to steady the Italians, was to express his willingness to propose to Congress legislation on the subject when he submitted the Treaty of Peace. Such legislation would practically form part of the scheme of mandates.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that in the meanwhile Italy might establish herself in Anatolia.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that in that case Italy would be compelled to get out again. The United States was the only country where Italy could get credits for essential purposes.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that no discussion had taken place in regard to the mandates for Anatolia.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that certain authoritative Turk had expressed the view that the whole of Turkey ought to be under a single mandate. He himself thought that this was more than he could induce the United States to undertake. The Turks were hated in the United States, and the only ground on which a mandate would be accepted in Turkey, would be to protect subject races against the Turks. He was assured that to put in a disturbing authority in Anatolia would inevitably cause trouble with the Greeks on one side and the Roumanians

[sic] on the other. There would be constant friction between them. Moreover, when the Italian people saw what additions were involved to their budgets they would not like the arrangements. He could not understand the position of the Italian Government in this matter. He compared it to the popular clamour against the destruction of war-ships, the fact not being understood how heavy was the cost of their upkeep.

14. SIR MAURICE HANKEY stated that he had received a letter from M. Berthelot stating that the Committee set up on May 1st (I. C. 178 B [178 D] Minute 8)⁸ had established that the problem applied equally to certain countries such as Roumania and Greece which would receive territorial increases very much in the same conditions as new States like Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and the kingdom of the Serbo-Croats and Slovenes. The question was especially important by reason of guarantees to be formulated for the Jews of Roumania and the Mussulmans of Thrace and Albania. The Committee therefore asked for an extension of its terms of reference to include Roumania and Greece.

The above proposal was approved and Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to notify M. Berthelot accordingly.

15. PRESIDENT WILSON drew attention to the position the Italians had assumed in Albania.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that a Protectorate had been announced without informing any of their Allies.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that Albania ought to be independent.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE doubted if sufficient unity could be ensured.

16. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he thought some attempt ought to be made to proceed further in regard to Turkey. Otherwise the Italians would establish themselves there. M. Clemenceau on the previous day had told them that Italy had seven battleships at Smyrna. This meant that they intended to land troops. It was said that Italy was making trouble between the Greeks and Turks, and having done so they would land troops with the ostensible object of keeping the peace.

PRESIDENT WILSON remarked that they would have to be informed that if they did not evacuate they would get no money.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that America had had a good deal of experience of bankrupt countries in central America, and Europe had had a good deal of experience of the same kind in the Balkans and Turkey. The one thing these countries could always do was to make war.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that they did it by living on the country.

New States.
Conditions To Be
Accepted by
Them. Extension
of Terms
of Reference
to Committee

Albania

Turkey

⁸ Ante, p. 394.

17. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he thought it ought to be decided that M. Venizelos should be allowed to land two or three Divisions at Smyrna to protect his fellow-countrymen in Turkey.

Smyrna. Pro-
posed Landing
of Greek
Divisions

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the report of the Greek Commission was now unanimously in favour of giving this area to Greece.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he was ready to allow M. Venizelos to send troops.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that undoubtedly he was ready.

M. CLEMENCEAU recalled the agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne.⁹

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne had been conditional on Italy playing an adequate part in the war against Turkey, and had also been subject to the agreement of Russia. He asked for a decision that M. Venizelos might be authorized to send troops on board ship to Smyrna to be kept there ready for landing in case of necessity.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked why they should not be landed at once? The men did not keep in good condition on board ship.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had no objection.

18. SIR MAURICE HANKEY read a letter he had received from Mr.

Reparation Com-
mission. Report
by Third Sub-
Commission

Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia in his capacity of Chairman of the Third Sub-Commission¹⁰ of the Commission on Reparation enclosing a report presented by the Third Sub-Commission. The last para-

graph of this report read as follows:—

“Under all the circumstances the Sub-Commission thinks that no useful purpose can be served by proceeding to make recommendations unless the Supreme War Council expresses a wish that it should do so.”

SIR MAURICE HANKEY was authorized in replying to this letter to thank Mr. Hughes for his letter and report, and to state that as this aspect of reparation had been dealt with as part of the general discussions of the Supreme Council, it would not be necessary for the Sub-Commission to make further recommendations at present.

19. At the conclusion of the meeting a message was received from the Marquis Imperiali stating that the Italian Delegation could not arrive from Rome on the following day before 12 o'clock even if the train was punctual; as the Italian delegation would wish to establish contact with the Allied and Associated Governments before meeting the Germans, he asked for a postponement of this meeting for twenty-four hours.

Proposed
Postponement of
the Meeting With
the Germans

⁹ Agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne between Great Britain, France, and Italy, April 19-21, 1917, *Current History* (March 1920), vol. XI, p. 500.

¹⁰ The Committee on Measures of Control and Guarantees.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the Italian credentials had not yet been presented. He suggested that M. Pichon ought to ask M. Bonin whether he wished the Italian credentials to be presented.

PRESIDENT WILSON said it would be impossible to change the date of the meeting. The Italians were entirely responsible themselves for the delay in their return, and must take the consequences. He agreed with Mr. Lloyd George that M. Bonin should be asked if he wished the Italian credentials to be presented. Italy had left the Conference without any justification and no postponement was possible.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed, and pointed out that the Italians could have returned earlier.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed.

(It was agreed that M. Pichon should be asked to consult M. Bonin as to whether he wished the Italian credentials to be presented to the Germans.)

Just as the Meeting was dispersing the question was raised in the ante-room by Mr. Baker and Mr. Mair who were waiting there, as to the date on which the summary of the Treaty of Peace should be made public.

SIR MAURICE HANKEY consulted M. Clemenceau who was already in his Motor car, and President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George who were in the ante-room, with the result that it was agreed that the summary of the Treaty of Peace should be published in the morning newspapers of Thursday, May 8th; that arrangements should be made to secure publicity simultaneously in all the countries concerned; and that no publicity should take place before that date.

(The question of publicity by wireless telegraphy was left to be decided when the Council of Three met in the afternoon at the Plenary Conference.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 6 May, 1919.

Appendix I to IC-181C

[Translation ¹¹]

COMMUNIQUÉ

The President of the United States has addressed to M. Clemenceau the following letter:

(text of letter)

The Prime Minister of Great Britain has addressed to M. Clemenceau the following letter:

¹¹ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

(text of letter)

The engagement foreseen in these two letters, for which legislative approval will be requested by the Governments, will be founded upon the following bases:

(1) Any violation by Germany of the engagements undertaken by her concerning the left Bank of the Rhine and 50-kilometer zone on the right Bank (Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Peace) will be considered by the signatories as an act of hostility against them and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world.

(2) The signatory (the United States in one case, the British Empire in the other) will immediately give its assistance to France, if any move of unprovoked aggression is directed against France by Germany.

(3) This agreement will be submitted for the approval of the Council of the League of Nations by majority vote.

(4) The agreement remains in force until the signatories consider that the League of Nations itself constitutes a sufficient guarantee.

Appendix II to IC-181C

[Draft by Mr. Balfour of letter from Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour to M. Clemenceau. Same as letter printed as appendix I to IC-181D, on page 494.]

Appendix III

Reparation

ARTICLE 2

(ARTICLE 232 OF THE TREATY)

ACTUAL TEXT

TEXT AS PROPOSED BY THE FRENCH
DELEGATION

(Approved by M. Clemenceau,
President Wilson, and Mr.
Lloyd George, 6th. May 1919.)

The Allied and Associated Governments recognise that the resources of Germany are not adequate, after taking into account permanent diminutions of such resources which will result from other provisions of the present

The Allied and Associated Governments recognize that the resources of Germany are not adequate after taking into account permanent diminutions of such resources which will result from other provisions of the present

Treaty, to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage.

The Allied and Associated Governments, however, require, and Germany undertakes, that she will make compensation for all damage in accordance with the definition contained in Annex I hereto done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property during the period of the belligerency of each as an Allied and Associated Power against Germany by such aggression by land, by sea and from the air.

Appendix IV

I. Neutral Zone of Savoy

II. Free Zones of Savoy and of the Gex District

I. Neutral zone of Savoy—In 1815, the king of Sardinia, having regained possession of Savoy, wished to protect that province against a French invasion. He obtained from the Powers by the final act of the Congress of Vienna (art. 92) confirmed by the declaration of Nov. 3rd/20th. 1815,¹² the following advantages, viz.

a). That the provinces of Chablais and of Faucigny and the territory North of Ugines, should be included in the Swiss neutrality.

b). That in case hostilities have broken out or are threatening to break out between the States adjoining Switzerland, Sardinian troops should be withdrawn.

c). That no troops in arms should be permitted to march across or to remain in the aforesaid territories, except such troops as Switzerland might consider advisable to keep therein.

Switzerland had not been a party in those acts. When Savoy was ceded to France by Sardinia, the Treaty of Turin, Nov. [March] 24th, 1860¹³ stipulated in art. 2 that France should come to an agreement with the powers represented at the Congress of Vienna and also with the Helvetic Confederation, concerning the guarantees established in 1815.

¹² *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. III, p. 234.

¹³ *Ibid.*, vol. L, p. 412.

France did not consider that she should at the time claim the benefit of art. 2 of the treaty of Turin. But the present war has shown the necessity of amending the clauses of 1815. If the Swiss neutrality had been violated, as was the case with the Belgium neutrality, a hostile army could have marched into Savoy before the French military authorities had time to organise the defense of that zone in which no military establishment of any kind including even hospitals, was to be contemplated.

The French Government, having previously come to an agreement with Switzerland, request that the Powers should recognise and make Germany recognise also, that the neutralization of the Northern portion of Savoy, resulting from the Treaty of 1815, has now ceased and that the neutralised zone is abolished.

II. Free zones.—Taking into account the isolated geographical position of the Gex district, which is separated from the French territory by the Jura, the treaty of Nov. 20th 1815 had put back the customs frontiers beyond that district. By the treaty of Turin, Nov. [*March*] 16th 1816,¹⁴ between Sardinia and Switzerland, a similar arrangement had been made, as regards the immediate neighbourhood of Geneva.

When Savoy became French, the French Government of their own account, extended the small Sardinian zone, as part of the population had expressed a wish to that effect.

The economic regime as established by the treaties of 1815 and 1816, originally included complete reciprocity of treatment for French goods going into Switzerland and Swiss goods coming into the aforesaid zone.

From 1849, the Confederation began to raise economic barriers around their territory. As such a policy could be considered as contrary to the spirit of the treaties, France and Switzerland entered into negotiations on the matter, but they only concluded special agreements for a limited period, such as the convention of 1881.¹⁵

Through recently denouncing this convention, France has recovered her freedom in that part of the zone which was extended in 1860, but in order to recover her freedom in the former Sardinian zones of 1815 and 1816, she must have the old treaties, which placed her in economic bondage, declared void.

France moreover does not intend to abolish purely and simply the regime of the free zones. She expressly desires to have the question settled by a treaty entered into, of their own consent, by the only two powers concerned, such a treaty as will be consistent with the economic

¹⁴ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. VII, p. 21.

¹⁵ *Archives diplomatiques, recueil mensuel de diplomatie, d'histoire*, etc. 1880-81, 2me série, vol. III, p. 182.

development and will bring about a notable improvement in the trade relations between France and Switzerland.

It is to be expressly understood that the regime of the free zones shall remain in force until the ratification of the convention which is now being negotiated between France and Switzerland.

Appendix V to IC-181C

[Article Proposed by the French Government for Incorporation Into the Treaty of Peace]

3 MAY, 1919.

The High Contracting Parties, while they recognise the guarantees stipulated by the treaties of 1815 and especially by the Act of Nov. 20th 1815 in favour of Switzerland,—the said guarantees constituting international obligations for the maintenance of peace,—declare however that the provisions of these treaties and conventions, declarations and such other acts as concern the neutralised zone of Savoy, are no longer consistent with the present circumstances. For that reason, after taking note of the agreement thereon entered into by France and Switzerland, they state that the stipulations concerning the neutral zone of Savoy, as determined by art. 8 of the treaty of Nov. 20th 1815, are and shall remain abrogated.

The High Contracting Parties, in the same way agree that the stipulations of the treaties of 1815 and other supplementary acts concerning the free zones of Haute-Savoie and the Gex district are no longer consistent with the present circumstances and that it belongs to France and Switzerland to come to an agreement together, with a view to settling between themselves, the regime of these territories, under such conditions as shall be considered suitable by both countries.

Appendix VI to IC-181C

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House May 6, 1919

The question having been raised as to the meaning of Article IV of the League of Nations Covenant, we have been requested by Sir Robert Borden to state whether we concur in his view, that upon the true construction of the first and second paragraphs of that Article, representatives of the self-governing Dominions of the British Empire may be selected or named as members of the Council. We have no

hesitation in expressing our entire concurrence in this view. If there were any doubt it would be entirely removed by the fact that the Articles of the Covenant are not subject to a narrow or technical construction.

Dated at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, the sixth day of May, 1919.

G. CLEMENCEAU
WOODROW WILSON
D. LLOYD GEORGE

Notes of a Meeting Held in M. Pichon's Room at Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, May 6, 1919, at 5:30 p. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BRITISH EMPIRE

FRANCE

President Wilson.

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd
George, M. P.

M. Clemenceau.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B., *Secretary.*
Professor P. J. Mantoux, *Interpreter.*

States To Be
Represented at
the Meeting With
the Germans

1. It was agreed that all belligerent Allied and Associated States should be present when the Treaty of Peace was handed to the Germans.

Demilitarisation of
German Territory
West of the Rhine

2. MR. HURST on behalf of the Drafting Committee reported that an important article had by mistake been left out of the final Draft of the Treaty. On the previous evening he recalled that the Drafting Committee had received a document purporting to come from M. Clemenceau in substitution for the articles that they had drafted on this subject. He had taken this fresh draft to Sir Maurice Hankey, who had also been approached on the subject by M. Tardieu, and Sir Maurice Hankey had obtained a consent to it of Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson at a very late hour. A new text had then been incorporated in the final Draft of the Treaty, but on examination it was found that the following important article had been omitted:—

“In case Germany violates in any way whatever the provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as committing an hostile act against the Powers’ signatory to the present Treaty and as intended to disturb the peace of the world.”

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that this draft differed slightly from the original draft which he had prepared. He handed the original draft to Mr. Hurst.

(It was agreed that Mr. Hurst should inform the Drafting Committee that this article was to be reinstated with the wording changed so as to correspond more closely to the original draft.)

3. With reference to the decision taken in the morning that the summary of the Peace Treaty should be published on Thursday morning in the Press of all countries, it was further decided that no radio telegraphic summary should be sent out before mid-night on Wednesday, May 7th.

Publication of the
Peace Treaty

(M. Tardieu undertook to communicate this decision to the Secretary General.)

4. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said the only difficulty arose about Togoland and the Cameroons in regard to which he was not personally well informed.

The Late German Colonies.
Allocation of
Mandates

M. Clemenceau, with the consent of his colleagues, sent for M. Simon, the French Minister of the Colonies.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said in regard to Togoland, he understood the British had captured one half, and the French the other half. The French wanted the capital named Lome. In regard to the Cameroons, the British and French had each helped to capture it. He did not know what arrangement had been reached but he understood that Lord Milner had made some arrangement.

In regard to the Pacific, he said he understood that the Mandates would be allotted as follows:—

Australia should receive a Mandate of New Guinea, and the islands in the Bismarck Archipelago to the east of New Guinea.

New Zealand should receive the Mandate for Samoa.

The Japanese could receive a Mandate for certain islands north of the Equator.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed in all the above.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said having regard to the island of Nauru, some difficulty had arisen as the Governments of the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, all had certain interests. He suggested the best plan would be to give the Mandate to the British Empire which would arrange exactly how it would be dealt with.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that if a Mandate was once assigned it could not be handed over to one of the Dominions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the island was very valuable owing to phosphate deposits, and the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, were all interested in these.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the policy of the open door would have to be applied. He drew attention to Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which provided for "equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the League".

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that it was essential that the Mandatory should have the right to apply a tariff as this was the only method by which they could raise revenue.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the United States possessed islands in the Samoan group.

In assigning the German Islands to New Zealand, difficulties would arise if a tariff were applied.

(At this point, M. Simon entered.)

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Simon to state what arrangements had been made as regards Togoland.

M. SIMON said none had been written. The position was that the British occupied one part and the French another. He himself had been authorised by the French Government to discuss the matter with Lord Milner, and they had searched for a basis of agreement. It would probably suit both parties if the French part were joined on to Dahomey and the British part to Ashanti. The only railway was occupied by the British. He had asked Lord Milner to make a division which would be suitable to both countries and in regard to the Tribes. Lord Milner had then left for England, and the negotiations had been broken off at a time when, in his opinion, an understanding had nearly been reached.

In regard to the Cameroons there was complete agreement. The Cameroons he stated were divided by a mountain range, and he explained on a map how one part could be conveniently joined to Nigeria and the other part to French territory. He had agreed this with Lord Milner, and they had arranged their scheme to suit the Tribes.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE made the following proposal that France should become the mandatory for the Cameroons, subject to an arrangement between France and Great Britain for a readjustment between the Cameroons and Nigeria, this agreement being submitted to the approval of the League of Nations.

In regard to Togoland he understood that mandates were difficult. The country was cut into small bits, and it would be found that half of a tribe was under a mandate, and the other was not. He suggested that the principle of mandates should not apply in this case.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought it was difficult to avoid mandates under the Treaty Clauses.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE stated that the Treaty Clauses would merely hand over Togoland with the other former colonies to the Allied and Associated Powers, which would have a free hand to arrange for their disposal.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that the arrangement must be accommodated to the circumstances.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed that M. Simon should before 11 a. m. on the following day prepare a scheme on the following lines:—

Great Britain and France to make a joint recommendation to the League of Nations in regard to the division of Togoland. France to have a mandate for the Cameroons, subject to a joint recommendation which the British and French Governments would make to the League of Nations for a rearrangement of the boundary between Nigeria and the Cameroons.

(The above was agreed to.)

(M. Simon withdrew, but shortly afterwards returned and asked that the portion of the Cameroons which the Germans had forced France to give up in 1819 [1911] should not be subject to a mandate.)

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that this should be included in the joint recommendation.

(This was agreed to.)

5. PRESIDENT WILSON asked if any answer had been received to the invitation to Austria and Hungary to send representatives to Paris.

Treaty With
Austria and
Hungary

M. CLEMENCEAU said the Hungarian Government had fallen, and no answer had been received. A message had been sent by the French Representatives in Vienna stating that an answer had been sent, but it had not yet been received.

6. At the end of the Plenary Meeting, which preceded this meeting, Mr. Lloyd George on behalf of Great Britain and President Wilson on behalf of the United States of America handed to M. Clemenceau an undertaking to come to the assistance of France in the event of aggression by Germany. (Appendix.)

Undertaking
by the United
States of America
& Great Britain
to France

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 6 May, 1919.

Appendix I to IC-181D

[*Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour to M. Clemenceau*]

6 MAY, 1919.

To Monsieur Clemenceau,

President du Conseil de la Republique Française.

The stipulations relating to the Left Bank of the Rhine contained in the Draft Treaty [of] Peace with Germany are as follows:—

(1) Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn fifty kilometres to the east of the Rhine.

(2) In the area defined above the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military manoeuvres of either kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilisation are in the same way forbidden.

(3) So long as the present treaty is in force Germany undertakes to co-operate in any enquiry which the Council of the League of Nations, acting if need be by a majority, may deem necessary.

As these conditions may not at first provide adequate security and protection to your country, H. M. G. agree to ask Parliament to authorize a treaty with France by which Great Britain shall be bound to come immediately to her assistance in the event of any unprovoked movement of aggression against her being made by Germany.

The Treaty will be in similar terms to that entered into by the United States and will come into force when the latter is ratified.

The Treaty must be recognised by the Council of the League of Nations as being consistent with the Covenant of the League, and will continue in force until on the application of one of the parties to it, the Council of the League agrees that the League itself affords sufficient protection.

The obligation imposed under this Treaty shall not be binding on the Dominions of the British Empire until the Treaty is ratified by the Parliament of the Dominion concerned.

D. LLOYD GEORGE
ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR

Appendix II to IC-181D

[President Wilson and Mr. Lansing to M. Clemenceau]

6 MAY, 1919.

To Monsieur Clemenceau

President du Conseil de la Republique Francaise

The stipulations relating to the Left Bank of the Rhine contained in the Draft Treaty of Peace with Germany are as follows:—

(1) Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn fifty kilometres to the east of the Rhine.

(2) In the area defined above the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military manoeuvres of either kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilisation are in the same way forbidden.

(3) So long as the present treaty is in force Germany undertakes to co-operate in any enquiry which the Council of the League of Nations, acting if need be by a majority, may deem necessary.

As these conditions may not at first provide adequate security and protection to your country, I agree to submit to the Senate for its advice and consent, a treaty with France by which the United States of America shall be bound to come immediately to her assistance in the event of any unprovoked movement of aggression against her being made by Germany.

The Treaty will be in similar terms to that entered into by Great Britain and will come into force when the latter is ratified.

The Treaty must be recognised by the Council of the League of Nations as being consistent with the Covenant of the League, and will continue in force until on the application of one of the parties to it, the Council of the League agrees that the League itself affords sufficient protection.

WOODROW WILSON
ROBERT LANSING

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Wednesday, May 7, 1919, at 11 a. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

ITALY

M. Orlando.

Secretaries—Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.
Count Aldrovandi.

Interpreter—Professor P. J. Mantoux.

Delivery
of the
Treaty to
Delegations

1. M. Dutasta was introduced, and was given authority to issue one copy of the Treaty of Peace to each Delegation with a notice that it was strictly confidential.

Photographs
at the Meeting
With the
Germans

2. M. Dutasta was instructed with reference to paragraphs that had appeared in the Press, that no photographs were to be taken of the meeting with the Germans. Sketches, however, would be allowed.

Polish-
Ukrainian
Armistice
Commission

3. SIR MAURICE HANKEY brought to notice a letter from General Botha, the Chairman of the Polish-Ukrainian Armistice Commission, asking for authority for the Secretary General to despatch the following telegram under the auspices of the Commission:—

“Secretary of State

Stanislau-Tarnopol.

Since the Ukraino-Polish negotiations have been commenced under auspices of the Peace Conference at Paris, warn High Command of our army to beware of every provocation of the enemy instructing the whole army to retain composure and dignity at any price during the negotiations.”

Secretary of State
Dr. Paneyko.”

and in addition asking that general authority should be given to the Polish-Ukrainian Armistice Commission to authorise the despatch by the Secretariat-General of such telegrams as the Commission should from time to time consider necessary in connection with its duties.

PRESIDENT WILSON was in favour of the necessary authority being given.

M. CLEMENCEAU did not altogether like having telegrams sent before he had seen them, but said that he would agree with the President of the United States of America.

(At this point M. Orlando and Count Aldrovandi entered.)

(It was agreed

(1) That the Secretary-General should have authority to send the above telegram on behalf of the Polish Ukrainian Armistice Commission.

(2) That the Polish-Ukrainian Armistice Commission should be given general authority to authorise the despatch by the Secretariat-General of such telegrams as the Commission should from time to time consider necessary in connection with its duties.)

Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to notify the Secretary-General accordingly.

4. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said the situation in Russia was developing in a very remarkable manner, and would have to be dealt with soon. There had been a curious collapse of the Bolsheviki, and the British Cabinet were pressing for a decision. It seemed that
 Russia Koltchak had made such progress that he might soon be in a position to join hands with the forces based on Archangel. On the other hand, it was possible that he might march direct on Moscow. This was M. Paderewski's view. Hence, in a short time, the Allied and Associated Powers might be faced with a Koltchak Government in Moscow. According to information furnished by M. Tchaikowski¹ and M. Paderewski, Koltchak was simply a soldier and nothing more. Denekin was said to be pro-German or at any rate in the hands of a pro-German Chief of Staff. All this pointed to the desirability of imposing some conditions on Koltchak and Denekin before further supplies were furnished. Koltchak's political programme was vague and indefinite, containing such items as "there must be land reform".

M. Paderewski was afraid of a very powerful military Russia developing under Koltchak.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that M. Paderewski, like all Poles, was anti-Russian.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that we should demand a programme of reforms and insist that our continued support depended on its being adopted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he and General Wilson had both formed a very high opinion of M. Tchaikowski. He thought that his colleagues ought to see him. He was sent to Siberia by the Czarist Government owing to his liberal views, and was urging that the

¹ N. V. Chaikovski, President of the Russian Provisional Government of the Northern Region and member of the Russian Political Conference at Paris.

Allies should prevent Russia from becoming Imperial again. He himself feared that more than he did Bolshevism.

M. CLEMENCEAU was afraid of both.

PRESIDENT WILSON said Bolshevism must collapse, whereas an Imperial Russia might remain. There was nothing in the Treaty with Germany to prevent the Germans from forming a powerful industrial and commercial union with Russia. He asked what the assistance given to Russia consisted in.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said arms and supplies.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if they had been able to build up stocks.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought not. Koltchak's success was probably due to the fact that the Bolsheviks had no coal or oil.

(M. Simon, the French Minister of the Colonies, entered.)

5. M. SIMON said that the document he had been asked to prepare required a very careful text, and was not yet ready.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had telephoned to Lord Milner about the Colonies, and hoped to receive an answer that afternoon. In the meanwhile, he would ask M. Simon to consult with an official of the Colonial Office for whom he had sent in regard to an agreement which he handed to him. (Appendix.)

6. PRESIDENT WILSON said he had received a letter from a gentleman who signed himself President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs for Montenegro, claiming a place at the Conference in the afternoon on the ground that Montenegro had been an effective belligerent. He did not raise the question of his being present this afternoon, but he thought a decision ought to be taken in regard to Montenegro before the Austrian settlement was concluded.

(This was agreed to.)

7. PRESIDENT WILSON said that he understood that the Persians were much depressed at not being consulted in regard to the Peace Settlement. They said that their interests were not being considered.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the Austrian [*Turkish?*] problem had not yet been discussed in any detail. When it was discussed, he wished the Council to hear what the representatives of India had to say, particularly in regard to Constantinople and the future of Islam. He thought that Persia ought then to be heard.

8. M. CLEMENCEAU reported that the Austrian Government had accepted the invitation to send a delegation. He then read a despatch from the French representative in Vienna, somewhat in the following terms:—

"The Press Bulletin of Berne has announced that the Austrian Delegation will be called to Paris only in the second half of the

German
Colonies:
Mandates

Montenegro

Persia

Austria

month. The Minister of Foreign Affairs asks if this is correct. I replied that the Austrian Delegation must be ready to leave on Saturday evening. Will you let me know whether the date of arrival on the 12th is maintained. A difficulty has arisen as regards the selection of delegates. The Christian Socialists were a powerful political party and insist that the views of the Allied and Associated Powers should be met and that the Head of the Delegation should not be Dr. Klein, who is an out and out supporter of union with Germany. Hence, the exact composition of the Delegation cannot yet be indicated, although it will not exceed the numbers already indicated."

He then read another telegram from the Head of the French Mission in Vienna, according to which the Head of the British Mission had asked to see him to ask if the arrival of the Austrian Delegates at Paris could not be postponed, and he had replied that his own instructions came from the President of the Conference, and he had no authority to discuss the matter.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he knew nothing of this, and gave instructions for enquiries to be made.

9. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he did not see why the Austrians should be mixed up in the settlement with the Jugo-Slavs and other parts of the old Austrian Empire. He suggested that Austria should be told that the general settlement was our affair, and that as far as she was concerned, it was only proposed to draw her frontiers. No difficulty would arise about the frontiers between Austria and Italy. All the difficulties concerned Croatia and Italy.

The Settlement
of Austria

PRESIDENT WILSON said he would like time to think this proposal over.

M. ORLANDO in reply to Mr. Lloyd George, said that peace with Austria-Hungary could not be made, because there was now no Austro-Hungarian State in the sense that there had been before the war. Austria-Hungary having disappeared, could not become a High Contracting Party. What would take place, he said, was a general settlement of the boundaries of the new States and Austria was one of these states. Hence, it was necessary to determine the frontiers with other states at the same time.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed, but could not see that Austria had anything to do with the boundaries of other States than those contiguous to her.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that as M. Orlando had indicated, the boundaries of all the states of Austria-Hungary must be made simultaneously, and a general settlement reached. The Czechs had fought for the Allied and Associated Powers, and the Jugo-Slavs had remained at war with them practically to the end. He thought the boundaries of the whole of the states must be settled together.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that a beginning had to be made somewhere. Why, he asked, should Austria starve because peace had not been made with Croatia. Bolshevism and difficulties of that kind would increase in Austria the longer the delay. There was no difficulty, he understood, between the boundary of Hungary and Croatia.

PRESIDENT WILSON said the Peace Settlement could not be made so easily, namely, by merely cutting up the countries into bits.

M. ORLANDO suggested that the various negotiations should be carried out simultaneously.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed, and suggested that every step should be taken as completely as possible in order that it might not transpire afterwards that there were no guarantees of the execution of the Treaty.

(The Meeting was then adjourned to the Offices of the Supreme War Council, after the Meeting with the Germans.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 7 May, 1919.

Appendix I to IC-181E

[*British Proposal for Distribution of Mandates*]

It is agreed that in the case of:—

Togoland. France and Great Britain shall make a joint recommendation to the League of Nations as to its future.

Cameroons. The mandate shall be held by France subject to a rectification of the Western boundary in favour of Nigeria—a recommendation as to the nature of the rectification to be made to the League of Nations by France and Great Britain.

German East Africa. The mandate shall be held by Great Britain.

German South West Africa. The mandate shall be held by the Union of South Africa.

The German Samoan Islands. The mandate shall be held by New Zealand.

The Other German Pacific Possessions South of the Equator, excluding the German Samoan Islands and Nauru, the mandate shall be held by Australia.

Nauru. The mandate shall be given to the British Empire.

German Islands North of the Equator. The mandate shall be held by Japan.

Notes of a Meeting Held at Mr. Lloyd George's Residence, 23 Rue Nitot, Paris, on Wednesday, May 7, at Noon

PRESENT

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
General Sir Henry Wilson, G. C. B.,
D. S. O., Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
Rear-Admiral G. P. W. Hope, C. B.,
Director of Operations Division Admiralty War Staff.

FRANCE

Monsieur Clemenceau.

GREECE

Monsieur Venizelos.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B., *Secretary*.
Prof. P. J. Mantoux, *Interpreter*.

1. The Conference had before it the conclusions of a conference held in the Hotel Astoria, Paris, on May 6th, 1919. (Appendix.)

Despatch of
Greek Troops
to Smyrna

M. VENIZELOS said that a Greek division could very well be sent from Macedonia; General Franchet d'Esperey had announced that the Greek Division

was not required there.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what troops Greece had immediately available to send to Smyrna.

M. VENIZELOS said the total was two divisions without weakening the position in Macedonia, but troops could not be spared from Thrace until Greek troops had been brought from Russia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked how soon two divisions could be transported to Smyrna.

ADMIRAL HOPE said that a transport had been ordered to carry one division as soon as possible from Salonika and Kavalla to Smyrna. At the present time, however, the ships were very much scattered and, at the moment, he could not say what ships could be made available in the Eastern Mediterranean, or how soon. Once the ships were assembled it would only take about a day to transport them from Salonika to Smyrna. In reply to President Wilson, he said he had no means of guessing how long it would take to assemble the ships. In reply to Mr. Lloyd George, he said that he was going back to London tomorrow and in a day or two would be able to let him know the exact position.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that in the meantime the divisions should be got ready.

M. VENIZELOS said that one division was ready now, and it was proposed that they should be embarked at the port of Leftera.

ADMIRAL HOPE said he understood that there was no heavy artillery attached to this division, only mountain artillery; in that case it could be embarked in the Bay of Kavalla, but heavy artillery could only be embarked from Salonika.

GENERAL WILSON, in reply to Mr. Lloyd George, said that, between Salonika and the Dardanelles, the Turks only had about three divisions. During the war the strength of the Turkish division had been reckoned at about 6,000 men but towards the end of the war they had died down to almost nothing. Of course, however, a division could be filled up.

M. VENIZELOS said that a Greek division comprised of 9,000 rifles, and 16,000 of all ranks. He understood that many of the Turkish divisions were reduced to the size of a regiment.

GENERAL WILSON thought that probably there was no very formidable Turkish force in this region.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the British ships at Smyrna might supply some information.

ADMIRAL HOPE doubted if they had any facilities for obtaining information as to the military forces.

GENERAL WILSON said that his news all came from Constantinople.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he supposed that the Armistice gave the Allies the right to send troops.

M. VENIZELOS said that more than 30,000 Greek citizens in the town of Smyrna were in danger from the Turks.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this provided a very strong reason for protecting them.

GENERAL WILSON said that it was true the Allies had power to land troops, but the Italians also had the right.

M. VENIZELOS pointed out that the Italians had landed in Adalia without consulting the Allies.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that if Greek troops were sent, the Italians could hardly land troops unless they intended to break with the Allies.

GENERAL WILSON raised the question of the command of the troops. He understood that the Greek divisions were to come away from the command of General Franchet d'Esperey without being placed under the command of General Milne or any other Allied commander. They would constitute an allied force under Greek command.

M. CLEMENCEAU, PRESIDENT WILSON, and MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed in this.

PRESIDENT WILSON raised the question as to whether the Turkish Government ought to be warned of the intention to land troops.

M. VENIZELOS thought that they ought, but only just before the landing took place. He, himself, knew the Turks well and he thought that if they received no warning, except just before the event, no resistance would be offered. Of course, however, there were some risks. All the facilities for landing were available.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether there was not a danger that the Commander of the Fort would fire on the Greek ships when the landing began.

M. VENIZELOS said that the danger would be of their firing from the forts when the ships were entering the Gulf of Smyrna.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that they would not fire on the transports.

M. VENIZELOS agreed that they probably would not fire, if the transports were convoyed.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested it would be safer to warn the Turks.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that this would undoubtedly be the correct procedure. But if the Turks were warned too far in advance they would make preparations. He suggested that no communication should be made to the Turks until the troops were on board.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if M. Venizelos had warned the Greeks to keep the matter quiet.

M. VENIZELOS said he had taken all possible measures with this object. All available Greek ships were being collected but they were mostly very small. It would be necessary to crowd the ships very closely but Greek soldiers would not object to this. The ships should be dispatched as soon as possible.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, summing up the conclusions of the meeting, said that:—

1. Admiral Hope was to proceed to England to ascertain all details about the number of ships available for transport and the time required; to give orders for the concentration of these ships at Salonika; and to inform him as soon as possible of the results of his mission.

2. M. Venizelos was to collect as many Greek transports as possible at Kavalla, and to arrange for the troops to be ready to embark.

M. VENIZELOS said that one division was sufficient to start with.

M. CLEMENCEAU, in reply to Mr. Lloyd George, said that General Franchet d'Esperey already knew of the expedition. He asked if anything was to be said to the Italians.

Mr. Lloyd George was reminded by SIR MAURICE HANKEY that Admiral Calthorpe, who was at the same time the British Naval Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean and Diplomatic Representative at Constantinople, had repeatedly insisted on the importance of his being informed whenever any redistribution of troops was made in the Eastern Mediterranean. He had, for example, complained of not

being informed when the Italian battalion was sent to Konia. The reason for this was that he wished to be able to make such dispositions as might be necessary to safeguard against the reaction of these movements in other parts of Turkey.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the fewer people who were informed, the better.

ADMIRAL HOPE said that Admiral Calthorpe must be told, as he was Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet. He suggested that this should be done by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that Admiral Calthorpe should be cautioned as to the great importance of secrecy.

M. VENIZELOS said that it would be extremely difficult to keep the matter secret as the concentration of ships would soon become known. (The Meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 7 May, 1919.

Appendix

*Conclusions of a Conference Held in Hotel Astoria, Paris, at
4:30 p. m., 6 May, 1919*

PRESENT

M. Venizelos, Admiral Hope, General Belin, General Bliss, General Sir H. Wilson

1. The Supreme Council having agreed to the immediate despatch of Greek troops to Smyrna and the occupation of that town by purely Greek forces, we decided:—

- (a) To notify General Franchet d'Esperey.
- (b) To order one Greek division to prepare to embark at Salonika.
- (c) To order a second Greek Division to get ready.
- (d) To collect transport for the move of one Division as rapidly as possible.
- (e) To examine what steps may be necessary to safeguard the journey.
- (f) To take steps to keep up the necessary communication between Greece and Smyrna.

2. We are of opinion that these troops are under Greek Command and in no sense under International Command except possibly during the sea-transit.

3. We are of opinion that if the Turks or the Italians or both oppose a landing we shall find ourselves in face of a difficult problem and we draw attention to this possibility.

4. We presume the Italian and Turkish Governments will be informed as we are not sure whether such action is covered by the Armistice Terms.

Copies to:—

Prime Minister.
Colonel Sir. M. Hankey.
Admiral Hope.
General Bliss.
D. M. O.
D. M. I.
Lord Hardinge.
M. Venizelos.
General Albi (French G. H. Q)
General Weygand.
C. I. G. S.

PARIS, 6 May, 1919.

Notes of a Meeting Held in the Conference Room of the Supreme War Council at the Grand Hotel Trianon, Versailles, on Wednesday, May 7, 1919, at 4: 15 p. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

President Wilson

GREAT BRITAIN

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
Prime Minister.

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. C. Strachey.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau, President of the Council.

M. Simon, Minister for the Colonies.

ITALY

M. Orlando.

Baron Sonnino.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. } *Secretaries.*
Count Aldrovandi
Professor Mantoux, *Interpreter.*

1. The Council had before them a document communicated by Mr. Lloyd George at the morning meeting (I. C. 181-E) (Appendix 1.)

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if there were any islands besides New Guinea in the Pacific the mandate of which went to Australia.

The German Colonies. Allocation of Mandates

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said there were a number of smaller islands to the east of New Guinea.

M. SIMON said he agreed with Mr. Lloyd George's proposals subject to a reservation in regard to the Cameroons. Some inconvenience would arise to France as a Mandatory State owing to the fact that a part of the Cameroons would pass under the direct and unrestricted sovereignty of the British Empire. He then produced a form of agreement that he had prepared (Appendix 2).

MR. LLOYD GEORGE deprecated the reference to the agreement of the 4th March 1916 in Article 1 of M. Simon's draft as he understood that there was not complete agreement about this.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he preferred Mr. Lloyd George's text.

M. SIMON drew attention to the fact that the British text made no allusion to the portion of the Cameroons which Germany had forced France to give up in 1911 and which ought not to be subject to a mandate.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this matter ought to have been raised in connection with the Peace Treaty. As it has not been raised it was difficult to prevent it being subject to a mandate.

M. SIMON said that if he understood the matter right there was a joint clause in the Treaty of Peace according to which all previous treaties with Germany disappeared. This would cover the territory in question.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that France and Great Britain in his draft were entitled to make recommendations to the League of Nations on this matter.

M. SIMON objected that Mr. Lloyd George's text provided that France should have the mandate of the Cameroons except in regard to one part.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that this part only concerned the rectification of the frontiers.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed that the difficulty would be entirely met by deleting the second paragraph relating to the Cameroons and altering the first paragraph to read as follows:—

"Togoland and Cameroons. France and Great Britain shall make a joint recommendation to the League of Nations as to their future".

2. M. ORLANDO observed that in Mr. Lloyd George's scheme, Italy was excluded from participation in the mandates in Africa. He had spoken of this question before and had said that if mandates were a burden Italy was ready to accept them. If mandates had advantages, then Italy had the right to share them. Moreover, Article 13 of the Treaty of London (Appendix III) provided that Italy should obtain equitable compensations in those parts of Africa that specially concerned her in the event of France and Great Britain increasing their colonial territories in Africa.

Italian Claims
in Africa

M. SIMON then read Article 13 of the Treaty of London.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he could state at once that he fully recognised the validity of Article 13 and that the British Government was prepared immediately to enter into discussions on this matter. It was no use their doing it, however, unless France was prepared to.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that the phrase in Article 13 of the Treaty of London referred to augmentation of British and French territory and not to mandates which, strictly speaking, were not an augmentation. He did not press the point however.

(Mr. Balfour withdrew at this point.)

The following decisions were reached:—

(1) *Togoland and Cameroons.* France and Great Britain shall make a joint recommendation to the League of Nations as to their future.

German East Africa. The mandate shall be held by Great Britain.

German South West Africa. The mandate shall be held by the Union of South Africa.

The German Samoan Islands. The mandate shall be held by New Zealand.

The Other German Pacific Possessions South of the Equator excluding the German Samoan Islands and Nauru, the mandate shall be held by Australia.

Nauru. The mandate shall be given to the British Empire.

German Islands North of the Equator. The mandate shall be held by Japan.

(2) That an Inter-Allied Committee consisting of one representative each of the British Empire, France and Italy should be formed to consider the application of Article 13 of the Treaty of London, dated 26th April, 1915.

(3) That the above decisions should be published.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 7 May, 1919.

Appendix I to IC-181G

[British Proposal for Distribution of Mandates. Same as appendix I to IC-181E, printed on page 500.]

Appendix II to IC-181G

ARTICLE 1

The administration of the territories of the former German Cameroons and the protection of the people living therein are committed to Great Britain and France under the conditions specified in the Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 22, Paragraph 5, and according to the Anglo-French Agreement of the 4th of March, 1916, which will be recommended to the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 2

Nevertheless France will re-enter in the whole possession of the territories of French Equatorial Africa, which in conclusion of the agreement of November 4th, 1911, she had handed over to Germany.

ARTICLE 3

The territories of German Togoland will be made between Great Britain and France the subject of an agreement which will be recommended to the League of Nations.

The territories thus bounded will become integral portions of the neighbouring possession to which they will have been allotted.

Appendix III to IC-181G

Copy of Article 13 of Treaty of London, Dated 26th April 1915

[Translation ¹]

In the event of France and Great Britain increasing their colonial territories in Africa at the expense of Germany, those two Powers agree in principle that Italy may claim some equitable compensation, particularly as regards the settlement in her favor of the questions relating to the frontiers of the Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somaliland and Libya and the neighboring colonies belonging to France and Great Britain.

¹ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Thursday, May 8, 1919, at 11 a. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

President Wilson.

GREAT BRITAIN

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
(Prime Minister.)

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau, President of the
Council.

ITALY

M. Orlando, President of the Council.
Baron Sonnino, Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

Count Aldrovandi.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. } *Secretaries.*

Professor Mantoux—*Interpreter.*

1. There was some discussion on the subject of the meeting with the Germans on the previous day,¹ in the course of which M. Clemenceau said that he had heard on good authority that Count Brockdorff-Rantzau said he would not sign the terms of peace.

The Meeting
With the
Germans on the
Previous Day

M. CLEMENCEAU raised the question as to whether Brockdorff-Rantzau's proposal for joint Commissions to examine the proposals on technical matters in the Treaty of Peace should be adopted.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he thought that Brockdorff-Rantzau's proposal had related to the responsibilities of the war rather than to technical matters.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Commission he had proposed on this matter was a neutral one: he had really made two proposals. He then read the draft of a reply which was to the following effect:—

(1) The proposed neutral Commission on responsibilities for the war would be contradictory to the articles in the Treaty of Peace on this subject.

(2) In regard to the proposal for technical commissions he must inform Brockdorff-Rantzau that verbal communications are and remain excluded. The German delegation must have its own Commissions and send replies to the Secretary-General.

(Before finally approving this draft it was agreed:—that the text of Brockdorff-Rantzau's statement on the subject should be consulted.

¹ See minutes of plenary session of May 7, 1919, vol. III, p. 413.

Later in the meeting Brockdorff-Rantzau's statement was available from which the following extract was read:—"Having regard to the disconcerting multiplicity of the problems which are raised by this aim pursued in common we must as rapidly as possible have the principal matters discussed by special expert commissions on the basis of the draft which you are submitting". Translated from the French Summary.)²

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that this did not constitute a definite proposal which need be replied to.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed that it would be better to take no notice.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed and suggested that one possible interpretation of the phrase was that if the Germans signed the Treaty they would want the assistance of the Allied and Associated Powers in carrying it out.

(It was agreed:—

That no reply should be made to this statement in Brockdorff-Rantzau's speech.)

2. PRESIDENT WILSON read a summary prepared by the American Delegation of the present position in regard to the settlement of the territorial boundaries of former Austro-Hungarian territory, as well as Bulgarian territory. The summary pointed out that the United States, British and French experts had agreed in regard to Bulgaria, the Greek frontiers, the Czecho-Slovak frontiers, the Roumanian frontiers, and the Jugo-Slav frontiers. The question of the frontiers between Belgium and Holland had not been dealt with. In regard to the Polish frontiers, agreement had not been reached, except with regard to Germany and the frontier between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. The frontiers of Albania and of Russia were also unsettled.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the best plan would be the one he had suggested on the previous day, namely, deal first with the frontiers of Austria and of Hungary, and to determine their boundaries and their conditions. Once these were out of the way, the more contentious questions which arose between the Allies could be dealt with.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that once peace was made with Austria and with Hungary, and once these countries had been made separate, and the Treaties of Peace with them had been completed, the present Conference would have no further authority. To leave it to the component parts to arrange matters between themselves would

²The translation in the minutes of the plenary session of May 7 reads as follows: "In view of the bewildering number of the problems which beset the fulfilment of our common purpose, we ought to refer the principal questions individually at the earliest possible moment to special Commissions of experts, for discussion on the basis of the draft presented by you." (Vol. III, p. 419.)

cause very serious trouble. He urged the importance of retaining the peace-making power in the present Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the difficulty could be surmounted by inserting an Article in the Treaty of Peace, binding Austria and Hungary respectively, to recognise the States contiguous to them, within the boundaries arranged by the Allied and Associated Powers as a whole.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that this clause would not bind the new States to respect the decision of the principal Powers. If they did not, this would mean launching out in a new sea of negotiation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if his Italian colleagues would pardon him, and he did not ask them to agree or to disagree in what he was about to say, the present atmosphere was not a favourable one for settling the more controversial questions. There was great public excitement, which was partly artificial and partly genuine. The best plan would be to give time for that to subside. It was not essential that [to] peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria and Hungary, that these controversial questions should be settled.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he was anxious to arrange that the boundaries between various States should not be left to separate agreement. He proposed, therefore, that it should be provided in the Treaty of Peace that Austria and Hungary respectively should recognize the States contiguous to them, within boundaries which should be stated, where possible, but where they could not be stated, were determined by some definite authority, for example, the League of Nations.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the League of Nations ought not to be burdened at the outset with these tremendously difficult problems. They should be settled by the Allied and Associated Governments.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested the best plan would be [to] have them settled by the principal Allied and Associated Governments. The important thing was that the latter should not divest themselves of their authority.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that the matter could be dealt with on these lines. Austria and Hungary were both starving and Peace Treaties with them ought to be concluded as soon as possible. The only part of Brockdorff-Rantzau's speech on the previous day which had made him feel uncomfortable was the passage where he had alluded to the starvation which had occurred since the Armistice had been signed.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that his statement had to be proved.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, at any rate, there was no doubt that Austria and Hungary were starving.

PRESIDENT WILSON told M. Clemenceau that we ought not to blink facts because we were annoyed with Brockdorff-Rantzau. There was no doubt people had been starved because through no-one's fault it had not been possible to get the Treaty of Peace ready earlier.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE drew attention to an Article by Mr. Hervé in the *Victoire*, in which he said that after reading the summary of the Treaty of Peace, he withdrew all his attacks on the slowness in preparing the Treaty of Peace.

M. CLEMENCEAU told President Wilson that he could give him an order to visit women from fourteen years of age to sixty, who had been violated by the Germans.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Sir Ernest Pollock had told him that documents before the Commission on breaches of the laws of war had been so bad that only parts of them were read. The Commission had become perfectly sick with reading them.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they had an awful case against the Germans.

PRESIDENT WILSON summed up the decision as regards the boundaries as follows:—Wherever they can be fixed, this shall be done, but where they cannot be fixed, the High Contracting Parties shall be bound to accept what the principal Allied and Associated Powers decide.

(There was no dissent from this.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE raised the case of the Ukraine. Could the principal Allied and Associated Powers settle that?

PRESIDENT WILSON said they could settle the boundary between the Ukraine and Poland. One difficulty was that the Ukraine declared herself independent of Russia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this was part of the general Russian question, and he hoped that a special day would shortly be set apart for discussing this.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the Council of Foreign Ministers should be asked to make a comprehensive enquiry and to make recommendations as to all the frontiers of former Austro-Hungarian territory, except those specially concerning Italy.

BARON SONNINO recalled that there was one portion of the frontier between Jugo-Slavia and Austria which was closely connected with the Italian problem. He thought the best plan would be for the Foreign Ministers to examine what the experts had proposed and to make recommendations.

(It was agreed:—

1. That the Council of Foreign Ministers should be asked to consider at once, and to make recommendations in regard to the territorial boundaries of Austria and Hungary, and of the new States

created out of former Austro-Hungarian territory, and States contiguous thereto, as dealt with in the reports of the various Commissions set up by the Preliminary Peace Conference.

2. That the Council of Foreign Ministers should be asked to hold their first meeting on this subject on the afternoon of to-day, May 8th.)

(Although no formal resolution was adopted, it was also substantially agreed that the Treaties of Peace with Austria and with Hungary should contain an Article binding the High Contracting Parties to recognise the frontiers of the various States formed out of the former Austro-Hungarian territory, within boundaries which should be fixed, wherever possible, but in cases where it was not possible to fix them, in time for the Treaties, within such boundaries as might be decided by the principal Allied and Associated Powers.)

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that this question should be referred to the same group of financial experts which had dealt with Reparation under the instructions of the Supreme Council, in connection with the German Treaty of Peace.

Reparation:
Clauses in the
Austrian and
Hungarian
Treaties

M. ORLANDO said he understood that the reparation experts were meeting to consider this subject on that very day, more particularly in connection with the scheme that he himself had proposed for a debit and credit account in regard to the countries formerly constituting part of the Austrian Empire.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that nevertheless there would be no harm in approving Mr. Lloyd George's proposal.

(The following resolution was agreed to:—

That the group of financial experts which, under the immediate direction of the Supreme Council, completed the Articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Germany on the subject of reparation, shall re-assemble to prepare for the consideration of the Supreme Council draft Articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Austria and in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary.)

Financial
Clauses in
the Austrian
and Hungarian
Treaties

4. (On the proposal of Mr. Lloyd George, the following resolution was agreed to:—

That the group of experts which, under the supreme direction of the Supreme Council, completed the Financial Clauses for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Germany, shall re-assemble to prepare for the consideration of the Supreme Council draft Articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Austria, and in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary.)

Austrian
Treaty and
Hungarian
Treaty:
Reference to
the Drafting
Committee

5. MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the Drafting Committee should be asked to start work on the Austrian Treaty and on the Hungarian Treaty.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the Drafting Committee were entitled to a rest after their very heavy labours in preparing the German Treaty.

(This was agreed to.)

Military,
Naval and
Air Terms of
Peace With
Austria and
With Hungary

6. After a short discussion, a resolution on the following lines was agreed to:—

That the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles, with whom shall be associated representatives of the Naval and Air Services of the United States of America, Great Britain, France and Italy, should prepare for the consideration of the Supreme Council of the principal Allied and Associated Powers draft military, naval and air articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Austria and in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary.

(It was also agreed that the exact text of this resolution should be left to M. Clemenceau, who would then forward it as an instruction to the Military Representatives.)

Convention
in Regard to
the Military
Occupation
of German
Territory
West of the
Rhine

7. After a short discussion, a resolution on the following lines was agreed to:—

That the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles should prepare for the consideration of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers a draft Convention in regard to the military occupation of the territories West of the Rhine, as provided for in Article 432 of the Treaty of Peace presented to the German Plenipotentiaries.

It was also agreed that the military representatives should invite the co-operation of a Belgian representative.

The exact terms of the reference to the Military Representatives was left to M. Clemenceau, who undertook to give the necessary instructions.

Size of the
Army of
Occupation

8. After a short discussion, a resolution on the following lines was agreed to:—

That the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles should prepare for the consideration of the Supreme Council of the principal Allied and Associated Powers a scheme for the size of the Army of Occupation of the German territory West of the Rhine, as provided for in Articles 428 and 429 of the Treaty of Peace presented to the German Plenipotentiaries.

It was also agreed that the Military Representatives should invite the co-operation of a Belgian Representative.

The exact terms of the reference to the Military Representatives was left to M. Clemenceau, who undertook to give the necessary instructions.

9. SIR MAURICE HANKEY reported that the Supreme Economic Council had forwarded various resolutions for the consideration of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, dealing with such matters as: Supply of Raw Materials to Czecho-Slovakia and Poland: Blockade of Germany and Hungary: and other matters.

Questions
Raised by
the Supreme
Economic
Council

He suggested that the most convenient procedure for dealing with these questions would be for the Supreme Council to meet the principal representatives of the Supreme Economic Council.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that all these questions were bound up with the elaboration of some scheme for providing credits for European countries, in regard to which he had already submitted a scheme.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed, but said it would be necessary to find some alternative proposal, as the scheme submitted by Mr. Lloyd George did not commend itself to the United States experts.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the British Government was in the position not only of owing large amounts to the United States, but of being guarantors of what other countries owed to the United States. Great Britain was both a creditor and a debtor nation, but if she could collect all that was due to her from other nations, the balance would be on the right side. Hence, he felt in a good position to make this proposal. He pointed out that the United States of America had made large profits out of the belligerents during the early part of the war, when she had not herself been a belligerent. He did not say this in any spirit of criticism whatever, as she was merely in the position that Great Britain had been in 1870.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the wealth which the United States had drawn from these sources had not gone to the Government, but to particular financiers and to particular classes of the nation. Congress would take the view that the Government ought not to accept on behalf of the nation any obligations because certain interests in the nation had made profits.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that unless the United States of America and Great Britain agreed on some scheme for re-starting Europe, a very serious state of affairs would arise.

(It was agreed that the leading representatives of the principal Allied and Associated Powers on the Supreme Economic Council should be invited to attend at 10.30 on the following day to raise the various questions referred to the Supreme Economic Council.)

10. MR. LLOYD GEORGE read a telegram he had received from the Allied Naval Armistice Commission in London, to the effect that the Germans were continuing to delay the surrender of German merchant-ships in Spain by raising questions affecting cargoes, and neglecting to instruct their Captains to hand over the ships to the representatives of France.

Surrender
of German
Merchant-ships

On April 21st a warning had been sent to the German Government that if the matter was not expedited a reference would be made to the Supreme War Council. A consultation had since taken place at Rotterdam, but as no action had resulted the matter was now brought before the Supreme War Council with a recommendation that pressure should be put on the Governments concerned to proceed with the delivery to France of these ships.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the pressure of the present treaty should be enough. In two weeks the Germans would be compelled to sign the whole treaty. He had only wanted to give them time to read and digest it, and get used to the idea that it would have to be accepted. He had never contemplated any additional matter being added.

(After some discussion it was agreed that Admiral Wemyss, on behalf of the Supreme Council of the principal Allied and Associated Powers should be instructed, through the Armistice Commission, to draw attention to the failure to carry out this undertaking, and, in the event of no satisfactory reply being received, to make recommendations as to the action to be taken.)

11. PRESIDENT WILSON asked if it was necessary to go into the question of breaches of the laws of war in connection with the Austrian and the Hungarian Treaties.

Breaches of
the Laws of
War in the
Austrian and
Hungarian
Treaties

M. SONNINO said that there were a certain number of personal cases, although the question was less serious than in the case of Germany.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that it had been agreed that the Austrian Emperor was not in any way responsible for the war.

M. ORLANDO said that there was a terrible record of crimes against some Austrians.

M. SONNINO pointed out that there were some bad cases in connection with submarines.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if it was possible to distinguish German from Austrian submarines.

M. SONNINO said that in most cases it was not possible, but there was evidence in some cases.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that someone in Austria-Hungary must have taken the decision and given the necessary authority, so that there ought to be clauses in the Treaties on this subject.

(This was agreed to.)

Ports, Water-
ways and
Railways and
the Austrian
and Hungarian
Treaties

12. It was agreed that the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways should be instructed to prepare articles for inclusion in the Treaties with Austria and with Hungary.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 8 May, 1919.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Friday, May 9, at 11: 25 a. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

ITALY

H. E. M. Orlando.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. } *Secretaries.*
Count Aldrovandi.

Prof P. J. Mantoux.—*Interpreter.*

(Mr. Hurst was introduced.) ¹

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the text of Article 430 of the

Guarantees. Pro-
vision for Re-
occupation of
Territory in
Case of
Necessity

Treaty of Peace differs from the instructions on the
subject which were given to the Drafting Committee.
The instructions to the Drafting Committee were as
follows:—

“In case either during or after this 15 years’ delay, the Inter-
Allied Commission of Reparations recognise that Germany refuse
to execute the whole or part of the conditions agreed upon by her
according to the present Treaty, the international re-occupation of
part or the whole of the areas defined by Article 2 will take place
immediately.”

Article 430 of the Treaty reads as follows:—

“In case either during the occupation or after the expiration of the
15 years referred to above, the Reparation Commission finds that
Germany has failed to observe the whole or part of her obligations
under the present Treaty, the whole or part of the areas specified in
Article 429 will be re-occupied immediately by the Allied and Asso-
ciated forces.”

The essential difference between the two texts, President Wilson
pointed out, is that in the Article in the Peace Treaty the words
“Germany has failed to observe” have been substituted for the
original words “Germany refuse to execute”.

¹ Cecil James Barrington Hurst, Legal Adviser to the British Foreign Office
and member of the Drafting Committee.

MR. HURST pointed out that the change was a very small one. It was an Article in regard to which no action would take place for at least five years, and then it would only affect a relatively small area of territory.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that there was considerable difference between refusal and failure to execute the Treaty.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out a further difference, namely, that the original draft, though loosely worded, was only intended to apply to Reparation, whereas Article 430 applied to the whole Treaty. The Reparation Commission had nothing to do with anything but Reparation. He agreed, however, that the original text was partly misleading.

MR. HURST said that this would entail the modification of Article 430, and no doubt an opportunity would arise during the negotiations with the Germans. The alteration would be to Germany's advantage, so that Germany was not likely to object. He undertook to arrange for a Meeting of the Drafting Committee in the afternoon, and to present a fresh draft by the following morning.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether the word "may" should not be substituted for "will" in the last line.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked what the original text was.

MR. HURST said it was "will".

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would prefer to adhere to the original text, owing to the effect of a change on the French people.

MR. HURST said the difficulty could be surmounted by using the future tense in the French text.

(It was agreed that the Drafting Committee should prepare a fresh draft of Article 430 to be presented to the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the following morning.)

(Mr. Hurst withdrew.)

(It was agreed in the afternoon to discuss the action to be taken in the event of a failure on the part of the Germans to sign the Treaty of Peace.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to circulate a memorandum by Marshal Foch.²

He circulated at the Meeting the memorandum by the Allied Admirals on the Naval action to be taken.)³

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, May 9, 1919.

² See appendix I to CF-4, p. 532.

³ See appendix II to CF-4, p. 533.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Friday, May 9, 1919, at 10: 30 a. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

President Wilson.
Mr. Baruch.
Mr. Norman Davis.
Mr. Hoover.
Mr. McCormick.

BELGIUM

M. Hymans.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd
George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. Lord R.
Cecil, K. C., M. P.
Mr. J. M. Keynes, C. B.
Mr. J. A. Salter.

FRANCE

M. Clémenceau.
M. Clémentel.
M. Loucheur.

ITALY

M. Orlando.
M. Crespi.
M. Giannini.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. O. B. } *Secretaries.*
Count Aldrovandi }
Professor P. Mantoux—*Interpreter.*

1. LORD ROBERT CECIL, speaking on behalf of the Supreme Economic Council, and on the invitation of President Wilson, stated the general economic problem confronting the Associated Governments. He said that the most important part of the problem was to get Europe to work again. A great proportion of the population were out of work in most countries in Europe. It was useless merely to provide food; in fact the danger to social order was likely to become worse and not better if people were merely fed. It was essential that raw materials should be made available. Poland might be taken as a typical case. Her great textile industry, on which Lodz for instance was absolutely dependent, was entirely stopped for want of cotton and wool, although her factories and their machinery were practically intact. The trouble was simply that she had no money to buy raw materials and no exports (a large part of which formerly went to Russia) to send in exchange for them. Even agriculture was affected by the absence of raw materials, as the want of proper boots and clothing for agricultural labourers reduced their capacity to work. The problem then was how to provide credit. Personally he would not advise giving unlimited funds or even limited funds uncontrolled to the Polish Government who might spend them on military undertakings.

The Economic
State of Europe

The problem, therefore, was twofold (*a*) to devise means of providing money, and (*b*) to devise means for seeing that it was used to set industry going. As far as he could see the position was getting worse and not better. What he had said of Poland, which he had taken merely as an instance, was generally true of Germany and other countries in Europe and the problem must be treated as a whole. Personally he regretted that there had not been a further relaxation of the Blockade some time ago. The problem was largely psychological and the continuance of the Blockade with a consequent feeling of distrust all over Europe was a large part of the difficulty. In the case of Belgium, for instance, it was clear that the provision of credit in itself was not sufficient as credits had there been offered without effecting a solution.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether prices did not constitute a large part of the difficulty, i. e. the anticipation that prices would fall had the effect of holding back orders.

LORD ROBERT CECIL agreed that this was a part of the difficulty but he said it was clear that it was necessary for a serious attempt to be made at once to see that raw materials were obtained by the countries to which he referred. This was mainly a financial problem.

2. In addition, however, Lord Robert Cecil desired to make two following specific proposals with regard to the Blockade:

(*a*) That semi-public communications should be at once entered into with the border neutrals with a view to securing from them such undertakings as would, if necessary, enable the Blockade to be re-imposed even more effectively than before.

(*b*) That a public statement should at once be issued making clear what modifications in the Blockade have already been made and concluding with a statement that all the rest of the Blockade against Germany would be removed the moment Peace was signed.

(It was agreed that the above action (*a*) and (*b*) should be taken, it being understood that the removal of the Blockade would not apply to Bolshevik Russia.)

3. LORD ROBERT CECIL, continuing, said that, personally, he had no specific financial proposal to make and considered the problem was one to which the experts should devote themselves at once. He wished, however, to refer to a special and important difficulty in the case of Germany. We had provided Germany with the full amount of food she had paid for. In addition we had large quantities afloat for which payment had not been arranged. The Germans had always warned us that they could not find sufficient money to pay for their rations up to the harvest, and the attempts to help the situation by allowing exports had broken down. A paper had been prepared by the Finance and Food Sections

Payment by
Germany for
Foodstuffs

of the Supreme Economic Council for delivery to the President of the German Financial Commission. This paper after describing the exact present position concluded with the statement that shipments would at once be stopped unless the German Government took certain immediate measures to provide further gold. This memorandum included the following statement as to the present position:—

(i) Food delivered to May 10	£19,050,000
(ii) Foodstuffs afloat on May 10 or landed for delivery .	£14,850,000
(iii) Loading for May delivery	£ 5,100,000
(iv) Balance collected for May delivery	£13,750,000
(v) Foodstuffs collected for June delivery by German tonnage	£10,670,000
(vi) Further United Kingdom supplies available for June	£ 5,000,000
Total:—	<hr/> £68,420,000 <hr/>

The payment situation is as follows:—

	<i>Millions</i>
(i) Original payments in gold and neutral currencies	6
(ii) First deposit in Brussels	11
(iii) Second Brussels deposit	7½
(iv) Further deposit promised	10
Total:—	<hr/> 34½ <hr/>

showing a deficit of over £30 million even when the further deposit promised was paid.

In answer to a question by Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Hoover stated that he thought that if the Germans could find £75,000,000 sterling in all (i. e. about £7,000,000 more than the amounts required for the supplies referred to above) they could with the addition of their foreign credits manage to carry through to the harvest.

LORD ROBERT CECIL continuing, stated that one difficulty resulted from the smuggling of German private securities abroad. Some of these were said to be taken by aeroplane; others to have got across into the occupied territory and so to neutrals.

MR. NORMAN DAVIS said the German Government were in fact continuing to requisition securities.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether a large part of the Brazilian debt was not in fact in German hands.

MR. KEYNES stated that the part so held did not amount to very much. The German Government had obtained about £1,000,000 from this source.

It was resolved that the Memorandum prepared for communication to the German Financial Commission should not be presented in view of the possible effect at this moment of a formal document of that

character on the Peace negotiations. It was agreed, however, that the representatives of the Associated Governments should discuss the question verbally with the German representatives along the lines of the statement.

Credit Scheme
for Europe.
Committee
Appointed

4. PRESIDENT WILSON considered that the general financial problem could not be discussed to a conclusion at the present meeting but that further expert advice must first be obtained. On his motion it was resolved that:—

“a Committee composed of two economic advisers from each of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers be requested to submit a systematic suggestion with regard to the means of assisting the nations which are in immediate need of both food, raw material and credit”.

5. LORD ROBERT CECIL subsequently raised the question of the control of the Danube. He stated that the river was at present partly under French and partly under British control, that there was general agreement that it was desirable to co-ordinate the control under a Commission of Four representing the four principal Associated Governments, but that a decision was required as to who should act as Chairman of this Commission. He himself hoped that Admiral Troubridge¹ would be chosen.

Control of
Danube

MR. HOOVER explained the practical obstruction to barge navigation resulting from the present complicated permit system, and he agreed with the proposal.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he considered it necessary that the whole should be under the supervision of the Military Authorities but that subject to that he thought it would be suitable that Admiral Troubridge should be Chairman of the Commission, and he agreed to write to General Franchet d'Esperey suggesting that he should propose the appointment of Admiral Troubridge to this position.

6. MR. HOOVER raised the question of the restriction on export of food from the Banat to Austro-Hungary. He pointed out that the need for food in the latter country was desperate and that the Associated Governments were in fact with much difficulty importing food from great distances. At the same time there was actually a surplus of food in the adjacent Banat for which there were sufficient commodities in Austro-Hungary to provide payment. The Serbs, however, were refusing to allow the export of this food.

Food From
the Banat for
Hungary

¹ Sir Thomas Troubridge, British admiral commanding on the Danube.

(It was agreed that M. Clemenceau should communicate with the Serbian Government intimating that the Associated Governments regarded it as of great importance that facilities for the export of foodstuffs from the Banat to German-Austria and, if a stable Government were established, to Hungary, should at once be given.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 9 May, 1919.

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Friday, May 9, 1919, at 4 p. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.,
Prime Minister.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

ITALY

M. Orlando.

Secretaries — Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.
Count Aldrovandi.
Interpreter — Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. SIR MAURICE HANKEY handed M. Clemenceau the draft of a letter prepared at M. Clemenceau's request, and agreed to by Mr. Hoover and the British Experts, inviting M. Pashitch to permit the export of food-stuffs from the Banat to Hungary.

Hungary: Food
Supplies From
the Banat

M. CLEMENCEAU approved that the terms of the letter carried out the decisions reached in the morning, and undertook to despatch it.

2. The Council had before them the following documents:—

1. A Note from Marshal Foch (Appendix I) as to the military action to be taken in the emergency contemplated.

Action in the
Event of the
Germans Declining
To Sign the Treaty

2. A Note from the Naval Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers on the Naval steps to be taken in the same contingency (Appendix II).

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that no very drastic proposal was contained in either of these documents.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that what was most disturbing him was that a certain period of time was allowed for the execution of the naval and military clauses, the maximum amount allowed being three months for the destruction of certain fortifications. For this period after the ratification of the Treaty of Peace, a much larger force would have to be maintained on the Rhine than thereafter. As far as he could recollect, his military advisers estimated it at 30 divisions. The United States' share of this would be such that they would have to stop sending troops home. By June 1st they would have reached

the minimum contingent to be supplied by the United States—some 6 or 8 divisions. This was rather a serious problem and serious not only to the United States of America. It would mean a number of transports lying idle for some three months. Once ships were fitted as transports they were unsuited for commercial purposes. It would probably not be worth while to convert them for commercial purposes and then reconvert them for transport purposes.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that General Wilson had told him he was anxious and rather alarmed at the rapid withdrawal of the United States forces. He had asked him to speak to General Bliss on the matter before it was raised at the Supreme Council.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that at present the United States were shipping 300,000 men a month homewards.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE speculated as to the number of troops required for the occupation of Berlin. These were possibilities that ought not to be excluded from purview, and this was the reason for General Wilson's anxiety.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought 6 divisions would be enough.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought to this it would be necessary to add the occupation of the Lines of Communication. He asked the distance, however, from Berlin to the Rhine, and to the sea.

SIR MAURICE HANKEY estimated the distance from Frankfort to Berlin at about 250 to 300 miles, and the distance from Berlin to Stettin about 90 miles.

NOTE. The discussion was adjourned at this point and resumed later. It will be more convenient to continue the record at this point.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he would like the Military representatives at Versailles specifically to consider what forces would be required for the occupation of Berlin. It was unnecessary for the Council to commit itself to a decision because it asked for this information. In his view, there was a good deal to be said for the occupation of Berlin if Germany refused to sign the Treaty. It would be the outward and visible sign of smashing the Junkers. They would never be convinced otherwise. He felt sure of this after hearing Brockdorff-Rantzau's speech.¹

PRESIDENT WILSON said the hope rested on the remainder of Germany ridding themselves of the Junkers. Apart from Brockdorff-Rantzau, the other German delegates had looked reasonable men.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that none the less they had allowed the Junker to take the lead. They could not free themselves from the sense of servitude to the Junkers.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that Mr. Lloyd George's theory was correct that the insolent parts of Brockdorff-Rantzau's speech had

¹ At plenary session of May 7, vol. III, p. 417.

been his own and the reasonable parts supplied by the other delegates.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that there was no cohesion or unity of thought in the document.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that Marshal Foch should be invited to the Council to give his views as to the amount of force required for the occupation of Berlin.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that Marshal Foch should also be asked to consider whether the Poles ought to make any advance on Berlin.

(It was agreed that Marshal Foch should be heard at 11 o'clock on the following day.)

3. PRESIDENT WILSON presented a military problem to his colleagues.

Policy in
Russia

The United States, he said, as agreed between the Allied and Associated Powers some time back, had been trying to send supplies to the civilian population of Siberia from Vladivostock. By agreement between the Allies and [omission] a Mr. Stevens, who, long ago in the days of the old regime had been in Siberia, had become the head of a somewhat inconvenient Commission to run the railroads of Siberia.² The United States had agreed to police the railroads as far west as Irkutsk.³ The position was that the United States Government did not believe in Koltchak. The British and French military representatives in Siberia, however, were supporting him. Koltchak had become irritated by the presence on the railway of United States soldiers, whom he regarded as neutrals. Moreover, the impression had got abroad among the peasants of Siberia that the United States was the standard of a free Government which they ought to imitate. When they saw the attitude of neutrality taken by the United States soldiers, they thought there must be something wrong with the Government of Koltchak. Further, the Cossacks were out of sympathy with the United States soldiers and he suspected that the Japanese would be glad to have a collision between the Cossacks and American soldiers. As a consequence of this state of affairs the United States Government found itself faced with the two following alternatives:—

1. To take sides with Koltchak and send much stronger forces to Siberia.

2. To withdraw.

If the former alternative were adopted and the United States increased their forces it was certain that the Japanese would increase

² The agreement was between the Allies and the United States. For the Inter-Allied Railway Agreement and correspondence concerning the American Railway Mission in Russia, headed by John F. Stevens, see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. III, pp. 183-307; *ibid.*, 1919, Russia, pp. 236-260; *ibid.*, 1923 vol. I, pp. 758-777; *ibid.*, The Lansing Papers, vol. II, pp. 329-331, 334, 336-337, 339-342, 359.

³ For assignment of sections of the Siberian railways to be guarded by American and Allied troops, see telegram No. 240, April 22, 2 p. m., from the Consul at Vladivostok, *Foreign Relations*, 1919, Russia, p. 555.

theirs still more. The original agreement had been that the Japanese and the United States should send roughly equivalent forces. When the United States sent 9,000 men the Japanese sent 12,000 men. He had not objected to this slight discrepancy, but the numbers of Japanese had subsequently gone up to 70,000, which had afterwards been reduced to a nominal 30,000. This, however, left a great disproportion. If the United States troops continued merely to guard the railway and to maintain, as it were, a neutral position, he was advised that collisions were bound to occur. If United States soldiers were attacked, it could not be expected that they would do nothing. If they were withdrawn, the field would be left to the Japanese and Koltchak, who was supported by the Allies.

He then read a series of telegrams from General Graves commanding the United States forces in Siberia, bearing out the above summary of the position, and pointing out that if the present policy were continued, there would almost certainly be a collision between the United States troops and Russian troops.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this strengthened his view as to the need of arriving at a policy in regard to Russia. Koltchak was advancing Eastward [*westward?*] at a very remarkable rate. He was in a position either to move Northwards and join hands with the forces based on Archangel, or to march on Moscow.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had always been of opinion that the proper policy of the Allied and Associated Powers was to clear out of Russia and leave it to the Russians to fight it out among themselves.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked that before a decision should be taken, the Council should hear M. Tchaikowsky.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that President Wilson should send a reply to General Graves asking him to take no action for the moment, as the whole problem was being considered by the Allied and Associated Powers.

PRESIDENT WILSON said the risk of this was that there might be a collision between the United States and Russian troops. He suggested that the Allied and Associated Powers should simultaneously ask Koltchak what his programme was.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested he might be asked two definite questions:—

(1) Will you allow the peasants to retain the land or do you propose to restore the old seignorial rights?

(2) Are you prepared to revive the Constituent Assembly?

PRESIDENT WILSON in regard to the first point, said that a few days ago he had asked a very Russophile friend whether the peasants had

really got the land out of all the chaos in Russia. His friend had replied that they had only got it in a very inequitable way, each man having seized the land nearest to him. The difficulty would not only be to distribute the land to the peasants, but to systematise the existing distribution involving in some cases dispossession of individuals and groups.

(After some further discussion during which Mr. Lloyd George produced a map showing the great advance that Koltchak's troops had made, it was agreed that M. Tchaikowsky should be heard on the following day at noon.)

Mr. Lloyd George undertook that Mr. Philip Kerr,⁴ who knew his address, should summon him.

4. SIR MAURICE HANKEY reported that he had communicated to the Secretary-General the decision of the Supreme Council that the Commission on Responsibility for Breaches of the Laws of War should be asked to prepare draft articles for insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Austria. In reply, he had merely received articles contained in Annex IV to the report of the Commission, with a letter stating that these were intended to apply equally to the cases of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey.

Sir Maurice Hankey pointed out, however, that these draft articles had been superseded by other articles prepared by the Supreme Council.

(After a short discussion it was agreed:—

(1) That Articles 228, 229 and 230 of the Conditions of Peace handed to the German Delegates should be taken by the Drafting Committee as the basis for the preparation of corresponding articles in the Treaties of Peace with Austria and with Hungary.

(2) That the Treaties of Peace with Austria and with Hungary should contain no article corresponding to Article 227 of the Conditions of Peace, handed to the German representatives, since it was not desired to arraign the Emperor of Austria.)

Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to communicate this decision to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.

5. Sir Maurice Hankey produced a report signed by Admiral Benson,⁵ Admiral Hope,⁶ Admiral de Bon,⁷ Admiral Grassi⁸ and Admiral

⁴ Secretary to Mr. Lloyd George.

⁵ United States representative on the Interallied Military and Naval Committee.

⁶ Deputy First Sea Lord, at times British representative in place of Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss on the Interallied Military and Naval Committee.

⁷ French representative on the Interallied Military and Naval Committee.

⁸ Italian representative on the Interallied Military and Naval Committee.

The Austrian
and Hungarian
Treaties.
Breaches of the
Laws of War, etc.

Isaur Takeshita⁹ on the subject of the disposal of submarines. With the exception of Admiral de Bon, it was unanimously recommended that all the submarines, submarine salvage vessels and docks surrendered by Germany should be broken up. Admiral de Bon did not, however, agree in this view and considered that the destruction of submarines and the future of submarine warfare could not be separated.

Disposal of
German
Submarines

(The subject was postponed for future consideration.)

6. SIR MAURICE HANKEY read the following letter from Lord Cunliffe:—¹⁰

“Dear Sir Maurice.—It has been suggested that before the Committee which is to report on what Austria could and should pay can make any real progress the “Big Four” must decide whether the new States, Poland, etc., are to bear any portion of the costs of the war.

New States and
Costs of the War

Could you get this point settled?—Yours very truly, Cunliffe.”

(The subject was postponed for further consideration.)

7. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had had a letter from Sir George Riddell drawing attention to the risk that when the German delegates made communications to the Allies, German journalists would telegraph them to Germany where efforts would be made to influence public opinion throughout the world in favour of the German point of view.

German Journal-
ists and Com-
munications to
the Allies

M. CLEMENCEAU said he did not much care if they did.

(It was agreed to take no action.)

8. SIR MAURICE HANKEY produced the formula which he had drafted in an attempt to give effect to a decision which, broadly speaking, he thought had been arrived at on the previous day.

Austrian and
Hungarian
Treaties.
Recognition of
New States

There was a short discussion in the course of which M. Orlando said he would like to consider the draft carefully before taking a decision.

Sir Maurice Hankey's draft is attached in Appendix 3. The alterations suggested in the course of the discussion are underlined.¹¹

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 9 May, 1919.

⁹ Japanese representative on the Interallied Military and Naval Committee.

¹⁰ British representative on the Subcommittee on Financial Capacity of Enemy States of the Commission on the Reparation of Damage.

¹¹ The underlined portions of appendix III are printed in italics.

Appendix I to CF-4

*The President of the Council, Minister of War, to Mr. Lloyd George,
Prime Minister*

No. 32/Me.

MINISTRY OF WAR, PARIS, April 11, 1919.

I have the honour to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a Note from Marshal Foch.

This Note records the opinions expressed by Marshal Foch, General Bliss, General Sir Henry Wilson and General Diaz in the course of a meeting which they held on April 8th in pursuance of a decision of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Governments.

For the Minister and by order.

[File Copy not signed]

General Division

Head Military Cabinet

[Enclosure]

[Note From the] Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

No. 19

April 9, 1919.

NOTE

In pursuance of the decision of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Governments dated April 8th, Marshal Foch and Generals Bliss, Sir Henry Wilson and Diaz met on April 8th, at 5 p. m.

They expressed the following opinion:—

We still possess to-day sufficient forces to undertake operations which might be necessary to overcome all difficulties likely to arise from the signature of Peace, for we shall not be confronted by armies properly organised or of equal value to our own. It is, however, clear that this advantageous situation is changing daily to our prejudice as time goes on and that it may be reversed whenever we have only reduced forces under arms.

1. *Question put*:—"In the case of the Enemy Powers (Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey) refusing to sign the Treaty of Peace."

In that case it would be a question of resuming the war in the form of operations directed against the centres of resistance of the Enemy Powers and, since the resistance would presumably come from Governments, directed in principle against the capitals or seats of those Governments.*

2. *Question put*:—"In the case where such disorder prevailed in one or other of the Enemy countries, that there was no Government to sign a Treaty of Peace."

*The United States could not participate in any action against Bulgaria or Turkey, since they are not at war with those powers. [Footnote in the original.]

In that case operations would be resumed in an attempt to achieve thereby the ends which the absence of any Government would leave in suspense; for instance, the payment of indemnities. For this purpose operations would be directed in such manner as to take possession of the centres of enemy wealth such as, so far as Germany is concerned, the Mines of the Ruhr Basin, with a view to securing by the occupation and exploitation of those centres the fulfillment of the Clause set forth in the Treaty.

With regard to Austria however, where the employment of such means might prove deficient, it appears especially urgent to check the development of Bolshevism by a prompt occupation of political centres and railways having their termini therein, in order to secure the communications of the troops of occupation.

3. *Question put*.—"In the case in which the German Government would be able to sign the Treaty of Peace on behalf of the whole of Germany, with the exception of Bavaria, on account of its jurisdiction neither being recognised nor existing in point of fact in that country."

In that case it would be necessary, after having treated with Germany, to reduce Bavaria by military action taken in concert with Italy, an operation which at the present time offers no difficulties.

In any one of the cases contemplated it would no doubt be necessary to revert to a certain extent to the enforcement of the Blockade; this question is not dealt with here, as it is in the province of the Admirals who are being likewise consulted.

FOCH

M.79

Appendix II to CF-4

[Note From the Naval Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers]

NAVAL ACTION IN THE EVENT OF NON-SIGNATURE BY ENEMY POWERS OF THE TREATIES OF PEACE

In conformity with the request of the President of the Supreme Council of 8 April, addressed to Admiral Wemyss, the Admirals representing in Paris the Navies of the United States of America, the British Empire, France and Italy met on 10 April to consider the steps to be taken in each of the contingencies mentioned in the President's memorandum. They submit the attached report for the consideration of the Council.

2. If any of the enemy Powers refuse to sign the Treaty of Peace, hostilities against such Power no doubt would be resumed, but in the second contingency, where the non-signature of the Treaty

resulted from there being no responsible Government, military occupation only might be necessary.

3. The operations to which the Allied navies could contribute would be:—

- (a) The establishment of a formal blockade.
- (b) Military operations against defended ports in conjunction with the Allied armies.
- (c) Occupation of surrendered ports.

The two latter would necessitate joint study and mutual understanding by the Military and Naval Staffs

4. As the navies are not concerned in the case of Bavaria, the attached report refers only to contingencies Nos. (1) and (2) of the President's memorandum.

W. S. BENSON
Admiral

GEORGE P. W. HOPE
Rear-Admiral
(on behalf of Admiral
Wemyss who concurs
in the report)

DE BON

M. GRASSI

For
The United States of America.

The British Empire

France
Italy

PARIS, 10 April, 1919.

[Enclosure—Report]

NAVAL ACTION POSSIBLE IN CERTAIN CONTINGENCIES

I. GERMANY

So far as Germany's sea forces are concerned her submarines have all been surrendered or rendered useless, and the Allied Naval Armistice Commission reports that the surface ships-of-war left in Germany are in such a condition that their value as a fighting force may be regarded as negligible. It would, therefore, appear impossible for Germany to raise an efficient naval fighting force in a reasonable time under the existing conditions of material and discipline; and, even if such a force were raised, the Allies could muster sufficient ships in the North Sea and Baltic to deal with the situation.

2. With regard to the principal German ports, it must be borne in mind that so far as is known the forts defending them are still effective, and strong opposition must be anticipated to any attempt to occupy them. Further, the maintenance of a naval force alone in a German port would be both difficult and hazardous, and its

presence would bring no more pressure to bear on the German people as a whole than the ordinary measures of an effective blockade.

3. The following are considered the only purely naval measures which could be taken:—

(a) The officers and men of the ships interned at Scapa made prisoners-of-war.

(b) The interned ships at Scapa seized.

(c) All fishing by German vessels prohibited.

(d) All German vessels found at sea, either with or without permits, seized.

(e) The blockade re-established by declaring a formal blockade of the whole of the enemy coast.

4. The Blockade has been gradually relaxed and in its present form is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain.

In order to enforce a formal blockade in the Baltic, the Allied force in that sea would require strengthening and bases would have to be established at Libau or elsewhere. It would probably be necessary to occupy such bases by a military force, transported by sea.

In the case of the North Sea the minefields in the Bight would prevent a close blockade.

5. In the event of Germany refusing to sign the peace terms, some action of an immediate and striking nature would be desirable.

Naval bombardments or demonstrations without the cooperation of the military on land would be both objectionable and ineffective.

Blockade can only act slowly, whilst the remaining measures mentioned in paragraph 3 would not produce the desired effect.

6. The Admirals therefore conclude that no naval measures by themselves are likely to be effective, and that any naval operations, such as the occupation of selected ports, must necessarily be carried out in conjunction with, or in continuation of, the operations of the land forces of the Allies.

II. AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY

All vessels-of-war are already interned or in Allied hands on the Danube.

The principal ports are in the occupation of the Allies.

2. With regard to economic pressure, the present system of inspection of all ships could be adjusted to reduce imports as considered desirable, and the establishment of a formal blockade of the Adriatic appears unnecessary.

3. With regard to the Danube, all the monitors and other armed craft are now under the control of the Allies. They have recently retired below Baja, and if an advance up the river is contemplated it could only take place in conjunction with military measures.

III. BULGARIA

Although the blockade has been raised there should be little difficulty in re-establishing it.

The Danube, so far as Bulgaria is concerned, is already under control.

IV. TURKEY

The blockade, which has been raised, could be re-established.

2. All forts and other defences commanding the passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea are now in the hands of the Allies. They should be completely destroyed as soon as possible.

Appendix III to CF-4

[*Draft by Sir Maurice Hankey of Agreement Regarding Recognition and Boundaries of New States*]

It is agreed:—

That the Treaties of Peace with Austria and with Hungary shall each contain Articles binding *Austria and Hungary as well as the other* High Contracting Parties to recognise the frontiers of the various States formed out of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and of all contiguous States. Wherever possible the complete boundaries of all these States are to be fixed in the said Treaties of Peace with Austria and with Hungary. In cases, however, where it is not found practicable to fix the whole of these boundaries before the signature of these Treaties *Austria and Hungary as well as the other* High Contracting Parties shall *agree to* recognise these States within such boundaries as may be subsequently determined by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. This will, of course, not apply to Austrian-Hungarian territory, the boundaries of which will be fixed by the respective Treaties of Peace.

9 MAY, 1919.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday, May 10, 1919, at 11 a. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

ITALY

M. Orlando.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. } *Secretaries.*
Count Aldrovandi. }
Professor P. J. Mantoux.—*Interpreter.*

(Marshal Foch and General Weygand were introduced.)

1. M. CLEMENCEAU explained to Marshal Foch that the Council had under consideration the possibility, though not probability, that Germany might refuse to sign the Terms of Peace. They wanted Marshal Foch's views as to the means available and the action to be taken in such an eventuality.

Action in the
Event of the
Germans Refus-
ing To Sign

MARSHAL FOCH said that on April 24th last, he had held a meeting with the Commanders-in-Chief of the Belgian, British, French and United States Armies and they had made a sum of their total forces. It had been established that, for the whole of the month of May, at least 40 divisions with 5 cavalry divisions would be available to operate on the front of the Rhine. He required 8 days' warning to put them in a state to march. The reason for this was that many men were on furlough and many officers were away on commissions or leave. Everything was prepared, and, at the end of 8 days, the army would be ready to march. If and when the moment came to intervene the action to be taken would be organised according to the objects aimed at. If it was a case of a regular Government refusing to sign, it would be necessary to strike at the centre of that Government. For example, Weimar and Berlin. It might be, however, that the situation would be less clear and that the German Government might say that it could not decide or that it required a plebiscite. Still, if the resistance was that of a regular Government at Berlin or Weimar, this resistance must be broken. The shorter roads should be followed with the maximum possible forces. The army would start from its bases at Cologne and Mayence.

Advancing from this base line towards Weimar and Berlin, the army would penetrate a zone very favourable to its advance, as its flanks would rest to the north on the River Lippe and to the South on the River Main. This zone was so advantageous for the advance that the enemy might be expected to capitulate before the armies reached their objective. Further, by advancing from the Rhine along the valley of the Ruhr, the result would be achieved of considerably reducing the enemy's financial resources. Advancing from the Rhine by the valley of the Main, the armies of the Allied and Associated Powers would cut Germany off from Bavaria, and, in addition, would be in a position to join hands with the Czecho-Slovaks. This was a perfectly feasible and not dangerous operation, and might achieve results without bringing the operations to a conclusion. These lines of advance would take the Allied Armies into the heart of the German Government. In reply to M. Clemenceau, he said that he envisaged action by the Czechs, which would be combined.

GENERAL WEYGAND, in reply to Mr. Lloyd George, said that the Czechs had 3 complete divisions formed, but these were now disposed along the Hungarian frontier. They had also several brigades, but a good deal of organisation would be required.

MARSHAL FOCH said that information on this point had been asked for. He then explained his plan by reference to a large map. He added one advantage to those he had already given, namely, that if, for any reason, the march had to be stopped, a line could be established on the River Weser parallel to the Rhine where the armies could rest in conditions very similar to those prevailing on the Rhine. In reply to President Wilson, he said there were no fortified places on the way and that neither Weimar nor Berlin were seriously fortified. In reply to Mr. Lloyd George he said that he certainly contemplated action by Polish troops which were already in occupation of Posen. In reply to President Wilson, he said that the nominal strength of the German forces was 450,000 men, but they were disarmed and dispersed and practically Germany could offer no resistance at all. In reply to Mr. Lloyd George, he added that he did not contemplate action by sea, as this was not feasible with modern artillery. He summed up by saying that, with 8 days' warning, he was prepared and was in accord with the various Commanders-in-Chief for an advance with incontestable superiority of forces and with his flanks secured. He would undertake to cut off Bavaria from Germany.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether he anticipated any danger from the mass of the working population.

MARSHAL FOCH said mainly in regard to their feeding.

M. CLEMENCEAU alluded to Marshal Foch's request for 8 days' warning. This might be difficult for the Governments to give. He

asked if Marshal Foch could reduce it, so that if the Governments saw the storm coming they could give an order which would be followed by action in less than 8 days.

MARSHAL FOCH said that this was practicable by stopping leave in the Armies.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that if leave was stopped and the men came back, the Germans would at once know it.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this would not be a bad thing.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that it might be done in such a way that Cologne and Mayence should see what was happening.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he had prepared a series of measures with the object of impressing the German people. Next week, for example, he proposed to go to the Rhineland and inspect the troops.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the great difficulty was that, if the Germans were given warning, they would denude the railways both of material and personnel, which would make the advance very difficult. Consequently, under Marshal Foch's directions, he had prepared a surprise operation with motor cars and cavalry, in order to leap forward at a moment's notice and seize certain junctions and important places. This could be done in a few hours.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he contemplated a surprise operation of great range, which involved very few troops and which would produce a surprise and considerable effect. He was now studying the execution of this measure, but it involved having 2 or 3 divisions in each army ready to march at a moment's notice and this could only be done by cancelling leave.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked when the plan could be ready.

GENERAL WEYGAND said it could be ready to-morrow.

M. CLEMENCEAU said there was no need for it for 10 or 12 days but it ought to be got ready.

MARSHAL FOCH said he could stop leave in, say, 2 divisions of each army, which would be enough to carry out this part of his plan.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that it might be an advantage to have some demonstration at an early stage. The Germans were now making up their minds. Possibly they thought that the Allied and Associated Powers would not march.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that that was exactly what the Germans were saying. They believed the French Army incapable of marching and that the United States Army was going home.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it might be too late 10 days hence and he thought some action ought to be taken now to show that the Allied and Associated Powers had made their minds up. He would like a demonstration made within a day or two. The most impressive form of demonstration would be to bring the cavalry to the front.

MARSHAL FOCH said that his cavalry were too few for a great demonstration, but he proposed himself to make an immediate visit to the Commanders-in-Chief of the various armies in such a way that while apparently secret, it would be known to everyone and all Germany would be puzzling to know what he was up to.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested a secret journey with careful leakage.

MARSHAL FOCH said that this was what he intended.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what he proposed to do about cancelling leave.

MARSHAL FOCH said that during his trip he proposed to ask each Commander-in-Chief to stop leave in 2 divisions of his army and to get these divisions ready to march. In reply to Mr. Lloyd George, he said that he could start any day next week.

M. CLEMENCEAU said the sooner the better.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed in this.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had received two documents, one of which stated that Scheidemann and Ebert would sign and the other that they would not sign.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the demonstration should be immediate, in order that Germany might know that we meant business. Monday would be too late. The Germans were making up their minds and it was important to influence them before they settled down in an attitude of refusal.

MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that nothing could happen before the 22nd, when the Germans might refuse the peace terms, so that if he commenced his visit on the 12th that would be soon enough. He would be back by the 18th.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was already receiving papers from the Germans. He suggested that Marshal Foch should support his tour by troop movements.

MARSHAL FOCH agreed, and added also movements of munitions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that it would take some time for the Germans to know that Marshal Foch was there. The German mind was not a quick one. Consequently, Monday was, in his view, too late for Marshal Foch's start.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed with Mr. Lloyd George that it was important to press the Germans as soon as possible.

PRESIDENT WILSON and M. ORLANDO also agreed.

MARSHAL FOCH undertook to leave at the earliest possible moment. (Marshal Foch, accompanied by General Weygand, withdrew.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 10 May, 1919.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday, May 10, 1919, at 11 : 45 a. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. }
Count Aldrovandi. } *Secretaries.*

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

ITALY

H. E. M. Orlando

Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

Austrian and
Hungarian
Treaties.
Recognition of
New States

(1) With reference to C. F. 4, Minute 8,¹ M. ORLANDO said that he accepted the draft which had been submitted by Sir Maurice Hankey on the previous afternoon on the subject of the recognition of the various States formed out of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and contiguous States. (Appendix I.)

Corfu. Evacua-
tion by the Allied
Powers

(2) M. CLEMENCEAU said that M. Venizelos had asked that the Allied Powers should evacuate Corfu.

M. ORLANDO, MR. LLOYD GEORGE and PRESIDENT WILSON agreed.

(It was agreed that the Allied forces should withdraw from Corfu.)

Reparation in
the Austrian and
Hungarian
Treaties

(3) M. ORLANDO reminded President Wilson of a request he had made to him on the previous day that he should prepare a text of a reference to the Committee dealing with Reparation in regard to Austria and Hungary.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he had not had time up to the present, but that he would take it in hand as soon as possible.

Revised Edition
of Article
430 of the German
Treaty

(4) With reference to C. F. 2,² Sir Maurice Hankey handed to M. Orlando a revised draft of Article 430 of the Treaty of Peace presented to the German Delegates, which had been prepared by the Drafting Committee, as well as an English translation of the Drafting Committee's Note. (The following text submitted by the Drafting Committee was approved:

¹ *Ante*, p. 531.

² *Ante*, p. 519.

"In case either during the occupation or after the expiration of the fifteen years referred to above the Reparation Commission finds that Germany *refuses to observe the whole or part of her obligations under Part VIII (Reparation) of the present Treaty* the whole or part of the areas specified in Article 429 will be re-occupied immediately by the Allied and Associated Forces.")

The words underlined ³ show the alteration in the original draft.)

M. CLEMENCEAU undertook to transmit this to the Germans through Colonel Henri, to be substituted for the original Article.

Comments
by the
German Delegation
on the
Treaty of Peace

(5) M. CLEMENCEAU handed round a communication he had received from the German Delegation, making some preliminary comments on the Treaty of Peace.

(The Secretary was out of the room when this document was read, and was unable to obtain a copy.) ⁴

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested the following reply:—

"In reply to the general objections which the German plenipotentiaries present to the provisions of the Treaty, it is only necessary to remind the German plenipotentiaries that we have formulated the terms of the Treaty with constant thought of the principles upon which the armistice and the negotiations for peace were proposed. We can admit no discussion of our right to insist upon the terms of the peace substantially as stated. We can consider only such practical suggestions as the German plenipotentiaries may have to present."

(Further consideration of the matter was postponed until the afternoon Meeting.)

Japanese
Representation
on the Committee
Set Up for
Dealing With
Detailed Com-
ments by the
Germans

(6) M. CLEMENCEAU read the following note from the Japanese Delegation:

"La Délégation Japonaise présente ses compliments les plus empressés à Son Excellence Monsieur Georges Clemenceau, Président de la Conférence de la Paix, et a l'honneur de lui exprimer son désir de se faire représenter aux Comités qui viennent d'être constitués pour examiner les observations que les plénipotentiaires Allemands pourraient avoir à présenter relativement aux Conditions de Paix."⁵

(It was agreed that the Japanese request should be granted.)

³ The words underlined are printed in italics.

⁴ This note appears in the appendix to CF-8, p. 564.

⁵ Translation: "The Japanese delegation presents its most respectful compliments to His Excellency, Monsieur Georges Clemenceau, President of the Conference of Peace, and has the honor of expressing to him its desire of being represented on the committees which are going to be set up to examine the observations which the German plenipotentiaries may have to make concerning the conditions of peace."

(7) SIR MAURICE HANKEY reported that the Secretary of the Japanese Delegation, M. Saburi, had called on him that morning and had presented a verbal request from Baron Makino that a representative of the Japanese Delegation should be invited to attend the meeting of the Supreme Council when any question relating to the disposal of German warships or submarines was under consideration.

Disposal
of German
Warships
and Submarines

(It was agreed that this request should be granted.)

(8) PRESIDENT WILSON said that Mr. Lansing knew the Austrian Delegate, Professor Lammasch, very intimately, and knew him to be a very reliable man. Professor Lammasch was not well, and had asked that his wife and daughter might be allowed to accompany him to St. Germain.

Austrian
Delegates

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had already received a similar request, and had taken on himself to grant it. He said that the Austrian Delegates were expected on Wednesday.

(9) MR. LLOYD GEORGE handed to M. Orlando a copy of the document signed by M. Clemenceau, President Wilson and himself, in regard to the proportions in which receipts from Germany should be divided between the Allied and Associated Governments in accordance with Article 7 of the Reparation chapter of the draft Treaty with Germany. (I. C. 178. D., Appendix 3.)^{*}

Division of
Amounts
Received
for Reparation
Between
the Allied and
Associated
Powers

M. ORLANDO undertook to give it his careful consideration.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, May 10, 1919.

Appendix I to CF-6

It is agreed:—

That the Treaties of Peace with Austria and with Hungary shall each contain Articles binding Austria and Hungary as well as the other High Contracting Parties to recognise the frontiers of the various States formed out of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and of all contiguous States. Wherever possible the complete boundaries of all these States are to be fixed in the said Treaties of Peace with Austria and with Hungary. In cases, however, where it is not found practicable to fix the whole of these boundaries before the signature of these Treaties Austria and Hungary as well as the other High Contracting Parties shall agree to recognise these States within such boundaries as may be subsequently determined by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. This will, of course, not apply to Austrian-Hungarian territory, the boundaries of which will be fixed by the respective Treaties of Peace.

^{*} *Ante*, p. 401.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday, May 10, 1919, at 12 noon

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

ITALY

M. Orlando.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. } *Secretaries.*
Count Aldrovandi. }
Prof. P. J. Mantoux.—*Interpreter.*

(M. Tchaykowsky was introduced.)

1. M. TCHAYKOWSKY said that he had spent 28 years of his life in England and 4 years in the United States of America, so that half his life had been spent in English speaking countries.

Situation in
Russia

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the Council was very anxious to have his views as to the best policy to be pursued towards Russia. All those present were friends of Russia and anxious to help her, and would be glad of any suggestions M. Tchaykowsky might have to offer.

M. TCHAYKOWSKY remarked that this was a large order.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that perhaps it would guide M. Tchaykowsky if he was to state the difficulties. The principal feature in the situation was the growing strength of Koltchak and his rapid advance westwards, which might presently enable him to get in touch with forces to the north and perhaps those to the south. He and his colleagues, however, were not entirely satisfied that the leadership of Koltchak was calculated to preserve what ought to be preserved of the new order of things in Russia. They had some fear that it would result in a policy of reaction and military power.

M. TCHAYKOWSKY said that he had already had the pleasure of presenting assurances on this point, both from Koltchak and from Denekin. Yesterday, a further definition of his policy had been received from Denekin, who had made his suggestion at the instigation of the various Attachés. This had appeared in the newspapers.

He then handed in the original which had been received on May 8th.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had not seen this before.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE and PRESIDENT WILSON were in the same position.

M. TCHAYKOWSKY said that it was a despatch from M. Neratoff¹ to M. Sazonoff, dated the 5th May, 1919, and had emanated from Constantinople. (The document was then read by President Wilson.) (A copy of the original telegram is attached. (Appendix.)) On the initiative of the Allied and Associated Governments, the Commander-in-Chief (General Denekin) has communicated to the Head of the United States' Mission, as well as to the Heads of the other Missions, the following decisions suggested by the said representatives, and he asked them to bring to the notice of their respective Governments the aims pursued by the Commander-in-Chief in South Russia in his struggle against the Soviet. His programme was as follows:—

1. The suppression of Bolshevik anarchy and the restoration of order in Russia.
2. The re-construction of the Russian Army and of a united Russia.
3. Convocation of the Russian National Assembly, elected on universal suffrage.
4. Decentralisation of administration. Local autonomy subject to a Central Government.
5. Religious liberty.
6. Land Reform.
7. Labour legislation, protecting the labouring classes against oppression either by the Government or by capitalists.

This bore the signature of the Commander-in-Chief and had been published locally. This, continued M. Tchaykovsky, was the fullest declaration that had yet been made. He explained that M. Sazonoff was the head of General Denekin's foreign department, but, during his absence in Paris, M. Neratoff was acting for him.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that probably the military representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers had only suggested that the programme should be communicated to Paris.

M. TCHAYKOWSKY said that this was Denekin's programme. Koltchak's declarations were clear enough as to his aims.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that Koltchak's proclamation had been in very general terms, particularly in regard to land reform. He did not obtain a distinct impression from it.

M. TCHAYKOWSKY said that in Siberia the land question was not nearly so acute as it was in European Russia. In the first place, the population was thin and there was plenty of land. In the second place, communal management of the land was in force. Hence, the

¹ Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Denikin government.

land question was not so vital or so epoch making there as in European Russia. In the Northern regions also, there was the land problem. All they could do at present, until a Constituent Assembly had settled the fundamental principles, was to satisfy themselves that land temporarily taken should not be returned unless the interests of the State demanded it. For example, in Archangel, there was a very important cattle breeding ground on which a considerable part of the population was dependent for its living. To deprive them of their forage and hay would be very detrimental to the public interest. In case of the appropriation of such land, the State would step in and see that the public interest did not suffer. The same applied to timber. There was an old law by which any peasant could obtain from the Government a plot of forest land for gradual cutting. In 40 years, this land became communal. Some peasants had spent a good deal of money and labour on such land and during the revolution both would be lost if the plot be seized. Here again, the State had to protect the rights of the worker who contracted with the State. The policy they pursued generally was to allow the occupied land to be kept until a Constituent Assembly finally decided the principles. The provisional government was the guardian of the common interest. It allowed renting of land but did not allow its sale, since purchase was the foundation of ownership. It was quite clear to him that Koltchak was acting on the same principle and leaving the final dispositions to a Constituent Assembly.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that two things were essential. First, the summoning of a Constituent Assembly, which should be a bona fide Assembly and not gerrymandered. The suffrage should not be twisted about to suit particular interests, as had been the case in Germany, where the suffrage had been divided into three classes. The first thing, therefore, was to see that the Assembly was on a bona fide basis, and then the land question could be safely entrusted to it. The second essential was to define the attitude of the Central Government towards the small States, such as Finland, Esthonia, Estland, Livonia, Lithuania, etc.

M. TCHAYKOWSKY said that in regard to Mr. Lloyd George's first point, he understood that the doubts and apprehensions that were felt arose from the fear of a military dictatorship menacing the functions of the Constituent Assembly. Once it was spread over political matters, military power might refuse to sign away its authority. There might be Mexican [*sic*] arguments at work. This, he understood, to be the foundation of the doubts that were felt. As for Koltchak, in a speech to the Zemstvos, he had promised to resign his position immediately there was a chance of getting a Constituent Assembly. No one could ask more of him than that. Siberia, he pointed out, was

more democratic than other parts of Russia. There had been no class of nobles or of large landowners, although there had been a few millionaires, but they did not now exercise former authority. There was only a small middle class and the bulk of the population consisted of peasant proprietors. There was practically no reactionary class. The only reactionaries in Siberia were the military element and had only come temporarily. It was on this population that Koltchak was dependent in his government and for his military success. This was why Koltchak, although a dictator, both in a military and political sense, was constantly announcing democratic measures. This, indeed, was essential to his position. Denekin's position was quite different. In his part of Russia, there were large numbers of landowners, from which class his military officers were largely drawn. This made General Denekin's declaration all the more significant. In reply to President Wilson, he said that Koltchak was much stronger than Denekin, who had largely exhausted his recruiting resources and could only be strengthened from outside. Koltchak, on the other hand, was entering a populous district and region from which he would be able to draw his recruits.

Referring to Mr. Lloyd George's second point, M. Tchaykowsky said that the question of the relations between the Central Government and the smaller States was a most delicate and unsatisfactory one in Russia. One result of the over-centralisation of Czardom and the treatment of those States by the Bolshevist population had been that all the national groupings that had sprung up had been seized by a fashion of independence. But when they looked at the question coolly and viewed their economic position, they were far from suggesting any such solution. Economically, these small States were weak and they must inevitably fall into dependence on someone else. The Lithuanians, for example, he understood, had already received large sums from the Germans. The same would apply to Esthonia and Latvia. He had had several conversations with Esthonian representatives in Paris and they admitted the truth of this. They at first said that since Germany had overrun Estonia, they must consider themselves free of any ties with Russia and start afresh. He had replied that he understood their standpoint but could not admit such a *tabula rasa* argument since Reval stood at the gate of the Finnish Gulf and since it had been built by Russian energy. Eventually, they had promised that, if when the day came for the final reckoning, Russia would treat them as equal to equal and not as obligatory members of the Russian State, they would be prepared to deal. They had sent a telegram in this sense to the head of their Government, but, owing to the serious situation there and the elections, the reply had been delayed. In reply to Mr. Lloyd George, he said that Esthonia

had two representatives in Paris. He believed, also, that Lithuania had representatives. These representatives had no authority to decide questions, but could negotiate.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if Koltchak had a representative in Paris.

M. TCHAYKOWSKY said that all four Russian delegates have been confirmed by Koltchak, but Prince Lvof had been particularly delegated from Siberia. M. Sazonoff in the similar way represented General Denekin. The constitution of Denekin's Government at the present time was rather complicated. He himself had written several letters to members of Denekin's Council, and had tried to persuade them to adopt the following principles:—

- (i) To devote the energy of the Commander-in-Chief, principally to meeting the enemy;
- (ii) To organise the right system of power, the essential element of which was a clear demarcation between their military and their political functions.

The full power belonged to the Commander-in-Chief, but he ought to use all his energies for military operations, and not to interfere in policy nor to allow his subordinates to do so. The political Government, however, ought to have a military department to deal with such matters as the recruiting training and supply of the Army. He knew this well, because they had had great difficulties in Archangel region in this respect. Now, however, their system was functioning perfectly.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE read the following quotation from a Memorandum from the Foreign Office, dated May 1st, 1919:—

"The most recent telegrams refer to the fact that over 90% of the burgher population and 80% of Russian peasants are co-operators loosely associated with the right wing of the Socialist Revolutionary party, who greatly resent the indifference to public support shown by Koltchak's Government, and more particularly condemn the Rinov² policy of attack on all representative institutions, which is doing the greatest harm".

He asked who Rinov was.

M. TCHAYKOWSKY said Rinov was not a Minister, and he did not know who he was. It was very difficult to judge of matters of this kind from a distance of thousands of miles.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE then continued to read:—

"They are, however, represented as in no way objecting to recognition of Koltchak's Government by us, as long as it is conditional on his taking a broader public basis."

² Maj. Gen. Ivanov-Rinov, commander of all the Russian troops in Eastern Siberia supporting the Kolchak government.

M. TCHAYKOWSKY said that he was a co-operator himself, and was indeed president of several Co-operative organizations. As far as he knew, however, the above information was contrary to the facts. He had personal friends in Siberia, who were high up in the Co-operative movement, and these were supporting Koltchak actually from the head offices of the Co-operative Societies. They would not dare do this if Koltchak were unpopular, as the Co-operative Societies were democratic in their organisation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE again quoted from the same document:—

“Koltchak’s recent brilliant successes on his front are neutralised to a certain extent by the growing unrest in his rear.”

M. TCHAYKOWSKY said he had a question to ask. Did this information come direct from Siberia, and, if so, what was the date of the report?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE read the following note by Lord Curzon³ explaining the position of the memorandum from which he had quoted:—

“As on many previous occasions I circulate this note by an able writer in the Foreign Office, not as committing the Foreign Office or the Secretary of State, but as representing the views of an expert authority.”

M. TCHAYKOWSKY said that this kind of report was often heard. Some facts took place, and were then exaggerated. For example, Koltchak himself was treated as the man who had carried out the *coup d’état*. This was not correct. Others had carried out the *coup d’état*, and had then forced the position of dictator on Koltchak by urging that if he would not accept it, his country would go to pieces. Koltchak had not pushed himself into it. In reply to Mr. Lloyd George, he said that Koltchak was an Admiral who had during the war commanded with distinction at Sebastopol. He did not know exactly from what class he was drawn. Most of his Ministers were former Socialists.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether the people who carried out the *coup d’état* were now Koltchak’s guides and counsellors.

M. TCHAYKOWSKY said they were, and he mentioned as an instance one of the Ministers who had been a well-known Social Revolutionary. His own position, he said, was very delicate in this matter. He stood between the two parties, and he did not want to be in the position of an arbitrator saying which was right and which was wrong. He stood only for the State, and his own position was mid-way between the parties.

³ British Lord President of the Council and Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that as President Wilson had explained, the Allied and Associated Powers did not want to associate themselves in the establishment of a militarist régime in Russia. He asked if M. Tchaykowsky had any information about General Judenitch.

M. TCHAYKOWSKY said he had been a very successful General in the Army of the Caucasus. He was a man who could be thoroughly trusted in military matters, and he was a man who was not prepared to be guided by reactionaries, of whom there were some in Finland.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether, if General Judenitch were given the means to take Petrograd, he could be trusted to maintain the democracy there.

M. TCHAYKOWSKY thought he could, and said that in any case he and his friends would look after that.

M. ORLANDO asked whether M. Tchaikowsky had considered the constitution in Russia of a Federated State comparable to the United States of America. Was this possible, he asked, in this vast country?

M. TCHAYKOWSKY said that absolutism in Russia had proved itself impossible. It meant an absolute faith in the Head of the State, as though he were a god on earth. This had died out. No one ever spoke of it now. It was essential, however, to eradicate the most anarchic feelings in Russia, and some thought that this could only be done by having a Constitutional Monarchy.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whom they would choose for the throne.

M. TCHAYKOWSKY said there was no candidate. It was a mere abstract proposition. He himself did not wish it. Whether this temporary event should take place or not, he was convinced that Russia would eventually become not only a Republic, but a Federated Republic. He had made a speech twelve years ago in Chicago, where he had said that in ten years Russia would become a Republic. This had come true.

(General Wilson entered at this point.)

GENERAL WILSON explained on a map the military situation.

(The following addition was kindly furnished by M. Tchaykowsky with his corrections):

In the course of this conversation M. Tchaykowsky said, in reply to Mr. Lloyd George's question, that it was very essential for the Russian interest now that Petrograd should be taken by an anti-Bolshevik force.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that this could be done by a Finnish force.

M. TCHAYKOWSKY said that if the appearance of Finns in Petrograd be inevitable, then Russian forces should also be there; otherwise a very delicate and complicated situation would arise seeing that the Finns are now claiming Russian territories.

GENERAL WILSON here produced a map on which he pointed out the line showing the present extent of the Finnish claims. It included not only the whole of Carelia but the whole Murman Coast and the Kola Peninsula, also cutting the White Sea from the Keme Town to the Gorge of the Sea.

Other approaches to Petrograd being mentioned, M. TCHAYKOWSKY answered some detailed questions as [to?] the number of Russian forces available among the Russian prisoners of war now in Germany and also among Russian troops in Esthonia.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, May 10, 1919.

(Revised May 15, 1919).

Appendix to CF-7

[Translation ']

Telegram From M. Serafimof to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Denekin Government (Sazonov)

CONSTANTINOPLE, May 5, 1919.

[Received May 8.]

302. Neratoff telegraphs as follows under No. 575:

Upon the initiative of the representatives of the Allied Governments, the commander in chief on April 10/23, 1919 sent to the American Colonel Riggs⁵ as well as to the chiefs of the French and British military missions the text of the following declaration of which the terms were suggested by the Allied representatives:⁶

"I request you to inform your Government of the ends purposed by the High Command of the Armed Forces of Southern Russia in their struggle with the power of the Soviets and in their governmental activity.

1. The abolition of the Bolshevik anarchy and the restoration of law and order in the country.
2. Reconstitution of the Russian army and of a strong and indivisible Russia.
3. Convocation of a National Assembly on the basis of universal suffrage.
4. Institution of a decentralized government through regional autonomy and a large measure of local self-government.
5. Guarantee of complete civil and religious liberty.
6. The immediate undertaking of an agrarian reform intended to satisfy the needs of the agricultural population.
7. The immediate application of labor legislation guaranteeing the working class against exploitation by the state or by capital."

⁵Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

⁶Lt. Col. E. F. Riggs, Chief of the American Mission to South Russia.

⁷The text of the same declaration was received in a telegram of May 2, 1919, from Consul Jenkins at Odessa; see *Foreign Relations*, 1919, Russia, p. 761.

This declaration bears the signatures of the commander in chief and of all the members of the Special Council. It has been made public here. End of Neratoff telegram.

Notes of a Meeting Held at Mr. Lloyd George's Residence at 23,
Rue Nitot, Paris, on Saturday, May 10, 1919, at 3 p. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson
General Bliss

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau

BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. Lloyd George
General Wilson
Captain Fuller

GREECE

M. Venezelos

Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B., *Secretary*
Prof. P. Mantoux, *Interpreter*

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested it would be best to begin by obtaining full information as to the present situation.

The Landing
of Greek
Troops at
Smyrna

CAPTAIN FULLER said that the following warships were at present at Smyrna:—

British:—One light cruiser, two destroyers, two sloops: One light cruiser, one leader, four destroyers ordered to Aegean:

French:—One battleship, one cruiser: One battleship is due to arrive on May 18th.

Greek:—One battleship, one cruiser, one destroyer.

Italian:—One battleship, six small vessels.

Admiral Kakoulides in Kilgis is proceeding to Constantinople from Black Sea to confer with Commander-in-Chief. Transports for from 12,000 to 14,000 men were assembling at Kavalla. They had left Athens, but their arrival at Kavalla had not yet been reported. More transports were being sent from Athens to convoy the material, but the date of their departure had not yet been reported.

M. VENEZELOS said that 14,000 Greek troops were available at Kavalla. He hoped that the whole of the transports would arrive at Kavalla this evening. They would then commence to embark.

CAPTAIN FULLER said that their embarkation should occupy from 24 to 36 hours. He agreed with Mr. Lloyd George that the whole force should be embarked by Monday evening.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked how long the material would take to embark? There was no time to lose.

GENERAL BLISS thought that 48 hours would be enough for the embarkation of the material, if, as he understood, there were no horses.

M. VENEZELOS suggested that if the matter was urgent the troops could be embarked and the transports could sail without waiting for the impedimenta. This was only a case of the occupation of a town and not of big military movements.

GENERAL WILSON thought that sufficient transport could be requisitioned in Smyrna for the purpose of distributing the food.

CAPTAIN FULLER said that the forts were on the hills outside the town.

M. VENEZELOS, in reply to President Wilson, said that not more than 24 hours would be required for the voyage from Kavalla to Smyrna.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if, when the Turks were told that Smyrna would be occupied, they would be told that the forts were to be handed over? He believed that the French had a considerable landing party of blue-jackets or marines on board their ships. The Turks would probably raise less objection to the surrender of the forts to the French or the British than to the Greeks.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he did not mind whether it was the French or the British.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he did not either.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if there was not a danger from the lack of unity of command?

CAPTAIN FULLER said that the whole of the transport and escort and landing operations would be under the supreme command of Admiral Calthorpe, who was the Allied Commander-in-Chief in that part of the Mediterranean.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Greek troops were under their own command.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that orders should be given for the forts to be handed over to the Greek troops when they had arrived.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he understood it had been agreed that both the Turks and Italians were to be informed just before the landing. The Allied representatives should be instructed to inform both by Monday night.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Italians ought to be told in Paris.

GENERAL WILSON suggested that Admiral Calthorpe should be instructed to inform the Turks that the forts were to be handed over under the terms of the armistice. They should be told that the forts were to be handed over to Allied troops, for, if they were not told they would have a legitimate right to resist.

GENERAL BLISS asked what objection there was to warning both the Turks and the Italians in time to ascertain their attitude? The chance of a conflict was much greater if they had no warning. Not to warn them was to invite disaster.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there was no fear of resistance by the Italians. The danger was that the Italians would egg the Turks on to fight. He asked M. Venezelos' view.

M. VENEZELOS said he disagreed with General Bliss. If the Italians were told beforehand they would tell the Turks. He advised that the Turks should be told only 12 hours before the landing. Admiral Calthorpe would direct the movements of the transports, and he would know at what moment to make the communication.

GENERAL WILSON suggested that the Italians would probably insist on joining in the landing as allies.

GENERAL BLISS pointed out that the Italians could not put many men ashore.

GENERAL WILSON pointed out they could bring up plenty of troops from Rhodes.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he foreshadowed a difficulty if the British Admiral went to Smyrna, having reached an understanding only with the Greek Commander. If the Italian Commander had no instructions to cooperate, an awkward situation would arise. The Italian Commander would have received no instructions to take orders from Admiral Calthorpe.

CAPTAIN FULLER pointed out that Admiral Calthorpe was Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. Before giving any order to the Italians he would, of course, have to consult the Italian commander.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that we did not want the Italians to land their troops.

GENERAL WILSON said it would be very awkward if the Italians had a battalion on the spot and wanted to land. Was our Admiral to be instructed to forbid it?

CAPTAIN FULLER pointed out that Admiral Calthorpe would very likely remain at Constantinople and delegate the command to the French Admiral.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said in that case the French Admiral would have command over the Italians as well as the other allied forces.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that, in that event, the Italians would ask why they were not to cooperate. They would also ask why the forts were to be handed to the Greeks.

GENERAL BLISS anticipated that, in the absence of any definite instructions, the Italian Admiral would say to himself that he did not want to lose the trick, and he would anticipate trouble with his own government if he did not take part in the landing. If, however, he knew beforehand, there would be no friction. Without instructions he felt sure the Italian Admiral would insist on participating in the landing.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that in his place he would certainly do so.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE remarked that if the Italians were informed on Monday their Admiral would know before Tuesday, and with the greatest expedition a landing could not take place before that day.

M. VENEZELOS urged the importance of Admiral Calthorpe going specially to Smyrna as Commander-in-Chief of the Allies in the Aegean. The Commander of the Italian ships would then never think of opposing him unless he had instructions from his own government. He believed that if the Italians were notified only some hours beforehand all would go well, on condition that the French occupied the forts.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that Admiral Calthorpe's personal authority would not be questionable, but if he deputed his authority to someone else, it was more doubtful.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Admiral Calthorpe, in that case, ought to be told to go to Smyrna.

CAPTAIN FULLER undertook to do this.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE recalled, however, that it was also important that Admiral Calthorpe should inform the Turks of what was taking place. Should he, he asked, do this by deputy?

M. VENEZELOS said he had received a despatch from the Greek representative at Constantinople, who had discussed the whole matter with Admiral Calthorpe, who had told him that he wanted to go to Smyrna, but that this was difficult owing to the absence of Admiral Seymour in the Black Sea, which prevented him from leaving.

CAPTAIN FULLER said that it had not been possible to release the British ships from the Black Sea to go to Smyrna, consequently Admiral Seymour was detained. In reply to Mr. Lloyd George he said that perhaps Admiral Seymour could be brought down to Constantinople, but it would take three days for him to come from the Crimea.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE considered there was a great deal to be said for Admiral Calthorpe being at Smyrna. He agreed with M. Venezelos that in that case the Italians were much less likely to make difficulties.

M. VENEZELOS and M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

GENERAL WILSON expressed doubts as to whether 12 hours was a long enough warning to the Turkish Government. They did not function very rapidly and the Commanders of the forts might not have received warning to hand over. In this case they would be justified in resisting. The difficulty might be got over by an order issued locally.

GENERAL BLISS was inclined to favour this.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether they would obey an order given locally under the armistice?

M. VENEZELOS suggested that the Turks should be asked to surrender the forts to the allied forces under the terms of the armistice

36 hours before the operation took place. 24 hours later they should be informed that allied troops were about to arrive.

CAPTAIN FULLER said that the landing party would be a French one. In reply to President Wilson he said he believed there were two forts.

GENERAL WILSON expressed doubts as to whether the size of the landing party was sufficient to deal with two forts.

CAPTAIN FULLER said there was little information about the forts.

(At this point there was considerable discussion about the forts.)

CAPTAIN FULLER read a draft of the instructions which he understood he was to send to the Admiralty for transmission to Admiral Calthorpe.

(These instructions were slightly modified during the discussion, but in their final form are recorded at the end of these Notes.)

(President Wilson withdrew, and shortly after Admiral de Bon, who had been summoned by telephone, arrived.)

PROFESSOR MANTOUX, at M. Clemenceau's request, explained the situation to Admiral de Bon.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if the Turks could be warned without warning the Italians also?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if the Italians were informed on Monday they would communicate it to the Turks.

M. VENEZELOS suggested that the Turks ought to be informed in regard to the forts on Monday afternoon.

ADMIRAL DE BON pointed out that Admiral Amet was at Constantinople.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in this case it would be unnecessary to recall Admiral Seymour from the Crimea. He asked what was the strength of the French landing party available.

ADMIRAL DE BON said it was from 300 to 400 men.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that this was enough unless the Turks intended to fight. If they should fight then a much larger number would not be sufficient.

GENERAL WILSON asked whether the Italians in Paris would be informed that no Italian troops were to be landed?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this difficulty should be surmounted by telling Admiral Calthorpe that the landing party was to consist entirely of French forces so as to avoid mixing up nationalities.

The following is a summary of the decisions reached:—

(1) At the Meeting of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers on Monday afternoon the Italian representatives should be informed of the action to be taken, and should be asked to issue instructions to place their Senior Naval Officer at Smyrna under Admiral Calthorpe's orders:

(2) Captain Fuller should make a communication on the following points to the British Admiralty, in order that instructions might be given to Admiral Calthorpe:—

(a) That, in view of the presence of Italian ships at Smyrna, it was very desirable that Admiral Calthorpe should be at Smyrna just prior to and during the operations:

(b) That it was presumed that the Greek troops would arrive at Smyrna not before Wednesday morning, May 14th:

(c) That the Italian representatives would be informed on Monday afternoon, as stated above:

(d) That Admiral Calthorpe should arrange with Admiral Amet at Constantinople to make the following communications to the Turks:—

(i) Thirty-six hours before the Greek troops are due to land at Smyrna, the Turks at Constantinople to be informed that the forts at Smyrna are to be handed over to allied detachments:

(ii) Twelve hours before the Greek troops are due to land at Smyrna, the Turks at Constantinople should be informed that allied troops will be landed at Smyrna in accordance with the armistice terms, and that these movements have been decided on in view of reported disorders in the neighbourhood of Smyrna:

[(3)] Admiral Calthorpe should also be informed that the forts will eventually be turned over to the Greek troops:

(e) Admiral Calthorpe should be instructed to arrange that no men are to be landed from Italian ships, nor should any British parties be landed. The landing parties for taking over the forts should be entirely French, thus avoiding the mixing up of nationalities:

(f) Admiral Calthorpe should, as soon as possible, report the date and time at which transports would leave Kavalla, and the date and time of their expected arrival at Smyrna, so that, if they are due at Smyrna later than Wednesday morning, the Supreme Council can adjust the time for informing the Italians in Paris to correspond.

(NOTE:—A communication in the above sense has been sent to the Admiralty, London, and Admiral de Bon is instructing Admiral Amet to follow Admiral Calthorpe's directions in this operation.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, May 10, 1919.

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday, May 10, 1919, at 4 p. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

Count Aldrovandi.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. } *Secretaries.*

Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

ITALY

H. E. M. Orlando.

- (1) M. CLEMENCEAU handed round two notes on the Peace Terms which had been forwarded by the German Delegation.

German Com-
ments on the
Peace Treaty

PRESIDENT WILSON produced the draft replies which he had prepared.

It was agreed:—

- (i) To approve the replies prepared by President Wilson;
(ii) That both the Notes and the Replies should be published at once.)

(The two Notes with the Replies are reproduced in the Appendix.)

(2) M. CLEMENCEAU produced a report that had been sent to him by the Ministry of Marine, signed by Admiral Benson, Admiral de Bon, and Admiral Hope in regard to the measures to be taken to maintain order in Slesvig during the operation of the plebiscite.¹ The Admirals had come to the conclusion that it was not their function to decide which nation should have the command of the Allied force. The report had been called for by a Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on April 30th.

Maintenance of
Order in
Slesvig During
the Plebiscite

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that as the matter was not urgent, it should be postponed.

(This was agreed to.)

¹ Printed as annexure A to FM-15, vol. iv, p. 712.

Boundaries
of Austria
and Hungary

- (3) M. CLEMENCEAU produced a report containing the results of consideration given by the Council of Foreign Ministers to the boundaries of Austria and Hungary.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE and PRESIDENT WILSON asked that before the report was discussed, it might be circulated.

(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to reproduce and circulate the report.)

- (4) MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what impression M. Tchaykowsky had made.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he had not been as definite as he himself would wish. He had received the impression that Koltchak's advisors had inclined to the Right as soon as they had got power. This very often happened.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he got the impression that M. Tchaykowsky did not quite trust Denekin. He did evidently like Koltchak, though he himself had not got a very clear impression of Koltchak's "entourage". He did not think public opinion would allow us to abandon Koltchak even if he should establish a reactionary Government, because the world would say that the establishment of order was so important. It would be awkward to be placed in the position of supporting a Government that we did not believe in.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he thought a fresh view ought to be obtained of Koltchak. He did not like being entirely dependent upon the views of British and French military men.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that Colonel John Ward, who commanded the Middlesex Battalion, was a Labour Member of Parliament.

(After some discussion President Wilson undertook to ask an American gentleman named Mr. Morris,² who was at present at Tokio, to proceed as rapidly as possible to Omsk in order to gather as much information as he could about Admiral Koltchak's political intentions.

He undertook to instruct him to consult Colonel Ward, and Colonel Johnson, Commanding the 5th Hants. Battalion, as to their view of the political situation.)

PRESIDENT WILSON said that Koltchak's programme was all right viewed in the background of M. Tchaikowsky's mind. What, however, did it look like, he asked, viewed in the background of Admiral Koltchak's mind?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he felt sure that a soldier was bound to get to the top in Russia. Even if the Bolsheviks ultimately prevailed, it would probably be by military action.

- (5) With reference to C. F. 4 Minute 6,³ SIR MAURICE HANKEY again

² Roland S. Morris, Ambassador to Japan.

³ *Ante*, p. 531.

brought forward Lord Cunliffe's letter asking for a decision as to whether new States such as Poland, were to bear any portion of the costs of the war. He was informed that a decision on this point was essential before the experts on Reparation by Austria and Hungary could proceed with their enquiry, and he was also informed that this was the most backward part of the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that his first and sentimental idea was that Poland ought to be let off altogether. Poland had been caught, as it were, in three nets—the Austrian, the German, and the Russian, and had in consequence suffered dreadfully. It seemed only common justice to leave her out from any share of costs of the war or reparation. The same did not apply to other parts of Austria-Hungary, but he did not know on what basis their share of reparation was to be reckoned. He asked whether they were to take a share of the national debt or only of reparation?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that their share of the national debt should be regarded as cancelled, as the Allied and Associated Powers were not concerned in this.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that reparation should be worked out on the same principles as for Germany, by categories of damage.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if put in the same categories as for Germany, the Austrian reparation would become merely collateral to Germany, and to that extent they would relieve Germany of her debt.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that one of the elements in his mind was that in fairness to Italy, to make Austria collateral, would increase the possibility of adequate reparation to Italy.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Italy was in exactly the same position as Great Britain.

M. ORLANDO agreed.

PRESIDENT WILSON said the difficulty was that there would not be enough to go round, and this was the argument for making Austria collateral.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if Germany's capacity to pay were adequate, all would agree that to make Austria collateral would be a relief. Even if Germany's resources were inadequate, this would provide some relief. He suggested that the claim for Austria and Hungary ought to be on a different basis. It ought to be assumed that Austria could not pay the whole of the damages, and it would be better to lay down definitely how much Austria and Hungary were to pay.

PRESIDENT WILSON hoped that a moderate sum would be named.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked who was to estimate the amount.

PRESIDENT WILSON said theoretically this could be done, but he did not know whether the sources of information were sufficient to enable the sum to be estimated and allotted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it would be very dangerous to impose an unknown liability on these new countries.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether the Reparation scheme for Germany could not be applied in some way, so as to make Austria's share collateral but independent.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed, without prejudicing the decision, that the experts should be asked to report as to how much the whole group of countries in the former Austro-Hungarian Empire could pay.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the experts should be asked to report whether it would be feasible to form a conclusion as to how much the whole group, omitting Poland, could pay, and, in the event of this not being feasible, to add to the suggestion an outline of the proportion to be paid by each component part.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE and M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

M. ORLANDO said that it was a very complex question, which would have to be referred to experts. For example, considering the case of war debts only, it would be very difficult to ascertain the precise situation of the several States formed out of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. It would be found that some had a war debt, and others had not, and the situation would be very confusing. The best plan was to put the matter in the hands of experts, who should be asked to take as the basis of their work that all the States except Poland should pay: on this basis the experts should estimate the capacity of the whole group to pay. Then they should examine the distribution of liabilities, as well as of means of payment. The Germans might have the right to complain if they did not know how much their former allies were to pay. This was an additional reason for dealing with the problem reasonably.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said there was another reason. All the Allied Powers had incurred heavy debts for the emancipation of these races. They had been freed not by their own efforts, but by those of the Allies. Their only share in the war had been to fight against us. Without taking a final decision as to the case of Poland, he thought the enquiry should be extended to Poland.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that Poland had been prostrated by the war almost as much as Belgium. He did not think that she ought to bear any part of the Austro-Hungarian war debt. He did not think that any of the new countries should bear a part of the Austro-Hungarian war debt, but only a part of reparation.

(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to draft a decision on this matter for consideration.)

(6) Sir Maurice Hankey said he had been asked by the British representatives on the Committee which was preparing the Financial Clauses for the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties to obtain authority to consult the Czecho-Slovaks and other States concerned.

(It was agreed that the Committee considering the Financial Clauses should have authority to consult the Czecho-Slovaks or delegates of any other State represented at the Peace Conference.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, May 10, 1919.

Appendix to CF-8

GERMAN ATTITUDE TO LEAGUE OF NATIONS

German Note

DEUTSCHE FRIEDENSDELEGATION.

VERSAILLES, May 9, 1919.

(Translation)

SIR: The German Peace Delegation has the honour to pronounce its attitude on the question of a League of Nations by herewith transmitting a German programme,⁴ which, in the opinion of the Delegation, contains important suggestions on the League of Nations problem. The German Peace Delegation reserves for itself the liberty of stating its opinion on the draft of the Allied and Associated Governments in detail. In the meantime it begs to call attention to the discrepancy lying in the fact, that Germany is called upon to sign the statute of the League of Nations, as an inherent part of the Treaty-draft handed over to us, on the other hand, however, is not mentioned among the states which are invited to join the League of Nations. The German Peace Delegation begs to inquire whether, and if so under what circumstances, such invitation is intended.

Accept, Sir, the expression of my highest estimation.

BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU

Reply

The receipt of the German programme of a League of Nations is acknowledged. The programme will be referred to the appropriate Committee of the Allied and Associated Powers. The German plenipotentiaries will find upon a reexamination of the Covenant of the League of Nations that the matter of the admission of addi-

⁴ For the text of this German program, see vol. vi, p. 765.

tional Member States has not been overlooked but is explicitly provided for in the second paragraph of Article I.

10 MAY, 1919.

GERMAN OBJECTIONS TO DRAFT CONDITIONS OF PEACE

German Note

DEUTSCHE FRIEDENSDELEGATION.

[MAY 9, 1919.]

The German Peace Delegation has finished the first perusal of the Peace Conditions which have been handed over to them. They have had to realise that on essential points the basis of the Peace of Right, agreed upon between the belligerents, has been abandoned. They were not prepared to find that the promise, explicitly given to the German People and the whole of mankind, is in this way to be rendered illusory.

The draft of the treaty contains demands which no nation could endure, moreover, our experts hold that many of them could not possibly be carried out.

The German Peace Delegation will substantiate these statements in detail and transmit to the Allied and Associated Governments their observations and their material continuously.

BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU

Reply

The Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers have received the statement of objections of the German plenipotentiaries to the Draft Conditions of Peace.

In reply they wish to remind the German Delegation that they have formed the Terms of the Treaty with constant thought of the principles upon which the Armistice and the negotiations for peace were proposed. They can admit no discussion of their right to insist upon the Terms of the Peace substantially as drafted. They can consider only such practical suggestions as the German plenipotentiaries may have to submit.

10 MAY, 1919.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Monday, 12 May, 1919, at 11 a. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BRITISH EMPIRE

President Wilson.

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

FRANCE

ITALY

M. Clemenceau.

M. Orlando.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. } *Secretaries.*
Count Aldrovandi.
Prof. P. J. Mantoux.—*Interpreter.*

1. M. CLEMENCEAU read a letter he had had from Brockdorff-Rantzau on the subject of Labour Legislation, (Appendix I) together with a draft reply (Appendix II).

Labour Legisla-
tion. Letter From
the German
Delegation

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the reply was a matter of some importance and should be carefully studied.

It would be a serious matter for France and for Great Britain if the Germans were to work 10 hours while we were limited by law to 8 hours.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that as an 8 hours man he did not share this view. The United States' experience had been that men could produce more in 8 hours than in 10.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed generally, but said that in some forms of labour, for example, cotton, he did not think the principle applied. In regard to coal, for example, the British experience had been that the adoption of shorter hours had lessened output.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed in regard to unskilled labour but not in regard to cotton. He thought the real argument was that it would be disadvantageous to the Allied and Associated Powers to have the sympathy of their working classes excited in favour of the German working classes, thus setting up a sympathetic connection between the two.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested the question should be referred for a reply to the Labour Advisers of principal Allied and Associated Powers.

(It was agreed that the letter from the German Delegation should be referred to a Committee of Labour Experts which should include

M. Colliard, of the French Delegation, Mr. Barnes of the British Delegation and Mr. Robinson of the United States Delegation.)

M. ORLANDO undertook to nominate an Italian representative.

Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to communicate this decision to the Secretary-General.

Prisoners of War.
Letter From
the German
Delegation

2. M. CLEMENCEAU read a letter he had received from the German Delegation on the subject of prisoners of war (Appendix III), but the question of the reply was postponed until the afternoon.

Reparation
in the Austrian-
Hungarian Treas-
ties. New
States and Costs
of the War

3. With reference to C. F. 8 Minute V,¹ SIR MAURICE HANKEY handed round the draft of a letter to Lord Cunliffe on these subjects.

(The letter was approved, signed by M. Clemenceau and dispatched to Lord Cunliffe.)

4. M. ORLANDO said he had a question of special interest to Italy to raise in connection with reparation by Austria and by Hungary, namely, the question of the tonnage in the Adriatic. In his view, the same distribution of the enemy tonnage could not be applied in the Adriatic as in the case of the German tonnage. The reason of this was that in the Adriatic whether the ships served Italian interests or Jugo-Slav interests, there was this common bond between them that if they were taken away from the Adriatic, it would deal a death blow to Italian ports and to Jugo-Slav ports. Hence, the portion of the Austrian-Hungarian tonnage in the Adriatic must not be dealt with on the same principles as the German tonnage. In reply to M. Clemenceau, he stated that these ships had been sequestrated by the Allies and used in the Mediterranean for the benefit of the Allies. The question now arose as to whom they should belong in the future. It would mean ruin to all the ports in the Adriatic if they were taken away from that sea.

The Austrian and
Hungarian Treas-
ties. Reparation
in Regard to
Shipping

M. CLEMENCEAU said he did not quite understand what was proposed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that surely M. Orlando did not suggest that Italy, while obtaining a share of the German ships, should also appropriate all the Austrian ships remaining in the Adriatic. If this were done, the Northern Powers being excluded from any share in the Austrian ships, while the Italians were receiving not only the whole of the Austrian ships but their share of German ships also, would not be fairly treated.

M. ORLANDO said that the question of the Austrian ships would not make an addition to the Italian tonnage, since they had a special economic use which was quite distinct from the Italian mercantile

¹ *Ante*, p. 560.

developments. To say to Italy that the acquisition of these ships would compensate her losses was not fair because, in fact, Italy would be acquiring certain ports that had essential shipping needs of their own. These ships would have to be appropriated as they had been in the past for the services of these ports.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he did not mind if Italy would stand out of the German claim altogether and take her chance of recouping herself from the Austrian-Hungarian Mercantile Marine. Most of the fighting with Germany had been done by Great Britain and France but, nevertheless, it had been decided to give Italy a share of the shipping. If Italy was to have a share of the ships of the nation she had not fought and in addition to have all the merchant ships of the nation she had fought, he really could not understand what logical basis was being acted on.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that what M. Orlando was claiming was that the Adriatic fleet should not be removed from that sea.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it would be equally fair and right to say that North sea ships were not to be removed from the North sea. The German ships plying in the North sea were just as essential there as the Austrian shipping was in the Adriatic. Nevertheless, the British Government had never thought of making such a demand.

M. ORLANDO wished to put the question in another aspect. He greatly regretted the effect of his proposal on Mr. Lloyd George as he was firmly convinced of its justice. Italy was now to have Trieste which was a great commercial sea port. If, however, Trieste was to be handed to Italy but its mercantile fleet was to be taken away, Italy would receive a ruined city. It had been rightly decided that Alsace-Lorraine was not to contribute towards reparation. Alsace-Lorraine was not a maritime country but was a riverside country and in that case it had been decided that the river craft should not be included in the German craft ceded for reparation, but should be left to Alsace. All he asked was the application of the same principles to Trieste since without these ships Trieste would be a ruined city.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that Great Britain had lost a very formidable tonnage.

M. ORLANDO said Italy had also.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Italian losses were not comparable to the British.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the British losses were larger in proportion even than the Italian.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he entirely agreed with the views expressed by Mr. Lloyd George.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked what exactly M. Orlando intended by the Trieste mercantile fleet.

M. ORLANDO said the merchant ships registered at the port of Trieste.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was not familiar with what had been decided about river craft on the Rhine, but he would point out that these could not be used anywhere else, whereas the ships registered at Trieste could for the most part be used in any part of the world. If Italy gave notice of this proposal, he would object to Italy having any share of the German ships. During M. Orlando's absence it had been agreed to share the Italian [*German?*] ships equally. Now Italy said that she was quite prepared to share equally in the German ships, but must have also all the Austrian and Hungarian ships. He must enter a strong protest against this proposal.

M. ORLANDO said that he regretted that his ideas of justice did not correspond with those of Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau. He then read the following extract from Annex III of the Reparation Clauses in the Treaty with Germany (Part VIII, Annex III, Clause 3, Page 108):—

"The ships and boats mentioned in paragraph 1, including all ships and boats which (a) fly, or may be entitled to fly, the German Flag; or (b) are owned by any German national, Company or Corporation, or by any Company or Corporation belonging to a country other than an Allied or Associated country, and under the control or direction of German nationals; or (c) which are now under construction (i) in Germany; (ii) in other than Allied or Associated countries for the account of any German national, Company or Corporation."

All he asked was that the same basis should be applied to the Austro-Hungarian nationals, but it should not apply to any citizen of Trieste, since these were becoming Italians.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that what M. Orlando meant was that, as in the German treaty only ships belonging to German nationals were being taken, the ships registered at Trieste must not be taken, since the inhabitants of Trieste became Italian citizens.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that they would not be Italian citizens until the Treaty was signed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was quite unable to understand how this proposal could be made. Hundreds of thousands of tons of Allied shipping had been sunk in carrying wheat and coal and munitions to Italy, and yet the Allies were not to participate in the tonnage received from Austria. Under this scheme Trieste and Pola were to be ruled out, because they were to become Italian, and the only ships to be taken were those in Sebenico and Spalato and other Jugo-Slav ports. In fact, as the Jugo-Slavs had now become Serbs and were Allies, the principal Allied and Associated Powers would be ruled out altogether.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed that if this principle was adopted they would never touch a penny.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he hoped it would never be necessary to tell this story in Parliament, in order to explain why Great Britain could get no part of the Adriatic Fleet.

M. ORLANDO said that it would be impossible for Italy to deprive Trieste of her Fleet so that the result would be that the rest of Italy would get no reparation for the ships lost.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the most dangerous voyage during the war had been that to Italy, and the British mercantile marine had lost very heavily in these narrow seas. He entirely disputed that Trieste would be ruined any more than any other port. If there was a chance of trade and business being done, ships of all flags would go there.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that Austria by this treaty was likely to be deprived of all access to the sea, as were the Czechs and other parts of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. Consequently, by the application of M. Orlando's principle all the ships belonging to Czechs and Hungarians would be divested of their nationality.

M. ORLANDO asked if he would be free, as Mr. Lloyd George suggested, to abandon the Italian share of the German commercial fleet and accept instead the whole of the fleet registered at Trieste and Pola.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said there were two principles of reparation. Either (1) that Italy should put in a claim against the Germans for damage inflicted on her by Germany and another claim against the Austrians and Hungarians for damage inflicted by Austria and Hungary; or, (2) to share in the total amount for reparation. Possibly there might be a third principle, namely, that Italy should look to Austria for the whole of her reparation, while Great Britain and France looked to Germany. He knew of no other principle except those three.

M. ORLANDO said that the least he could ask was that Italy's share of the ships should include the ships at Trieste.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if he made this demand whether the amounts were in the proper proportion or not.

M. ORLANDO replied yes.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that M. Orlando's intention was, supposing Italy received 100 ships, that these ships should be picked out from the Trieste ships. This was a question which might be discussed.

5. M. CLEMENCEAU said that there only remained the Greek affair, on which some explanation should be given. During the absence of the Italian delegates from Paris, the Greeks had asked us to agree to a disembarkation at Smyrna, which we conceded. As a consequence, a concentration of ships had taken place, he believed at Kavalla. There was no question of making a repartition affecting Smyrna, but we desired that the Greeks should be able to land to protect their co-nationals from massacres; many such had lately taken place. We considered it convenient that British, French and Italian detachments should take part in the landing. So far as we know there were at Smyrna many Italian warships, 6 or 7.

The Expedition
to Smyrna

M. ORLANDO said there were only 2.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that we should not wish that the British, French and Italian disembarkation should be made in a different manner. France had there only a small force, and we should not like the Italians to land a much larger detachment. We could not do that without warning M. Orlando in order to ask him to make appropriate dispositions.

M. ORLANDO asked if it was a question of a Greek, French, British, and Italian landing.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Greeks would occupy Smyrna, but, he repeated, we did not pretend to give an indication of any repartition of territory.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said we proposed that the occupation should be a Greek occupation, to suppress massacres lately perpetrated against Greek subjects.

M. CLEMENCEAU repeated that the Greeks had asked permission to make this landing.

PRESIDENT WILSON, interrupting, said that the original suggestion had not come from the Greeks. The Council had suggested to the Greeks that they should land their troops to prevent massacres.

M. CLEMENCEAU said: Yes, that is right. In these circumstances, and in order to prevent a conflict, and to keep the best possible order, Admiral Calthorpe² had been asked that he should go from Constantinople to Smyrna. According to his information, the Italians had already disembarked some time back some sailors at Smyrna, and then they had been withdrawn.

M. ORLANDO said he had no information to this effect.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that what was intended was that simultaneously with the Greek occupation there should be a disembarkation of Italians, French and English, leaving the custody of the city to the Greeks.

² Admiral Sir Somerset Arthur Gough-Calthorpe, British High Commissioner at Constantinople and Allied commander in chief in the Eastern Mediterranean.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Allied disembarkation was solely for the occupation of the forts, and that they would be replaced by Greeks, when they would embark again. It was natural that there should not be more commands in a single place. The command at Smyrna would be Greek.

(Turning to Colonel Hankey, he asked if Turkey had been warned.)

SIR MAURICE HANKEY said it had not.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Sir George Riddell had received a letter from a British inhabitant of Smyrna, a thoroughly reliable man whom he himself knew quite well, giving a very bad account of Turkish atrocities on the Greeks, which included massacres and tortures.

M. ORLANDO said he was not well up in this question, and would like to postpone his answer in the afternoon when he had talked it over with M. Sonnino.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that according to his information, three Italian landings had taken place without any notice to their Allies, namely, at Makri Marmaris, Budrum and at Scala Nuova. He asked if that was true and what was the reason for them.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that there was also a landing at Adalia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said we knew all about that.

M. ORLANDO said it was on this question that he wished to consult M. Sonnino, who knew all about the matter.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked that he would take particular note of the landings mentioned by Mr. Lloyd George.

6. PRESIDENT WILSON asked Sir Maurice Hankey how matters stood as regards the preparation of the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties.

SIR MAURICE HANKEY replied that he had, in accordance with instructions, circulated the report of the Foreign Ministers on the subject of boundaries, and that this was ready for consideration.

(It was agreed to meet on the same afternoon with the Foreign Ministers at the Quai d'Orsay and consider the boundaries of Austria and Hungary.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 12 May, 1919.

Appendix I

Letter From Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau to M. Clemenceau on the Subject of the International Labour Convention

Translation

GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION
VERSAILLES, May 10, 1919.

SIR: With reference to articles 55 and 56 of the Proposals for the establishment of a League of Nations submitted by us, we beg here-

with to transmit the draft of an International Agreement on Labour Law, prepared by the German Government.³

The German Government is of one mind with the Allied and Associated Governments in holding that the greatest attention must be given to Labour questions. Domestic peace and the advancement of mankind depend vitally on the adjustment of this question. The demands for social justice repeatedly raised in this respect by the working classes of all nations are only partly realised in principle in Section XIII of the draft of Peace Conditions of the Allied and Associated Governments on the organisation of Labour. These sublime demands have for the most part been realised in Germany with the assistance of the working classes, as is generally acknowledged, in an exemplary manner. In order to carry them into execution everywhere in the interest of mankind the acceptance of the programme of the German Delegation is at least necessary.

We deem it requisite that all states should join the agreement, even though not belonging to the League of Nations.

In order to guarantee to the working classes, for whom the proposed improvements are intended, co-operation in the framing of these provisions, the German Delegation is of the opinion that representatives of the national Trade Union organisations of all contracting powers should be summoned to a conference at Versailles to discuss and take decisions on international Labour Law, before the peace negotiations are terminated.

The proceedings of this conference should, in the opinion of the German Delegation, be based on the resolutions of the International Trade Unions Conference in Bern (5th to 9th February 1919:⁴ Programme for International Labour Legislation, addressed to the Peace Conference in Paris) which emanated from the decisions of the International Trade Unions Conference in Leeds in 1916.⁵ At the request of the Trade Unions of Germany we beg to enclose a copy of these resolutions,⁶ which have been adopted by representatives of the Trade Union organisations of Bohemia, Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, Holland, Italy, Canada, Norway, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain and Hungary.

Accept [etc.]

BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU

³ For the text of this draft, see appendix to German proposals for a League of Nations, vol. vi, p. 774.

⁴ For text, see *Conditions of Peace With Germany*, Senate Document No. 149, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1919), p. 36.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 39.

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 42.

Appendix II

Preliminary Draft of a Reply to Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau

12 MAY.

SIR: I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of May 10th⁷ in regard to International Labour Legislation. The reply of the Allied and Associated Governments is as follows:—

1. Article 427 indicates clearly that the enumeration of principles set forth in Part XIII is not exhaustive. The purpose of the organisation set up by that part of the Treaty is that it should pursue the constant development of the International Labour Regime. All the necessary improvements will be brought about through that organisation.

2. The Labour Convention has been inserted in the Treaty of Peace and Germany will therefore be called on to sign it. In the future, the right of your country to participate in the organisation created by Article 387 will be determined by the situation of Germany in respect of the League of Nations, that situation being defined by Article I of the Treaty and by the reply sent on May 10th by the Allied and Associated Governments to your letter dated 9th of the same month.

3. It has not been thought necessary to summon for the present a Labour Conference at Versailles. The conclusions of the Syndical Conference at Berne have been studied with the closest attention. Representatives of the Syndicates have taken part in the preparation of the Articles relating to Labour. As appears, moreover, from the Annex to Section II of Part XIII, (page 200) the programme of the first session of the Conference, which will be held at Washington as soon as the Treaty comes into force, already comprises the majority of the questions raised at the Syndical Conference at Berne.

The Allied and Associated Governments are therefore of the opinion that their decisions give satisfaction to the anxiety which the German Delegation professes for social justice, and ensure the realisation of the reforms which the working-classes have more than ever the right to hope for after the cruel trial to which the world has been subjected during the last five years.

⁷ Appendix I, *supra*.

Appendix III

Letter From Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau to M. Clemenceau on the Subject of Prisoners of War

(Translation)

GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION,
VERSAILLES, 10 May, 1919.

SIR: The German Delegation has noted with satisfaction that the Draft Treaty handed to it recognises the principle that the Repatriation of German Prisoners of War and German Interned Civilians is to be effected with the greatest possible rapidity.

It is in accordance with the opinion of the German Peace Delegation that the task of settling the details of execution of that Repatriation should be entrusted to a Special Commission. Direct conversations between the Commissions pretty well of all the Belligerent States in regard to Prisoners have been shown to be the best means of solving the difficulties, and it ought to be all the easier at the present moment to clear up by early discussion in a Commission any divergencies of view or doubts in regard to certain points. The German Peace Delegation, bearing in mind the difference of jurisdiction in the various countries concerned, is of opinion, for instance, that it is indispensable for Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians, who have been detained for offences other than those against discipline, to be repatriated unconditionally. Germany has recognised this same principle as regards the Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians of the Allied and Associated Powers detained in Germany. In the view of the German Peace Delegation, certain alleviations should, as a matter of course and for reasons of equity, be agreed in favour of Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians for the period which will elapse until their final departure.

The German Peace Delegation has, moreover, been compelled to note that the arrangements contemplated are favourable only to the Allied and Associated Governments, for instance, so far as concerns the restoration of private property, the search for persons who have disappeared and the care to be taken of graves. The German Peace Delegation presumes that, for questions such as these, complete reciprocity may be required for general reasons of humanity.

Because of the great technical difficulty of repatriating Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians, especially in view of the shortage of tonnage and the lack of coal, the greatest importance should be attached to finding a solution of all preliminary questions before the despatch of the repatriated Prisoners and Interned Civilians actually begins. For that reason, the German Peace Delegation proposes that the Commission should start its deliberation forthwith, separately from all other questions. The explanation of this proposal lies, firstly

in the fact that there are thousands of German Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians in oversea countries, but the German Delegation is likewise thinking of the Germans who are in Siberia, and whose despatch seems to be a question not only of special urgency, but of extraordinary difficulty.

The German Delegation, for reasons of internal policy, regards it of the utmost importance that the German Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians should be returned to their homes in as normal conditions as possible, in order that they may there be brought back as rapidly as possible into the economic life of the country. That only appears possible—the precise settlement of transport problems apart—if everything possible is done to improve the mental and physical state of those who are returning home.

Having regard to the present situation in respect of economic existence in Germany, it must be admitted that Germany is unable to do with her own resources everything required in order to secure that end. This refers especially to food and clothing; therefore the German Delegation thinks it desirable that the deliberations of the Commission should likewise include an examination of the question of the manner in which the Allied and Associated Governments might assist Germany in the solution of these problems. The question arises, for instance, of supplying against re-payment complete sets of clothing (underclothing and civilian clothing), and footwear for the prisoners before their despatch.

I avail [etc.]

BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Monday, May 12, at 3:30 p. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

ITALY

M. Orlando.
Baron Sonnino.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. } *Secretaries.*
Count Aldrovandi
M. Mantoux—*Interpreter.*

1. M. LOUCHEUR was introduced.

With reference to C. F. 6, Minute 4,¹ M. LOUCHEUR drew attention to the revised edition of Article 430 of the German Treaty as approved by the Supreme Council of the principal Allied and Associated Powers on May 10th, which reads as follows:—

Further Re-
vision of Article
430 of the
German Treaty

“In case either during the occupation or after the expiration of the fifteen years referred to above, the Reparation Commission finds that Germany refuses to observe the whole or part of her obligations under Part VIII (Reparation) of the present Treaty, the whole or part of the areas specified in Article 429 will be re-occupied immediately by the Allied and Associated Forces.”

He pointed out that some portions of the Reparation Clauses were scattered through the Treaty, and not included in Part VIII. He therefore asked for the omission of the words “under Part VIII”.

(It was agreed that the words “under Part VIII (Reparation) of the present Treaty” should be omitted, and that the following should be substituted:—“For reparation as provided in the present Treaty”. Article 430 of the Treaty should therefore read as follows:—

“In case either during the occupation or after the expiration of the fifteen years referred to above, the Reparation Commission finds that Germany refuses to observe the whole or part of her obligations *for reparation as provided in* the present Treaty, the whole or part of the areas specified in Article 429 will be re-occupied immediately by the Allied and Associated Forces.”

(The words underlined ² show the alteration in the last draft.)

¹ *Ante*, p. 541.

² The words underlined are printed in italics.

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there was a demand from the British Parliament for the Treaty of Peace to be laid on the Table of the House. He had replied that he must consult his colleagues before he could possibly consent. Mr. Bonar Law had given his view that as a summary had been published, the inference would be drawn if the Treaty was not published that the summary was inaccurate.

Publication of the
Treaty of Peace

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had already refused to lay the Treaty, both to the Senate and the House of Representatives.

M. ORLANDO said he did not like publication, as it made it so much more difficult to make changes.

M. SONNINO agreed with this view.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he could not lay the Treaty before the Senate until he returned to the United States.

(It was agreed that the text of the Treaty of Peace as handed to the Germans should not be laid before the legislatures of the Allied & Associated Powers.)

(M. Loucheur withdrew.)

3. PRESIDENT WILSON asked what was the decision of his Italian colleagues in regard to the questions put to them that morning.

The Expedition
to Smyrna

M. ORLANDO said he accepted in principle. He thought it might be preferable to leave the troops of the Principal Powers on shore, and not to withdraw the British, French and Italian detachments, pending the final decision as to the disposal of Smyrna. That was the only alteration he asked for.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the landing parties from the British and French ships would not exceed 200.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the British detachment would not exceed 50.

M. SONNINO said that their retention on shore would give the expedition an international character.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked who would have the command?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said the Greeks.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that the command must be Greek, since Greece disposed of by far the largest force.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought it unsuitable to place the troops of the Principal Allied Powers under Greek command. Nothing could be more to the point than the decision taken today that the landing was without prejudice to the ultimate disposal of Smyrna in the Treaty of Peace.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought it undesirable to leave handfuls of men on shore.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Sir George Riddell's correspondent, of whom he had spoken in the morning, had himself seen Turkish troops firing at Greeks, and had seen two quite harmless people shot. There had been no rebellion or provocation.

PRESIDENT WILSON considered a continued joint occupation unwise.

M. ORLANDO said he would not insist.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether the Turks would now be told?

PRESIDENT WILSON said they would be told 12 hours before the movement took place.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if the Greeks could leave at once?

PRESIDENT WILSON said he understood that they could. Cavalla was only 24 hours distant.

M. SONNINO asked if the ships were already assembled?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this was the case. The decision had been taken more than a week ago.

(It was agreed:—That the Greek force should start from Cavalla as soon as ready, and that an Italian detachment should take part in the landing of Allied forces.)

Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to communicate this decision to the British naval authorities for the information of Admiral Calthorpe, and to M. Venizelos.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, May 12, 1919.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House, Place des
Etats-Unis, Paris, on Tuesday, May 13, 1919, at 4 p. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BRITISH EMPIRE

President Wilson,

Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.—*Secretary*.
Professor P. J. Mantoux.—*Interpreter*.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said that three of the German Plenipotentiaries had left for Berlin, saying that they would not sign, but Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau, according to his information, said there was no way of avoiding it.

The Germans and
the Peace Treaty

MR. LLOYD GEORGE drew attention to the speech by Scheidemann, reported in the French newspapers, from which, however, he said it was difficult to draw a conclusion as to whether he intended to sign or not.

2. PRESIDENT WILSON said that he had invited his experts to make a further study of the Italian claims. A proposal had been put before him, which he thought would, at any rate, be acceptable to the Jugo-Slavs, and which was based on the idea of a plebiscite all down the Dalmatian Coast. He then produced some suggestions for the solution of Adriatic problems, which, he understood emanated from the British Delegation. It so happened that their line, drawn quite independently, corresponded very closely to the line drawn by the United States experts. He then explained on a map the line proposed by the United States experts, the principal features of which (so far as could be gathered) were a departure from the Treaty of London in favour of the Italians in the region of the Sexten Valley; the proposal being to straighten the line and avoid a curve, thus closing up the only open valley through the Alps; the allocation of the railway junction of Villach to Austria, of Tarvis to the Italians, and of Assling to the Jugo-Slavs. The line continued thence along the crest of the mountains across the Istrian Peninsula, differing

Italian Problems.
The Adriatic

from the Italian claim, which took in the southern slope of the mountains. The Treaty of London, President Wilson continued, had laid down that the line should be drawn along the point where the rivers flow eastward. As a matter of fact, they flowed underground in this region, and the Italians drew the line at where the rivers emerged from underground. For this area between the line of the crest and the line of the outflow of the rivers, the United States experts proposed a plebiscite. In order to surmount the objection that the island of Cherso in Italian hands would strangle the Port of Fiume, the United States experts proposed that this island should be Jugo-Slav, but that a group of islands south of it, which they stated were ethnologically Italian should go to the Italians. In the portion of Dalmatia claimed by Italy they proposed that a plebiscite should be held on the understanding that any part should be Italian that declared in favour of Italy. They proposed further, that a plebiscite should be held at Fiume, the population of Fiume being told that they would only assume Italian nationality after Italy had constructed an efficient port in Buccari, which was a good port a few miles to the southward of Fiume, rather enclosed by mountains.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that would settle the question of Fiume, as they would never create a rival port so close.

PRESIDENT WILSON, continuing, said there was some reason to believe that the capitalists who controlled shipping, wanted to kill Fiume as a port. He did not see how the Italians could decline so favourable a plebiscite as one in which parts could elect to become Italian. His object was to find a formula by which a decision could be postponed and put into another process than the present Peace Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would like to find a formula also, but he was not sure of this plan. He thought the Italians would agree to accept Zara and Sebenico without the islands, but the Jugo-Slavs wanted the islands above all.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the decision from which he could not depart was that the Conference had no right to hand over people to a sovereignty they did not wish. If, by hook or by crook, the Italians obtained Fiume, how were the British and French then bound to give them Dalmatia?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if the Italians obtained Fiume, the British and French were entitled definitely to say that they must give up Dalmatia.

PRESIDENT WILSON said the difficulty was that public opinion in Italy was far more inflamed about Fiume than about Dalmatia. He read an interesting document, giving both the Jugo-Slav and the

Italian version of the declaration made at Fiume in favour of annexation to Italy. From both accounts, it was clear that it was no general popular demand, but merely a declaration formed by a group of private persons, who, according to the Italian account, did get some kind of a meeting to endorse it. His view was that if Fiume was allowed to become Italian after the creation by Italy of an efficient Croatian port at Buccari, the Treaty of London would no longer be binding.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE describes a conversation he had had with the Aga Khan, the head of an Indian Mohammedan sect, a man of immense wealth and vast knowledge. In the course of the conversation, the Aga Khan had said that the mistake made in the Treaty of Peace with Germany was in the handing over of so many Germans to the Poles, whom they regarded as an inferior race. He had also said that he knew Fiume well, and that it was in all respects an Italian town.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had been informed by an American officer, who was thoroughly sympathetic to the Italians, that if he were in the place of the Italian Government and secured Fiume, the first thing he would do would be to clear out the so-called Italians and replace them with real Italians. They were like citizens of other countries, who had long resided abroad and had lost the real qualities of their nationality.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he wished to explain the conception he had formed of the Italian case, which he thought, had never been quite understood. Italy had a good deal of national pride. The feelings they had, sprang not merely from their treatment in regard to Fiume, but over the whole field of the Treaty of Peace. They were not being treated quite as a great first class power. In fact, not quite as equals of the other great Powers. They realised that there were a certain number of backward people to be taken in hand by more efficient nations. They knew the question had arisen, for example, as to whether the United States could take in hand certain parts of Turkey, an onerous and difficult task. No one however, was asking Italy to undertake this burden. Consequently, their pride of race was hurt. They knew that the Japanese were being allowed to accept a mandate in the Pacific, but no one was saying to Italy "will you not take this backward people in hand." It would be much better to settle the question of Fiume in this sort of atmosphere. The principal Allied and Associated Powers were the real trustees of the League of Nations looking after the backward races, and for a long time, they would remain the trustees of the League of Nations.

(President Wilson agreed.)

We were saying to Turkey "we cannot leave you to run alone any longer; you have got into a rut; and you will remain in it until some

big country comes along and pulls you out." Gaul and Britain would have remained in such a rut if Rome had not come along and pulled them out. Asia Minor was now in exactly the same situation. The question now arose as to whether Italy should not be asked to take charge. The Italians, he pointed out, were an extremely gifted race. It was curious in this war, how they had developed some of the qualities for which the Romans had been famous. For example, they were amazingly good engineers and had created the most wonderful roads.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that it was marvellous how they had maintained the war in the mountains.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, continuing, said that this showed what gifts the Italian people had. Italy was a very poor country. It contained no coal and no iron. Yet it had produced a vigorous and manly race.

M. CLEMENCEAU referred to the remarkable emigration from Italy to the two Americas.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had been trying to give his colleagues a picture of what was in his mind. Why should we not say frankly to the Italians "we have not quite worked you into the picture yet." He thought that the Italians had been underrated. Consider, for example, the question of police. The Greeks had asked the British Government to organise the police forces for them in the towns, and he believed that they were right, because the British were very good police. In the mountains, however, the Greeks had not gone to the British Government, but to the Italians for police. In Asia Minor, the Italian police would be working under conditions similar to those that had once prevailed in Italy, which had been infested with bandits. He was not proposing that Italy should be offered a mandate for the whole of Anatolia, but why, he asked, should they not be invited to police, and develop a part of Anatolia, where they would find a country not dissimilar from their own. He understood that inland, there were great patches of desert but they contained lakes, and, as in Mesopotamia, there were possibilities of irrigation. He was told that before the war, Italian emigration had been as great as 800,000 to 900,000 a year. Why should these not be diverted to Turkey, which had not the population to develop Anatolia. He felt that the whole frame of mind of the Italian representatives would change if the questions could be discussed as a whole. There was Somaliland. He knew there were difficulties in regard to this. Directly the question was raised, the French said they could not live without Djibouti, and the British said much the same. Turning to M. Clemenceau, he said that if France could not give up something here, neither could we. He thought, however, something might be done here. The British

experts claimed that there were coal and oil, but Great Britain had plenty of coal and oil elsewhere. Moreover, there was a difficulty about Aden, which was dependent on Somaliland for its supplies of fresh vegetables and food. To this he had replied, that the Italians would probably produce far more food than anyone else.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that Mr. Lloyd George had stated the case on right principles. He would like, however, to set out the plan in parts. Considering first the part of Anatolia which needed supervision, he would like Smyrna and the adjacent district, as proposed in the report of the Greek Commission, to be united to Greece, in complete sovereignty. The same would apply to the Dodecanese. In addition, he would like to give Greece a mandate for the remainder of the territory claimed by M. Venizelos.

(Mr. Lloyd George at this point left the room to fetch a map.)

President Wilson explained his proposals on the map.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE then made a suggestion on the following lines. The United States should take a mandate for Armenia; France should take a mandate for Northern Anatolia; Italy for Southern Anatolia; and Greece should be dealt with as proposed by President Wilson. The United States, he earnestly hoped, would also take a mandate for Constantinople.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he could not settle this question until he had returned to the United States and definitely ascertained whether the United States would accept a mandate. He reminded his colleagues that it had been represented to him that certain influential and important elements in Turkey were very anxious that Turkey should not be divided, but that it must be subjected to guidance. There should be a single mandate for the whole. The principle was the same as that which he had contended in the case of the Arabs, namely, that the mandate should not be divided. He felt there was much to be said for this proposal.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he did not think this could be done in practice.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that his idea was that the southern parts of Anatolia should be economically developed, involving a question of administration. In northern Anatolia, however, the mandate should be limited to advice and guidance.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that to be frank it was not so easy to distinguish between a mandate for development and administration, and a mandate for mere guidance.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought there was a great difference between guidance and administration.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE then turned to the map of Anatolia attached to the report of the Greek Commission. He pointed out that there

was no very convenient port in the Italian sphere, and he urged it would be necessary to give them part of Makri.

PRESIDENT WILSON said it would be easy to draw the line so as to leave Makri to the Italians. He again repeated that he thought the Greeks ought to have a mandate outside the purely Greek zone. He felt that the whole district included in the western slope of the mountains should be treated as one geographical unit, and ought not to be divided.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he understood the Italians attached importance to including Scala Nuova.

SIR MAURICE HANKEY, in reply to a question by Mr. Lloyd George, said he had visited Ephesus, which was a short distance inland from Scala Nuova, and had also anchored in the Bay of Scala Nuova in a battleship. His recollection of it was a flat, alluvial plain, where the sea had receded, low-lying, with slight undulations, surrounded by hills. There was a railway, as well as a road, running from Ephesus to Smyrna, but he could recall no road across the plain, which was only traversed by mules. The population was scanty, and so far as he could remember, the villages were miserable collections of hovels, inhabited by Turks, although the hotels and better class people were Greek.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the Greeks had hitherto never been taken, as it were, into the family of nations. He thought that if they were given what Venizelos had claimed—which he stated very frankly, and with great ability—he felt that a new spirit would be put into the Greek nation. He felt that under leaders such as Venizelos, they might make a success. It was, he thought, true of nations as of men, that when given a big job, they would rise to the occasion.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that they were very good traders in all parts of the world.

PRESIDENT WILSON said it would add a good deal if some cession could be made to the Italians in Somaliland.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he personally would like to add Cyprus to Greece, although there were considerable difficulties. He thought that such an act would deprive the whole transaction of any atmosphere of "grab".

PRESIDENT WILSON said it would be great thing if Mr. Lloyd George could accomplish that.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that of course the Turks had a right to be in Turkey, but they had no right to make it a wilderness.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that people who knew the Turks well said that the body of the population were really docile people. They were all right so long as they were not put in authority. Under the guidance of a friendly power, they might prove a docile people.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed, but said he was very anxious not to cheat anyone out of what belonged to him.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that his conception of a mandatory for Turkey was a guide, but a guide who must be obeyed. If advice was rejected, it might be necessary to exercise pressure. Normally, the position should be one of guiding.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the United States would not have an easy task in Armenia.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had at the present moment before him reports on affairs in Armenia of such an appalling nature that he found it difficult to read them.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the first thing to be done was to decide what was to be allotted to Italy.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether the Turks would stand the Italians as mandatories. The Italians, he thought, were a more efficient executive race than the Greeks, and always had been in history. The Greeks had had more ideas, but the Romans had been the superior executive nation.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he was rather anxious about putting a superior executive race as mandatory round the Greeks at Smyrna. The effect might be ruinous.

M. CLEMENCEAU said a decision ought to be taken about Scala Nuova.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE undertook to make enquiries about the possibilities of creating a port at Makri. He asked M. Clemenceau to make enquiries also. If no port could be constructed at Makri, it might be necessary to give the Italians Mersina. What the Italians wanted was Heraclea, where there were some coal mines. Italy had no coal and no fuel. He understood that the Italians would be satisfied if, as part of their reparation from Germany, they could receive the German shares in the mines of Heraclea and Zunguldak. He asked M. Clemenceau to consider this.

M. CLEMENCEAU undertook to do so.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if Mr. Lloyd George could draw up a complete picture of the settlement.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that this would be the best plan. If President Wilson would draw up a scheme for Dalmatia, he would draw up a scheme for Asia Minor.

PRESIDENT WILSON said his idea was that if the Italians should get Fiume under the plebiscite he had proposed that they should surrender all claims to Dalmatia and the islands, except one group of islands inhabited by Italians South of Cherso, and the island of Lissa. The getting of Fiume could depend upon the Italians consenting to restrict the boundary to the crest of the mountains on the Istrian Peninsula. He asked if his proposal for a Greek mandate over the

territory in the hinterland of the Smyrna region to be assigned to the Greeks, was acceptable.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said his only fear was that the Mahommedan population was a very fierce one, and he doubted if the Greeks could handle it.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in Crete a very strange thing had happened. Although there could be seen in Crete any number of Greek villages which had been destroyed by the Turks, and of Turkish villages destroyed by the Greeks in the past, when he had visited Candia he had been received by a Turkish mayor who was on the best of terms with the Greeks, and the two populations seemed to live in accord.

(Mr. H. Nicolson was introduced.)¹

MR. LLOYD GEORGE told Mr. Nicolson he had been invited in to hear the general lines of the proposals that had been made, in order that he might draft a proposition in regard to them.

PRESIDENT WILSON explained that his proposal was to unite to Greece in full sovereignty Smyrna and the surrounding district, as proposed in the report of the Greek Commission (as subsequently modified by agreement between the British and American experts so as to exclude the valley of the Meander and the country South of it), and in addition to give Greece a mandate over the larger area claimed by M. Venizelos. Mr. Lloyd George, however, had suggested that in order to give the Italians a harbour, the line should be drawn so as to leave Makri to them. The Dodecanese should be united to Greece in full sovereignty. Italy should have a mandate for the remainder of the Southern part of Anatolia, for which the Council would be glad if Mr. Nicolson could draw a line on an economic basis.

MR. NICOLSON, referring to a line drawn on the map which Mr. Lloyd George had produced, said that this had only been very hastily drawn, and he could no doubt find a more logical basis if given a little more time. This line had been drawn so as to exclude the Baghdad railway from the Italian zone.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said there was no reason to exclude the railway, because in any event the railway would have to pass through the territory included in several mandates, and arrangements would have to be made for it to become an international line.

(Mr. Nicolson withdrew.)

¹ Harold Nicolson, assistant to the British representative, Sir Eyre Crowe, on the Commission on Greek and Albanian Affairs.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the Italians had always asked for a comprehensive proposal. He hoped, therefore, that the result of the present meeting would be to produce one. It would be a great advantage if something could also be said about Somaliland. He proposed that M. Clemenceau should see M. Simon,² and that the French should take the initiative in some proposal.

M. CLEMENCEAU undertook to see M. Simon on the subject.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE repeated the objections which the British Colonial experts had to the cession of Somaliland.

3. It was agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers should be asked to consider and make recommendations in regard to the territorial boundaries of Bulgaria. They should be authorised to consult the representatives in Paris of the various nations concerned in this settlement.

Prisoners of War.
Letter From Count
Brockdorff-
Rantzau

4. M. CLEMENCEAU handed round a letter from Count Brockdorff-Rantzau on the subject of Prisoners of War,³ together with a draft reply.⁴

5. (It was agreed that the Indian Delegation should be heard in regard to Constantinople at the end of the present week.)

Hearing of the
Indian Delegation

MR. LLOYD GEORGE undertook to endeavour to find someone who could state the Mohammedan case in regard to Constantinople in addition to the statement by the Maharajah of Bikaner and Lord Sinha. He thought possibly some Mohammedan expert might be attached to the Indian Delegation.

6. SIR MAURICE HANKEY handed to M. Clemenceau a communication from the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference,⁵ enclosing a copy of a letter addressed by M. Pachitch to M. Clemenceau, requesting that two milliards of francs out of the 20 milliards required from Germany as an instalment in respect of reparation for damage should be allotted to Serbia.

Serbian Claim
for Reparation

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that Serbia was acquiring very large new territories.

(It was agreed that the question should be referred in the first instance to the Committee considering the question of Reparation in the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties.)

² Henry Simon, French Minister of Colonies and representative on the Commission on Colonies.

³ Appendix III to CF-9, p. 574.

⁴ Appendix I(B) to CF-13, p. 609.

⁵ Appendix VB to CF-20, p. 752.

7. (It was agreed that on the following day the Council should meet the principal Members of the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways, in order to discuss the clauses prepared by them for the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties.)

8. MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether the Turks were to be invited to Paris, or whether they should be met somewhere else.

Commission on
Ports, Waterways
and Railways

PRESIDENT WILSON said that as only some of the Allied and Associated Powers had been at war with Turkey, it might be better to agree on terms and then send a Commission to meet the Turks. His own position in the matter was that as a member of the League of Nations, the United States would have to guarantee the arrangement.

Peace With
Turkey

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that their position was a good deal more than that, since he hoped the United States would accept the Mandate.

(It was agreed that in view of the pressure of work on the Drafting Committee, the Treaty with Turkey should not be put in hand just yet.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, May 13, 1919.

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's Residence, Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Wednesday, May 14, at 11 a. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.
The Hon. Henry White.
Dr. Manley O. Hudson.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith, K. C. B.
Colonel Henniker, R. E.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Albert Claveille.

ITALY

M. Orlando.
M. Crespi.
M. de Martino.

Secretaries Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.
Count Aldrovandi.
Interpreter Professor P. J. Mantoux.

REGIME OF PORTS, WATERWAYS & RAILWAYS

(1) The Council had before it a letter from the Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways, notifying the amendments necessary in their text to render it suitable for inclusion in the Treaty with Austria (Appendix).

**Clauses for Treaty
With Austria**

M. CRESPI, as President of the Commission, reported that, as the Commission had drawn up one text envisaging the enemy countries as a whole, their present letter was solely confined to notifying the alterations necessary to apply that text to Austria. No questions of principle had arisen and no new proposals were put forward.

(2) On behalf of the Italian Delegation, however, he desired to delete in Article 61. A. (now Article 42) the reference to Article 45 (now Article 26) relating to the regime of railway tariffs as regards traffic to Adriatic and Black Sea Ports. By including this paragraph in Article 61. A. it was subjected to the possibility of revision, or reciprocity, after five years; but as Italy already gave reciprocity, the Italian Delegation thinks that the matter can be settled immediately and finally.

**Railway Regime
to Adriatic Ports.
Revision**

M. DE MARTINO explained that the Clause (last paragraph of Article 45) had no political bearing and was irrespective of the fate of the Adriatic ports in question. Before the war there existed a regime of tariffs which favoured Austrian and Hungarian ports on the Adriatic as compared with German, etc., ports. Now in place of Austria as the hinterland to those ports there will be a variety of States, and unless the pre-war arrangements as a whole were maintained there would be a state of anarchy as regards railway rates, etc., which Germany would doubtless be able to utilise for her benefit. It was to prevent this that the Italians had suggested the clause in question which would maintain a pre-war tariff system. It did not fix the rates of freight, but merely the existing railway arrangements as a whole. If this was to be revised after five years the results would be deplorable to the States owning the Adriatic ports. The clause was of benefit to the whole of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy; and as Italy formally declares that she is ready to give reciprocity in the matter she desires that the possibility of revision after five years should be avoided.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE understood that the intention of the Italian Delegate was to make the clause (last paragraph of Article 45) permanent.

PRESIDENT WILSON drew attention to Article 61 (now Article 41) under which the Council of the League of Nations could recommend the revision of any clauses relating to a permanent administrative regime. It did not, however, appear to him that this would affect the matter since a railway tariff regime could in all probability not be considered as a permanent administrative regime. He saw no danger to Italy for the possible reconsideration after five years.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed. He thought it would be difficult, if not impossible, to maintain pre-war rates for more than five years, even if they could be maintained as long. Railway wages had doubled and increases in other costs would of necessity involve increases of railway rates unless the railways were to become bankrupt.

M. DE MARTINO said that they did not want to fix the rates of railway tariffs but only to keep the system as a whole in being. It was a matter of proportion.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that in practice the establishment of proportion would be very difficult.

He said that the British Delegation on the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways had gone into the matter very carefully and that they would never have agreed to this if they had thought that it was going to be permanent.

MR. HUDSON said the American Delegation on the Commission had similarly only accepted the Italian proposal on the understanding that there was a time-limit.

M. CLAVEILLE was entirely in favour of the inclusion of Article 45 (now Article 26) in the Treaty. He pointed out that railway rates were of three kinds:

- (1) General tariffs.
- (2) Special tariffs.
- (3) Export tariffs.

The object of the Italian proposal was that the proportion which the second and third categories bore to the first should be maintained for the traffic in question, and he thought this should be a fairly simple matter. He pointed out, however, that Article 61. A. (Article 42) did not mean that the clause would be revised after five years. It simply meant that the clause would in any case remain in force for five years and that after that time it would be revised only if the Council of the League of Nations thought fit. As Italy was ready to accept reciprocity he did not think they would risk losing anything by allowing the reference to remain.

M. ORLANDO suggested that in the interests of the stability of trade the period should be extended from five to ten years.

PRESIDENT WILSON emphasised that the clauses as they stood only provided for the possible revision by the League after five years. Inasmuch as Italy would be in the League of Nations he thought their position was abundantly safeguarded.

In view of these explanations M. Orlando withdrew the Italian proposal.

(3) MR. LLOYD GEORGE wished to raise a question of principle. Austria and Hungary now became land-locked States without access to the sea. They had just been discussing provisions suggested by the Commission to protect Trieste, etc., against attempts on the part of Austria or Hungary artificially to divert traffic from them. He wanted to know whether there was any protection at all for Austria and Hungary as regards their access to the sea being cut off by artificial means. They have a right to get to the sea and he would like to know whether that was safeguarded in the Commission's suggested clauses.

Right of Access
of Austria to
the Sea

M. CLAVEILLE said that in the Commission's clauses there was no such guarantee, but this would be given by the General Convention which the Commission had been instructed by the Supreme Council to prepare. Enemy States agreed beforehand in the Treaties to accept this Convention, so that the general rights thereby conferred

would apply to Austria and Hungary. He agreed that such countries should not be cut off from the sea and thought that access was not only in the interests of those countries but of the ports through which their commerce would be carried on.

M. ORLANDO agreed that guarantees must be given to the countries concerned.

PRESIDENT WILSON understood that there was a possibility of the General Conventions not being pressed on with.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed. The Conventions might take many months to draw up and even longer to come into force. The Peace Treaty is, however, to be signed very shortly, and the matter now under consideration is one which affects the very life of the countries. They must have access to the sea; and as matters stand at present they had no guarantee that if they had some trivial dispute with the surrounding countries those countries might not cut them off. To refer them to a General Convention in the present indefinite conditions was not a satisfactory solution. He proposed that a clause should be inserted in the Treaty and that the Commission on Ports, Waterways and Railways should be left to produce a suitable wording.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed.

This proposal was accepted, and the Supreme Council nominated the following as a Committee to prepare a suitable article:

United States of America.	Dr. Hudson.
British Empire.	Sir H. Llewellyn Smith.
Italy.	M. Crespi.
France.	M. Claveille.

(4) Subject to the inclusion of this Article, which should also go into any Treaty with Hungary, the Supreme Council accepted the articles for inclusion in the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties as submitted by the Commission, it being understood that the alterations made by the Supreme Council in the Articles submitted for the Treaty with Germany should also be made in the Articles for the Treaties with Austria and Hungary so far as they are applicable.

(5) The following resolution, embodying the results of the meeting were initialled or signed, as shown below, for communication to the Drafting Committee.

Communication
of Decision to
Drafting
Committee

The Supreme Council of the Allies, at a meeting at 11.00 a. m. on Wednesday, May 14th, accepted the clauses regarding Ports, Waterways and Railways, recommended by the Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways, for inclusion in the Austrian Treaty, subject to the retention in Article 61. A. (now Article 42) of the reference to Article 45 (now Article 26) and to the inclusion of a new article safeguarding the right of Austria (and eventually Hungary) of access

to the Sea. The drafting of this new article was entrusted to a small Committee nominated at the Meeting.

It was also decided that the alterations made by the Supreme Council in the Articles submitted for the Treaty with Germany should also be made in the Articles for the Treaty with Austria, so far as they are applicable.

W. W.
D. L. G.
G. C.
ORLANDO

Appendix to Minutes of Meeting at 11 a. m. May 14

From the President of the Commission on the International Régime of Ports, Waterways and Railways to the President of the Peace Conference

PARIS, 12 May, 1919.

The Commission on the International Régime of Ports, Waterways and Railways was requested by letter dated the 7th May from the Secretariat General of the Conference to submit its report on the clauses to be inserted in the Treaties of Peace with Austria and Hungary.

The Commission has already forwarded (on the 25th April) a supplementary report,¹ in an annex to which appeared the text of the clauses to be imposed on the enemy Powers as a whole. The Commission acted on the supposition that the same text would be submitted for signature to all belligerent Powers, who would undertake severally to observe the stipulations which affected them.

For a separate treaty with Austria or with Hungary the Commission on the International Régime of Ports, Waterways and Railways has no addition to propose in the clauses submitted by it. The sole modification to be made in the text is a modification purely in form with the object, on the one hand, in the case both of the Treaty with Austria and of the Treaty with Hungary, of deleting such of the stipulations as do not affect the signatory enemy Power, and on the other hand of introducing the verbal alterations rendered necessary by the substitution of several special treaties and a general treaty. A statement of those deletions, drafting alterations, and renumberings, article by article, is appended to this letter. In drawing up the list of the articles in its general text which do not appear to it to affect the Treaty with Austria or the Treaty with Hungary, the Commission has acted on the supposition that in both these treaties will appear an article similar to Article 434 of the Treaty with Germany, that is to say binding both these States to recognise the full force of the Treaties of Peace and additional Conventions which

¹ *Ante*, p. 266.

have been, or might be, concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers with the Powers which fought on the side of Austria and Hungary.

The Commission desires to point out, moreover, that while it has deleted all stipulations which only affect such enemy Powers as still retain possession of maritime littorals, it has retained certain clauses regarding ports; the Commission, in fact, has always included under the word "port" river ports as well as sea ports.

Article 33 of the text transmitted on April 25th, dealing with reparation for damages suffered by the European Commission of the Danube, has been retained without change; the Commission is anxious to call attention to the necessity of not appearing, by inserting these stipulations successively in each of the treaties with the enemy Powers and by mentioning in each case only the signatory enemy Power, to impose in turn on each of such Powers the whole of the restitutions and reparations.

Lastly, as regards Article 61 (A) of the text forwarded on April 25th, in which are mentioned certain articles subject to future revision and to limited periods of application, the Italian Delegation maintains its reserve already mentioned in the report of the 25th April as to the insertion of the last paragraph of Article 45 (Régime of Tariffs applicable to Adriatic ports) among the articles subject to revision. The Italian Delegation declares that as Italy on her side proposes to maintain the régimes of tariffs applicable to the traffic of the Adriatic ports, she already gives to the enemy Powers the benefit of reciprocity as regards this clause.

From its ignorance of the delimitations of frontiers, the Commission has not considered itself in a position to decide whether the second paragraph of Article 55 of the text of April 25th referring to the line Bratislava-Mura Keresztur and to the Mura Keresztur-Pragerhof branch affects at one and the same time Austria and Hungary or only Hungary. The Commission has proposed its insertion in both treaties with these Powers only under reserve of correction by the competent Authorities.

CRESPI
(*President*)

[Enclosure]

Modifications in the Articles Submitted by the Ports, Waterways, and Railways Commission To Fit Them for Insertion in Separate Treaties With Austria and Hungary

Consecutive Numbers of the Articles			Modifications for Treaty with Austria	Modifications for Treaty with Hungary
In the Report of the Commission (April 25th)	In a Treaty with Austria	In a Treaty with Hungary		
1.....	1	1	Fifth line—omit the words: "for this purpose the crossing of territorial waters shall be allowed".	Fifth line—omit the words: "for this purpose the crossing of territorial waters shall be allowed".
2.....	2	2	No change.	No change.
3.....	3	3		
4.....	4	4		
5.....	5	5		
6.....	6	6	Delete the words: "Under the reserve of restrictions concerning the exercise of maritime coasting trade".	Delete the words: "Under reserve of restrictions concerning the exercise of maritime coasting trade".
7.....	7	7		
Heading.....				
8.....				
9.....			Delete heading & substitute "Section B. Clauses relating to the Danube."	Delete heading & substitute "Section B. Clauses relating to the Danube."
10.....				
Heading.....				
Sub-Heading.....				
11.....	8	8	Delete reference to the Elbe, Oder and Niemen. The Article will then begin:—"The following river is declared international—the Danube from Ulm; and all navigable parts of this river system which naturally provide..." etc. Line 10 for "river systems" read "river system". Last line: for "Article 33 A" read "Article 24".	Delete Reference to the Elbe, Oder & Niemen. The Article will then begin:—"The following river is declared international—the Danube from Ulm; and all navigable parts of this river system which naturally provide..." etc. Line 10 for "river systems" read "river system". Last line: for "Article 33 A" read "Article 25".
12.....	9	9	First line: for "on the waterways" read "on the waterway".	First line: for "on the waterways" read "on the waterway".

Consecutive Numbers of the Articles			Modifications for Treaty with Austria	Modifications for Treaty with Hungary
In the Report of the Commission (April 25th)	In a Treaty with Austria	In a Treaty with Hungary		
13.....	10	10	No change.	No change.
14.....	11	11		
15.....	12	12		
16.....	13	13		
17.....	14	14		
18.....	15	15	First Line: for "Articles 12 to 17" read "Articles 9 to 14". Fifth line: Delete reference to the Elbe, Oder & Niemen so that the wording becomes:—"above mentioned river system of the Danube and such other parts of this river system". Lines 9, 10 & 11: Delete all after the words:—"said General Convention".	First line: for "Articles 12 to 17" read "Articles 9 to 14". Fifth line: Delete reference to the Elbe, Oder, & Niemen so that the wording becomes:—"above mentioned river system of the Danube and such other parts of this river system". Lines 9, 10 & 11: Delete all after the words:—"said General Convention".
19.....	16	16	4th Line: for "river systems referred to in Article 11" read "river system referred to in Article 8". 6th Line: for "those river systems" read "that river system".	4th Line: for "river systems referred to in Article 11" read "river system referred to in Article 8". 6th Line: for "those river systems" read "that river system".
Heading.....			Delete the heading "(2) Special Clauses regarding the Elbe," etc. and the whole of Articles 20 to 25.	Delete the heading "(2) Special Clauses regarding the Elbe," etc. and the whole of Articles 20 to 25.
20.....				
21.....				
22.....				
23.....				
24.....			Amend heading "(3) Special Clauses regarding the Danube" to "(2) Special Clauses regarding the Danube".	Amend heading "(3) Special Clauses regarding the Danube" to "(2) Special Clauses regarding the Danube".
25.....				
Heading.....				
26.....	17	17		
27.....	18	18		
28.....	19	19	2nd Line—for "Article 11" read "Article 8". 1st Line: for "Article 27" read "Article 18".	No change. 2nd Line—for "Article 11" read "Article 8". 1st Line: for "Article 27" read "Article 18".
29.....	20	20	No change.	No change.
30.....		21	Delete the whole Article.	(Article remains.)
31.....	21	22	No change.	No change.
32.....	22	23		
33.....	23	24		
33A.....	24	25		

Consecutive Numbers of the Articles			Modifications for Treaty with Austria	Modifications for Treaty with Hungary
In the Report of the Commission (April 25th)	In a Treaty with Austria	In a Treaty with Hungary		
Heading.....			For "Section D. Clauses regarding the Rhine & Moselle" read "(3) Special Clause regarding the Rhine".	Delete whole heading.
34.....			Delete all these Articles.	Delete all these Articles.
35.....				
36.....				
37.....				
38.....				
39.....				
40.....				
41.....			Delete sub-para. (1) & (3). The whole Article will then read: "The B States will offer no objection to any proposals of the Central Rhine Commission for extending its jurisdiction to the Rhine above Basle up to the Lake of Constance, subject to the consent of the Government of the Swiss Confederation".	Omit the whole Article.
42.....	25			
Heading.....			"Section E. Use of Northern Ports". Delete the whole heading.	"Section E. Use of Northern Ports". Delete the whole heading.
43.....			Delete both paragraphs.	Delete both paragraphs.
44.....				
45.....	26	26	No alteration.	No alteration.
46.....	27	27		
47.....	28	28	No alteration.	No alteration.
48.....	29	29		
49.....	30	30	Last 2 lines. Delete all words after Poland and substitute "converted by Austria to the Austrian gauge such lines being regarded as detached from the Austrian system."	Delete the last paragraph ("The provisions of paragraphs Prussian State system").
50.....	31	31		
51.....	32	32	No change.	No change.
52.....	33	33		
53.....	34	34	Line 9: Delete the words "of the improvement of the Bratislava (Pressburg)-Nagy-Kanisza Line."	Line 8: Delete the words "the new transalpine lines of the Col de Reschen and the Pas de Predil, of . . .

Consecutive Numbers of the Articles			Modifications for Treaty with Austria	Modifications for Treaty with Hungary
In the Report of the Commission (April 25th)	In a Treaty with Austria	In a Treaty with Hungary		
54.....			Delete the whole Article.	Delete the whole Article.
55.....	35	35	Last 2 lines: for "those of the B States" read "those of the railways over which the running powers are exercised."*	Delete sub - paragraph (2) Last line: for "those of the B States" read "those of the railways over which the running powers are exercised."
56.....	36	36	No change.	No change.
57.....	37	37		
58.....	38	38		
59.....	39	39		
60.....	40	40		
61.....	41	41	1st Line: for "Articles 1 to 10, 12, 45, 47 to 49" read "Articles 1 to 7, 9, 26, 28 to 30".	1st Line: for "Articles 1 to 10, 12, 45, 47 to 49" read "Articles 1 to 7, 9, 26, 28 to 30".
61A.....	42	42		
61B.....	43	43	No change.	No change.

*NOTE: Until the exact frontiers of Austria are known the reference to Hungarian railways cannot be omitted from the Treaty with Austria. [Footnote in the original.]

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Wednesday, May 14, 1919, at 11:45
a. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.
Mr. McCormick.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. Lord Robert Cecil, M. P.
Lt. Commander Arnold Forster.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.
M. Clementel.

ITALY

M. Orlando.
M. Crespi.

Secretaries—Count Aldrovandi.
Sir Maurice Hankey.
Interpreter—M. Mantoux.

PROPOSALS WITH REGARD TO THE BLOCKADE OF GERMANY

1. LORD R. CECIL stated that there were two subjects for consideration; viz., (a) A Public announcement indicating the present position of the Blockade of Germany and stating that it would be raised in the event of signature of the Peace Treaty (Annex 1), (b) a plan of the measures to be taken in the event of its being decided to reimpose the blockade. (Annex 2.) In referring to this plan Lord Robert Cecil drew attention to the proposal in the last paragraph that the Governments of the neutral countries contiguous to Germany should now be invited to consent to prohibit trade with Germany if called upon to do so. This would make it possible to exercise a more immediate and more effective pressure on Germany, if such pressure should become necessary.

2. Statement with regard to the present position of the blockade (Annex 1).

MR. LLOYD GEORGE drew attention to the words in the first sentence of the statement "as soon as the German representatives have signed the Treaty of Peace." He suggested that after the signature of the treaty the German assembly might repudiate it.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether it would be necessary to wait for the approval of the Treaty by the Allied Parliaments, before raising the blockade. It was agreed that this would be unnecessary.

PRESIDENT WILSON proposed that the words quoted above should be amended to read:—

“as soon as Germany has formally accepted the Treaty of Peace.”

It was agreed that the Statement should be published, subject to this amendment.

3. Measures to be taken in the event of reimposition of the blockade.

PRESIDENT WILSON stated that this was not the time to discuss whether we should or should not reimpose the blockade in the event of Germany refusing to sign the Peace Treaty. In his judgment the most suitable means of pressure would be some kind of military occupation rather than blockade measures which would tend to reduce her population to starvation and despair. To have our armies in an area thus starved would not be an edifying spectacle. Blockade would be more terrible than military occupation and presents many inhumane features; if it were reimposed it would presently become distasteful to the world. The President expressed grave doubts whether the blockade should be reimposed unless no other course were open.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE was of opinion that in any case the application of the blockade would only be necessary for a fortnight or three weeks. An excuse was wanted in Germany for signing the Peace Treaty. The fear of the reimposition of the blockade would provide such an excuse. Haase,¹ for example is afraid of the blockade. There is a pressure in Germany against signing the Treaty, which is a very painful Treaty to sign.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed himself as all in favour of a military occupation as a demonstration but not as the only means of pressure. Some parts of Germany would not mind a military occupation. After only a fortnight of the reimposed blockade there would be a general cry to Scheidemann² of “Sign, Sign”.

4. On the question of the declaration of a formal blockade.

LORD R. CECIL drew attention to the statement of the British Admiralty as to objections to such a declaration; he understood that the Admiralty view was that the ships now in commission were insufficient for the maintenance of a strictly “effective” blockade.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the United States had never admitted the legality of the existing form of blockade. The Admiralty caveat was thus a little unacceptable.

LORD R. CECIL said that whether the blockade was absolutely effective or not did not matter, what mattered was the general stoppage of trade.

¹ Hugo Haase, leader of the Independent Socialist Party of Germany.

² Philip Scheidemann, President of the Ministry of the German Republic.

PRESIDENT WILSON added that there was a difference between blockade breaking and blockade running. Under the conditions indicated by the Admiralty there might be cases of blockade running: but a definite breach of blockade, such as would render it legally ineffective, would require a naval force which Germany does not now possess.

It was agreed that if blockade measures have to be reimposed a formal blockade should be declared. No definite decision was arrived at as to whether blockade measures should or should not be taken in the event of Germany refusing to sign the Peace Treaty: but it was understood that such preparations would now be made as would render it possible to give effect to the blockade measures proposed, in the event of its being necessary to take such action.

In particular it was agreed that the Demarche to Neutral Governments referred to by Lord R. Cecil (see general note at end of Annex 2) should be made now.

5. LORD R. CECIL referred to the possibility of exercising economic pressure on countries, which were appealing to the Allies for assistance and supplies, and were at the same time fighting with their neighbours in defiance of the wishes of the Council.

He cited the case of Poland which is at present engaged in operations against the Ukraine. He referred also to the food supplies withheld by Serbia in the Banat.

He suggested that the Council might on occasion think it desirable to notify the Supreme Economic Council that economic pressure should be applied in such cases.

It was agreed that this should be done and that the Supreme Economic Council should be free to take such action as seemed to them desirable in such cases.

[Annex I]

SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL

[Public Announcement Indicating the Present Position With Regard to the Blockade of Germany]

The Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Governments have authorised the following statement as to the present position of the blockade against Germany. Arrangements have been made to remove the blockade against Germany immediately and completely as soon as Germany has formally accepted the Treaty of Peace.

In the meantime the following temporary relaxations have already been made for the duration of the Armistice.

1. *Foodstuffs.*

The import of foodstuffs into Germany is now free within the limits of a monthly ration of 300,000 tons of cereals and 70,000 tons of fats. Foodstuffs within the ration may be exported to Germany without formality from any country which is prepared to allow the export to her. Fish imported from the neutral countries contiguous to Germany does not count within the ration. Since March 25th, 1919, the quantity of foodstuffs shipped to Germany by the Associated and Allied Governments has amounted to about 550,000 tons, of which about 250,000 tons have been actually delivered. In effect Germany is now free to import all the food for which she can pay.

2. *Exports.*

Exports of gold, silver, securities and war material are prohibited, and other exports over land frontiers are free. As regards oversea exports the Allied Governments have retained certain rights of pre-emption over coal and dye-stuffs and certain other commodities. Other articles can be exported freely to any country prepared to accept them.

3. *Black Lists.*

All black lists of firms and persons in neutral countries have been withdrawn, and all disabilities attaching to trade and communications with such firms and persons have ceased to operate.

4. *Communications.*

Commercial correspondence with regard to the export and import trade of the character indicated above is permitted, subject to certain regulations which have been accepted by the German Government, and to the Enemy Trading Laws of the Belligerent countries.

5. *Fishing Area.*

The area open to German fishing craft has been largely extended. A quantity of net thread, etc., for repair of nets has been allowed to proceed from Holland in accordance with a request of the German Government.

6. *Exports from the Allied and Associated Countries to the countries contiguous to Germany.*

There is a free list of articles which may now be exported without licence or other formality. In the case of other articles (except where a control has been retained for domestic reasons) the rules as to the obtaining of licenses and guarantees have already been largely relaxed. Export will be further freed from formalities, if a general guarantee is given by the Governments of the neutral countries concerned that they will prevent re-export of such imported articles to Germany without the consent of the Associated Governments.

7. *Raw Materials.*

Permission has been given for the import of raw materials urgently required for use in the German coal mines. Arrangements are being

made for the early shipment of these supplies, subject to the necessary finance being forthcoming.

The principal difficulty with regard to the import of raw material is the financial one. In order to obviate this difficulty as far as possible the Supreme Economic Council has approved a plan whereby Germany may be permitted to import rations of raw materials for the urgent needs of the coal mining and other essential industries, in so far as these requirements can be met from German-owned stocks in neutral countries.

MAY 12, 1919.

Annex II

SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL

[Plan of Measures To Be Taken in the Event of Its Being Decided To Reimpose the Blockade]

"In accordance with the instructions given by the Supreme Economic Council at its meeting on May 5th, the Superior Blockade Council and the Military and Naval experts consulting with the Council, submit to the Council of Four the following report:

In case the German Government should refuse to accept the preliminaries of peace, the following measures should be immediately taken if the Associated Governments should decide to have recourse to means of economic coercion:

(A) *Declaration of formal blockade.*

Declaration of a formal blockade of the whole of the coast line in the occupation of the Germans, both in the Baltic and in the North Sea.

SECRETARY'S NOTE: Since the adoption of the foregoing recommendation, information has been received from the British Admiralty, that they have strong objections to the declaration of a formal blockade, and consider that the re-establishment of the system of blockade in force before the armistice would be sufficient to accomplish the object in view, especially as more complete naval supervision of any permitted sea traffic between the Northern Neutrals and Germany is now possible.

(B) *Danish, Dutch and Swiss Land Frontiers.*

Consideration was given to the question as to whether the communications upon the Danish, Dutch or Swiss Frontiers on the German side could be cut by the Allied troops. The Sub-Committee appreciate the fact that, if all or any of these operations could be carried out, the efficiency of the Blockade would be greatly strengthened but they feel that these questions lie outside their province.

(C) *Rhine.*

The maintenance of a completely effective control upon traffic between the banks of the Rhine.

(D) *Bavarian Frontier of Germany.*

The Inter-Allied Commission now in Vienna will take effective measures to prevent exports and imports between Austria and Germany.

(E) *Czecho-Slovak Frontier of Germany*
Polish Frontier of Germany

Requests to the Governments of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland effectively to prevent any trade with Germany.

The Sub-Committee appreciate the supreme importance of Dantzig and the Dantzig Polish Railway for the revictualling of Poland but they were advised by the Representatives of the General Staffs that the occupation of Dantzig and the control of the railway would entail Naval and Military measures of such importance that they cannot be considered at short notice.

(F) *Renewal to the fullest extent of Measures previously in force in the case of Neutrals in their relation to Germany.*

(a) The Re-imposition of the

- (1) Censorship.
- (2) Black Lists.
- (3) Rations.

(b) Reconsideration of the present Free List.

(c) Withdrawal of all concessions made to the Germans under the Brussels Agreement so far as these concessions represent relaxations of previous blockade policy.

(SECRETARY'S NOTE: Concessions not related to the Blockade were not considered by the Council to come within the province of this report.)

GENERAL NOTE: It would greatly increase the effectiveness of the Blockade if the Neutral Governments of the countries with whom agreements are now in force (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland and Switzerland) should consent forthwith to prohibit if called upon by the Associated Governments to do so, all exportation, re-exportation or transit of goods from or across their respective countries to or from Germany, except with the consent of the Associated Governments."

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House, Place des
Etats-Unis, Paris, on Wednesday, May 14, at 12:15 p. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

ITALY

M. Orlando.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. } *Secretaries*
Count Aldrovandi
Professor P. J. Mantoux.—*Interpreter*

1. M. ORLANDO said that two questions had been raised by the Drafting Committee in regard to the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties. One of these questions concerned responsibilities for the breaches of the laws of war. Naturally, the clause in the German Treaty applying to the Kaiser, was not applicable to the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties, and there was no equivalent Article. Where, however, some alteration was required was in the case where subjects of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire had committed crimes and had subsequently assumed some fresh nationality, such as Czecho-Slovak, or one of the other nationalities. Provision should be made that such persons should not escape trial.

Responsibility
for the War, and
Breaches of the
Laws of War

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that no provision inserted in the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties could compel the Czech-Slovak Government to surrender people accused of crimes.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE drew attention to a mistake in Article 227 of the German Treaty, where it was stated that the special tribunal "will be composed of four judges, one appointed by each of the following Powers; namely, United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan". The number four should, apparently, be five.

Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to call the attention of the Secretary-General to the above mistake, in order that the Germans might be notified.

2. M. ORLANDO said that there was a second point to which he wished to draw attention, namely, the language of the Austrian and Hun-

garian Treaties. He had consented to the German Treaty being drafted in the English and French languages, to the exclusion of Italian. In view, however, of Italy's special position towards Austria and Hungary, he asked that the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties might also be drafted in the Italian language.

Language of the
Treaty of Peace

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had no objection.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had no objection, provided that the Italian representatives of the Drafting Committee were fully qualified to prepare the necessary drafts.

M. ORLANDO said that they were amply qualified.

(It was agreed that the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties should be prepared in the Italian, as well as in the English and French languages.)

3. The Council had before it a letter from Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau, dated May 10th, on the subject of German Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians, together with a draft reply (Appendix I. (A) & (B)).

Prisoners of War:
Letter From Herr
Brockdorff-
Rantzau

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had no objection to the substance of the draft reply, but thought it might be couched in more sympathetic language, particularly in regard to the portion relating to the graves of the fallen.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if Mr. Lloyd George would prepare a revised draft.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE undertook to do this.

4. With reference to C. F. 9, Minute I,¹ the Council had before it a letter from Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau, transmitting a draft International Agreement on Labour Law,^{1a} prepared by the German Government, together with a draft reply prepared by the Committee to which the question had been referred. (Appendix II.)

International
Agreement on
Labour. Letter
From Herr
Brockdorff-
Rantzau

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it was worth considering whether it would not be desirable to admit the Germans to the Labour Organisation before they were admitted to the League of Nations.

(It was agreed that before the draft reply was approved, the Committee should be invited to express their views on this question.)²

5. M. CLEMENCEAU read the attached résumé of three German Notes which had arrived in the night of 13th/14th May, 1919 (Appendix III).

¹ *Ante*, p. 565.

^{1a} See appendix to German proposals for a League of Nations, vol. vi, p. 774.

² The text of the reply as sent, May 14, was identical with the draft reply in appendix II, p. 610, except for the substitution of the signature of M. Clemenceau for Mr. Barnes' initials on the draft.

(It was agreed that these notes should be referred to the appropriate Committees set up by the Peace Conference to consider such questions.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to place himself in communication with the Secretary-General on the subject.)

6. PRESIDENT WILSON read the following letter which he had received from Mr. Lansing, relating to two pamphlets received from the Chinese Delegation:—

Claims by China

"The Mission has received from the Chinese Delegation direct and also through the Secretariat-General two pamphlets, one of which sets forth China's claim submitting for abrogation by the Peace Conference the Treaties and Notes by and between China and Japan of May 25, 1915³ and the other presents for readjustment by the Conference a number of important questions, among which may be mentioned 'the withdrawal from China of Foreign Troops and Police, the withdrawal of Foreign Post Offices and the Abolition of Consular Jurisdiction'.

The first pamphlet deals with a question growing out of the war, and one affecting not only American rights but those of other associated Governments, but it seems unlikely that the Claim can have consideration by the Conference.

The second pamphlet has to do with questions not directly related to the war and questions therefore still more unlikely to be considered by the Conference.

But in view of the present feeling in China in consequence of the decision in the Kiaochow Question, I beg to suggest that the Council of Four send the Chinese Delegation a written statement pointing out that it will be impossible for the Peace Conference to consider these matters, whose importance is fully recognized, and suggesting that they be brought to the attention of the Council of the League of Nations as soon as that body is able to function."

(Mr. Lansing's proposal was agreed to, and Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to draft a letter for the signature of the President of the Conference.)

7. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Mr. Arthur Henderson, as Chairman of the Berne Labour Conference, had approached him and asked if the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would receive a deputation from the Conference in regard to the Peace Terms.

Berne Labour
Conference and
the Peace Terms

He had replied to him that as Chairman of the Labour Conference he had already received a summary of the Peace Terms; that these Peace Terms had now been delivered to the Germans; and that consequently no useful purpose would be served by the deputation. He asked if an official reply might now be sent in the same sense.

³ *Foreign Relations*, 1915, pp. 171, 197.

(This was agreed to, and Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to draft a letter, either from the President or from the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference.)

8. PRESIDENT WILSON said that since the communication which he had been asked to send to Luxembourg through the medium of an American Officer, no action had been taken in regard to the future status of Luxembourg. He then read a document, the gist of which was that the people of Luxembourg wanted the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to receive a delegation, and did not wish to hold a plebiscite until after that.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it would be impossible to refuse.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed.

PRESIDENT WILSON said the communication had no doubt been addressed to him, rather than to the President of the Conference, because he had been the medium for transmitting the previous communication from the Supreme Council.

(It was agreed that President Wilson should reply that the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would be glad to receive a deputation from the people of Luxembourg.)

9. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had received from the British Representatives in Siberia reports as to the risk of trouble between the United States forces in Siberia and the Russian troops. The view of the British Representatives, which of course he could not confirm, was that the Russian General Ivanoff⁴ had done his best to smooth matters, and that the trouble was largely due to General Graves.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that General Graves was a man of most unprovocative character, and wherever the fault might lie, he felt sure it was not with him. The British representatives were, he would not say partisans of, but at any rate friendly to, Koltchak.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said they might fairly be termed partisans.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 14 May, 1919.

Appendix I (A) to CF-13

Letter From Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau to M Clemenceau on the Subject of Prisoners of War

[Same as appendix III to CF-9, printed on page 574.]

⁴ Maj. Gen. Ivanov-Rinov, commander of all the Russian troops in Eastern Siberia supporting the Kolchak government.

Appendix I (B) to CF-13

[Draft Reply to German Note on Prisoners of War]

MR. PRESIDENT: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of May 10,⁵ relating to prisoners of war.

1. Prisoners of war and civilian prisoners who have been guilty of crimes or penal offences cannot be allowed to return to their native country. As such crimes have been committed on the soil of the Allies, the cases have been dealt with by the proper authorities in the various territories and punishment carried out accordingly. To say the least, it would seem strange that the perpetrator of a particular crime should receive punishment according to his nationality, i. e. that he should be set at liberty if he be German, whilst an Englishman, an American, a Frenchman or an Italian in a similar case would have to undergo the maximum penalty. This would imply the according of specially favoured treatment to the Germans, an idea which cannot be entertained.

How could we undertake to liberate such a malefactor as the German prisoner Hoppe who was sent to work on a farm in the Seine-Inférieure? This prisoner at night broke into the farmer's house and murdered him and his wife in cold blood with a bill-hook.

For this double murder Hoppe was sentenced to death on June 11th 1918 by a regularly constituted Court-Martial. The Berne conventions⁶ have suspended the execution of the sentence until peace has been signed. Would justice be satisfied if, as a consequence of the Peace Treaty this murderer was reprieved. We cannot conceive that the terms relating to prisoners of war should guarantee immunity to those guilty of murder and other penal offences.

According to the terms of the Treaty of Peace all Germans who have committed actions contrary to the laws of the countries of the Allied and Associated Powers, are to be handed over to those Powers, wherever those actions were committed.

How then is it possible to demand at the same time that those Germans in the Allies territory who have committed crimes most severely punished by the Penal Code, should be released by those Powers?

For cogent reasons, it was prescribed in the Armistice terms of Nov. 11th 1918, that civil and military prisoners belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers should be returned unconditionally. Now the fate of the German criminals awaits decision. Justice

⁵ Appendix III to CF-9, p. 574.

⁶ For the agreement between France and Germany concerning prisoners of war, April 26, 1918, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxi, p. 713; for the agreement between France and Germany concerning the liberation or repatriation of civilians, and the treatment of the population in occupied territories, April 26, 1918, see *ibid.*, p. 721.

cannot be robbed of her imprescriptible rights by the inclusion in the Peace Treaty of an Amnesty for crimes committed by prisoners.

2. There is no special point in the improvement of conditions asked for on behalf of prisoners of war. Unlike the Germans in their treatment of the subjects of Allied and Associated Powers, these latter to their honour have invariably assured to German prisoners of war treatment in keeping with the laws of humanity and international agreements.

3. The restitution of personal property constitutes a legal right. But as Germany has not fulfilled her undertakings and as she still withholds the personal property belonging to repatriated prisoners, the Allied and Associated Powers are under the necessity of calling upon Germany to respect her obligations. It is to this end that Art. 223 has been framed.

4. As regards search for the missing, the Allied and Associated Powers have invariably supplied the Germans with such information as was in their possession. Their attitude in this respect will not undergo any modification.

In Germany on the other hand a considerable number of the subjects of the Allied and Associated Powers have been deprived of the right of communicating with their relatives. This violation of international agreements has been the occasion of poignant anguish and uncertainty to many families. The measures enumerated in Art. 222 aim at putting an end to all such uncertainty.

5. As regards places of burial, articles 225 and 226 of the Treaty have doubtless escaped your attention. Your demand is fully met by them.

6. The Allied and Associated Powers cannot in any way contemplate the cession of clothing and underwear.

The steps to be taken for repatriating prisoners will be determined immediately after the signing of Peace Preliminaries.

Believe me [etc.]

Appendix II to CF-13

[Same as appendix I to CF-9, printed on page 571.]

M. 143

Copy of Draft Letter to the German Delegation

SIR: I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of May 10th in regard to International Labour Legislation, together with draft of international agreement on Labour Law.

The reply of the Allied and Associated Governments is as follows:—

I. They take note of the declaration made by the German Delegates that domestic peace and the advancement of mankind depend upon the advancement [*adjustment*] of labour questions and they are convinced that such adjustment will be rendered easier in the future than in the past as men's minds are free from the fear of war, and industry relieved of the burden of armaments which German Militarism has laid upon it.

Part 13 of the Draft conditions of Peace provide the means by which such adjustment can be made, and Section 2 of that part lays down the principles which will progressively guide the labour organisation and the League of Nations.

Article 427 indicates clearly that the enumeration of the principles set forth is not exhaustive. The purpose of the Labour Organisation is that it should promote the constant development of the International Labour Regime.

II. The Labour Convention has been inserted in the Treaty of Peace and Germany will therefore be called upon to sign it. In the future the right of your country to participate in the Labour Organisation will be secured so soon as she is admitted into the League of Nations in accordance with Article I of the Treaty.

III. It has not been thought necessary to summon a Labour Conference at Versailles. The conclusions of the syndical Conferences at Berne which are reproduced in the Draft of the International Agreement on Labour Law referred to in the first paragraph of your letter of the 10th instant had already been studied with the closest attention. Representatives of the trade unions had taken part in the preparation of the Articles relating to Labour. As appears, moreover, from the annex to Section 2 of Part 13, page 200, the Agenda of the first session of the International Labour Conference comprises the most important of the questions raised at the Syndical Conference at Berne. This Session will be held at Washington in October next. Trade Unions will be invited to take part and it will be held under definite rules, which provide for due effect being given to conclusions, subject only to the assent of the competent authorities of the countries represented.

IV. The Draft International Agreement on Labour Law prepared by the German Government is deficient in that it makes no provision for the representation of Labour at the International Conferences. It is also inferior to the provisions submitted in Part 13 in the Peace Conditions in the following respects:—

(a) Five years is suggested (Article 7) as the maximum interval between Conferences.

The Peace Conditions lay down one year (Article 389).

(b) Each country (Article 7) has one vote.

The Peace Conditions give a vote to each delegate, whether representing the Government, employers or workers. (Article 390.)

(c) Resolutions are only binding if carried by a majority of four-fifths of the voting countries (Article 7).

The Peace Conditions provide that a majority of two-thirds only of the votes cast shall be necessary on the final vote for the adoption of a recommendation or Draft Convention by the Conference. (Article 405.)

The Allied and Associated Governments are therefore of opinion that their decisions give satisfaction to the anxiety which the German Delegation professes for social justice, and that they ensure the realisation of reforms which the working classes have more than ever the right to expect after the cruel trial to which the world has been subject during the last five years.

G. N. B[ARNES]

Appendix III to CF-13

[Translation ¹¹]

Résumé of Three German Notes Received During the Night of May 13-14, 1919

The first note ¹² relates to the delivery of German tonnage, to the surrender of the colonies, to the loss of agricultural areas in the East, and to the delivery of three-quarters of the German production of ore. The note states that Germany would be so deprived of raw materials that she would be able to supply herself with neither food nor work. Those who sign the treaty, the note states, will sign the death warrant of millions of men. The note declares that Germany is able to furnish statistical proof on this subject.

The second note ¹³ relates to reparations. It protests against the article of the treaty which declares that Germany and her allies are responsible for the war. It states that the German people did not want the war and would never have engaged in a war of aggression. It requests a copy of the report of the Commission which established the responsibility of the makers of the war.

The third note ¹⁴ is a reply to the letter of the Allied Governments which stated that they were governed constantly by the principles upon which the Armistice was concluded. The note protests against the cessions of territory, reserving a special reply for the question

¹¹ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

¹² Appendix IA to CF-20, p. 738.

¹³ Appendix II to CF-19, p. 727.

¹⁴ Appendix II to CF-23, p. 817.

of Kehl and Alsace-Lorraine. It also separates out the questions of Poland and Schleswig. It protests especially against the articles of the treaty relating to the Saar Basin. It states that the Germans would be ready to consider possible arrangements concerning the replacement of coal which could be furnished to France. It declares that Germany is also ready to give satisfaction to Belgium in this connection. It states that the German plenipotentiaries reserve the right to make a further declaration concerning the eastern areas.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Wednesday, 14 May, 1919, at 4 p. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D.
Lloyd George, M. P.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.
Professor P. J. Mantoux

Secretary.
Interpreter.

1. The Council had before it two resolutions prepared for Mr. Lloyd George by Mr. Harold Nicolson of the British Delegation. (Appendix I and Appendix II).

Asia Minor:
Mandates

MR. LLOYD GEORGE explained that these proposals had been prepared as part of a comprehensive scheme to be presented to the Italian Delegation.

2. PRESIDENT WILSON said that he would accept the resolution contained in Appendix I in regard to the acceptance of a Mandate by the United States of America for Armenia and another for Constantinople and the Straits, subject to the assent of the Senate. The only alteration he wished to make was the inclusion in paragraph 2 of the Italian Delegation among the Powers to agree on the frontiers of the mandate in regard to the Straits.

Mandate for the
United States
of America

M. CLEMENCEAU also accepted Appendix I with this alteration.

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE produced a map which had been prepared by Mr. Nicolson of the British Delegation to accompany the resolutions in Appendix II.

The Greek, French
and Italian
Mandates

PRESIDENT WILSON noted that, in this map, the valley of the Meander was included in the territory to be united to Greece. He agreed that this was the best arrangement. When the United States' experts had proposed to cut this out of the Greek zone, they had done so in the Turkish interest and on the supposition that there would be an independent Turkish State. The present scheme, however, was not providing for a separate Turkey independent of mandate.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Italians would press very strongly for Scala Nuova.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that it would be inexpedient to have the Italians there in such close contact to the territory united to Greece.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the map did not give Mersina to the Italians. This raised the question of what port Italy was to have.

SIR MAURICE HANKEY read the following notes about the ports of Marmarice, Karaghatch and Makri, which had been prepared in the Naval Section of the British Delegation:—

“Marmarice.

This magnificent harbour is completely land-locked, and affords secure anchorage with good holding ground for a large number of deep draught vessels. It is well adapted for use as a Naval Base. There appears to be no reason why it should not also be equally suitable as a commercial port, provided the communications to the interior were developed.

Karaghatch.

This is also a fine harbour, but does not appear to be so suitable as Marmarice for a commercial port, owing to the rugged nature of the surrounding land. Communication with the interior is quite undeveloped.

Makri.

This harbour though affording complete shelter is not so large as the two harbours mentioned above, and owing to neighbouring marshes, the town is exceedingly unhealthy. It would appear to afford better facilities for reclamation and wharfage than Marmarice and Karaghatch, and communication with the interior is more developed. An Italian Syndicate shortly before the war was considering the question of constructing railways from Makri to Mouglia, etc.”

He also read extracts from the “Mediterranean Pilot,” Vol. 5, and produced the charts.

PRESIDENT WILSON urged that the line should be drawn so as not to include the harbour of Marmarice, which he understood to have been the intention on the previous day.

(This was agreed to.)

(Mr. Harold Nicolson entered.)

PRESIDENT WILSON and MR. LLOYD GEORGE gave Mr. Nicolson the necessary instructions for re-drawing the map so as not to include Marmarice in the Italian zone. Mr. Nicolson was also instructed to revise Appendix II, page 2, so as to substitute Makri for Marmarice.

(Mr. Nicolson withdrew.)

PRESIDENT WILSON then read Appendix II. In Resolution 3, the following sentence: “In view of the fact that the Turkish Government has not shown itself able to protect the interests of Christian populations under its sovereignty” was altered by the omission of the word “Christian” and the substitution of the word “the.” The name “Makri” was substituted for “Marmarice.”

MR. LLOYD GEORGE considered that the arrangement was now all right.

M. CLEMENCEAU also agreed.

PRESIDENT WILSON said it looked to him all right.

(The resolutions reproduced in Appendices I and II were approved, as the basis of part of an offer to be made to Italy.)

4. PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the boundaries of the Armenian Mandate had not yet been drawn. He suggested that the map in the ante-room, which had been drawn by American experts, provided suitable boundaries.

(The Council then adjourned to the ante-room and studied the map prepared by American experts.)

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the Southern boundary was drawn so as to leave Alexandretta south of the Silesian [*Cilician*] boundary.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the Western boundary in the region of the Black Sea differed somewhat from the line prepared by British experts. He handed a map drawn by British experts to President Wilson, who undertook to consider it in consultation with his own experts.

(The Council returned to the Library.)

5. M. CLEMENCEAU said that, in order to make a clean job of it, some arrangement ought to be made between General Allenby and the Emir Feisal. The latter had behaved very well since his arrival in Syria.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that, at the moment, the best plan would be to draw a map of occupation, showing what territories would be occupied by the various Powers concerned. He suggested that there should be a small Committee to examine the question.

(M. CLEMENCEAU nominated M. Tardieu.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE nominated General Sir Henry Wilson.)

6. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the French experts in the Foreign Office would not hear of any arrangement with the Italians about Djibouti.

7. PRESIDENT WILSON said it had been brought to his notice that the clause intended to have been included in the Reparation Clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, Part VIII, Annex 2 paragraph 2, had been omitted. He suggested, therefore, that the only thing to be done was to sign an agreement, of which he read a draft.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought it would be better to reinsert it in the Treaty of Peace.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that it might be put in an errata.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed that it should be included when the final reply was given to the Germans. He did not like having too many documents on these subjects.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed.

(The Agreement in Appendix III was initialled, and Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed, after obtaining M. Orlando's initials, to forward it to the Drafting Committee for incorporation in the final Treaty with Germany.)

(M. Orlando's initials were affixed the same evening. M. P. H.)

8. PRESIDENT WILSON informed Sir Maurice Hankey that it had been agreed during an informal conversation on the previous afternoon that the Drafting Committee should only take instructions from the Supreme Council of the principal Allied and Associated Powers in regard to the material for Articles to be inserted in the Treaties of Peace, and that these instructions should be initialled by the Heads of States.

Instructions to
the Drafting
Committee To Be
Initialled by the
Supreme Council

9. SIR MAURICE HANKEY read the following note from Mr. Hurst, on behalf of the Drafting Committee:—

League of Nations
& Labour Con-
vention in the
Treaties of Peace
With Austria &
With Hungary

"The present intention of the Drafting Committee is to insert the Covenant of the League of Nations and the draft Labour Convention and Resolutions in the Treaty of Peace with Austria in exactly the same manner as has been done in the draft Treaty of Peace with Germany. If this is not in accordance with the wishes of the Council of Prime Ministers, we should be glad if you would let us know. I have ascertained from Lord Robert Cecil and Mr. Barnes that the above is in accordance with their views. Some of the Allied and Associated Powers represented at the Peace Conference were not at war with Austria, but we are making them all parties to the Treaties and modifying the language of the first clause, so as to bring in statements as to the termination of the war and the resumption of the relations being [*not?*] inconsistent with their being parties; consequently, it is quite feasible to insert the Covenant of the League of Nations without any alteration, as the signatories to the Austrian Treaty and to the German Treaty will be the same; no alteration, therefore, will be required in Article I and in the Annex to the Covenant."

(The above was approved and initialled. Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward it to Mr. Hurst, after obtaining M. Orlando's initials.)

10. PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the hope that M. Clemenceau's proposal would be adopted and that Austria would be inserted in the list of Nations invited to adhere to the League of Nations. He, himself, was strongly in favour of this proposal. He doubted, however, whether the Supreme Council had the right to decide this without consulting a plenary meeting.

Austria and the
League of Nations

M. CLEMENCEAU said it ought not to decide in the absence of the Italian Representatives.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed.

11. MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what was the nature of the mandate contemplated for the Italians in Anatolia.

Nature of Mandates & Sovereignty in Anatolia PRESIDENT WILSON said he had in mind the Moslem feeling about not wiping out the Turkish race. His idea had been to set up a Turkish State in the north of Anatolia and to put it under the supervision of France. He pointed out that, under the scheme of mandates as originally devised, there were three classes, one class consisted of nations which were on the verge of being able to run themselves and only required a very loose mandate, a second class provided for less developed countries, and a third class provided for wholly dependent countries.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked what differences he contemplated in regard to the Turkish population in the Italian and French mandates in Anatolia.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had understood that in the north the population was more purely Turkish.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this was not the case outside the coastal districts.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the awkward question to decide was that of sovereignty. If what Mr. Lloyd George said was correct, it would be better not to extend the sovereignty of Northern Anatolia over Southern Anatolia, otherwise both France and Italy would have advisers at the Turkish capital dealing with different parts of Turkish territory.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that that was the great argument against dividing Anatolia.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked what sort of mandate was contemplated in each case.

PRESIDENT WILSON said it was substantially the same.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE read a memorandum which had been prepared by Mr. Balfour in consultation with experts in the Foreign Office, in which some sort of a condominium was contemplated.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that a condominium would never do. It was bound to give rise to difficulties and might even give rise to wars. He was reminded by Mr. Lloyd George that there had been great trouble between France and Great Britain in Egypt, which might have resulted in war between the two countries but for his personal intervention.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE continued to read Mr. Balfour's memorandum, in which some international body for finance was proposed.

PRESIDENT WILSON was altogether opposed to that. In regard to a proposal in the memorandum providing for prior claims in regard to

concessions for the mandatory Power, he pointed out that this was contrary to the principle provided for in the League of Nations' Covenant for equal opportunity to all Nations in mandated territory. This did not mean that the United States of America would rush in everywhere. Direct American enterprise was certainly not to be expected in Anatolia. There would certainly be a natural priority to the Mandatory but there should not be a priority of claim.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE quite agreed and pointed out that it would be very unfair if the Italians had a priority of claim in Southern Anatolia when the British were compelled to give equal opportunity in German East Africa.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that his object all along had been to avoid even an appearance of grabbing. These considerations brought us face to face with the problem as to the form of political unity which was to exist in Southern Anatolia. His idea would be to organise it as a self-governing unit, to elect its own Governor-General with Konia as its capital. Otherwise, there would be the difficulty of a single capital in which the representatives of both Mandatories would live.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that another scheme was that the Sultan should remain in Constantinople exercising supervision over the whole of Turkey. France would then overlook one part of Anatolia, Italy another part, Greece a third, while the United States overlooked the Sultan. If Brusa was in the French Mandate and the Sultan ruled over the whole of Anatolia, it would create a very awkward situation for the Italians.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that Southern Anatolia would have to be constituted as a separate unit.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked who would appoint the Governor?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested the Sultan under advice.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if the Turks could not elect a Governor.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said this would make it a Republic.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had no objection to this.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that difficulties would arise in connection with the Khalifate in this case.

M. CLEMENCEAU said his objection to any scheme by which the Sultan nominated the Governor or to any scheme of election was that there would be a French and an Italian candidate and this would always give rise to friction and difficulty. He suggested that a Prince should be drawn from the Sultan's family and appointed to rule in Anatolia. In any other scheme, there would be trouble all the time.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the Italians should be left to choose a member of the Sultan's family.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that Southern Anatolia would then be an independent State under an Italian Mandate.

(On President Wilson's suggestion, it was agreed in principle that Anatolia should be separated politically into two parts, the method of separation being left for further consideration. It was also agreed that, as President Wilson had some information to the effect that there was a prospect of the Italians and Yugo-Slavs coming to an understanding on the Adriatic question and as the proposals in regard to Asia Minor were only part of comprehensive proposals to be presented to the Italian Delegation, the resolutions agreed to should not be presented to the Italian Delegation for the moment.)

M. Clemenceau undertook to speak to M. Orlando in this sense.)

12. With reference to C. F. 6. Minute 1,¹ and Appendix I to those Minutes, SIR MAURICE HANKEY read the following letter from Mr.

Hurst, the British Representative on the Drafting Committee:—

Austrian and
Hungarian
Treaties: Recog-
nition of New
States

"You will remember the instructions that went to the Drafting Committee about the frontiers of Austria and Hungary and of contiguous countries. It is a paper marked Appendix II [III] to C. F. 4.² The interpretation which we are putting on the second sentence is that the Big Four desire that the frontiers of a country like Roumania who [*should?*], so far as possible be set out in the Treaty with Hungary not merely the frontier between Roumania and Hungary itself. That is to say, that the Northern frontier of Roumania where it joins Russia and the Southern frontier where it touches Bulgaria will both be set out when a decision has been come to as to what that frontier should be. The same would apply even though the State concerned had no common frontier whatever with the enemy before with whom the treaty was made. For instance, Roumania. Though Roumania will not touch Austria, the Roumania frontiers would nevertheless be set out in the Treaty with Austria. This seems to follow from the second sentence of your paper, but I should like to make sure that we are right in this."

(After a short discussion, it was agreed that Mr. Hurst's interpretation of the previous decision was correct, and Sir Maurice Hankey was authorised to inform him accordingly.)

13. With reference to C. F. 13, Minute 6,³

Claims of the
Chinese Delegation

M. CLEMENCEAU signed the following letter to the Head of the Chinese Delegation:—

14 MAY, 1919.

"YOUR EXCELLENCY,

On behalf of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, I beg to acknowledge the receipt from the Chinese Delegation of two

¹ *Ante*, p. 541.

² *Ante*, p. 536.

³ *Ante*, p. 607.

pamphlets, one of which sets forth China's claim submitting for abrogation by the Peace Conference the Treaties and Notes by and between China and Japan of May 25th, 1915, and the other presents for readjustment by the Conference a number of important questions, among which may be mentioned the withdrawal from China of foreign troops and police, the withdrawal of foreign post offices and the abolition of consular jurisdiction.

In reply I am asked to state that while the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers fully recognises the importance of the questions raised they do not consider that they fall within the province of the Peace Conference and they suggest that these matters should be brought to the attention of the Council of the League of Nations as soon as that body is able to function.

I am

Your Excellency's Obedient Servant

(Signed) G. CLEMENCEAU

His Excellency

M. Lou Tseng-Tsiang,

Ministre des Affaires Etrangères."

14. With reference to C. F. 13, Minute 7,⁴

Berne Labour
Conference and
the Peace Terms

M. CLEMENCEAU signed the following letter to Mr.
Arthur Henderson:—

14 MAY, 1919.

"SIR,

I am asked by the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to inform you that they have considered your request, transmitted verbally through Mr. Lloyd George, that the Supreme Council shall receive a deputation from the International Trades Union Conference in Berne.

In reply I am asked to state that as the summary of the Peace Terms is already published and has been communicated to the German plenipotentiaries, it is felt that no useful object would now be served by the proposed deputation.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) G. CLEMENCEAU

The Rt. Hon. A. Henderson."

15. SIR MAURICE HANKEY reminded the Council that before the Meeting with the German Delegates the question had been raised as to the recognition of Montenegro, and that it had been agreed that a decision ought to be taken in regard to Montenegrin representation before the Austrian settlement was concluded (I. C. 181. E., Minute 6).⁵

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that according to his recollection early in the Conference it had been agreed that the United States should send a Commissioner to investigate and report on matters in Montenegro.

(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to investigate this question.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 14 May, 1919.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 607.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 498.

Appendix I CF-13A

Resolution

(Agreed to by M. Clemenceau, President Wilson, and Mr. Lloyd George on 14th May, 1919, as part of a proposal to be made to the Italian Delegation.)

The President of the United States of America, on behalf of the United States, and subject to the consent of the Senate thereof,

ACCEPTS:—

1. A mandate over the Province of Armenia as constituted within frontiers to be agreed upon between the United States, British, French and Italian Delegations, whose recommendations, if unanimous, shall be accepted without further reference to the Council.

2. A mandate over the City of Constantinople, the Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and a small contiguous territory, the frontiers of which shall be determined by agreement between the United States, British, French and Italian Delegations, whose recommendations, if unanimous, shall be accepted without further reference to the Council.

N. B. The words underlined were added to the original draft in the course of discussion.

Appendix II to CF-13A*[Resolution]*

(Agreed to by M. Clemenceau, President Wilson, and Mr. Lloyd George, on 14th May, 1919, as part of a proposal to be made to the Italian Delegation.)

IT IS RESOLVED

(1) That Turkish sovereignty shall cease over Constantinople, Turkey in Europe, The Straits and the Sea of Marmora.

(2) That the ports of Smyrna and Aivali and the connected district as shown by the red line on the map, which embraces a predominantly Greek population, as well as the islands of the Dodecanese and the island of Castellorizo, shall be ceded to Greece in complete sovereignty.

(3) That what remains of Anatolia east of the frontier suggested for Armenia shall constitute the future State of Turkey, and be treated as follows:—

In view of the fact that the Turkish Government has not shown itself able to protect the interests of the populations under its sovereignty and is not now in a position to develop the natural resources of the country, it is realised that the future State of Turkey will stand in need of external guidance. Taking, however, into account the existence of numerous Greek minorities in Western Anatolia and

the established interests of Italy in the regions bordering upon the province of Adalia, it is felt that the mandate to assist Turkey should preferably be entrusted to three Powers.

It is proposed therefore:—

(1) That in the west Greece should be granted complete sovereignty over the region and Islands above mentioned together with a mandate over the contiguous region enclosed within the dotted red line as shown on the map.

(2) That Italy should be granted a mandate over the southern sea-board stretching from a point to the west of the port of Makri to the point where the suggested frontier for Armenia strikes the Mediterranean. The frontier of this Italian zone is shown in green upon the map and has been drawn in such a way as to provide a convenient geographical and administrative boundary, while affording full opportunity for economic development and irrigation in the province of Konia.

(3) The mandate for the remaining portion of the future Turkish State shall be entrusted to France.

(4) The rights of allied holders of Turkish stock shall be safeguarded by the maintenance of the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt in a form to be determined upon by the Four Great Powers and Greece. An expert Committee shall be nominated to examine and report on the means necessary to give effect to this decision.

Appendix III to CF-13A

[Memorandum Regarding Clause Relative to Right of Withdrawal From Reparation Commission]

It appearing that the clause relative to right of withdrawal from representation on the Reparation Commission was by inadvertence omitted from the Conditions of Peace as presented to the German plenipotentiaries, we agree that the said clause shall be reinserted, unless the Germans object to such reinsertion. In any event the clause shall be deemed to establish the right of, and procedure for, withdrawal, in so far as concerns the several Allied and Associated Powers. The clause in question, which was designed to form a part of Annex II, Paragraph 2, Part VIII (Reparation clauses), reads as follows:

“Each Government represented on the Commission shall have the right to withdraw therefrom upon twelve months’ notice filed with the Commission and confirmed in the course of the sixth month after the date of the original notice.”

G. C.
W. W.
D. Ll. G.

PARIS, May 14, 1919.

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Thursday, May 15, 1919, at 11 a. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.
Professor P. J. Mantoux

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

ITALY

M. Orlando.

Secretary.
Interpreter.

(NOTE. This was not a regular meeting, but there was some delay in the assembly of the experts for the discussion of the Military, Naval and Air Clauses for the Austrian and Hungarian treaties, and advantage was taken of this interval to deal with the following questions.)

1. With reference to C. F. 13, Minute 3,¹ MR. LLOYD GEORGE produced a re-draft of the reply to Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau's letter on the subject of Prisoners of War. (Appendix I.) Before the reply was sent, however, he wished to raise a question of principle, namely, as to whether supplies of clothing, including underclothing and boots, if available, ought not to be given to prisoners of war on release, as proposed by Brockdorff-Rantzau. He thought it possible that some stocks of German uniforms and clothing might have been captured in the advance of 1918, and he suggested that these, supplemented by any other stocks that might be available, might be used to provide some outfit to prisoners of war.

M. CLEMENCEAU doubted whether any stocks were available, but had no objection to inquiry being made.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that inquiry should be made.

(It was agreed:

That the reply in regard to Prisoners should be suspended pending inquiry by the Governments concerned as to whether any stocks of German uniforms and clothing, or other stocks, were available for the purpose of providing against repayment an outfit to German prisoners.)

¹ *Ante*, p. 606.

2. With reference to C. F. 13, Minute 4,² M. CLEMENCEAU said he had understood on the previous day that the intention was to send the reply drawn up by the expert Committee to which it had been referred. Consequently, he had despatched the letter to Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau. If necessary, a supplementary letter could be sent on the subject, when the Committee reported on the question of whether the Germans should be admitted to the Labour Organisation, before they were admitted to the League of Nations.

3. Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to write a letter to Lord Cunliffe, informing him, for the information of the Committee on Reparation, that the Supreme Council would be glad to receive the draft clauses on Reparation for inclusion in the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties not later than Saturday, May 17th.

4. SIR MAURICE HANKEY reported that, as requested on the previous afternoon, he had made inquiries as to how the question stood of the representation of Montenegro. He found that on January, 12th, 1919, it had been decided in principle that Montenegro should be represented at the Conference, but the decision had been left open as to how her Representatives should be chosen. On that occasion M. Sonnino had suggested that in the meantime the United States of America should send a representative to discover how things were in that country. M. Clemenceau had pointed out that if President Wilson wished to send someone to inquire, he would do so without any authority from the Powers associated with him. President Wilson had then said he was willing to send someone, but not an official representative on behalf of this Conference, and Mr. Lloyd George had agreed. (See *Proces-Verbal of March [January] 12th*, I. C. 104 [BC-A1], p. 6.)³

PRESIDENT WILSON undertook to inquire if any action had been taken in the matter by his Government.

5. M. ORLANDO approved and initialled the proposals of the Drafting Committee on this subject, which had been approved and initialled by his colleagues on the previous afternoon.

6. SIR MAURICE HANKEY handed copies of the Report of the Committee on New States to M. Clemenceau, President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George and M. Orlando.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 15 May, 1919.

² *Ante*, p. 606.

³ Vol. III, pp. 487-489.

International
Agreement on
Labour: Reply to
Brockdorff-
Rantzau

Reparation in the
Austrian &
Hungarian
Treaties

Montenegro

League of Nations
& Labour Conven-
tion in the
Treaties of Peace
With Austria &
With Hungary

New States: Re-
port of Committee

Appendix to CF-14

*[Draft Reply to Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau Regarding
Prisoners of War]*

[This draft was approved by the Council at the meeting of May 20, 11 a. m. (CF-20), and the reply, dated Paris, May 20, 1919, signed by G. Clemenceau, is printed as appendix IV to CF-20, page 749.]

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Thursday, May 15, 1919, at 11 a. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

President Wilson.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
Secretary-General.
Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

ITALY

H. E. M. Orlando.
Secretary-General.
Count Aldrovandi.

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Brig.-Gen. P. D. Lochridge.

BRITISH EMPIRE

General Sir H. H. Wilson, G. C. B.
Rear-Admiral G. P. W. Hope, C. B.
Major-Gen. The Hon. C. J. Sackville-
West, C. M. G.
Brig.-Gen. P. R. C. Groves, D. S. O.
Mr. P. Kerr.

FRANCE

General Belin.
General Duval.
Comdt. Lacombe.
Admiral de Bon.

ITALY

General Diaz.
General U. Cavallero.
Admiral P. Thaon de Revel.
Admiral M. Grassi.
Capitano di Corvetta Ruspoll.

JOINT SECRETARIAT

BRITISH EMPIRE.... Major A. M. Caccia.
FRANCE..... Captain A. Portier.

Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

CONDITIONS OF PEACE—AUSTRIAN MILITARY, NAVAL AND AERIAL
CLAUSES

1. PRESIDENT WILSON said that the Austrian and Hungarian military, naval and aerial clauses, submitted by the military, naval and air experts had been circulated (see Annex A and B). He suggested that the Council should in the first place consider any outstanding questions in regard to which differences of opinion existed between the experts.

Military Clauses
of Austrian Con-
ditions of Peace

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the very first chapter of the draft military clauses (Article 2), raised a very big question of principle, which

would have to be considered, not only in regard to Austria, but also in reference to all the new little States which might be formed. Should it be decided that each of these little States, including Roumania, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, were each to be allowed to maintain comparatively large Armies, nothing would keep them from going to war with one another. On the other hand, should Austria and Hungary be allowed to maintain Armies, whilst the other little States were prevented from doing so, the former would always intervene and so cause serious disturbances. This process could be seen at work at the present moment.

M. CLEMENCEAU intervening remarked that these States were still at war.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE replied that the little States he referred to were not actually at war with each other; they were supposed to be on friendly terms. Nevertheless the Poles and Ukrainians, the Poles and Czecho-Slovaks, were actually flying at each other's throats. In his opinion, it was essential that the Council should lay down definite principles in regard to armaments, which would be applied to Austria, Hungary and all adjoining States.

Two alternative texts of Article 2 of the draft military clauses had been submitted by the Military Advisers. The great difference between the two proposals lay in the fact that the American-British proposal made for a small Army; whereas the French-Italian proposal meant, in application, the creation in a very short time of a great Army, which could be organised for war purposes by the Germans. For this reason alone, he strongly supported the American-British proposal.

It was imperative that the Council should now do all that lay in their power to prevent these big Armies, which would practically be directed by German brains, from springing up again. Experience had proved that in reality very little difference in fighting value existed between soldiers whose military training had extended over a period of twelve months and those whose training had extended over a period of two or three years. Obviously, the former were not as good as the latter, but they had been found to be quite good enough to give a good account of themselves, whenever they met the Germans.

M. CLEMENCEAU presumed that for the moment Mr. Lloyd George's remarks applied only to Austria and Hungary, and not to the other adjoining States.

PRESIDENT WILSON remarked that he personally had taken it for granted all along that the size of the Armies would be restricted.

M. CLEMENCEAU, continuing, said that if the Council was discussing Austria, he would urge that the size of that Army should be so fixed as to bear the same ratio to the figures of population, as had been

agreed to in the case of Germany. So far as he could judge, the figure of 40,000 men prescribed as the total number of effectives and reservists for the Army of the State of Austria had been fixed on no basis. In the case of Germany with a population of sixty millions, an Army of 100,000 men had been considered sufficient for the maintenance of order within the territory and for the control of the frontiers; whereas in the case of Austria with a population of seven millions, an Army of 40,000 was to be maintained. In his opinion the figure 40,000 was excessive.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was inclined to agree. He wished, in that connection, to lay stress on the fact that if, in addition, the French-Italian proposal were accepted, namely, that the Army should be organised on a basis of compulsory short term service, in four or five years time an enormous Army would have been created.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed. He would support the American-British proposal, which laid down that the Army of the State of Austria should in future only be constituted and recruited by means of voluntary enlistment.

M. ORLANDO said that on the question of general principle, he wholly supported Mr. Lloyd George's proposal. Speaking in a general way, he thought that one of the chief causes of war in the future would be due to the warlike spirit which existed in the minds of the people of the Balkans. Consequently, now was the moment most favourable to take a decision on the question of principle, and to decide whether all these small States should or should not be limited in their arguments [*armaments?*], if only as the means of training these people in civil pursuits.

In regard to the alternative American-British and French-Italian proposals, M. Clemenceau had said that he would support the former proposal, which laid down that the Austrian Army should in future only be constituted and recruited by means of voluntary enlistment. That being the case, Italy would be left alone to support the proposal that the Austrian Army should be organised on a basis of a one year compulsory short term service. His reason for supporting the latter system had been fully explained by him when drafting the Covenant for the League of Nations. As he had then explained to President Wilson, Italy would not be able to raise an Army by voluntary service. Such a system would be too difficult in its application, since the whole traditions of the country went against it. Consequently, the Italian Army would have to be organised on a basis of compulsory service. Should the Italians, however, see that no other country adopted this method of recruitment, it would become impossible for Italy alone to maintain the system of compulsory service. But, since it had been decided in the case of Germany that universal compulsory

military service should be abolished and that the Army should in future only be constituted and recruited by means of voluntary enlistment, he agreed that no sufficient reason existed for reaching a different decision in the case of Austria. He would therefore accept the American-British proposal, as had been done by M. Clemenceau.

In regard to the total number of effectives and reservists in the Army of the State of Austria, his Military Adviser informed him that the figure of 40,000 had been proposed by the British representative. It represented a maximum. He felt convinced that Austria would not be able to raise that number of Volunteers since she would be unable to raise the necessary funds. Therefore the mere fact that a voluntary system of enlistment had been prescribed would make it impossible for Austria to raise the maximum number (40,000) permissible, and only a proportion would actually be enlisted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he quite agreed with the views expressed by M. Clemenceau and M. Orlando in regard to the size of the Army, although his military advisers took a different view. He thought, however, it might be interesting to hear how this figure of 40,000 had been arrived at.

GENERAL SACKVILLE-WEST explained that the maximum of 40,000 men permissible would, in reality, produce a relatively small army, because in that figure all the services were included. It had been laid down that the formations composing the army of the State of Austria should not exceed 3 divisions of infantry and 1 division of cavalry, which meant 15,000 to 20,000 fighting men. He thought that number would only be sufficient for the maintenance of order within the territory of the State of Austria and for the control of her frontiers. He laid stress on the fact that the army in question would be sufficient only for the control of the frontiers and not for their defence. Furthermore, the military advisers considered that Austria possessed a good many potential enemies, many of whom already possessed larger armies than Austria would be permitted to maintain.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked for some further information as to the manner in which the figure of 15,000 to 20,000 combatants out of 40,000 men was reckoned.

GENERAL SACKVILLE-WEST explained that the various services, including the war offices, schools, etc., would absorb a larger number of men. It had, however, been clearly laid down that the formations composing the army should not exceed 3 divisions, which would not be capable of expansion by mobilisation.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired whether the same reasoning would apply to Germany in regard to the 100,000 men to be maintained by her.

GENERAL SACKVILLE-WEST replied that with a larger army a proportionately smaller number of men would be required for the organisation

of the auxiliary services. He thought that an army of 100,000 men would produce 60,000 combatants.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was radically opposed to the proposals of the military advisers. In his opinion, the Council should be consistent in its action. Germany, with a population of 60,000,000, had been given an army of 100,000 men; whereas it was now proposed to give Austria, with a population of 7,000,000, an army of 40,000 men. He must ask to be enlightened as to the meaning of this discrepancy. What reply could be given to the German Plenipotentiaries should they protest that 100,000 men would not be sufficient to ensure their safety? It would be within the recollection of the Council that Marshal Foch had recommended an army of 200,000 for Germany and the Council had on its own initiative reduced that number to 100,000. In his opinion, with a voluntary army of professional soldiers there would be no necessity for the men to attend schools annually. In considering the proposals submitted by the military representatives, he desired to remind his colleagues that it was the business of soldiers to make war, whereas the heads of Government were there to make peace. The latter were merely aiming to produce such a state of affairs as would prevent wars in the future.

Mr. Lloyd George had said that in disarming Austria, it would be necessary to keep in mind the reduction of the forces to be maintained in all adjoining territories. He (M. Clemenceau) was quite ready to accept that suggestion; but, if Germany were permitted to maintain an army of 100,000 men only, it would not be possible to give Austria 40,000 men, for Germany would be justified then in saying that she had not been treated fairly. He, personally, would never agree to such a proposal. He had merely one object in view, namely, to make such a peace treaty as would guarantee the peace of the world in the future. With that object in view, it would be necessary to ensure the disarmament of those countries who had been aggressors, and, in the first place, he would insist on the disarmament of Germany and Austria. Austria had been the first to declare war; she had rejected proposals for arbitration. He knew the Austrians well. They were not a warlike people: but for that very reason they had allowed themselves to be used as the tools of the more warlike Power. He agreed that the Council should carefully examine the advice tendered by the military representatives; but it was the duty of the Council to lay down the political policy which should be followed. He did not wish to say that it would be necessary, in fixing the size of the Austrian army, to follow with mathematical exactitude the same proportion in regard to the population as had been fixed in the case of Germany. But, in his opinion, 10,000 to 12,000 men would be amply sufficient for the maintenance of

order within the territory of Austria and for the control of her frontiers. No large industrial population would exist in the new State of Austria, since the industrial part was situated chiefly in Bohemia. On the other hand, the country people were peaceful and law-abiding. He urged, therefore, that the same proportion as far as possible, should be fixed for Austria as had been taken for Germany and no more.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that, in accordance with General Sackville-West's calculation, the proportion between the armies to be maintained would be as 15,000 to 60,000 and not as 40,000 to 100,000. In his opinion, the considerations which underlay those calculations ought to be taken into account, and it would not be sufficient merely to consider the superficial total.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that taking the figures of combatants the proportion between the combatants of Austria and Germany would be as 1 is to 4; whereas the population compared in the ratio of 1 to 7. He enquired what would be the number of combatants, should the total number of effectives be fixed at 25,000?

GENERAL SACKVILLE-WEST replied that the total number of combatants would be about 13,000.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that Marshal Foch had perhaps been right in recommending an army of 200,000 men for Germany.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he positively declined to reopen that question. He certainly did not wish to give an argument which could be used against the Allies. He urged that the total number of effectives in the army of the State of Austria should not exceed 15,000. The question of finding sufficient men for schools and other such like institutions did not worry him in the least.

M. ORLANDO whilst admitting the principle that a reduction in the total of 40,000 would be necessary, thought that in order to arrive at the exact figure it would be best to refer the question back to the military representatives, since in calculating the number of combatants consideration would have to be given to the auxiliary services and so forth. At the same time he would urge his colleagues to instruct their experts to study the armament plans to be enforced in all parts of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire. He thought that in principle the Heads of Governments were in complete agreement: the difficulty lay in the method of applying the accepted principle. M. Clemenceau had said that Europe had been the victim of the aggressive spirit of Germany and Austria. He would point out, however, that Austria had consisted of a conglomeration of different states and it was not known at which particular centre the aggressive spirit complained of had been situated.

M. CLEMENCEAU, intervening, said he knew full well where the aggressive spirit resided, namely, at Vienna, where a dozen or so Junkers were the obedient followers of Bismarck. M. Orlando would not suggest that the war had been started in Poland, or in Bohemia, or in Transylvania. He himself had visited Vienna frequently during a period of 20 years before the war, and had invariably been told by the Vienna aristocracy when he sought to detach them from Germany, that they had no choice but to follow Germany, their previous conqueror.

M. ORLANDO, continuing, said that he did not wish to enter into a discussion on that point. He thought, however, that even M. Clemenceau would not deny that Vienna represented the headquarters of a number of nations. From the French point of view it might be sufficiently near the truth to say that the danger came from Vienna, but for an Italian it was necessary to examine the question more carefully, and to see whether there were not other sources of danger outside Vienna.

M. CLEMENCEAU wished to invite attention to another matter requiring consideration, namely, the question of Hungary. The Austrians were not a warlike people but the Hungarians were; and whatever power for aggression might be given to Austria would also have to be given to Hungary with the inevitable danger that the latter would drag Austria into military enterprises. He, himself, had no desire to arm Austria and Hungary with a view to their starting military operations against adjoining new States. He noticed that the Italian newspapers said that Austria must be armed in order to hold back the Jugo-Slavs. That was not his policy. If the little States were not to be allowed to attack Austria, the latter should in its turn not be permitted to undertake military operations in combination with Hungary with a view to oppress the people whom the Allies had delivered from their bondage. For that reason he supported Mr. Lloyd George's proposal to disarm Austria & Hungary and all the surrounding States. He also read in the Italian papers that Italy should come to terms with Germany in order to start operations against the Slavs. He would never be able to accept a policy so inimical to the interests of the Allies.

M. ORLANDO begged M. Clemenceau to consider that he (M. Orlando) was in complete agreement with him in regard to the question of disarmament. He fully agreed that it would be right to reduce the Austrian and Hungarian armies. He knew from bitter experiences on the Italian front that the Hungarians made good soldiers. That was an argument in favour of further reducing the size of the army to be allowed to Austria. M. Clemenceau had made a reference to certain Italian newspapers. He would invite M. Clemenceau's attention to the fact that these same papers had been vilifying him (M. Orlando).

Surely that was sufficient evidence that these papers were antagonistic to the policy of the Italian Government. Furthermore, had he possessed any influence over these papers he would surely, in the first place have prevented them from attacking him.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that M. Orlando's proposal should be accepted. That is to say that the military representatives should be directed to examine the whole question on a broader basis and to report what forces should be allowed to Austria, Hungary and all the adjoining small States. The question was one of the greatest importance, and unless the matter were considered, as a whole, the Peace of Europe would again be disturbed in the near future. A decision to reduce the Austrian and Hungarian armies to 15,000 men each would not achieve the desired result if, at the same time, no limit were placed on the armaments to be maintained by Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, Roumania, Bulgaria and Greece. Unless restricted, each of the latter States would pass all their men through the army and in a short time would possess forces varying from one to two million men. He fully agreed with M. Clemenceau that Vienna had, in the past, been a centre of intrigue: but, in his opinion, what had created a warlike temper in Europe, had been the constant succession of wars in the Balkan provinces. The military men in Europe had seen wars going on in those regions and those feats of arms had aroused in them a warlike spirit. Therefore, should Jugo-Slavia be permitted to raise an army of one million; Czecho-Slovakia an army of one million; Roumania an army of two millions; Greece an army of 600,000, the result would be appalling. Many pugnacious people still existed in Germany, and even in Russia, and should these large armies be permitted in the Balkan States, the Allied and Associated Powers would be bound to get mixed up in the troubles that would inevitably arise. He need not remind his colleagues that in accordance with the laws of mankind, the oppressed of to-day became the oppressors of to-morrow. The State with a big army would inevitably start bullying the State with a small army, especially if the former had itself in the past been bullied. In that connection, Italy had no desire in the future to be compelled to maintain a large army, including millions of men, whether raised by a voluntary or a compulsory method of enlistment, in order to protect herself, but should her neighbours on the opposite side of the Adriatic be allowed to maintain large armaments, she would have no option in the matter. He urged his colleagues, therefore, to accept M. Orlando's proposal, namely, that the military representatives at Versailles should be instructed to consider what forces should be allowed to Austria, Hungary, Roumania, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, including Serbia and Montenegro, Poland, Bulgaria and Greece, on the basis of maintaining the same proportionate standard as had been

fixed in the case of Germany, bearing in mind local conditions and, in the case of Poland, the fact that she would have to defend herself against the possible attacks of Bolshevik forces in the East. He thought all these questions should be settled before the signature of the Treaty of Peace.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it should be clearly understood that the Military Representatives would examine the question merely from a military point of view.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed. He thought it would be impossible for the Council to determine the size of the Austrian army until the sizes of the armies to be maintained by the adjoining States had been decided. In his opinion, all these questions hung together to form a single scheme. Naturally the calculation could not, as stated by M. Clemenceau, be carried out on a strictly mathematical basis: but the military regime applied to Germany should be taken as the standard, making an exception in the case of Poland.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the military representatives should begin with a study of the Austrian question as it was very urgent. Moreover, several of the other questions mentioned were mixed up with the Russian question; that is to say, they involved an unknown factor. His remarks applied more particularly to Poland.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that it would not be possible to consider the question for each State independently; otherwise the Council would be confronted with the answer of Austria, who would say that she did not mind accepting the figure of, say, 15,000 men; but before doing so she would be entitled to know what armies were to be maintained by the countries surrounding her.

(It was agreed that the Military Representatives, Supreme War Council, Versailles, should prepare and submit a report showing what forces should be allowed to Austria, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia (including Montenegro) Roumania, Poland, Bulgaria and Greece, taking the German figures as a proportional standard. In the case of Poland due allowance shall be made for the existing situation on the Eastern frontier.)

(2) PRESIDENT WILSON drew attention to the following two reservations made by Admiral Benson, the American Naval Representative:—

Naval Clauses of
Austrian Peace
Treaty

(i) The terms of the Treaty should require that surrendered vessels of war or war material be destroyed or broken up:

(ii) That Naval terms should contain no prohibition against the manufacture within the limits of States formerly a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire of naval war material on foreign order.

His judgment agreed with Admiral Benson's first reservation, and the second reservation he thought was very reasonable indeed, and he strongly supported it.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that in the German conditions of peace a similar clause had been inserted. He saw no reason why an exception should be made in the case of Austria, and he certainly did not wish to enable Germany to start factories for the manufacture of arms, ammunition and other naval war material in Austria.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that in the matter of the manufacture of naval war material, Germany was differently situated to Austria. Germany had a seaboard, whereas the new state of Austria would have no seaboard.

ADMIRAL HOPE explained that Austria could nevertheless manufacture mines and torpedoes and deliver them to the Germans. The particular article under discussion had, however, in reality been introduced into the Austrian conditions of peace in order to keep the latter in line with the German conditions.

ADMIRAL DE BON explained that the object of the article in question was to prevent Austria from supporting other nations, who might enter into war, by supplying them with arms, ammunition and other naval war material. He wished to point out that Austria at the present moment possessed a very magnificent war material in the form of a heavy gun.

PRESIDENT WILSON invited attention to Article 16 of the draft Military Clauses, wherein it was clearly laid down that the manufacture of arms, munitions or any war material should only be carried out in one factory, which should be owned and controlled by the State. Furthermore, all the establishments in excess of the one authorized would have to be rendered useless or converted to a purely commercial use in accordance with the decisions to be taken by the Inter-Allied Committee of Control. Under these circumstances, he thought that the danger contemplated by the naval experts would be extremely small.

M. ORLANDO thought that if Austria were given the opportunity of manufacturing war material for export to foreign countries, she could nominally pretend to work for, say, South America, whilst in reality manufacturing for Germany.

ADMIRAL DE BON made the suggestion that by the omission of this clause, very great complications might arise in the future, should some new war material be invented, since such article might very possibly be constructed in factories outside the one permitted, without openly contravening the Articles of the Conditions of Peace.

ADMIRAL THAON DE REVEL observed that during the war, it had been shown how rapidly factories could be transformed to war uses. For that reason, he thought it would be far more effective to restrict the output, rather than to restrict the number of factories.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he was extremely anxious to make some distinction in favour of Austria, in order to wean her away from her

old Ally. Germany had been the chief archenemy of peace in Europe. He thought, therefore, it would be both to the advantage of the Allies and to the advantage of the whole group of nations in Europe, should the object he had in view be achieved.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that the question was not one of great importance in regard to Austria. He would, therefore, support President Wilson's proposal.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had been greatly impressed by Admiral de Bon's point of view. He failed to see why any safeguard should be renounced. In his opinion, the Council were far too ready to assume that its decisions would be faithfully followed by the enemy. He wished to insist that his opinion should be carefully recorded on this point, namely, that the decisions of the Council would, in all probability, not be followed in their entirety. Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, would take every opportunity to evade their part of the contract. American troops would then be far away. Nevertheless, the Council were inclined always to eliminate such precautions as it had decided to take, knowing full well that most of these precautions would disappear in the course of time. President Wilson had said that the question under reference constituted merely a small matter. In his opinion, it was not a small matter to take precautions to prevent future bloodshed and loss of life. Both Admiral de Bon and Admiral Revel had expressed the view that by omitting the condition under discussion, Austria would be in a position to manufacture war material for Germany. In conclusion, should his views not be accepted, he wished his dissent to be clearly understood and recorded.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that, owing to some misunderstanding, his naval advisers had not been apprised of the meeting. Consequently, he had not the advantage of their advice. On the other hand, steps had been taken to limit Germany's power of constructing war material, and, in addition, the manufacture of arms, munitions or any war material in Austria had been restricted to one factory. Under those conditions, he failed to see wherein the danger lay. That might be due to intellectual disability on his part, but he could only see visible things; he could not see invisible things. Furthermore, in drafting the Conditions of Peace with Austria, he was anxious not to go too much into details which were immaterial. He thought it would be in the best interests of the Allied and Associated Governments that they should assist in the future industrial development of Austria. At present, Austria had lost all her industries, which had now been absorbed by Czecho-Slovakia. He thought it would be highly desirable to bring about the industrial development of Austria. However, it would not be possible for him to reach a

decision on the question under reference, without first consulting his naval adviser. He proposed, therefore, that further discussion should be adjourned.

(It was agreed to adjourn the further consideration of President Wilson's proposal, namely, that the Naval terms of Peace should contain no prohibition against the manufacture within the limits of States formerly a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, of naval war material on foreign orders).

Air Clauses of
Austrian Condi-
tions of Peace

3. (It was agreed to accept the Air Clauses, subject to a second reading).

Inter-Allied Com-
missions of Control

4. (It was agreed to accept the Clauses relating to Inter-Allied Commissions of Control, subject to a second reading).

General Clauses

5. PRESIDENT WILSON invited attention to Article 50 which read as follows:—

“So long as the present Treaty shall remain in force, the State of Austria undertakes to submit to any investigation that the League of Nations, by a majority of votes, may consider necessary.”

He thought the words “to submit to any investigation” were too harsh, and he suggested that the words “to respond to any enquiry” should be substituted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that in the Conditions of Peace with Germany, the Clause had been made somewhat less harsh. It read as follows:—

“So long as the present Treaty remains in force, Germany undertakes to give every facility for any investigation which the Council of the League of Nations, acting, if need be, by a majority vote, may consider necessary.”

(It was agreed that Article 50 of the Draft Military, Naval and Aerial Clauses (General Clauses) should be amended to read as follows:—

“So long as the present Treaty shall remain in force, the State of Austria undertakes to respond to any enquiry that the League of Nations by a majority vote may consider necessary”).

6. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had just heard with great regret that the Supreme Council would no longer have the benefit of the counsel of Admiral de Bon, who was about to take up another appointment. On behalf of the British delegation, he wished to place on record how much the solidarity which had existed between the British and French Admiralties had been due to Admiral de Bon's tact, judgment, good sense and ability. He (Mr. Lloyd George) spoke with very great feeling.

Appointment
of Admiral
de Bon to the
Mediterranean

PRESIDENT WILSON and M. ORLANDO very heartily endorsed Mr. Lloyd George's remarks.

ADMIRAL DE BON returned thanks for the kind words spoken by Mr. Lloyd George, President Wilson and M. Orlando.

(The Meeting then adjourned).

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 15 May, 1919.

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Annexure A

Conditions of Peace (Austria)—Military, Naval and Aerial Clauses

MILITARY CLAUSES

CHAPTER I. *General*

ARTICLE 1.

Within three months of the coming into force of the terms of peace, the military forces of the State of Austria shall be demobilised to the extent prescribed hereinafter.

ARTICLE 2.

(American-British proposal)

Universal compulsory military service shall be abolished in the State of Austria. The Army of the State of Austria will in future only be constituted and recruited by means of voluntary enlistment.

ARTICLE 2.

(French & Italian proposal)

The Army of the State of Austria shall be organised on a basis of 1 year compulsory short term service. Nevertheless, it may include a maximum of 8,000 enlisted or re-engaged volunteer Non-Commissioned Officers and Men. The men incorporated in each contingent, as well as enlisted or re-engaged volunteers, shall after their period of service be definitely released from all further military obligations.

The men of each annual class not incorporated shall not be liable for any military obligations.

CHAPTER II. *Effectives and Cadres of the Army of the State of Austria*

ARTICLE 3.

The total number of effectives and reservists in the Army of the State of Austria must never exceed 40,000 men, including officers and establishment of depots.

The formations composing the Army of the State of Austria must not exceed 3 divisions of infantry and one division of cavalry.

The total effective strength of officers, including the personnel of staffs, whatever their composition, and including civilian officials holding the corresponding rank to officer, must not exceed 2,000.

The Army of the State of Austria shall be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the territory of the State of Austria, and to the control of her frontiers.

ARTICLE 4.

The divisions must not be grouped under more than one Army Corps Headquarter Staff. The maximum strengths of the Staffs and of all formations are given in Table I annexed hereto; these figures need not be exactly followed, but must never be exceeded.

The maintenance or formation of forces differently grouped, or of other organisations for the command of troops, or for preparation for war is forbidden.

The following units may each have a Depot:—

- An Infantry regiment.
- A Cavalry regiment.
- A Field Artillery regiment.
- A battalion of pioneers.

ARTICLE 5.

All measures of mobilisation, or appertaining to mobilisation, are forbidden.

In no case must formations, administrative services or staffs include supplementary cadres.

It is forbidden to carry out any preparatory measures, with a view to requisitioning animals or other means of military transport.

ARTICLE 6.

The number of gendarmes, customs officials, foresters, constables of local or municipal police, etc., may not exceed the number of men employed in a similar capacity in 1913 and existing within the boundaries of the new State of Austria.

The number of these officials shall not be increased in the future except in such numbers as may be necessary to maintain the same proportion between the number of officials and the total of the population in the localities or municipalities which employ them.

These officials, as well as officials employed in the railway service, must never be assembled for the purpose of taking part in any military exercises.

ARTICLE 7.

Any other formation of troops not included in the above articles is forbidden, and such other formations as may exist shall be suppressed within the period laid down by Article I of these terms.

CHAPTER III. *Recruiting and Military Training*

ARTICLE 8.

All officers must be regulars (*officiers de carrière*). The officers now serving, who are retained in the Army, must undertake the obligation to serve in it up to the age of 40 years at least. Officers now serving who do not join the new army, will be released from all military obligations; they must not take part in any military exercise, whether theoretical or practical.

Officers newly appointed must undertake to serve on the active list for 20 consecutive years at least.

The number of officers discharged for any reason before the expiration of their term of service must not exceed in any year 5% of the total effectives of officers provided for in the 3rd paragraph of Article III. If this percentage is unavoidably exceeded the resulting shortage must not be made good by fresh appointments.

ARTICLE 9.

(American-British Proposal)

The period of enlistment for non-commissioned officers and privates must be for a total period of not less than 12 consecutive years, including at least 6 years' service with the colours.

The proportion of men discharged before the expiration of the period of their enlistment, for reasons of health or as a result of disciplinary measures, or for any other reason, must not in any year exceed 5% of the total effectives, fixed by Article 3 of these terms. If this percentage is unavoidably exceeded, the resulting shortage must not be made good by fresh enlistments.

ARTICLE 9.

(French & Italian Proposal)

The voluntary enlistments and re-engagements (8,000 men fixed by Article 2) for non-commissioned officers and men shall in no case be less than 12 years continuous service. The numbers of non-commissioned officers and men discharged from the Army for any cause whatever before the expiration of their period of enlistment or obligatory service shall not exceed each year for each of the above-mentioned categories 5 per cent of the total effectives fixed by Article 3 of these terms.

If the proportion of 5 per cent is unavoidably exceeded the resulting shortage shall not be made good by fresh enlistments.

CHAPTER IV. *Schools, educational establishments, military societies, etc.*

ARTICLE 10.

On the expiration of three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty there must only exist in the State of Austria two

military schools absolutely reserved for the recruitment of the officers of the units allowed.

The number of students admitted to attend the courses of the said schools will be strictly in proportion to the vacancies to be filled in the cadres of officers. The students and the cadres will be reckoned in the effectives fixed by Article 3 of the present Treaty.

Consequently and during the period fixed above all military academies or similar institutions in the State of Austria as well as the different military schools for officers, student officers, cadets, non-commissioned officers or student non-commissioned officers other than the schools above provided for will be abolished.

ARTICLE 11.

Educational establishments, other than those referred to in Article 10 above, the universities, societies of discharged soldiers, shooting and touring clubs, and associations or clubs of every description, must not occupy themselves with any military matters. They will on no account be allowed to instruct or exercise their pupils or members in the use of arms.

These educational establishments, societies, clubs, etc., must have no connection with the Ministry of War or any other military authority.

ARTICLE 12.

In all schools and educational establishments of every description, whether under State control or private management, the teaching of Gymnastics must be devoid of all instruction or practice in the use of arms or training for war.

CHAPTER V. *Armament, munitions and material, fortifications.*

ARTICLE 13.

At the expiration of three months from the coming into force of these terms, the new Army of the State of Austria must not possess an armament greater than the amounts fixed in Table 2, with the exception of an optional increase not exceeding 1/20th part for small arms and 1/40th for guns, which shall be exclusively used to provide for such eventual replacements as may be necessary.

ARTICLE 14.

At the expiration of three months from the coming into force of these terms, the stock of munitions at the disposal of the Army of the State of Austria shall not exceed the amounts fixed in Table 3.

Within this period the Government will store these stocks at points to be notified to the Principal Allied and Associated Governments. No other stocks, depots or reserves of munitions shall be established.

ARTICLE 15.

The number and calibre of guns constituting the normal fixed armament of any fortified places actually in existence in the State of

Austria will be immediately notified to the Principal Allied and Associated Governments, and will constitute maximum amounts, which may never be exceeded.

Within three months of the coming into force of these terms, the maximum stock of ammunition for these guns will be reduced to, and maintained at, the following uniform rates:—

1,300 rounds per gun for those, the calibre of which is 10.5 c. m. and under.

500 rounds per piece for those of higher calibre.

ARTICLE 16.

The manufacture of arms, munitions or any war material, shall only be carried out in one factory, which shall be owned and controlled by the State.

Within three months from the coming into force of these terms, all other establishments for the manufacture, preparation, storage or design of arms, munitions or any war material whatever, shall be suppressed as such or converted to purely commercial uses. Within the same period, all arsenals will be suppressed, except those used as depots for the authorised stocks of munitions, and their personnel dismissed.

The establishments or arsenals in excess of those required for the manufactures authorised will be rendered useless or converted to a purely commercial use in accordance with the decisions to be taken by the Inter-Allied Committee of Control.

ARTICLE 17.

Within three months from the coming into force of these terms, all arms, munitions and war material, including anti-aircraft material, of whatever origin, existing in the new State of Austria in excess of the amounts allowed, will be surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Governments.* This will also apply to special plant intended for the manufacture of military material, except such as may be recognised as necessary for equipping the authorised strength of the Army of the State of Austria.

The surrender in question will be effected at such points in the territory of the State of Austria as may be selected by the said Governments who will decide as to the disposal of the material.

ARTICLE 18.

Importation into the State of Austria of arms, munitions and war material of every kind is strictly prohibited.

The same applies to the manufacture for and export of arms, munitions and war material of every kind to foreign countries.

* The Italian Military Representative proposed the surrender of the above material should be made to the Italian Government on behalf of the Principal Allied and Associated Governments who would decide as to its disposal. [Footnote in the original.]

ARTICLE 19.

The use of *Flammenwerfer*, asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in the State of Austria. The same applies to materials specially intended for the manufacture, storage and use of the said products or devices.

The manufacture and importation into the State of Austria of armoured cars, tanks and all similar constructions suitable for use in war are also prohibited.

TABLE 1

**MAXIMUM STRENGTH OF EFFECTIVES AND RESERVES ALLOWED FOR STAFFS
AND FORMATIONS**

(These tabular statements do not constitute a fixed establishment, but the figures therein contained represent maximum figures which must not be exceeded).

Units	Maximum number authorised	Maximum strengths of each unit	
		Officers	Other ranks
I. ARMY CORPS HEADQUARTERS			
Army Corps Headquarters Staff.....	1	50	300
Total.....	50	300

Unit	Maximum number of such units in a single Division	Maximum strengths of each unit	
		Officers	Other ranks
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INFANTRY DIVISION			
Headquarters of an Infantry division.....	1	25	70
H. Q. of Divisional infantry.....	1	5	50
“ “ “ Artillery.....	1	4	30
Regiment of infantry.....	3	65	2, 000
Each regiment comprises 3 battalions of infantry.			
Each battalion comprises 3 companies of infantry & 1 machine gun company.			
Divisional squadron of Cavalry.....	1	6	160
Trench Mortar battalion, consisting of 3 companies.....	1	14	500
Pioneer Battalion.....	1	14	500
This battalion comprises Headquarters Section 2 Companies of Pioneers 1 Pontoon Section 1 Searchlight Section			
Field Artillery Regiment.....	1	84	1290
Each Regiment comprises Headquarters 3 Groups of Field [or] Mountain artillery			
Each group comprises 3 batteries, each of 4 field or mountain guns or field howitzers.			
Field Signal Company.....	1	11	330
This Company includes 1 Telephone and telegraph detachment 1 Listening section 1 Carrier pigeon section			
Divisional Medical Service.....	1	28	550
Parks and trains.....	14	940
Total for Infantry Division.....	400	10, 420

Unit	Maximum number of such units in a single Division	Maximum strengths of each unit	
		Officers	Other ranks
III. ESTABLISHMENT OF A CAVALRY DIVISION			
Headquarters of a Cavalry Division.....	1	15	50
Cavalry Regiment.....	6	30	720
Each regiment comprises 4 squadrons.			
Field Artillery Group (3 batteries).....	1	30	430
Total strength of a Cavalry Division	225	4, 800

TABLE 2

TABULAR STATEMENT OF ARMAMENT ESTABLISHMENT FOR A MAXIMUM OF 3 INFANTRY DIVISIONS, 1 CAVALRY DIVISION AND 1 ARMY CORPS HEADQUARTERS STAFF

Material	Infantry Division	For 3 Infantry Divisions	For 1 Cavalry Division	1 Army Corps Headquarters	Total
Rifles.....	12, 000	36, 000	Armament to be drawn from the surplus of infantry Divisions.	36, 000
Carbines.....	6, 000		6, 000
Heavy machine guns ..	108	324	12		336
Light " " ..	162	486		486
Trench Mortars, light.	18	54		54
" " medium.....	9	27		27
Field or mountain guns.	24	72	12		84
Field or mountain Howitzers.....	12	36		36

TABLE 3

MAXIMUM STOCKS AUTHORISED

Material	Maximum No. of arms authorised	Ammn. Establishment per unit	Maximum totals
Rifles.....	36, 000	} 500 rounds.....	21, 000, 000
Carbines.....	6, 000		
Heavy machine guns.....	336	} 10,000 rounds.....	8, 220, 000
Light " " ..	486		
Light trench mortars.....	54	1,000 "	54, 000
Medium " " ..	27	500 "	13, 500
Field or mountain {guns.....	84	1,000 "	84, 000
Artillery. {howitzers..	36	1,000 "	36, 000

NAVAL CLAUSES

ARTICLE 20.

From the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty all ex-Austro-Hungarian warships, submarines included, are declared to be finally surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

All the monitors, torpedo boats and armed vessels of the Danube Flotilla will be surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

ARTICLE 21.

The ex-Austro-Hungarian auxiliary cruisers and fleet auxiliaries enumerated below will be disarmed and treated as merchant ships.

Bosnia	Persia	Trieste
Gablonz	Prince Hohenlohe	Baron Bruck
Carolina	Gastein	Elisabeth
Africa	Helouan	Melcavich
Tirol	Graf Wurmbrand	Baron Call
Argentina	Pelikan	Gaea
Lussin	Hercules	Cyclop
Teodo	Pola	Vesta
Nixe	Naiade	Nymphé
Gigante	Pluto	Buffel
Dalmat	President Wilson (ex Kaiser Franz Joseph)	

ARTICLE 22.

All warships, including submarines, now under construction in ports which belong or previously belonged to Austria-Hungary, shall be broken up.

The work of breaking-up these vessels will be commenced as soon as possible after the coming into force of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 23.

Articles, machinery and material arising from the breaking-up of ex-Austro-Hungarian warships of all kinds, whether surface vessels or submarines, may not be used except for purely industrial or commercial purposes.

They may not be sold or disposed of to foreign countries.

ARTICLE 24.

The construction or acquisition of any submarine, even for commercial purposes, shall be forbidden in the State of Austria.

ARTICLE 25.

All arms, ammunition and other naval war material, including mines and torpedoes, which belonged to Austria-Hungary at the date of the signature of the armistice of 3 November, 1918,¹ are declared to be finally surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

The manufacture in territory of the State of Austria and the export of these articles to foreign countries shall be forbidden.

ARTICLE 26.

During the three months following the coming into force of the present Treaty, the Austrian high-power wireless telegraphy station

¹ Vol. II, p. 175.

at Vienna shall not be used for the transmission of messages concerning naval, military or political questions of interest to the State of Austria, or any State which has been allied to Austria-Hungary in the war, without the assent of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. This station may be used for commercial purposes, but only under the supervision of the said Governments, who will decide the wavelength to be used.

During the same period the State of Austria shall not build any more high-power wireless telegraphy stations in her own territory or that of the State of Hungary, Germany, Bulgaria or Turkey.

Admiral Benson (U. S. A.) makes the two following reservations:—

(1) The terms of the Treaty should require that surrendered vessels-of-war or war material be destroyed or broken up.

(2) That naval terms should contain no prohibition against the manufacture, within the limits of States formerly a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, of naval war material on foreign order.

AIR CLAUSES

ARTICLE 27.

The armed forces of the State of Austria must not include any military or naval air forces. No dirigible shall be kept.

ARTICLE 28.

Within two months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the personnel of the air forces on the rolls of the Austrian land and sea forces shall be demobilised.

ARTICLE 29.

Until the complete evacuation of Austrian territory by the Allied and Associated troops the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy in the State of Austria freedom of passage through the air, freedom of transit and of landing.

ARTICLE 30.

During the six months following the coming into force of the present Treaty, the manufacture and importation of aircraft, parts of aircraft, engines for aircraft, and parts of engines for aircraft, shall be forbidden in all territory of the State of Austria.

ARTICLE 31.

On the coming into force of the present Treaty, all military and naval aeronautical material must be delivered by the State of Austria and at the expense of the State of Austria, to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Delivery must be effected at such places as the said Governments may select, and must be completed within three months.

In particular, this material will include all items under the following heads which are or have been in use or were designed for warlike purposes:—

Complete aeroplanes and seaplanes, as well as those being manufactured, repaired or assembled.

Dirigibles able to take the air, being manufactured, repaired or assembled.

Plant for the manufacture of hydrogen.

Dirigible sheds and shelters of every kind for aircraft.

Pending their delivery, dirigibles will, at the expense of the State of Austria, be maintained inflated with hydrogen; the plant of the manufacture of hydrogen, as well the sheds for dirigibles, may, at the discretion of the said Powers, be left to the State of Austria until the time when the dirigibles are handed over.

Engines for aircraft.

Nacelles and fuselages.

Armament (guns, machine guns, light machine guns, bomb-dropping apparatus, torpedo-dropping apparatus, synchronisation apparatus, aiming apparatus).

Munitions (cartridges, shells, bombs, loaded or unloaded, stocks of explosives or material for their manufacture).

Instruments for use on aircraft.

Wireless apparatus and photographic or cinematograph apparatus for use on aircraft.

Component parts of any of the items under the preceding heads.

The material referred to above shall not be removed without special permission from the said Governments.

AERIAL NAVIGATION

ARTICLE 32.

The aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall have full liberty of passage and landing over and in the territory and territorial waters of the State of Austria and shall enjoy the same privileges as aircraft belonging to the State of Austria, particularly in case of distress by land or sea.

ARTICLE 33.

The aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall, while in transit to any foreign country whatever, enjoy the right of flying over the territory and territorial waters of the State of Austria without landing subject always to any regulations which may be made by the State of Austria, and which shall be applicable equally to the aircraft of the State of Austria and those of the Allied and Associated countries.

ARTICLE 34.

All aerodromes in the State of Austria open to national public traffic shall be open for the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers,

and in any such aerodrome such aircraft shall be treated on a footing of equality with Austrian aircraft as regards charges of every description, including charges for landing and accommodation.

ARTICLE 35.

Subject to the present provisions, the rights of passage, transit and landing, provided for in Articles 32, 33 and 34 are, subject to the observance of such regulations as the State of Austria may consider it necessary to enact, but such regulation shall be applied without distinction to aircraft belonging to the State of Austria and to the aircraft of Allied and Associated countries.

ARTICLE 36.

Certificates of nationality, airworthiness, or competency and licences, issued or recognised as valid by any of the Allied and Associated Powers, shall be recognised in the State of Austria as valid and as equivalent to the certificates and licences issued by the State of Austria.

ARTICLE 37.

As regards internal commercial air traffic, the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy in the State of Austria most favoured nation treatment.

ARTICLE 38.

The State of Austria undertakes to enforce the necessary measures to ensure that all Austrian aircraft flying over her territory shall comply with the Rules as to lights and signals. Rules of the Air and Rules for Air Traffic as and in the neighbourhood of aerodromes, which have been laid down in the Convention relative to Aerial Navigation concluded between the Allied and Associated Powers.

ARTICLE 39.

The obligations imposed by the preceding provisions shall remain in force until the 1st January, 1923, unless before that date the State of Austria shall have been admitted into the League of Nations or shall have been authorised by consent of the Allied and Associated Powers, to adhere to the Convention relative to Aerial Navigation concluded between those Powers.

INTER-ALLIED COMMISSIONS OF CONTROL

ARTICLE 40.

All the Military, Naval and Air Clauses contained in the present Treaty, for the execution of which a time limit is prescribed, shall be executed by the State of Austria under the control of Inter-Allied Commissions (Military, Naval, Air) specially appointed for this purpose by the principal Allied and Associated Powers.

The above mentioned Commissions will represent the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in dealing with the Government of the State of Austria in all matters concerning

the execution of the Military, Naval or Air clauses. They will communicate to the authorities of the State of Austria the decisions which the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have reserved the right to take or which the execution of the Clauses may necessitate.

ARTICLE 41.

The Inter-Allied Commissions of Control may establish their organisations at Vienna and shall be entitled, as often as they think desirable, to proceed to any point whatever in the territory of the State of Austria, or to send a sub-commission or to authorise one or more of their members to go to any such point.

ARTICLE 42.

The Government of the State of Austria must furnish to the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control all such information and documents as the latter may deem necessary to ensure the execution of their mission; and all means (both in personnel and in materiel) which the above mentioned Commissions might need to ensure the complete execution of the Military, Naval or Air Clauses.

The Government of the State of Austria must attach a qualified representative to each Inter-Allied Commission of Control with the duty of receiving from the latter any communications which it may have to address to the Government of the State of Austria and to furnish it with, or to procure, all information or documents demanded.

ARTICLE 43.

The upkeep and cost of the Commissions of Control and the expenses involved by their work shall be borne by the State of Austria.

ARTICLE 44.

It will be the special duty of the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control to receive from the Government of the State of Austria the notifications relating to the location of the stocks and depots of munitions, the armament of the fortified works, fortresses and forts, and the location of the works or factories for the production of arms, munitions and war materiel and their operations.

It will take delivery of the arms, munitions, war materiel and plant intended for war construction, will select the points where such delivery is to be effected and will supervise the works of destruction, and rendering things useless, or of transformation of materiel, which are to be carried out in accordance with the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 45.

It will be the special duty of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control to proceed to the building yards and to supervise the breaking-up of the ships which are under construction there, to take delivery of arms, munitions and naval war materiel, and to supervise the destruction and breaking-up provided for.

The Government of the State of Austria must furnish to the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control all such information and documents as the Commission may deem necessary to ensure the complete execution of the naval clauses, in particular the designs of the war-ships, the composition of their armaments, the details and models of the guns, munitions, torpedoes, mines, explosives, wireless telegraphic apparatus, and in general everything relating to naval war materiel, as well as all legislative or administrative documents or regulations.

ARTICLE 46.

It will be the special duty of the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control to make an inventory of the Aeronautical material which is actually in the possession of the Government of the State of Austria, to inspect aeroplane, balloon and motor manufactories, and factories producing arms, munitions and explosives capable of being used by aircraft, to visit all aerodromes, sheds, landing grounds, parks and depots which are now in Austrian territory and to authorise where necessary a removal of material and to take delivery of such material.

The Government of the State of Austria must furnish to the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control all such information and legislative, administrative or other documents which the Commission may consider necessary to ensure the complete execution of the air clauses and in particular a list of the personnel belonging to all the air services of the State of Austria and of the existing material as well as of that in process of manufacture or on order, and a list of all establishments working for aviation, of their positions, and of all sheds and landing grounds.

GENERAL CLAUSES

ARTICLE 47.

After the expiration of a period of three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the laws of the State of Austria must have been modified and shall be maintained by the Government of the State of Austria in conformity with the first part of the present Treaty.

Within the same period all the administrative or other measures relating to the execution of this part of the Treaty must have been taken by the Government of the State of Austria.

ARTICLE 48.

The following portions of the Armistice of 3rd November, 1918 (Villa Giusti) :—

Paragraphs 2, 3, 4 of Chapter 1 (Military Clauses).

Paragraphs 2, 3, 6 of Chapter 1 of the annexed Protocol, (Military Clauses).

remain in force so far as they are not inconsistent with the above stipulations.

ARTICLE 49.

The State of Austria undertakes from the coming into force of the present Treaty not to accredit to any foreign country any Military, Naval or Air Mission and not to send, or allow to leave, any such Mission; it undertakes, moreover, to take the necessary measures to prevent nationals of the State of Austria leaving its territory in order to enlist in the Army, the Fleet, or the Air Service of any foreign power, or to be attached to such with a view to helping in its training, or generally to give any assistance to the Military, Naval, or Air instruction in a foreign country.

The Allied and Associated Powers undertake, on their part, that from the coming into force of the present Treaty they will neither enlist in nor attach to their Armies, Fleets or Air Forces any national of the State of Austria with the object of helping in military training or in general employ any national of the State of Austria as a military, naval, or air instructor.

The present provision, however, in no way hinders the right of France to recruit her Foreign Legion in accordance with French Military Laws and regulations.

ARTICLE 50.

So long as the present Treaty shall remain in force the State of Austria undertakes to submit to any investigation that the League of Nations by a majority vote may consider necessary.

VERSAILLES, 13 May, 1919.

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Annexure B

Conditions of Peace (Hungary)—Military, Naval and Aerial Clauses

MILITARY CLAUSES

CHAPTER I. *General*

ARTICLE 1.

Within three months of the coming into force of these terms of peace, the military forces of the State of Hungary shall be demobilised to the extent described hereinafter.

ARTICLE 2.

(American-British Proposal)

Universal compulsory military service shall be abolished in the State of Hungary. The Army of the State of Hungary will in future only be constituted and recruited by means of voluntary enlistment.

ARTICLE 2.

(French and Italian Proposal)

The Army of the state of Hungary shall be organised on a basis of 1 year compulsory short term service. Nevertheless it may include a maximum of 8,000 enlisted or re-engaged volunteer N. C. O.'s and men. The men incorporated in each contingent, as well as enlisted or re-engaged volunteers, shall after their period of service be definitely released from all further military obligations.

The men of each annual class not incorporated shall not be liable for any military obligations.

CHAPTER II. *Effectives and Cadres of the Army of the State of Hungary*

ARTICLE 3.

The total number of effectives and reservists in the Army of the state of Hungary must never exceed 45,000 men, including officers and establishment of dépôts.

The formations composing the army of the state of Hungary must not exceed 3 divisions of infantry and two divisions of cavalry.

The total effective strength of Officers, including the personnel of staffs, whatever their composition, and including civilian officials holding the corresponding rank to officer, must not exceed 2,250.

The Army of the State of Hungary shall be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the territory of the State of Hungary and to the control of her frontiers.

ARTICLE 4.

The divisions must not be grouped under more than one Army Corps Headquarter Staff. The maximum strengths of the Staffs and of all formations are given in Table I annexed hereto; these figures need not be exactly followed, but must never be exceeded.

The maintenance or formation of forces differently grouped, or of other organisations for the command of troops, or for preparation for war is forbidden.

The following units may each have a Dépôt:—

- An infantry regiment.
- A cavalry regiment.
- A field Artillery regiment.
- A battalion of Pioneers.

ARTICLE 5.

All measures of mobilisation, or appertaining to mobilisation, are forbidden.

In no case must formations, administrative services or staffs include supplementary cadres.

It is forbidden to carry out any preparatory measures, with a view to requisitioning animals or other means of military transport.

ARTICLE 6.

The number of gendarmes, customs officials, foresters, constables of local or municipal police, etc., may not exceed the number of men employed in a similiar capacity in 1913, and existing within the boundaries of the new state of Hungary.

The number of these officials shall not be increased in the future except in such numbers as may be necessary to maintain the same proportion between the number of officials and the total of the population in the localities or municipalities which employ them.

These officials, as well as officials employed in the railway service, must never be assembled for the purpose of taking part in any military exercises.

ARTICLE 7.

Any other formation of troops not included in the above articles is forbidden, and such other formations as may exist shall be suppressed within the period laid down by article I of these terms.

CHAPTER III. *Recruiting and Military Training*

ARTICLE 8.

All officers must be regular (*officiers de carrière*). The officers now serving, who are retained in the army, must undertake the obligation to serve in it up to the age of 40 years at least. Officers now serving, who do not join the new army, will be released from all military obligations; they must not take part in any military exercise, whether theoretical or practical.

Officers newly appointed must undertake to serve on the active list for 20 consecutive years at least.

The number of officers discharged for any reason before the expiration of their term of service must not exceed in any year 5 per cent of the total effectives of officers provided for in the 3rd paragraph of Article 3. If this percentage is unavoidably exceeded, the resulting shortage must not be made good by fresh appointments.

ARTICLE 9.

(American and British Proposal) (French and Italian Proposal)

The period of enlistment for Non-Commissioned officers and privates must be for a total period of not less than 12 consecutive years, including at least 6 years' service with the colours.

The proportion of men discharged before the expiration of the period of their enlistment, for reasons of health or as a result of disciplinary measures, or for any other reason must not in any year exceed 5% of the total effectives fixed by Article 3 of these terms. If this percentage is unavoidably exceeded, the resulting shortage must not be made good by fresh enlistments.

The voluntary enlistments and re-engagements (8,000 men fixed by Article 2) for Non-Commissioned officers and men shall in no case be less than 12 years continuous service. The numbers of Non-Commissioned officers and men discharged from the army for any cause whatever before the expiration of their period of enlistment or obligatory service shall not exceed each year for each of the above mentioned categories 5% of the total effectives fixed by Article 3 of these terms.

If the proportion of 5% is unavoidably exceeded the resulting shortage shall not be made good by fresh enlistments.

CHAPTER IV. *Schools, Educational Establishments, Military Societies &c.*

ARTICLE 10.

On the expiration of three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty there must only exist in the state of Hungary two military schools absolutely reserved for the recruitment of the officers of the units allowed.

The number of students admitted to attend the courses of the said schools will be strictly in proportion to the vacancies to be filled in the cadres of officers. The students and the cadres will be reckoned in the effectives fixed by Article 3 of the present treaty.

Consequently and during the period fixed above all military academies or similar institutions in the State of Hungary as well as the different military schools for officers, student officers, cadets, Non-Commissioned officers or student Non-Commissioned officers other than the schools above provided for will be abolished.

ARTICLE 11.

Educational establishments, other than those referred to in Article 10 above, the universities, societies of discharged soldiers, shooting and touring clubs, and associations or clubs of every description, must not occupy themselves with any military matters. They will on no

account be allowed to instruct or exercise their pupils or members in the use of arms.

These educational establishments, societies, clubs, etc., must have no connection with the Ministry of War or any other military authority.

ARTICLE 12.

In all schools and educational establishments of every description, whether under state control or private management, the teaching of gymnastics must be devoid of all instruction or practice in the use of arms or training for war.

CHAPTER V. *Armament, Munitions and Material*

ARTICLE 13.

At the expiration of three months from the coming into force of these terms, the new army of the State of Hungary must not possess an armament greater than the amounts fixed in Table 2, with the exception of an optional increase not exceeding 1/20 part for small arms and 1/40 for guns, which shall be exclusively used to provide for such eventual replacements as may be necessary.

ARTICLE 14.

At the expiration of three months from the coming into force of these terms, the stock of munitions at the disposal of the army of the State of Hungary shall not exceed the amounts fixed in Table 3.

Within this period the Government will store these stocks at points to be notified to the Principal Allied and Associated Governments, no other stocks, depots or reserves of munitions shall be established.

ARTICLE 15.

The manufacture of arms, munitions or any war material, shall only be carried out in one factory, which shall be owned and controlled by the state.

Within three months from the coming into force of these terms, all other establishments for the manufacture, preparation, storage or design of arms, munitions or any war material whatever, shall be suppressed as such or converted to purely commercial uses. Within the same period, all arsenals will be suppressed, except those used as depôts for the authorised stocks of munitions, and their personnel dismissed.

The establishments or arsenals in excess of those required for the manufactures authorised will be rendered useless or converted to a purely commercial use in accordance with the decisions to be taken by the Inter-Allied Committee of Control.

ARTICLE 16.

Within three months from the coming into force of these terms, all arms, munitions and war material, including anti-aircraft material,

of whatever origin, existing in the new State of Hungary in excess of the amounts allowed, will be surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Governments.† This will also apply to special plant intended for the manufacture of military material, except such as may be recognised as necessary for equipping the authorised strength of the army of the State of Hungary.

The surrender in question will be effected at such points in territory of the State of Hungary as may be selected by the said Governments who will decide as to the disposal of the material.

ARTICLE 17.

Importation into the State of Hungary of arms, munitions and war material of every kind is strictly prohibited.

The same applies to the manufacture for and export of arms, munitions and war material of every kind to foreign countries.

ARTICLE 18.

The use of *Flammenwerfer*, asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in the State of Hungary. The same applies to materials specially intended for the manufacture, storage and use of the said products or devices.

The manufacture and importation into the State of Hungary of armoured cars, tanks and all similar constructions suitable for use in war are also prohibited.

TABLE 1

MAXIMUM STRENGTH OF EFFECTIVES AND RESERVES ALLOWED FOR STAFFS AND FORMATIONS

(These tabular statements do not constitute a fixed establishment, but the figures therein contained represent maximum figures which must not be exceeded).

Units	Maximum Number authorised	Maximum Strengths of each unit	
		Officers	Other Ranks
I. ARMY CORPS HEADQUARTERS			
Army Corps Headquarters Staff.....	1	50	300
Total.....	50	300

† The Italian Military Representative proposed the surrender of the above material should be made to the Italian Government on behalf of the Principal Allied and Associated Governments who would decide as to its disposal. [Footnote in the original.]

Unit	Maximum number of such units in a single Division	Maximum Strengths of each unit	
		Officers	Other ranks
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INFANTRY DIVISION			
Headquarters of an Infantry Division.....	1	25	70
H. Q. of Divisional Infantry.....	1	5	50
“ “ “ Artillery.....	1	4	30
Regiment of infantry.....	3	65	2, 000
Each regiment comprises			
3 battalions of infantry			
Each battalion comprises			
3 companies of infantry &			
1 machine gun company			
Divisional squadron of cavalry.....	1	6	160
Trench mortar battalion, consisting of 3			
companies.....	1	14	500
Pioneer battalion.....	1	14	500
This battalion comprises			
Headquarters Section			
2 companies of pioneers			
1 pontoon section			
1 searchlight section			
Field Artillery Regiment.....	1	84	1, 290
Each regiment comprises			
Headquarters			
3 Groups of artillery			
Each group comprises			
3 Batteries, each of 4 field or mountain			
guns or field howitzers.			
Field Signal Company.....	1	11	330
This Company includes			
1 Telephone and telegraph detachment			
1 Listening section			
1 Carrier pigeon section			
Divisional Medical Service.....	1	28	550
Parks and trains.....		14	940
Total for infantry Division.....		400	10, 420
III. ESTABLISHMENT OF A CAVALRY DIVISION			
Headquarters of a Cavalry Division.....	1	15	50
Cavalry Regiment.....	6	30	720
Each regiment comprises 4 squadrons			
Field Artillery Group (3 Batteries).....	1	30	430
Total strength of a Cavalry Division.....		225	4, 800

TABLE 2

TABULAR STATEMENT OF ARMAMENT ESTABLISHMENT FOR A MAXIMUM OF 3 INFANTRY DIVISIONS, 2 CAVALRY DIVISIONS AND 1 ARMY CORPS HEADQUARTERS STAFF

Material	Infantry Division	For 3 Infantry Divisions	Cavalry Division	For 2 Cavalry Divisions	For 1 Army Corps H. Q.	Total
Rifles.....	12, 000	36, 000	Armament to be drawn from surplus of infantry Divisions.	36, 000
Carbines.....	6, 000	12, 000		12, 000
Heavy machine guns....	108	324	12	24		348
Light " ".....	162	486		486
Trench mortars, light....	18	54		54
Trench mortars, medium.....	9	27		27
Field or mountain guns.	24	72	12	24		96
Field or mountain howitzers.....	12	36		36

TABLE 3

MAXIMUM STOCKS AUTHORISED

Material	Maximum No. of arms authorised	Ammunition establishment per unit	Maximum totals
Rifles	36, 000	500	24, 000, 000
Carbines	12, 000		
Heavy machine guns.....	348	10, 000	8, 340, 000
Light " ".....	486		
Light trench mortars.....	54	1, 000	54, 000
Medium trench mortars.....	27	500	13, 500
Field and mountain Artillery {	guns.....	1, 000	96, 000
	howitzers	1, 000	36, 000

NAVAL CLAUSES

ARTICLE 19.

From the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty all ex-Austro-Hungarian warships, submarines included, are declared to be finally surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

All the monitors, torpedo boats and armed vessels of the Danube flotilla will be surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

ARTICLE 20.

The ex-Austro-Hungarian auxiliary cruisers and fleet auxiliaries enumerated below will be disarmed and treated as merchant ships:—

Bosnia	Persia	Trieste
Gablonz	Prince Hohenlohe	Baron Bruck
Carolina	Gastein	Elisabeth
Africa	Helouan	Melcavich
Tirol	Graf Wurmbrand	Baron Call
Argentina	Pelikan	Gaea
Lussin	Hercules	Cyclop
Teodo	Pola	Vesta
Nixe	Naiade	Nymphe
Gigante	Pluto	Buffel
Dalmat	President Wilson (ex Kaiser Franz Joseph)	

ARTICLE 21.

All warships, including submarines, now under construction in ports which previously belonged to Austria-Hungary, shall be broken up.

The work of breaking up these vessels will be commenced as soon as possible after the coming into force of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 22.

Articles, machinery and material arising from the breaking up of ex-Austro-Hungarian warships of all kinds, whether surface vessels or submarines, may not be used except for purely industrial or commercial purposes.

They may not be sold or disposed of to foreign countries.

ARTICLE 23.

The construction or acquisition of any submarine, even for commercial purposes, shall be forbidden in the state of Hungary.

ARTICLE 24.

All arms, ammunition and naval war material, including mines and torpedoes, which belonged to Austria-Hungary at the date of the signature of the Armistice of 3rd November, 1918,² are declared to be finally surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

The manufacture in territory of the State of Hungary and the export of these articles to foreign countries shall be forbidden.

ARTICLE 25.

During the three months following the coming into force of the present Treaty, the Hungarian high-power wireless telegraphy station at Budapest shall not be used for the transmission of messages concerning naval, military or political questions of interest to the state of Hungary, or any state which has been allied to Austria-Hungary in the war, without the assent of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. This station may be used for commercial purposes but only under the supervision of the said Governments, who will decide the wave-lengths to be used.

² Vol. II, p. 175.

During the same period the State of Hungary shall not build any more high-power wireless telegraphy stations in her own territory or that of the State of Austria, Germany, Bulgaria or Turkey.

Admiral Benson (U. S. A.) makes the two following reservations:—

(1) The terms of the Treaty should require that surrendered vessels of war or war material be destroyed or broken up.

(2) That naval terms should contain no prohibition against the manufacture, within the limits of States formerly a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, of naval war material on foreign order.

AIR CLAUSES

ARTICLE 26.

The armed forces of the State of Hungary must not include any military or naval air forces. No dirigible shall be kept.

ARTICLE 27.

Within two months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the personnel of the air forces on the rolls of the Hungarian land and sea forces shall be demobilised.

ARTICLE 28.

Until the complete evacuation of Hungarian territory by the Allied and Associated troops the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy in the State of Hungary freedom of passage through the air, freedom of transit and of landing.

ARTICLE 29.

During the six months following the coming into force of the present Treaty, the manufacture and importation of aircraft, parts of aircraft, engines for aircraft, and parts of engines for aircraft, shall be forbidden in all territory of the State of Hungary.

ARTICLE 30.

On the coming into force of the present Treaty, all military and naval aeronautical material must be delivered by the State of Hungary and at the expense of the State of Hungary, to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Delivery must be effected at such places as the said Governments may select, and must be completed within three months.

In particular, this material will include all items under the following heads which are or have been in use or were designed for warlike purposes:—

Complete aeroplanes and seaplanes, as well as those being manufactured, repaired or assembled.

Dirigibles able to take the air, being manufactured, repaired or assembled.

Plant for the manufacture of hydrogen.

Dirigible sheds and shelters of every kind for aircraft.

Pending their delivery, dirigibles will, at the expense of the State of Hungary, be maintained inflated with hydrogen; the plant of the manufacture of hydrogen, as well as the sheds for dirigibles, may, at the discretion of the said Powers, be left to the State of Hungary until the time when the dirigibles are handed over.

Engines for aircraft.

Nacelles and fuselages.

Armament (guns, machine guns, light machine guns, bomb-dropping apparatus, torpedo-dropping apparatus, synchronisation apparatus, aiming apparatus).

Munitions (cartridges, shells, bombs, loaded or unloaded, stocks of explosives or material for their manufacture).

Instruments for use on aircraft.

Wireless apparatus and photographic or cinematograph apparatus for use on aircraft.

Component parts of any of the items under the preceding heads.

The material referred to above shall not be removed without special permission from the said Governments.

ARTICLE 31.

The aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall have full liberty of passage and landing over and in the territory and territorial waters of the State of Hungary and shall enjoy the same privileges as aircraft belonging to the State of Hungary, particularly in case of distress by land or sea.

ARTICLE 32.

The aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall, while in transit to any foreign country whatever, enjoy the right of flying over the territory and territorial waters of the State of Hungary without landing subject always to any regulations which may be made by the State of Hungary, and which shall be applicable equally to the aircraft of the State of Hungary and those of the Allied and Associated countries.

ARTICLE 33.

All aerodromes in the State of Hungary open to national public traffic shall be open for the aircraft of the Allied and Associated powers, and in any such aerodrome such aircraft shall be treated on a footing of equality with Hungarian aircraft as regards charges of every description, including charges for landing and accommodation.

ARTICLE 34.

Subject to the present provisions, the rights of passage, transit and landing, provided for in Articles 31, 32, and 33 are, subject to the observance of such regulations as Hungary may consider it necessary to enact, but such regulation shall be applied without distinction to aircraft belonging to the State of Hungary and to the aircraft of Allied and Associated countries.

ARTICLE 35.

Certificates of nationality, air-worthiness, or competency and licenses, issued or recognised as valid by any of the Allied and Associated Powers, shall be recognised in the State of Hungary as valid and as equivalent to the certificates and licenses issued by the State of Hungary.

ARTICLE 36.

As regards internal commercial air traffic, the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy in the State of Hungary most favoured nation treatment.

ARTICLE 37.

The State of Hungary undertakes to enforce the necessary measures to ensure that all Hungarian aircraft flying over her territory shall comply with the Rules as to lights and signals, Rules of the Air and Rules for Air Traffic on and in the neighbourhood of aerodromes, which have been laid down in the Convention relative to Aerial Navigation concluded between the Allied and Associated Powers.

ARTICLE 38.

The obligations imposed by the preceding provisions shall remain in force until the 1st January, 1923, unless before that date the State of Hungary shall have been admitted into the League of Nations or shall have been authorised by consent of the Allied and Associated Powers; to adhere to the Convention relative to Aerial Navigation concluded between those Powers.

INTER-ALLIED COMMISSIONS OF CONTROL

ARTICLE 39.

All the Military, Naval and Air Clauses contained in the present Treaty, for the execution of which a time limit is prescribed, shall be executed by the State of Hungary under the control of Inter-Allied Commissions (Military, Naval, Air) specially appointed for this purpose by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

The above mentioned Commissions will represent the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in dealing with the Government of the State of Hungary in all matters concerning the execution of the Military, Naval or Air Clauses. They will communicate to the authorities of the State of Hungary the decisions which the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have reserved the right to take or which the execution of the Clauses may necessitate.

ARTICLE 40.

The Inter-Allied Commissions of Control may establish their organisations at Budapest and shall be entitled, as often as they think desirable, to proceed to any point whatever in the territory of the State

of Hungary, or to send a sub-Commission or to authorise one or more of their members to go to any such point.

ARTICLE 41.

The Government of the State of Hungary must furnish to the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control all such information and documents as the latter may deem necessary to ensure the execution of their Mission; and all means (both in personnel and in material) which the above mentioned Commissions might need to ensure the complete execution of the Military, Naval or Air Clauses.

The Government of the State of Hungary must attach a qualified representative to each Inter-Allied Commission of Control with the duty of receiving from the latter any communications which it may have to address to the Government of the State of Hungary and to furnish it with, or to procure, all information or documents demanded.

ARTICLE 42.

The upkeep and cost of the Commissions of Control and the expenses involved by their work shall be borne by the State of Hungary.

ARTICLE 43.

It will be the special duty of the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control to receive from the Government of the State of Hungary the notifications relating to the location of the stocks and depots of munitions, and the location of the works or factories for the production of arms, munitions and war material and their operations.

It will take delivery of the arms, munitions, war material and plant intended for war construction, will select the points where such delivery is to be effected and will supervise the works of destruction, and rendering things useless, or of transformation of material, which are to be carried out in accordance with the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 44.

It will be the special duty of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control to proceed to the building yards and to supervise the breaking-up of the ships which are under construction there, to take delivery of arms, munitions and naval war material, and to supervise the destruction and breaking-up provided for.

The Government of the State of Hungary must furnish to the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control all such information and documents as the Commission may deem necessary to ensure the complete execution of the naval clauses, in particular the designs of the warships, the composition of their armaments, the details and models of the guns, munitions, torpedoes, mines, explosives, wireless telegraphic apparatus, and in general everything relating to naval war material, as well as all legislative or administrative documents or regulations.

ARTICLE 45.

It will be the special duty of the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control to make an inventory of the Aeronautical material which is actually in the possession of the Government of the State of Hungary, to inspect aeroplane, balloon and motor manufactories, and factories producing arms, munitions and explosives capable of being used by aircraft, to visit all aerodromes, sheds, landing grounds, parks and depots which are now in Hungarian territory and to authorise where necessary a removal of material and to take delivery of such material.

The Government of the State of Hungary must furnish to the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control all such information and legislative, administrative or other documents which the Commission may consider necessary to ensure the complete execution of the air clauses and in particular a list of the personnel belonging to all the air services of the State of Hungary and of the existing material, as well as of that in process of manufacture or on order, and a list of all establishments working for aviation, of their positions, and of all sheds and landing grounds.

GENERAL CLAUSES

ARTICLE 46.

After the expiration of a period of three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the laws of the State of Hungary must have been modified and shall be maintained by the Government of the State of Hungary in conformity with the first part of the present Treaty.

Within the same period all the administrative or other measures relating to the execution of this part of the Treaty must have been taken.

ARTICLE 47.

The following portions of the Armistice of 3rd November, 1918 (Villa Giusti) :—

Paragraphs 2, 3, 4 of Chapter 1 (Military Clauses),
Paragraphs 2, 3, 6 of Chapter 1 of the annexed Protocol (Military Clauses),

remain in force so far as they are not inconsistent with the above stipulations.

ARTICLE 48.

The State of Hungary undertakes from the coming into force of the present Treaty not to accredit to any foreign country any Military, Naval or Air Mission and not to send, or allow to leave, any such Mission; it undertakes, moreover, to take the necessary measures to prevent nationals of the State of Hungary leaving its territory in

order to enlist in the Army, the Fleet, or the Air Service of any foreign power, or to be attached to such with a view to helping in its training, or generally to give any assistance to the Military, Naval, or Air instruction in a foreign country.

The Allied and Associated Powers undertake, on their part, that from the coming into force of the present Treaty they will neither enlist in nor attach to their Armies, Fleets or Air Forces any national of the State of Hungary with the object of helping in military training or in general employ any national of the State of Hungary as a military, naval, or air instructor.

The present provision, however, in no way hinders the right of France to recruit her Foreign Legion in accordance with French Military Laws and regulations.

ARTICLE 49.

So long as the present Treaty shall remain in force the State of Hungary undertakes to submit to any investigation that the League of Nations by a majority vote may consider necessary.

VERSAILLES, 13 May, 1919.

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House, Place des
Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday, May 17, 1919, at 11 a. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

**Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.
Prof. P. J. Mantoux.**

*Secretary.
Interpreter.*

1. Attention was drawn to the draft notes circulated by Sir Maurice Hankey on the subject of the proposed mandates in Asia Minor. (C. F. 13A. Minute 3, Minute 11, and Appendices 1 and 2).¹ Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to make it clear in the revise of the Minutes that the decision had only been intended as provisional, and as part of a proposal that it was contemplated to make to the Italian Delegates.

Mandates in
Turkey. Altera-
tion in Minutes
No. 13A

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had received information from M. Venizelos sent by the Governor General of Samos, to the effect that the Italians had landed 500 men at Scala Nuova and occupied the Customs House. Consequently, they were now in possession of the whole coast of Asia Minor from Scala Nuova to Adalia. He felt that some immediate representation ought to be made to M. Orlando on the subject.

The Italian
Landing at
Scala Nuova

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that a joint memorandum should be signed by Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau and himself, addressed to M. Orlando. This would give him an opportunity to look into the matter. He should be told that the independent action on Italy's part was a matter of serious concern to the Allied and Associated Powers. If his explanations were not satisfactory, he should be told that Italian claims could not be discussed. A joint communication of this kind would be more formal and more impressive than a verbal remonstrance.

¹ *Ante*, pp. 614, 618, and 622.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE handed round a memorandum from Mr. Balfour (Appendix), which he described as a powerful one, in regard to provisional decisions taken on the subject of Anatolia. He felt considerable doubt as to whether this provisional conclusion was a correct one. In any case, if the Italians continued on their present lines, it might be better to have only one mandate for Anatolia.

M. CLEMENCEAU said for his part he did not want it.

PRESIDENT WILSON produced an ethnographical map of Anatolia, and pointed out how much more mixed the population was in the southern half of Anatolia than in the north, where it was almost wholly Turkish.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it had to be borne in mind that the whole Mohammedan world would be aroused by this partition of Turkey, and this affected France just as much as it did Great Britain.

(It was agreed that Mr. Lloyd George should prepare the draft of the memorandum for consideration, and possibly for subsequent presentation to M. Orlando, on the subject of the Italian landings on the Coast of Asia Minor).

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 17 May, 1919.

Appendix to CF-15A

[*Memorandum by Mr. Balfour of the British Delegation*]

THE PROBLEM OF ITALY AND TURKEY IN ANATOLIA

MAY 16, 1919.

The scheme provisionally accepted on Wednesday last at a meeting of the "Three",² contemplates the final destruction of the Turkish State. This is already condemned, and I think rightly, to the loss of its European possessions, its Arab-speaking population, and Armenia. It is therefore in any case reduced, as far as the area of its Empire is concerned, to a mere fraction of its former self; this fraction, however, we originally proposed to preserve, thus leaving to the Sultan that great block of Anatolia lying west [*east*] of the meridian of Constantinople, which is not merely inhabited by a population the vast majority of whom are Turks, but which contains within its boundaries most of the Turkish race. For this scheme has now been substituted one which cuts this region into two separate states, with different capitals, different sovereigns and different mandatories.

I look with much misgiving at this proposal. It will not only deeply shock large sections of Mohammedan opinion, but I think it

² See CF-13A, p. 618.

will also be made the subject of a great deal of very unfavourable Christian commentary. We are all most anxious to avoid as far as possible placing reluctant populations under alien rule; but ought we not to be quite as careful to avoid the opposite fault? Is it a greater crime to join together those who wish to be separated than to divide those who wish to be united? And if the Anatolian Turks say they desire to remain a single people under a single sovereign, to what principle are we going to make appeal when we refuse to grant their request?

I think we must admit that no such scheme would ever have been thought of, if it had not been necessary to find some method of satisfying Italian ambitions. Unfortunately, this necessity haunts and hampers every step in our diplomacy. The Italians, armed with the Treaty of London, and supported by a passionate public opinion, will never be content with fragments of Tyrolese and Jugo-Slav territory in Europe; with French and British Colonial concessions in Africa, and with the Caucasus in the Middle East. We have also to find something for them out of the Turkish Empire in Asia Minor. Now I believe there are only two kinds of scheme possible by which the latter operation can be accomplished;—the scheme of partition advocated by the "Three", and the scheme which I ventured to lay before them. This last has not, perhaps, in all respects, been very clearly understood; which is not surprising, for it was very hastily written, and not very fully explained. But the matter is so important that I may be permitted to return to it.

Under my scheme Turkey remained an undivided State without a Mandatory. Its status was substantially that of the historic Turkish Empire. Its territories were, indeed much diminished; it could no longer count as a Great Power; but in other respects the Sultan would reign at Brussa or Konia as his predecessors had formerly reigned at Constantinople.

Now it must be remembered that even at Constantinople representatives of the Western Powers had special positions in his administration, justified, and, indeed, rendered necessary for various well-known reasons. The public debt, the customs, and in some cases the police, were under the control or supervision of foreign advisers. This system I do not propose to alter, but rather to perfect. The Turks are familiar with it, up to a certain point they welcome it, and they do not deem it inconsistent with their unity or their independence.

The alternative scheme, which found favour on Wednesday, destroys both; for it cuts Turkey into two halves; and puts each half under a separate Mandatory. What are its compensating advantages? It is said, in the first place, that it avoids the evils of a Condominium. A Condominium, we are told, is never a success; it is slow moving,

ineffectual and the occasion of endless friction between the controlling Powers;—a friction so acute as even to endanger the peace of the world.

But the plan I propose is not a Condominium. A Condominium, as I understand it is the joint Government of a single State by many powers acting collectively. Under such a system, the Powers first agree upon a policy, and then impose it upon the subordinate State. They control, actually or potentially, the whole administration. If they differ, the administrative machinery stands still. If their differences are due to their being moved by inconsistent interests, they may become acute and even dangerous. The subordinate Government is perpetually tempted to play one off against the other, and the whole country becomes the theatre of rival intrigues. Everybody quarrels, and nothing is done.

Now nobody will pretend that the Constantinople Government was a good one, but it was not as bad as all this. There were, of course, endless [intrigues], political and financial. There was a perpetual struggle to obtain influence with the Sultan and his Ministers. There was much corruption; there was much mal-administration. But it was never a Condominium. The Sultan appointed his ministers; he appointed the Governors of his Provinces; he raised and commanded the Army; he directed the foreign policy of his country, and was in these and all other important respects, an independent sovereign. Certain branches of his administration were no doubt controlled, not by a foreign Condominium but by foreigners. He remained, nevertheless, in quite a different position from that which he would have held either under a Condominium or under a Mandatory.

Another objection raised against my scheme is that it gives special privileges to Italy in the southern part of the Turkish state. This is quite true, and of course I should greatly prefer that it were otherwise. But inasmuch as the whole plan is primarily devised in order to do something to satisfy Italian appetites, that is, I am afraid, inevitable. From an administrative point of view, the scheme would no doubt be much better if the Italians played no part in it. I freely admit it—but I submit that the argument is irrelevant. The Italians must somehow be mollified, and the only question is how to mollify them at the smallest cost to mankind.

Then it is said that to give the Italians a first claim to concessions in any district is to violate the principle of equal opportunities for all nations. Again, I am not prepared to deny the charge. My whole object is to give the Italians something which they will really like, and it seems that they have a great liking for concessions. I remember, when the Marquis Imperiali was comparing the advantages which the French would get out of Cilicia with the advantages which Italy was

likely to get out of her share of Asia Minor, he was wont to dwell upon the wonders of a certain copper mine, which he said, I am sure quite truly, was to be found somewhere in the French zone. In the same way, I observe that Baron Sonnino's eyes are lovingly fixed upon a very indifferent coal mine on the Southern shores of the Black Sea. Personally, I regard these hopes and expectations with considerable scepticism. I doubt the existence of these hidden riches in Southern Anatolia. Even if they exist, I doubt whether their exploitation is going to make Italy rich; and I have a strong suspicion that even if these industrial enterprises are started under Italian patronage, they will be found after no great lapse of time to be under German management. But all this does not seem to me to be to the point. The object is to find some privileged position for the Italians in Southern Anatolia; and I particularly beg the "Three" to remember that she has already got the germs of such a position by a pre-war arrangement which she made with the Turks, in respect of the region neighbouring on Adalia. My suggestion only extends and emphasises her privileges. It does not create them.

In any case, as Italy is not, under my plan, intended to occupy the position of a Mandatory in these regions, the general principle—that no Mandatory has a right to exceptional trade advantages in the country which it controls—is not violated. The only difference that I can see between what would happen under my plan, and what would happen if nothing were done for the Italians in Asia Minor, is that in the first case Italy would without question or controversy have the refusal of all concessions within a certain area: in the second case these concessions will be scrambled for at Brussa by the rival company-mongers of every country under Heaven, supported, no doubt, by their respective Ministers. The first plan may be an infringement upon the liberty and equality, nominally at least, secured by the second; but I do not know that these most excellent things are seen to the best advantage when they are enjoyed by corrupt administrators and greedy speculators.

But once again, this is relatively unimportant compared with the main objects of the scheme I am endeavouring to support. This is designed to do two things; to maintain something resembling an independent Turkish Government, ruling over a homogeneous Turkish population; the other is to find a position for the Italians within this Turkish state which will make a sufficient appeal to the ambitions of the Italian Government. From every other point of view the plan is, I admit, a bad one; but from this point of view—which is the one at the moment chiefly occupying our thoughts—I still think it worthy of serious consideration.

A. J. B[ALFOUR]

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House, Place des
Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday, May 17, 1919, at 11.10 a. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.
Count Aldrovandi
Professor P. J. Mantoux.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

ITALY

M. Orlando.

Secretary
Secretary
Interpreter.

1. **M. CLEMENCEAU** reported that there was a very strong demand for the publication of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. He was informed that the Germans themselves had published certain portions, so that the text of these portions would soon be in the hands of the Press. Consequently, he had yesterday spoken to President Wilson and Mr. Balfour on the subject, and had gathered that they were favourable to publication.

Publication
of the Treaty
of Peace With
Germany

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he had only expressed himself favourable to the publication of those parts which the Germans had already published, and even so, he had insisted that the decision must be reserved until Mr. Lloyd George returned.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE recalled that only a few days before, he had raised this very question in consequence of a telephone message from Mr. Bonar Law,¹ and as a result of their discussion, an emphatic reply had been given that the Treaty would not be published. His objection was, that when the Treaty was once published, it was very difficult to alter it, and there might be some details which we ought to concede to the Germans, if it would make it more acceptable to them.

(At this point M. Orlando and Count Aldrovandi entered.)

PRESIDENT WILSON said there was a great difference between what was published by the Germans and what we gave officially to our own people. Once we had published them to our own people, the Clauses assumed an official form, and made it very difficult to change.

¹ British Lord Privy Seal; plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the original Treaty had been somewhat defective and yet it was rather difficult to publish a different document to what the Germans had received. He was informed by Sir Maurice Hankey that it was physically impossible to publish the Treaty before Tuesday or Wednesday, as it could not be printed in London before then. By Wednesday, however, the German reply was due, and he thought the matter might be postponed until then. He did not like going back on a previous decision.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would do whatever Mr. Lloyd George wished.

(It was agreed that the Treaty of Peace as handed to the Germans, should not be published at present.)

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that on the previous day, he had addressed some British troops, and had pointed out to them how disastrous it would be to throw away the results of five years warfare, by not seeing the matter through. He had told them that in certain eventualities, it might be necessary to go to Berlin, and they had shown themselves to a man, quite ready to do so, if necessary. This was a division that had lost nearly 9,000 men in the advances of last year.

3. M. CLEMENCEAU handed in a list of material which could be supplied by the French Government, if it were so decided, in order to provide outfits for German Prisoners of War. (Appendix I.) He said that the remainder of the captured material had already been used to supply the German prisoners.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was informed that the quantities that the British Government could supply were very small, but he had no details up to the present.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had not received his list.

4. M. CLEMENCEAU handed to Sir Maurice Hankey for translation and circulation a draft [reply], prepared by the appropriate Committee of the Conference, to Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau's letter on the subject of the Saar Valley.²

5. M. CLEMENCEAU handed to Sir Maurice Hankey for translation and circulation a copy of a draft reply, prepared by the appropriate Committee of the Peace Conference to Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau's letter on the subject of reparation.³

Action in Event
of Germans
Refusing To Sign

Prisoners of War:
Reply to Brock-
dorff-Rantzau's
Letter

Saar Valley:
Reply to the
German Letter

Reparation. Reply
to Brockdorff-
Rantzau's Letter

² Appendices II and IV to CF-23, pp. 817 and 823.

³ Appendices II and III (a) to CF-19, pp. 727-729.

6. M. CLEMENCEAU drew attention to a Memorandum prepared by Mr. W. T. Layton, of the British Delegation, and circulated at the request of Lord Robert Cecil, on the subject of the supply of Armaments to the new States of Central and Eastern Europe (Appendix II).

MR. LLOYD GEORGE recalled that during the war the Ministers of Munitions used to confer together on such matters.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the first step was to find out what was being done.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that M. Loucheur and Mr. Layton should confer on the subject.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

M. ORLANDO said he would nominate a representative.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the United States of America had not supplied any armaments, except a few to General Koltchak.

M. ORLANDO asked what the states affected were.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested the Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Roumanians, Serbo-Croats, and he added that the various nationalities formed out of Old Russia and Siberia should also be considered.

(It was agreed that M. Loucheur, Mr. W. T. Layton, and an Italian representative to be nominated by M. Orlando should report on the facts as to what supplies of armaments or munitions have been or are being sent to Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania, Serbo-Croatia, Montenegro, Greece, and the various States formed or forming out of the former Russian Empire, including Siberia.)

7. MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the reference to this Committee was closely connected with the reference to the Military Representatives at Versailles to consider the size of the military forces of the new States in connection with the Military Peace Terms of Austria and Hungary.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this was a very difficult question, and it would be necessary in his view to secure the intervention of the League of Nations.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought it would not be very difficult to get an agreement if all the nations were included in the group.

8. ARISING out of the above discussion, attention was drawn by MR. LLOYD GEORGE to reports he had received to the effect that the supplies promised to Serbia were not reaching the Serbian Army.

Supplies to Serbia

(At M. Clemenceau's request, he undertook to give M. Clemenceau a memorandum on the subject).

9. PRESIDENT WILSON said that he had seen a report in the newspapers to the effect that the Polish Diet refused the view of M. Paderewski in favour of stopping operations on the Ukraine front, as desired by the Allied and Associated Powers. M. Paderewski had refused to accept the view of the Diet, and threatened to resign. If Poland continued fighting, he thought that the representatives of Poland ought to be asked to withdraw from the Peace Conference. His information, however, was entirely derived from the newspapers.

The Polish-Ukrainian Armistice

M. CLEMENCEAU doubted if this impression was correct. He had information to the effect that the Polish orders to continue fighting had been recalled.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE read extracts from a telegram received from General Carton de Wiart ⁴ to the effect that the military preparations were too far advanced, and public opinion was too firmly set for the operations to be stopped from Poland, and that hostilities could only be brought to an end by the direct intervention of the Peace Conference.

He then read a comment by Lord Robert Cecil, suggesting that the Supreme Economic Council should on Monday inform M. Dmowski ⁵ that no further supplies would be sent unless hostilities ceased.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that M. Paderewski had a letter in his possession from Mr. Hoover, informing him that aid would only be extended to Poland so long as he was in charge.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE then read extracts from a letter by General Botha, Chairman of the Polish-Ukrainian Armistice Commission, who pointed out that the Supreme Council was being brought into contempt by the neglect of its decisions by the Poles, and that the League of Nations would become nugatory unless the present Conference could enforce its decisions. He pointed out that the Ukraine was the only state formed out of the old Russian Empire to whom no armaments had been supplied, though they were fighting the Bolsheviks.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Ukrainians were more than half Bolshevik themselves.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed with General Botha, and pointed out the difficulty that there were no means of obtaining exact information.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers was carrying on temporarily, pending the formation of the League of Nations. Its orders could not be defied without weakening the League of Nations itself.

⁴ British representative on the Interallied Mission to Poland.

⁵ Roman Dmowski, President of the Polish National Committee; plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.

PRESIDENT WILSON said it was the Conference, rather than the League of Nations, that would be discredited. The Conference was engaged in a final settlement, rather than on these temporary disputes. The fixing of the frontier between the Ukraine and Poland was a very difficult matter.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Ukraine was willing to stop fighting, and that it was the Poles who were making the difficulty.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if General Haller's Army was still being transported to Poland? Could the transport of the remainder be stopped? His own opinion was that if 2 Divisions had gone, that was enough for the present.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that M. Paderewski ought to be supported, as he was a very honest and loyal man. He should be given an intimation that if the orders of this Council were not carried out, no further support would be given. He would do this through the Foreign Ministers.

PRESIDENT WILSON said it was important not to give even a superficial idea that M. Paderewski was not being supported. He had played the game straight throughout. The message ought to be sent, not to M. Paderewski, but to General Pilsudski, the Head of the Polish State.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if it was possible to address the Head of the State.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that it was.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked President Wilson to draft a despatch.

(It was agreed that President Wilson should draft for consideration a draft addressed by the Council of the Allied and Associated Powers to General Pilsudski.)

10. During the above discussion the question arose as to what was the proper designation of the Council of Four.

SIR MAURICE HANKEY reported that he had been using the term "Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers".

PRESIDENT WILSON demurred to the use of the word "Supreme", which some of the smaller States disliked.

(It was agreed that in any future communications the nomenclature to be adopted should be "Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers", but that no announcement should be made.)

11. There was a short conversation on the subject of Teschen.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that on the previous day he had seen M. Benes⁶ and M. Kramar.⁷ M. Benes had given a very intelligent

⁶ Edouard Beneš, Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs; plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.

⁷ Charles Kramar, Czechoslovak President of the Council of Ministers; plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.

and unbiassed description of the Teschen question. He had explained that the question of coal was only one part of the subject. In any case, most of the coal basin, of which the Teschen coal mines formed a part, must form part of Poland. There was an important question, however, owing to the fact that the only lines of railway running east and west in the north of Czecho-Slovakia, ran through Teschen territory.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what the population was.

PRESIDENT WILSON said they had not gone into this question. M. Benes had told him it was impossible for the Poles to agree with the Czecho-Slovaks, as they had been asked to do. The reason was that in Poland it was a party question and no party could afford to give way. This was not the case in Czecho-Slovakia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if everyone there was agreed to grab all they could.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that one of the strongest arguments in favour of the Czecho-Slovaks was that this part of Teschen had been the acknowledged boundary of Bohemia in the days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He had received a letter from Mr. Hoover to the effect that the coal output of Teschen had been reduced owing to the uncertainties of the situation to 25% of the normal. Mr. Hoover was urging him to suggest that some temporary international management should be adopted, in order to bring the output of coal up to the normal.

12. The Council had before them Report No. 2 of the Committee on New States.⁸

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the only controversial part of the report arose in connection with Annex B, dealing with the subject of the Jewish Sabbath.

(After a short discussion, the first paragraph of Annex B was agreed to).

(Mr. Headlam-Morley entered.)

PRESIDENT WILSON asked Mr. Headlam-Morley to give his views on Annex B. He understood that he had been the supporter of this clause, and had stood alone on the Committee.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that he had conferred with representatives of the Jews on this matter. M. Lucien Wolff, whom he had found to be the most moderate representative, was against the extreme claims of the Zionists, and was supported by M. Neymer of the British Foreign Office. They all insisted, however, that the provisions in Annex B were of extreme importance.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he and his colleagues were quite agreed as to the first paragraph.

⁸ The text of this report does not accompany the minutes. It presented a draft of minorities provisions for the treaty between Poland and the Allied and Associated Powers (Paris Peace Conf. 181.23202/9).

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said the second paragraph had been suggested by Sir Esme Howard, who was himself a Roman Catholic.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether the object of this paragraph, which suggested that elections should not take place on a Saturday, was put in to prevent action by the Poles, which otherwise would amount to a virtual disenfranchisement of the Jews.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY replied that this was the case. He added that his colleagues had felt that this was rather a small matter to insert in a Treaty, and might be provided for by an exchange of Notes. In view of the great importance attached to it by the Jews, however, he, himself, had felt that he would not be doing his duty if he did not bring it before the Council.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that Mr. Miller, the American representative on the Committee, had suggested that in view of the Continental practice of holding elections on a Sunday, it would make Saturday rather more sacred than Sunday.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that arrangements might be made for the Jews to record their votes separately on another day.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said he presumed an opportunity would be given to the Poles to make their comments on this matter, which was of great importance to them. He suggested that they should be given an opportunity to send a formal note on the subject, in order to place their views on record. If their note was of a favourable character, this might meet the case.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought it would not. All sorts of technical difficulties would be raised about carrying out this decision. For example, in Roumania, by a quibble over the use of the word "citizen", the Jews had, in effect, been deprived of their rights. He feared that any sanction less formal than a Treaty would be read in such a way as to render it useless. It would be said that the assurances were informal and would be got around somehow.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that the Committee had left out one clause, which the Jews had suggested, namely, that not only should they not have to work on their Sabbath, but that they should be allowed to work on the Christian Sabbath.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought the Committee was right in this. To allow the Jews to work on Sunday would be regarded as an unfair advantage against the Christians. Such, at any rate, was the feeling in England, as regards the opening of Jewish shops.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether the last word of the first paragraph should not be "Saturday" instead of "Sabbath."

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that Sabbath was the correct word, but that the word before—"the"—was a misprint for "their". The report was being reprinted, as it contained several inaccuracies.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he, personally, was converted to the inclusion of Annex B.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it should be submitted to the views of the Poles.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he not only had a friendly feeling towards the Jews, but he thought it was perfectly clear that one of the most dangerous elements of ferment arose from the treatment of the Jews. The fact that the Bolshevik movement had been led by the Jews was partly due to the fact that they had been treated largely as outlaws. They had no affection for a country where they were only permitted to live on tolerance, with every man's hand against them. He therefore felt it was necessary to put them on a proper footing.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said the proper thing was to do as the Germans were doing, and make an intelligent use of the brains of the Jews. He had noticed that half the German Delegates were Jews.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council ought to hear what the Poles had to say about the matter.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said that the Committee had suggested that their report should be communicated officially to the Poles, and that the Committee might then be permitted to receive the Polish Delegation and discuss the matter with them. First, however, they wished to have the report approved in principle.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE urged that the report should be communicated to the Poles in Poland, as the Polish representative in Paris, M. Dmowski, did not represent the democratic opinion in Poland.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the Committee should be authorised to present their report formally to the Polish Delegates in Paris, and to discuss it with them while the report should also be transmitted to the Polish Government for observations.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY raised the question as to the right of appeal by minorities to the League of Nations. They thought that this right was reserved nominally only for the Governments of States. They had, nevertheless, felt that it would not be advisable that the Germans in Poland should only have the right to approach the League of Nations through the German Government.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that one of the Articles of the League of Nations gave the representatives of every State the right to call attention to matters affecting the peace of the world, whether the Government was interested in them or not, and this was not to be regarded as an unfriendly act. By the application of this Article, the Jews of Poland would be able to introduce [*induce?*] their friends in other countries, such as the United States of America, Great Britain or France, to draw the attention of the League to their position. In any case, however, the League of Nations could not change the minds

of the people. Dislike of the Jews in Poland would continue in spite of everything.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY asked President Wilson's permission to send him a memorandum on this subject.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he would be glad to receive it.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said he hoped that the economic and financial clauses, which were under consideration by the experts, would be ready very soon. He said that the Committee was about to proceed to its examination of the Preamble to Czecho-Slovakia.

(It was agreed:

1. To approve in principle Report No. 2 of the Committee on New States.

2. That the Committee should communicate the Report officially to the Polish Delegation in Paris, and should confer with them on the subject.

3. That the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference should telegraph the gist of the Report to the Polish Government, and invite its views.)

(13). With reference to C. F. 14 Minute 4,¹⁰ President Wilson said that M. Vesnitch when asked for explanation as to the reports of maltreatment of Montenegrins by the Serbians, replied that King Nicholas was surrounded by bad people. The answer was of course totally irrelevant, since King Nicholas was in France and was not taking any part in the administration of Montenegro. He himself was very anxious to get someone to represent Montenegro at the Peace Conference.

Montenegro

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what had occurred in regard to the investigations which President Wilson undertook on January 12th to make.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the investigation had been undertaken, and that he was expecting the report in the near future.

(It was agreed to adjourn the discussion pending the receipt of the report expected by President Wilson).

(14). With reference to C. F. 14 Minute 2,¹⁰ the Council had before them the reply from the Committee composed of Mr. Barnes,

Mr. Shotwell, M. Fontaine and M. G. de Grunne¹¹ to the question referred to them by the Council, namely, as to whether Germany should be admitted to the Labour Organisation before she is admitted

International
Labour Organi-
sation Question
of Admission of
Germany

to the League of Nations (Appendix III).

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed agreement in the report of the Committee.

¹⁰ *Ante*, p. 625.

¹¹ British, American, French, and Belgian representatives, respectively, on the Subcommission on Labor for the Study of the Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace.

M. CLEMENCEAU also expressed himself in favour of the proposal that Germany should be admitted immediately after the Washington Conference.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed, but suggested that it would be preferable to send it to the Washington Conference with a recommendation in its favour.

(It was agreed that the accompanying letter should be remitted to the Washington Conference with a favourable recommendation from the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to communicate in this sense with the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference).

(15). At the end of the Meeting a telephone message was received from the Secretariat-General to the effect that Herr Brockdorff-

The German
Delegation

Rantzau was leaving for Spa this evening to confer with his Government and intended to return by Monday evening, May 19th.

(16). With reference to C. F. 13. A., Minute 8,¹² the following decision was approved as carrying out the intention of the Council and

Instructions to
the Drafting
Committee To Be
Initialed by
the Council

was initialed by M. Clemenceau, President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George and M. Orlando.

(It was agreed that the Drafting Committee of the Peace Conference shall not accept any decisions of the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers which does not bear the initials of M. Clemenceau, President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George and M. Orlando. Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to communicate this decision to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee).

(17). At Mr. Lloyd George's request it was agreed to hear the Indian Delegation in the afternoon at 4 : 30 p. m.

Indian Delegation

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 17 May, 1919.

Appendix I to CF-16

FRENCH REPUBLIC

MINISTER OF WAR
General Staff of the Army
CABINET

PARIS, 16 May, 1919.

No. 677.5/11

General Alby, Chief of General Staff.

To The President of the Council, Minister of War.

You ask me whether France had in hand stocks of clothing, including underclothing, boots, etc., obtained either from captures in the war,

¹² *Ante*, p. 617.

or from any other source, which might be used for the equipment of German prisoners of war against payment.

I have the honour to inform you that:

1. The Army no longer has any further stocks which could be used for this purpose.

2. The Supply Branch (Service de l'Intendance) only has a small supply of clothing, including:

2000 pairs of trousers.

7200 sweaters.

800 cloaks.

500 Horse buckets.

a wagon load of boots, half boots, and lace boots.

This clothing is intended for the German prisoners of war, belonging to our formations of prisoners of war.

Consequently, there remains in France no stock of clothing beyond a small supply indicated above, which has already been allotted for use.

J. ALBY

Appendix II to CF-16

Note on the Supply of Armaments to the New States of Central and Eastern Europe

Prepared by Mr. W. T. Layton at the request of Lord Robert Cecil

It is extremely important that a general policy should be laid down on the question of supplying arms to the new States of Central and Eastern Europe. So far as I am aware the position is that at present certain quantities of munitions are being allocated to various Nations by the French on the instructions of Marshal Foch; but in addition to this the various new States are making application to the Allies individually to be allowed to purchase their surplus stocks, and there is nothing except the financial difficulty to prevent the various Governments from selling these stocks while the market is brisk.

So far as Great Britain is concerned, the War Office has allocated certain munitions to Russia in accordance with Allied military policy. Except for this allocation, no arms have been supplied to Europe and up to the present we have refused to entertain any applications in the case of Small Arms in view of the negotiations which the Foreign Office is conducting with our Allies for the signature of an Arms Convention. But this instrument which forbids the sale of surplus stocks of Small Arms only is not yet approved, and it is doubtful whether any of our Allies have hitherto regarded it as limiting their dealings with European Countries.

In the case of armament not covered by the Arms Convention, Great Britain has opened negotiations but has not as yet made any sales.

If the British Ministry of Munitions and the corresponding Departments of our Allies are to consider themselves free to conclude sales of war material independently, it is evident that the relative military strength of the various new States of Europe might be greatly affected by the enterprise of the various Governments in acquiring some of the enormous surplus stocks of munitions in Europe.

It is also equally clear that the credits acquired by the various European States may be dissipated in the competitive purchase of munitions at the expense of the raw materials necessary for the re-establishment of their industries.

It is to be presumed that the League of Nations will in time deal with the question of rationing the Armaments allowed to the various States of Europe, but unless more immediate steps are taken, serious mischief will be done during the next six months.

It is therefore proposed:—

(a) That the Heads of States should be asked to formulate an interim policy to govern both the scale of equipment and the means by which armament is to be provided for the new States of Europe—having regard to the disarmament terms to be imposed on enemy powers and—

(b) That the Allied and Associated Governments should undertake not to make any sales or allocations of munitions except on the authorisation of an Inter-Allied Commission to be set up with the duty of seeing that the policy laid down in (1) is adhered to.

W. T. L[AYTON]

15.5.19.

Appendix III to CF-16

*Copy of Letter From Committee of the Labour Commission to the
Secretary-General, Peace Conference*

PARIS, 15 May, 1919.

SIR: The Committee of the Labour Commission has considered the question submitted by you on behalf of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers in your letter of the 14th.

The question is whether Germany should be admitted to early participation in the Labour Scheme of Organisation. The Committee answer in the affirmative.

During the sittings of the Labour Commission several members expressed the view that early admission of the Germans was desirable, so that Germany might be under the same obligation in respect of

labour as other advanced industrial countries. We believe that the Commission would have expressed itself in that sense, but for the fact that the scheme was framed as part of the League of Nations.

But if the Germans are to be kept out of the League for any considerable time, the Committee think that they should be admitted earlier to the Labour Organisation.

The Committee would not suggest admittance before the Washington Conference.

(1) Because in their present temper the probability is that they would use the occasion to create friction among the industrial classes of other countries which have been at war with them;

(2) It would raise the further question of the representation of other ex-enemy countries;

(3) The Organising Committee is already at work collecting materials from Allied, Associated and Neutral Countries on the assumption that those only are to be represented. To bring in Germany now would introduce an element of confusion and possibly of illwill.

We are of the opinion, however, that she might be admitted immediately after the Washington Conference. The further question arises as to the terms of admission. Unless otherwise provided for she would be entitled as one of the eight chief industrial countries to a place on the governing body. We should give her such place if she came in.

We are further of opinion that if the Supreme Council endorses the admission as suggested above, the recommendations and conventions adopted by the Washington Conference should be sent to the Government of Germany.

Since this matter may also affect the League of Nations it is suggested it should also be communicated to the Committee on the League of Nations.

GEORGE N. BARNES (British Empire)

JAMES T. SHOTWELL (U. S. A.)

ARTHUR FONTAINE (France)

G. DE GRUNNE (Belgium)

M. DUTASTA,

Secretary-General, Peace Conference

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House, Place des
Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday, May 17, 1919, at 4.15 p. m.**

[PRESENT]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.

Count Aldrovandi

Professor P. J. Mantoux

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

ITALY

M. Orlando.

Secretary.

Secretary.

Interpreter.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he and his colleagues had been considering the action of the Italian Government in landing forces at Scala Nova and other places on the Coast of Asia Minor, without consulting them. They had prepared a document which was now being reproduced, and which he would hand to M. Orlando. He then made a statement identical with the document. (Appendix 1.)

**The Italian
Landings on the
Coast of
Asia Minor**

M. ORLANDO said that on the day when his colleagues had announced to him the decision to disembark forces at Smyrna, Mr. Lloyd George had asked for details of the Italian landings elsewhere, and he had replied he knew very little about them, which was the absolute truth. He had then said he would consult Baron Sonnino. On the same afternoon, he had visited Mr. Lloyd George at his flat, and Baron Sonnino had explained that these landings were carried out for dealing with disorders that had arisen. Nothing more had been said on the matter, which he had presumed to be disposed of. He would receive the communication which his colleagues had to make to him, and would discuss it with Baron Sonnino.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that on the previous occasion when this subject had been raised, all that had been heard of was a landing to repair a pier at Scala Nova, after which, the Italian forces had been re-embarked. This fresh news, however, was of a far more formidable nature, since 500 troops were reported to have been landed, the Italian flag had been hoisted, the Customs House occupied, and some of the troops pushed some distance inland. The occupation of Marmarice had only been reported by the Italian fleet, but these last reports were

of definite landings. Moreover, they had occurred at a time when the three principal Powers associated with Italy had expressed themselves rather opposed to Scala Nova being in the Italian sphere, and in favour of it being in the Greek sphere. It had been a subject of discussion and no final decision had been taken. It was in this state of affairs that the Italian landing had taken place. In such conditions, it was difficult to take a decision in regard to Asia Minor or anywhere else. If such a thing were to happen in any dispute between France and Great Britain, it would create a most difficult situation. What he specially regretted was that this action tended to prejudice a discussion which he thought was going very well. He and his colleagues had been sincerely anxious to meet the views of Italy as far as they could, and he thought it was a very grave matter that this action should be taken, as it were, to jump the claim, when the matter was under discussion.

M. ORLANDO said he quite understood the feelings of Mr. Lloyd George, and thought, giving the interpretation placed by him on this action by Italy, that he was dissatisfied. He, himself, had not the intention which Mr. Lloyd George had suggested, and he deplored it. He had believed this landing to be merely a repetition of the same sort of thing as had occurred before, namely, a disembarkation to meet some local difficulty. He did not know of any serious landing of any considerable forces. He knew nothing of the landing of troops, the seizure of the Customs House, or the hoisting of the Italian flag, in fact, he had believed this to be a landing without any intention of prejudicing the future disposition of this territory. It was necessary, however, to preserve respect for each other's opinions, and he repeated that he would study the memorandum and take whatever dispositions were necessary.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would like to add that he and his colleagues had deliberately kept Greek troops away from Scala Nova, because they thought it would be unfair to Italy for them to land while the question was *sub judice*.

(At the end of the meeting, the memorandum was communicated to M. Orlando).

2. PRESIDENT WILSON said he had received a report of a great victory by General Denekin on the Czaritzen front. He claimed to have captured 10,000 prisoners, 128 machine guns, and 28 field guns, which ought to account for a large part of the Bolshevik forces on this front.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that coming at the same time as the capture of Samara by Koltchak, this was news of great importance.

SIR MAURICE HANKEY called attention to the expression of opinion by the Foreign Ministers that the Council of the Principal Allied and

Associated Powers should consider the question of policy towards Russia.¹

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had communicated with the United States Ambassador at Tokio, in order to arrange for the despatch of Mr. Morris as promised.

(At this point the Council adjourned to the room upstairs, in order to hear the Indian Delegation, which is dealt with separately in a stenographic report.² On the withdrawal of the Indian Delegation there was some conversation in regard to mandates in Asia Minor).

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was much impressed by the accumulating evidence of the unrest that would be caused in the Moslem world by the removal of the Sultan from Constantinople. Neither Great Britain nor France, as great Mohammedan Powers, could afford this unrest, and neither could the United States, if she was about to become a Mohammedan Power. If the Turkish capital were removed to Brussa and the Sultan with the Khalifate was established there, there would always be ferment and intrigue. He, himself, was in favour of keeping the Khalifate at Constantinople. The United States of America, the probable mandatory of Constantinople and the Straits, could be relied on to be absolutely impartial. He felt himself more or less pledged by the declaration he had made on behalf of the Turkish Government. M. Clemenceau had sent him a telegram approving this declaration.

Mandates in
Turkey. Constantinople and the
Khalifate

M. CLEMENCEAU said he could not recall it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he would let M. Clemenceau have a copy. The British Empire had nearly a million men fighting the Turks when no-one else had more than two thousand. He asked his colleagues to consider the desirability of keeping the Khalifate at Constantinople.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 17 May, 1919.

Appendix to CF-17

[*Memorandum Regarding Landing of Italian Forces on the Coast of Asia Minor*]

The President of the United States and the Prime Ministers of France and Great Britain have been told that Italian troops have occupied Scala Nova, landing sailors and marines, taking charge of the customs house, and hoisting the Italian colours. They would be very much obliged if the Prime Minister of Italy would inform them as to whether this statement is correct and if so as to the reasons which have influenced him in taking this action without giving his col-

¹ See vol. iv, pp. 719-720.

² CF-18, p. 690.

leagues any previous intimation of the intentions of the Italian Government. They are the more anxious as this landing has been preceded by other landings at Adalia, Marmarice and Budrum about which they have also not been consulted. They would point out that they have never taken any action in Turkey without previous consultation with their Italian colleague. In the case of the recent Greek landing at Smyrna they discussed the proposal with him before orders were given for a single Greek detachment to leave the shores of Greece and Signor Orlando himself agreed to the expedition and to a joint Allied landing to secure the forts. They also feel bound to express their astonishment at the action of the Italian authorities, if it is true, in view of the fact that M. Clemenceau had informed Signor Orlando on Thursday last that, in the opinion of the majority of his colleagues on the Council of Four, Scala Nova ought not to be included in an Italian sphere of influence in Asia Minor. They would be much obliged if Signor Orlando could give them full information in regard to this matter as they feel it is impossible for the Council of Four to attempt to deal with the problems of the near East if one of its members persistently takes action on its own account without previously consulting the other members.

17 MAY, 1919.

**Stenographic Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's
House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday, May 17,
1919, at 4:30 P. M.**

PRESENT

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson

FRANCE

Mr. Clemenceau

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Mr. Lloyd George

ITALY

Mr. Orlando

INDIAN DELEGATION

The Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu, M. P.,
Secretary of State for India;
H. H., the Maharajah of Bikanir;
The Rt. Hon. Lord Sinha;
H. H., the Aga Khan;
Mr. Aftab Ahmad;
Mr. Yusuf Ali,
Indian Civil Service (retired)

Secretaries

Sir Maurice Hankey;
Count Aldrovandi.

Interpreter—M. Mantoux.
Stenographer—C. L. Swem.

HON. E. S. MONTAGU: Mr. President and Gentlemen, I think I can first express our heartfelt thanks for this opportunity of stating our case, because we feel deeply that you gentlemen, who are pursuing the peace of the world in this room, are likely to endanger for a long time to come the peace of the world in the East unless you realize the strength of Mohammedan feeling against the sort of peace that we hear rumored as a result of the war with Turkey. The Government of India feel this particularly strongly; but I would propose today, with your permission, that you should hear the case from my Indian colleagues. The case is always the more forceful when presented by the inhabitants of the country itself, than by one who is privileged to represent them. I am accompanied here this afternoon by my two colleagues on the Imperial British Indian Delegation who are both Hindus. Their object in coming here this afternoon is to demonstrate by the words which they will address to you subsequently the depth and reality with which Hindu Indians sympathize with

the case of Mohammedan Indians. I would ask you first to hear His Highness, The Aga Khan.

H. H., THE AGA KHAN: Mr. President and Gentlemen: As you are aware, there are seventy million Mohammedans in India; and if you include the countries that border India and are in relations with India intimately, there are seventy-five million. I am quite sure that in this particular subject of Turkey and the sort of peace that is concluded in the Mohammedan states, which unfortunately were led into the war by German machinations, they are deeply interested; and in this particular subject I think I am right in saying that we have the full sympathy of our Indian fellow-citizens who are not Mohammedans but who are Hindus, of which class both of my friends here are members. As you are aware, the fall of Turkey was a great deal due to our efforts from India. The larger number of troops sent against Turkey were Indian troops. It was Indian blood and Indian treasure, Mohammedan blood and Mohammedan treasure, which was shed and used to bring about that great result, and while that war went on, we were convinced, and we are still convinced, in spite of rumors to the contrary, that this war was a real crusade for modern principles of justice and fair play towards all men, and that behind the hatred and death of this war, lay the principle that you were preaching. That was the principle behind it. Now, we maintain that this principle of nationality is a sacred one and does not apply to one country and not to another,—to big countries and not to small ones.

For these reasons we pray that where the Turkish race has its home, where it has been for centuries and centuries, such as Asia Minor, Thrace, the town of Constantinople and Asia Minor proper, which is the home of the Turkish-speaking race,—we pray that that country should remain Turkish. We appeal to the principle of nationality. We appeal to your speeches. We appeal to the interests, the vital interests, of France and Italy in the development of their future commerce and industry in those countries, that the final break with these Mohammedan nations should not take place. We appeal to No. Twelve of your Fourteen Points,¹ Mr. President, and to the speeches that you have made, sir. We beg of you to bear in mind the principles for which we have fought, like all of you, and to apply them without fear or favor wherever they can be applied, and we believe that they can be applied, if you will put into this, our case, a judicial mind.

I will not go into other points which I am leaving for my friends here, but there are one or two points which I desire to mention. Germany will be invited sometime into the League of Nations. The German races, wherever there have been no mandates appointed for the Germans, have been promised that they will enter the League of

¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, pp. 15-16.

Nations in the fullness of time. Now, the same ought to be promised to the Turkish races in the same condition. It does not matter whether Turkey is small or great, but if they are a nation, if they are one language, you mustn't punish the future generations still unborn for the sins of the people of this generation.

Another point which I bring before your notice is the Eastern provinces of Turkey, the Northeastern provinces of Turkey, and the Southwestern provinces of the Caucasus of Russia. They are Armenians, Mohammedans, Kurds, Turks—they are so to speak the real Macedonia of the Eastern races. The frontier between Turkey and Russia even before 1877 was a purely political frontier. It was not an ethnological or geographical frontier south of the Caucasus. We appeal to you, sir, that whatever the form of government which is to be established for what is called Armenia, it should at least apply to the whole of those areas, and that it should be equality for all races, all religions and all peoples within those confines. There have been undoubtedly in the past in these countries terrible bloodshed and fighting and so on, but let us at least see that those things do not happen to the Armenians or to the other people. I don't care particularly to mention them, but nobody now tries to decimate or reduce the Mohammedan population there, and they should have the same equal rights, no fear and no favor, but fair play.

These are the two points which I respectfully bring before you, and I am sure that there are seventy millions of my compatriots who feel them as strongly as I do.

RT. HON. E. S. MONTAGU: May I just intervene to say that I presume you all realize that the Sultan of Turkey has a spiritual authority far exceeding his temporal possessions as Khalif of the Mussulmans, which makes his destiny and the fate of his people of peculiar and particular interest to the Mohammedans of the world, even though they are not connected with Turkey?

H. H. THE AGA KHAN: Especially in India. That relationship has been very intimate, and it has never been severed even during the war. While Mohammedan troops have been fighting against the Turks, they have been praying for the Sultan of Turkey as Khalif at the same time. They fought because they believed they were fighting for principles above that.

Nobody has proposed to punish the Germans, who are the main offenders of this war, by taking Berlin from them. The Austrian Germans are to have Vienna. Why should the Turks alone have their capital taken from them?

RT. HON. E. S. MONTAGU: Mr. Aftab Ahmad, who comes from the Indian frontier, and who is a lawyer now, was a member of the Council of India.

MR. AFTAB AHMAD: Mr. President and Gentlemen, With your permission I shall observe that I feel the honor of being given this privilege of expressing my views on this momentous question,—the future of the Turkish Empire. I, as an Indian Mussulman, beg to say that the seventy millions of the Mussulmans of India occupy a special place in the great British Empire, which has played such a prominent part in bringing this war to a triumphant close. As citizens of the Empire the Indian Mussulmans have shed their blood and contributed their full share for the service and success of their Empire and the Allied cause. Not only in the other theatres of war, but even against Turkey herself, the Mussulmans of India fought for the principles of justice, freedom and self-determination—principles to which the great Allied Powers are definitely committed and to the benefit of which all races and creeds are equally entitled.

Having stood successfully the most severe test during a long period of trial and trouble, the Mussulmans of India are now naturally and, I think, rightly interested in the future settlement of the Turkish Empire, the only surviving Mohammedan power in the world and the seat and center of the dearly cherished Khalifat. But now it is said that the Turk is to be turned out of Constantinople, and that Asia Minor is to be cut up into pieces and distributed among France, Italy and Greece. We have also heard that Mesopotamia, Arabia, Syria and Palestine are to be placed under non-Moslem governments. As regards Constantinople, Thrace and Asia Minor, we would earnestly appeal to the principles proclaimed by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Great Britain as bearing upon their war aims in general, and on this part of the Turkish Empire in particular.

His Highness has already referred to Point No. 12 of your Fourteen Points, and especially to the important speech delivered by our Prime Minister in January [19]18², and with your permission I should just like to read a few words from your Point No. 12, that

“The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.”

And on the same point the Prime Minister was pleased to say in explaining and defining the principles for which Great Britain was fighting in this war,

“Nor are we fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominately Turkish in race.”

² *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. 1, p. 4.

I may be permitted to observe that these words have gone down deep into the hearts of millions of Mohammedans all over the world and nothing can eradicate them. They have put perfect faith and belief in these words, and they are anxiously waiting for the realization of the things which these words promise.

It is clear from what the Peace Conference has so far decided that the future of the enemy territories is settled upon the principle of nationality. We beg and pray that the same principle may be applied to the case of Turkey. It is needless to point out that these parts of the Turkish Empire are predominately Turkish in race, and it is not only the question of the sovereignty of the Sultan and the Khalifat, but the fate of the whole Turkish race, inhabiting these parts, is involved in your decision. Any such dismemberment of Turkey and subjugation of the Turkish race to foreign domination will be most strongly resented by the Moslems of India and will be regarded by them as due to the fact that Turkey is a Mohammedan power. This is sure to leave a sense of most bitter feeling in India and other parts of the Moslem world. There is no valid reason why Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria should be allowed to keep their capitals and Turkey should be deprived of sovereignty over Constantinople. We earnestly appeal that the Sultan should not only be allowed to possess complete sovereignty, but that in due course Turkey should be admitted to the League of Nations.

As regards Mesopotamia, Arabia, Syria and Palestine, our prayer is that they should continue to be under a Mohammedan government. The Mussulmans in India and other parts of the world are most anxiously watching the settlement with a view to see how far the principles of justice and self-determination are given effect to in the case of these territories. In this connection the essential points which we would earnestly urge before this august body are:

1. Establishment of Mohammedan government, not only in name but in fact, based on the principle of self-determination.

2. Definite and effective provision for their unhampered economic development, protecting their natural resources against foreign exploitation.

3. Definite and effective provision for the spread and extension of modern education of all grades and kinds to secure moral and intellectual advancement of the people.

And, lastly, adequate representation of representative Mohammedans upon any body or institution which the League of Nations should set up for periodical inspection of territories under its mandate, so that in due course these territories may also be admitted to the League.

Such are the tests which Mussulmans will naturally apply to any settlement which the Peace Conference may be pleased to determine

with regard to the Turkish Empire. We earnestly appeal that these essential points will be kept in view.

I may, in conclusion, be permitted to observe that upon the issue of your deliberations with regard to the future fate of Turkey depend, to a large extent, not only the future relations between the Indian Mussulmans and the Empire, but the situation in the whole Islamic world. We are most anxious to avoid the causes of that general unrest which is discernible in so many parts of the world at the present time and which may have most disastrous results.

RT. HON. E. S. MONTAGU: Mr. Yusuf Ali was a member of the Indian Civil Service and was a member of the Government of India; and is now resident in London.

MR. YUSUF ALI: Mr. President and Gentlemen: My colleagues who have spoken before you have already placed our case before you from various points of view. There is one point of view, however, in which I think you might be interested and on which I propose to concentrate my attention. I have been a very close student of the vernacular papers in India, and especially the Mohammedan vernacular papers, and I have been struck with the fact that the chief interests of the editors, and therefore presumably of their readers, have been concerned mainly during this war with the doings and the future of the Mohammedan powers concerned. It is well known how much strain was put upon the loyalty of the Indian Mohammedans when Turkey went into the war against us, but I claim, and I venture to think that that claim is justified, that the Indian Mohammedans stood that test steadfastly and loyally; and I think that they are entitled to have a voice in the settlement of the Mohammedan countries that is now before you.

It may be asked, What is their interest? I will not at the present moment go into questions of ethnology and point out that amongst the various strains which compose the body of Indian Mohammedans there is a good deal of Turkish Blood and Turkish tradition. The word "Urdu" which is the name of the national language of the Indian Mohammedans, called in Europe "Hindustani," is itself derived from a Turkish word meaning "camp,"—showing the origin of that language, how it arose in the camps of the Turks and Tartars, who were a great power in the time of the Mogul Empire in India. To you, sir, it is superfluous for me to refer to the visit, the historical visit of Captain Hawkins in the reign of Jahangir, and how he mentions the language in which he talked to the Mogul court was Turkish. I do not wish to lay any particular emphasis upon this, but it will at least show you that there are Turkish affinities and that the Indian Mohammedans in feeling an interest in the Turks and in their empire are feeling an interest which is quite close to them.

But apart from that we have the Arabian strain and the Persian strain, and the Central Asian strain, and the Hindu strain amongst the Indian Mohammedans, but whatever the origin, we all feel that we have an interest in our brother Mussulmen. The tie of religion with us is, it seems to me, rather stronger than the tie of religion amongst many of the followers of any of the other great historical religions. In fact, religion seems to take almost the place of blood or nation, and you can understand and appreciate the position as regards the Indian Mohammedans feeling an interest in Turkey.

And then they also feel that the last Mohammedan power, as my friend Mr. Aftab Ahmad has put it, the last remaining Mohammedan power if it vanishes will leave behind very large issues for which we venture to submit the world is not at present prepared. Here again it will be presumptuous for me to refer to the intricate political, economic and international questions which would justify us in making that statement. You gentlemen can deal with that much better than I can, but it is necessary to advert to the fact that this difficulty is present in our minds, and we base some of the arguments for favorable treatment of Turkey upon these very practical considerations.

Then there is the question of the declarations and pledges. Here I should like to say that we must take these declarations and pledges as they were understood by the Indian Mohammedans, as they would have been justified in understanding them, and I think I am right in saying that they universally expected that whatever settlement was arrived at after the war, it would not forever banish the hope of setting the Turkish and other peoples comprised in the Turkish Empire on their legs again.

Then there is the great question of the Khalifat. The Khalifat is a question on which perhaps it is difficult to speak briefly, but nevertheless, with your permission, I shall offer just a few remarks upon its practical aspect. I do not wish to go into history. I do not wish to go into theology. But I do wish to point out that the spiritual influence of the Khalifat, which is acknowledged in India by British subjects and by other subjects in other parts of the world, is intimately bound up with the prospects of educational and moral advancement amongst all the Moslem people, and if we handle that question in a manner that is prejudicial to the hopes and aspiration of the Moslem people, or if we cut off the whole of the old historical tradition, it is possible, indeed it is probable, that we shall make the advancement of the Moslem people more and more difficult.

MR. LLOYD-GEORGE: Is it hereditary?

MR. YUSUF ALI: It is in theory elective, but in practice it has been hereditary. In India some of the papers recently raised the question of the spiritual organization of the Indian Mohammedans, and various suggestions and proposals were put forward, but I could not help

noticing that they all related themselves to the historical growth of the spiritual head of Islam; and if we cut that off, I think that we shall find that the Indian Mohammedans will be placed at a great disadvantage,—you may say owing to their own ideas,—but they will in fact be placed at a great disadvantage in the race for future progress. We have at the present moment great and promising schemes for the self-development of India, politically, industrially and in other ways, and we wish and hope that the Mohammedans should take their rightful share in that self-development, but we feel that if extraneous causes,—prejudices, if you like so to call them,—in any way cut them off from taking their proper share as citizens of the British Indian Empire and of the British Empire, it would be a great calamity, not only to our own people, not only to the Indian Empire, but to the world at large.

It seems to us that sometimes Europe is apt to forget Islam, to forget the power that is behind it, to forget the force that it wields; and, at any rate, it is our duty clearly to point out that that power still exists, and if it is forgotten or neglected, it will only mean further complications in the future. We should like, therefore, that full consideration be given to the feelings and sentiments of the Indian Mohammedans on the question of the retention by the Turks of Constantinople and Thrace and Asia Minor, where they have substantially a Turkish population, and that the interests of the Mohammedans in all the other provinces should be so safeguarded that they have a reasonable hope of making further and further progress and entering into that committee of nations which is typified by admission when the time comes to the League of Nations.

H. H. THE MAHARAJAH OF BIKANIR: I should like, as a Hindu Indian, and as the ruler of one of the independent states of India under the King's protection, to observe that the princes and the people, even though they are non-Moslems, will be found in general sympathy with the aspiration of their brother Moslems in India. And as one who has the honor of representing the Indian Princes at this Conference, I should like to point out that the premier prince in India happens to be a Mohammedan ruler who has influenced for the good not only the activities of his own state, but Moslem opinion throughout India, in favor, of course, of the King Emperor and also of the Allies. I should like to plead also very strongly for the retention of the Sultan in Constantinople, and to strongly deprecate any partition of Turkey proper.

I need not repeat two points which I had put down, but which have been brought out by His Highness, the Aga Khan,—points concerning the tremendous loyalty of the Indian Mohammedans who formed a very considerable portion of the Indian Army, whose loyalty was taxed to the utmost. I can testify from having been with them in the

field, both in France, where thousands of Indian Moslems lie now, and in Egypt. In Mesopotamia, in East Africa, West Africa, the Shantung Province, and in every theatre of war, the Mohammedans have fought, and the point which His Highness brought out is a point which must appeal to all, that though they recognized the Khalif as their spiritual ruler, yet they fought against him: before and after fighting, every day, in the mornings and evenings, they were offering prayers for the Khalif, while still fighting for the King and the Allies in the cause of civilization.

The recent unrest in India is undoubtedly a reflex to a very great extent of the tremendous feeling of the Mohammedans and their apprehensions in regard to the future of Turkey, about which all sorts of rumors are current, and I would beg with a full sense of responsibility to say that if the Sultan and the Turks are deprived of Constantinople and there is a partition of Turkey, there will be grave unrest, hatred and trouble in the future, not only for India, not only for the British Empire, but for the world at large.

RT. HON. LORD SINHA: Gentlemen, I do not think it necessary for me to occupy any of your time after the matter has been so fully dealt with by my colleague, The Maharajah of Bikanir, as well as by the three Mohammedan gentlemen who have had the privilege of addressing you. I can only remind you once again of the fact that there are seventy millions of Mohammedans in India, which comprise, therefore, more than one-fifth of the population of the country. These Mohammedans comprise amongst them some of the most war-like races in India, and furnish a very large proportion of the Indian Army, of that Army with which the victory over Turkey has been so successfully obtained. I am confident from what I have read and seen as regards the feelings of my Mohammedan fellow-citizens in India, and I am confirmed in that feeling by the discussions I have had both yesterday and today with the three gentlemen who have addressed you just now, that there is grave anxiety in India amongst the Mohammedans with regard to the rumored dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. The Indian Mohammedan will not understand why, when the German is left in Berlin and the Austrian in Vienna, the Turk should be expelled from Constantinople. He will be apt, and I am afraid he will have reasonable justification for it,—he will be inclined to consider that after all he has fought against his religion and that, notwithstanding the professions of the various eminent statesmen who have declared the war aims and objects with regard to this war which has just terminated, that notwithstanding these declarations after all it has been, like in old times, the war of one religion against another. And what is more, and what is of great consequence to us in India, the Indian Mohammedan will have the belief that he has been made to fight by

false promises, made to fight against the spiritual head of his religion and made to fight, therefore, against his own religion himself, which to him is a far more living faith than, I am sorry to say, it is with regard to many others. That is the danger which is such a menace to the British Empire, and therefore I submit it to the world at large, and I do not hesitate for one moment to ask you to give it your full and grave consideration. We in India are likely to be sufferers in the first instance no doubt from this feeling amongst the Mohammedans, but it will not be confined to India. The peace of the world will be gravely imperilled, and I therefore join my voice with that of my fellow-subjects in earnestly proclaiming that the Turks should not be dealt with more severely or less justly than the other enemies in this war.

RT. HON. E. S. MONTAGU: I should like to give you some information which you may not have heard of the reality of the danger to the peace of the world which is thereby involved. It is only three days ago that I saw a representative of your Government, Mr. President, who has been in captivity with the Bolsheviks in Turkestan.³ He has come home after a most perilous journey, involving six sentences of death, and he tells me that all the way he traveled through that vast Mohammedan country he was struck by the various alterations in the tone of the Mussulman towards the Entente since the Armistice. They have heard these rumors of the dismemberment of Turkey, and he was struck by the anti-Entente feeling.

I don't know whether you have heard of the very serious trouble that we have had in the Punjab in India, where certain Hindu secessionists, largely influenced I believe by outside influences, largely influenced, I believe, by Bolshevik influences, were stirring up the people to resist the laws of the land. The Mosques were thrown open to them, and the non-Mussulman, the non-believer, the Hindu, was invited into the Mohammedan pulpit to preach opposition to the laws of the Indian Government, a thing which never happened before in the history of the world, I should imagine, and it would have been regarded by the old-fashioned Mohammedan as a desecration of their Mosques. Now, this is due, not to one item, but to a whole series of items. The talk about Constantinople began it; the rumors of the landing of Italian and Greek soldiers in Asia Minor, the suggestions that the Mosque of San Sofia should be rededicated as a Christian Church,—all these things have brought into these people's minds the belief that despite what was said to them during the war, this war has turned out to be a war of non-Mohammedans against Mohammedans, a war of non-Moslem faiths against the Moslem faith; and the feeling which has been shown by my colleagues today merely makes me implore you

³ The reference is to Roger C. Tredwell, American Consul at Tashkent. Concerning his detention by Soviet authorities and negotiations for his release, see *Foreign Relations*, 1919, Russia, pp. 167-184 *passim*.

to remember that that feeling, if it is not corrected by the terms of peace, may endanger the peace of the world throughout the East, and may add to the already dangerous elements in Russia.

MR. LLOYD-GEORGE: Surely, Mr. Secretary of State, the Moham-medans of India must know that most of the fighting has been done amongst the Christians.

RT. HON. E. S. MONTAGU: The fighting has been done amongst the Christians, but the peace terms dictated to our Christian enemies will strike them as so much more moderate than the peace terms which lead to the complete disappearance of our only Mussulman state. And did you see that the Turkish newspapers have published a statement that they thought the terms of peace to Germany very fair?

THE PRESIDENT: I want to speak of one thing that has been mentioned, though it has not been dwelt upon, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding. That is the suggestion that entrance into the League of Nations should be left open as freely to Mussulman Governments as to other. There is really no difficulty upon that point; but I want to call your attention to the fact that the covenant of the League limits membership to self-governing nations, and that Germany is not admitted at once because we are not sure that she is a self-governing nation. It was the opinion among all the conferees on this subject that we must wait until we had conclusive proof that Germany was no longer under the government of a single individual or a small group of individuals, but under the government of her own people, and that therefore her disposition to the rest of the world and her ambitions were altogether altered before she could be admitted into the League. I for my part do not anticipate any opposition to the admission of any government that displays those changes. So that it is not a question of present political relationship.

MR. LLOYD-GEORGE: There will certainly be no religious question.

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly not. It is merely a question of political form of government.

There is another matter that I would like to make clear in that connection: The whole theory of mandates is not the theory of permanent subordination. It is the theory of development, of putting upon the mandatory the duty of assisting in the development of the country under mandate, in order that it may be brought to a capacity for self-government and self-dependence which for the time being it has not reached, and that therefore the countries under mandate are candidates, so to say, for full membership in the family of nations. I think that is a very important fundamental idea of the whole mandatory conception.

H. H. THE AGA KHAN (or Lord Sinha): In these Mohammedan countries democracy is really part of their religion in a way. It is a

historical fact that in Islam it was common for centuries, while in the Middle Ages it did not exist in many other countries, and those self-governing and democratic principles should be applied to these Mohammedans. They should be allowed to enter the League of Nations, and nothing should be done to prevent their remaining self-governing nations, just as Germany will enter when she changes her spirit.

MR. YUSUF ALI: We are afraid, sir, that if the arrangements are as rumored, that will delay the process of their becoming self-governing, or will destroy their hopes altogether.

THE PRESIDENT: Of course, I think we all recognize that the trouble in Asia Minor has been the rivalry and clash of nationalities and religions, and that the problem is complex because the mixture is so complex and the competition so sharp.

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Monday, May 19, 1919, at 11 a. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B., *Secretary*.
Professor P. J. Mantoux, *Interpreter*.

Marshal Foch and General Weygand were introduced by M. Clemenceau.

MARSHAL FOCH reported that he had visited the Allied Armies in the occupation zone of the Rhine. He had first visited the French Army at Mayence. The French had eighteen divisions ready to march, three of which were in the Belgian zone. Not all these were complete with full cadres, but they had sufficient to start at once. There were a few men on leave who would have to be recalled. The men at the head were in a good frame of mind, and ready to do what was required at once. The army was fully equipped with munitions and transport. In short the French army was ready to march with fifteen divisions, besides three in the Belgian zone and three cavalry divisions.

Action in the
Event of the
Germans Refus-
ing To Sign

To the left of the French army was the United States Army at Coblenz. This consisted of the First Army composed of three divisions of Infantry, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd. After the 27th May, the 3rd Division would be withdrawn; hence the position was that three Divisions were available till May 27th, and thereafter two Divisions. In addition, if necessary, the 4th and 5th Divisions, which were about to be withdrawn, could be made available by countermanding the transport arrangements, which would commence their withdrawal on the 21st. By cancelling these arrangements, five Divisions could be made available. The United States divisions had everything complete; artillery, ambulances, ordnance, munitions. He had offered the United States Commander-in-Chief a French cavalry

Division, in order that he may maintain communication with the British Army on his left. The only thing which might be insufficient was the number of Divisions.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the American Divisions were 27,000 men strong.

MARSHAL FOCH continuing, said that to the left of the United States Army was the British Army at Cologne. It consisted of ten Divisions which, however, were not ready to march without seven days' warning. The officers who had conducted the campaign were being gradually replaced by young officers, but this process was not yet complete. The British Army lacked certain things, for example, guns on motor carriages and cavalry, but it would be ready to march after seven days' warning. He asked Mr. Lloyd George's permission to draw General Wilson's¹ attention to the deficiencies, and to arrange matters with him as rapidly as possible so as to reduce the time within which the army could march.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Secretary of State for War was in Paris, and the best plan would be for Marshal Foch to see him.

MARSHAL FOCH continuing said that north of the British Army was the Belgian Army, consisting of six infantry Divisions, and one cavalry Division, with three French Divisions already referred to in support. The Belgian Army was in excellent condition. It had lacked some motor transport, which the French Army had supplied, and it was now quite ready to march. From this review of the situation it resulted that the whole army would be ready to march as soon as the British effectives were completed, and a French cavalry Division moved to the left of the United States Army. At the same time the Polish Army was being rapidly transported. 192 trains had already passed, each conveying a battalion of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, or a battery of artillery, or supplies. About 100 trains remained to complete the transport. At the rate of 6 trains a day, 17 or 18 days would be required to complete operations. Hence in little over a fortnight the new Polish army would have been completely concentrated in Poland. It was well constructed with complete cadres. In reply to M. Clemenceau he said that it contained at least 600 French officers. It was a new, fresh army, and it would be acting from a very advantageous geographical situation.

As regards the Czecho-Slovak army, he gathered from the correspondence that it was hoped to send at least one Division in the direction of Nuremberg, which would be able to join with the Allied troops marching eastwards from Mayence.

¹ Field Marshal Sir Henry H. Wilson, British Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

From the above the conclusion he drew, although it was open to reservation, was that it would be best not to launch the offensive until the whole of the Poles had been transported, as otherwise at the least hint of an offensive by the Allied and Associated Powers, the transport across Germany would cease.

The above was all he had to say from a military point of view, but he wished to report that Dr. Hayne [*Heim*],² a representative of Bavaria, had asked a fortnight ago to see someone from G. H. Q. The day before yesterday he had reported that he was ready to enter into relations with the French representatives. Consequently an officer had been designated to meet him at Luxemburg, with instructions to hear what he had to say, but not to commit himself in replying.

In the course of a short subsequent discussion, MR. LLOYD GEORGE put the question as to how soon the Allied troops could march, supposing first that Marshal Foch were to arrange with Mr. Churchill in the course of the day to make good the deficiencies of the British Army, and second, supposing the Germans were told on Thursday next that they must sign within five days, or the armistice would expire.

MARSHAL FOCH said that if the British deficiencies were made good, the armies could march at the expiration of the five days.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE then authorised Marshal Foch to make any arrangements he could with Mr. Churchill, so as to enable the army to march at the end of this period. He felt that if the order were given for them to march, the armies should be in a position to march at once.

(It was agreed that Marshal Foch should see Mr. Churchill, the British Secretary of State for War, at once, and make all arrangements with him to put the British Army on the Rhine in a position to march without delay.)

(Marshal Foch and General Weygand withdrew.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 19 May, 1919.

² Georg Heim, member of the Bavarian *Volkspartei*; member of the Peace Committee in the Reichstag. For the resulting interview between Dr. Heim and General Desticker, see appendix I to CF-28, p. 906.

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's Residence in the
Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Monday, May 19, at 11.30 a. m.**

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

President Wilson.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

Sir Maurice Hankey
Prof. P. J. Mantoux

Secretary.
Interpreter.

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE read a telegram received from the British General Haking at Spa, communicating a telegram he had received from Berlin. According to this information, some German troops marching past the British Embassy, where the British Military Mission was quartered, had called out "Down with England" but the demonstration had been half-hearted, and the men had been grinning at the time. There had been a protest against the terms of peace, in which 8,000 to 10,000 people had taken part, but they had made no demonstration in passing the Embassy. There was no indication of serious movements of troops westward, and the informant doubted whether the Germans would make any attempt to re-take Posen, which would mean starting the war all over again, except in case of great desperation. Great depression was reported in all parts of Berlin.

News From
Berlin

M. CLEMENCEAU said that his information was of a very similar nature.

2. PRESIDENT WILSON read two telegrams he had received from the American Minister at Warsaw, one containing a message from M. Paderewski. Paraphrases of both these telegrams are reproduced in the appendix.

The Polish-
Ukrainian
Armistice

MR. LLOYD GEORGE's comment on this was that it was extremely difficult to establish the facts. General Botha, on review of all the facts in his possession as Head of the Armistice Commission, had taken the very opposite point of view to that taken in these telegrams. Clearly, therefore, it would be very dangerous to come to a conclusion without further advice. He considered that General Botha should

be asked to summon the Armistice Commission, and to advise the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the subject.

PRESIDENT WILSON and M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

(Later in the Meeting, it was ascertained that General Botha had been called to London, but messages were sent asking him to return at once.)

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Bolshevik reply to Dr. Nansen's letter was another instance of the extraordinary difficulty in eliciting facts.¹ To read this reply gave the impression that the Bolsheviks refused Dr. Nansen's offer because they did not wish to compromise their prospects of military success. All the information he had received, however, was that the Bolsheviks were collapsing in a military sense.

The Bolshevik
Reply to Dr.
Nansen's Letter

4. PRESIDENT WILSON read a dispatch from a very experienced United States representative, who had visited Buda-Pest. The gist of this was that Bela Kun's Government wished to avoid bloodshed and murder, but was unable to control its agents, with a result that the "Red Guard" were pillaging, and there was great chaos in the country. The Roumanian advance had increased the disorders, and the failure of the Roumanians to continue their advance had again caused further disorders and attacks on the alleged counter-revolutionaries. Some bad instances were given of murders, including that of the President of the late Hungarian Parliament. Attention was also called to Italian intrigues in Hungary. The dispatch concluded by a recommendation that military intervention by the Allied and Associated Powers was essential. It stated that there would be no difficulty in this, because the mass of the people condemned the present Government. Failing intervention, there would be anarchy. The French were at Belgrade, and ready to occupy Buda-Pest, and claimed to have sufficient troops. It was stated that the occupation of Buda-Pest would not be a formidable enterprise. The second recommendation was that simultaneously with the advance, an Allied Mission should be sent under some man like General Smuts.

Hungary

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if Buda-Pest was occupied, what would happen next?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said the difficulty was to get out after an occupation like this.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would study the possibilities of a French advance in concert with the Roumanians. He did not want the French troops carrying out this operation alone.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he would not trust the Roumanians, who had local interests and would excite the hostility of the Hungarian

¹ For the text of Dr. Nansen's letter, see *Foreign Relations*, 1919, Russia, p. 111. For the Bolshevik reply, see *ibid.*, p. 111; also enclosure 1 to appendix III to CF-20, p. 743.

population. He was very doubtful whether an advance was a wise thing to do.

M. CLEMENCEAU said a good deal would depend upon what happened at the expiration of the fortnight given to the Germans, next Thursday. He undertook to have the situation studied from a military point of view, and to report on the following day as to the possibility of occupying Buda-Pest.

5. M. CLEMENCEAU communicated some confidential information he had received as to the probability of the Germans agreeing to sign. This indicated that the Germans would probably ask for a further delay. He believed, however, that Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau knew the Treaty would have to be signed in the end, and would sign it himself if he could not get someone else to do so. He thought the Germans ought to be given more time if they required it.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed, and considered that on the whole a demand for delay would be a good sign.

6. MR. LLOYD GEORGE reported a visit he had received from M. Orlando on the previous day. One significant point was that M. Orlando had been accompanied by his own *chef-de-cabinet* and not by Count Aldrovandi, who was Baron Sonnino's *chef-de-cabinet*. M. Orlando had shown him the proposals he had made to Dr. Miller of the American Delegation, and he had shown clearly how much he was affected by the question of Fiume. He had ended by making an appeal for the mandate for the whole of Anatolia. Mr. Lloyd George had replied to him that that was quite hopeless. At last M. Orlando had let out that he really did not care a scrap about Asia-Minor if he could get Fiume. Italian public opinion was not really concerned with Asia-Minor, and the Italian Government only wished to have that as compensation if they could not secure Fiume. M. Orlando had admitted that he would rather have Fiume than anything in Asia-Minor. Mr. Lloyd George asked him whether, supposing Italy got Fiume, he would drop Asia-Minor; and he had replied that he would. He had kept reverting all through the interview to the question of Fiume, and had said that Italian public opinion was very much engaged in it. Mr. Lloyd George had asked if the Yugo-Slavs could have the use of Fiume while a new port was being constructed at Italian expense.

The more he thought of the problem presented by the presence of the Italians in Asia Minor, the more full of mischief the scheme seemed. The Mohammedan deputation, who had given evidence on Saturday, were very alarmed about the whole outlook. They had only been persuaded to come with great difficulty. They had discussed the question until 2 a. m. on Saturday morning and their opinion had been that

the whole Mohammedan world would be so upset by what was being done in Turkey that it would be better for them to avoid being mixed up with it. The Turks, while respecting the British, French and Americans, the two former of whom had beaten them, absolutely despised the Italians. To put the Turks under the Italians when they thought themselves better men than the latter, would put the whole Mohammedan world in revolt. At the risk of appearing to vacillate, he would like to reconsider the provisional decision already taken.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he did not in the least mind vacillating, provided the solution reached was the right one.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that his present attitude was that it would be best to get the Italians out of Asia Minor altogether. Frankly, he had changed his mind on the question of dividing Anatolia. He thought that it would be a mistake to tear up this purely Turkish province.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that what had impressed him in the evidence of the Mohammedan deputation was what they had said about Turkish sovereignty. He, himself, had forgotten that he had used the word in the 14 points. These 14 points now constituted a sort of Treaty: in fact in the case of Germany, as Mr. Lloyd George pointed out, they were the basis of the Treaty with Germany. However, it was impossible to work on different sets of principles in the different Treaties of Peace. He was impressed by the fact that the sentiment of the sovereignty of the Sultan was closely connected with the sentiment of Khalfate. He had derived the impression that if the Mohammedan troops, who had fought against the Turks, had thought they were doing more than break the alliance of the Turks with Germany, they would not have fought. They would not have continued fighting to destroy the sovereignty of the Sultan over the Turkish people. Moreover, he and Mr. Lloyd George had said they would not destroy Turkish sovereignty. He had forgotten this until reminded of it on Saturday. (Mr. Lloyd George said he had also forgotten it). It was true that he had written the 14 points when the situation was altogether different and when there had been a close combination of the four enemy powers, but, nevertheless, this did not affect the essential principles on which they were based. He asked if some way could not be discovered for finding a solution on the following lines? He had not thought it out in detail but this was his idea:—Could not the Sultan be left his sovereignty over Anatolia and merely required in certain specific matters to take the advice of, say, the French Government? For example, he might have to take their advice in regard to financial and economic matters and perhaps in regard to international relations. He was not sure that this would not be managed by retaining the Turks in Constantinople, although exercising no sovereignty there. Just

as the Pope of Rome lived in Rome without sovereignty and issued his orders to the Roman Catholic Church. Inasmuch as the Mandatory Power at Constantinople would only be responsible for local matters, he saw no reason [that] there should be any clash.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had been thinking of some similar scheme.

PRESIDENT WILSON said his idea would be to assign some residential district in Constantinople to the Sultan. He would not, of course, be confined there any more than the Pope of Rome was confined to Vatican for it was of his own volition only that the Pope confined himself. The Sultan would then be separated from his Kingdom merely by a narrow strip of water and territory.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in this case France—and he had no objection to France being entrusted with this—should, in his view, be confined to guiding the Sultan in regard to finance, concessions, and commercial matters. He was opposed to interference with matters of Government as it would only cause great anger in the whole Mohammedan population.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the terms would have to be drawn very carefully as the Turkish Government was a very bad one.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was reminded that the matter of *Gendarmerie* would be a difficult one. It had always been found necessary to maintain an International *Gendarmerie* for the purpose of keeping order. In this case, however, the main Greek and Armenian populations were being withdrawn from Turkish rule and there would only be relatively unimportant minorities under the Turks.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the scheme should be put in writing and examined.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had arranged for a meeting in the afternoon of members of the British Cabinet who were in Paris.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the Mohammedan deputation who had been received on Saturday had, he had observed, pricked up their ears when something was said about a mandate. It would be difficult for the Turks to distinguish between one sort of mandate and another. What he was suggesting was in effect to give a mandate to France without calling it a mandate. That is to say, France would not be responsible to the League of Nations, she would be in a similar position as an independent friendly country advising the Turkish Government under treaty stipulations. The terms of the Treaty, therefore, would be more limited than the terms of the mandate.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if France took a position of this kind towards the whole of Asia Minor, which would be a very important trust, he would have to ask for a re-examination of the whole question of mandates in the Turkish Empire.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that this solution would leave the Italians out entirely. This brought him back to the question of Fiume.

He was inclined to think that this matter had better be left for a few days. He understood that there was a tendency towards changes of opinion in Rome which might take shape in a few days' time. He had heard that the Italians and Jugo-Slav shipping people were getting together on the question of shipping in the Adriatic.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that this was at the expense of the British Empire. The Italians were trying to make a negotiation with the Jugo-Slavs to divide the whole of the Austro-Hungarian shipping. It was a most shabby scheme. Great Britain had probably lost hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping in Italy's interest and now Italy was trying to exclude her from any share. Italy would have starved but for the risk that British and French ships had run.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that M. Orlando, in his conversation with Dr. Miller and other American representatives, had, in the end, acceded to the idea of an independent Fiume. If he, himself, were in a position to offer friendly advice to M. Orlando, he would tell him to say to the Italian people that it was not to the interest of Italy to destroy her friendship with the United States. The Americans were willing to take up this position that Italy could have any territory in dispute, the population of which would vote for Italian sovereignty. If Italy declined this offer it would show that she was not sincere in what she had said about the unredeemed Italian peoples.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if the Italians could be got out of Asia Minor altogether it would, in his opinion, be worth giving them something they were specially concerned in, even if it involved the Allies swallowing their words.

PRESIDENT WILSON hoped that Mr. Lloyd George would not press this point of view. He was bound to adhere to his principle that no peoples should be handed over to another rule without their consent.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had assumed that the agreement of the Jugo-Slavs could be obtained. After all, Fiume was a Town with an Italian flavour and an Italian name. Aga Khan had said that no-one who knew Fiume could think of it as anything but an Italian city. It was true that if the suburbs were included there would be a small majority in favour of the Jugo-Slavs. If, however, the Jugo-Slavs were willing to accept another harbour to be constructed by the Italians somewhere else, would it not then be possible to hand Fiume with their consent to the Italians. Surely, this would be worth while if by these means the Italians could be bought off Dalmatia—and in this respect he and M. Clemenceau were in a difficult position owing to the Treaty of London—and if they could also be bought off Asia Minor. This latter was, in his view, most important to the peace of the world.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this was virtually the proposition that had been put to the Italians by the American group. Their proposal

had not been to hand Fiume to the Italians but to have a plebiscite if the Italians had constructed a port at Buccari. This, of course, was subject to the people of Fiume still desiring to become Italian. The difficulty he foresaw was in the Italians being able to finance the construction of a port.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that Italy had an abundance of good engineering labour and he thought they could carry out the scheme.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that in his view the weakest part of the Italian case was their insistence on an Army sustained by compulsory service. In France, conscription, he understood, was both a habit and a preference. This, however, was not Italy's argument. The Italians said they could not get a voluntary Army because they would have to pay so little.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE again insisted on the importance of getting the Italians out of Asia Minor. If this were not done there would always be trouble there as well as in Armenia where America would have the mandate.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Mohammedan deputation were also very strongly opposed to an Italian mandate in the Caucasus.

(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to invite M. Venizelos and Baron Sonnino for a meeting at 4-30 p. m.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS 19 May, 1919.

Appendix I to CF-18B

Mr. Gibson, American Minister at Warsaw, to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace

(Telegram—Paraphrase)

AMERICAN LEGATION,
WARSAW, May 14, 1919.

Mr. Gibson states that the following is a confidential message which Mr. Paderewski sends for President Wilson.

That everything should be done according to the wishes expressed by you has been my most earnest desire since my arrival here from Paris. In compliance with the request made by you two divisions of the army under General Haller which were on the Volhynian front and marching to assist in defending Lemberg, have been stopped.

Again having convinced myself that the Ukrainians are far removed from being what they have pretended and what the Conference desires to consider them, I must bring this information to your attention and to that of your colleagues. General Oskilko, Commander in Chief of the Second Ukrainian Army, with two of his superior

officers, has deserted, and asking protection, has surrendered to the Polish Army. He gives as a reason for this conduct the contamination of the Ukrainian Army by Bolshevism and the necessity of quitting in order that his own life might be saved. General Oskilko is now under the escort of Polish soldiers at Lublin.

Desirous of meeting your wishes, and the wishes of your colleagues, I looked thoroughly into the situation, and I found that the whole of the East Galician country is unanimous in a demand for decisive and energetic action, owing to the numerous crimes which the Ukrainians daily commit in East Galicia, massacres and slaughters which can only be compared to the Turkish crimes in Armenia. Before my arrival, plans had been made and orders had been issued for an offensive without General Haller's co-operation; May 12th was the date set for the beginning of the action. At my insistence, however, action was withheld. On the 11th, General Pavlenko telegraphed a reminder that in Paris the armistice was being concluded, and announced the cessation of all military operations. We credited them with being sincere in their intentions. But they attacked us at two new points on the 12th,—at Vatrzyki they entered our entrenchments, and they bombarded the city of Sanok, hitherto outside of military operations. The Government is now rendered powerless by the excitement throughout the country by the indignation expressed by the most reasonable of the leading people; indeed, it is not possible to ask quiet and patience of a people at the same moment they are being murdered ruthlessly by Ukrainian soldiers who have turned against their own chiefs, by bandits organized in the hope of plunder, with whom Poland is asked to negotiate as with equals. The defence and protection of a population of 1,700,000 is the sacred duty of the military and civilian authorities, is the view held by them, for a portion of this population has practically been exterminated, and any resistance to the just and legitimate conclusion reached by those authorities would immediately bring about a revolution covering the whole country. While I am willing to tender at any moment the resignation of my Government, the situation hardly would be improved by this action. Allied military observers to attend the operations would gladly be received by the chief command. Your sure insight, based on your sublime sense of justice, I am confident, will grasp the tragedy of the situation, and your opinion is hopefully and impatiently awaited.

I. J. PADEREWSKI

From Mr. Gibson, American Minister at Warsaw, to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace

(Telegram—Paraphrase)

AMERICAN LEGATION,
WARSAW, May 14, 1919.

Mr. Gibson states that the early attention of the Conference should be given to the situation which has arisen in Poland since the return of Mr. Paderewski from Paris. Mr. Gibson, and the French and British diplomatic representatives have in independent actions pointed out to Mr. Paderewski and to the Foreign Office members the serious attention which the Conference already has given to the Lemberg situation. Upon returning from Paris, and finding that all arrangements for attacks on the Lemberg and Volhynian fronts had been made, Paderewski energetically took the matter up, stating that he had promised upon his honor that no offensive on the Lemberg front should be made with Haller's army, and that he would resign unless the orders were changed. On May 12th the orders were withdrawn, and immediately thereafter Paderewski was attended by a delegation from the Diet and informed that the tales of atrocities committed by the Ukrainians caused the feeling in the country to be so outraged that it was necessary to go ahead with the operations. Paderewski, while striving to maintain views expressed by him, has small hopes of success. He now limits himself to the statement that he will endeavor to obtain the release of the Allies to the promise made by him, but failing in that course and unless the Diet adheres to his viewpoint he would be compelled to resign. On the 15th another conference with the Diet leaders is to be held, and in an effort to bring the situation under control Paderewski will propose the following arrangement:

One. Complete independence of the Lithuanians and White Russians to be formally recognised by the Diet.

Two. The granting of Eastern Galicia to Poland with complete local autonomy to be urged upon the Peace Conference by Paderewski.

Three. For the purpose of maintaining order and obviating additional outrages Paderewski is to ask the Peace Conference that he and General Pilsudski be permitted discretionary powers in connection with the use of Polish forces. Failure of claims on points mentioned, would place Paderewski government in untenable position, and his adherents claim that to overthrow him would bring about immediate revolution and disorder. Mr. Gibson says that his information indicated that even the opponents of Paderewski do not claim that complete order would be maintained. Mr. Gibson further says should the government not yield, a general strike of railroad, post office and telegraph employees would threaten, and that this movement compared to some forms of political upheaval would invoke more danger. Mr. Gibson

adds that any of these developments undoubtedly will find the internal situation ripe, and that it appears to be plain that unless the dark and more or less hysterical conditions now existing can be taken into consideration at their whole value, no sound conclusions can be arrived at in regard to Polish matters. Mr. Gibson further adds that two alternatives may be offered to us, and outlines them as follows:

First. Paderewski's personal responsibility to which he is held on account of the promise made by him in Paris to be modified, in order to secure his continuance in office, and assure the continuance of his wholesome and sincere restraining influence at a time when there does not seem to be any one of similar characteristics to take his place.

Second. Paderewski to be held strictly to the fulfillment of the promise made by him, which would carry with it the possibility of his enforced retirement, without gaining our point, and with the loss of the strong personal influence which he has wielded on behalf of our ideas. This action would permit the government to come into the control of any of the factions now only too anxious to seize it, on Chauvinistic grounds, which in the present excited state of public opinion readily appeal to the crowd. Mr. Gibson says that he cannot think of anyone who might control a majority in the Assembly, and replace Paderewski with any likelihood of holding it in an orderly manner.

Public feeling has been aroused by various happenings. The belief is current that in certain Galician villages the entire Polish populace has been exterminated by the Ukrainians, and various additional excesses are attributed to them. General Oskilko's surrender (to which Paderewski referred in his telegram to the President) together with the apparent reasons for same, have been the cause of further excitement. In addition, there has been the recent surrender to the Poles of several regiments composed of Russian soldiers from the Tula Division, which in April allied themselves with Ukrainian forces in order to support [*suppress?*] Bolshevism. They say that they want to join Poles so as to down the Ukrainians, who themselves are the advocates of Bolshevism. No matter what the foundation for these stories may be, their effect is definite, giving rise to a situation which we cannot ignore. The opponents of Paderewski in the Diet and elsewhere make use of this situation to influence public opinion in favor of advancing into Galicia in order to protect the lives of over a million Poles, and cause the downfall of Paderewski, who is denounced as submitting to the murder and torture of citizens and soldiers of Poland rather than incur the displeasure of American, British and French statesmen.

Late to-night, accompanied by his British Colleague, Mr. Gibson called on Paderewski and made an appeal that he would endeavour to dominate the situation by a supreme effort, and bring Poland to sup-

port and carry out his promises. Mr. Gibson urged the matter on the ground of Polish interests; he stated that if in the face of all obstacles he definitely determines to put an end to offensive operations and carry out the armistice, he will go back to Paris with his prestige greatly augmented; on the other hand, despite the sincerity of his efforts, his position in Paris will be impaired if an advance is made into Galicia. Paderewski admitted to Mr. Gibson the truth of this, and promised to maintain a stiff front and do all he could to fulfil the wishes of the President, but he entertained small hope that a change of heart on the part of the Diet and the people could be forced.

Mr. Gibson adds that he will continue to endeavour to carry out the desires of the Peace Conference according to his understanding of them, and requests that the mission cable him a full expression of its views.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Monday, May 19, 1919, at 4 p. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

Count Aldrovandi

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. } *Secretaries.*

Prof. P. J. Mantoux.—*Interpreter.*

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

ITALY

M. Sonnino.

M. Venizelos was introduced.

1. **PRESIDENT WILSON** drew attention of M. Sonnino to the memorandum handed to M. Orlando on May 17th (C. F. 17. Appendix).¹ He said that what concerned the Council was that the landings seemed to have taken place without any justification.

The Italian
Landings on
the Coast of
Asia Minor

BARON SONNINO handed round the text of a reply prepared by the Italian Delegation (Appendix I.) He doubted if the presence of M. Venizelos would be found helpful. He did not feel justified in assenting to his presence when the communication had been made to M. Orlando, especially in the absence of the latter.

(M. Venizelos then offered to withdraw and left the room).

PRESIDENT WILSON said he did not quite understand Baron Sonnino's attitude. M. Venizelos was a member of the Peace Conference and equal with all the other members.

BARON SONNINO said he was not speaking in his own name, but for the President of the Council who was ill. He did not feel justified in agreeing to another party who had not been present when the memorandum was handed to M. Orlando taking part in its general discussion. He felt it was not quite fair, either to himself or to the Italian Delegation, more especially as M. Venizelos had a particular interest in all these questions.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if it was because M. Venizelos was not interested that he should not be present.

¹ *Ante*, p. 688.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that because he was an interested party, Baron Sonnino took this view.

BARON SONNINO said he knew very little of the circumstances in which the memorandum had been presented to M. Orlando. He could not understand why it should be discussed in the presence of a fifth party. The Italian Delegation had not been particularly asked to be present to discuss the sending of Greek soldiers to Smyrna.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that not a single Greek soldier had left for Smyrna until the Italian Delegation had been consulted.

BARON SONNINO said that M. Venizelos had been invited to send the troops on May 6th.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the Italian Delegation at that time was not in Paris.

BARON SONNINO said that the Italian Delegation had had a general discussion earlier in the Peace Conference with the Greeks on this subject but it had been suspended pending the discussion of larger questions, including the Adriatic and mandates in Turkey, etc.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the reason for the decision to send Greek troops to Smyrna was that the Greeks were being massacred in that region. He, himself, had received a letter from a British merchant at Smyrna reporting massacres of Greeks. There were two or three hundred thousand Greek inhabitants at Smyrna and it had been necessary to provide some protection. This reason did not apply to the Italian landing at Scala Nuova as there were no Italians there.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had had to make an exhaustive enquiry as to why a single Company of French troops had been landed at Heraclea. This landing had not been ordered from Paris and nothing had been known of it there. It had, as a matter of fact, been ordered at the request of the Turks by the Local French Command at Constantinople, the reason being that coal was wanted at Constantinople and owing to disturbances at Heraclea, it was not arriving. He declared that he was prepared to withdraw this single Company if the Conference demanded that he should.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the memorandum handed by Baron Sonnino did not explain why 2,000 Italian troops had been landed at Scala Nuova.

BARON SONNINO said that there had been troubles in this district: for example, when the Greeks landed at Smyrna, there had been murders and massacres by the Greeks. In 1917, not only Scala Nuova but even Smyrna had been attributed to Italy. The question was still under discussion when the Greek landing was authorised.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Smyrna was not attributed to Italy by the Treaty of London.

BARON SONNINO pointed out that under Article 9 of the Treaty of London, it was recognised in a general manner that in the event of

the total or partial partition of Turkey in Asia, Italy should obtain an equitable part in the Mediterranean region in the neighborhood of the province of Adalia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Italy had shown no anxiety during the war to occupy any part of Turkey, neither Smyrna nor Budrum, nor Scala Nuova. At that time such action on their part would have been very welcome.

M. SONNINO said Italy had offered troops for the Turkish theatre several times.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said they were only Abyssinian troops, and then only about 1,000, when 200,000 to 300,000 were wanted to fight Turkey.

M. SONNINO said that Italy had her hands full fighting Austria.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he must respectfully remind M. Sonnino that this was not a conversation merely between Allies. The United States had a right to a place there, and further had a right to ask questions, regardless of the Treaty of London. This Treaty did not provide an effective reason why troops should be disembarked on the mainland, or why these places should be occupied.

M. SONNINO said that at Adalia there had been disorders amounting to anarchy.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if the landings at Scala Nuova, Makri and Budrum had been due to the same cause.

M. SONNINO said there had been disorders at Makri; Marmaris had been occupied because it was necessary to keep ships off the coast of Adalia and Marmaris was the only place at which they could lie in all weather. These landings did not compromise the final territorial decisions.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that although it might not be the Italians' intention to prejudice the decision by this action, in fact it was prejudiced.

M. SONNINO said it was necessary to avoid disorder. At Smyrna there had been disorder, and he was informed the Greeks had gone to Aidin. That was not in accordance with the recent decision.

M. CLEMENCEAU said they had asked permission to go there, and that was why M. Venizelos was present.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he and his colleagues had deemed it only courteous to M. Sonnino to invite him to be present when the question was discussed of giving a more extended region of occupation to the Greek troops.

M. SONNINO said that in the present discussion he would have preferred that M. Venizelos should not be present. The Italian Delegation had had discussions with M. Venizelos, and M. Venizelos had published what had occurred in the newspapers. The discussions had then been suspended pending the consideration of larger problems.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that M. Venizelos had taken no action without the consent of the Council of Four. If Italy preferred to depend upon her own action she could not expect to take part in the discussions of the Council. As far as he was concerned, unless Italy removed her troops, he would take no further part in the discussion of the Italian claims in Asia Minor. The Italian action was a direct defiance of the Council. It had been done in a way that he did not like to describe. A discussion had actually been in progress with Italy, and the question of Scala Nuova had not been decided. He could not imagine anything more insulting to the Council than this action.

M. SONNINO pointed out that in 1917 Smyrna had been attributed to Italy.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that this had been subject to the consent of Russia. Russia, however, had never given her consent, and had gone out of the war. Then the United States of America came in, and the whole situation changed. Mr. Balfour had stated this in writing to the Italian Government.

M. SONNINO said that the French Government had stated that the 1917 agreement held good.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that M. Pichon had never told him so. He had not been consulted.

M. SONNINO said that he recognised that the United States was not bound, but Article 9 of the Treaty of London clearly spoke of the regions round Adalia being attributed to Italy and it was in these regions that the landings had taken place.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that Italy had taken a very wide interpretation of the phrase. He was sure his British and French colleagues would understand it when he said that the United States did not recognise their right to hand over Turkish populations to Italy. This was a world settlement, and all were partners in it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the British and French Governments had agreed that the portion of the Turkish Empire for which it had been proposed that they should have mandates should be visited by a Commission. He asked if M. Sonnino was willing that this should apply also to Adalia.

M. SONNINO said that Italy had put no boundary excluding the Commission from Asia Minor.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this was a very important declaration.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked M. Sonnino if it would not be the right thing for Italy to withdraw from Scala Nuova.

M. SONNINO pointed out that there had been massacres at Smyrna, which was not far away.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that M. Sonnino had not even alleged massacres at Scala Nuova, Makri or Budrum.

M. SONNINO said there had been disorders at Makri and very serious disorders at Adalia, amounting to anarchy.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked by what right Italy intervened.

M. SONNINO said that the Italians were established at Rhodes.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that Rhodes had not been ceded to Italy.

M. SONNINO said that the Italians had been at Rhodes ever since the war with Turkey. They had been discussing the question of the Dodecanese with the Greeks, but these islands were provisionally occupied. No ill consequences had come from any of these landings, and no person had been hurt. Why, he asked, did the Council want Italy to withdraw their troops. The Italian Government had to consider public opinion in Italy, and there would be very serious agitation if this action was taken. There was no particular object in it. Surely it was not desired to do harm to Italy.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had only asked for an explanation. He accepted what M. Sonnino had said about disorders at Adalia, but there had not been any serious disorders elsewhere.

M. SONNINO said that in order to retain Adalia, ships were necessary, and this explained the occupation of Marmaris.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what was the reason for the landing at Scala Nuova.

M. SONNINO said that no one had been hurt there.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if this meant that any power could occupy any place without the consent of the Allies.

M. SONNINO said that the United States of America was free to do so, but that Great Britain and France had entered into certain agreements.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Scala Nuova was not included in any binding agreement.

M. SONNINO referred to the agreement of 1917.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in his conversation at St. Jean de Maurienne he had made it quite clear to M. Sonnino that the agreement depended on Italy making an effort in Turkey.

M. SONNINO said that Italy had put everything she had into this war—every dollar and every man—and no country had suffered greater strain. The troops had had to be put however, where the pressure was greatest.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he was not in any way reproaching M. Sonnino.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was not, either. He had, however, repeatedly pressed on M. Sonnino at St. Jean de Maurienne that this agreement depended upon a great effort being made for the defeat of Turkey.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the object of all was to occupy a position of common counsel. To hear that Italy, without a word to anyone, had landed troops in Asia Minor had been very disconcerting.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this was more especially the case as it was obviously done in order to peg out a claim. M. Venizelos had been told that he must not land Greek troops at Scala Nuova, because the question was *sub judice*. The Italians had done this without saying a word to people who were in the same room with him. He knew what would be said about a man of business who did such a thing.

(M. Venizelos was introduced.)

2. PRESIDENT WILSON told M. Venizelos that the Council wished to discuss with him the suggestions he had sent to Mr. Lloyd George for a more extended occupation in the Smyrna Vilayet.

Conditions of
Greek Occupation
of Smyrna
Vilayet

M. VENIZELOS, misunderstanding the question, commenced a historical dissertation on the Greek claims in Asia Minor, in the course of which he was interrupted by Mr. Lloyd George, who said it was rather the immediate action by Greece that it was proposed to discuss.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he understood there were two questions: (1) the sending of Greek troops to any part of the Aidin Vilayet, and, (2), the use of the Smyrna-Aidin railway.

M. VENIZELOS said that apart from the First Greek Division that had been sent to Smyrna, he had now ordered two more regiments as well as 500 gendarmes. He had done this because the Turks had commenced a sort of strike on the occasion of the Greek landing, and there had been no organised forces to keep order. The gendarmes had been sent to keep order in the town. The Greek Commanding Officer now had, he thought, enough men to spare some troops to go up country. He could send them, if necessary, to the Headquarters of the various Sandjaks. At the moment when he had gone to the Council a despatch was being decyphered to the effect that the Turks had hoisted the Greek flag, and had asked for troops to be sent up country. He did not claim that this showed the Turks were enthusiastic about the Greek occupation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if there had been any disturbances inland.

M. VENIZELOS said he had no information on the subject. The original disturbance at Smyrna had been partly due to the strike of Turkish officials, and partly to the opening of the prisons, after which there had been some looting. In reply to Mr. Lloyd George, he said that at the present moment the Turks were responsible for preserving order inland. He had not ordered any troops to Aidin, but he had no information as to whether troops had gone there.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked him if he was sure he had not ordered troops to Aidin.

M. VENIZELOS said he had given general orders to the Greek Commanding Officer to send troops wherever it was necessary for the occupation of localities where disorder occurred. Consequently, he could not say for certain whether Greek troops had been sent. However, it took twelve hours to reach Aidin, and he thought it unlikely that they would have been sent without his hearing. His instructions had been that no troops were to be sent where there was any risk of their encountering Italian troops. He wished to say expressly that towards the South the furthest point to which he wished to send troops was Aidin. He did not wish to send any South or East of that point. He had no knowledge of any Greek troops outside the Smyrna district.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether M. Venizelos did not think it best in all the circumstances to await developments before putting in operation any more extended plan for occupation. The Council was always available for consultation, and things were just now at such a nice point that it would be better to determine action by common counsel.

M. VENIZELOS said that he was ready to issue an order that no Greek troops were to go inland at all. Nevertheless, to provide against the possibility of serious disturbances and massacres, he would like to arrange some procedure which did not necessitate the delays involved in sending dispatches to Paris, consulting the Council, and sending dispatches back. He proposed, therefore, that no troops should be sent without the authority of Admiral Calthorpe.² He would propose to instruct the Greek Commanding Officer not to act except under Admiral Calthorpe's order. If every decision had to be approved at Paris, action might be taken too late to stop massacres.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this was a very sensible suggestion, provided that Admiral Calthorpe was on the spot.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that Admiral Calthorpe or the Officer Commanding the Allied Fleet at Smyrna, who might be a British or a French Admiral, should give the necessary authority.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought this a very good plan. The use of the Smyrna-Aidin railway would be contingent on circumstances.

M. VENIZELOS asked that the French railway should also be available.

M. CLEMENCEAU accepted Mr. Lloyd George's proposal.

M. VENIZELOS said that there were a large number of refugees from Turkey, resident in Greece and the islands. If these could be landed now, they might be re-settled in time to commence agricultural operations. He explained on a map that they inhabited the Sandjak of Smyrna and the Kaza of Aivali. He asked for authority for Greek troops to be sent into these two districts without obtaining special

² Admiral Sir Somerset A. Gough-Calthorpe, British High Commissioner at Constantinople and Allied commander in chief in the Eastern Mediterranean.

authority for the purpose of establishing order and protecting the returning refugees.

(This was agreed to).

(M. Venizelos withdrew).

A few minutes later Sir Maurice Hankey read a draft of the dispatch to Admiral Calthorpe, which, after some discussion, was approved in the following form:—

“The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers has approved that in the event of disorders in the Vilayet of Aidin anywhere North of Aidin inclusive, Greek troops may be sent to restore order, but only after obtaining the approval of the Senior Naval Officer of the Allied Fleets at Smyrna, who will be the final judge as to whether the circumstances justify the despatch of troops. Greek troops, however, may be sent without special authority to the districts within the Sandjak of Smyrna, but not South of Ayasoluk and within the Kaza of Aivali for the purpose of establishing order and protecting the returning refugees. The Greek military authorities should be given facilities on all railway lines radiating from Smyrna for carrying out this movement. M. Venizelos is sending instructions to the Greek authorities to conform to these arrangements.”

3. Sir Maurice Hankey was drafting the above dispatch during the following conversation, the notes of which are consequently very brief.

M. SONNINO again reverted to the question of the Italian troops, and asked for the agreement of his colleagues to keep things as they were without withdrawing the Italian troops.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that as far as he was concerned the Italian Government must take the whole responsibility for the retention of these troops.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this was his view.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it was his view also.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Italian action was most prejudicial to the work of the Conference. M. Orlando, when asked for an explanation had said he knew nothing about the matter, and it was perfectly clear that he did not. Apparently the Head of the Government had not even been consulted.

M. SONNINO said that of course M. Orlando was kept informed.

(It was at this point that Sir Maurice Hankey read the Draft dispatch quoted above).

4. The Council had before it Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau's letter on the subject of Reparation (Appendix II), and the draft reply prepared by a Committee under M. Klotz (Appendix III(a)).

Responsibility
for the War and
Reparation. Reply
to Herr Brockdorff-
Rantzau's Letter

(This letter was approved, subject to the following alterations:—

In the sixth paragraph, the substitution of the word “claimed” for the word “admitted”.

In the seventh paragraph, line 1 to read as follows:—"she did not act upon the principle she now contends for either in 1871" etc. . . . instead of "she did not recognise this principle either in 1871" etc.

In the eighth paragraph delete the words "you will not be surprised to learn that" and substitute "in reply we beg to say that".)

Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to see that the necessary alterations were made in the French version and to prepare a copy for M. Clemenceau's signature.

(It was further agreed that after signature Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau's letter, together with the reply, should be published.)

The letter as finally approved is contained in App² III(b).

5. The Council had before them a letter from Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau, together with a draft reply.³

On MONSIEUR CLEMENCEAU's suggestion the subject was adjourned until the draft reply to a second letter from the Germans on the same subject was available.^{3a}

6. MR. LLOYD GEORGE read the following information he had received in regard to the supply of clothing to German prisoners:—

(1) There is no German clothing available of any kind.

Prisoners of War.
Reply to Herr
Brockdorff-
Rantzau

(2) All the German prisoners now held by us have underclothing and boots sufficient for them to be sent straight back to Germany.

(3) As regards their civilian clothing, our prisoners of war are wearing prisoners of war coats and trousers. They could be returned to Germany wearing the trousers already supplied, but not the coats.

We have no stocks of civilian clothing available. All available stocks were bought up for the British who have been demobilised and the stocks available for this purpose were insufficient.

Mr. Lloyd George said his attention had been drawn to the suggestion that altered British uniforms might be used. For instance, the military buttons might be cut off and uniforms made for all intents and purposes into civilian suits. He said he was informed that we were actually 200,000 suits short for our own soldiers. Hence he thought that the question should be treated as one in which we were unable to give any help.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the United States Army had no civilian supplies at all; only military supplies.

M. CLEMENCEAU instructed M. Mantoux to ascertain the state of Prisoners of War in France.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the reply should be that we would supply the prisoners with the best clothing we had, but should explain that we had not enough to give a complete equipment to every prisoner.

³ Appendices II and IV to CF-23, pp. 817 and 823.

^{3a} Appendices III and V to CF-23, pp. 820 and 824.

SIR MAURICE HANKEY asked whether any repayment was to be exacted for the clothes provided, as contemplated in Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau's letter.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if they were merely to go in the best makeshift that could be arranged, this was unnecessary.

(It was agreed that Mr. Lloyd George's draft should be revised in the light of the above discussion).

7. PRESIDENT WILSON said that he had ordered an enquiry to be sent to Koltchak, direct from the State Department, asking him to specify his programme and policy.⁴ He said he had also received information from M. Kerenski.⁵ He would not

Russia regard this as a good source of information unless it happened to tally with information he had received elsewhere. Kerenski and his friends hoped that there would be no recognition of Koltchak or anyone else as representative of all the Russias and that as a condition of further assistance, certain agreements should be exacted from all the parties opposed to the Bolsheviks, by which they would pledge themselves to a certain progressive policy. They should be informed that a departure from this would cause them to lose the support of the Allied and Associated Powers. This seemed to provide the rudiments of a policy.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that it was important to impose conditions.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that these Russian groups could be broken down at any time by our failure to support them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was amazed at the amount of material that had been supplied. They had received something like £50,000,000 of armaments and munitions.

8. The following resolution submitted by Sir Maurice Hankey was approved:—

Prisoners of War
and the Austrian,
Hungarian and
Bulgarian Treaties

"It is agreed that the Committee which drew up the Articles in regard to Prisoners of War for the Treaty with Germany, should meet again to prepare, for the consideration of the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, Articles for inclusion in the Treaties with Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria."

PRESIDENT WILSON read a copy of a letter from M. Fromageot, a copy of which had been handed him by Sir Maurice Hankey, who had received it from Mr. Hurst. (Appendix IV).

Reparation.
Correction to
Article 232 in
the Treaty of
Peace With
Germany

(After a short discussion it was agreed that the words "during the period of the belligerency of each as an Allied and Associated Power against Germany" should be reinstated in the French text of Article 232.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 19 May, 1919.

⁴ See telegram of May 15 from the Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan, *Foreign Relations*, 1919, Russia, p. 349.

⁵ Alexander F. Kerensky, Prime Minister of Russia, July to November, 1917.

Appendix I to CF-19

[Italian Memorandum Concerning Landings in Asia Minor]

The landings of Italian Troops in Asia Minor, concerning which the President of the United States and the Premiers of France and Great Britain have asked for information, were determined by imperative reasons of public order and carried out without giving rise to any conflicts such as occurred in case of the Greek landing at Smyrna.

For nearly a month before the Italian occupation, the province of Adalia has been a prey to anarchy. The further occupations are purely military in character, as are the others effected by the Allied Powers in Turkey, and will in no way affect the ultimate decision as to the final disposal of the various territories belonging to the Ottoman Empire.

Furthermore, and although the final settlement of these territories is not now in question, the Italian Prime Minister cannot but draw the attention of the Prime Ministers of France and Great Britain to the provision of article 9 of the Treaty of London of April 26th, 1915, and the rights which, on the basis of this article, were recognised to Italy.

As to the remark that such action was taken without previous consultation with his colleagues, Signor Orlando wishes to point out in his turn that the very cause and the conditions of such landings made any previous consultation impossible. On the other hand it was entirely without Signor Orlando's knowledge that Greece was invited to participate with her troops in the occupation of Smyrna. This action prejudiced "de facto" if not "de jure" the final settlement to be arrived at in the case of this city, concerning which and in accordance with the wishes of the Allied Powers there had been—between the Italian and Greek Governments—conversations which were still pending and showed all the conciliatory spirit by which the Italian Government was animated in the matter.

Likewise no previous notice was given to the Italian Premier of the occupation of Heraclea by French forces.

The Italian Prime Minister wishes to assure the President of the United States and the Premiers of France and Great Britain that he is no less anxious than they are to arrive to [at] a friendly understanding with his colleagues for the final settlement of the Mediterranean problem in a way which, by fulfilling in their letter and their spirit the agreements which determined Italy's entrance into the war, may give Italy, also on this point, the satisfaction the Italian people rightly expect.

PARIS, May 18, 1919.

W. C. P. 788

Appendix II to CF-19

[*The Head of the German Delegation (Brockdorff-Rantzau) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)*]

Translation

GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION
VERSAILLES, May 13, 1919.

MR. PRESIDENT: In the draft of a Peace Treaty submitted to the German Delegates, Part VIII, concerning Reparation, begins with Article 231, which reads as follows:—

“The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her Allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her Allies.”

Now the obligation to make reparation has been accepted by Germany by virtue of the note from Secretary of State Lansing of November 5, 1918,⁷ independently of the question of responsibility for the war. The German Delegation cannot admit that there could arise, out of a responsibility incurred by the former German Government in regard to the origin of the world war, any right for the Allied and Associated Powers to be indemnified by Germany for losses suffered during the war. The representatives of the Allied and Associated States have moreover declared several times that the German people should not be held responsible for the faults committed by their Government.

The German people did not will the war and would never have undertaken a war of aggression. They have always remained convinced that this war was for them a defensive war.

The German Delegates also do not share the views of the Allied and Associated Governments in regard to the origin of the war. They cannot consider the former German Government as the party which was solely or chiefly to blame for this war. The Draft Treaty of Peace transmitted (by you) contains no facts in support of this view; no proof on the subject is furnished therein. The German Delegates therefore beg (you) to be so good as to communicate to them the Report of the Commission set up by the Allied and Associated Governments for the purpose of establishing the responsibility of the authors of the war.

Pray accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my high consideration.

BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU

⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1918, supp. 1, vol. I, p. 468.

Appendix III (a) to CF-19

Translation.

MINISTRY OF FINANCE,
PARIS, 16 May, 1919.

Minister of Finance to M. Clemenceau.

You were so good as to communicate on the 15th May to the Reparations Commission and the Responsibilities Commission a letter from the President of the German Peace Delegation dated May 13th, 1919, relative to the responsibility of the German people in regard to the origin of the war and the obligation to make reparation.

These two Commissions immediately met together at the Ministry of Finance and selected me to preside over their common labour.

After consideration of Count Brockdorff-Rantzau's letter and an exchange of views between the members of the two Commissions these Commissions unanimously approved a draft reply to be submitted to the Council of Four.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith this draft.

KLOTZ

[Enclosure]

Draft Reply to Principal German Plenipotentiary Approved by M. Klotz, Mr. James Brown Scott, Lord Sumner, M. Crespi and M. Sakutaro Tachi, To Be Submitted to the Council of Four

SIR: In your note of May 3rd [13th] you state that Germany, while 'accepting' in November 1918 'the obligation to make reparation' did not understand such an acceptance to mean that her responsibility was involved either for the war or for the acts of the former German Government.

It is only possible to conceive of such an obligation if its origin and cause is the responsibility of the author of the damage.

You add that the German people would never have undertaken a war of aggression. Yet, in the note from Mr. Secretary of State Lansing of November 5th, 1918, which you approve of and adduce in favour of your contention, it is stated that the obligation to make reparation arises out of 'Germany's aggression by land, sea and air'.

As the German Government did not at the time make any protest against this allegation, it thereby recognised it as well-founded.

Therefore Germany recognised in 1918 implicitly but clearly, both the aggression and her responsibility.

It is too late to seek to deny them today. It would be impossible, you state further for [*that*] the German people should be regarded as the accomplices of the faults committed by the 'former German Government'. However, Germany has never admitted, and such a declaration would have been contrary to all principles of international law that

a modification of its political régime or a change in the governing personalities would be sufficient to extinguish an obligation already undertaken by any nation.

She did not recognise this principle either in 1871 as regards France, after the proclamation of the Republic, nor in 1917 in regard to Russia after the revolution which abolished the Tsarist régime.

Finally, you ask that the report of the Commission on Responsibility may be communicated to you; you will not be surprised to learn that the Allied and Associated Powers consider the reports of the Commissions set up by the Peace Conference as documents of an internal character which cannot be transmitted to you.

Appendix III (b) to CF-19

Translation

MINISTRY OF FINANCE,
PARIS, 16 May, 1919.

Minister of Finance to M. Clemenceau.

You were so good as to communicate on the 15th May to the Reparations Commission and the Responsibilities Commission a letter from the President of the German Peace Delegation dated May 13th, 1919, relative to the responsibility of the German people in regard to the origin of the war and the obligation to make reparation.

These two Commissions immediately met together at the Ministry of Finance and selected me to preside over their common labour.

After consideration of Count Brockdorff Rantzau's letter and an exchange of views between the members of the two Commissions these Commissions unanimously approved a draft reply to be submitted to the Council of Four.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith this draft.

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SIR: In your note of May 3rd [13th] you state that Germany, while 'accepting' in November 1918 'the obligation to make reparation' did not understand such an acceptance to mean that her responsibility was involved either for the war or for the acts of the former German Government.

It is only possible to conceive of such an obligation if its origin and cause is the responsibility of the author of the damage.

You add that the German people would never have undertaken a war of aggression. Yet, in the note from Mr. Secretary of State Lansing of November 5th, 1918, which you approve of and adduce in favour

of your contention, it is stated that the obligation to make reparation arises out of 'Germany's aggression by land, sea and air'.

As the German Government did not at the time make any protest against this allegation, it thereby recognised it as well-founded.

Therefore, Germany recognised in 1918 implicitly but clearly, both the aggression and her responsibility.

It is too late to seek to deny them today. It would be impossible, you state further that the German people should be regarded as the accomplices of the faults committed by the 'former German Government'. However, Germany has never claimed, and such a declaration would have been contrary to all principles of international law that a modification of its political régime or a change in the governing personalities would be sufficient to extinguish an obligation already undertaken by any nation.

She did not act upon the principle she now contends for either in 1871 as regards France, after the proclamation of the Republic, nor in 1917 in regard to Russia after the revolution which abolished the Tsarist régime.

Finally, you ask that the report of the Commission on Responsibility may be communicated to you: In reply we beg to say that the Allied and Associated Powers consider the reports of the Commissions set up by the Peace Conference as documents of an internal character which cannot be transmitted to you.

Appendix IV to CF-19

[*Letter From M. Fromageot, French Member of the Drafting Committee*]

The following question with regard to the Reparation clauses in the Draft Treaty of Peace with Germany has been brought to the notice of the Drafting Committee.

The following is the English text of the second paragraph of Article 232:—

"The Allied and Associated Governments, however, require, and Germany undertakes, that she will make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property *during the period of the belligerency of each as an Allied and Associated Power against Germany* by such aggression by land, by sea and from the air, and in general all damage as defined in Annex I hereto."

There are no words in the French text corresponding to those in the English text. There is, therefore, a divergence which must be put right, but the question arises as to whether the French text is to be brought into accord with the English or the English with the French.

The history of the matter is as follows. On May 3rd, Sir M. Hankey addressed a letter to the Secretary General of the Conference saying that in order to exclude any application of Reparation funds to new States such as Poland, the words 'during the belligerency, etc' were to be introduced. The Drafting Committee accordingly introduced the phrase which thenceforward figured in the French and English text. The order of the phrase however in the two versions differed as it had not been easy to arrange the English draft precisely in the same way as the French.

On the morning of May 6th at a meeting of the Council of Prime Ministers, various modifications were made in the Reparation Articles on the suggestion of M. Loucheur who was present at the meeting.⁸ The instructions were communicated verbally to the Drafting Committee who were also present at the time. One of these alterations was to Article 232 and was to the effect that the wording was to be changed and a new phrase introduced after the word 'air' which figured in the paragraph. The alterations were made accordingly but in the press of work on that day it was not noticed that the effect was to suppress the words 'during the belligerency of each, etc.' in the French text and not to suppress them in the English text.

Later on that same day a further letter from Sir M. Hankey was sent to M. Dutasta, containing the official record of this amendment but it was not received until after the Draft Treaty had gone to the printer in its final form. According to these later instructions the phrase 'during the belligerency of each, etc' would be excluded, but there seems great doubt as to whether it was really intended to suppress the phrase which had been inserted expressly for the purpose of excluding any claims by the new States such as Poland.

On the other hand, this phrase affects other governments besides the new States and it may be that the full effect of the addition of the phrase had not been fully appreciated when instructions were given on May 3rd to insert it.

In view of the above, the Drafting Committee can only ask for further instructions from the Council of Prime Ministers.

On behalf of the Drafting Committee

HENRI FROMAGEOT

14 MAY, 1919.

⁸ See IC-181C, p 478.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Tuesday, May 20, 1919, at 11 a. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

ITALY

H. E. M. Orlando.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. } *Secretaries.*
 Count Aldrovandi.
 Prof. P. J. Mantoux.—*Interpreter.*

1. The Council had under consideration the German note on the economic effect of the Treaty of Peace (Appendix 1A), and a draft reply agreed to by American, British, French and Italian representatives. (Appendix 1B.)

**Suggested Reply
to German Letter
on Economic
Effect of
Peace Treaty**

MR. LLOYD GEORGE considered that, in paragraph 2, a statement should be given as to Great Britain's imports of food and iron ore, in order to show that Germany would only be in the same position as Great Britain had been in for years. In paragraph 5, Mr. Lloyd George suggested that the actual figures of shipping losses should be given, in order to bring home to the German people the reasons why they would suffer in common with the rest of the world from the shortage of shipping.

PRESIDENT WILSON commented that the last paragraph was somewhat weak. If any part of the German case was true, it was a bad reply to point out that the millions of German citizens who had been engaged in military matters could turn their activities to works of peace.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the case of Great Britain was the answer to this part of the German contention.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out the omission from sufficient emphasis on the fact that all countries would be embarrassed by lack of raw material owing to the shortage of shipping.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said his general comment on the letter was that this was the most important of the replies to any of the German letters. It was very important to make a thoroughly good case, which should be supported by figures.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed in this view. It should be pointed out how small the proportion of imports that Germany would lose would be to the total losses due to the war.

M. ORLANDO said that Italy before the war could only import one seventh part of the raw materials she required in Italian bottoms. After the war, she could only import 1 fourteenth in Italian bottoms.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that someone with the gift of writing should be asked to re-draft the reply.

(After some discussion, it was agreed that Lord Curzon¹ should be asked to re-draft the reply for the consideration of the Council of the principal Allied and Associated Powers.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU signed a French translation of the reply to Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau's letter of May 13th on the subject of Reparation and Responsibilities.

(The German letter and the reply are contained in Appendix 2A, and Appendix 2B.)

(It was agreed that the two letters should be published as soon as they had been sent.)

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE read extracts from views expressed by Herr Dernburg, German Minister of Finance, on the Peace Terms, to Colonel Thelwall of the British Mission, Berlin.

4. SIR MAURICE HANKEY read a letter from Mr. Headlam-Morley urging that the Draft Treaty with Poland attached to Report No. 2 of the Committee on New States should be referred to the Drafting Committee.

(The following was accepted and initialled:—

"It is agreed that the Drafting Committee of the Peace Conference should carefully review the draft of a Treaty with Poland attached to Report No. 2 of the Committee on New States. The Drafting Committee should suggest any alterations that may seem to them advisable in order to carry out more effectively the principles and objects with which this Treaty has been drawn up. If there are any material alterations which the Drafting Committee wish to suggest they should confer with the Committee and render a joint report to the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers."

Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward the resolution to the Secretary-General for the Drafting Committee.)

5. MR. LLOYD GEORGE read a telegram from British G. H. Q., Constantinople, dated May 17th, to the effect that the Greeks on landing had been fired on by Turkish gendarmes and that firing had continued all day, the Greeks attacking and killing Turkish soldiers whenever they were seen. It was further alleged in the telegram that the wounded were killed and some of them

¹ British Lord President of the Council; Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

thrown into the sea and that the Greek Officers had made no attempt to restrain their men.

(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to bring this to the attention of M. Venizelos.)

6. The following resolution, carrying out the decision of the previous day, was initialled by M. Clemenceau, President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George:—

Reparation:
Article 232 of
the Treaty With
Germany

“The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have considered the attached letter from M. Fromageot² and have agreed that the following words ‘during the period of the belligerency of each as an Allied and Associated Power against Germany’, which had been omitted from the French text but retained in the English text of Article 232 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, should be re-instated in the French text.”

M. ORLANDO, however, pointed out that the question had been examined by an expert Committee which had voted unanimously an American proposition in favour of the omission of the words quoted and the addition of other words at the end of the article. He asked if this had been in mind when the decision had been taken on the previous day. He suggested that before a final decision was taken, the experts should be seen.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had some vague recollection of the incident. The proposal had been made by Mr. Dulles, one of the American lawyers, whose thought had been for United States citizens on board the *Lusitania* who, unless some special provision was made, would get no reparation. From a pecuniary, though not from a sentimental, point of view, this was a relatively small matter. Whatever had been the attitude of the experts, however, it was evident that nothing had got into the Treaty.

M. ORLANDO pointed out M. Fromageot's letter explained that the purpose was to exclude the claims by New States.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said this was not the case. He proposed that the decision of the previous day should be adhered to.

M. ORLANDO reserved his consent, but undertook to consider the matter with experts.

7. The Council had before them a copy of the reply by the Bolsheviks to Dr. Nansen's letter,³ together with a Memorandum agreed to by Mr. Hoover, Lord Robert Cecil, M. Clémentel, and Professor Attolico,⁴ with a covering letter from Lord Robert Cecil to Sir Maurice Hankey.

(Appendix 3.)

The Bolshevik's
Reply to
Dr. Nansen

² Appendix IV to CF-19, p. 730.

³ For Dr. Nansen's letter, see *Foreign Relations*, 1919, Russia, p. 111.

⁴ American, British, French, and Italian members, respectively, of the committee appointed to advise the Supreme Council concerning the Nansen proposals.

After a prolonged perusal of this document

M. CLEMENCEAU said he did not see how any change could be made in what the Council had tried to do. There was no doubt that the Bolsheviks were now going down hill. Dr. Nansen had suggested a humanitarian course, but Lenin was clearly trying to draw it into a political course.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that Lenin's argument was that the price the Allied and Associated Powers were trying to exact for food was that their enemies should beat the Bolsheviks by compelling the latter to stop fighting. What was really intended was to stop aggressive fighting by the Bolsheviks, because this was inconsistent with food distribution. They were perfectly correct in claiming that the Allies were supporting Koltchak and Dennikin, and not putting pressure on them to stop fighting. Lenin's argument was that for him to stop fighting was to sign his death warrant.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that Lenin was not in the hands of the Allies.

PRESIDENT WILSON replied that if supplies were stopped, Koltchak and Dennikin would have to stop fighting too.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it was impossible to stop Lenin fighting, and his word could not be trusted.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he did not feel the same chagrin that he had formerly felt at having no policy in regard to Russia. It had been impossible to have a policy hitherto.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said there had been very little choice. There had been a lunatic revolution which certain persons, in whom little confidence was felt, were trying to squash. The only reason why the Allies had encouraged them was to prevent Germany from getting supplies. They were, however, now entitled to say, having supported us so far "you cannot leave us in the lurch."

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the Americans had only gone to Siberia to get the Czechs out, and then the Czechs had refused to go.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that his Government's object had been to reconstitute the Eastern front. They had succeeded in doing this, though somewhat East of the line on which they had hoped to establish it. Nevertheless, the reconstitution of the front did prevent the Germans from getting supplies, with which they might have broken the blockade. The feeling in Great Britain was that it was impossible now to leave these people in the lurch.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that at least pledges could be exacted for further support.

M. CLEMENCEAU fully agreed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed, and said it could be done in either of two ways:—

- (1) By a formal dispatch;
- (2) By summoning the representatives of the various Russian groups now in Paris and putting the conditions to them.

PRESIDENT WILSON preferred the first proposal. The second would be contrary to the idea that had been at the basis of the Prinkipo scheme, namely, that it would not be fair to hear one party without hearing the other. His view was that a formal demand and notice ought to be sent to the various Russian groups. He had himself sent something that was almost equivalent to this, as he felt he was entitled to do.

(After some discussion it was agreed that Mr. Philip Kerr⁵ should be asked to prepare a draft for the consideration of the Council.)

Mr. Kerr was sent for. While awaiting Mr. Kerr

PRESIDENT WILSON read extracts from a document which had been alluded to at a discussion on the previous day, signed by M. Kerensky and some of his friends, and which contained a number of proposals, including the following:—

(i) That the Powers should only help the various Russian groups on certain fundamental conditions for the establishing of Russia on a democratic basis with a constituent assembly, and Governments which declined to agree should not be supported.

(ii) That as a Constituent Assembly could clearly not be called at the present time, Regional Assemblies should be elected on a democratic basis for the re-establishment of Local Government.

(iii) That a representative mission should be sent by the Great Powers to Russia to give assurance of sympathy and assistance.

(iv) That proposals for supplying food were harmful.

These proposals in short, President Wilson continued, were that the Powers should obtain an assurance from each group that it would be united with the other groups to form an all Russian Government on a constituent basis, and that in the meantime each group should do what it could in its own area.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE was afraid of splitting up Russia.

PRESIDENT WILSON said it was merely proposing to substitute a democratic for an autocratic basis.

(After some further discussion Mr. Kerr entered.)

PRESIDENT WILSON informed Mr. Kerr that the Council desired to make a further effort with Russia along the lines of definite assurance to the several groups as to what they were aiming at. They had been reading a document prepared by certain Russian groups in Paris who, though anti-Bolshevist, were suspicious of reactionary tendencies among the groups fighting the Bolsheviks. These suggested that pledges should be demanded from the various groups fighting the

⁵ Secretary to Lloyd George.

Bolshevists to establish a government on a democratic basis. In the meanwhile it was proposed to establish a democratic Government in these Regions by setting up Provincial Central Assemblies. The idea of the Council was to embody these demands in a message to the several Governments, and they hoped Mr. Kerr would prepare a draft for their consideration.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the question of the Baltic Provinces had not been discussed. All the other Russian groups fighting the Bolshevists were violently opposed to any recognition of Esthonia and Latvia and the other Baltic provinces. They alleged that to recognise them would be to tear up Russia and to bar access to the sea.

MR. KERR asked what promise was to be given to the various Russian groups to encourage them to give these undertakings.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it was not a question of promising more, but of continuing the assistance which was now given.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the dispatch should intimate that without satisfactory guarantees no further help would be given.

MR. KERR asked if they were to accept the frontiers laid down by the League of Nations.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said they must.

PRESIDENT WILSON said there was no other solution. He then produced a letter from Mr. Hoover on the subject of the Baltic Provinces, where there was an appalling shortage of food. This was due, according to Mr. Hoover, not to lack of financial or shipping facilities, but to the absence of order. He suggested that enough naval force should be given to provide for the protection of relief in the coast towns, and for its distribution along the coast. In this way the established governments should be helped to preserve order. The situation was so appalling from the humanitarian point of view, that he hoped the Council would be willing to hear a deputation composed of the British and the United States Naval authorities and himself.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that in the first instance, Mr. Hoover should discuss the matter with the Admirals.

(This was agreed to.)

(Mr. Kerr withdrew with instructions to draft a letter of [*for*] consideration.)

8. The Council had before it a draft reply prepared by Mr. Philip Kerr, under instructions from Mr. Lloyd George, to Brockdorff-Rantzau's letter of May 10th on the subject of Prisoners of War. (Appendix 4.)

Prisoners of
War. Reply to
Brockdorff-
Rantzau's Letter

(The reply was approved.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to ask the Secretary-General to translate it into French for M. Clemenceau's signature.)

(It was agreed that Brockdorff-Rantzau's letter, together with the reply should be published after despatch to the Germans).

9. The Council had before them a letter from the Serbian Delegation⁶ urging that out of the initial one thousand million pounds to be paid by Germany, eighty-million pounds should be specifically assigned to Serbia, together with a Memorandum by the Committee considering the question of Reparation in the Austrian Treaty, to whom it had been referred on May 13th.

Reparation.
Serbia's Claims

(The Memorandum of the Committee was approved, subject to the omission of the first paragraph of Clause 2, and the first four words of the second paragraph.) (Appendix 5.A. and Appendix 5.B.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 20 May, 1919.

Appendix IA to CF-20

[*The Head of the German Delegation (Brockdorff-Rantzau) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)*]

Translation of French
Translation of German Original

GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION,
VERSAILLES, May 13, 1919.

M. PRÉSIDENT: In conformity with my communication of the 9th instant,⁷ I have the honour to present to Your Excellency the Report of the Economic Commission charged with the study of the effect of the conditions of Peace on the situation of the German population.

"In the course of the last two generations, Germany has become transformed from an agricultural State to an industrial State. As long as she was an agricultural State, Germany could feed forty million inhabitants.

In her quality of an industrial State she could ensure the nourishment of a population of sixty seven millions. In 1913, the importation of food stuffs amounted, in round figures, to twelve million tons. Before the war a total of fifteen millions of persons provided for their existence in Germany by foreign trade and by navigation, either in a direct or an indirect manner, by the use of foreign raw material.

According to the Conditions of the Treaty of Peace, Germany will surrender her merchant tonnage and ships in course of construction suitable for overseas trade. German shipbuilding yards will build for five years in the first instance tonnage destined for the Allied and Associated Governments.

Germany will, moreover, renounce her colonies; all her overseas possessions, all her interests and securities in the Allied and Associated countries, and in their colonies, Dominions and protectorates, will as an instalment of the payment for part of the reparation, be subject to liquidation, and be exposed to any other economic war measure which the Allied and Associated Powers think fit to maintain or to take during the years of peace.

⁶ See appendix VB, p. 752.

⁷ See appendix to CF-8, p. 564.

By the putting into force of the Territorial Clauses of the Treaty of Peace, Germany would lose to the East the most important regions for the production of corn and potatoes, which would be equivalent to the loss of 21% of the total crop of those articles of food. Moreover, the intensity of our agricultural production would diminish considerably. On the one hand, the importation of certain raw material indispensable for the production of Manure, such as Phosphates, would be hindered, on the other hand, this industry would suffer like all other industries from lack of coal. The Treaty of Peace provides for the loss of almost a third of the production of our coal mines. Apart from this decrease, we are forced for ten years to deliver enormous consignments of coal to various Allied countries.

Moreover, in conformity with the Treaty, Germany will concede to her neighbours nearly three quarters of her mineral production, and more than three fifths of her zinc production.

After this diminution of her products, after the economic depression caused by the loss of her Colonies, of her merchant Fleet, and of her possessions abroad, Germany would not be in a state to import from abroad a sufficient quantity of raw material. An enormous part of German industry would therefore inevitably be condemned to destruction. At the same time, the necessity of importing food stuffs would increase considerably, whilst the possibility of satisfying that demand would diminish in the same proportion.

At the end of a very short time, Germany would, therefore, not be in a position to give bread and work to her numerous millions of inhabitants, who would be reduced to earning their livelihood by navigation and by trade. These persons would have to emigrate, but that is a material impossibility, all the more so because many countries and the most important ones will oppose any German immigration. Moreover, hundreds of millions [*thousands*] of Germans expelled from the territories of the Powers now at war with Germany, from the Colonies and territories which Germany must surrender, will return to their native land.

The putting into execution of the conditions of Peace would, therefore, logically bring about the loss of several millions of persons in Germany. This catastrophe would not be long in coming about, seeing that the health of the population has been broken down during the War by the Blockade, and during the Armistice by the aggravation of the Blockade of famine.

No help, however important, or over however long a period it might be distributed, would prevent these deaths "en masse". Peace would impose on Germany numberless human sacrifices that this War of four years and a half did not demand of her, (1,750,000 killed, nearly 1,000,000 dead, victims of the Blockade).

We do not know, and indeed we doubt, whether the Delegates of the Allied and Associated Powers realise the inevitable consequences which will take place if Germany, an industrial State, very thickly populated, closely bound up with the economic system of the world and reduced to the obligation to import enormous quantities of raw material and food stuffs, suddenly finds herself pushed back in the phase of her development which would correspond to her economic condition and the numbers of her population as they were half a century ago.

Those who will sign this Treaty will sign the death sentence of many millions of German men, women, and children."

I thought it my duty, before entering upon a discussion of other details of the Treaty, to bring to the knowledge of the Allied and Associated Delegations this summary exposé of the problem of the German population.

I have at the disposal of Your Excellency statistical proofs of the above statements.

I have [etc.]

BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU

M.166

Appendix I (B) to CF-20

Suggested Reply to German Note on the Economic Effect of the Peace Treaty

(Agreed to by the American, British, French and Italian Representatives)

1. We have noted the communication of the German Delegation of May 13th with reference to the studies of its Economic Commission as to the Treaty of Peace.⁸ Our observations upon the communication are as follows:

2. In general, we would point out that though Germany will lose territories in which grain, iron ore, coal and the like are produced, such commodities are not thereby made unavailable for Germany. The importation of food and materials, which took place on a large scale before the war, may be expected to continue in the future.

3. The German note ignores the great relief to German productive industry which will be afforded by the reduction of armaments, and it takes no account of the diminution of German consumption owing to the transfer of territory with nearly six million inhabitants.

4. The gradual transformation of Germany from an agricultural State to an industrial State has not affected in the past, nor should its continuance in the future, affect the nourishment of the population; inasmuch as the products of industry are readily exchangeable for the products of agriculture. The severance of agricultural territory which is restored to Poland will not destroy its productivity like the devastation wrought by the German armies in the West. Nothing in the Treaty will prevent the products of these regions from finding a market, as heretofore, in Germany.

5. As to the merchant marine and the Germans employed in that and any coordinate industries, it will be recognized that the destruction of merchant shipping has created throughout the world a shortage, and has added to the sufferings of all those who follow the sea

⁸ Appendix IA, *supra*.

as a means of livelihood. There can be no special consideration evolved for the seamen of Germany at the expense of the seamen of the Allied and Associated Nations, who lost their livelihood, owing to the destruction of a large portion of the world's shipping which German methods of warfare brought about; an amount far in excess of the tonnage which will be transferred under the terms of peace. The transfer of German ships to Allied flags will not prevent Germany from carrying on overseas trade.

6. The statements pertaining to the production of fertilizers are apparently founded on a misconception. Phosphate has always been imported by Germany, and there is no stipulation in the Peace Treaty which prevents such continued importation. As regards Coal, it is to be noted that the transferred territories include important areas of coal consumption as well as of production. Through the destruction of the coal mines of France, the shortage throughout the continent of Europe has been needlessly intensified. The industries of the Allies should not be the first ones to suffer through such wanton destruction.

7. The cession of the Briey Basin containing iron ore deposits is simply a return of these properties to their original owners. All raw materials, such as iron ore, will naturally seek industries to which they are essential. No restrictions are imposed by the Treaty upon Germany's importation of such materials.

8. The world is faced with the necessity of drastic re-adjustments in industry and the means of livelihood; and it is obvious that Germany must, like the other countries, re-adjust itself to changed conditions. When the world's shipping tonnage has again become normal, an adequate supply of raw materials should be available to all countries, including Germany.

9. In the framing of the Treaty of Peace, there has been no intention, on the part of the Allied and Associated Governments, to destroy Germany's economic life. On the contrary, the necessity for a return to more normal economic conditions has been borne constantly in mind. For example, the Reparations Commission is, in various clauses, charged with specific instructions to this end.

10. The wholesale sacrifice of life and health, and the wanton devastation of territory and the destruction of wealth which have marked this war are bound for many years to impose enormous burdens on the Nations of the world. These burdens are not created or aggravated by the conditions of Peace nor could any conditions be drafted which would remove them. The Treaty certainly does not impose an excessive share of these burdens on Germany. Germany will, moreover, find new resources by reason of the fact that millions

of her citizens, who up to now have been employed in military affairs, or in preparation for war, can now turn their whole activities to works of Peace.

Appendix II (A) to CF-20

[The German note of May 13, 1919, is printed as appendix II to CF-19, page 727.]

Appendix II (B) to CF-20

Reply to Principal German Plenipotentiary, Approved by the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers

PARIS, May 20, 1919.

SIR: In your note of May 13th⁹ you state that Germany, while accepting in November 1918 'the obligation to make reparation' did not understand such an acceptance to mean that her responsibility was involved either for the war or for the acts of the former German Government.

It is only possible to conceive of such an obligation if its origin and cause is the responsibility of the author of the damage.

You add that the German people would never have undertaken a war of aggression. Yet, in the note from Mr. Secretary of State Lansing of November 5th, 1918, which you approve of and adduce in favour of your contention, it is stated that the obligation to make reparation arises out of 'Germany's aggression by land, sea and air.'

As the German Government did not at the time make any protest against this allegation, it thereby recognised it as well-founded.

Therefore Germany recognised in 1918 implicitly but clearly, both the aggression and her responsibility.

It is too late to seek to deny them to-day. It would be impossible you state further that the German people should be regarded as the accomplices of the faults committed by the 'former German Government'. However, Germany has never claimed and such a declaration would have been contrary to all principles of international law that a modification of its political régime or a change in the governing personalities would be sufficient to extinguish an obligation already undertaken by any nation.

She did not act upon the principle she now contends for either in 1871 as regards France, after the proclamation of the Republic, nor in 1917 in regard to Russia after the revolution which abolished the Tsarist régime.

⁹ Appendix II to CF-19, p. 727.

Finally, you ask that the report of the Commission on Responsibility may be communicated to you. In reply, we beg to say that the Allied and Associated Powers consider the reports of the Commissions set up by the Peace Conference as documents of an internal character which cannot be transmitted to you.

G. CLEMENCEAU

M.163

Appendix III to CF-20

FEEDING OF RUSSIA

Copy of Letter From Lord Robert Cecil to Sir Maurice Hankey

BRITISH DELEGATION,
PARIS, May 16, 1919.

MY DEAR HANKEY: When the Nansen scheme was first started, I understand that Hoover, Clémentel, an Italian and I were appointed as a Committee to advise the Supreme Council as to the steps to be taken in connection therewith.

Yesterday Mr. Hoover brought to me the reply that Lenin has sent to the Nansen letter, and suggested that we should take some action upon it. I enclose a copy of Lenin's reply.

Accordingly, a meeting was held today in the Astoria, attended by Mr. Hoover, Professor Attolico and myself. Monsieur Clémentel was invited but was prevented from coming. At that meeting it was agreed that Mr. Hoover should send immediately the following reply to Nansen's question at the end of the Lenin telegram:—

"Please inform Nansen that until whole matter has been given further consideration by the Governments here we consider it extremely inadvisable to arrange any meeting with Bolshevik representatives."

We further agreed upon the memorandum of which I also send you a copy. Will you please inform the Supreme Council.

Yours very sincerely,

ROBERT CECIL

[Enclosure 1—Telegram]

[The Representative at Copenhagen of the American Relief Administration (Swenson) to the Commission to Negotiate Peace]

COPENHAGEN, May 14, 1919.

Recd. PARIS 10 a. m., 15.

Ammission, Paris.

Crab 104, May 14th. For Hoover.

Following telegram ¹⁰ was received by wireless through Swedish station to Mr. Fridtjof Nansen:

"Sir: Your very kind message of April 17th ^{10a} containing your exchange of letters with the Council of Four reached us only on May 4 by way of the Nas Wireless Station and was at once given to the People's Commissariat of Social Welfare for thorough examination. Wish in the name of the Russian Soviet Government to convey to you our heartiest thanks for the warm interest you manifest in the well-being of the Russian people. Great are indeed the suffering and privations inflicted upon the Russian people by the inhuman blockade of the Associated and so-called Neutral Powers and by the incessant wars forced upon it against its will. If left in peace and allowed free development Soviet Russia would soon be able to restore her national production, to regain her economic strength, to provide for her own needs and to be helpful to other countries. But in the present situation in which she has been put by the implacable policy of the Associated Powers help in foodstuffs from abroad would be most welcome to Russia, and the Russian Soviet Government appreciates most thankfully your human[e] and heartfelt response to her sufferings, and considering the universal respect surrounding your person will be especially glad to enter into communication with you for the realisation of your schemes of help which you emphasise as being purely humanitarian. On this basis of humanitarian work or help to suffering people we would be disposed to do everything in our power to further the realisation of your project. Unfortunately your benevolent intentions which you indicate yourself as being based upon purely humanitarian grounds and which according to your letter must be realised by a commission of fully non-political character have been mixed up by others with political purposes. In the letter addressed to you by the Four Powers your scheme is represented as involving cessation of hostilities and of transfer of troops and war material. We regret very much that your original intentions have thus been fundamentally disfigured by the government[s] of the Associated Powers. We need not explain to you that military operation[s] which obviously have in view to change external or internal conditions of the involved countries belong wholly to the domain of politics and that likewise cessation of hostilities which means preventing the belligerent who has every reason to expect successes from obtaining them is also a purely political act. Thus your sincerely charitable intentions have been misused by others in order to cover such purposes which are obviously political with the semblance of an action originally humanitarian only. Being ready to lend every assistance to your scheme so far as it bears the character you have ascribed to it in your letter we at the same time do not wish to be the objects of foul play, and knowing that you like ourselves mean business and wish really to attain the proposed, we would like to ask whether this incantation [*intermixture?*] of heterogeneous purposes has been finally adopted by yourself. We expect that we will be able to make it clear to you that in order to realise our [*your?*] intentions this interpretation

¹⁰ The Russian text in *Mezhdunarodnaya Politika* is dated May 7.

^{10a} Quoted in telegram No. 284, May 9, 1919, from the Ambassador in France, *Foreign Relations*, 1919, Russia, p. 111.

must be carefully avoided. You are no doubt aware that the cessation of the wars upon the Russian people is likewise the object of our most warm desires and it must be known to you that we have many times proposed to the Associated Governments to enter into negotiations in order to put an end to the present bloodshed and that we have even agreed to take part at the Conference at Prinkipo notwithstanding the extremely unfavourable conditions proposed to us and also that we were the only party to accept it. [We] responded in the same peace loving sense to overtures made by one of the Great Powers. The Prinkipo Conference was frustrated not by us but by our adversaries, the protégées of the Associated Powers, the counter-revolutionary governments of Koltchak, Denikin and the others. These are the Thislu [*tools?*] with the help of which the Entente Governments are making war upon us and are endeavouring to obtain our destruction and wherever they are victorious their victory means the triumph of the most extreme barbarity and bestiality, streams of blood and untold sufferings for the labouring masses [, domination] of the wildest reaction. Koltchak from the East, Denikin from the South, the Roumanian Feudris [*feudals*], the Polish and Finnish most reactionary militarists, the German Barons and Esthonian white guards from the West and Russian white guard bands from the north, these are the enemies whom the Entente Governments mob [*move?*] against Soviet Russia and against whom as against Entente troops we are carrying on a desperate struggle with ever-growing success. The so-called Governments of Koltchak and Denikin are purely monarchical, all power belongs there to the wildest adherents of Tsarism, extreme Tsarist papers are in every way imported [*supported?*] by them. Tsarist hymns are constantly sung [at] their ceremonies. The so-called constitution of Koltchak is in reality monarchical; among their soldiers they distribute only Tsarist literature, under the domination of Denikin the adherents of Constitutional government of the people are persecuted and under the domination of Koltchak the adherents of the constituent assembly are imprisoned or shot. Program [*Pogrom*]-making literature is being widely distributed by these so-called governments and whenever Jews come under their domination they are the object of the most horrible bestialities. In the West the Polish legionaries and the troops of the Ukrainian counter revolutionary Petliura who are both supported and even directed by Entente officers have perpetrated such massacres of Jews which by far surpass the most horrible misdeeds of the black hundred of old Tsarism. As the Russian Red Cross in its appeal to the International Red Cross on April 28 states whole villages, whole towns were turned the Russian [*sic*] neither sex nor age was spared and in numerous places the whole Jewish population was literally wiped out by these troops headed by Entente Generals and officers. The [*In the?*] realm of Koltchak and Denikin everything that was gained by the peasants through the revolution is being taken back from them. Koltchak declares solemn manifestoes that peasants must not have possession [of] land taken by force from the nobility. He orders in his decrees that the seizure of the land of the gentry by the peasants should be prosecuted as a serious crime and brushes [*crushes*] the resistance of the peasants by wholesale massacres during which [in some] parts

of Siberia many thousands of peasants were killed en masse. For the workers this domination means every possible persecution, oppression, wholesale arrests, and [in] many cases wholesale shootings, so that in some towns the workers were simply wiped out by the enraged ex-Tsarist officers who are [at] the head of Koltchak's troops. The horrors perpetrated by these Koltchak officers defy description, and their victims are innumerable including all that is progressive, all that is free thinking in Siberia. Inebriated officers are torturing, flogging, tormenting in every way the unfortunate labouring population under their domination and to be a worker is to be predestined to be the object of their brutalities. These are the adversaries owing to [*against*] whom we are engaged in a desperate struggle and whom the Associated Governments are in every way supporting, providing them with war material, foodstuffs, financial help, military commanders and political advisers and on the north and east fronts sending their own troops to help them. In the hands of these barbarous bandits Entente rifles and Entente cannons are sending death to the Russian workers and peasants struggling for their life and liberty. The same Entente Governments are the real source of the military supplies with the help of which our Polish Roumanian Finnish and other adversaries from the west are uninterrupted by [*uninterruptedly?*] attacking us and it was officially declared in the French Chamber of Deputies and in the British House of Commons that the policy of the Entente is now to send against Soviet Russia the armies of these nationalities. An American radio of May 8 [6?], sent from Lyons says most emphatically that the Entente encourages the movement of the troops raised by the Russian counter revolutionary General Youdenitch which presumably threatens Petrograd that the Entente expects that the Bolsheviki will be forced to withdraw to Moscow and that the Associated Governments [intend in connection herewith to bind (*abandon*) your plan of revictualling Russia. While declaring they have abandoned the idea of intervention the Associated Governments]¹¹ are in reality carrying on the most reckless interventions policy and even the American Government, despite all the statements to the contrary published in the American Press, seems at present to be wholly dominated by implacable hostility of the Clemenceau Ministry against Soviet Russia. This being the case we are in a position to discuss cessation of hostilities only if we discuss the whole problem of our relations to our adversaries, that is in the first place to the Associated Governments. That means to discuss peace and to open real negotiations bearing upon the true reasons of the war waged upon us and upon those conditions that can bring us lasting peace. We were always ready to enter into peace negotiations and we are ready to do it now as before and we will be glad to begin discussing these questions but of course directly with the other belligerents, that is with the Associated Governments or else with the persons empowered by the latter. But it is of course impossible for us to make any concessions referring to these fundamental problems of our existence under the disguise of a presumably humanitarian work. This latter must remain purely humanitarian

¹¹ The bracketed passage has been supplied from the copy of the telegram received by the American Commission to Negotiate Peace (Paris Peace Conf. 861.48/48).

and nonpolitical and we will welcome every proposal from your side made to us in the spirit of your letter sent by you to the Council of Four on April 3rd.^{11a} [To] these wholly nonpolitical proposals we respond most gladly, we thank you most heartily for your good intentions, we are ready to give you every possibility of controlling the realisation [of] such humanitarian scheme, we will of course cover all the expenses of this work and the cost of the foodstuffs and we can pay if you desire by Russian goods. But seeing that your original plan has been so unfortunately disfigured and considering that the most complete and difficult questions that have been created must first be thoroughly elucidated, we would suggest that you take the necessary steps to enable delegates of our Government to meet you and your collaborators abroad and to discuss these questions and we asked you kindly to indicate the time and place for this conference between our delegates and the leaders of your commission and what guarantees can be obtained for the free passage of our delegates through countries influenced by the Entente. Signed People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs, Tchitcherin.[""]

Nansen adds "Please tell Hoover that I intend to meet Lenin's delegates perhaps Stockholm but shall be glad to hear Hoover's opinion soon as possible."

SWENSON

[Enclosure 2]

[*Memorandum on the Nansen Proposal*]

Lenin's reply to Nansen really amounts to this:

"I shall be very glad to accept supplies but not to cease from fighting, though I would be prepared to enter into negotiations for a general Russian peace."

It is now for the Associated Governments to take the next step, and before deciding what that step should be they must make up their minds what is to be their policy in Russia.

It seems to me they have two courses open to them: They may either decide that so long as the Bolshevik Government is in power there is no hope for Russian peace, and that therefore the first thing to do is to smash the Bolsheviks. If this is to be their line they must strain every nerve to support Koltchak, Denikin, the Letts, the Esthonians, the Poles, and even the Finns in attacking Russia. They must furnish them with supplies and money and instructors, and do everything to make their coming campaign against the Bolsheviks successful. They must also break off all relations direct and indirect with the Bolsheviks, and advise Nansen to say that in view of Lenin's response his scheme for relief is at an end, and that nothing further of that sort can be looked for by the Russian Government. That is one policy. It may be the

^{11a} *Foreign Relations*, 1919, Russia, p. 102.

right one, but it undoubtedly involves much further bloodshed and destruction of material wealth.

The other policy would be to ask the military authorities to define as nearly as they can what is the position of the various forces fighting in Russia. As soon as the line dividing the combatants has thus been determined, each and all of them should be admonished to retire, say, 10 kilometres on their own side of the line, and to refrain from all future hostilities. They would be told that international commissaries would be sent to the various fronts to see that these directions were obeyed. If, and so far as, they were obeyed, the Associated Powers would do their utmost to supply to the various Governments concerned food and clothing and other necessities. If some refuse and some accept, those who accept should be supported. Those who refused would be deprived of all assistance. The Governments should further be informed that the Associated Powers or the Council of the League of Nations would immediately take into consideration the whole Russian problem. Their first step would be to call upon all sections of the Russian people, or any part of them who express their adherence to this policy to elect by free and universal suffrage, under the supervision of the League of Nations, a constituent assembly for the purpose of determining the future constitution of the Russian Government. In the meantime Nansen would be advised to say that so long as the Soviet Government declined to abstain from fighting he was powerless to help them.

This policy is in accordance with the general principle underlying the Covenant of the League of Nations—namely, that national grievances must not be settled by a resort to arms unless every other possible means of settling them has been first tried. It does not in any way prejudice the rights of any Russian quarrels, but it proceeds upon the principle that in any case peace is to the interest of all concerned.

I believe that either of these policies has a fair chance of success, and may be defended by powerful arguments. What is not defensible is a combination of the two: a suggestion that Lenin must cease fighting while we are supplying arms and equipment to Denikin and Koltchak; or, conversely, that Koltchak and Denikin should be encouraged to wage war against Lenin while we are negotiating with the latter to give him economic assistance. Compromises of this kind can only lead to a prolongation of hostilities in Russia, and the spreading in that country of the belief that the Associated Powers cannot be trusted.

MAY 16, 1919.

Appendix IV to CF-20

PRISONERS OF WAR

Copy of Reply Approved by Council of Principal Allied and Associated Powers to Letter From Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau Dated 10 May, 1919

(See WCP 783)

PARIS, MAY 20, 1919.

SIR: The representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers have given consideration to the note of the German Peace Delegation dated 10th May 1919¹² in regard to the repatriation of the German prisoners of war. In reply they wish to state that they cannot agree that prisoners of war and civilian prisoners who have been guilty of crimes or penal offences should be released. These crimes and penal offences have been committed on Allied soil and have been dealt with by the legally constituted authorities without reference to the fact that the wrongdoer was a German rather than an Allied citizen. For instance a certain German prisoner broke at night into the house of a farmer on whose estate he was set to work and murdered the farmer and his wife in cold blood with a bill-hook. For this double murder the said prisoner was sentenced to death on June 11th 1919, by a regularly constituted court martial. Under the Berne Convention,¹³ however, the execution of the sentence is suspended until peace has been signed. Justice would certainly not be satisfied if, as a consequence of the Treaty, this murderer were reprieved. For these reasons the Allied and Associated Powers cannot agree to alter the provisions of the Draft Treaty in respect of prisoners of war who have been guilty of crimes or penal offences.

In regard to the second question, the German Peace Delegation makes no specific suggestions as to the alleviation which they would propose for the prisoners of war and interned civilians between the date of the signing of peace and their repatriation. The Allied and Associated Powers are not aware of what alleviation it is possible to make seeing that they have scrupulously endeavoured to observe both the laws of war and the dictates of humanity in the treatment which they have given to prisoners of war, and that as provided in the last section of article 218 it is essential that prisoners of war and interned civilians should remain subject to discipline and control pending their repatriation in the interests of all concerned. The German Peace

¹² Appendix III to CF-9, p. 574.

¹³ For the agreement between France and Germany concerning prisoners of war, April 26, 1918, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxi, p. 713; and for the agreement between France and Germany concerning the liberation or repatriation of civilians, and the treatment of the population in occupied territories, April 26, 1918, see *ibid.*, p. 721.

Delegation may rest assured that it is the intention of the Allied and Associated Powers to treat their prisoners of war during the period between the signing of peace and repatriation with full consideration of their feelings and their needs.

The restitution of personal property to prisoners of war constitutes a legal right which the Allied and Associated Powers have every intention of respecting. As regards information about the missing the Allied and Associated Powers have always endeavoured to supply the German Government with all information in their possession on this subject and they will certainly continue to do so after peace is signed. Concerning the care of graves they would point out that articles 225 and 226 would appear to assure to the German people that the graves of their fellow citizens shall be both respected and properly maintained and that so far as is practicable under clause 225 the bodies of their soldiers and sailors may be transferred to their own country.

In regard to the German request for complete reciprocity the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers have to state that they felt it necessary to include Article 222 in view of the treatment which their own nationals have received while interned in Germany during the war. As there was no parallel between the treatment which was accorded to prisoners of war by the German Government on the one side and the Allied and Associated Powers on the other no claim for reciprocity in this respect can arise.

In regard to the third question, the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers are ready to do everything possible to repatriate German prisoners of war and interned civilians properly fed and in good condition after the conclusion of peace. They regret, however, that the pressing demands upon them from territories recently liberated from the German yoke as well as from their own nationals will probably make it impossible for them to supply the prisoners of war with the clothing etc., for which the German Peace Delegation asks.

Finally in regard to the appointment of a Commission to deal with the repatriation of prisoners of war, the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers will be glad to set up such Commissions immediately upon the signature of peace. They regret, however, that they do not see their way to appoint them until they are notified of the intention of the plenipotentiaries of the German Empire to sign peace.

G. CLEMENCEAU

Appendix V A to CF-20

Memorandum on the Request of the Serbian Delegation Enclosed in Sir Maurice Hankey's Letter of May 15 [11], 1919

The suggestion of the Serbian Delegation that, out of the initial £1,000,000,000, 2 milliards of Francs or £80,000,000, should be specifically assigned to Serbia, seems to us, in that form, inadmissible.

1) There is no reason to think that the total of the Serbian claims bear such a proportion to the total of the claims ranking against Germany and likely to be accepted by the Commission, even if the fact that Serbia gains large territories at the expense of Austria is not treated as ground for a reduction of her claims.

2) [There is not in the case of Serbia the special ground, which existed in the case of Belgium, that the damages inflicted on her were caused in a war which was specially a violation of her international status as well as generally aggressive and accompanied by inhuman conduct.

On the other hand]* we think that Serbia's claim to prompt and even generous assistance is strong. Her population has been left in great distress; her country was thoroughly pillaged by processes equally methodical and merciless; and the resumption of her agricultural industry is half paralysed by lack of live stock, of agricultural implements and of means of transport by road and rail. The difficulty is to find a practical relief for her.

Serbia has many partners in this condition of urgent need. It is probable that, on the one hand, the rate at which her injuries can be repaired is slow, since so much of it is damage to buildings, while, on the other, a relatively small amount of aid, if given in the right form and very promptly—such as rolling stock, agricultural implements, tools and breeding stock—would quickly produce extensive benefit.

Apart from the specific share of these things, which may be assigned to her out of the reparation in specie that can be obtained from Austria, from Hungary and from Bulgaria, the only thing that can be done is an immediate creation of credit by an immediate promise of a defined amount from the first sums realised out of the German reparation. Live stock and agricultural implements are hard to buy: the available quantity is small and the purchases are many and are pressing, but if Serbia is given money or the means of getting money, she must take her share with the rest and buy what she can. The British, French and Italian representatives suggest a promise of £5,000,000 forthwith or of £1,000,000 every three months for fifteen months, and the representatives of the United States of America now assent to this proposal.

* The words in square brackets were deleted by the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. [Footnote in the original.]

Appendix V B to CF-20

SERBIAN CLAIMS FOR ONE-TENTH OF TOTAL SUM OF FIRST INSTALMENT
OF REPARATION DEMANDED FROM GERMANY

Translation

PEACE CONFERENCE, SECRETARIAT GENERAL,
QUAI D'ORSAY, PARIS, 11 May, 1919.

The Secretariat-General of the Peace Conference has the honour to transmit herewith to the Secretariat-General of the British Delegation, for urgent communication to Mr. Lloyd George, copy of a letter addressed by Mr. Pachitch to M. Clemenceau and requesting that two milliards out of the twenty milliards required from Germany as an instalment in respect of Reparation for damage should be allotted to Serbia.

THE SECRETARIAT GENERAL
OF THE BRITISH DELEGATION.

[Enclosure]

DELEGATION OF THE KINGDOM
OF THE SERBS, CROATS AND
SLOVENES TO THE PEACE
CONFERENCE,
PARIS, May 9, 1919.

Translation

MR. PRESIDENT: As no other country has suffered more than Serbia during the war which has so happily terminated, and no other country has received so small a measure of relief, our people finds itself in the greatest degree deprived of all means of recovery, and even of existence. Moreover, the Germans and Austro-Hungarians have regarded as an enemy country not only Serbia, properly speaking, but also all the provinces of the former Hapsburg Monarchy, which are inhabited by our racial kinsmen, especially Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dalmatia and Smyrna [*Slovenia?*] and have behaved accordingly towards their inhabitants. The definite ruin of our unfortunate country was, however, only completed on the day when Marshal Mackensen invaded it at the head of German troops in October, 1915. In Serbia the enemy not only carried off or destroyed all privately owned instruments of production, but likewise destroyed all means of communication and all elements indispensable for the restoration of economic life. Serbia finds herself absolutely incapable of resuming her economic activity in default of means of communication and of the necessary instruments. Our Delegates on the Reparation Commission urged this point in the most pressing manner and handed in lists of objects of first necessity. They had previously asked that we should be authorised to recover in Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria, the live-

stock, the instruments of production, the tools and means of communication *which had been removed by the enemy from our country. The Germans, more especially during their retreat, relentlessly seized the livestock and carried it off; it was their army which destroyed the means of communication.*

Our request on this point was not met and it thus comes about that the Germans are returning to their Allies *Serbian livestock* in compensation for the livestock removed, and that certain Serbian dealers are repurchasing in Bulgaria *Serbian livestock* at exorbitant prices.

While bringing this situation to the notice of the Supreme Council of the Allies, we pray that it may receive their most favourable consideration. We think that there is no exaggeration in the idea that it would be just and equitable that, out of the twenty milliards which Germany will have to hand to the Allies as an instalment of Reparation for damage, two milliards should be allotted to us for the immediate reconstruction of our country and especially for the purchase of livestock, instruments of production, tools and means of communication.

We beg leave once more to insist on the point that *it is the Germans who have been the principal authors* of the destruction of our railways and of our ways of communication, as well as of the pillage of our livestock and provisions. Throughout the occupation of our country special German trains, "loot trains" (*Beutezüge*) carried off from our country everything which the German army had removed both from public and private properties. The Austro-Hungarians and the Bulgarians did likewise.

We therefore have the honour to beg the Supreme Council of the Allies, over which your Excellency presides with so great a spirit of solidarity, to be so good as to right this injustice and guarantee to Serbia without delay two milliards in respect of Reparation for damage, and thus enable her to resume her economic life, failing which our country can only look forward to a gloomy future.

P. PACHITCH

**Notes of a Meeting Held in President Wilson's House, Place des
Etats-Unis, Paris, on Wednesday, May 21, at 11 a. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.
Professor P. J. Mantoux

Secretary.
Interpreter.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU handed round the attached Note from the German Peace Delegation, asking for an extension of the time limit. (Appendix I.)

German Request
for an Extension
of Time Limit

(After a short discussion, Colonel Henri¹ was sent for from Versailles, and instructed to ascertain informally from the Germans the extent of the time limit which they desired, in order that M. Clemenceau might have some definite proposition to make to his colleagues).

General Albi² was introduced.

2. M. CLEMENCEAU handed a despatch from the French Military Mission at Prague to the Ministry of War, to M. Mantoux, which was translated by him. This despatch stated that General Haller's Polish troops had attacked the Ukrainian troops south of Przemysl and were threatening Borislav. The Polish troops should arrive at Drohobycz tomorrow. The Galician population were already beginning to retire towards the passes of the Carpathians in order to take refuge in Czecho-Slovakia. The Ukrainian Government had asked for support by the Czech troops in the Borislav district, but this was not likely to be granted. The Czech Government was concerned lest the Bolshevik forces should, owing to the diversion by the Polish attack, overwhelm the Ukrainians. The military command in Czecho-Slovakia under the burden of the demands from the Ukrainian front had no reserves to spare for the

Polish-Ukrainian
Armistice

¹ Lt. Col. Marie Joseph Henri, of the French General Staff; head of the liaison group with the enemy peace delegations at Versailles.

² Chief of the French General Staff.

Carpathians. Communication from Transylvania to Poland through Czecho-Slovakia was interrupted.

GENERAL ALBI said that this news had been brought to General Pellé³ by Ukrainian officers. He explained on a map how the Ukrainians, who had been fighting the Bolsheviks for the last two months, were under pressure from Polish, Bolshevik and Roumanian forces.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this was a breach of faith by General Haller, who had absolutely no right to take this action. He said that General Botha had been much impressed with the Ukrainians' case, and had suggested that the Council of Four should see the Ukrainians. The Poles were helping to crush an independent movement against the Bolsheviks.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that Mr. Hoover had suggested that the whole group should be informed that supplies of every kind would stop if fighting did not cease.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Sir Esme Howard,⁴ who had always been favourable to the Poles, had sent him memorandum, advising that the Poles ought to be stopped on their present lines.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if President Wilson's memorandum⁵ had been sent to the Poles.

PRESIDENT WILSON reminded him that it had been suspended owing to the receipt of M. Paderewski's telegram.⁶

MR. LLOYD GEORGE urged that the Ukrainian Delegation should be heard. These small nations were going straight to perdition, and adopting all the worst vices of which the Prussians had been accused.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the first question seemed to be to define the boundaries. Until that was done, it was difficult for the Council to take up an intelligible position for stopping the fighting between these States.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE advocated the stoppage of food and munitions as a means of bringing the fighting to an end. The Polish Ukrainian Armistice Commission had defined the boundary. General Botha told him that the Polish population in the Lemberg region was only about one-sixth of the total.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that M. Paderewski had told him that Lemberg was Polish.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that according to General Botha, Lemberg was a Polish town in the Ukrainian district.

(It was agreed that General Botha and the Members of the Polish-Ukrainian Armistice Commission, as well as the Ukrainian Delegation should be seen on the same afternoon at 4 p. m.)

³ Gen. Maurice C. J. Pellé, of the French Army, chief of the General Staff and Commander in Chief of the Czechoslovak Army.

⁴ British representative on the Interallied Mission to Poland.

⁵ See CF-16, p. 677, and appendix I to CF-22, p. 782.

⁶ See appendix I to CF-18B, p. 711.

(General Albi withdrew.)

3. PRESIDENT WILSON read a draft reply to the German proposals on the subject of the League of Nations. (Appendix II.) This reply had been prepared by the appropriate Committee of the Conference, of which Lord Robert Cecil had acted as Chairman.

League of Nations.
Reply to the
German Note

(The reply was approved. Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to inform the Secretary-General, and ask him to prepare a French translation for M. Clemenceau's signature).

It was at this point that Colonel Henri was seen, (see Minute I).

4. MR. LLOYD GEORGE handed round a scheme in regard to Italian claims, covering both Fiume and Turkey, which he had prepared for a basis of consideration. (Appendix III.) M.

Italian Claims

Orlando had been called away to meet his colleagues on the borders of Italy, and had suggested that the opportunity might be taken for a private discussion between the other three members of the Council in regard to Italian claims, and it was for this reason that he had prepared this Scheme.

(There was a short adjournment for reading this proposal.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that perhaps the Council would be glad to hear his reasons. He had discussed the matter for two days with some of his colleagues in the British Cabinet, who had come from London for the purpose. He first referred to the question of Asia Minor. He pointed out that there was undoubtedly a good deal of unrest in the Mohammedan world, in regard to the future of Asia Minor and Turkey generally. Great Britain was, perhaps, the greatest Mohammedan power. There were some 70 millions of Mohammedans in India and several millions in Egypt and the Soudan. There had lately been a good deal of trouble in both these countries. Now Afghanistan was in ferment, and the Amir had declared war. About one and a quarter millions of troops had been raised in India, a large proportion of the fighting men being Mohammedans. These had done the bulk of the fighting against the Turks. It was true there had been some French troops in Gallipoli and a large number of British troops had been used both in Gallipoli and in the subsequent campaigns against the Turks. Nevertheless, in the campaigns subsequent to Gallipoli, the Indian troops had preponderated. The Mohammedan world realised this. Undoubtedly, the partition of Asia Minor would cause anger in the Mohammedan world. The more he thought the matter over, the less was he, as head of the Power which had done nine-tenths of the fighting against Turkey, willing to agree to the partition of Asia Minor. This was the view of the British Cabinet. Not only would it create permanent trouble in the East, but they had come to the conclusion that it would be unjust. The Allies had no more right to split up Turkey than Germany, in former days, had had to split up Poland.

Germany had had exactly the same justification in the case of Poland as there was now in the case of Turkey, namely, that the Government was incompetent. The Allies had a perfect right to say that the Turks should not rule over alien races like the Greeks, Armenians and Arabs, whom they had always misgoverned. But this argument did not apply in those parts of Turkey where the population was overwhelmingly Turk. If Smyrna, and Constantinople and Armenia were ruled out, the population of Anatolia would probably be more than 90% Turk. As an instance of the danger of partition, he mentioned the division of Bengal, which had caused trouble for years. Supposing Anatolia were divided, with the French in the North and the Italians in the South and the Sultan were at Brusa, would it be possible for the French to avoid interference? How could they help it with the Sultan in their sphere?

M. Clemenceau himself had said that this was an impossible situation and had suggested that there should be two Sultans, one in the North and one in the South. But this was unjustifiable to tear the population in half. It would cause constant unrest and trouble throughout the Mohammedan world and the British Delegation could not agree to it. He would like the same power which had the mandate for Constantinople to have the mandate for Anatolia. This was the view of the British Delegation after two days largely devoted to the study of the question. They considered that one power ought to control both, and that power should be the one in Constantinople. In Armenia and Mesopotamia and in Syria where there were non-Turkish races, other powers could govern. But in the case of Anatolia there should be some sort of Government by men of the Turkish race. Some sort of control, however, was desirable. Otherwise there might occur massacres of such Greeks and Armenians and the inhabitants of such other races as remained. The British Delegation would prefer America to exercise this control. The reason for this—and it was necessary to speak very plainly in considering these great problems affecting the future of the world—was that the United States of America would be more acceptable to the Mohammedan world than any other part[y]. One reason was that America was known to have a very great respect for liberty and would consequently be expected to be very fair. Another reason was that America had no past in dealings with Mohammedans. This was not the case either with France or Great Britain. The Mohammedans were honestly afraid lest the Algerian experiment should be tried in Turkey, involving the complete subservience of Mohammedans to Christians. No doubt there would be the same feeling towards Great Britain. A second reason was that if France were given the mandate for Anatolia, Italy would have the right to complain under the Treaty of London. Italy

feared lest France should regard herself as the only Mediterranean Power. This was really the basis of the whole of Baron Sonnino's case. Italy must also be ruled out from a mandate for the whole of Anatolia. This was hardly arguable. To give it to France, however, would make the position of Italy impossible. Hence, he could see nothing for it but for the United States of America to accept the mandate.

If, however, the United States could not see its way to accept a mandate, he saw no alternative but to continue the present system with the Turks in entire control. In reality, however, it would not work like the present system. America would have a mandate for Armenia and for Constantinople and it would not be possible for the Turk to remain absolutely free to misrule as he wished. As far as he knew the Turk never had perpetrated any very serious atrocities in Anatolia, even if he had never governed it particularly well. Moreover, the present system included certain restrictions on Turkish administration. There was a debt under an International Board; as France was the largest holder of the debt, the Board had a French President. This would continue. As regards concessions, this was probably a more nominal than real difficulty, since no one, except the United States, had any money. Hence, a scramble for concessions among the European Powers was a scramble for nothing. France had the Cameroons and Togoland to look after, both requiring a good deal of development. Moreover, his proposal gave France a provisional mandate for Syria until the report of the Commission was received. If the report was against France, there might have to be some reconsideration by the Powers in common. It was, however, essential for President Wilson to get home before very long, and the same applied to himself, and some provisional arrangement was necessary. These were his views, which had been prepared in consultation with his colleagues. He did not pretend that he had not vacillated. He had come to the conclusion, however, that any other solution would cause trouble to France and to Great Britain, and to the peace of the world. Hence, he could not consent to the partition of Anatolia. Finally, until Russia was settled, he thought it would be necessary for the United States to control the Caucasus also. The British were in control at present, but they could not see their way to remain there.

He wished to point out that these proposals were closely linked up with his proposals in regard to the Adriatic. In the interests of the peace of the world, he thought it would be worth while to press these on the Jugo-Slavs.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out certain inconsistencies in Mr. Lloyd George's plan. Very good grounds were found in Asia Minor against handing over the population against its will to a Mandatory. But in

the case of Jugo-Slavia the same principle was not applied. The only way to remove that inconsistency was to adopt the principle of the plebiscite which he had advocated. For example, in the case of the Islands, the only way to settle the question of which population predominated was by a plebiscite since the official statistics were disputed both by the Italians and the Jugo-Slavs. Whenever the Jugo-Slavs had been forced to intervene with a plebiscite, the figures had gone against the Italians. Even in regard to Lissa an inhabitant of that Island had told him that the population would not vote for the Italians. He, himself, all along had been willing to say to the Italians you must evacuate the whole territory which will then be put provisionally under the League of Nations, Fiume for the time being becoming a free City giving full access to the district served by the Port.

This access would continue until the construction of a Port of equivalent usefulness at Buccari. Then he would take the vote of the population in regard to Fiume.

In regard to the other territories, the League of Nations would arrange a plebiscite and Italy should be allowed to have any considerable district other than a mere Township that voted for her. This plan would square with the principles proposed by Mr. Lloyd George for Anatolia. His idea was the same as Mr. Lloyd George had suggested in a conversation with him just before the meeting in regard to Cilicia [*Silesia*], where Mr. Lloyd George had suggested doubts as to whether the population was Polish in sentiment. There might be cases where the preference of the population was stronger than the nationality. For example, there might be people in Cilicia [*Silesia*] who, though Polish in origin, preferred to remain German. The same principle might apply to the Adriatic. On the coast of Asia Minor on the Aegean littoral there was a considerable Greek population. He was fully in favour of giving the Turks complete access to the sea but he was apprehensive of extending Turkish sovereignty to the coast in the neighbourhood of the Dodecanese. If Turkish sovereignty extended to these shores, the Turks would always remember that the Islands had not long since been taken from them.

To illustrate this, President Wilson brought out an ethnographical map of Turkey pointing out that the population of the coast was very similar to the population of the Island. There was a close similarity between Mr. Lloyd George's plan and his own proposals. He himself, had suggested that the Turks should retain full sovereignty in Anatolia but that the Sultan should be allowed to inhabit a reserved area in Constantinople in the territory of the Mandatory for the Straits. Nevertheless, he would not be hampered in his administration of Anatolia by the Mandatory of the Straits though he might sometimes be guided by the Mandatory's advice. If the United States

were the Mandatory of the Straits they would not in the least object if the Sultan were advised in stipulated matters by other Powers on the subject of the government of Anatolia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE considered that if the United States could not take a Mandatory over Anatolia, it would be better for the Sultan to clear out of Constantinople. The Sultan's Court and guards comprising a very large number of people, would be a great inconvenience to the Mandatory Power.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested the guards might be limited in number. Since Saturday he had been considering the question very carefully and he doubted the advisability of accepting a Mandate for Anatolia. If the same Power was Mandatory in Constantinople and in Armenia, it would be very difficult for the Sultan to cause much trouble.

He then adverted to the Commission for Syria. The Delegates whom he had nominated were men of such standing that he could not keep them waiting any longer in Paris, consequently he had instructed them to leave for Syria on Monday and to await there their colleagues on the Commission.⁷

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said the same applied to the British Delegates and he thought he would give them the same orders.

M. CLEMENCEAU said in this case he must drop out. He said that the promises made to him had not been kept. General Sir Henry Wilson had apparently not been in a position to discuss with M. Tardieu the question of the sphere of occupation in Syria.

In reply to Mr. Lloyd George who had asked in what way the promises made to him had not been kept, he said that in the Autumn of 1918 when he saw how the British were acting in Syria, he had come to London and had asked Mr. Lloyd George to say exactly what he wanted. Mr. Lloyd George had said Mosul and Palestine. He had returned to Paris, and in spite of the objections of M. Pichon and the Quai d'Orsay, he had conceded it. Then Mr. Lloyd George had said that France and Great Britain would get along all right. Nevertheless they had not succeeded in getting along all right. Early in the year the proposal had been made for the evacuation of Syria by British troops and the substitution of French troops. Lord Milner had asked him to put this aside for the moment and had undertaken to discuss it with him. He had never done so. Then Lord Milner had promised to help M. Clemenceau with Emir Feisal. He had never carried out his promise. After this, Lord Milner had produced a map by which Syria was divided in order to provide a railway for the British to Mesopotamia. Later, Mr. Lloyd George had suggested

⁷ The Americans appointed were Charles R. Crane and H. C. King.

that President Wilson should have part of Cilicia. He had even agreed to this. Thus, he had given up Mosul and Cilicia and some more territory for the sake of the British Railway.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE interrupting, asked what M. Clemenceau's grievance was? What constituted a breach of faith?

M. CLEMENCEAU continuing, said that the latest phase had concerned the withdrawal of British troops. It had been agreed to arrange for zones of occupation. It had been agreed that M. Tardieu and General Sir Henry Wilson should study the question. After three days of consultation, General Wilson said that there could be no arrangement unless the limits of Syria were fixed. M. Tardieu had quite properly said that this was not a matter that he could deal with.

France, having given up Mosul and some region required for the Railway and Cilicia, thought she had a right to compensation. He had then suggested that France should have a Mandate over part of Anatolia. Of course he recognised that no promises had been given, but the idea had been proposed in the course of their conversations. He himself, had just listened and had shown no undue hurry about it. Only yesterday it had been suggested that France should have a Mandate for the whole of Anatolia. To-day however, Mr. Lloyd George came forward with fresh combinations. He knew the cause of this. It was the arrival of Lord Curzon. He had heard all about this from London where Lord Curzon had spoken very freely. Lord Curzon was the fiercest friend France had in England. He regarded it as a good thing to take from France Mosul and part of Syria for a railway and Cilicia, and to do nothing in return. He had another objection. Throughout this Conference his policy had been the closest union between France, Great Britain and the United States of America. He had made great concessions in this respect. Only this morning he had had a meeting of certain representatives from the right of the Chamber and he had reminded them of the great service that Great Britain and the United States had rendered to France, and had insisted that their close cooperation must be continued. Was it a good thing though that France should be excluded from Asia Minor because of the susceptibilities of the Italians? He had public opinion in France to consider. France being the country with the greatest financial interests of any country in the world in Turkey surely ought not to be expelled from Asia Minor on two such grounds as the Mussulman question and the Italian question. He, like his colleagues, had been impressed by the Mohammedan Deputation. He had a genuine respect for the Moslem religion, and the Deputation had made an impression on him. He had thought that something ought to be done for them. He had no proposal to make to-day, but while something might be done for the Turkish people, he was unable to accede to Mr. Lloyd George's proposals. He considered the two hypotheses which he attributed to Lord Curzon

dangerous. He considered it dangerous to introduce the United States of America in Asia Minor. To say that the United States were to have a Mandate not only for Constantinople and Armenia, but for the whole country between them would cause a bad ferment and division in the whole of the European world. It would introduce the ideas of men who had not thought of the repercussion of these events in Europe. He did not know what the effect would be in the United States of America, nor could he speak definitely for any country but France, but as regards France, though the feelings in favour of the United States were strong and of long standing, this proposal, if carried out, would not produce a good opinion. He recognised that the United States had done a great deal for France. They had struck the last blow in the war, and France was eternally grateful for it, but if the idea got about that Great Britain had brought the United States in to get France out, public feeling in France would not stand it. He did not say the idea was correct but that it would get about. Rather than sign any such agreement, he would not leave the Conference but it might be necessary for him to leave the Government. He did not say this in order merely to use a threatening argument, but he should not be doing his duty unless he gave this answer. He need hardly say that he was not going to conspire with M. Orlando and M. Sonnino in this matter but it would be impossible to prevent public feeling in France from joining with public feeling in Italy. It should not be forgotten that beyond the military and political decisions to be taken, there were human feelings and hearts to be considered, hence he begged that it would not be decided to keep France out as well as Italy by bringing in the United States of America. He was quite willing to admit, if his colleagues wished him to, that the Government of some other Power might conceivably be better in these regions but it was impossible to ignore Italy and the very bad consequent effect that such exclusion would have in France. When he had begun to speak he had had it in his mind to ask for time to examine the proposition coolly, and to-day he would make no proposal, but after having been led to believe that matters were to be arranged satisfactorily, this proposal had taken him by surprise.

If his colleagues really wished to induce him to believe that Mesopotamia and Palestine should go to Great Britain and Asia Minor to America, he was quite ready to think the matter over. He hoped his colleagues would not think he had forgotten the past. He would never allow any impression to be given outside that he had forgotten what Great Britain and America had done for France. He would do his duty to the Peace of the world, but he hoped before any further discussion, his colleagues would think these matters over.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he must answer one or two of M. Clemenceau's observations. France had no right to complain of the

loyalty of Great Britain which had given substantial guarantees for France's security. Great Britain had volunteered to make these guarantees without any pressure being put upon her. She had volunteered to put her whole strength in support of France.

As regards the charge of a break of faith, this was without any foundation. On the occasion of the London visit, Mr. Lloyd George had promised Syria to France provided that he gave up Mosul.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that France had had a definite agreement before as to Syria.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in London it had been agreed that Syria should go to France and Mesopotamia to Great Britain, but that Mosul, which was in the same watershed as Mesopotamia, should form part of that country and go to Great Britain. In his statement M. Clemenceau had entirely ignored the article of his scheme which gave the Mandate for Syria to France. This was clearly stated in the document. Was this a case of bad faith? He recalled the proposal that he had made for a redistribution of the forces in Turkey in order to relieve the British Army which had a very large force there, occasioning demobilisation difficulties. He himself, had gone away to London and for some reason he had never quite understood, the scheme had fallen through. On his return, President Wilson had proposed the Commission to Syria. The United States and Great Britain and Italy had their Delegates all ready. It was France who had never appointed their Delegates.

This was a formal document and had been signed by all of them. M. Clemenceau had not carried out his part of the bargain. He did not say that M. Clemenceau had not kept faith, but he certainly had not carried out the bargain.

As regards General Wilson's conversations with M. Tardieu, his account was that he had gone to M. Tardieu with a map, as it was absolutely essential to delimitate the sphere of occupation. In this map the whole of Syria had been attributed to the occupation of France. M. Tardieu replied he knew about the subject. Surely it was plain common sense to delimitate the spheres of occupation on a map. It was quite unwarrantable to charge him with a breach of faith because of this incident. As a matter of fact, no counter-proposal had been made by M. Tardieu. As regards the railway to Syria, this was part of a proposal under which half the oil of Mesopotamia was to be given to the French. The railway was essential to the transport of the oil and was in the interests of the French. It had not been a bargain but was merely a proposal that was under discussion, and there was no breach of faith here. As regards Asia Minor, he had never heard of a French claim until the previous day. There had never been the smallest indication that France wanted a mandate for

Asia Minor. The project had arisen out of a discussion of the Italian claims. M. Clemenceau had himself made the proposal that France should have a mandate for the northern half of Anatolia. When the proposal was made, however, it was found that the claim included priority for concessions. Then President Wilson had pointed out that under the mandate scheme, priority for concessions was not permissible. It was not true that France had the greatest claim in Turkey. Within the last few days he had had the interests of the various Powers in Turkey examined, with the result that Great Britain was found to have the largest trade, Germany the second, France being a bad third. It was true that France had a large claim in the Bagdad railway, but the Bagdad line would not run mainly through the part of Anatolia which had been contemplated in the French mandate. It would run through all the mandated territory, American, French and British. Hence the basis of this claim was not in the French zone at all. He did not believe that French public opinion had made any claim for a mandate for Anatolia. He had carefully studied the French newspapers, and had only found one reference to it, namely, in the newspaper *Temps*, and he believed that to be Italian propaganda. He did not want to discuss in detail the agreement⁸ signed between Lord Grey⁹ and M. Cambon,¹⁰ but he meant to point out that it had always been understood that the two countries were to do their utmost to attack the Turks. He had tried to carry out this part of the agreement. He had met M. Ribot¹¹ and M. Painlevé,¹² and Marshal Foch at Boulogne, and Marshal Foch had produced a plan by which the French were to attack from the north and the British from the south. The French Government, however, would not agree. Afterwards, a document had been prepared by the military representatives at Versailles. M. Clemenceau, himself, however, had been against it. Hence, the whole policy was on the understanding of a co-operation in overthrowing the Turks, which had never been carried out on the French side. All sorts of plans had been discussed. At one time the British would have liked to have landed at Alexandria, but could not go there, owing to French susceptibilities. There had been a project for a French landing at Tripoli, but the French had never gone there. Great Britain was the largest Eastern Power, and now the greatest of all Mohammedan Powers. This was the reason for the objections made to a French mandate over Anatolia.

⁸ Sykes-Picot Agreement, May 9-16, 1916, *Current History*, vol. xi (March, 1920), p. 499.

⁹ British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, December 1905-December 1916.

¹⁰ Paul Cambon, French Ambassador in Great Britain.

¹¹ Alexandre Felix J. Ribot, French President of the Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs, March-September 1917.

¹² Paul Painlevé, French Minister for War, March-September 1917; President of the Council of Ministers, September-November 1917.

It was not in the least fair to suggest Lord Curzon was anti-French. It was not right to make a just peace in the West and not to make a proper peace in the East. It was solely in the interests of peace in the East that he had been unable to agree to a division of Anatolia. It was for this reason that he had come to the conclusion that the better plan would be for the United States of America to have the mandate. If M. Clemenceau said that this was because Great Britain was jealous of France, he made a suggestion that was not a very worthy one to a Power that had done and guaranteed so much for France.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he hoped, in the first place, the consideration of this question would be postponed for a time, since great issues were involved. He would contemplate with the greatest uneasiness and distrust any misunderstanding that might arise in this matter. He must say at once that the United States would find it very difficult to take any part in Asia Minor where they had no material interests. Any part in the sacrifices and burdens of this mandate would be politically disadvantageous to America. Hence, America desired nothing in Asia Minor. What they did desire most of all was first, the accord between the great powers, and second, peace with the world. He hoped therefore, that the question would be viewed solely from these points of view. Mr. Lloyd George's plan might or might not be the best. But whether they agreed or disagreed in this particular plan, they must find one which would be best for the peace of the world. He had formed no judgement on the scheme for himself, and would think it over. He could only say at this stage, that he feared it was impossible for the United States to take a mandate for Asia Minor. It was difficult for her to take a mandate even for Armenia, where she had permanent interests of long standing, and where a good deal of money had been spent by Americans for the relief of the Armenian people. As regards Constantinople, he thought that even some of the public men who were opposed to him politically would support him in taking a mandate. He did not, however, think that he could persuade them to accept a mandate for Asia Minor. Although he did not exclude the possibility of altering his opinion, his present conviction was, that it would be better not to divide Anatolia, and that the Sultan should be left in Constantinople. If that caused too great complications, he should be removed to Brusa. His present judgement also was that it would be dangerous to bring the Turks to the coast in the neighbourhood of the Dodecanese, supposing that these islands were to go to Greece. He suggested that instead of a mandate to the United States, something should be laid down to provide for giving advice to the Turks. What had been suggested was that the Sultan should accept advice in regard to certain

specific matters, for example, finance, commercial matters and *gendarmérie*. In discussions with his United States colleagues, he had told them that France was already in the position of advisor as regards the Ottoman debt. He had told his colleagues that he thought the other processes of advice might come from the French Government. He thought that M. Clemenceau had misunderstood his proposal that the United States Delegates on the Syrian Commission should proceed to Syria to await their colleagues. At any rate, they were men of such standing that he could not keep them waiting in Paris. If they did not go to Syria they must go back to the United States.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he thought they ought to go to Syria.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was ready for the French representatives to go, as soon as the British troops in Syria had been replaced by French. The question had been referred to Sir Henry Wilson and M. Tardieu. He did not think that General Wilson could have reported the result of this interview correctly. General Wilson had said that the limits of Syria must be fixed and M. Tardieu had replied that only the Council of Four could do that.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that General Wilson had submitted a document to M. Tardieu. There had been no breach of faith here.

SIR MAURICE HANKEY said possibly the misunderstanding was due to him. The conversation between General Wilson and M. Tardieu had been interrupted in order that certain decisions might be taken, which could only be taken by the Council of Four. On the previous day, just as he was entering the meeting, a large map had been thrust into his hand, containing the proposal for the line of delimitation for Syria, which General Wilson had put forward. At the morning meeting he had had no opportunity to bring this matter forward, and there was no afternoon meeting and the map was still lying in the room.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE insisted that the negotiations in regard to the railway were to the advantage of France. However, he must put a stop to these negotiations until the present misunderstanding was cleared up.

(It was agreed that the Syrian question should be discussed the same evening.)

(The Meeting then adjourned until 4 p. m. the same afternoon.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 21 May, 1919.

Appendix I to CF-20A

[*The Head of the German Delegation (Brockdorff-Rantzau) to the President of the Peace Conference (Clemenceau)*]

GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION,
VERSAILLES, May 20, 1919.

SIR: The German Peace Delegation intends during the next days to submit communications to the Allied and Associated Governments on the following points, which in the eyes of the Delegation fall under the definition of suggestions of a practical nature:

1. a note concerning territorial question in the East;
2. a note concerning Alsace-Lorraine;
3. a note concerning the occupied territories;
4. a note concerning extent and discharge of the obligation undertaken by Germany in view of reparation;
5. a note concerning the further practical treatment of the questions of Labour Law;
6. a note concerning the treatment of German private property in enemy countries.

Besides this, a syllabus is being prepared of the observations which the German Government are called for by the Draft of the Treaty of Peace in its detailed provisions.

The problems hereby involved being in part of a very complicated nature and it having been necessary to discuss them extensively with the experts in Versailles as well as with those in Berlin, it will not be possible to dispose of them within the time limit of 15 days notified by your Excellency on the 7th inst., although the Delegation will take pains to transmit as many notes as possible within the limit. Having regard to this I beg, in the name of the German Peace Delegation, to move that the contents of the intended notes be regarded as having already been made the subject of discussion in writing, and that the requisite time be granted to us for a more detailed exposition.

Accept [etc.]

BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU

M. 171

Appendix II to CF-20A

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Draft Reply to the German Proposals

The Committee of the Allied and Associated Powers appointed to consider the proposals of the German Government on the subject of the League of Nations have examined these proposals with care.¹³

¹³ See CF-8 and appendix, pp. 559 and 563. For text of the German proposals, see vol. VI, p. 765.

They note with interest the stipulations contained in the project of the German Government, and have considered that a suitable opportunity for the general discussion of these stipulations will arise when the League has been definitely constituted. For the moment, they limit themselves to drawing attention to a certain number of the specific points raised.

They beg to point out that the proposals of the German Government deal with matters which have been discussed at length by the Commission of the League of Nations. But they consider in general that the proposals of the Covenant are much more practical than those of the German Government and better calculated to secure the objects of the League.

They are glad to note that the German Government is in favour of a League for the maintenance of peace which shall be based on, and which shall give effect to, the general principles of democratic government. With that point of view they are in hearty agreement. But they do not consider that all the specific proposals of the German scheme would, in practice, be an advantage for the purpose.

They submit the following observations on certain of the suggestions put forward by the German Government:—

i. With regard to the establishment of a separate International Mediation Office (paragraphs 16–18, and 62 of the German project), they do not consider that any body of Mediators chosen in accordance with the German plan would in fact have the necessary authority to settle international disputes or to maintain the peace of the world. That will be the function of the Council as constituted by the Covenant.

At the same time they are in sympathy with the view that some system of impartial Commissions for conciliation may in many cases be the most suitable and the most effective means for the preliminary investigation, and where possible, for the settlement, of disputes not taken to arbitration; and they beg to point out that there is nothing in the Covenant to prevent the use of such Commissions. They anticipate that in practice such Commissions will be set up whenever they would serve a useful purpose.

ii. The proposals of the German Government for the composition, jurisdiction and procedure of a Permanent Court of International Justice (paragraphs 14–15, 29–36) have been carefully reviewed, and will be submitted for detailed consideration to the Council of the League of Nations, when it prepares a plan for the establishment of a Permanent Court in accordance with Article 14 of the Covenant.

iii. The League of Nations Commission of the Conference at an earlier stage considered the principle of obligatory Arbitration (paragraphs 30–33), and decided that its universal application in the form proposed is not practicable at the present time. The Committee point out, however, that they have provided for an obligatory recourse to pacific means for the settlement of all disputes and they believe that the establishment of a Permanent Court will do much to encourage the extension of the principle of arbitration. They are in sympathy

with many of the proposals made in paragraphs 44–53 of the German Government's project with reference to Freedom of Transit and Communications and the economic and commercial relations between different peoples. They beg to point out that general agreements on these matters, of the sort suggested by the German Government, are already under consideration by the Allied and Associated Powers, and that they will be submitted in due course to the League of Nations.

iv. With regard to the proposal that all costs and damages resulting to Members of the League from a breach of the Covenant should be paid by the Covenant-breaking State (paragraph 65), the Allied and Associated Powers recognise generally the justice of the principle laid down by the German Government, which is indeed of general application. They are, however, so confident that this measure would in fact be adopted by the League in the unfortunate event of a breach of the Covenant that they do not consider any modification of the provisions of the Covenant to be required.

v. They are glad to note that the German Government is in favour of Disarmament (paragraphs 40–42). They beg to point out that the Covenant provides for the preparation and submission to the Members of the League of proposals for international disarmament.

vi. They note the proposals of the German Government (paragraphs 62–64) as to sanctions for breach of obligations of the Members of the League. They are however, of opinion that the automatic economic pressure on Covenant-breaking States provided by Article XVI of the Covenant, to be followed by such international military or naval action as may be necessary, is likely to be speedier and more effective than the German suggestions.

Appendix III to CF-20A

[*Memorandum Submitted to the Council by Mr. Lloyd George*]

SCHEME FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF ITALIAN CLAIMS

(1) On the signature of peace with Austria, Fiume to be held provisionally in trust by the League of Nations pending the construction of a harbour for Yugo-Slavia at Italian expense.

On the completion by Italy of a harbour on the Adriatic which shall be deemed by the Council of the League of Nations to provide a satisfactory substitute to Fiume with sufficient anchorage, wharfage, and railway facilities and connected by a practicable line of railway with the railway system of Yugo-Slavia—Fiume to be handed over to the sovereignty of Italy. Italy to allow railway facilities within Fiume itself should this be necessary in order to provide railway connection.

(2) Italy to resign all claims on the mainland of Dalmatia.

(3) Italy to have the Island of Cherso when Fiume is handed over

to her. Italy to have immediately on the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Austria in full sovereignty those islands south of Cherso in which the Italian nationality preponderates including the island of Lissa.

MAY 21, 1919.

SCHEME FOR SETTLEMENT IN THE TURKISH EMPIRE

(1) The United States of America to have a full mandate over Constantinople and The Straits of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus.

Constantinople
and the Straits

(2) *First Alternative:* The United States of America to have a light mandate over the whole of Anatolia. The Sultan of Turkey and the Government to remain at Constantinople.

Asia Minor

Second alternative: If the United States of America cannot accept a mandate over the whole of Anatolia this region to remain subject to the sovereignty of the Sultan of Turkey without a mandatory.

(3) In either alternative provision to be made for access from Anatolia to the Mediterranean, Sea of Marmora, and Black Sea.

(4) The portion of the vilayet of Aidin proposed by the Greek Commission to be united with Greece in full sovereignty. No mandate to be given to Greece over any more extended zone.

Smyrna

Armenia
and Cilicia

(5) The United States of America to have a full mandate over Armenia and Cilicia.

(6) The mandate for Armenia to include a provisional mandate over Russian Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the whole Caucasus region pending a solution of the Russian problem.

Caucasus

(7) France to have a provisional mandate over Syria pending the report of the Commission which is proceeding to the Near East.

Syria

(8) Great Britain to have a provisional mandate over Mesopotamia and Palestine pending the report of the Commission that is proceeding to the Near East.

Mesopotamia
and Palestine

Arabia

(9) To be independent.

(10) These arrangements have been made after sympathetic consideration of the just claims of Mohammedans in the interests of the peace and good government of the world. They have been framed with the fullest desire to safeguard the essential interests of the Moslem faith.

The Holy
Places

The Allied and Associated Governments pledge themselves to leave to Mohammedan Guardianship the Holy Places of the Moslem faith wherever situated and declare that they will not assist or countenance

any interference with the present purposes to which any religious edifice is dedicated.

The Allied and Associated Powers state emphatically that they regard the question of the Kaliphate as being one purely for decision by Mohammedans and that they will in no case intervene in the matter.

**Notes of a Meeting Held in President Wilson's House, Place des
Etats-Unis, Paris, on Wednesday, May 21, at 4 p. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.
Count Aldrovandi
Professor P. J. Mantoux

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

ITALY

M. Sonnino.

Secretary
Secretary
Interpreter

Colonel Henri was introduced.

1. COLONEL HENRI reported that, as instructed in the morning, he had questioned Von Lersner, the representative of Brockdorff-Rantzau, through whom he was accustomed to communicate. In his conversation, he had made the request in an informal way, and had asked how long Von Lersner thought that the German Delegation required. After thinking it over Von Lersner said about a fortnight. Colonel Henri had then asked whether this information could be given formally, and Von Lersner after a moment's reflection, had said that it would be better not to put the question to Brockdorff-Rantzau, as it might make difficulties with the German Government. He had said that the German Delegation was preparing six more notes, not of very great importance, as well as a memoir, which, Colonel Henri observed, probably contained counter proposals. Von Lersner had then asked if the Germans could be allowed a train of printers, containing five cars, and 15 persons. This was required to speed up the preparation of the great memoir. Colonel Henri had said that he would ask for instructions on this. Von Lersner told him that Brockdorff-Rantzau and his colleagues were working very hard up to one or two o'clock in the morning.

M. CLEMENCEAU then read a note he had received from Marshal Foch, containing a summary of information received at General Headquarters, as to the German steps if negotiations broke down. The first was a telephone message received on the morning of May 20th

from the Intelligence Department in Alsace, according to which, the 14th German Army had been sent secret orders that German troops were to be sent to the rear to provide for the advance of the Allies. The second was from a French Officer, detached from the 10th Army, dated 6 p. m. on the 20th May. According to him, the Germans were sending 100 kilometres back, all their railway rolling stock, motor cars, and agricultural implements. The third was from the Coal Committee at Cologne, which said that at Essen it was believed that the Germans intended to break off and that the archives were being sent to Berlin.

(Colonel Henri withdrew.)

PRESIDENT WILSON said that it was perhaps a safe conclusion to draw, that the Germans did not mean to sign in the present circumstances. This factor, ought perhaps to enter into the question of an extension of the time, though in such a big Treaty, he thought the demand for an extension not unreasonable.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought it reasonable.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed, but would not give a fortnight's extension.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested 10 days.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE urged that it should not be beyond the following Wednesday evening. He would allow them to have a printing train, since it would speed up the production of their document.

M. SONNINO suggested that the time should depend upon whether this was to be a final extension or not, if there were to be no further extensions, a day or two longer should be given.

M. CLEMENCEAU raised the question as to whether any final date should be given for the Germans to agree to sign at the risk of the Armistice coming to an end.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought this inadvisable, because it was impossible to tell how long the Allied and Associated Governments would require to examine the elaborate counter proposal which the Germans were probably submitting. All that could be done at present was to fix a date for the extension.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that after this extension, they would ask for another.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that 15 days was too great an extension.

PRESIDENT WILSON considered that as no further extension would be granted, a liberal allowance was now desirable.

M. SONNINO suggested until the end of the month.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE urged that that was too long. It was probable that the Germans had already made up their minds, and he would not give them more than a week.

(After some further discussion, it was agreed:—

1. That the Germans should be given an extension until Thursday, May 29th. 1919.

2. That they should be allowed their printers' train.)

NOTE—The attached letter (Appendix) in this sense, was signed by M. Clemenceau, who, at the same time, gave M. Dutasta verbal instructions to allow the Germans to have their printers' train.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 21 May, 1919.

Appendix to CF-21

EXTENSION OF TIME-LIMIT GRANTED TO GERMANS

PARIS, May 21, 1919.

SIR; I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 20th of May ¹ stating that the subjects on which the German Delegation wishes to offer suggestions are so complicated that the memoranda of the German Delegation cannot be completed within the fifteen days granted on the 7th instant and asking in consequence for an extension of the time limit.

In reply I beg to inform Your Excellency that the Allied and Associated Governments are willing to grant an extension until Thursday, May 29th.

G. CLEMENCEAU

HERR BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU

¹ Appendix I to CF-20A, p. 767.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the
Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, at 4: 15 p. m. on Wednesday, May 21,
1919

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.
Count Aldrovandi
Prof. P. J. Mantoux

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

ITALY

M. Sonnino.

Secretary.
Secretary.
Interpreter.

The following Members of the Polish-Ukrainian Commission were also present:—

General The Rt. Hon. Louis Botha, (*President*).

Dr. Lord,

Lieut.-Colonel F. H. Kisch,

General Le Rond,

M. Brambilla,

United States of America.

British Empire.

France.

Italy.

Captain Brebner }
Captain Escoffier } *Secretaries.*

There were also present the following Members of the Ukrainian Delegation to the Peace Conference:—

M. G. Syderenko.

Dr. B. Paneyko.

M. Lozynsky.

Colonel D. Witowsky.

PRESIDENT WILSON stated that the reason for the presence of the Ukrainian Delegation was the distressing circumstances existing on the Polish-Ukrainian front and stated that the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers had invited the Delegates to make a statement as to their views on these circumstances. The Council would be glad if the spokesman would set forth those views.

Polish-Ukrainian
Armistice

M. SYDERENKO expressed in the name of the Ukrainian Delegation their gratitude to the illustrious representatives of the Great Powers for the interest they were showing in the Ukrainian people. He stated that Ukrainian territory had been devastated, the people had suffered extremely, and that they all deplored the state of war that existed between Poland and Ukraina. They would like to live with the

Poles in peace and harmony, and as brothers. They, however, were not the aggressors, but were only defending the country of their forefathers. They had more than once expressed their willingness to enter into an armistice and repeated that willingness again. They trusted that the Peace Representatives of the Entente would settle this question in accordance with the principles of justice and right as enunciated by President Wilson and as accepted by the Great Powers. Particularly anxious were they that the matter of the Armistice should receive an immediate settlement. The Armistice Commission had asked them to express their view and they had accepted the terms of the Armistice proposed by that Commission, but in spite of this they were informed that the Poles had made continuous attacks and had occupied further parts of Ukrainian territory. With regard to this point Dr. Paneyko the Vice President, would give further information.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE wished to know what the attitude of the Ukrainians was toward the Bolsheviks.

M. SYDERENKO, in reply, stated that the Ukrainians were defending their national territory, and that the Bolsheviks had invaded and were ravaging their country. They regarded the Bolsheviks as their worst enemies, and were doing their best to establish peace and order.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, to make this point clear, asked whether that statement meant that the Poles were attacking the Ukrainians on the Western side while the Bolsheviks were attacking them on the East. The answer was in the affirmative.

DR. PANEXKO stated that the population of Eastern Galicia consisted of about 4,000,000 Ukrainians. These had been given over by the Austrian authorities to Polish domination, and that was the reason why the Ukrainians greeted with joy the collapse of the Austrian Empire and immediately proceeded upon that collapse to establish their own national life and State. This State was founded on the principle of self-determination, as accepted by the Entente, but at the same time guaranteed the rights of minorities. From a social and economic point of view, the State is based upon the principles of democracy, and is introducing moderate reforms, chiefly with reference to the agricultural situation. The estates of the great land-owners have not been declared forfeit, but a scheme has been adopted for buying out these land-owners, the object being to obtain a middle class peasantry as the backbone of the State. In spite of the rights of the Poles being guaranteed, the latter, dreaming of the old historical Polish Empire, extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea, proceeded to attack this new State. The Polish population within the borders of the State, chiefly belonged to the bureaucratic and large land-owning classes, but the bulk of the population is Ukrainian.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether there was any substantial difference between the Polish and Ukrainian languages.

DR. PANEYKO replied that all Slavic languages are closely related, but the Ukrainian language is distinct from that of the Poles. One is not a dialect of the other. The Russian Ukrainians spoke the same language as those in Eastern Galicia. In religion the Galicians are Greek Catholics, owing allegiance to the Church of Rome.

Dr. Paneyko, continuing, stated that when the Government, established by the German Military Command in Ukraina, was overthrown, a movement for liberating the Western Ukraine was commenced by the inhabitants.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE put the question whether, supposing Russian Ukraina should remain part of Russia, the Western Ukrainians would prefer to remain under Poland or under Russia as an autonomous State.

DR. PANEYKO answered that it was difficult to reply to this question. Their aim and object was complete national independence, and he expressed the opinion that an autonomous State as suggested would not solve the problem, but would only serve to create a situation corresponding to the Balkan States.

M. SYDERENKO pointed out that the Ukrainian people were now all united. At one time they had been divided between Russia and Austria. Now, their common object was national independence. No union with Poland was possible, as the Ukrainians counted a population of some 40,000,000, while the Poles only totalled some 20,000,000. The Russians, on the other hand, had always only used Ukraina only for their own interests. All the Ukrainian parties from Right to Left were united in the one aim of obtaining complete independence as an indivisible State.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE then asked if it was correct to state that whatever happened to Ukraina as a whole, the Ukrainians would prefer to throw in their lot therewith. Did they want to be separated from the Eastern Ukrainians? The answer was, No. What they desired was a united independent Ukrainian State.

Mr. Lloyd George further enquired whether the Ukrainians were prepared to stop fighting if the Poles should do the same, and, if so, would they treat the Polish people fairly and with justice.

DR. PANEYKO stated in reply, that they had been willing to stop and had so stated several times previously. Legislation had also been passed guaranteeing to the Poles minority rights, which legislation had been much appreciated by the latter. To a further query of Mr. Lloyd George, whether, if ordered by the Delegation here in Paris, the Ukrainian troops on the front would obey such order, the reply was, Absolutely, and that the Armies under command of

the Ukrainian Government were well-organised and under complete control of the Ukrainian Government.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether, if the Ukrainians were relieved on this Polish-Ukrainian front, would these armies be used against the Bolsheviks on other fronts.

DR. PANETYKO replied, Certainly. This army was animated with a desire to proceed against the Bolsheviks in their country. The Ukrainian Delegation felt that such army would be more successful against the Bolsheviks because they understood the population which was at present subject to Bolshevik rule, and would get a sympathetic reception from their co-patriots. The Bolsheviks had over-run Ukraina, because the latter's army had to be withdrawn to defend their homes against the ravaging and pillaging of the Poles. Bolshevism would not find a rich field in Eastern Galicia, as the population there had enjoyed constitutional liberties far more than the Ukrainian population in Russia. The Ukrainians were anxious for the support by the Entente in the way of officers, supplies, munitions of war, etc. and stated that the Poles at the present time, with the assistance of the Allies, were invading Ukraina and burning and ravaging the country. In the name of humanity, he called upon the Entente to stop the Poles. Every day he received appeals for protection from the Ukrainians.

(The Deputation then withdrew.)

PRESIDENT WILSON requested General Botha to read the report of the Polish-Ukrainian Armistice Commission, (Appendix 4). The report was then read by Colonel Kisch.

GENERAL BOTHA then pointed out that the Ukrainians had accepted the draft Armistice terms subject to some slight modification, and demonstrated on the map attached to the report,¹ the various lines of demarcation suggested by the Armistice Commission, the Poles and the Ukrainians respectively. The Poles from the beginning had taken up the attitude that it was essential for them, in order to fight Bolshevism, to shorten their line and thus to join hands with Roumania and occupy a line towards the East of the Eastern boundary of Eastern Galicia.

PRESIDENT WILSON wished to have the opinion of General Botha and the Commission as to what effective steps could be taken to make the Poles agree to the draft Convention. As far as he understood the position from the reports that had come in, it appeared that the Poles were continuing their plans of attack regardless of the protests of M. Paderewski, and that Haller's Army was being used on this front.

GENERAL LE ROND pointed out that the telegram stating that Haller's

¹The map of Eastern Galicia which forms part of the report has not been reproduced.

Army was being used on the Ukrainian front came from Prague, and without further reliable authority it could be hardly accepted as correct. The same remark applied to the report that the Poles had taken Beltz, well within the Ukrainian lines.

GENERAL BOTHA, in reply to President Wilson, stated that, as a Commission, they had not gone into the political question as to what steps should be taken to enforce the Armistice terms. The Commission had impressed upon both parties the urgent necessity for stopping bloodshed, had drafted a draft armistice attached to the report, and submitted it to both parties for their acceptance. As Chairman of that Commission, he could only refer to the unanimous conclusion of the Commission, that when the Poles refused to accept the draft armistice their mandate was at an end. He was of opinion that bloodshed should be stopped at once for he feared that if it were allowed to continue peace would never reign in this region. Furthermore, if the Poles would stop this fighting it would give the Supreme Council an opportunity of further considering the question of frontiers and thus enabling a settlement to be obtained.

PRESIDENT WILSON then read a draft telegram which it had been proposed to send to General Pilsudski (Appendix I), before the latest telegram had arrived from M. Paderewski (Appendix II) and asked whether this telegram met with the approval of General Botha, pointing out that the effect of the telegram might be to create starvation amongst the people and suggesting that the terms of the telegram should be restricted to withholding military supplies.

GENERAL BOTHA suggested omitting all reference to the kind of supplies, thus leaving it open for decision later on, but President Wilson pointed out that such a course would be inadvisable unless the Council had already decided what it would do should the Poles prove obdurate.

GENERAL LE ROND pointed out that the Poles had always maintained that the continuous front from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea was essential for their safety as against Bolshevism and had alleged that in their present line there was a gap, namely, the Ukrainian front where communications were passing through between Lenin and Bela Khun. If the Poles overthrew Paderewski and no other Government could be established, the only alternatives were either to starve the Poles or force them to become Bolsheviks, and he suggested that the telegram should be confined to food supplies. Both sides were filled with ambitious aims but there certainly was some ground for the Polish desire for a continuous front, more especially when the Polish Army seemed to have the better morale.

GENERAL BOTHA pointed out that the Poles stood under the protection of the Supreme Council, and were receiving assistance in the

shape of troops, munitions of war and food. The Ukrainians fighting against them had on the other hand not been recognised, were receiving no assistance from the Allies; their country had been devastated by war, and the suffering amongst the population must be great. Yet, both countries were in the same position in this respect, that both owed their present existence to the sacrifices of the Allies. He believed that it would be to the interests of the Poles to listen to the Supreme Council. They had already been told that in the matter of territory they should occupy by force of arms. Such would not be taken into consideration in deciding the ultimate frontiers. He considered the cry of Bolshevism to be a bogey and felt it was impossible for the Supreme Council to allow a small nation to be over-run by its neighbours on the ostensible pretext of a defensive, strategical measure against Bolshevism, which at this point was some hundred miles removed from the present Polish frontier. The Poles owed their very existence to the great sacrifices of the Allies and therefore the Allies had every right to demand that they should be listened to. Furthermore, if the fighting on this front were stopped, it would mean obtaining some sixty thousand men to assist in waging war against the Bolsheviks. Looking at the question from the Ukrainian point of view, it must appear to the latter that they are being deceived by the Allies. Military assistance is being sent to the Poles by the Allies in the shape of Haller's Army, and supplies, etc., are being forwarded and being used to over-run a neighbouring State which like Poland owes its existence and continuance to the sacrifices of the Allies. There was plenty of room along the Eastern frontier of Ukraina for the Poles to fight Bolshevism side by side in agreement with the Ukrainians. He felt that the time had come for the Supreme Council to take active steps. It was impossible after the Ukrainians had expressed their willingness to accept the draft armistice terms to send them home again without a settlement having been reached.

PRESIDENT WILSON sympathised with this argument but expressed the fear that if strong action forced the downfall of the Paderewski Government, Poland would turn Bolshevik, as had happened in other cases. As far as he could judge the present temper of the Diet, Poland would become anarchical if any extreme measure should be adopted.

DR. LORD pointed out that the draft Armistice Terms had as yet not been agreed to by the Supreme Council, but had only been submitted unofficially to the contending parties by the Armistice Commission. He expressed the view that if the Supreme Council should adopt the Armistice with such modifications as they thought fit and formally submit the same to the Poles and Ukrainians, the former would probably accept them.

GENERAL BOTHA feared that delay had been the root of all the trouble, and that every day that passed without a settlement made the problem more difficult.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that the Supreme Council had hitherto acted rather weakly in this matter. He remarked that it seemed to him that Poles were using Bolshevism as a cloak for their Imperialistic aims. From the experience in Russia he had formed the conclusion that the only way to fight Bolshevism was to use nationals of the country affected. Wherever foreign troops intervened the hands of Bolshevism were strengthened, and therefore to fight Bolshevism in Ukrainia we should rather use Ukrainians than Poles. Ukrainians may naturally say that the Poles in pretending to fight Bolshevism really were pillaging and ravaging their country and the result would be simply to force Bolshevism upon Ukrainia. We are told that the Warsaw mob would overthrow the Paderewski Government if we took strong steps. If that were so it showed pretty conclusively that the Poles were quite unfitted to govern themselves. He hoped that the draft telegram prepared by President Wilson would be sent and suggested that the word "supplies" could be interpreted later. By using the wide term "supplies" some advantage was to be gained and if a decision was necessary the word could be restricted to military supplies. He suggested that a telegram should be sent to General Haller stating that rumours had come to the ears of the Supreme Council that in defiance of their express instructions General Haller had allowed his troops to march against the Galicians.

GENERAL LE ROND suggested that instead of telegraphing to General Haller the telegram should be sent to General Pilsudski of the Polish High Command.

(It was agreed that M. Clemenceau should send a telegram on the above lines to General Pilsudski and at the same time forward through the French Liaison Officer a copy to General Haller for his information.

General Le Rond and Colonel Kisch were instructed to submit a draft telegram (see Appendix III).

After further discussion as to the terms of the draft telegram, it was decided that President Wilson should re-draft the same with two additions:—

- (1) Calling the attention of the Poles to the fact that they owe their legal existence as a State to the Council and
- (2) Stating that the draft Armistice Terms had been adopted and confirmed by the Council.)

(The Meeting then terminated.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 21 May, 1919.

Appendix I to CF-22

Telegram From the President of the Peace Conference to General Pilsudski, Head of the Polish State

The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers feel that it is their duty to call the attention of the Government of Poland to facts which are giving them the greatest concern and which may lead to consequences for Poland which the Council would deeply deplore. The boundary between Poland and the Ukraine is under consideration and it is as yet undetermined, and the Council has more than once informed the Polish Government that they would regard any attempt either by Poland or by the Ukrainian authorities to determine it, or to prejudice its determination, by the use of force, as a violation of the whole spirit and an arbitrary interference with the whole purpose of the present Conference of Peace, to which Poland, at least has consented to leave the decision of questions of this very sort. The Council has, therefore, more than once insisted that there should be an armistice on the Ukrainian front, arranged in Paris and under the advice of the Council itself. The Polish military authorities, while acquiescing in principle, have in effect insisted upon such conditions as would amount to a settlement of the very questions in controversy, and have continued to use forces in maintenance of their claims. This has inevitably made the impression on the minds of the members of the Council that the Polish authorities were in effect, if not in purpose, denying and rejecting the authority of the Conference of Peace. The Council feel it their duty, therefore, in the most friendly spirit but with the most solemn earnestness, to say to the Polish authorities that, if they are not willing to accept the guidance and decisions of the Conference of Peace in such matters, the Governments represented in the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers will not be justified in supplying Poland any longer with supplies or assistance of any kind. If it is her deliberate purpose to set at nought the counsel proffered by the Conference, its authority can no longer it is feared be made serviceable to her.

PARIS, May 19, 1919.

Appendix II to CF-22

[Paraphrase of telegram from Mr. Gibson. American Minister at Warsaw, to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. May 14, 1919. same as first telegram in appendix I to CF-18B, printed on page 711.]

Appendix III to CF-22

*Telegram From the President of the Peace Conference to
General Pilsudski, Warsaw*

(Approved by the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers on 21st May, 1919)

The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have heard rumours from several sources to the effect that troops of General Haller's Army have recently taken part in operations against the Ukrainian forces in Eastern Galicia, in the region of Belz or elsewhere.

The Council would be glad to receive early information from the Polish Government with regard to these reports, which the Council is reluctant to believe, since definite engagements were undertaken by General Haller not to take part in the operations against the Ukrainians.

Appendix IV

*Report (with Appendices) Presented to the Supreme Council of the
Peace Conference by the Inter-Allied Commission for the Negotia-
tion of an Armistice Between Poland and the Ukraine*

MAY 15, 1919.

FORMATION, TERMS OF REFERENCE AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSION

Following upon the negotiations set on foot on the initiative of the Council of Four during March, 1919, negotiations which proved abortive (see Appendix I),² the Council of Four at their meeting of the 2nd April,³ adopted the following proposals:—

I. That an Inter-Allied Armistice Commission should immediately be appointed to conduct at Paris the negotiations with Polish and Ukrainian representatives for an Armistice in Eastern Galicia;

II. That in order to avoid all suggestions of partiality, this negotiation should be entrusted not to the Commission on Polish affairs but to a Commission to be created *ad hoc*;

III. That the Commission is to be made up of one military and one civilian representative from each of the four Allied and Associated Powers interested in the Galician question;

IV. That this Commission is to recommend such measures as it deems necessary for the execution of the suspension of arms in Eastern Galicia during the negotiation of the terms of the Armistice. (While

² The reference is to appendix I to this report, *infra*.

³ No minutes of this meeting of the Council of Four appear in Department files.

it is not yet certain whether a formal suspension of arms has been signed in Eastern Galicia, the Polish and Ukranian Commanders-in-Chief have accepted a truce in principle, and the speedy conclusion of such a Convention seems probable.)

At the same time, the Council of Four addressed the following telegram, dated the 3rd April, to the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs at Warsaw:—

“To the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs:

“It will be recalled that in its note of the 19th March ^{3a} the Conference suggested to both the Polish and Ukrainian Governments that a suspension of arms should be arranged in Eastern Galicia pending the discussion at Paris of an Armistice under the mediation of the Allied and Associated Governments. To further these objects the Conference has decided to appoint an Armistice Commission to hear the representatives of the two belligerents, and this Commission will begin its sittings in Paris as soon as it is informed that a truce has been concluded and that accredited Polish and Ukrainian representatives are ready to present their views. To save time, it is suggested that representatives be appointed from the Polish Delegation now in Paris. If the plan of mediation proposed by the Allied and Associated Governments is to be carried out, it is essential that the Convention for the suspension of arms which is now being arranged in Eastern Galicia should contain nothing that would prejudice the nature of the future Armistice, and the Allied and Associated Governments cannot doubt that in the negotiation for a suspension of arms the Polish Government will act upon this principle.

“WOODROW WILSON.

G. CLEMENCEAU.

“D. LLOYD GEORGE.

V. E. ORLANDO.”

On the 18th April the Council of Four decided ⁴ that the following Powers, United States of America, British Empire, France and Italy, should each nominate two representatives to sit on this Commission.

The “Inter-Allied Commission for the negotiation of an armistice between Poland and the Ukraine” was thus composed as follows:—

United States of America:

Dr. Isaiah Bowman.

and later

Dr. Lord (as from 12th May).

Colonel S. D. Embick.

British Empire:

General the Rt. Hon. Louis Botha (President).

Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. Kisch.

France:

General Le Rond.

M. Degrand.

Italy:

M. Brambilla.

Commandant Pergolani.

^{3a} See telegram of the Supreme Council, quoted on p. 789.

⁴ No minutes of this meeting of the Council of Four appear in Department files.

The following also took part in the proceedings of the Commission:—

British Empire:

Captain Brebner.

Dr. Englenburg.

France:

Captain Escoffier (Secretariat-General).

M. Meyer (Interpreter).

On the 8th May the Commission appointed a Sub-Commission to draft an Armistice Convention. This Sub-Commission was composed of the military members of the Commission:—

United States of America:

Colonel S. D. Embick.

British Empire:

Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. Kisch.

France:

General Le Rond.

Italy:

Commandant Pergolani.

The following also took part in the proceedings of this Sub-Commission:—

France:

Captain de la Touche.

Captain Escoffier (Secretary)

Italy:

Captain Origo.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSION AND SUB-COMMISSION

The Commission held nine and the Sub-Commission two meetings.

The Polish Delegation, composed as follows, appeared before the Commission on the 29th April, and 6th, 12th and 13th May:—

M. I. Paderewski, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

M. R. Dmowski, President of the Polish National Committee.

General Rozwadowski, representing the Polish High Command.

The following Ukrainian Representatives appeared before the Commission on the 30th April, and 8th, 12th and 13th May:—

M. G. Syderenko, President of the Delegation of the Ukrainian Republic.

Dr. B. Paneyko, Vice-President and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

M. Lozynsky, Under-Secretary of State: First Special Delegate.

Colonel D. Witowsky, Special Delegate.

REPORT PRESENTED TO THE SUPREME ALLIED COUNCIL ON THE CONCLUSION OF AN ARMISTICE BETWEEN POLAND AND THE UKRAINE

In accordance with the Terms of Reference laid down for it by the

Council of Four, the Commission decided to convoke Polish and Ukrainian Delegates.

The Commission impressed upon the representatives of the two parties still at war in Eastern Galicia, the necessity for putting an end to bloodshed, at a time when the Peace Conference in Paris was endeavouring to arrange for universal peace.

The Commission, in order to obtain information, and with a view to preparing an equitable Armistice Convention, asked the Delegations of the two parties to state the conditions on which they would agree to a suspension of hostilities.

After having taken note of the answers received, the Commission, on the 9th May, unanimously approved the draft Armistice Convention of which the text is given in Appendix II. This was presented to the two parties on the 12th May, and they were both informed that the acceptance of the conditions of the Convention would in no way prejudice the solution of the question of frontiers, which would be decided by the Supreme Council. Both parties were, at the same time, asked to submit in writing their observations with regard to the draft Armistice Convention.

These written replies reached the Commission on the morning of the 13th May. The Polish reply is given in Annex IV, and the Ukrainian reply in Annex V. These documents can be summarised as follows:

(a) On the Polish side:—

The Polish Government cannot consider the question of an Armistice with the Ukrainian forces except as a factor affecting the general military situation and the security of the whole country. Engaged on the east in the struggle against Bolshevism, of which the progress threatened the whole of the eastern frontier, and being in constant fear of a German attack from the west, the Polish Government considered it necessary to build up a continuous eastern front composed of Allied troops. The Government could not, therefore, be a party to an Armistice which did not contain clauses which would allow of Polish troops effecting a junction with the Roumanians.

(b) On the Ukrainian side:—

The Ukrainian Representatives raised several objections to the Draft Convention; the more important of their demands were as follows:—

1. An extension northwards, into Russian territory, of the demarcation line laid down for Galician territory in Article 2 of the Convention, with a view to avoiding hostilities between Poles and Ukrainians on the whole front.

2. A modification of the demarcation line so as to obtain for the Ukrainians the Sambor-Sianki railway.

3. That one-third of the output of the oil-fields should be assigned to Poland during the armistice, instead of one-half, as proposed by the Commission (Article 10).

4. That a longer time should be allowed for the withdrawal of the Ukrainian troops from the west of the demarcation line (Article 3), and that some modification should be made in Article 4, with regard to the zone in which 20,000 troops, contemplated by the Commission, should be maintained.

After examining these arguments, the Commission again heard, on the afternoon of the 13th May, the Polish Delegates and the Ukrainian representatives, when both parties were asked whether they wished to submit any further observations.

M. Dmowski declared that the written reply addressed to the President of the Commission had been based on the conviction that he was in harmony with the ideas of his Government and of the Polish High Command; that he did not believe himself authorised to adopt a different attitude; and that he had telegraphed to Warsaw on the 12th May repeating the conditions of the Armistice submitted by the Commission and expected an answer to his telegram at any moment.

M. Dmowski further added that the special question of the conclusion of an armistice with the Ukrainian forces was only part of the general military situation of Poland, and that, from this point of view, his Government would be glad to see this matter submitted for the opinion of the Inter-Allied High Command.

The Commission informed M. Dmowski that it took note of his observations, which it would report to the Supreme Council, mentioning the answer from the Government at Warsaw should this arrive in time for inclusion in the Report.

In the name of the Ukrainian representatives M. Lozynsky declared, after discussion, that he accepted in principle the armistice conditions as they had been formulated by the Commission.

M. Lozynsky was informed that the Commission could in no way modify its attitude with regard to the demarcation line which had been fixed, nor with regard to the provisional distribution of the output of the oil-fields; on the other hand, the Ukrainian demands with regard to an increased allowance of time for the withdrawal of their troops, and with regard to the number and disposition of these troops, might be taken into consideration.

M. Lozynsky declared his acceptance: at the same time he asked the Commission to take into consideration certain points raised in the Ukrainian declaration, viz., the number and disposition of the troops to be maintained respectively on the two sides of the demarcation line: the subsequent extension of the demarcation line northwards beyond the northern frontier of Galicia; and lastly, the neutralisation of the Sămbor-Sianki railway line.

M. Lozynsky was informed that the Commission took note of his declaration which would be reported to the Supreme Council.

CONCLUSIONS OF THE COMMISSION

The Armistice Convention drawn up by the Commission having been submitted to and examined by the two parties, the Commission has the honour to report as follows to the Supreme Council:—

1. That the Commission is unable to discuss the conditions demanded by the Polish Delegation, since these raise questions of general policy, which are beyond the competence of the Commission.

2. Should the Draft Armistice Convention (Appendix II) be taken as a basis for subsequent negotiations, the Commission considers that due account should be taken of the requests made by the Ukrainian Representatives relative to—

(a) An increased allowance of time for the withdrawal of their troops east of the demarcation line, and

(b) With regard to the number and disposition of these troops.

As the Armistice Convention unanimously adopted by the Commission has not been accepted by one of the two contending parties, the Commission regard their mandate at an end, and can only report to the Supreme Council the proposals which they have put forward with a view to bringing the two parties to an agreement, and the causes which prevented the success of their efforts.

LOUIS BOTHA
R. H. LORD
S. D. EMBICK
F. H. KISCH
H. LE ROND
DEGRAND
G. BRAMBILLA
M. PERGOLANI

APPENDIX I*Previous Negotiations*

Several previous attempts had been made to bring about a cessation of hostilities between the Poles and Ukrainians, but of these the only negotiations which need be mentioned in this report were those conducted towards the end of February by an Allied Mission. This mission met with a certain measure of success in that it succeeded on the 24th February, 1919, in concluding a truce which was duly signed by delegates representing the two parties. The Armistice Commission further drew up Armistice terms which it presented to the Polish and Ukrainian Delegations on the 28th February, on which date the suspension of hostilities was revoked by the Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief for military reasons (*pour les raisons d'un ordre purement*

militaire). The resumption of hostilities followed automatically and the Armistice negotiations were necessarily suspended.

On the 19th March the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference despatched the following telegram to the Polish and Ukrainian Commanders of the forces opposing each other at Lemberg:—⁵

In the course of its sitting of the 19th March the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference has decided to request both parties now opposing each other at Lemberg to conclude a truce immediately on receipt of the present telegram.

"In consequence, the Chiefs of the Allied and Associated Governments apply to General Rozwadowski (or; to General Pawlenko) to acquaint him with the request from the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference immediately to stop hostilities, as far as he is concerned, in front of and in the region of Lemberg; this request is simultaneously being sent to General Pawlenko, commanding the Ukrainian forces before Lemberg (or; to General Rozwadowski, commanding the garrison of Lemberg).

"Throughout the duration of the truce, the troops of both parties shall remain on their positions; the communications by rail between Lemberg and Przemysl must, however, remain open strictly in so far as is necessary for the daily revictualling of the town.

"The Supreme Council adds that it is ready to hear the territorial claims of both parties concerned, and to approach the Ukrainian and Polish Delegations in Paris, or whatever authorised representation the parties may select, with a view to changing the suspension of arms into an armistice.

"The hearing of the Ukrainian and Polish representatives with regard to their respective claims, is moreover, made subject to the formal condition of an immediate suspension of hostilities."

The following reply was received on the 24th March from General Pawlenko, the Ukrainian Commander:—

"With all my heart I accept the proposal of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, dated the 20th March, in order to give fresh proof that I and the Ukrainian army are at all times disposed to put an end to bloodshed."

The absence of any definite reply from the Polish authorities led to the telegram, dated the 3rd April, quoted above, and to the appointment of the present Commission.

APPENDIX II

*Draft for an Armistice Convention Between Poland and the Ukraine,
Concluded Under the Mediation of the United States of America,
the British Empire, France and Italy*

Instructions shall be issued forthwith for the cessation of all military action between the Polish and Ukrainian forces with effect from 6 a. m. on

⁵ See BC-53, vol. iv, p. 412.

2. The military line of demarcation separating the Polish and Ukrainian armed forces for the duration of the Armistice will be as in Annex A, and is shown on the attached map.⁶

3. All Polish troops east of the above line will be withdrawn to the west of it, and all Ukrainian troops west of it will be withdrawn to the east of it within five days of the cessation of hostilities.

4. The number of Polish troops and of Ukrainian troops respectively in East Galicia on either side of the demarcation line shall be reduced within fifteen days of the cessation of hostilities to 20,000. It will be the duty of the Armistice Commission appointed under Article 5 to decide whether it is possible subsequently to reduce the above effectives.

The importation to Eastern Galicia of munitions of war during the period of Armistice shall be limited to the quantities approved by the Armistice Commission.

5. An Inter-Allied Armistice Commission formed of representatives of the mediating Powers shall supervise the execution of the clauses of the present Armistice. This Commission may delegate to Sub-Commissions the duty of settling special or particular questions.

The Armistice Commission shall fix the positions of the troops of the two parties in such a way as—

(a) To avoid all friction between Poles and Ukrainians.

(b) To ensure the maintenance of order throughout the whole country.

The Polish and Ukrainian authorities in Eastern Galicia will accept all arrangements made by the Commission and will afford the Commission every facility in the execution of its duties.

6. All Polish and Ukrainian prisoners of war held by the two parties will be returned under arrangements to be concluded between them within seven days of the cessation of hostilities.

7. All Poles or Ukrainians who may have been interned or seized as hostages by the Ukrainian or Polish Authorities respectively since the 11th November, 1918, for political reasons will be released forthwith.

Similarly, no obstacle will be placed in the way of the return to their former place of residence or to the enjoyment of full rights and liberty of all such persons, and of nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers, even if they have participated in the present war.

All property which has been confiscated belonging to persons in the territory under the occupation of the Polish and Ukrainian forces respectively will be returned to the persons entitled thereto, or where that is impossible compensation will be paid.

⁶ Map not reproduced.

8. No person will be molested or injured in respect of his rights or property on account of his nationality or his participation in the war.

9. In the territory under the military occupation of the Polish and Ukrainian forces respectively in accordance with Article 2, the principles laid down in the regulations annexed to the Land War Convention of 1907 (the Hague Convention)⁷ will be strictly observed by the two parties, and due regard will be paid to the desires of the inhabitants whose nationality differs from that of the forces in occupation. Local Authorities, representative of the majority of the inhabitants of the several districts concerned, will be granted the maximum possible facilities.

10. The disposal of the output of the oilfields shall be on the basis that one-half of the output of the oil-fields shall be delivered monthly on rail to the Polish authorities against payment in cash or in kind. The price charged shall be assessed by the Armistice Commission on the basis of the cost of production inclusive of administrative and transportation expenses.

11. All transactions relative to the property, rights and interests (*biens, droits et intérêts*) appertaining to the enemies of the Allied and Associated Powers in the territories placed under the control of the parties are prohibited for the duration of the present Armistice and will be treated as null and void. The above provision does not, however, prevent transactions which are necessary for the exploitation of such properties.

12. During the present Armistice no concessions shall be granted for the rights of exploitation on the oil-fields lying on State land on the territory of either party.

13. The provisions of the present Armistice must not be taken in any way as deciding the definitive status of the territory of East Galicia which will be determined in due course by the Allied and Associated Powers in treaties or conventions to be concluded by them at a later date. This Armistice will expire when such definitive status is so determined.

Annex A

Reference Austrian Staff Map 1/200,000

The proposed Armistice Line—

leaves the Bug at its confluence with the Kozloroice and follows the course of this river to its confluence with the Warezanka, passing west of Uhrynów;

thence taking a line southwards through the trigonometrical points 246, 258, 208, 210 to a point on the course of the Blotnice river immediately north of point 207 (passing east of Lubow and Waniow and west of Siebieczow and Zabrze);

⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1907, pt. 2, p. 1204.

thence taking a direct line to the confluence of the Rata and Zeldec rivers and following the course of this river upstream to the apex of the salient it makes at point 252 north of Dzibulki;

thence in a south-easterly direction to the points 240, 238 (south of Zottance), and thence eastwards to the point in the administrative boundary between the districts of Lemberg and Kamionka immediately west of point 262;

thence follow this boundary and the boundary between Lemberg and Przemyslany to the extremity of the re-entrant 1,500 metres south-west of point 276 north of Peczenia;

thence the southern boundary of the district of Lemberg to meet the Dniester;

thence the Dniester upstream, then the Bystrzyca upstream to Mokrzany where it meets the western administrative boundary of the district of Drohobycz;

thence the latter boundary southwards to point 1,001 (Bukowska):

thence by the water-parting south-south-westward to point 1,132 (Szymoniec), then following a stream south-westwards passing Radyecz to meet the river Zawddka;

thence the river Zawddka downstream to its confluence with the Stryj;

thence the river Stryj upstream to its confluence north-west of Matkow with a tributary flowing from Krywka; thence the course of the latter tributary southwards and continuing so as to meet the old boundary between Hungary and Galicia at point 831 (Jaszenowa).

APPENDIX III

Draft for an Undertaking To Be Made by the Ukrainian Representatives, Supplementary to the Armistice Convention Between the Polish and Ukrainian Forces

In signing the Armistice Convention of even date, the undersigned is authorised to undertake in the name of the Ukrainian authorities *de facto* in power in Eastern Galicia that the said authorities will take all necessary measures to ensure that the forces to be maintained in Eastern Galicia shall not include any officers who belonged to the German or Austro-Hungarian Armies, or who belong to the German, Austrian and Hungarian Armies other than natives of Galicia.

APPENDIX IV

Reply of Polish Delegation

(Translation)

MAY 13, 1919.

MR. PRESIDENT: In the draft terms made by the Commission under your chairmanship, the Armistice between the Polish and Ukrainian

forces is looked upon from the point of view of being a question which exclusively concerns the relations between the Poles and Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia.

When summoned before the Commission, the Polish Delegates had the honour of explaining that in view of the dangerous situation in which their country at present was placed, military action in Galicia should be determined by the demands of the general military situation of Poland.

While whole-heartedly associating themselves with the desire of the Commission to put an end to bloodshed as soon as possible in this territory, the political future of which will be decided by the Peace Conference, the Polish Government is bound to view the question of an Armistice from the standpoint of the military security of their country as a whole, which unfortunately still finds herself in a state of war along her whole eastern boundary.

The Polish Supreme Command had accepted without reserve the draft Armistice of the 28th February, because at that time this portion of our front was not so directly menaced by the Bolsheviks. The tentative suggestions of an Armistice made towards the end of March had no result, because it became necessary to obtain adequate safeguards against the danger of Bolshevism, which was increasing amongst the Ukrainian forces. To-day this danger has become much greater, as the Bolshevik troops have advanced to the frontier of Galicia, and the Bolshevik movement is making rapid progress amongst the Ruthenian troops of Galicia. The disorganisation amongst these troops is proceeding rapidly to-day.

On the other hand, the reports received by the Polish Government as to the German preparations against Poland, and an entente between the Germans and the Bolshevik Government of Russia, give ground to the fear of a simultaneous attack upon Poland from the east and the west. If, at the moment of such attack, Eastern Galicia were exposed to an easy invasion by the Russian Bolshevik armies, the military situation of Poland would become hopeless—threatened on the west by German troops, pressed on the east by Russian Bolshevik armies, she would find herself soon enveloped in the southeast, and thus be separated from Roumania, from whom she is awaiting military co-operation.

It is these considerations which have influenced the Polish Commander-in-Chief to aim at an effectual junction in Eastern Galicia of the Polish and the Roumanian armies, in order to establish an uninterrupted front with Roumania against Bolshevik invasion from the east. The Polish General Staff hope that this junction will be effected during the current month.

I take the liberty of expressing the opinion that the conclusion of an Armistice between the Polish and Ukrainian forces must not stand in the way of the realisation of this aim. If we should be obliged to accept the proposed Armistice drafted by the Commission, having a front which makes such a considerable curve towards the west, our troops would find themselves exposed to dangerous surprises, and at the same time the realisation of a continuous Polono-Roumanian front would become impossible.

In order to safeguard Poland's safety, the conditions of the Armistice should contain the following clauses:—

1. The occupation by the Polish or Roumanian troops of the railway lines Lemberg-Halicz-Stanislawow-Czernowitz, and Stanislawow-Koromego [*Körösmező*].

2. The right to introduce into the territory of Eastern Galicia a number of Polish or Roumanian troops sufficient for the establishment of a common front on the line of the Dniester, of the Zlota-Lipa and of the Styr, in order to be able efficiently to protect the above-named railway lines.

An Armistice, in which these clauses are not stipulated, would not, I am convinced, meet the necessity of the safety of my country; and I should not deem myself authorised to accept it on behalf of the Polish Government.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurance of my high regards.

ROMAN DMOWSKI

APPENDIX V

Reply of Ukrainian Delegation

Statement concerning the Proposition of the Armistice Conditions between the Polish and Ukrainian Forces, as presented through Mediation of United States of America, Great Britain, France and Italy, to the Ukrainian Delegates on May 12, 1919 *

The proposition of the Armistice conditions as handed over to the Delegates of the Western Ukraine (Ukrainian territory of the late Austro-Hungary) imposes upon Ukrainians great sacrifices. It abandons to Poles not only the Ukrainians ethnographic territory, occupied by them contrary to the principle of the self-determination of nationalities through abuse of the Allies' help, but compels Ukrainians to cede that part of the territory which since the beginning of the Polono-Ukrainian conflict remained under the control of the Ukrainian Government and its army. This proposition abandons to the Poles 18,000 square kilom., with a population of 2,000,000 (according

* The English text of the proposition has been used as basis for our answer, as the Article 10 of the French text has not been delivered to us and Article 9 appears incomplete. [Footnote in the original.]

to 1910 census), which has an overwhelming Ukrainian majority, excluding the Jews who have given an incontestable proof of their unwillingness to be subjects of the Polish State on account of pogroms perpetrated on them and who have manifested their desire to be included in the Ukrainian State. The Ukrainian population constitutes 70 per cent. of the population of the whole territory on the basis of their mother-language and 65 per cent. on the basis of their religion (Uniate); it forms the indigenous and productive population. The Poles, on the other hand, constitute the immigrated, movable, bureaucratic part of the population, concentrated for the most part in Lemberg. (They form here the maximum 50 per cent. of all the inhabitants.)

The predominance of this Polish population till November, 1918, was based exclusively upon the Secret Conventions entered into in 1865 and 1867 between the Polish aristocracy and the dynasty of Hapsburgs, which resulted in the formation of a German-Magyar-Polish triolism in the whole of the monarchy, in a Polish absolutism in Ukrainian Galicia; this is the reason why the Ukrainian population is rejoicing at the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire, as it had afforded it an opportunity to free itself from the Polish bureaucratic bondage.

In the name of the principle of free self-determination of nationalities the Ukrainians have organised themselves into a national State under the name of the Western Ukrainian Republic, based on the democratic principles which have no relation to social utopias. They have guaranteed the liberty of person and property, granting an autonomy to each of its national minorities. Constituted by the will of the people, the Government (State Secretariat) has organised a national army. (A lack of officers has compelled the general staff to accept into the ranks of its army a few non-Ukrainian officers in insignificant numbers, Czechs, Croats, Roumanians, subjects of former Austria and few Austrians of German speech. These officers have all belonged to the ranks of the former Galician regiments recruited in the Ukrainian territory. On this occasion we affirm most categorically that not a single German officer ever entered into our army.)

The latter, comprising 100,000 men at the beginning of hostilities, was obliged to oppose enemies on two fronts:—

1. Western front against the Poles, who, desiring to force their supremacy over the Ukrainian territory, had decided to destroy at any price Ukrainian sovereignty. With this object in view, they began on the 11th November, not without a participation of non-Polish officers of the Austrian army, an organised campaign.

2. The Eastern front against the Bolsheviks, who had vast forces with which they made an invasion of the territory of the Ukrainian Republic, which had been already proclaimed in the Ukrainian ter-

ritories of the former Russian empire, and this compelled the State Secretariat of the Ukrainian Republic to extend its aid to the Government of Eastern Ukraine with which Galician Ukraine had formed a federative union. Reinforcing continuously the anti-Bolshevik front from Roumania to Pripet marshes, the Government of the Western Republic has fulfilled a part of the mission that had been imposed upon it by history; while the Ukrainians under the old Czarist régime were deprived of the conditions which might have developed their social and political life, their brethren in Galicia and Bukovina, thanks to their work, developed their own institutions, and were enabled since the middle of the 19th century to create some appreciable amount of social experience and spirit of initiative, qualities indispensable in the life of an independent State. This is the reason why Western Ukraine and its Government believe that their most important task, in the very interests of the European culture, is to be the Piedmont of the whole Ukraine by supplying same with military and civic forces. Only these creative internal forces are able to achieve the pacification and organisation of liberated Ukraine. With this object in view the principal task is the struggle against the Bolshevik imperialism, against that expansion of civic and political experiment.

If this task is not achieved yet as it should have been, if a part of Ukrainian territories has been subjected to Bolshevik ravages, the reason is that the Ukrainian army, instead of expelling the Bolsheviks from its country and building foundations for law and order, is obliged to defend its territory against Polish invasion. That is how the Poles are working hand-in-hand with the Red Guards in order to crush this Ukrainian Piedmont, while the Ukrainians have prevented a junction of the Russian Bolsheviks with the Hungarians, preparing thus the fall of the latter.

The best proof that the Ukrainian Government does not entertain any imperialistic plans is in the fact that it conducts the war against the Poles exclusively under compulsion, and that it has protested through diplomatic channels only against the partial occupation of the Ukrainian Bukovina by Roumanians and Hungarian Ruthenia by the Czecho-Slovakia; believing that the Peace Conference will settle these differences in the spirit of national equity, in the same manner, in order to give proof of our moderation and our confidence in the Allied Powers, we declare in the name of our Government our acceptance in principle of the proposition which has been given to us. But we believe that it is indispensable, both in our interest and in the interest of all concerned, to make in some articles of this proposition the following modifications which we shall endeavour to expound in the following lines:—

ARTICLE I.

Accepted without reservation.

ARTICLE II.

We request to alter the demarcation line on two points:

1. In the north it should begin from the Dnieper, then follow the river Pripet as far as Pinsk, then run along the course of the river Pine, follow the Dnieper-Bug Canal, return along the river Moukhavetz up to Brest-Litowsk, from there along the Bug up to the confluence with the river Kozlovica, &c.

2. In the south the line should start from the point where the administrative borders of the districts of Lemberg, Premyselany and Bobrka (village Peczenia) meet and follow the administrative borders between the districts of Lemberg and Bobrka, up to the point 375, whence it is to follow Lemberg approximately, from Szczezec to the administrative border of the district of Grodek near the station Stawceany, then the administrative borders between the districts of Orodek-Rudki, Mosciska-Rudki, Mosciska-Sambor, Przemyśl-Sambor, Przemyśl Stary Sambor, Dobromil-Stary Sambor, Lisko-Stary-Sambor, Lisko-Turka up to the old Hungarian frontier (*vide* the line traced on the map).

Motives.

Ad. I.—If the demarcation line ended at the Bug River, the old Austro-Russian frontier, the Western Ukrainian Republic, occupying only the territory of former Austria, would be placed in a precarious strategic position, at the moment when Polish armies would appear in the north and in the east at the same time.

Ad. II (a).—The alteration proposed by us on this point corresponds better to the present military situation; and as compared with the situation at the moment of the appeal made by the Supreme Council on the 19th of March our line offers even considerable advantages to the Poles.

Ad. II (b).—But the most important reason for this modification is found in consideration that, foreseeing an Armistice of long duration, we Ukrainians would be connected by a single railway line (Stryj-Lawoczne-Munkacs) with the Czecho-Slovaks, Hungarians, Yugo-Slavs, Italians and Austrians, with most of which our Government has already concluded commercial treaties. The Stanislaw-Körömezö-Sziget line is devoid of all commercial value; moreover, it leads into the territory occupied by the Roumanians, with whom we have more convenient ways of communication through Bukovina.

It would be disastrous for the economic life of Ukraine, considering that Poles would have six double-track railways communicating with the above-named countries, therefore, our request for the Sambor-Sanki line does not appear unreasonable.

ARTICLE III.

As to the term of evacuation of the Ukrainian troops from beyond the demarcation line, which concerns practically only Ukrainians, we propose to extend same, on account of the inconvenient railway net and bad condition of our rolling-stock and locomotives, so much more so as Article 4 imposes already upon our railroad administration very trying obligations.

ARTICLE IV.

The maximum of the Ukrainian troops prescribed by this article seems to us prejudicial for the following reasons:—

1. Under Ukrainian administration will remain more than twice the extent of territory and population than under Polish administration, consequently the relation of the two territories demands twice as large an Ukrainian contingent as is proposed by the plan.

2. As it has been already indicated in the introduction, our principal national task consists in the organisation of our forces for the struggle against the invaders of Eastern Ukraine—the Bolsheviks. This organisation is not possible except in the territories remaining under the legitimate power of the Government of the Ukrainian Western Republic, viz., Eastern Galicia.

If the contingent does not surpass the figure of 20,000 men, which number is hardly sufficient to maintain order in the country, such a military preparedness would be entirely impossible, while Poles will have every facility for organisation and concentration of their troops in Western Galicia, in former Russian Poland, Poznanian, &c. . . .

3. Consequently we propose a modification of Article VI in this direction, that on the east of the demarcation line which is to be fixed, a zone should be created more or less equal in width to the part of the territory in Eastern Galicia occupied by Poles.

Only there the Ukrainians should be obliged not to raise their contingent above the number fixed for Poles in Eastern Galicia (in this instance the number of 20,000 would be exaggerated). We propose that east of this zone the Ukrainians should be at liberty to organise forces against the Bolsheviks.

ARTICLE V.

Accepted without reserve.

ARTICLE VI.

See Article III.

ARTICLES VII and VIII.

Accepted without reserve.

ARTICLE IX (according to English text).

It would be just that part of East Galicia occupied by Poles should be subjected to a special military and administrative jurisdiction, the same as the territory occupied by our armies.

ARTICLE X (according to English text).

As the production of petroleum represents practically the only article of export for East Galicia and otherwise Poles possess rich oil-fields in Western Galicia amply sufficient to satisfy their wants, we consider that portion of oil demanded by Poles should be limited to their needs but not become an object of export. Therefore we

propose to limit the quantity of oil apportioned to Poles to one-third of the total production.

ARTICLE XI.

Seeing that the Armistice may last a long time, we propose to supplement this Article in the following manner: that the prohibition as foreseen in this Article should not be applicable except at the moment when such prohibitions are in force with the Allied and Associated Powers.

ARTICLES XII AND XIII.

Accepted without reserve.

In case more explicit information should be necessary, we are prepared to supplement the above modifications by verbal explanations.

ADDITIONAL ENGAGEMENT.

We propose to alter it in the sense that only those officers of German tongue shall be dismissed who are not natives of Galicia and Bukovina and to the extent of their being replaced by Allied or neutral officers.

DR. PANEYKO, *State Secretary of Foreign Office.*

DR. M. LOZYSKY, *Under-Secretary of State.*

First Special Delegate.

DMYTRO WITOWSKY, *Special Delegate.*

DÉLÉGATION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE UKRAINIENNE,
37, RUE LA PÉROUSE, PARIS, May 13, 1919.

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Wednesday, May 21, 1919, at 6:15 p. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

Secretary — Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.
Interpreter — Professor P. J. Mantoux.

PRESIDENT WILSON read the draft of a reply to the German Note on the Economic Effect of the Treaty of Peace which had been prepared at the request of the Council by Lord Curzon: (Appendix I.)

1. Subject to a few alterations in detail, the Note was approved.

Reply to the
German Note
on the Economic
Effect of the
Treaty of Peace

Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward it to the Secretary-General for translation into French for the signature of M. Clemenceau.

It was agreed that the letter should be published after it had been signed and despatched.¹

2. **PRESIDENT WILSON** said he would like to intimate to the Germans that the Experts of the Allied and Associated Powers were now ready to discuss with their Experts in regard to Financial and Economic Conditions.

Verbal
Discussions With
the Germans

M. **CLEMENCEAU** thought it would weaken the Allied and Associated Powers.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that his object was to demonstrate to Europe that nothing had been left undone which might have induced the Germans to have signed. If they did not sign it would involve sending troops into the heart of Germany and their retention there for a long period. Germany could not pay the costs of this occupation which would pile up the expenses to people who were already protesting against the burden of occupation. People would ask if there was anything reasonable left undone which might have averted this. There would be no loss of dignity by carrying out this plan. The experts of the Allied and Associated Powers would merely explain the meaning of some parts of the Treaty of Peace which, in his view, the Germans

¹ The note was dated May 22.

had failed to understand. If our Experts could show that no heavier burden had been laid on the German people than justice required, it might make it easier for the German Delegates to explain to their own people.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that this would serve the objects of the Germans. He agreed that they would probably leave without signing, but when troops began to move, they would sign soon enough. They wanted some excuse with their own people to make them sign.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that sufficient excuse would be given if some concession could be gained. He had nothing particular in mind but there might be some concession which did not matter very much which could be made. The question would not be decided until the German answer to our proposals was available. He had in his mind that they would make proposals perhaps about coal.

M. CLEMENCEAU said we had a very strong answer on this. He had seen some extraordinary effective figures of M. Loucheur's.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought they might also make proposals about restoration. He thought before deciding this question, it would be better to await the German reply and to keep an open mind on the subject.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the letter which had just been considered gave a conclusive reply to the German letter but provided no ray of hope. It merely said that the Treaty was right and nothing more. He had understood that the experts who had discussed with the German Financial Experts at Villette found Herr Melchior a very sensible man. Melchior was now one of the German Delegates, and he was a representative of the kind of people in Germany who wanted to get their industries going again, and he wanted to avoid the chaos and confiscations of property and looting which had occurred elsewhere. These people wanted to get their country started again, and they would listen to what our experts had to say. The United States Experts had, all along, said that the present scheme of reparation would not yield much. This was Mr. Norman Davis' view, and Mr. Keynes, the British expert, shared it. He himself wanted the Allies to get reparation. He feared they would get very little. If it could be shown to Melchior that the Reparation Commission was allowed to consider the condition of Germany and to adjust the arrangements accordingly from time to time, it might enable him to persuade the German people.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that President Wilson was right, but he did not want to be placed in the position of a man who was begging a favour. He preferred Mr. Lloyd George's idea, of waiting until the German comprehensive reply was received. This would be our "morceau de résistance".

PRESIDENT WILSON said he was afraid ten years hence we should find that nothing had been got out of the Treaty of Peace, and this would cause a reaction in Germany's favour.

3. M. CLEMENCEAU informed his colleagues that he had postponed signing the reply to Brockdorff-Rantzau's letter on the subject of Prisoners of War ^{1a} because he wished to attach to it an admirable report he had received showing the equipment of German Prisoners of War. He hoped to have this on the following day.

Prisoners of War:
The Reply to
Brockdorff-
Rantzau's Letter

4. The attached telegram to General Pilsudski was approved. (Appendix II.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward it to the Secretary-General with instructions to translate it into French; to despatch it to General Pilsudski; and to arrange for a copy to be sent to the French Liaison Officer, or any other Officer on the Staff of General Haller, for the information of General Haller.)

Telegram
to General
Pilsudski

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 21 May, 1919.

M.166

Appendix I to CF-22A

Suggested Reply to German Note on the Economic Effect of the Peace Treaty

Redraft by Lord Curzon

1. The Allied Powers have received and have given careful attention to the report of the Commission appointed by the German Government to examine the economic conditions of the Treaty of Peace.²

This Report appears to them to contain a very inadequate presentation of the facts of the case, to be marked in parts by great exaggeration, and to ignore the fundamental considerations arising both out of the incidence and the results of the war, which explain and justify the terms that it is sought to impose.

2. The German Note opens with the statement that the industrial resources of Germany were inadequate before the war for the nourishment of a population of 67 millions, and it argues as though this were the total for which with diminished resources she will still be called upon to provide. This is not the case. The total population of Germany will be reduced by not less than six million persons in the non-German territories which it is proposed to transfer. It is the needs of this smaller aggregate that we are called upon to consider.

^{1a} For the text of the proposed reply, see appendix IV to CF-20, p. 749.

² Appendix IA to CF-20, p. 738.

3. Complaint is made in the German Note that Germany is required to surrender her merchant tonnage, existing or in course of construction, and that a prior claim is made upon her shipbuilding capacity for a limited term of years. No mention, however, is made of the fact that a considerable portion of the smaller tonnage of Germany is left to her unimpaired; and it seems to have entirely escaped the notice of her spokesmen that the sacrifice of her larger shipping is the inevitable and necessary penalty imposed upon her for the ruthless campaign which, in defiance of all law and precedent, she waged during the last two years of the war upon the mercantile shipping of the world. As a partial offset against the $12\frac{3}{4}$ million tons of shipping sunk, it is proposed to transfer 4 million tons of German shipping. In other words, the shipping which it is proposed to take from Germany constitutes less than one-third of that which was thus wantonly destroyed. The universal shortage of merchant shipping is the result, not of the terms of peace, but of the action of Germany, and no surprise can reasonably be felt if she is called upon to bear her share—and it is a very moderate share—of a loss for which her own criminal deeds have been responsible.

4. Great stress is laid upon the proposal that on the Eastern side Germany shall be deprived of the Regions specially concentrated to the production of wheat and potatoes. This is true. But the Note fails altogether to observe that there is nothing in the Peace Treaty to prevent either the continued production of these commodities in the areas in question, or their importation into Germany. On the contrary the free admission of the products of the Eastern districts is provided for during a period of five years. Moreover, it is fortunate for Germany that these Regions have lost none of their productivity owing to the ravages of war. They have escaped the shocking fate which was dealt out by the German armies to the corresponding territories in Belgium and France on the West, and Poland, Russia, Roumania and Serbia in the East. There appears to be no reason why their produce should not continue to find a market on German soil.

5. Stress is laid upon the proposed restriction in the import of Phosphates. It is, however, forgotten, that Germany has never produced but has always imported the Phosphates of which she stands in need. Nor is there anything in the terms of peace which will prevent or hinder the importation of phosphates into Germany in the future. Other countries, which do not produce phosphates, are also compelled to import them in common with many other products from the outside; and the only difference in the two situations will arise from the relative degree of wealth or impoverishment in the countries concerned.

6. The German Note makes special complaint of the deprivation of coal, and asserts that nearly one-third of the production of the existing German coal mines will be lost. But it omits to notice that one-fourth of the pre-war consumption of German coal was in the territories which it is now proposed to transfer. Further it fails to take into account the production of Lignite, 80 million tons of which were produced annually in Germany before the war, and none of which is derived from the transferred territories. Neither is any reference made to the fact that the output of coal in the non-transferred districts was rapidly increasing before the war, and that there is no reason to doubt that under proper management there will be a continuing increase in the future.

7. But should not the coal situation be viewed from a different and wider standpoint? It cannot be forgotten that among the most wanton acts of devastation perpetrated by the German armies during the war was the almost complete destruction by her of the coal supplies of Northern France. An entire industry was obliterated with a calculation and a savagery which it will take many years to repair. The result has been a grave and prolonged shortage of coal in Western Europe. There can be no reason in equity why the effect of this shortage should be borne exclusively by the Allied nations who were its victims, or why Germany who deliberately made herself responsible for the deficiency should not to the full limit of her capacity make it good.

8. Stress is also laid upon the hardships alleged to be inflicted upon Germany by the necessity of importing in future iron ores and zinc. It is not understood why Germany should be supposed to suffer from conditions to which other countries contentedly submit. It would appear to be a fundamental fallacy that the political control of a country is essential in order to procure a reasonable share of its products. Such a proposal finds no foundation in economic law or in history.

9. The Allied Powers cannot accept the speculative estimate presented to them in the German Note of the future conditions of German industry as a whole. This estimate appears to them to be characterised and vitiated by palpable exaggerations. No note is taken of the fact that the economic disaster produced by the war is widespread, and, indeed, universal. Every country is called upon to suffer. There is no reason why Germany, which was responsible for the war, should not suffer also. She must for this reason realise that her economic, in common with her political and military existence, must be conducted henceforward on a reduced and lower plane. The German note tabulates and aggravates every contemplated deprivation of material, and endeavours to paint a picture of unrelieved gloom. But

it fails, as already mentioned, to make any allowance for the fact that the present population of Germany will be diminished by 6,000,000 and that there will consequently be that less number of people to provide for, to feed and to clothe.

10. Similarly, as regards the population of the future, no reliance can be placed on the data which are contained in the German Note. On the one hand, it is sought to prove that emigration from Germany will be necessary, but that few countries will receive the intending emigrants. On the other hand, it is sought to show that there will be a flood of Germans returning [to] their native land to live under the conditions which have already been described as intolerable. It would be unwise to attach too much weight to either speculation.

11. Finally, the German Note rashly asserts that the Peace Conditions will "logically bring about the destruction of several millions of persons in Germany", in addition to those who have perished in the war or who are alleged to have lost their lives in consequence of the blockade. Against the war losses of Germany might very fairly be placed the far greater losses which her initiative and conduct of the war have inflicted upon the Allied countries, and which have left an ineffaceable mark upon the manhood of Europe. On the other hand, the figures and the losses alleged to have been caused by the blockade are purely hypothetical. The German estimate of future losses, which, though it is described as logical, appears to be no less fantastic, could be accepted only if the premises upon which it is presumed to rest are accepted also. But they are entirely fallacious. There is not the slightest reason to believe that a population is destined to be permanently disabled because it will be called upon in future to trade across its frontiers instead of producing what it requires from within. A country can both become and can continue to be a great manufacturing country without producing the raw materials of its main industries. Such is the case, for instance, with Great Britain, which imports at least one-half of her food supplies and the great preponderance of her raw materials from abroad. There is no reason whatever why Germany under the new conditions should not build up for herself a position both of stability and prosperity in the European world. Her territories have suffered less than those of any other Continental belligerent state during the war. Indeed, so far as pillage or devastation is concerned, they have not suffered at all. Their remaining and untouched resources, supplemented by the volume of import trade, should be adequate for recovery and development on a modest but sufficient scale.

12. The German reply also ignores the immense relief that will be caused to her people in the struggle for recovery by the enforced reduction of her military armaments in future. Hundreds of thou-

sands of her inhabitants, who have hitherto been engaged either in training for armies or in producing instruments of destruction, will henceforward be available for peaceful avocations and for increasing the industrial productiveness of the nation. For no boon should Germany be more grateful.

13. But the first condition of any such recuperation would appear to be that Germany should recognise the facts of the present state of the world, which she has been mainly instrumental in creating, and realise that she cannot escape unscathed. The share which she is being called upon to bear of the enormous calamity that has befallen the world has been apportioned by the victorious Powers, not to her deserts, but solely to her ability to bear it. All the nations of Europe are now bearing burdens and suffering from losses which are almost more than they can carry. These burdens and losses have been forced upon them by the aggression of Germany. It is right that Germany, which was responsible for the origin of these calamities, should make them good to the utmost of her capacity. Her hardships will arise not from the conditions of peace, but from the acts of those who provoked and prolonged the war. Those who were responsible for the war cannot escape its just consequences.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, May 21, 1919.

Appendix II to CF-22A

Telegram From the President of the Peace Conference to General Pilsudski, Warsaw

(Approved by the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on 21st May, 1919)

The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have heard rumours from several sources to the effect that troops of General Haller's Army have recently taken part in operations against the Ukrainian forces in Eastern Galicia, in the region of Belz or elsewhere.

The Council would be glad to receive early information from the Polish Government with regard to these reports, which the Council is reluctant to believe, since definite engagements were undertaken by General Haller not to take part in the operations against the Ukrainians.

Notes of a Meeting Held at Mr. Lloyd George's Residence, 23 Rue Nitot, Paris, on Thursday, May 22, 1919, at 11 a. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B.
General Sir H. H. Wilson, G. C. B.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau
M. Tardieu
M. Berthelot

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.
Prof. P. J. Mantoux

Secretary
Interpreter

1. With reference to C. F. 20.A., Minute 4:—¹

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would confine himself to questions of fact. As had been said yesterday, the Sykes-Picot Agreement detailed spheres in Syria, both of sovereignty and of influence. When he had gone to London, he wanted to settle the question once for all. There had been a good deal of friction which he wanted to get rid of. Mr. Lloyd George then said he wanted Mosul. He replied that he would do his best, but that he must consult the Quai d'Orsay. He had promised, however, to defend Mr. Lloyd George's case, and he had done so. He only heard on this very morning of the negotiations between M. Bérenger² and some British petroleum people, for laying a pipe-line to the coast. He knew nothing of the details of this arrangement. It was not a proposal for a railway, however, and it was not that to which he had alluded yesterday. It was only a matter of laying a pipe-line to get petroleum to Tripoli, in the interests of those who wanted to buy and those who wanted to sell. He was not very much interested in this matter, as Mr. Lloyd George had erroneously assumed on the previous day.

He must recall at this point that Mr. Lloyd George had also spoken to him in London of Palestine, which, according to the Treaty of

¹ *Ante*, p. 756.

² Victor Henry Bérenger, French General Commissioner for Petroleum, 1917-1920.

London was to be subjected to some kind of international rule. Mr. Lloyd George had asked for British rule, with arrangements for the sanctity of the Holy Places. He had replied that he had no objection, provided the sacred spots were protected. In London, however, the conversation had been about Mosul, and Palestine. Before these conversations had been finally concluded, he had been shown a map, which was now in front of him. He recalled that the Sykes-Picot agreement had provided for an enclave at Haifa, where would be the terminus of a British railway to Mesopotamia, but he understood that the idea of that railway was that it should go mainly through the British zones, although he thought some arrangement had been made for part of it to go through the French zone. Consequently, he had been very surprised on the previous day to see the map now before him. He did not dispute the fact that the map left Mosul, Palestine, and Cilicia out of the French zone, but what had surprised him was to find the line across the desert had been moved northwards for a considerable distance. In fact, the new line he saw on this map was the line on the map Lord Milner had shown him, and which Mr. Lloyd George had professed at the time not to know anything about. After all that he had previously given up, this new concession was asked for. What was the reason? In order that the British might construct a railway. He could understand Great Britain wanting a railway through a more fertile tract, and to meet this desire he had no objection to their railway passing through French territory. He was, however, not ready to consider the present proposal, which would divide in two Jebel Druse (GENERAL WILSON commented: the Hauran), and take it from Syria. This he could not admit. Although today the only question under discussion was the limits of occupation, he must register a protest against this line.

He did not wish to raise any question of pride or *amour propre* between Great Britain and France. He had only raised this question because he had been asked to send French Commissioners. As soon as the question of the substitution of French for British troops was arranged, he would be ready to send the Commissioners.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether M. Clemenceau now claimed the whole of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, or was it only invoked when it was desired to obtain something from Great Britain? The territory in dispute was, under the Sykes-Picot Agreement, not allotted to France, but was entirely Arab. The same applied to Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs, which were to be entirely Arab. Under the Sykes-Picot Agreement they were not included in Syria, and France was only to have the littoral. If that arrangement was to stand, he would be glad to know. He thought it was agreed that the Sykes-Picot Agreement had been a bad one. He wanted to know whether

it existed or not. If it exists, France has no right to hoist a flag or to put a soldier in the Arab zone; they had only the right to provide advisors. The Sykes-Picot Agreement was based on an understanding that the Turks were to be overthrown, in which case there was to be a certain division of responsibility. It was, however, based on the supposition of a joint effort. It was never supposed that one Power was to do the whole thing. He had repeatedly raised the question of operations to defeat Turkey. Lord Milner had been present with him on the first occasion when he had raised it. There had been a conference at Boulogne. Still earlier, Lord Kitchener had wanted to land troops at Alexandretta but the French had opposed it. The French had been in the position of not going there themselves and not letting us go. Yet, the best direction of attack was from the north. Great Britain had incurred white casualties of some 125,000 men in the Turkish campaign. If Syria had been attacked from Alexandretta, it would have been a ripe pear ready to be plucked. If the agreement was to be invoked, it was a pity this had not been done in the earlier stages. At that time, France had not been so keen about it. M. Clemenceau had then said that he did not care about Syria. (M. CLEMENCEAU demurred to this. Of course he cared about it, but he had not seen any economic advantage in it.) General Robertson⁴ had shared M. Clemenceau's opposition to the Turkish campaign and had been supported in his opposition by M. Clemenceau. General Wilson, however, had taken a different view, as had the Military Representatives at Versailles. Eventually, the decision to attack Turkey had been carried, but the British had had to undertake the operation practically by themselves. If the Sykes-Picot agreement was to be claimed in the letter, he would say, first, that the portion now in dispute was Arab and not French under that agreement, and, secondly, that it ought to have been claimed when it involved some effort. We were not claiming the whole of this territory, because we have conquered it. We were only saying that we were entitled to explain why we desired certain re-adjustments. It was no use for France to claim that she had not been able to fight in Syria because she had been fighting so hard in France. As a matter of fact, at the time when these decisions had been taken and at the time when the principal fighting in Turkey occurred, the British were also doing the bulk of the fighting in France. Their casualties at that time had been 50 per cent. higher than the French. General Pétain,⁵ no doubt for reasons he considered sufficient, would not participate in the big attacks. Why did we now want this re-adjustment? Of the pipe line, he knew nothing and was very annoyed

⁴ Gen. Sir William Robertson, British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 1915-18.

⁵ Henri Philippe Pétain, Commander in Chief of the French Armies.

when he first learned of it. There seemed to have been some negotiation between the people in Paris interested in oil and those in London. Consequently, at the moment when M. Clemenceau had said that he did not like the arrangement (M. CLEMENCEAU interjected that he had referred to something quite different), he had cancelled it. He did not want to be mixed up with oil trusts in London or America or Paris, as he was afraid it would vitiate the whole business. Consequently, on the previous afternoon, he had written to M. Clemenceau to cancel the whole of these oil negotiations. Mr. Walter Long^a appeared to have initiated these negotiations, but he had never spoken to Mr. Lloyd George about them. When it was put as a sort of breach of faith, he thought it was time to put an end to these negotiations.

Once Mosul had been conceded to the British, the upper line shown on the map was the only possible line. It was the question of a rectification of a line through what was practically a desert, although it contained oases. It was purely a question of which line was to be adopted. He pointed out that the French line was not direct. It was curved out towards Mosul and drawn so as to prevent the British from having the oasis of Tadmor. This would put the British railway entirely at the mercy of the French oil interests. All that was asked was that the line should go direct and give us Tadmor. He did not wish to be at the mercy of oil interests, whether they were British or French. Unless the map he had presented was agreed to, he would have to await the report of the Commission before withdrawing the British troops. If they reported that the British were not wanted there, then the British would have no right to stay, neither would the French if the report was against them.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he must deal with two or three of Mr. Lloyd George's arguments. First, there was the question as to whether the Sykes-Picot agreement held. He claimed that it did, of course. Mr. Lloyd George had not questioned it in London. He had declared that this was the Treaty to which he intended to remain faithful and that the word of the British Government was engaged. A Treaty was a Treaty and could not be departed from, but he declared on his honour that Mr. Lloyd George had said repeatedly he would remain faithful to it, so he, himself, adhered to it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether this included Damascus?

M. CLEMENCEAU said of course when he gave Mosul he realised he would share in Damascus and Aleppo on corresponding terms. Of course, he recognised that Damascus was Arab. He had two things to say. When he had agreed that Mosul should be included in the British zone, Mr. Lloyd George had never told him that it

^a British Secretary of State for the Colonies to January 1919; First Lord of the Admiralty from January 1919.

involved this considerable alteration in the line. He would never have agreed to give up Mosul if he had realised this. And, secondly, at no time was it understood that, as a consequence of the Sykes-Picot agreement, France would have to interfere in Turkey. With the Germans at Chateau-Thierry, he had not regarded Turkey as very important. Mr. Lloyd George claimed that the British had lost more men than the French in 1917. That was a matter that could be established by figures. Anyhow, he was not the man to question the war action of the British Army. He knew what they had done and nothing would induce him to say anything against them. But there was no relation between that and what had been conquered here by the British with the help of French troops.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said the help had been negligible. Perhaps 2,000 men out of 200,000—1 per cent.

M. CLEMENCEAU, continuing, said that, at any rate, the French flag had been there. If he had resisted Mr. Lloyd George's proposals at Versailles, it had been because he thought that if the white forces had been used on the French front, the war would have ended much sooner. That was all he had to say on this subject. If he had not agreed to cede Mosul in London, the present controversy would never have arisen. How far, he asked, did it affect the military occupation? The British were in occupation and consequently it was for them to decide and for him to draw the conclusions. He was not willing, however, to accept the line now proposed. Mr. Lloyd George said: "Now I shall send my commissioners, but I shall not withdraw the troops." If Mr. Lloyd George took this attitude, he, himself, would do no more. He thought that Mr. Lloyd George was wrong, but he would take very great care not to push matters so far as to make trouble between the Entente. As for himself, he would say plainly that he would no longer associate in connection with the British in this part of the world, because the harm done to his country was too great. As regards the petroleum question, he knew nothing and did not care any more for it than Mr. Lloyd George did. It was only today that he had heard that M. Bérenger had gone to London. This was all he had to say. It was for Great Britain to decide as to the withdrawal of her troops and to take the responsibility.

PRESIDENT WILSON enquired as to what part he was asked to play in this affair. He, himself, had never been able to see by what right France and Great Britain gave this country away to anyone.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was quite willing to abide by the decision of the inhabitants as interpreted by the Commission.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that that was necessarily his own point of view. He had no other means on which to form judgment. He did

not think that these peoples could be left entirely to themselves. They required guidance and some intimate superintendence, but this should be conducted in their interests and not in the interests of the mandatory.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he could not send Commissioners if the French would not send any, but the American Commissioners could go alone.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that his Commissioners were absolutely disinterested. One of them was Mr. Charles R. Craig [*Crane*], a very experienced and cosmopolitan man. He proposed that the question should now be adjourned for further consideration.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the question must not be considered by itself. It must be treated together with the Italian question. He understood that the French Colonial Office was not willing to make any concessions to Italy in Africa. The British Colonial Office was prepared to surrender a considerable tract of territory. Lord Milner said that the Italians asked for 60,000 square miles and we were willing to give up 40,000 square miles. It had also been proposed that we should give up Cyprus, although that was not in any bargain or treaty. The Cameroons had been captured half by us and half by the French, but the whole of the naval part of the campaign had been undertaken by the British. Yet, we were conceding nearly the whole of the Cameroons to France. In Togoland, the British had conquered the better half of the country, and yet we were giving up almost the whole to France. This ought to be taken into account in considering the Syrian question.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that his attitude towards Italy was that she could take a mandate over any territory where the inhabitants asked for her.

GENERAL WILSON asked if General Allenby⁷ would remain in command in Syria, and whether he was authorised to refuse to allow French troops to be sent in. The French kept wanting to send regiments into Syria and General Allenby said that this would give trouble if it was done before an agreement was reached.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that General Allenby was in command and was responsible for order and must have a free hand in the matter until a settlement had been reached.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he hoped a settlement might be reached soon. The door was certainly not locked to one.

(The subject was adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 22 May, 1919.

⁷Field Marshal Sir Edmund Allenby, Commander in Chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 1917-19.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Thursday, May 22, 1919, at 11:45 a. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. } *Secretaries.*
Count Aldrovandi.
Professor P. J. Mantoux.—*Interpreter.*

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

ITALY

M. Orlando.

Members of the Committee which drew up the draft replies to the German letters on the Saar Valley.

AMERICA

Dr. Haskins.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Eyre Crowe.
Mr. Headlam-Morley.

FRANCE

M. Loucheur.
M. Tardieu.

1. While the Council was assembling, the Resolution in Appendix I authorising the Supreme Economic Council to announce that the blockade on Hungary would be suspended as soon as a Government is installed there which gives some assurance of settled conditions, was approved.

Hungary. Reso-
lution by the
Supreme Economic
Council Approved

SIR MAURICE HANKEY was instructed to forward it to the Secretary General with instructions to arrange for the Supreme Economic Council to take the necessary action.

2. The Council had before them the following documents relating to the Saar Basin:—

Saar Valley

- (1) Letter from Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau to M. Clemenceau dated 13th May (Appendix II).
- (2) Letter from Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau to M. Clemenceau dated 16th May (Appendix III).
- (3) Draft reply to the letter dated May 13th (Appendix IV).
- (4) Draft reply to letter dated May 16th (Appendix V).

MR. LLOYD GEORGE drew attention to the passage in Appendix II, in which the German Delegation take exception to the fact that the

restitution of the Saar Valley at the end of fifteen years is made to depend on the ability of the German Government to re-purchase from the French Government, in gold, all the coal mines of the territory and that if this payment is not made, France would acquire the territory permanently even if the population should unanimously vote for Germany. He read the following extract from clause 36 of the Annex to Part III, Section 4 of the Treaty:—

“If within the six months following the decision of the experts the price above referred to has not been paid by Germany, the said territory will be finally acquired by France.”

This meant that if the Germans could not pay the people of the Saar would remain in servitude. If they could remain independent he would not object to this clause so much, but he felt that at present this was quite wrong.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the difficulty might be met by providing that if the people of the Saar Valley elected for Germany and the German Government could not pay, they might at least be permitted to remain independent.

M. TARDIEU drew attention to paragraph 6 of Appendix IV from which he read the following extract:—

“If, on the one hand, the direct agreement authorised by paragraph 38 came to nothing and if, on the other hand, as you fear, the Commission on Reparations forbade the payment in gold provided for in para. 36, it would then be the duty of the League of Nations to consider the consequences resulting from that refusal both for Germany and for the population of the region under consideration—on condition, of course, that the provisions of para. 37 were carried out.”

He then read a text which would meet Mr. Lloyd George's objections.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the Germans were not so much afraid that they would not have the money, but that the Reparation Commission would not allow them to use it. He understood that the object of this new proposal was to prevent that. No doubt the Germans could borrow the money on the security of the mines if the Reparation Commission allowed them to. President Wilson thought that some special representation should be made to the Reparation Commission on the subject. He then read the following alternative draft handed to him by Dr. Haskins:—

“Substitute for the final paragraph of Article 36 on page 38 the following:—

The price above referred to shall be paid by Germany within one year after the decision of the experts.

No provision of the present Treaty shall in any way prejudice the right and obligation of Germany to make any payment pursuant to the provisions of this Annex, particularly the provisions of this paragraph and of paragraph 38 thereof.

The obligation of Germany to make such payment shall be taken into account by the Reparation Commission and for the purpose of the payment Germany may create a prior charge upon her assets or revenues, upon such detailed terms as agreed to by the Reparation Commission."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE preferred this to the other text.

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY said he felt that some action of the kind was required, and that if it was not taken there would be a serious situation. The fact of Article 36 quoted above being in the Treaty was producing a bad effect on neutral countries where it was being said "If Germany cannot pay the sovereignty will be transferred to France". He felt that the Allied and Associated Powers ought to get out of this situation and to propose a fresh Article on their own initiative.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he was of the same opinion.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the words quoted by Mr. Lloyd George should be omitted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Germany must have some guarantee that this action should not be taken since it constituted something equivalent to servitude for debt.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the best plan would be to leave it to some authority to decide at the end of 15 years, and this authority had best be the League of Nations.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the experts should retire and draft a clause to meet the case.

(The Experts withdrew.)

(After an interval the experts returned with a draft clause which was accepted.)

After a short further discussion the meeting was adjourned in order that the Expert Committee might reassemble and revise the two draft letters in the light of the discussion.

NOTE. The various documents referred to, not being available at the time when these Minutes were drafted, they will be contained in the Minutes of the next discussion on the subject.¹

3. M. CLEMENCEAU reported that he had signed and dispatched the reply approved on the previous day² to Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau's letter dealing with the economic effect of the Treaty of Peace.

The Economic
Effect of the
Treaty of Peace

¹ See appendix to CF-24, p. 827.

² See appendix I to CF-22A, p. 802.

Prisoners of War.
Reply to Herr
Brockdorff-
Rantzau's
Letter

4. M. CLEMENCEAU reported that he had signed and dispatched a reply³ to Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau's letter on the subject of prisoners of war.

Covenant of the
League of Nations.
Omission of
Reference to the
Air Service

5. SIR MAURICE HANKEY reported that the Head of the Aerial Section of the British Delegation had strongly urged that wherever the Naval and Military Services were mentioned in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Air Service should also be mentioned.

General Groves had pointed out that elsewhere throughout the Treaty of Peace the Air Service was mentioned whenever the Naval and Military Services were mentioned and he considered that this omission from the Covenant of the League of Nations thereby became conspicuous and might lead to the inference that Aerial warfare was excluded.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the change could not be made without summoning a Plenary Meeting of the Allied and Associated Powers represented at the Peace Conference.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that Aerial warfare in its belligerent forms was included either in the Naval or in Military warfare and he did not think that any misunderstanding could arise from this omission. He thought it was unnecessary to introduce the change which, as Mr. Lloyd George had pointed out, could only be effected by a Plenary Conference.

SIR MAURICE HANKEY pointed out that the British Air Service was entirely separate from the Naval and Military Services and he was under the impression that the same was true in Germany. He also understood that the French were contemplating a separation of their Air Service from the Naval and Military Services.

(It was agreed that the alteration in the Covenant of the League of Nations should not be made.)

6. The Council had under consideration the following clause, submitted by the Committee on New States for insertion in the Treaty with Austria, together with corresponding clauses for insertions in the Treaties with Hungary and with Bulgaria:—

Committee on
New States.
Clause for
Insertion in the
Treaties With
Austria, Hungary
and Bulgaria

“The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes accepts and agrees to embody in a Treaty with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers such provisions as may be deemed necessary by the said Powers to protect the interests of inhabitants of Serbia, who differ from the majority of the population in race, language, or religion.

“The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes further accepts and agrees to embody in a Treaty with the said Powers such provision as they may deem necessary to protect freedom of transit and equitable treatment of the commerce of other nations”.

³ See appendix IV to CF-20, p. 749.

(The above clause was approved and initialled by the Four Heads of Government.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward it to the Secretary General for communication to the Drafting Committee together with an intimation that the initials to the clause for the Austrian Treaty would cover the clauses for Treaties with Hungary and Bulgaria.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 22 May, 1919.

Appendix I to CF-23

[Translation ']

*The French Minister of Commerce, Industry, Posts, and Telegraphs
to the Secretary General of the Peace Conference*

No. 609 S.C.I.

PARIS, May 20, 1919.

I have the honor to bring it to your attention that the Supreme Economic Council at its meeting of May 19 had before it an English proposal relating to the blockade of Hungary of which the text is as follows:

"It is desirable to let it be publicly known that the blockade of Hungary will be suspended as soon as a government is installed there which gives some assurance of settled conditions."

The Council adopted this proposal, which it decided to submit to the Council of Heads of Governments.

Appendix II to CF-23

SAAR BASIN

Letter From Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau to M. Clemenceau

Translation

GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION,
VERSAILLES, May 13, 1919.

M. LE PRESIDENT: The German Peace Delegation has learnt from Your Excellency's letter of the 10th inst.,⁵ that the Allied and Associated Governments, in drawing up the conditions of the Treaty of Peace, have been constantly inspired by the principles in accordance with which the Armistice and the peace negotiations were proposed. The German Delegation does not of course, wish to throw any doubt on this statement, but it must reserve the right

⁵ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

⁶ Appendix to CF-8, p. 564.

to set forth the conditions which, in its opinion, are in contradiction with the intentions of the Allied and Associated Governments. This contradiction is most obvious when those conditions of the draft Treaty are considered which concern the cession of different parts of the territory of the Empire inhabited by a German population.

Leaving aside the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine to France and the occupation of Kehl, the articles concerning which I reserve for later treatment, Germany is required to resign to a foreign domination, temporary or permanent, the following territories:—the district of the Sarre, the circles of Eupen and Malmedy with Prussian Moresnet, Upper Silesia, some German parts of Middle Silesia, of Posnania and of West and East Prussia. The provisions concerning the administrative district (*Regierungsbezirk*) of Slesvig are equivalent to a cession of parts of German territory.

The German Delegation does not fail to recognise that in favour of a number of provisions relative to territorial changes, contained in the Draft Treaty of Peace, the right of the self determination of peoples can be adduced, seeing that some populations which till now were under German domination, as, for example, the Polish population, do not consider themselves German. National reasons can also be adduced in the case of the question of Slesvig, though the German Delegation is unaware of the powers by virtue of which the Allied and Associated Governments make this—a frontier question for settlement between Germany and Denmark—the subject of peace negotiations. The neutral Government of Denmark well knows that the present German Government has always been disposed to come to an understanding with it for the delimitation of a new frontier corresponding with the principle of nationalities. If the Danish Government nevertheless prefers to push its claims by the devious method of peace negotiations, the German Government has no intention of raising objections.

This attitude of the German Government does not however, extend to territories of the Empire which are not undoubtedly inhabited by a population of foreign race. The German Government considers it most of all inadmissible that German territories should, by the Treaty of Peace, be made the subject of bargains between one sovereignty and another, as though they were mere chattels or pawns in a game, in order to ensure the satisfaction of the financial and economic claims of the adversaries of Germany.

This is especially true in the case of the Sarre Basin. Nobody could deny that this Basin is inhabited by a purely German population. The Draft Treaty nevertheless provides for a change of domination in this partly Prussian, partly Bavarian territory, which will bring about a complete amalgamation in matters of customs, coinage,

administration, legislation and jurisdiction and which, at least in so far as those matters are concerned, will completely sever the connection between the territory of the Sarre and the rest of the Empire. The authorities of the occupying Power cannot be unaware that the whole population refuses with the greatest energy to be separated from its Fatherland. The few who, in order to flatter the occupying Power or to gain profit for themselves, pretend otherwise, need not be considered.

It will be vain to argue that an occupation of 15 years only is contemplated and that, at the end of that period, the future nationality of the population will be decided by a plebiscite, since the restitution of this territory to Germany is made to depend on the ability of the German Government to repurchase from the French Government in gold, in a short time, all the coal mines of the territory, and, if this payment could not be made, France would acquire the territory permanently even should the population unanimously vote for Germany. According to the financial and economic clauses of the Treaty, it seems impossible that, at the end of 15 years, Germany will be able to dispose of the necessary amount of gold and, moreover, even if she possessed it, the Commission on Reparations, which would then dominate the country, would probably not allow it to be used for this purpose. There is in modern history no example of a civilised Power binding another to subject its own nationals to a foreign domination as the equivalent of a sum in gold.

Public opinion in the enemy countries represents the cession of the territory of the Sarre as just compensation for the destruction of the mines of Northern France. The German Delegation also recognises that an indemnity in money alone would not offset the deterioration of the economic position of France. While the justice of the demand for an indemnity in kind is recognised, this indemnity should and can be found by other means than by a foreign domination which, notwithstanding the most humane intentions on the part of the authorities, will always remain odious.

The German Delegation is ready at once to enter into negotiations with the Allied and Associated Governments with a view to examine how to make good the deficiency of coal till the mines destroyed had been put back into working order, a task which Germany has undertaken to accomplish. In the course of these negotiations she would propose to find some more just arrangement than the primitive and unsuitable method of compensation involved in the surrender of the mining Basin of the Sarre. In the place of the deficient coal supply of northern France, it would be necessary to deliver coal from German mines, i. e., not only from the Sarre but also from the Ruhr. Leaving aside the fact that it would not be

practical, on account of conditions of communication, to use as compensation only coal from the Sarre which, till now, has found its natural outlets in other directions, it seems indispensable to give to the country of the Ruhr a share in the deliveries of coal, because the damaged districts need the products of the Ruhr region as much as they do those of the Sarre.

The German Delegation feels sure that it would not be difficult to make on the subject of this delivery of coal an arrangement which would satisfy all the legitimate claims of France, provided only that the experts of the two parties enter into direct relations and work out the conditions of delivery on a commercial basis.

As regards Belgium, Germany is ready to repair to the full extent the damage inflicted on her. Germany therefore does not see why she should be forced to cede Prussian Moresnet and the circles of Eupen and Malmédy. It is impossible to furnish proof that these circles are inhabited by an undoubtedly non-German population. The plebiscite by means of which it is proposed to give to the population the apparent right to participate in the settlement of its own fate has therefore no basis in the agreed principles of the Peace. But according to the Draft Treaty of Peace the plebiscite will not even be decisive, but rather an appeal in which Germany would take no part and which decides arbitrarily the future of a territory even if the population expressed the wish to remain under German sovereignty. This provision is unjust in itself and in contradiction with the principle that no national aspiration should be satisfied if its satisfaction would create new discord and conflict.

The German Delegation reserves the right to express later in a special note its opinion on the provisions concerning the territorial changes in the East of Germany.

Accept [etc.]

BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU

Appendix III to CF-23

SAAR BASIN

Letter From Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau to M. Clemenceau

(Translation)

GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION,
VERSAILLES, May 16, 1919.

SIR: In my Note, dated 13th, inst.,^a on the territorial provisions of the Peace Draft relating to the West of Germany I pointed out, in the name of the German Delegation, that the guarantees which

^a Appendix II, *supra*.

are required, especially for the reparation of the damages caused to the coal mines of Northern France, could best be given by economical agreements which should be discussed viva voce by the experts of both parties. It does not appear to the German Peace Delegation to be advisable that such agreements should be delayed to the extent provided for by paragraph 38 of the Annex to Articles 45 to 50 of the Conditions of Peace, i. e. till the fifteen years' period of occupation, intended for the Saar Basin, has expired.

In connection herewith I beg to transmit to Your Excellency the enclosed draft of a proposal which has been elaborated by the experts of the German Peace Delegation, requesting You to submit the same to the experts of the Allied and Associated Governments for examination and to let us have a reply as to whether a viva voce discussion of the proposal can be taken into view.

The German Delegation would only contemplate to publish the experts' proposal, if the Allied and Associated Governments should on their part attach value thereto.

Accept [etc.]

BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU

[Enclosure]

Proposal of the German Experts

According to article 45 of the Peace Treaty, the chief object of the measures proposed in part III, section IV, concerning the Saar Basin, is to furnish compensation for the destroyed coal-mines in the North of France and to make good in part the war-damages caused by Germany. According to article 46 the full freedom of exploitation is to be ensured by the provisions contained in chapter II of the annex.

The point at issue is therefore to satisfy and safeguard economic interests of France. In a like sense the provision of paragraph 38 of the annex could be taken, provided that the agreements therein mentioned between France and Germany are to be understood as being of an economic nature.

We are of opinion that this end could be attained by other measures than those mentioned above, namely by such as are conducive to an adjustment of the interests of both part[ie]s. We therefore propose the following:

1) Having in view the necessity of adequately supplying France with coal, it does not seem advisable to treat the question of the Saar territory without having regard to the coal supplies to France and some of her Allies, provided for in part VIII, Annex 5. In order to meet the interests in question as completely as possible the following questions must be answered:

a) Which quantities of the different kinds of coal are required to meet the total inland demand in France and Belgium?

b) Which quantities of coal are to be supplied to the different regions, in particular of France?

We are prepared immediately to ascertain to what extent we are capable of supplying the required quantities and for this purpose to draw up a plan of delivery. In so doing regard will have to be taken to the necessity of providing for increased transport by sea in view of the long expanse of time over which the obligation to deliver coal is extended.

It would be necessary to fix the details of delivery in viva voce negotiations between the experts of the Powers interested.

2) As to reparation of the war damages suffered by the coal-mines we propose the following: the concerns damaged in Northern France to be participated [*to participate*] by shares to an extent agreed upon in such German coal-mines as are charged with the delivery of coal to the regions mentioned.

The details of this transaction to be settled mutually by the German and French experts.

3) The object of the measures provided for in article 49 and in chapter II of the annex to part III. section IV. concerning the Saar territory is, just as that of the occupation of the territory to the left of the Rhine and of the bridge-heads provided for in Part 14, section I., to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations, which will be undertaken by Germany.

These measures as well as the measures of control carried out and contemplated up to now by the Allied and Associated Governments, measures which mean a restriction or cancellation of the liberty of German economic life would, apart from the heavy political danger, moreover paralyse the productive capacity of Germany, the entire maintenance of which is of the utmost importance also for her neighbours. In lieu of these measures we are ready to propose a system of guaranties of economic nature, perfectly on a par with the former. As far as supplies of coal enter into account we allow ourselves to be guided by the following principles:

The desired guaranties for regularity of production and of delivery may be given in the following way:

a) By the participation of French concerns (mentioned sub voce 2) which is to be realised to an extent insuring to them a considerable influence upon the administration of the German concerns in question;

b) By the grant of a right of precedence as to the surplus of the entire German output in coal over and above the home-requirements. Should this surplus not suffice for the discharge of the quantities of supply agreed upon, the consumption of coal from Germany, France and Belgium will be rationed in due proportion; for the purpose of superintending the putting into execution of the above mentioned measure a committee consisting of representatives of Germany, France and Belgium is to be established. This agreement would likewise have to take into account the interests of Italy.

Appendix IV to CF-23

Draft Reply to the Letter of Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dated May 13, 1919, Relative to the Regime of the Basin of the Saar

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of May 13th, 1919.¹

The Allied and Associated Governments formally deny that any of the provisions alluded to in that letter have the effect of transferring people "from one sovereignty to another" as though they were mere chattels or pawns in a game. Public opinion will in fact be consulted in the case of all parties in question. The situation on the spot has in each case been kept in view in settling the methods by which this will be done.

As regards the Basin of the Saar, in particular, the Allied and Associated Governments, while maintaining their point of view have the honour to observe that:

1. The Reparation constituted by the cession of the mines is not only a special reparation limited to coal, but forms part of the general reparation due by Germany for the systematic destruction which she has wrought; Article 45 of the Treaty clearly lays this down.

2. The Allied and Associated Governments deny that the population of this Basin is purely German. It is on account of the mixed character of this population that special provisions have been made. The plebiscite which is to take place after 15 years will make possible an impartial judgment, not one favouring France or Germany, but one favouring the interests of the population as freely judged by it.

3. It is completely untrue that the change of Government would place the Basin of the Saar under the authority of France. The "dominations" called "odious" in your letter of the 13th May is the administration of the League of Nations.

4. The Treaty secures to the inhabitants the maintenance of all their present safeguards and liberties; and moreover, as regards fiscal and social questions, provides for a number of special advantages.

5. There is no confusion in the Treaty between the commercial contracts of which coal from the Ruhr will be the object (Annex V, Part VIII) and the cession of the mines of the Saar. The two questions are essentially distinct, as stated above in para. 1.

6. Para. 38 of the Annex relating to the Basin of the Saar expressly reserves the possibility of a direct arrangement between France and Germany at the end of the fifteenth year. The fears which you express on the subject of the possible consequences of paras. 36 and 37 are not, therefore, justified in fact. If, on one hand, the direct agreement authorised by para. 38 came to nothing, and if, on the other hand, as you fear, the Commission on Reparations forbade the payment in gold provided for in para. 36, it would then be the duty of the League of Nations to consider the consequences resulting from that refusal both for Germany and for the population of the

¹ Appendix II, p. 817.

region under consideration—on* condition, of course, that the provisions of para. 37 were carried out.

As regards the cession of territory allowed to Belgium, perfect liberty is secured for popular opinion to express itself within six months in the case of the circles of Malmedy and Eupen. The only exception made relates to the part of the territory of Prussian Moresnet, which lies to the West of the road from Liège to Aix-la-Chapelle the population of which is under 500 and the woods of which have been transferred to Belgium as partial reparation for the destruction of forests wrought by Germany on Belgian territory.

As regards Slesvig, the Peace Conference took cognisance of the question at the request of the Danish Government and of the population.

Accept, etc.

Unanimously adopted on May 15th by the Committee composed of:—

Dr. S. E. Mezes	(United States of America)
Sir Eyre Crowe	(British Empire)
M. André Tardieu	(France)
Marquis della Torretta	(Italy)
M. H. Ijuin.	(Japan)

M. 172

Appendix V to CF-23

Draft Answer to the Letter of Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, Dated May 16, 1919

I have the honour to acknowledge Your Excellency's letter of 16th May,⁸ enclosing a memorandum from German Experts which makes a proposal with respect to supplying France with coal other than by the transfer of the mines of the Saar.

The Allied and Associated Governments maintain their letter of in answer to your letter of

The proposal of the German Experts rightly notes that the transfer to France of the coal mines of the Saar Basin is to be made "as compensation for the destruction of the coal mines in the north of France and as part payment towards the total reparation due by Germany for the damage resulting from the war." It does not, however, keep these ends clearly in view in the alternative arrangements which it proposes and which it seeks to assimilate to the right of option on the purchase of certain amounts of German coal, provided for in Part VII, Annex V, which is a quite distinct matter.

⁸ Appendix III, p. 820.

Any such arrangement as proposed for the supplying of a quantity of coal other than the amounts provided in Part VIII, Annex V, inevitably involves a still greater degree of uncertainty than contemplated at the end of Clause 2 of that Annex. No possible arrangement of this sort could give France the security and the certainty which she would receive from the full ownership and free exploitation of the mines of the Saar.

Similarly, the proposed handing over of shares in German coal mines, situated in German territory and subject to German exploitation, would be of doubtful value to French holders. The full and immediate transfer to France of mines adjacent to the French frontier, with proper credit upon the reparation account due from Germany, constitutes a more prompt, secure and businesslike settlement of the matter of compensation for the destruction of French coal mines, while at the same time it makes full use of those mines as a means of payment on the general account of reparation.

The object of the measures provided for in Article 49 and in Chapter II of the Annex to Part III, Section IV, to which the note of the German experts refers, is stated in Article 46, namely "to assure the rights and welfare of the population and to guarantee to France complete freedom in working the mines". These measures are quite independent of the occupation provided in Part XIV, Section I.

With regard to Paragraph 38 of the Annex to the Treaty, relating to the Saar, it has already been said and it is hereby confirmed that this paragraph only applies to the particular eventual agreements to intervene between France and Germany, as to the re-purchase of the rights of property of France in case the League of Nations, after a plebiscite, should decide in fifteen years the union to Germany of all or part of the territory of the Saar Basin.

The resort to the procedure provided for by the said paragraph is therefore at present out of the question.

As for the quality of the coal and to the places of delivery, it is, as has already been said a question distinct from that of the Saar and settled by Part VIII of the Treaty.

Your economic propositions are therefore in the opinion of the Allied and Associated Governments inoperating. They provide none of the necessary guarantees mentioned in Articles 45-46-47. Finally, in a general way the Allied and Associated Governments state that the particular form of reparation was chosen, as it was felt that the destructions of the mines in the North of France was an act of such a nature that a definite and striking retribution should be exacted, different from the mere provisions of a specified or unspecified amount of coal.

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Thursday, May 22, 1919, at 4 p. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

ITALY

H. E. M. Orlando.

Sir Maurice Hankey K. C. B. } *Secretaries.*
Count Aldrovandi.
Prof. P. J. Mantoux.—*Interpreter.*

The following experts on the Saar Valley were also present:—

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Dr. Haskins.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Sir Eyre Crowe, K. C. B.,
K. C. M. G.
Mr. Headlam-Morley.

FRANCE

M. Tardieu.

1. During the assembly of the meeting on the Reparation Clauses for the Treaty with Austria, the Council examined the re-drafts of the letters prepared by the Committee in reply to the letters from the German Delegation on the subject of the Saar Valley, dated May 13th and May 16th.¹

After a short discussion the letters attached in the Appendix were approved, a few small modifications being introduced.

Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to communicate these letters to the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference for the following action:—

1. For preparation of a fair copy for signature by the President of the Conference and despatch.
2. For communication to the Drafting Committee, in order that the necessary alteration might be made in the Treaty of Peace.
3. For publication after despatch.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 22 May, 1919.

¹ Appendices II and III to CF-23, pp. 817 and 820.

The Saar
Valley: Replies
to the Letters of
the German
Delegation

Appendix to CF-24

*Draft of Proposed Answer to Letter of Count Brockdorff-Rantzau
of May 13, 1919*

MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT, (Mr. President)—I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of May 13th, 1919.²

The Allied and Associated Governments absolutely deny that any one of the provisions referred to in the said letter may have as a consequence to transfer peoples from one allegiance to another "as though they were but mere things or pawns". In fact for all the territories in question the wishes of the people will be consulted. The procedure to be followed in such consultations is settled with due regard to local conditions.

On the other hand, as regards more particularly clause 36 of the Annex concerning the Saar Basin, the result which would ensue from the interpretation placed upon that clause in your letter of May 13 is emphatically not one which the Allied and Associated Governments ever contemplated.

The said Governments, accordingly, while adhering to their point of view, beg to remark that:

1. Such reparation as is constituted by the cession of the mines is not merely a special reparation limited to coal, but a part of the general reparation due by Germany for the systematical destructions carried out by her. Article 45 of the Peace Treaty makes the point quite clear.

2. The Allied and Associated Governments object to the population of that basin being represented as purely German; it is on account of the complex character of that population that special provisions have been made. The plebiscite arranged at the conclusion of the fifteen years' period, will make it possible to form an absolutely impartial opinion, not indeed for the benefit of either France or Germany, but from the sole consideration of the interest of the populations, as freely decided by them.

3. It cannot in any way be contended that the Saar Basin would be placed under French control by the change in the Government. The "domination" that is termed as "hateful" in your letter of May 13th is the administration of the League of Nations.

4. The Treaty ensures to the inhabitants the continuation of all their present guarantees and liberties: it also provides for a number of special advantages of a fiscal or social character in their favour.

5. No confusion exists in the Treaty between the trade contracts to be established for the coal from the Ruhr district (see Annex 5 of part 8.) and the cession of the Saar mines; the two questions are essentially distinct, as stated above under paragraph I.

² Appendix II to CF-23, p. 817.

6. With regard to the difficulties which you apprehend as to Germany's ability to effect the payment in gold contemplated under clause 36, the Allied and Associated Governments, desirous of avoiding all possibility of misunderstanding, have decided to word the last paragraph of the said clause as follows:

"If, nevertheless, Germany, after a period of one year, shall not have effected the said payment, the Reparation Commission shall do so in accordance with such instructions as may be given by the League of Nations and, if necessary, by liquidating that part of the mines as is in question."

In the matter of cessions of territories to Belgium, full liberty is ensured for popular opinion to express itself within a period of six months, in the districts of Malmedy and Eupen. The only exception that has been made applies to that part of the territory of Prussian Moresnet lying west of the road from Liege to Aix-la-Chapelle, the population of which numbers less than 500 inhabitants, and in which the woods are transferred to Belgium as part reparation for the destruction of forests by Germany on Belgian territory.

As regards Slesvig, this question was taken up by the Peace Conference on the request of the Danish Government and the population of Slesvig.

*Draft Answer to the Letter of Count Brockdorff-Rantzau,
Dated 17 [16] May, 1919*

I have the honour to acknowledge Your Excellency's letter of the 17th [16th] May,³ enclosing a memorandum from German experts which makes a proposal for supplying France with coal otherwise than by the transfer of the mines of the Saar.

Subject to the modified procedure indicated in my previous letter, the settlement of the question of the Saar Basin made by the treaty is maintained in its general lines and the Allied and Associated Governments are unable in this respect to agree to any change.

The proposal of the German experts rightly notes that the transfer to France of the coal mines of the Saar Basin is to be effected "as compensation for the destruction of the coal mines in the North of France and as part payment towards the total reparation due from Germany for the damage resulting from the war". It does not, however, keep these twofold ends clearly in view in the alternative arrangements which it proposes and which it seeks to assimilate to the right of option on the purchase of certain quantities of German coal, provided for in Part VII, Annex V, which is quite a distinct matter.

Any such arrangement as proposed for the supplying of a quantity of coal other than the quantity provided in Part VIII, Annex V,

³ Appendix III to CF-23, p. 820.

inevitably involves a still greater degree of uncertainty than contemplated at the end of Clause X of that Annex. No arrangement of this sort could give France the security and the certainty which she would derive from the full ownership and free exploitation of the mines of the Saar Basin.

Similarly, the proposed handing over of shares in German coal mines, situated in German territory and subject to German exploitation, would be of doubtful value to French holders and would create a confusion of French and German interests which cannot be at present contemplated.

The complete and immediate transfer to France of mines adjacent to the French frontier, with a proportionate credit upon the reparation account due from Germany, constitutes a more prompt, secure and businesslike settlement of the matter of compensation for the destruction of French coal mines, while at the same time it makes full use of these mines as a means of payment on the general account of reparation.

The object of the measures provided for in Article 49 and in Chapter II of the Annex to Part III, Section IV, to which the note of the German experts refers is stated in Article 46, namely, 'to assure the rights and welfare of the population and to guarantee to France complete freedom in working the mines'. These measures are quite independent of the occupation provided in Part XIV, Section I.

As regards Clause 38 of the Annex to the Treaty, relating to the Saar, it has already been said and it is hereby confirmed that this Clause applies only to the special agreements which may eventually be arrived at between France and Germany, respecting the re-purchase of the French proprietary rights in case the League of Nations should, after a plebiscite, decide at the end of fifteen years in favour of the union with Germany of all or part of the territory of the Saar Basin. Resort to the procedure contemplated under the said Clause is therefore at present out of question.

As for the quality of the coal and the places of delivery, these are, as already stated, questions distinct from that of the Saar, and are settled by Part VIII of the Treaty.

Your economic propositions are therefore in the opinion of the Allied and Associated Governments unworkable. They provide none of the necessary guarantees mentioned in Articles 45, 46, 47.

In conclusion, the Allied and Associated Governments declare generally that if a particular form of reparation was chosen as regards the Saar Basin, this was done because it was felt that the destruction of the mines in the North of France was an act of such a nature that a definite and striking retribution must be exacted, different from the mere supply of a specified or unspecified amount of coal.

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Thursday, May 22, 1919, at 4:15 p. m.**

PRESENT

**UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA**

President Wilson

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd
George

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau

ITALY

M. Orlando

Experts of Reparation

Mr. Baruch
Mr. McCormick
Mr. Lamont
Mr. Norman Davis
Mr. Dulles
Mr. Robinson

Lord Sumner
Lord Cunliffe
Mr. Sutton

M. Klotz
M. Loucheur
M. Jouasset

M. Crespi
M. d'Amelio

Secretaries:

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.
Count Aldrovandi

Interpreter:

M. Mantoux

**Reparation
in the Treaty of
Peace With
Austria**

1. The Council had before them the draft of Reparation clauses for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace with Austria (Appendix).¹

**The Share of the
New States**

2. PRESIDENT WILSON called attention to the proposal, in the draft Reparation clauses for insertion into the Treaty with Austria, that the new states arising out of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire should bear a share in the Reparation debt. He considered that this would place an overwhelming burden on these States. He said that he was advised that if these countries took over the pre-war debt attaching to their territory and a Reparation liability also this would constitute a "per capita ["] liability exceeding that of France and Great Britain.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he could not accept such an estimate and pointed out that the amount of the Reparation liability affecting those countries had not been fixed: this was left to the proposed Reparation Commission.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he was assuming that it was intended that these States should pay their share of the Reparation liability in full. This, in his opinion, would be an unduly heavy burden, and he was informed that, if it were imposed, some of these States would

¹ Appendix I, p. 836.

refuse to sign the Treaty. He pointed out that there was a danger that these States, being placed in a position of co-debtors with Germany, might turn in that direction for their economic development. He added that it was not so much the amount of the liability but the principle of its imposition that would have so damaging an effect on the immediate credit of these countries.

MR. LAMONT said that no doubt the proposal that these States should pay was just in principle: but the demands of the Reparation Commission seemed scarcely consonant with the aims of the Committee which had been set up with a view to assisting these States to establish their credit. Further he doubted whether they would be able to pay any sum of importance.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the greater number of the nationals of these States had fought against the Allies right up to the end of the war: they would never have achieved their freedom but for the war. If they had remained neutral the war might have been shortened by two years. Why should they get their freedom without paying for it? It would surely be unjust that they should do so, when in Great Britain there would be a "per capita" liability of £800 per house as a result of the war. These states ought to bear the same burden as those who helped them to get their freedom. The Allies had advanced large sums to Serbia: was it intended that the Jugo-Slav State should bear none of this? He pointed out that some of these countries, e.g. Bohemia and Transylvania, had very large resources.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that under the Financial Clauses of the Treaty these States are intended to share in the debts of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, both the debts incurred during the war and previous to it. He agreed that Mr. Lloyd George was quite right in principle but he did not see how these countries could take a part in the credit system of Europe if they were pressed too hard and especially if they were not to know the extent of their indebtedness for two years.

M. ORLANDO said that it seemed to be suggested that the decision of the Council of Four that the former Austro-Hungarian Empire should be responsible for its indebtedness should now be reversed. He pointed out that Italy was undertaking the liability for her annexed territories. Mr. Lloyd George had referred to the shipping of Trieste as enemy shipping; but it could scarcely be properly so described if these new States were to get off their liability. Very possibly they could not pay much but the establishment of the principle was important. He could not go to his country and say that four-fifths of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was getting off its liabilities.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that it was not suggested that these States should pay nothing. But he thought they ought to know at once what they have to pay.

M. KLOTZ said that in the proposed Reparation Clauses there were special advantageous provisions for these States, e. g. they are not required to issue bonds of guarantee: they are to pay nothing for two years: their liability having been fixed in 1921 may not subsequently be increased—i. e. there is no joint liability: they are allowed to use any payments they may be entitled to from enemy States as a set-off against their indebtedness.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed with President Wilson that it was not desirable that these States should have an indefinite liability hanging over them for so long. He thought the amount could be fixed in a shorter time than two years: six months should be enough. The problem was not a gigantic one as in the case of Germany. He thought further that the Austrian debt to the Allies should be provided for before her own internal debts. He doubted whether it was a good thing to have the same Reparation Commission to deal with Austria and Germany. He thought this might involve delay.

3. PRESIDENT WILSON said that he understood that this question had been thoroughly discussed before settlement. He thought that the main directing Commission should be the same in both cases though they would, of course, have experts to assist them on special places and questions.

The Question
of a Separate
Reparation
Commission

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the decision to have the same Commission in both cases had been taken in view of the interval of two years adopted in each case for the fixation of liability: but the adoption of a time limit of six months in the case of Austria would involve the appointment of a separate Commission. Further, it would not be necessary to work on quite such rigid principles in the case of Austria.

MR. LAMONT pointed out that if there were two Commissions and they were empowered to deal in the bonds to be issued they might compete against each other.

M. ORLANDO thought that a number of Sub-Committees etc. would be necessary but thought that there should be one Supreme Commission.

M. KLOTZ thought it would be difficult for the same Commission to deal with both debts in view of the shorter interval now proposed for the fixation of the Austrian debt. He suggested that the Main Commission might constitute a special section to deal with Austria.

PRESIDENT WILSON said there now seemed general agreement in principle and suggested that the present Commission on Reparation should settle the point.

Belligerency
an Essential
to Reparation
Claims

4. M. CRESPI called attention to the last paragraph of Article II of the proposed Reparation Clauses and the note attached thereto, as follows:—

“Damage done to persons or the property of persons who, at the moment when the damage took place, did not belong to the population of a State which, at the period in question, was recognised by the majority at least of the principal Allied and Associated Powers is not included herein.”

(Art. 232 of the
Treaty With
Germany)

NOTE:

“In the Conditions of Peace transmitted to Germany, the English text limits the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to the recovery of damage suffered ‘during the period of the belligerency of each as an Allied and Associated Power against Germany.’ There is no corresponding phrase in the French text.

The phraseology of the English text appears to have been introduced by the Drafting Committee of the Peace Conference as the result of a communication to the effect that the Supreme Council had decided not to accord the right of recovery for damage suffered by new States which, at the times the damage was suffered, had not yet been recognised. The English text adopted does not appear to be entirely in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council, since its effect, among other things, is to prevent recovery for damage suffered from acts of aggression leading up to a declaration of war against Germany, and to prevent recovery for damage suffered by Allied and Associated States during the period when they were at war with Austria-Hungary but not yet with Germany.

“Accordingly, the Commission charged with the preparation for submission to the Supreme Council of Reparation Clauses for the Treaty of Peace with Austria has in the above text eliminated the words ‘during the period of the belligerency of each as an Allied and Associated Power’ and has substituted the above sentence, which it is believed will more accurately express what is understood to be the intention of the Supreme Council.”

He pointed out that some States though not actually at war with Germany had suffered damage at German hands: similarly with Austria. He thought that in such cases a claim for damage should be established.

M. ORLANDO pointed out that the question was the same for Austria and Germany: there must be a uniform text.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the text suggested in the Reparation Clauses would exclude Poland. He pointed out that this text would enable Italy to claim against Germany in respect of a period during which she was not at war with Germany. He thought such a claim could not be substantiated.

M. ORLANDO said that Reparation was based on the principle of solidarity. As regards the Adriatic Italy accepted the view that this principle prevented any special claims. He thought it would

be very difficult to distinguish damage caused by Austrian from that caused by German agency.

M. CRESPI said that German aeroplanes had bombarded his factory before the declaration of war by Italy against Germany, and there was no doubt that German U Boats had sunk Italian ships before this date. On the principle of solidarity Germany should be regarded as responsible for all damage.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Italy, no doubt for very good reasons, did not for a considerable period, declare war on Germany, though urged to do so by the Allies. This was a considerable hindrance to the Allies in the effective application of the blockade. He further pointed out that U Boats sunk neutral as well as Allied shipping. He did not think that claims by Italy for damage against Germany before she declared war on Germany could be justified.

On the proposal of M. KLOTZ it was agreed that the words "during the period of the belligerency of each as an Allied and Associated Power against Austria" should be inserted in Article II and the last paragraph omitted. It was further agreed that the same form which had been omitted from the French text but retained in the English text of Article 232 of the Treaty with Germany should be inserted in the French text.

Consequent on this discussion M. ORLANDO initialled the Resolution given in the Appendix hereto² which had already been initialled by his three colleagues, and Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward it to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.

5. M. KLOTZ then called attention to Annex III of the proposed Reparation Clauses for Austria, dealing with merchant shipping. He pointed out that as Austria becomes a land-locked country it was proposed that she should surrender her entire merchant fleet. He called attention to the Italian objection to this proposal and to the recommendation made by the French and American representatives on the Reparation Commission that an arrangement should be made to leave a larger percentage of shipping in the Adriatic than would normally be the case under the pool.

M. ORLANDO expressed the thanks of Italy for the French and American proposals. He said, however, that he failed to see why the Adriatic should be worse off as regards shipping than Germany who is to be left with a proportion of her smaller tonnage and fishing vessels. He pointed out that the smaller craft and coasting vessels were an important part of the economic life of the coastal population and he thought it unjust and dangerous to take them away from their owners. It was true that Austria was to have no ports but the sea and the sea-faring population remain. The tonnage in question—some 60,000 tons—was a relatively small matter.

² Appendix II, p. 858.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he thought there would be no difficulty over the fishing vessels. But shipping was an especial concern of Great Britain owing to her very heavy losses—nearly 8 million tons. The Greeks had also been very heavy losers and moreover had lost precisely the kind of ship which it was proposed should be given to Italy and the Jugo-Slavs. He reminded the Council that Great Britain had lost her ships in carrying for Italy and France etc. British tonnage had been placed at the disposal of the whole world and none of it used for private enterprise. The recent withdrawals for various reasons by various countries, e. g. the United States of America, Brazil and Portugal, of shipping from the pool was making a very bad impression in Great Britain. The country was very short of shipping, and probably, taking all things into account, it was the most important British industry. He asked the council not to force a concession on Great Britain at that meeting. He suggested there should be a conference between the parties interested, including Greece, with representatives of the British Board of Trade who would not be found indisposed to make concessions.

It was agreed that the text of the Annex should stand and that a special arrangement for the Adriatic should be considered by representatives of France, Italy, Greece and Great Britain.

LORD SUMNER said that he had been approached by representatives of Jugo-Slavia who wished to secure a share for Jugo-Slavia of the libraries and learned materials of all kinds now in Vienna. He did not think that this matter fell within Reparation but he had drawn up the following clause providing, not for the division of this material, but securing that Austria should maintain it in good condition, allow reasonable access to it, etc.

Libraries,
Museums, Art
Collections etc.

“With regard to all objects of an artistic, archaeological, scientific or historic character, forming part of collections, which formerly belonged to the Government or to the Crown of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and are not otherwise provided for in this present Treaty, Austria undertakes:

(a) to negotiate, when required, with the States concerned, for an amicable arrangement, whereby any portion thereof or any objects belonging thereto which ought to form part of the intellectual patrimony of the ceded districts, may be repatriated to their districts of origin on terms of reciprocity, and

(b) for twenty years, unless such an arrangement is sooner arrived at, not to alienate or disperse any of the said collections, or to dispose of any of the above objects, but at all times to ensure their safety and good condition and to make them available at all reasonable times to students, who are nationals of any of the Allied and Associated Powers.”

This clause was adopted.

On the suggestion of Mr. Lloyd George the drafting of Reparation
 Clauses for Bulgaria was referred to the Reparation
 Commission.

Reparation
 in the Treaty
 With Bulgaria

PRESIDENT WILSON said that, having regard to the fact that the rights of small States deserve special consideration, he thought that the representatives of the States previously forming part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire should have an opportunity of giving their views before the text of these Clauses of the Treaty with Austria was definitely adopted.

Decisions To Be
 Discussed With
 Small States

This was agreed.

The meeting terminated at 6.45 p. m.

Woodrow Wilson Papers

[Appendix I to CF-24/1]

Treaty With Austria—Draft Reparation Clauses

SECTION I.—*General Provisions*

ARTICLE I

The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Austria accepts the responsibility of Austria and her Allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Austria and her Allies.

ARTICLE II

The Allied and Associated Governments recognise that the resources of Austria are not adequate, after taking into account the permanent diminutions of such resources as will result from other provisions of the present Treaty, to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage.

The Allied and Associated Governments further require and Austria undertakes that she will make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property by the said aggression by land, by sea and from the air, and in general all damage as defined in Annex I hereto.

Damage done to persons or the property of persons who, at the moment when the damage took place, did not belong to the population of a State which, at the period in question, was recognised by

the majority at least of the principal Allied and Associated Powers is not included herein.*

ARTICLE III

The amount of such damage for which compensation is to be made by Austria shall be determined by an Inter-Allied Commission to be called "The Reparation Commission" and constituted in the form and with the powers set forth hereunder in Annexes II-V inclusive hereto. The said Commission is the same as that provided for by Article 233 of the Treaty with Germany.

The Commission of Reparation shall consider the claims and give to the Austrian Government a just opportunity to be heard. The Reparation Commission shall determine the total amount of damage under Annex I hereto, and after taking into consideration the past and present situation of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and such other facts as the Commission may think relevant, the Commission will allocate against the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, including portions thereof which may form part either of new States or of Allied and Associated States, so much of the total amount of damage as the Commission may determine. After having made this determination, the Commission shall divide the total amount allocated to the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire among the different States to which such territory will belong in pursuance of the present Treaty. In making such allocation the Commission shall take into consideration the resources of the respective portions of the territory referred to above and, in particular, such resources as are affected by damage suffered, as well as by the diminutions resulting from other clauses of the

* In the Conditions of Peace transmitted to Germany, the English text limits the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to the recovery of damage suffered "during the period of the belligerency of each as an Allied and Associated Power against Germany." There is no corresponding phrase in the French text.

The phraseology of the English text appears to have been introduced by the Drafting Committee of the Peace Conference as the result of a communication to the effect that the Supreme Council had decided not to accord the right of recovery for damage suffered by new States which, at the times the damage was suffered, had not yet been recognised.

The English text adopted does not appear to be entirely in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council, since its effect, among other things, is to prevent recovery for damage suffered from acts of aggression leading up to a declaration of war against Germany, and to prevent recovery for damage suffered by Allied and Associated States during the period when they were at war with Austria-Hungary but not yet with Germany.

Accordingly, the Commission charged with the preparation for submission to the Supreme Council of Reparation Clauses for the Treaty of Peace with Austria has in the above text eliminated the words "during the period of the belligerency of each as an Allied and Associated Power," and has substituted the above sentence, which it is believed will more accurately express what is understood to be the intention of the Supreme Council. [Footnote in the original.]

present Treaty. The Commission may also take into consideration such other facts as it may deem relevant. The interested Powers shall be notified not later than the 1st May, 1921, of the compensation which may be required under the categories of damage set out in Annex I conformably to the procedure indicated above. The Commission shall notify Austria of the amount arrived at as the total of the claims and the allocation thereof fixed as above provided, at the same date as notification is made to the other States, but the portion of liability assigned to Austria will not be finally fixed but shall remain provisional until the Commission shall unanimously be of the opinion that Germany has the resources and the intent to pay the total amount of claims presented against Germany and her allies and approved by the Commission after deducting from such total amount the portion allocated to territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The Commission shall concurrently fix a schedule of payments prescribing the time and manner for the discharge by Austria of her entire obligations, as they shall have been provisionally determined in accordance with the preceding paragraph, within a period of thirty years from the 1st of May, 1921. If, however, within the period mentioned, Austria fails to discharge her obligations, any balance remaining unpaid may, within the discretion of the Commission, be postponed for settlement in subsequent years or may be handled otherwise in such manner as the Allied and Associated Governments, acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in this part of the present Treaty, shall determine.

ARTICLE IV

The Reparation Commission shall, after the 1st of May, 1921, from time to time consider the resources and capacity of Austria, and after giving her representatives a just opportunity to be heard, shall have discretion to extend the date and to modify the form of payments such as are to be provided for in accordance with Article III, but not to cancel any part except with the specific authority of the several Governments represented on the Commission.

ARTICLE V

In order to enable the Allied and Associated Governments to proceed at once to the restoration of their industrial and economic life pending the full determination of their claims, Austria shall pay in the course of the years 1919, 1920 and the first four months of 1921, in such instalments and in such manner (whether in gold,

commodities, ships, securities or otherwise) as the Reparation Commission may lay down, a reasonable sum which shall be determined by the Commission.

Out of this sum the expenses of the armies of occupation subsequent to the Armistice of the 3rd November, 1918, shall first be met, and such supplies of food and raw materials as may be judged by the Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers essential to enable Austria to meet her obligations for reparation may also, with the approval of the said Governments, be paid for out of the above sum. The balance shall be reckoned towards the liquidation of the amount due for reparation.

Austria shall further deposit bonds as prescribed in paragraph 12 (c.) of Annex II hereto.

ARTICLE VI

Austria further agrees to the direct application of her economic resources to reparation as specified in Annexes III, IV and V relating respectively to merchant shipping, to physical restoration and to raw material: provided always that the value of the property transferred and any services rendered by her under these Annexes, assessed in the manner therein prescribed, shall be credited to her towards the liquidation of her obligations under the above Articles.

ARTICLE VII

The successive instalments including the above sum paid over by Austria in satisfaction of the above claims will be divided by the Allied and Associated Governments in proportions which have been determined upon by them in advance on a basis of general equity and the rights of each.

For the purposes of this division the value of the credits referred to in Article XIII and in Annexes III, IV and V shall be reckoned in the same manner as cash payments made in the same year.

ARTICLE VIII

In addition to the payments mentioned above, Austria shall effect, in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Reparation Commission, restitution in cash of cash taken away, seized or sequestered, and also restitution of animals, objects of every nature and securities taken away, seized or sequestered in the cases in which it proves possible to identify them on territory belonging to, or during the execution of the present Treaty in the possession of, Austria or her allies.

ARTICLE IX

The Austrian Government undertakes to make forthwith the restitution contemplated in Article VIII above and to make the payments and deliveries contemplated in Articles III, IV, V and VI above.

ARTICLE X

The Austrian Government recognises the Commission provided for by Article III as the same may be constituted by the Allied and Associated Governments in accordance with Annex II, and agrees irrevocably to the possession and exercise by such Commission of the power and authority given to it under the present Treaty.

The Austrian Government will supply to the Commission all the information which the Commission may require relative to the financial situation and operations and to the property, productive capacity and stocks, and current production of raw materials and manufactured articles of Austria and her nationals, and further any information relative to military operations which, in the judgment of the Commission, may be necessary.

The Austrian Government shall accord to the members of the Commission and its authorised agents the same rights and immunities as are enjoyed in Austria by duly accredited diplomatic agents of friendly Powers. Austria further agrees to provide for the salaries and the expenses of the Commission and of such staff as it may employ.

ARTICLE XI

Austria undertakes to pass, issue and maintain in force any legislation, orders and decrees that may be necessary to give complete effect to these provisions.

ARTICLE XII

The provisions in this part of the present Treaty shall not affect in any respect the provisions of Sections III and IV of Part X (Economic Clauses) of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE XIII †

The following shall be reckoned as credits to Austria in respect of her reparation obligations:—

- (a.) Any final balance in favour of Austria under Sections III and IV of Part X (Economic Clauses) of the present Treaty.

†References to be completed when the terms of the Economic and other clauses are known. [Footnote in the original.]

- (b.) Amounts due to Austria in respects of transfers provided for
- (c.) All amounts which, in the judgment of the Reparation Commission, should be credited to Austria on account of any other transfers under the present Treaty, of property, rights, concessions or other interests. In no case, however, shall credit be given for property restored in accordance with Article VIII.

ARTICLE XIV

The Powers other than Austria, referred to in the fourth paragraph of Article III in the present part of this Treaty, and to which a portion of the reparation charges shall have been allocated in conformity with the said Article, shall be debited with the amount of this portion.

This portion shall form the subject of a schedule of payments established under the conditions indicated in the last paragraph of Article III, and each of the sums charged to each of the Powers interested in carrying out this system of payments may, subject to the consent of the Reparation Commission, be compensated for up to the amount in question when it falls due, by such sums which the said Power may be entitled to receive as reparation, at the same time or subsequently, both in virtue of the present Treaty and of Treaties concluded with Powers allied to Austria. The surplus, if there be any, shall be paid to the Commission under conditions to be determined by it. If the compensation is not carried out, the payments shall be made in entirety to the Reparation Commission.

The Commission shall always have the power to postpone or to remit in part or in whole the payments referred to above. Decisions relating to a final remission of payment must be unanimous.

ARTICLE XV

The transfer of the Austrian submarine cables which do not form the subject of particular provisions of the present Treaty is regulated by Annex VI hereto.

ANNEX I

Compensation may be claimed from Austria in accordance with Article II above in respect of the total damage under the following categories:—

1. Damage to injured persons and to surviving dependants by personal injury to or death of civilians caused by acts of war, including bombardment or other attacks on land, on sea or from the air, and of the direct consequences thereof and of all operations of war by the two groups of belligerents wherever arising;

2. Damage caused by Austria or her allies to civilian victims of acts of cruelty, violence or maltreatment (including injuries to life or health as a consequence of imprisonment, deportation, internment or evacuation, of exposure at sea, or of being forced to labour by Austria or by her allies) wherever arising and to the surviving dependants of such victims;

3. Damage caused by Austria or her allies in their own territory or in occupied or invaded territory to civilian victims of all acts injurious to health or capacity to work or to honour as well as to the surviving dependants of such victims;

4. Damage caused by any kind of maltreatment of prisoners of war;

5. Damage caused to the peoples of the Allied and Associated Powers by pensions or compensations in the way of pensions to Naval and Military victims of war, including members of the Air Force, whether mutilated, wounded, sick or invalided, and to the dependants of such victims, the amount due to the Allied and Associated Governments being calculated for each individual as being capitalised cost of such pensions and compensations at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty on the basis of the scales in force in France on the 1st May, 1919.

6. The cost of assistance by the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers to prisoners of war, to their families and dependants.

7. Allowances by the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers to the families and dependants of mobilised persons or persons serving with the forces, the amount due to them for each calendar year in which hostilities occurred being calculated for each Government on the basis of the average scale for such payments in force in France during that year.

8. Damage caused to civilians by being forced by Austria or her allies to labour without just remuneration.

9. Damage in respect of all property, wherever situated, belonging to any of the Allied or Associated States or their nationals, with the exception of naval or military works or materials, which has been carried off, seized, injured, or destroyed by the acts of Austria or her allies on land, on sea, or from the air, or damage directly in consequence of hostilities or of any operations of war.

10. Damage in the form of levies, fines and other similar exactions imposed by Austria or her allies upon the civilian population.

ANNEX II

1. The Commission referred to in Article III shall be called the "Reparation Commission" and is hereafter referred to as the "Commission." Delegates to this Commission shall be nominated by the

United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium and Serbia, and each of these Powers will appoint one Delegate and also one assistant Delegate who will take his place in the case of illness or necessary absence but at other times will only have the right to be present at proceedings without taking any part therein. On no occasion shall Delegates of more than five of the above Powers have the right to take part in the proceedings of the Commission and to record their votes.

2. The Delegates of the United States of America, Great Britain, France and Italy shall have this right on all occasions. The Delegate of Japan shall have this right on occasions when questions relating to damage by sea and questions arising under Article XIV of the Financial Clauses, in which Japanese interests are concerned, are under consideration. The Delegate of Serbia shall have this right when questions relating to Austria, Hungary or Bulgaria are under consideration.

3. Such of the Allied and Associated Powers as may be interested shall have the right to appoint a Delegate to be present and act as assessor only when their respective claims and interests are under examination or discussion: this Delegate shall not have the right to vote. When the Commission, in application of paragraph 7 following, appoints Committees to consider questions arising under the present Treaty, a reasonable representation of such Allied and Associated Powers as may be interested shall, if they so desire it, be provided for.

4. In the case of death, resignation or recall of any Delegate, assistant Delegate or assessor, a successor to him shall be nominated as soon as possible.

5. The Commission shall have its principal permanent bureau in Paris and shall hold its first meeting in Paris as soon as practicable after the coming into force of this present Treaty, and thereafter will meet in such place or places and at such time as may be deemed convenient and as may be necessary for the most expeditious discharge of its duties.

6. At its first meeting the Commission shall elect from among the Delegates referred to above, a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman, who shall hold office for a year and shall be eligible for re-election. If a vacancy in the chairmanship or vice-chairmanship should occur during the annual period, the Commission shall proceed to a new election for the remainder of the said period.

7. The Commission is authorised to appoint all necessary officers, agents and employes who may be required for the execution of its functions and to fix their remuneration; to constitute committees, whose members need not necessarily be members of the Commission,

and to take all executive steps necessary for the purpose of discharging its duties; and to delegate authority and discretion to officers, agents and committees.

8. All the proceedings of the Commission shall be private unless on particular occasions the Commission shall otherwise determine for special reasons.

9. The Commission shall be required, if the Austrian Government so desire, to hear within a period which it will fix from time to time, evidence and arguments on the part of Austria on any questions connected with her capacity to pay.

10. The Commission shall consider the claims and give to the Austrian Government a just opportunity to be heard but not to take any part whatever in the decisions of the Commission. The Commission shall afford a similar opportunity to the allies of Austria when it shall consider that their interests are in question.

11. The Commission shall not be bound by any particular code or rules of law or by any particular rule of evidence or of procedure, but shall be guided by justice, equity and good faith. Its decisions must follow the same principles and rules in all cases where they are applicable. It will establish rules relating to methods of proof of claims. It may act on any trustworthy modes of computation.

12. The Commission shall have all the powers conferred upon it and shall exercise all the functions assigned to it by the present Treaty. It shall, in general, have wide latitude as to its control and handling of the whole reparation problem as dealt with in this part of the present Treaty, and shall have authority to interpret its provisions. Subject to the provisions of the present Treaty, the Commission is constituted by the several Allied and Associated Governments referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 above as the exclusive agency of the said Governments respectively for receiving, selling, holding, and distributing the reparation payments to be made by Austria and by the States referred to in Article III under this part of the present Treaty.

The Commission must comply with the following conditions and provisions:—

(a.) Whatever part of the full amount of the proved claims is not paid in gold or in ships, securities, commodities or otherwise, Austria shall be required, under such conditions as the Commission may determine, to cover by way of guarantee, by an equivalent issue of bonds, obligations or otherwise, in order to constitute an acknowledgement of the said part of the debt.

(b.) In periodically estimating Austria's capacity to pay the Commission shall examine the Austrian system of taxation. First, to the end that the sums for reparation which Austria is required to pay shall become a charge upon all

her revenues prior to that for the service or discharge of any domestic loan and, secondly, so as to satisfy itself that in general the Austrian scheme of taxation is fully as heavy proportionately as that of any of the Powers represented on the Commission.

(c.) In order to facilitate and continue the immediate restoration of the economic life of the Allied and Associated countries the Commission shall, as provided in Article V, take from Austria by way of security for and acknowledgment of her debt a first instalment of gold bearer bonds free of all taxes or charges of every description established, or to be established, by the Austrian Government or by any authority subject to them. These bonds will be delivered on account and in three portions (the crowns gold being payable in conformity with Article XVII of the Financial Clauses of the present Treaty), as follows:—

- (1.) To be issued forthwith 2 milliards crowns gold bearer bonds, payable not later than the 1st May, 1921, without interest. There shall be specially applied towards the amortisation of these bonds the payments which Austria is pledged to make in conformity with Article V of the present part of this Treaty, after deduction of the sums used for the reimbursement of the expenses of the armies of occupation and for payments of foodstuffs and raw materials. Such bonds as may not have been redeemed by the 1st May, 1921, shall then be exchanged for new bonds of the same type as those provided for below (paragraph 12(c), 2). If the sum fixed for the Reparation Commission in application of Article V for the payments to be made in 1919, 1920 and 1921 is less than the figure of 2 milliards mentioned above, the Commission shall cancel the amount of the bonds issued in excess of this sum.
- (2.) To be issued forthwith 4 milliard crowns gold bearer bonds bearing interest at $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. per annum between 1921 and 1926, and thereafter at 5 per cent. per annum with an additional 1 per cent. for amortisation beginning in 1926 on the whole amount of the issue.
- (3.) To be delivered forthwith a covering undertaking in writing to issue when, but not until, the Commission is satisfied that Austria can meet such interest and sinking fund obligations, a further instalment of four milliard crowns bearer bonds bearing interest at five per cent., the time and mode of payment of principal and interest to be determined by the Commission.

The dates for the payment of interest, the manner of employing the amortisation vote and of other questions relating to the issue, management and regulation of the bond issue shall be determined by the Commission from time to time.

Further issues by way of acknowledgment and security may be required as the Commission subsequently determines from time to time.

In case the Reparation Commission should proceed to

fix definitely and no longer provisionally the sum of the common charges to be borne by Austria as a result of the claims of the Allied and Associated Powers, the Commission shall immediately annul all bonds which may have been issued in excess of this sum.

- (d.) In the event of bonds, obligations or other evidence of indebtedness issued by Austria by way of security for or acknowledgment of her reparation debt being disposed of outright, not by way of pledge, to persons other than the several Governments in whose favour Austria's original indebtedness was credited, an amount of such reparation indebtedness shall be deemed to be extinguished corresponding to the nominal value of the bonds, &c., so disposed of outright and the obligation of Austria in respect of such bonds shall be confined to her liabilities to the holders of the bonds, as expressed upon their face.
- (e.) The damage for repairing, reconstructing and re-building property situated in the invaded and devastated districts, including re-installment of furniture, machinery and other equipment, shall be calculated according to the cost at the date when the work is done.
- (f.) Decisions of the Commission relating to the total or partial cancellation of the capital or interest of any of the verified debt of Austria must be accompanied by a statement of its reasons.

13. As to voting the Commission will observe the following rules:—

When a decision of the Commission is taken, the votes of all the Delegates entitled to vote, or in the absence of any individual, of their assistant Delegates, shall be recorded. Abstention from voting is to be treated as a vote against the proposal under discussion. Assessors shall have no vote.

On the following questions unanimity is necessary:—

- (a.) Questions involving sovereignty of any of the Allied and Associated Powers or the cancellation of the whole or any part of the debt or obligations of Austria;
- (b.) Questions of determining the amount and conditions of bonds or other obligations to be issued by the Austrian Government and of fixing the time and manner for selling, negotiating or distributing such bonds;
- (c.) Any postponement, total or partial, beyond the end of 1930, of the payment of instalments falling due between the 1st May, 1921, and the end of 1926 inclusive.
- (d.) Any postponement, total or partial, of any instalments falling due after 1926 for a period exceeding three years.
- (e.) Questions of applying in any particular case a method of measuring damages different from that which has been previously applied in a similar case.
- (f.) Questions of the interpretation of the provisions in this part of the present Treaty.

All other questions shall be decided by the vote of the majority.

In the case of any difference of opinion among the Delegates, which cannot be solved by reference to their Governments, upon the question whether a given case is one which requires unanimous vote for its decision or not, such difference shall be referred to the immediate arbitration of some impartial person to be agreed upon by their Governments whose award the Allied and Associated Governments agreed to accept.

14. Decisions of the Commission, in accordance with the powers conferred upon it, shall forthwith become binding and may be put into immediate execution without further proceedings.

15. The Commission shall issue to each of the interested Powers in such form as the Commission shall fix:

- (1.) A certificate stating that it holds for the account of the said Power bonds of the issues mentioned above, the said certificate on the demand of the Power concerned being divisible into a number of parts not exceeding five;
- (2.) From time to time certificates stating goods delivered by Austria on account of her reparation debt which it holds for the account of the said Power.

Such certificates shall be registered and, upon notice to the Commission, may be transferred by endorsement.

When bonds are issued for sale or negotiation, and when goods are delivered by the Commission, certificates to an equivalent value must be withdrawn.

16. Interest shall be debited to Austria as from the 1st May, 1921, in respect of her debt as determined by the Commission after allowing for sums already covered by cash payments or their equivalent by bonds issued to the Commission or under Article XIII. The rate of interest shall be 5 per cent. unless the Commission shall determine at some future time that circumstances justify a variation of this rate.

The Commission, in fixing on the 1st May, 1921 the total amount of the debt of Austria, may take account of interest due on sums arising out of reparation and of material damage as from 11th November, 1918 up to 1st May, 1921.

17. In case of default by Austria in the performance of any obligation under this part of the present Treaty the Commission will forthwith give notice of such default to each of the interested Powers and may make such recommendations as to the action to be taken in consequence of such default as it may think necessary.

18. The measures which the Allied and Associated Powers shall have the right to take, in the case of voluntary default by Austria, and which Austria agrees not to record as acts of war, may include

economic and financial prohibitions and in general such other measures as the respective Governments may determine to be necessary in the circumstances.

19. Payments required to be made in gold or its equivalent on account of the proved claims of the Allied and Associated Powers may at any time be accepted by the Commission in the form of chattels, properties, commodities, businesses, rights, concessions within or without Austrian territory, ships, bonds, shares or securities of any kind or currencies of Austria or other States, the value of such substitutes for gold being fixed at a fair and just amount by the Commission itself.

20. The Commission in fixing or accepting payment in specified properties or rights shall have due regard for any legal or equitable interests of the Allied and Associated Powers or of neutral Powers or of their nationals therein.

21. No member of the Commission shall be responsible, except to the Government appointing him, for any action or omission as such member. No one of the Allied and Associated Governments assumes any responsibility in respect of any other Government.

22. Subject to the provisions of the present Treaty this Annex may be amended by the unanimous decision of the Governments represented from time to time upon the Commission.

23. When all the amounts due from Austria and her Allies under the present Treaty or the decisions of the Commission have been discharged, and sums received, or their equivalents, have been distributed to the Powers interested, the Commission shall be dissolved.

ANNEX III

1

Austria recognises the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to the replacement ton for ton (gross tonnage) and class for class of all merchant ships and fishing boats lost or damaged owing to the war.

Nevertheless and in spite of the fact that the tonnage of Austrian shipping at present in existence is much less than that lost by the Allied and Associated Powers in consequence of the aggression of Austria and her Allies, the right thus recognised will be enforced on the Austrian ships and boats under the following conditions:—

The Austrian Government on behalf of themselves, and so as to bind all other persons interested, cede to the Allied and Associated

Governments the property in all merchant ships and fishing boats belonging to Austrian nationals.†

2

The Austrian Government will, within two months of the coming into force of the present Treaty, deliver to the Reparation Commission all the ships and boats mentioned in paragraph 1.

3

The ships and boats in paragraph 1 include all ships and boats which (a) fly or may be entitled to fly the Austrian merchant flag, or (b) are owned by any Austrian national, company or corporation or by any company or corporation belonging to a country other than an Allied or Associated country and under the control or direction of Austrian nationals: or (c) which are now under construction (1) in Austria§ (2) in other than Allied or Associated countries for the account of any Austrian national, company or corporation.

4

For the purpose of providing documents of title for the ships and boats to be handed over as above mentioned, the Austrian Government will

- (a.) Deliver to the Reparation Commission in respect of each vessel a bill of sale or other document of title evidencing the transfer to the Commission of the entire property in the vessel, free from all encumbrances, charges and liens of all kinds as the Commission may require;
- (b.) Take all measures that may be indicated by the Reparation Commission for ensuring that the ships themselves shall be placed at its disposal.

5

Austria undertakes to restore in kind and in normal condition of upkeep to the Allied and Associated Powers within two months of the coming into force of the present Treaty in accordance with procedure to be laid down by the Reparation Commission any boats and

†This paragraph has been accepted in this form by the American, British and French Delegations, but not by the Italian Delegation. The American and French Delegations in putting forward this text desire to express their feeling that an arrangement should be come to between the Allies with a view to maintaining in the Adriatic a tonnage calculated on more liberal principles than would be involved by the direct application of paragraph 1. [Footnote in the original.]

§The Italian Delegation asks that after the words "in Austria" shall be added the words "as delimited by this treaty." The American and French Delegation[s] support this request; the British Delegation makes reservation. [Footnote in the original.]

other movable appliances belonging to inland navigation which, since the 1st August, 1914, have by any means whatever come into her possession or into the possession of her nationals and which can be identified.

With a view to make good the loss in inland navigation tonnage from whatever cause arising which has been incurred during the war by the Allied and Associated Powers, and which cannot be made good by means of the restitution prescribed above, Austria agrees to cede to the Reparation Commission a portion of the Austrian river fleet up to the amount of the loss mentioned above, provided such cession shall not exceed 20 per cent. of the river fleet as it existed on the 3rd November, 1918. The conditions of this cession shall be settled by the arbitrators referred to in Article (339) of Part (XII)—(Ports, Waterways and Railways) of the present Treaty, who are charged with the settlement of difficulties relating to the apportionment of river tonnage resulting from the new international régime applicable to certain river systems or from the territorial changes affecting those systems.

6

Austria agrees to take any measures that may be indicated to her by the Reparation Commission for obtaining a full title to the property in all ships which have, during the war, been transferred or are in process of transfer to neutral flags without the consent of the Allied and Associated Governments.

7

Austria waives all claims of any description against the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals in respect of the detention, employment, loss or damage of any Austrian ships or boats.

8

Austria renounces all claims to vessels or cargoes sunk by or in consequence of naval action and subsequently salvaged in which any of the Allied or Associated Governments or their nationals may have any interest either as owners, charterers, insurers, or otherwise, notwithstanding any decree of condemnation which may have been made at a Prize Court of Austria or of her nationals.

ANNEX IV

1

The Allied and Associated Powers require and Austria undertakes that in part satisfaction of her obligations expressed in this part of

the present Treaty, she will, as hereinafter provided, devote her economic resources directly to the physical restoration of the invaded areas of the Allied and Associated Powers to the extent that these Powers may determine.

2

The Allied and Associated Governments may file with the Reparation Commission lists showing:—

- (a.) Animals, machinery, equipment, tools and like articles of a commercial character which have been seized, consumed or destroyed by Austria, or destroyed in direct consequence of military operations, and which such Governments, for the purpose of meeting immediate and urgent needs, desire to have replaced by animals and articles of the same nature which are in being in Austrian territory at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty.
- (b.) Reconstruction materials (stones, bricks, refractory bricks, tiles, wood, window glass, steel, lime, cement, &c., machinery, heating apparatus, furniture and like articles of a commercial character, which the said Governments desire to have produced and manufactured in Austria and delivered to them to permit of the restoration of the invaded areas.

3

The lists relating to the articles mentioned in 2 (a) above shall be filed within sixty days after the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty. The lists relating to the articles in 2 (b) shall be filed on or before the 31st December, 1919. The lists shall contain all such details as are customary in commercial contracts dealing with the subject-matter, including specifications, dates of delivery (but not extending over more than four years) and places of delivery but not prices or value, which shall be fixed as hereinafter provided by the Commission.

4

Immediately upon the filing of such lists with the Commission, the Commission shall consider the amount and number of the materials and animals mentioned in the lists provided for above which are to be required of Austria. In reaching a decision on this matter the Commission shall take into account such domestic requirements of Austria as it deems essential for the maintenance of Austrian social and economic life, the prices and dates at which similar articles can be obtained in the Allied and Associated countries as compared with those to be fixed for Austrian articles, and the general interest of the Allied and Associated Governments, that the industrial life be not so disorganised as to affect adversely the ability of the Austrians to perform the other acts of reparation stipulated for. Machinery,

equipment, tools and like articles of a commercial character in actual industrial use are not, however, to be demanded of Austria unless there is no free stock of such articles respectively which is not in use and is available, and then not in excess of 30 per cent. of the quantity of such articles in use in any one establishment or undertaking.

The Commission shall give representatives of the Austrian Government an opportunity and a time to be heard as to their capacity to furnish the said materials, articles and animals.

The decision of the Commission shall thereupon and at the earliest possible moment be communicated to the Austrian Government and to the several interested Allied and Associated Governments. The Austrian Government undertakes to deliver the materials, articles and animals as specified in the said communication, and the interested Allied and Associated Governments severally agree to accept the same, providing they conform to the specification given or are not, in the judgment of the Commission, unfit to be utilised in the work of reparation.

5

The Commission shall determine the value to be attached to the materials, articles and animals to be delivered in accordance with the foregoing, and the Allied or Associated Power receiving the same agrees to be charged with such value, and the amount thereof shall be treated as a payment by Austria to be divided in accordance with Article VII of this part of the present Treaty.

In cases where the right to require physical restoration as above provided is exercised, the Commission shall ensure that the amount to be credited against the reparation obligation of Austria shall be fair value for work done or material supplied by Austria, and that the claim made by the interested Power in respect of the damage so repaired by physical restoration shall be discharged to the extent of the proportion which the damage thus repaired bears to the whole of the damage thus claimed for.

6

As an immediate advance on account of the animals referred to in paragraph 2 above, Austria undertakes to deliver in equal monthly instalments in the three months following the coming into force of the present Treaty the following quantities of live stock:—

Italy:

4,000 milch cows of from 3 to 5 years;
1,000 heifers;
50 bulls from 18 months to 3 years;
1,000 calves;
1,000 working bullocks;
2,000 sows.

Serbia:

1,000 milch cows of from 3 to 5 years;
500 heifers;
25 bulls from 18 months to 3 years;
1,000 calves;
500 working bullocks;
1,000 draught horses;
1,000 sheep.

Roumania:

1,000 milch cows of from 3 to 5 years;
500 heifers;
25 bulls from 18 months to 3 years;
1,000 calves;
500 working bullocks;
1,000 draught horses;
1,000 sheep.

The animals delivered shall be of average health and condition. If the animals so delivered cannot be identified as animals taken away or seized, the value of such animals shall be credited against the reparation obligations of Austria in accordance with paragraph 5 of this Annex.

7

As an immediate advance on account of the articles referred to in paragraph 2 above, Austria undertakes to deliver during the six months following the coming into force of the present Treaty in equal monthly instalments such supplies of furniture in hard and soft wood intended for sale in Austria as the Allied and Associated Powers shall ask for month by month through the Reparation Commission and which the Commission shall consider justified on the one hand by the seizures and destruction carried out in the course of the war on the territory of the said Powers and on the other hand proportionate to the supplies at the disposal of Austria. The price of the articles so supplied shall be carried to the credit of Austria under the conditions provided for in paragraph 5 of this Annex.

ANNEX V

1

Austria shall give, as partial reparation, to the Allied and Associated Governments severally an option during the five years following the coming into force of the present Treaty for the annual delivery of the raw materials hereinafter enumerated: the amounts delivered to bear the same relation to their annual importations of these materials before the war from Austria-Hungary as the resources of Austria as now delimited by the present Treaty bear to the resources before the war to [of] the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Timber and timber manufactures;
Iron and iron alloys;
Magnesite.

2

The price paid for the products referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be the same as the price paid by the Austrian nationals under the same conditions of shipment to the Austrian frontier and shall be subject to any advantages which may be accorded similar products furnished to Austrian nationals.

3

The foregoing options shall be exercised through the intervention of the Reparation Commission, which subject to the specific provisions hereof shall have power to determine all questions relative to procedure and qualities and quantities of products and the times and modes of delivery and payment. In giving notice to the Austrian Government of the foregoing options, the Commission shall give at least 120 days' notice of deliveries to be made after the 1st January, 1920, and at least 30 days' notice of deliveries to be made between the coming into force of the present Treaty and the 1st January, 1920.

If the Commission shall determine that the full exercise of the foregoing options would interfere unduly with the industrial requirements of Austria, the Commission is authorised to postpone or to cancel deliveries and in so doing to settle all questions of priority.

ANNEX VI

Austria renounces on her own behalf and on behalf of her nationals in favour of Italy all rights, titles or privileges of whatever nature in any submarine cables or portions of cables connecting the territories which are assigned to the Kingdom of Italy under the present Treaty.

Austria also renounces on her own behalf and on behalf of her nationals in favour of the principal Allied and Associated Powers all rights, titles and privileges of whatever nature in the submarine cables, or portions thereof, connecting the territories ceded by Austria under the terms of the present Treaty to the various Allied and Associated Powers.

The States concerned shall provide for the upkeep of the installations and the proper working of the said cables. As regards the cable from Trieste to Corfu, the Italian Government shall enjoy in its relations with the company owning this cable the same position as that held by the Austro-Hungarian Government, reserving at the

same time the right to conclude a new agreement with the above-mentioned company. The value of the cables or portions of cables referred to in the two first paragraphs of the present Annex, calculated on the basis of the original cost, less a suitable allowance for depreciation, shall be credited to Austria in the Reparation Account.

SECTION II—*Special Provisions*

ARTICLE XVI

In carrying out the provisions of Article VIII Austria undertakes to surrender to each of the Allied and Associated Powers respectively all records, documents, objects of antiquity and of art, and all scientific and bibliographical material taken away from the invaded territories whether they belong to the State or to provincial, communal, charitable or ecclesiastical administrations or other public or private institutions.

ARTICLE XVII

Austria shall in the same manner restore objects of the same nature as those referred to in the preceding article which may have been taken away since the 1st June, 1914, from the ceded territories, with the exception of objects bought from private owners. The Reparation Commission will apply to these objects the provisions of Article XI of the Financial Clauses, if these are appropriate.

ARTICLE XVIII

The Austrian Government will hand over without delay to the Allied and Associated Governments concerned, archives, registers, plans, title deeds and documents of every kind concerning the civil, military, financial, judicial or other forms of administration in the ceded territories. If any one of these documents, archives, registers, title deeds or plans is missing it shall be restored by the Austrian Government upon the demand of the Allied and Associated Governments concerned.

Austria will give up to each of the Allied States respectively all the records, documents and historical material possessed by public institutions which may have a direct bearing on the history of the ceded territories and which have been removed during the last ten years. This last-mentioned period, as far as concerns Italy, shall be extended to the date of the proclamation of the Kingdom (1861).

The new States arising out of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire and the States which receive part of the territory of this Empire undertake on their part to give up to the Austrian Government the records, documents and material dating from a period not exceeding twenty years, which have a direct bearing on the history or administration of the new Austrian territory and which may be found in the territories ceded to the Allied and Associated Powers.

ARTICLE XIX

Austria acknowledges that she remains bound, as regards Italy, to execute in full the obligations referred to in Article 15 of the Treaty of Zurich of the 10th of November, 1859, in Article 18 of the Treaty of Vienna of the 3rd of October, 1866 and by the Convention of Florence of the 14th of July, 1868, concluded between Italy and the Emperor of Austria-Hungary.

ARTICLE XX

Within a period of twelve months after the coming into force of the present Treaty a Committee of three jurists appointed by the Reparation Commission shall examine the conditions under which the objects or manuscripts in possession of Austria, included in the attached list presented by the Italian Government, were carried off by the House of Hapsburg and by the other Houses which have reigned in Italy. If it is found that the said objects or manuscripts were carried off in violation of the rights of the Italian provinces the Reparation Commission, on the report of the Committee referred to, shall order their restitution. Italy and Austria agree to accept the decisions of the Commission.

Belgium may also submit claims for restitution, to be examined by the same Committee of three jurists, relating to the objects and documents enumerated in Annex II hereto. Belgium and Austria undertake to accept the decisions taken by the Reparation Commission as the result of the report of the said Committee.

ANNEX I

Tuscany

The Crown jewels (such part as remains after their dispersion); the private jewels of the Princess Electress of Medici; the medals which form part of the Medici heirlooms and other precious objects—all being domanial property according to contractual agreements and testamentary dispositions—removed to Vienna during the eighteenth century.

Furniture and silver plate belonging to the House of Medici and the jewel of Aspasio in payment of debts owed by the House of Austria to the Crown of Tuscany.

The ancient instruments of astronomy and physics belonging to the Academy of Cimento (being a person in law) removed by the House of Lorraine and sent as a present to the cousins of the Imperial House of Vienna.

Modena

A "Virgin" by Andrea del Sarto and four drawings by Correggio belonging to the Pinacothek of Modena and removed in 1859 by the Archduke Francis V.

The three following MSS. belonging to the library of Modena:—

Biblia vulgata (Cod. Lat. 422/23),
Brevarium Romanum (Cod. Lat. 424) and
Officium Beatae Virginis (Cod. Lat. 262),

carried off by the Archduke Francis V in 1859.

The bronzes carried off under the same circumstances in 1859.

Certain objects (among others two pictures by Salvator Rosa and a portrait by Dosso Dossi) claimed by the Duke of Modena in 1868 as a condition of the execution of the Convention of the 20th June, 1868, and other objects given up in 1872 in the same circumstances.

Palermo

Objects made in Palermo in the twelfth century for the Norman kings and employed in the coronation of the Emperors, which were carried off from Palermo and are now in Vienna.

Naples

Ninety-eight MSS. carried off from the Library of S. Giovanni a Carbonara and other Libraries at Naples in 1718 under the orders of Austria and sent to Vienna.

Various documents carried off at different times from the State Archives of Milan, Mantua, Vienna, Modena and Florence.

ANNEX II

Objects and documents removed for safety from Belgium to Austria in 1794:—

- (a.) Arms, armour and other objects from the old Arsenal of Brussels.
- (b.) The treasure of the "Toison d'or" preserved in previous times in the "Chapelle de la Cour" in Brussels.
- (c.) Coinage, stamps, medals, and counters by Theodore van Berckel which were an essential feature in the archives of the "Chambre des Comptes" at Brussels.
- (d.) The documents relating to the map "carte chorographique" of the Austrian Low Countries drawn up by Lieut.-General Comte Jas de Ferraris.

Appendix II

[Resolution by the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers]

The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have considered the attached letter from M. Fromageot and have agreed that the following words "during the period of the belligerency of each as an Allied and Associated Power against Germany", which had been omitted from the French text but retained in the English text of Article 232 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, should be re-instated in the French text.

G. C.
W. W.
D. Ll. G.
V. O.

20 MAY, 1919.

[Enclosure]

[The letter from M. Fromageot, dated May 14, 1919, annexed to this appendix, is the same as appendix IV to CF-19, printed on page 730.]

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Thursday, May 22, 1919, at 6:15 p. m.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

ITALY

M. Orlando.

Sir Maurice Hankey—Secretary.
Professor Mantoux—Interpreter.

1. **PRESIDENT WILSON** read the despatch attached in the Appendix, which was a revision of the earlier draft prepared as a result of the meeting on the previous day.¹ The revised despatch was agreed to.

PRESIDENT WILSON raised the question of whether it should be sent to Poland or handed to M. Paderewski on his arrival in Paris.

As there was some doubt as to the date on which M. Paderewski was due to arrive, the question was adjourned till the following day.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 22 May, 1919.

Appendix to CF-25

Telegram From the President of the Peace Conference to General Pilsudski, Head of the Polish State, Warsaw

The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers feel that it is their duty to call the attention of the Government of Poland to facts which are giving them the greatest concern and which may lead to consequences for Poland which the Council would deeply deplore. The boundary between Poland and the Ukraine is under consideration and is as yet undetermined, and the Council has more than once informed the Polish Government that they would regard any attempt either by Poland or by the Ukrainian authorities to de-

¹ See appendix I to CF-22, p. 782.

termine it, or to prejudice its determination, by the use of force, as a violation of the whole spirit and an arbitrary interference with the whole purpose of the present Conference of Peace, to which Poland, at least, has consented to leave the decision of questions of this very sort. The Council has, therefore, more than once insisted that there should be an armistice on the Ukrainian front, arranged in Paris and under the advice of the Council itself. Full conferences in that matter have been held between a carefully selected Inter-Allied commission and representatives of Poland and the Ukraine, and terms of armistice drawn up which have been formally approved by the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The representatives of the Ukraine have accepted those terms, but the Polish military authorities, while acquiescing in principle, have in effect insisted upon such conditions as would amount to a settlement of the very questions in controversy, and have continued to use force to maintain their claims. This has inevitably made the impression on the minds of the members of the Council that the Polish authorities were in effect, if not in purpose, denying and rejecting the authority of the Conference of Peace. The Council feel it their duty, therefore, in the most friendly spirit but with the most solemn earnestness, to say to the Polish authorities that, if they are not willing to accept the guidance and decisions of the Conference of Peace in such matters, the Governments represented in the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Governments will not be justified in furnishing Poland any longer with supplies or assistance. If it is her deliberate purpose to set at naught the counsel proffered by the Conference, its authority can no longer, it is feared, be made serviceable to her. The Council will, of course, insist upon an absolute cessation of hostilities on the part of the Ukrainian military forces.

PARIS, May —, 1919.

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Friday, May 23, 1919, at 11 a. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

ITALY

H. E. M. Orlando.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. } *Secretaries.*
Count Aldrovandi
Prof. P. J. Mantoux.—*Interpreter.*

1. M. CLEMENCEAU reported that he had received from Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau a letter on the subject of private property, dated May 22nd, 1919. (Appendix I.)

**Private Property:
Letter From
Brockdorff-
Rantzau**

(It was agreed:—That this letter should be referred in the first instance to the Committee which has been advising the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the subject of Reparation in connection with the Treaties of Peace with Austria and Hungary, who should be asked to draft a reply for consideration. (See below, Minute 6, regarding the composition of this Committee.))

2. M. CLEMENCEAU said he had received a further note from Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau, dated May 22nd, 1919, on the subject of International Labour. (Appendix II.)

**International
Labour: Further
Letter From
Brockdorff-
Rantzau**

(It was agreed:—That this letter should be referred in the first instance to the Committee which had dealt with the previous letter from the German

Delegation on this subject, and which should be asked to draft a reply for the consideration of the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.)

3. M. CLEMENCEAU said he had reason to believe that the Japanese Government were about to propose to the Allied and Associated Governments the recognition of the Omsk Government.

Russia He thought that these Governments ought to anticipate them. He did not like to leave it to Japan to take the initiative.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked whether it was proposed to recognise this Government as representing all Russia, or merely as a local Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied as representing all Russia.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he could not do that.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he also was opposed to that. Mr. Kerr's draft despatch to the Russian *de facto* Government was ready, and he thought that it ought at once to be considered.

(It was agreed:—To discuss Mr. Kerr's draft letter in the afternoon.)

4. M. CLEMENCEAU read a Memorandum he had received from the Quai d'Orsay, the gist of which was somewhat as follows:—In March, there was a vote in the Luxemburg Chamber in favour of the organisation of a double referendum on the following questions:—

Luxemburg

1. The form of the future State of Luxemburg, including the question of the dynasty.
2. An economic union with one or other of Luxemburg's neighbours.

The Belgian Government, apprehending that the political referendum was a manoeuvre in opposition to their own negotiations with Luxemburg, asked for its postponement. This was agreed to by the Council of Four and was notified on April 16th to the Luxemburg Government through the medium of the United States General in Luxemburg. Towards the middle of May, a report was received from the First Secretary to the United States Legation in Luxemburg to the effect that the referendum on the economic question was being organised to take place immediately after the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. He added that the vote would probably be in favour of economic union with France, unless the French Government announced that it would not take it into consideration. It was, however, difficult for the French Government to take the responsibility for this, even though they were anxious to do nothing in opposition to the interests of Belgium. Public opinion in France would not stand it. The result of such action might be that Luxemburg, unable to unite economically with France, and unwilling to unite with Belgium, might relapse into her former relations with Germany. Hence, M. Clemenceau suggested, it would be desirable that the Council should notify Luxemburg that their request in regard to the political referendum applied equally to the economic referendum, and should advise the Luxemburg Government not to present the Peace Conference with a situation which would be tantamount to a *fait accompli*.

PRESIDENT WILSON reported that, as he had been asked to, he had, after a short delay, written to the Luxemburg Government to say that the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would be glad to receive a deputation. He had, as yet, received no reply.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that his position was that, if Luxemburg proposed economic union with France, he could not say no. Nevertheless, he did not want to do anything which appeared detrimental to Belgium.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it was a question primarily for the people of Luxemburg and no attempt ought to be made to manoeuvre them into political or economic union with Belgium, if they did not desire it. Their wishes ought to be obtained.

M. CLEMENCEAU made the definite proposal that President Wilson should inform the Luxemburg Government that the invitation to them to abstain from a political referendum applied equally to an economic referendum.

PRESIDENT WILSON hoped that the question would be settled by the reception of the Luxemburg deputation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that this would be the best solution. It was purely a matter for the Luxemburg people themselves and the Powers should not meddle and compelled [*compel*] them to make up their minds.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that it was undesirable to complicate matters with Belgium just now.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed. He was very anxious not to have any trouble with Belgium. If Luxemburg were to vote for union with France, Belgium would say that it was the result of French machinations. The Belgians were just beginning to see that France did not want Luxemburg and he wanted to show them that France was playing straight. He believed it to be a real fact that the people of Luxemburg did not want political union with France, whom they regarded as a heathen people, being themselves subject to clerical influence. He, himself, would accept the union of Luxemburg with France, if offered by Luxemburg, but his first object was to continue in close accord with Belgium.

(It was agreed:—That President Wilson should wait a day or two and then send a reminder to Luxemburg.)

5. There was a short discussion on the subject of the military forces of Austria.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he thought the question was a very delicate one. He, himself, was prepared to come rather nearer than he had been to the views of President Wilson. In regard to the small States, there were two

aspects; one financial and one political, apart from the military. The financial had been discussed yesterday. He was glad, however, that the report of the Reparations Committee had not been finally approved, and that it had been referred back for further drafting. He thought that the financial authorities had viewed it too much from a purely financial point of view and had not sufficiently taken political considerations into account. The question was really not disconnected from the question of the number of troops that small countries like Poland and Czecho-Slovakia should have. He agreed to a limitation of their armaments, but thought that they should not be reduced at once and too hastily.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested the possibility that some gradual system of reduction might be introduced pending the solution of the Russian question, and that the reduction to the final figures might depend on the settlement of that question.

(It was agreed:—To adjourn upstairs and discuss this question in the first instance with experts.)

6. Arising out of the previous discussion, M. CLEMENCEAU said he wished to add a further political element to the Reparation Committee.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE and PRESIDENT WILSON said they had no objection.

Reparation
Committee for
the Treaties
With Austria,
Hungary & Bulgaria

M. CLEMENCEAU proposed to add M. Loucheur and M. Tardieu.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, in that case, he would add General Smuts and Mr. Keynes.

(It was agreed:—That the Committee appointed to advise the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the question of Reparation with Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria should be composed as follows:—

United States of America.

Mr. Norman H. Davis.
Mr. B. M. Baruch.
Mr. T. W. Lamont.
Mr. J. F. Dulles.
Mr. V. McCormick.

British Empire.

Lord Cunliffe.
Lord Sumner
General Smuts
Mr. J. Keynes.

France.

M. Klotz.
M. Loucheur.
M. Tardieu.
M. Jouasset.

Italy.

M. Crespi.
M. d'Amelio.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 23 May, 1919.

Appendix I to CF-26

GERMAN PROPERTY ABROAD

Translation of German Note

GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION,
VERSAILLES, May 22, 1919.

SIR: The provisions of the Conditions of Peace concerning private property of the nationals of both parties are chiefly inspired by the tendency of the Allied and Associated Governments to treat all German private property situated within their sphere of power as an uniform mass for distribution, out of which, in a bankruptcy-like procedure, both the private claims of their nationals and the state-claims to war indemnity are to be satisfied. This aim is to be arrived at by means of a series of provisions which, if carried through, would lead to the result that all German property situated in countries which are under the influence of the Allied and Associated Governments would be confiscated and all German nationals would be materially restricted in their legal capacity.

In the first place it is provided that all measures taken during the war against German private property in enemy countries are to remain in force as legally binding (Article 297*d*). This clause, it is true, provides for reciprocity, but only a semblance of reciprocity is given. For the enemy nationals are to be entitled to full compensation for all damages caused to them by German exceptional laws; furthermore they are to be granted the right of, in their free option, demanding restitution in full, and eventually, if such restitution cannot be effected of even claiming equivalents in specie (Article 297 *e, f, g*). On the other hand, however, German nationals who have been subjected to exceptional laws of enemy countries are not only to be debarred from all possibility of replacement into the former state, but are also deprived of any claim to compensation against the enemy states or their authorities, so that the latter are not even then liable, if it can be proved that German property in enemy countries has fallen a victim to corrupt and fraudulent machinations (para. 2 of the Annex to Article 298).

The operation of the measures taken by the Allied and Associated Governments during the war would, however, not suffice to lay hand on all available German property for the purposes contemplated. It is therefore on the one hand provided that, whereas Germany must immediately abrogate all exceptional laws enacted by her, the liquidation of German property in enemy countries may be proceeded with after the conclusion of peace, even under new war measures which may be enacted (Article 297 *a* and *b*). No time limit being

fixed herefor, the enemy Governments evidently go so far as to reserve for themselves the possibility of extending the process of liquidation to such German property which may come within their territory in the future. Besides this temporal prolongation of war measures an extension as to the area of their application is contemplated which is of even greater moment. For Germany is to be forced to deliver up all securities held by her nationals and relating to rights in property situated in the territory of the Allied and Associated Governments, according to this, all shares and debentures of enemy companies would, *inter alia*, have to be delivered up (para. 10 of the Annex to Article 298). Furthermore, German property situated in the territories to be ceded by Germany is to be subjected to liquidation, so that e. g., the property of the numerous Germans in Alsace-Lorraine, who are not granted French nationality or are not expressly permitted to remain in the country, and particularly the whole of German private property in the German Colonies is subjected to compulsory sale (Article 53, Article 121). Finally, almost all German property situated in Russia, China, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey is to be added to the mass for distribution. The Allied and Associated Governments not being able to apply forthwith a direct process of liquidation in these countries, they select the circuitous way of empowering the Reparation Commission, beyond its other capacities, to demand from the German Government the immediate expropriation of all German public utility undertakings and all German concessions situated in these countries (Article 260).

The appropriation of the net proceeds, derived from these sales of German property, for distribution by way of bankruptcy, is provided for in the following manner (Article 297. *h.* and para. 4 of the Annex to Article 298). The net proceeds realised in Germany are to be paid in cash immediately in the currency of the enemy Government concerned at the pre-war rate of exchange, so that Germany would eventually be obliged to pay back a multiplex sum of the proceeds actually collected. On the other hand, the proceeds realised by the Allied and Associated Governments from the liquidation of German property are not to be paid to Germany, but, instead, are to be charged with a treble mortgage and thus to be wholly and finally withdrawn from the right of disposal by the German entitled thereto. In the first place are to be satisfied therefrom the claims of nationals of the enemy State concerned to compensation on account of exceptional laws having been applied against their property in Germany, further, private claims of such nationals against German nationals, and lastly, claims of such nationals to compensation growing out of all acts committed by the German Government or by German authori-

ties since July 31st, 1914, and before the enemy State concerned entered into the war. (The authoritative appreciation of compensation claims of the latter kind is evidently to be left over to the free judgment of the enemy Government concerned.) In the second place are to be satisfied claims to compensation and private claims of nationals of the Allied and Associated States against the States allied with Germany or against the nationals of such States, thus making German private property liable e. g. also for the claims of British nationals against the Turkish Government or against Turkish nationals. The assets remaining after these two categories of claims have been satisfied are then to be applied to the payment of the war indemnity owed by Germany by being transferred to the clearing account of the Reparation Commission. This mode of procedure may, it is true, be departed from, it being provided that the proceeds of German liquidations need not be paid in cash but may be set off against the proceeds of enemy liquidations. Such proceeding, the details of which cannot clearly be inferred from the provisions of the draft, is, however, only to be adopted if the enemy Government concerned so thinks fit.

The German Peace Delegation feel bound to declare that the arrangement set forth above appears to them to be unacceptable in principle as being in different respects opposed to the most elementary conceptions of a peace of Right. This inconsistency is all the more manifest as the questions of private law here at issue belong to a subject-matter which should under all circumstances be excluded from a treatment guided by motives of political power.

If, as is proposed by the other side, the aggressions against private property effected during the war on grounds of exceptional laws be in principle acknowledged and upheld as final, this should of course apply equally to both parties. In any case, however, such settlement should only be applicable to measures adopted during the war. It may be left out of discussion whether and to what extent such measures may be regarded as admissible during the war; there should, however, be no doubt as to the necessity of these measures—which have always been designated as acts of warfare by the authorities responsible therefor—being immediately brought to a close on the cessation of the hostilities at the front. Germany must therefore in principle maintain the point of view that all measures of the kind here referred to which have been taken after the conclusion of the Armistice are illegal, as representing a continuation of hostilities. With still more emphasis, however, the imputation put to Germany, of assenting to a continuation of the aggressions against private property even beyond the conclusion of Peace, must be repudiated. This would, instead of restoring Peace, in truth mean to perpetuate economic war.

Another point of view which has evidently also been disregarded by the Allied and Associated Governments leads to the same result. The proposed appropriation of the German private property situated in foreign countries amounts to a so extensive confiscation of private property of all kind, that a general undermining of the fundamental principles of international legal intercourse will of necessity result therefrom. Under the present conditions it ought to be the special task of the Powers to bring the principle of inviolability of private property, which has been subjected to so many restrictions during the war, into full force again in international intercourse. Germany has up to now presumed that this view would be advocated by the Allied and Associated Governments with the same consistency as has been expressed in a judgment of the highest English Law Court, the House of Lords, on January 25th 1918 in a law suit between a German and an English Firm. In this judgment the following passage is contained:

"It was not the Law of this country that the property of enemy subjects were [*was*] confiscated. Until the restoration of peace the enemy could of course make no claim to have it delivered up to him; but when peace was restored, he was considered entitled to his property with any fruits which it might have borne in the meantime".

The same view has been taken by the highest German Court in a well known leading judgment of October 26th 1914, by which the private rights of a French subject are acknowledged as continuing to exist in Germany during the war. This conception which has been upheld by the Courts of both parties during the war would be turned into its reverse by the Treaty of Peace if the Allied and Associated Governments henceforth lay hands on all German private property within their reach in order to satisfy therefrom state and private claims which are not directed against the concerned owner himself. Such appropriation must appear as especially arbitrary if not even claims against Germany or against German nationals are involved but claims against the states allied with Germany and the nationals of such states. If the Allied and Associated Governments try to veil the confiscatory character of the procedure by expressly providing for the indemnification of the owners through means of the German Empire, they cannot thereby change the nature of the matter.

The disastrous consequences which the contemplated confiscation of Germany's property abroad would entail from an economical point of view have already been mentioned in my note dated 13th inst.¹ and are too patent to require further illustration. On the other

¹ Appendix IA to CF-20, p. 738.

hand the German Peace Delegation is conscious of the fact that under the pressure of the burden resulting from the Peace Treaty for the whole future of German economic life German property abroad cannot be maintained in its former extent. In order to be able to discharge her pecuniary obligations Germany will rather have to sacrifice this property abroad in a large measure. To do so she is prepared. Germany must however maintain that the right of disposal over property abroad be regulated in a manner having regard to the legal principle above enunciated. The German Peace Delegation is convinced that between this point of view and the interests of the Allied and Associated Governments a compromise could be found. A number of the scruples pointed out would already be made to vanish if the principle of reciprocity were applied, as is in concordance with the spirit of the League of Nations. For the rest it would indeed be requisite that the questions at issue be discussed viva voce in detail by the experts of both parties.

Accept [etc.]

BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU

Appendix II to CF-26

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LEGISLATION

Translation of German Note

GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION,
VERSAILLES, May 22, 1919.

SIR: In the name of the German Delegation I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Reply-Note, dated May 14th, 1919,² which has been given us on our Note concerning International Labour Legislation.

The German Delegation takes note of the fact that the Allied and Associated Governments are of one mind with the German Democratic Government in believing domestic peace and the advancement of humanity to be dependent on the solution of labour questions. The German Delegation, however, does not agree with the Allied and Associated Governments as to the ways and means of arriving at the solution.

In order to avoid misunderstandings and false impressions, the German Delegation deems it to be necessary to elucidate the fundamental conditions precedent underlying their Note of May 10th, 1919.³

² The text of the reply as sent is identical with the draft reply in appendix II to CF-13, p. 610, except for the substitution of the signature of M. Clemenceau for Mr. Barnes' initials on the draft.

³ Appendix I to CF-9, p. 571.

In the opinion of the German Democratic Government the final decision in questions of Labour Law and Labour Protection belongs to the workers themselves. It was the intention of the German Delegation to give occasion, even while the negotiations of Peace are proceeding, to the legitimate representatives of the working people of all countries of casting their vote on this point and bringing into conformity the Draft of the Conditions of Peace, the proposal of the German Democratic Government and the resolutions of the International Trade Unions Conference held at Berne from February 5th to 9th 1919. Contrary to this proposal, the Allied and Associated Governments do not think it necessary to call a Labour Conference at Versailles for this purpose.

The International Labour Conference contemplated to be held at Washington, to which you refer in your reply-Note of May 14th 1919, cannot replace the Conference demanded by us, because it is to be held on the principles which are established by the Draft of the Treaty of Peace for the organization of Labour. The latter, however, disregards the demands raised by the International Trade Union Conference at Berne in two material directions.

The first divergence is in respect of the representation of the workers. According to the proposal of the International Labour Conference at Berne, one-half of the members of the Conference entitled to vote must consist of representatives of the workers of each country who are organised in Trades Unions. The German Delegation has endorsed this proposal by transmitting the Protocol of the International Trade Union Conference at Berne. Contrary to this, the draft of the Treaty of Peace grants to the workers only one quarter of the total votes at the International Conference; for, according to the Draft of the Allied and Associated Governments, each country is to be represented by two Government Delegates, one employer, and only one worker. The Governments are even in a position, according to Article 390 of the Draft of the Treaty of Peace, to exclude the workers' vote by not nominating an employer and thus giving to Governmental bureaucrats the casting vote as against the representatives of practical life. This system is at variance with the democratic principles which have, to the present day, been upheld and fought for in common by the whole international work-people, and will deepen the impression held among the workers that they are, as before furthermore only to be the object of a legislation governed by the interest of private capital.

The second divergence refers to the legally binding force of the resolutions of the Conference. According to the resolutions of the International Trade Union Conference at Berne the International Parliament of Labour is to issue not only International Conventions

without legally binding force, but also International Laws which, from the moment of their adoption, are to have the same effect (legally binding force) as national laws (Proclamation to the workers of all countries, adopted by the International Trade Union Conference at Berne, 1919, at the motion of Jouhaux, the delegate of France). The Draft of the German Democratic Government endorses this resolution and makes the passing of such laws depend on the assent of four fifths of the nations represented. No such resolutions can be passed by a conference which is called on the basis of Part XIII of the Draft of the Treaty of Peace, but only Recommendations or Drafts which the Governments concerned may adopt or repudiate, — and for such non-obligatory proposals a majority of two thirds of the votes cast is even required.

In so providing, the Draft of the Conditions of Peace deviates to such an extent from the resolutions of the International Trade Union Conference at Berne that a discussion and decision by the Organisation of Labour, as part of the Peace Negotiations, is absolutely imperative. This would at the same time be in accordance with the demand raised by the International Trade Union Conference at Berne that the minimum claims of Labour agreed upon be, already at the conclusion of Peace, turned unto [*into?*] International Law by the Society of Nations. Moreover a firm foundation for the Peace of the World shall be erected by this means, whereas a Treaty concluded by the Governments alone without the assent of the organised workers of all countries will never bring forth social peace to the world.

The Allied and Associated Governments give no place to these considerations in their Reply. As have above been illustrated, the resolutions of the International Trade Union Conference at Berne are, in fact, not taken into consideration by Part XIII of the Draft of the Treaty of Peace, so that the fears expressed by the German Democratic Government with regard to social justice are in reality not taken into account. This fact must be noted. If we are apprized by the Reply-note that the representatives of the Trade Unions of the countries represented by the Allied and Associated Governments have taken part in the elaboration of the clauses of the Conditions of Peace relating to labour, we must on the other hand make note of the fact that they have made no announcement of any kind notifying a change of their views on the resolutions of the International Trade Union Conference at Berne, much less of an abandonment of these resolutions which they themselves have adopted.

The German Delegation again moves to call a conference of the Representatives of the national organisations of all Trade Unions, before the Negotiations of Peace are terminated. Should this motion

again be rejected, an utterance of the leaders of the Trade Unions of all countries is at least necessary. In moving this in the second line, we desire to bring about, that the provisions of the Treaty of Peace relating to Labour may also have the approval of all Trade Union Organisations.

Accept [etc.]

BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU

Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Friday, May 23, at 11:30 a. m.

PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

President Wilson.

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George.

Secretary-General.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

ITALY

H. E. M. Orlando.

Secretary-General.

Count Aldrovandi.

ALSO PRESENT

AMERICA, UNITED STATES OF

Admiral Benson.

Rear-Admiral H. S. Knapp.

Rear-Admiral Long.

Capt. L. McNamee.

Commander A. F. Carter.

General Tasker H. Bliss.

Major-Gen. M. N. Patrick.

General McKinstry.

BRITISH EMPIRE

General Sir H. H. Wilson.

Major-Gen. W. Thwaites.

Major-General C. J. Sackville-West.

Rear-Admiral G. P. W. Hope.

Brig.-Gen. P. R. C. Groves.

FRANCE

General Belin.

Comdt. Lacombe.

M. G. Cahen.

M. De Montille.

Admiral Ronarch.

General Duval.

ITALY

General Cavallero.

Colonel Toni.

Admiral Grassi.

Count Vannutelli-Rey.

Lt.-Col. Piccio.

JOINT SECRETARIAT

BRITISH EMPIRE

Major A. M. Caccia.

FRANCE

{ Capt. A. Portier.

{ M. Fould.

Interpreter—Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

1. PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the draft clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, referring to Prisoners of War (Annex A) had been drawn up on the same lines as the corresponding clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

Clauses in
the Treaty
of Peace
With Austria
Referring to
Prisoners of
War

The clauses in question referred only to the release of prisoners belonging to Austria proper. For good and sufficient reasons, no reference had been made to those prisoners

who were nationals of territories which had belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, such as Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, and Austrian Poland. The Prisoners of War Commission had, however, in their report to the Supreme Council embodied a definite proposal, which read as follows:—

“Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war, and interned civilians who were nationals of territories which belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and which are to be allotted to Allied and Associated States shall be set at liberty forthwith. All necessary facilities shall be given by the Allied and Associated States to delegates of the Legations and Consulates of new States, in order that they may enter into direct communication with their nationals who are prisoners of war or interned civilians and may facilitate and accelerate their repatriation.”

M. CAHEN said he would read the following statement, which expressed the views of the Prisoners of War Commission on this point:—

“The Commission thought that the question thus raised was of the greatest interest, and discussed it at length. The question is indeed nothing less than that of deciding the fate of prisoners and interned civilians who were nationals of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire; should this question form the subject of a special stipulation in the Treaty of Peace concluded with the new Austrian State, or on the other hand, since it is a question of interallied interests, should any general decision be deferred and the Allied and Associated Governments be left to deal with the question in due season and to settle it by special agreements?

In view of the fact that, according to instructions received by the Italian Delegation, the Commission was only appointed to study conditions to be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with the new Austrian State, concerning the repatriation of prisoners of war who were subjects of that State, the Italian Delegation was of opinion that the Commission was not competent to accept the amendment proposed by the Serbian Delegation. That amendment dealt with a question which was not of direct interest to the new Austria and which must be decided by direct arrangement between the Governments concerned.

It therefore thought that the Commission could express no opinion on the said amendment and must confine itself to transmitting it direct to the Governments of the principal Allied and Associated Powers through their delegates on the Commission.

The Italian Delegation, for its part, was willing to transmit the amendment to the Italian Government.

The majority of the Commission considered, on the contrary that as it was instructed to determine the date and method of repatriation of enemy prisoners of war, it was not justified in indifference to the fate of nationals of Allied and Associated countries retained in captivity.

While doubtless holding that the Treaty of Peace regulating relations with the new Austrian State should not include special stipulations with regard to the liberation of Czecho-Slovaks, Jugo-Slavs, Poles and Transylvanians, the Commission considered it inadmissible

that Austrian prisoners should be repatriated unless Czecho-Slovaks, Jugo-Slavs, Poles and Transylvanians were certain of benefiting in the same way.

It therefore deemed it essential to call the attention of the Supreme Council to the necessity and urgency of a general decision, common to all the Allied and Associated Powers, in favour of all prisoners captured in the ranks of the Austro-Hungarian armies, and who no longer belong to the Austrian State. The insertion of such a clause in the text would moreover have caused the postponement of its application until the Treaty came into force. While recommending it to the favourable consideration of the Supreme Council, the majority of the Commission thought that the decision was not inseparable from the Treaty of Peace and might even precede it.

This decision, which is claimed as an act of justice and impatiently awaited, will when backed by the authority enjoyed by the resolutions of the Supreme Council, ensure the immediate release of prisoners who were nationals of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and have become nationals of new Allied and Associated States."

M. ORLANDO said that the members of the Prisoners of War Commission were unanimously agreed that the question under reference did not directly concern the Treaty of Peace with Austria. In his opinion, the question would have to be considered from two points of view, namely, from the point of view of fact and from the point of view of right.

In regard to the question of fact, Italy had not been in any way behindhand in according special treatment to the prisoners of war and interned civilians in question. Nearly the whole of the Czechs, some 40,000, had already been liberated. Similarly, Poles, Roumanians of Transylvania, and even Jugo-Slavs, had also been liberated. The prisoners of war who were nationals of territories which had belonged to the late Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, still remaining in Italy, had been concentrated in special camps, where they enjoyed special treatment. A very much larger number would already have been liberated; but at the present moment very great difficulties existed in regard to transportation. The policy of the Italian Government was to send home as many of these people as possible. From the point of view of fact, therefore, the Italian Government had already taken steps to give effect to the recommendations of the Commission. Moreover, it would continue the repatriation of these prisoners as quickly as the existing transportation conditions permitted.

In the second place, in regard to the question of right, a difficulty at once arose since the repatriation of prisoners of war was dependent upon the conclusion of peace. Naturally, as soon as Peace was concluded all prisoners of war would be set free. Consequently, the problem resolved itself into one of deciding at what particular moment peace could be considered to have been concluded with the new

States of Jugo-Slavia, Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, etc. In regard to the territories included in Austria proper, and in Hungary, a separate Peace would be signed, and from that moment the prisoners of war belonging to these territories would be repatriated. But in regard to the new States which previously had formed part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, peace would in his opinion exist only when these territories had been finally delimited, and at that moment the prisoners would by right be released. That being the case, he could not accept the resolution of the Commission, wherein it was laid down that all Austro-Hungarian Prisoners of War and interned civilians who were nationals of territories which belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy should be set at liberty forthwith. In the first place he could not accept such a legal international obligation, before Peace had been declared. Furthermore, it would as a matter of fact be impossible for him to comply with such a resolution because until the frontiers were determined it would be impossible to know to what particular country a prisoner of war in reality belonged, that is, it would be impossible to say whether he was a friend or a foe. For instance, in the case of an inhabitant of the Banat, or of Galicia, it would be impossible to say whether he was to be considered a Roumanian or a Hungarian, or something else.

To sum up, in regard to the question of fact, Italy had already set free a large number of the Austro-Hungarian Prisoners of war and interned civilians, who were nationals of territories which belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, within the limits possible under existing transportation facilities. And, in regard to the question of right, he felt unable to accept any formal obligation, as no nation could be compelled to free all prisoners until peace was signed.

Under those circumstances, he thought that no formal decision should be taken on this question. Should his colleagues, however, favour the acceptance of the draft clauses proposed by the Commission, the matter should be discussed solely from a political point of view.

PRESIDENT WILSON expressed the view that the prisoners of war in question should be liberated as soon as possible, whether they were by right entitled to repatriation or not.

M. ORLANDO replied that that was exactly what Italy had been doing. In other words, he was prepared to accept the principle involved in the recommendation made by the Commission; but he could not accept a formal obligation.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that if after liberating the prisoners that belonged to Austria proper, any of the Allied powers should continue to detain prisoners which belonged to other parts of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the impression would be cre-

ated that States which were friendly were being treated more harshly than enemy States, and the situation in Southern Europe would thereby be still further complicated.

M. ORLANDO thought that the hypothesis put forward by President Wilson was an impossible one. He assured the Council that as far as Italy was concerned, the moment the nationals of Austria proper were liberated, the nationals of all those other territories which had belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would obviously also be set free. On the other hand, he could not possibly take a formal obligation to release forthwith all prisoners of war at present interned in Italy. That was the only engagement which he could not accept.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that the Allied and Associated Governments need only be required at the present moment to accept the policy without taking any definite formal obligation.

M. ORLANDO said that under these circumstances he accepted the proposal. He would do his best to liberate as many of the prisoners of war as possible. The present difficulty lay wholly in want of transport.

(The Supreme Council, approved the articles relating to prisoners of war to be inserted in the conditions of Peace with Austria. (Appendix A.) The Heads of the Governments further agreed that all prisoners of war who were formerly nationals of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and have now become nationals of an allied or associated country must be liberated immediately, subject to the possibilities of transportation and the final settlement of the frontiers of the new states. In any case they should not be liberated later than the prisoners of war who are nationals of the new Austrian state.)

2. PRESIDENT WILSON said that the Military representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles had submitted, in accordance with the resolution taken by the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers on the 15th May, 1919, a report on the strength of the Armies to be allowed for Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Jugo-Slavia, Roumania, Poland, and Greece. (Appendix B.)

Military, Naval
and Aerial
Clauses of the
Conditions of
Peace With
Austria and
Hungary.
(a) Military
Clauses

M. ORLANDO suggested that the Military representatives present should be asked to make a reasoned statement, showing the grounds for their recommendations.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed the view that the reasons for the recommendations made by the military representatives were set forth very clearly in the Report, which had been circulated. He thought the report in question gave a very good summary of the arguments relating to difficulties of the question.

PRESIDENT WILSON called on General Bliss to make a statement.

GENERAL BLISS stated that the original draft of the Military Clauses for insertion in the Conditions of Peace with Austria had been prepared by the Military Representatives, Versailles, during his unavoidable absence. On his return to Versailles, he had found that the draft submitted by the Military Representatives had already received consideration by the Supreme Council, which had decided to return the same to the Military Representatives for modification along certain fixed lines. As a result of a careful study of the labours of his colleagues, he wished to state that he accepted without qualification their conclusions. The figures originally arrived at by the Military Representatives were necessarily based almost entirely on military considerations. He fully realised, however, that in the end the question must be, and would be, settled chiefly on political grounds. In studying the question, the Military Representatives had given full value to all connected questions such as the population of the territories; the character of the territory; the frontiers and the relation between land and maritime frontiers; the character of the local industries (e. g. whether chiefly agricultural or industrial); the general character of the population; the existence of large cities and so forth. Each of the Military Representatives working independently had formed his own estimates. These had naturally differed to a certain extent in details; but the results reached had been practically the same.

He fully realised that the Supreme Council was bound by its decision in regard to the strength of the military forces to be allowed to Germany; and on that account the Military Representatives had received definite instructions to take the German figures as a proportional standard in fixing the forces to be allowed to Austria-Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia, Yugo-Slavia, Roumania, Poland, Bulgaria and Greece. He felt that it might be somewhat hackneyed to re-state the fact that the figures accepted for Germany had not been based on military advice. The Military Committee, presided over by Marshal Foch, had originally been unanimous in recommending to the Supreme Council that a total force of 200,000 men should be allowed to Germany: the whole force to be raised by conscription. The recommendation of the Military Committee had been referred back by the Supreme Council, with instructions that a system of voluntary enlistment should be substituted for the compulsory system proposed. In consequence, the Committee had recommended that the total number of effectives and reservists in the army, to be organised on a basis of a long term compulsory service, should not exceed 140,000. The French Representatives, whilst accepting this figure, expressed a strong recommendation that it should be reduced

from 140,000 to 100,000 effectives. When the question again came under the consideration of the Supreme Council, the British Prime Minister had made some very carefully considered remarks which indicated a reluctant dissent from the views of his military advisers. He laid great stress on the apprehension of a renewed attack by Germany which existed in France; he believed that this apprehension was a factor that must be taken into account, and in consequence he proposed that the Council should accept the figure recommended by the French representatives, and that the force should be brought down to 100,000 effectives. He (General Bliss) had never heard an argument which convinced him that the figure 100,000 was correct from a military point of view, and he personally could not bring himself to relinquish his military judgment except as the result of convincing argument.

Finally, when the whole question was referred back to the Military Representatives on the 15th May last with a mandate that the force for Austria should not exceed 15,000 men, the case appealed to him in the following way. An intelligent survey of the situation in Central and Southern Europe would inevitably justify the anticipation that considerable trouble must in the near future arise in those regions, especially as a result of the application of the Peace Conditions. Now, should the Allied and Associated Governments prevent those States from maintaining a sufficient force for the maintenance of order, who would be responsible for doing the work? The total strength of the forces to be maintained by Austria as originally recommended by the Military Representatives for military reasons was much less than the force which even the weakest of the Entente Powers proposed to maintain. In his opinion, the strength of the forces recommended by the Military Representatives was exceedingly small for the purpose of maintaining order in those turbulent regions. He fully acknowledged that eventually the question would have to be settled chiefly from political considerations, but he felt very strongly that by radically reducing the forces of Austria-Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, Roumania, Bulgaria, and Greece, as proposed, those States would be converted into mere vassals of the two Continental Powers of the Entente. Should disorders then occur, and the States be unable to cope with the same through want of forces, the inevitable result would be that stronger armies would have to be maintained by France and Italy, following in the occupation from time to time of the territories in question for the purpose of quelling disorders. He did not think that such a situation pointed to the maintenance of the Peace of Europe in the future. The Council no doubt realised the danger of future combinations between Ger-

manic, Slavonic and Asiatic races, which might eventually sweep the civilization of Western Europe out of the way. He personally had never believed in the possibility of the extinction of all traces of Anglo-Latin civilization from Western Europe, but he thought that by eliminating the possibility of the maintenance of order in Central and Southern Europe, the Council were formulating a possible scheme to bring this about. The brilliancy of the military glory which now lightened up certain of these Western nations of Europe might in reality not be an evidence of health but only the hectic flush of disease which would eventually result in the downfall of our strip of Latin and Anglo-Saxon civilization along the Western coast of Europe.

In conclusion, he wished to lay stress on the fact that the acceptance of the figures based on the instructions issued by the Supreme Council would inevitably reduce these States to a condition of vassalage to the Western Powers of the Entente.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked General Bliss to state his proposal.

GENERAL BLISS replied that his suggestion was that the Council should accept the figures recommended by the Military Representatives.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that it had been assumed that the Supreme Council had instructed the Military Representatives to act on the basis of 15,000 effectives for Austria. He himself had never agreed to that figure and, in fact, he had suggested 20,000. The considerations which General Bliss had urged were, he thought, very serious and large, and required to be very carefully considered. In his opinion, the Supreme Council could not proceed to accept or alter the figure off-hand. He proposed, therefore, that this question should be reserved for discussion from a political point of view.

M. CLEMENCEAU associated himself with what President Wilson had said. He would ask, however, that a copy of General Bliss speech be circulated so that each of the members of the Supreme Council might have his remarks before them.

M. ORLANDO agreed. He added that General Bliss's speech had made a considerable impression on him.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that without doubt the Supreme Council would very shortly receive from Germany some protest in regard to the strength of the authorised forces, which had been fixed at 100,000 men. In his opinion, the Germans would never accept that figure. At the present moment, he personally was disposed to agree with General Bliss's statement that 100,000 men would be an inadequate force for Germany. He had originally accepted that figure as a compromise in view of the fact that Marshal Foch had pressed the matter. The French were the nearest neighbours to Germany, and

he thought that their wishes should as far as possible be conceded. He felt certain, however, that the Supreme Council would receive within the next two or three days the German view of the matter. He thought, therefore, that it would be best to consider the problem from the point of view of Germany, Austria, Hungary, and the other States as a whole. He did not think it possible to take Austria and Hungary separately.

PRESIDENT WILSON invited attention to the following statement which occurred in the Report of the Military Representatives, namely:—

“On their Eastern frontier these two nations, Poland and Roumania, are in contact with Bolshevist Russia. Not only are they themselves directly menaced by this, but they in fact constitute a barrier which defends Europe against Bolshevism. They must therefore be left in a condition to continue war against the Russian Maximalists with all possible means at their disposal. It is indispensable that Poland and Roumania should be authorised to keep all their forces mobilised under the control of the League of Nations until the Russian question is definitely settled.”

MR. LLOYD GEORGE adhered to his statement that the question of the strength of the armies to be allowed for Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czecho-Slovakia, Yugo-Slavia, Roumania, Poland and Greece, must be considered as a whole. Should Czecho-Slovakia be allowed to raise a conscript army without limitations, she would have an army of 1¼ millions as compared to the army of 100,000 allowed to Germany. In his opinion, it was quite impossible to restrict Germany without at the same time restricting the other countries; otherwise Germany would be forced into an offensive alliance with the Balkan States aimed at the Western Powers. In this connection, he had been greatly impressed by the remark made by General Bliss in the course of his statement, in regard to the possible formation of a Germano-Slav alliance.

(It was agreed to adjourn the further consideration of the Military Clauses of the Conditions of Peace with Austria.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the only question in regard to the Naval Clauses, which called for a decision, related to the following reservation made by Admiral Benson, the American Representative:—

(b) Naval
Clauses

“That the Naval Terms should contain no prohibition against the manufacture within the limits of States formerly a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire of naval war material on foreign order.”

In his opinion, the matter was a very small one, and he personally was quite indifferent as to the inclusion or exclusion of the condition in question.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that at the last Meeting he had been under the impression that the point raised was a very serious one. Since then he had consulted his experts, and he agreed that the question was one of only slight importance. On the other hand, he doubted whether it was worth while to include in the Conditions of Peace, clauses which were of no real importance. On this account he proposed that the condition in question should be omitted.

(It was agreed that the Naval Terms should contain no prohibition against the manufacture within the limits of States formerly a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire of naval war material on foreign order.

NOTE: This entails the deletion of paragraph 2 of Article 25.

The Naval Clauses, as amended, were adopted.—For text see Appendix C.)

(c) Air
Clauses

(The Air Clauses were adopted without amendment.—For text see Appendix D.)

(d) Inter-allied
Commission of
Control (e) Gen-
eral Clauses

(The Clauses dealing with Inter-allied Commission of Control, and the general clauses were adopted without amendment.—see Appendix E and F.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, May 23, 1919.

Appendix "A" to CF-27

Draft of Articles to Insert in the Preliminaries of Peace With Austria

ARTICLE 1.

The repatriation of Austrian prisoners of war and interned civilians, who are nationals of the new Austrian State, shall take place as soon as possible after the coming into force of the present treaty, and shall be carried out with the greatest rapidity.

ARTICLE 2.

The repatriation of Austrian prisoners of War and interned civilians shall, in accordance with Article 1, be carried out by a Commission composed of Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers on the one part and of the Austrian Government on the other part.

For each of the Allied and Associated Powers a Sub-Commission composed exclusively of representatives of the interested powers and of Delegates of the Austrian Government shall regulate the details of carrying into effect the repatriation of prisoners of war.

ARTICLE 3.

From the time of their delivery into the hands of the Austrian authorities, the prisoners of war and interned civilians are to be returned without delay to their homes by the said authorities. Those among them who, before the war, were habitually resident in territory occupied by the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers, are likewise to be sent to their homes, subject to the consent and control of the Military Authorities of the Allied and Associated Armies of Occupation.

ARTICLE 4.

The whole cost of repatriation from the moment of starting shall be borne by the Austrian Government who shall also provide means of transport and working personnel as considered necessary by the Commission referred to in Article 2.

ARTICLE 5.

Prisoners of war and interned civilians awaiting disposal or undergoing sentence for offences against discipline shall be repatriated irrespective of the completion of their sentence or of the proceedings pending against them.

This stipulation shall not apply to prisoners of war and interned civilians punished for offences committed subsequent to May 1st, 1919.

During the period pending their repatriation all prisoners of war and interned civilians shall remain subject to the existing regulations, more especially as regards work and discipline.

ARTICLE 6.

Prisoners of war and interned civilians who are awaiting trial or undergoing sentence for offences other than those against discipline may be detained.

ARTICLE 7.

The Austrian Government undertakes to admit to its territory without distinction all prisoners liable to repatriation.

Prisoners of war or Austrian nationals who do not desire to be repatriated may be excluded from repatriation; but the Allied and Associated Governments reserve to themselves the right either to repatriate them or to take them to a neutral country or to allow them to reside in their own territories.

The Austrian Government undertakes not to institute any exceptional proceedings against these persons or their families nor to take any repressive, or vexatious measures of any kind whatsoever against them on this account.

ARTICLE 8.

The Allied and Associated Governments reserve the right to make the repatriation of Austrian Prisoners of war or Austrian nationals

in their hands conditional upon the immediate notification and liberation by the Austrian Government of any Prisoners of war and other nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers who are still held in Austria against their will.

ARTICLE 9.

The Austrian Government undertakes (1) to give every facility to Commissions of Enquiry into the cases of those who cannot be traced; to furnish such Commissions with all necessary means of transport; to allow them access to camps, prisons, hospitals and all other places; and place at their disposal all documents whether public or private which would facilitate their enquiries. (2) To impose penalties on any Austrian officials or private persons who have concealed the presence of any nationals of any of the Allied or Associated Powers, or who may have neglected to reveal the presence of any such after it had come to their knowledge.

ARTICLE 10.

The Austrian Government undertakes to restore without delay from the date of the coming into force of the present treaty, all articles, money, securities and documents which have belonged to nationals of the Allied and Associated Powers, and which have been retained by the Austrian Authorities.

ARTICLE 11.

The High Contracting Parties waive reciprocally all repayment of sums due for the maintenance of prisoners of war in their respective territories.

SECTION 11. *Graves*

ARTICLE 12.

The Allied and Associated Governments and the Austrian Government will cause to be respected and maintained the graves of the soldiers and sailors buried in their respective territories.

They agree to recognise any Commission appointed by the several Governments for the purpose of identifying, registering caring for or erecting suitable memorials over the said graves, and to facilitate the discharge of its duties.

Furthermore, they agree to afford, so far as the provisions of their laws and the requirements of public health allow, every facility for giving effect to requests that the bodies of their soldiers and sailors may be transferred to their own country.

ARTICLE 13.

The graves of prisoners of war and interned civilians who are nationals of the different belligerent states and have died in captivity

shall be properly maintained in accordance with Article 12 of the present treaty.

The Allied and Associated Powers on the one part and the Austrian Government on the other part reciprocally undertake also to furnish to each other (1) a complete list of those who have died, together with all information useful for identification; (2) all information as to the number and positions of graves of all who have been buried without identification.

PARIS, 23 May, 1919.

SWC-411

[Appendix B to CF-27]

Report on the Strength of the Armies To Be Allowed for Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czecho-Slovakia, Yugo-Slavia, Roumania, Poland and Greece

On May 15th, 1919, the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers made the following Resolution:—¹

It was agreed that the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council, Versailles, should prepare and submit a report showing what forces should be allowed to Austria, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia, Yugo-Slavia (including Montenegro), Roumania, Poland, Bulgaria and Greece, taking the German figures as a proportional standard.

In the case of Poland due allowance shall be made for the existing situation of the Eastern frontier.

The Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council have the honour to submit to the Supreme Council the conclusions and proposals contained in the attached Tables, which are based:—

(1) In regard to the numbers of the populations and the frontiers of the States above-named, on the reports of the different Commissions charged with the territorial questions relative to the said States;* and

(2) In regard to the determination of the effectives to be authorised for each of the armies of these States, on the proportion adopted in the case of Germany and decided to be sufficient by the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers for ensuring the maintenance of order and for control of the frontiers; also on the instructions given by the Supreme Council relative to the strength of the forces to be allowed to Austria.

The Military Representatives nevertheless persist in their opinion that the very reduced number of effectives which they have fixed in

¹ See CF-15, p. 635.

*No report had been drawn up for Bulgaria. The frontiers arising from the reports with regard to Serbia and Greece have been adopted. [Footnote in the original.]

accordance with the instructions which have been given them are insufficient to ensure the efficient carrying out of the tasks which these States may be called upon to perform more particularly during the period of uncertainty following upon the publication of the terms of Peace.

In the course of their discussion they have felt compelled to make the following observations to which they think it indispensable to call the attention of the Supreme Council:—

1. Generally with regard to all the States under consideration.

If it is admitted that Germany with an army of 100,000 men and an excellent system of communications could, in case of urgency or at a moment's notice, transport a large or small part of her forces from one point of her territory to another to ensure the maintenance of order, that would not be the case with the small States. If the figures calculated in accordance with the instructions given by the Supreme Council were adopted, the latter States would only have at their disposal very reduced forces. The whole might not be sufficient in the case of disturbance in a big town or industrial neighbourhood.†

Not having the same facilities for communication as Germany it would, besides, be very difficult for them to assemble quickly at any desired point their forces scattered over the whole country.

The most recent experience has shown that the maintenance of order in large towns necessitates forces the number of which might be estimated at two or three per cent of the total population. These forces represent for large towns the effectives of several divisions whether they are required to suppress risings, as was the case in Germany, or simply to prevent possible disturbances, as has been the case in various Allied countries.

Austria especially includes the capital of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, Vienna, which has more than 2,000,000 inhabitants. If it should become necessary to suppress disturbances of any magnitude there is no doubt that it would be necessary for the Government to have at its disposal a force of not less than 25,000 to 30,000 men.

It seems also essential to take into account the nature of the frontiers and their value from the point of view of defence. It is impossible to consider Germany, the half of whose frontiers are bordered by the sea, by neutral States or neutralised zones, from the same standpoint as States such as Hungary which is surrounded by hostile neighbours with open frontiers.

†The following is the population of the capitals of the countries: Vienna, 2,031,488; Budapest, 880,371; Sofia, 100,000; Prague, 541,000; Belgrade, 92,000; Bucharest, 350,000; Warsaw, 870,000; Athens, 167,000. [Footnote in the original.]

2. Poland and Roumania.

On their Eastern frontier these two nations are in contact with Bolshevist Russia. Not only are they themselves directly menaced by this but they in fact constitute the barrier which defends Europe against Bolshevism. They must therefore be left in a condition to continue war against the Russian Maximilists with all possible means at their disposal.

It is indispensable that Poland and Roumania should be authorised to keep all their forces mobilised under the control of the League of Nations until the Russian question is definitely settled.

Consequently, taking the above facts into consideration, the Military Representatives consider it their duty to propose to the Supreme Council the numbers of effectives laid down in the left hand column of Table 2 attached.

GAL. BELIN

Military Representative, French Section, Supreme War Council

C. SACKVILLE-WEST

Major-General, Military Representative, British Section, Supreme War Council

UGO CAVALLERO

Military Representative, Italian Section, Supreme War Council

TASKER H. BLISS

Military Representative, American Section, Supreme War Council

VERSAILLES, 21 May, 1919.

[Enclosure]

TABLE 1

POPULATIONS AND FRONTIERS

States	Populations included in the new frontiers	Length of frontiers in kilometres		Remarks
		Land Kms.	Sea Kms.	
Austria	7, 000, 000	1, 850	
Hungary	10, 000, 000	1, 540	
Bulgaria	5, 000, 000	1, 400	300	
Czecho-Slovakia	13, 000, 000	2, 500	
Yugo-Slavia (including Serbia and Montenegro)	11, 000, 000	2, 300	600	
Roumania	16, 000, 000	2, 250	350	
Poland	22, 000, 000	2, 500	100	
Greece	6, 000, 000	900	2, 800	
			without Islands	

(NOTE:—All the figures given above are necessarily only approximate).

TABLE 2

MAXIMUM EFFECTIVES AUTHORISED

Total effectives* proposed by the Military Representatives, taking into consideration the above mentioned points	States	Total effectives calculated on the basis given by the Supreme Council	Remarks
40, 000	Austria.....	15, 000	These effectives may be grouped as each state desires in Divisions, Brigades, Regiments, or mixed Units with the following 3 reservations. (1) That the effectives of formed Units shall compulsorily be included within the maximum and minimum figures given in Table 6 attached; (2) That the proportion of Officers shall not exceed $\frac{1}{20}$ th of the total effectives with the colours; (3) That the number of guns, howitzers, and machine-guns shall not exceed the proportion of— 3 guns or howitzers (field or mountain) per 1,000 men of total effectives with the colours; 2 trench mortars per 1,000 men of total effectives with the colours; 15 machine-guns (including light machine-guns and automatic rifles) per 1,000 men of total effectives with the colours. In no case shall Units be formed greater than a Division as laid down in Tables 3 and 4 attached.
45, 000	Hungary.....	18, 000	
20, 000	Bulgaria.....	10, 000	
50, 000	Czecho-Slovakia.....	22, 000	
40, 000	Yugo - Slavia (including Serbia and Montenegro).	20, 000	
60, 000	Roumania.....	28, 000	
80, 000	Poland.....	44, 000	
20, 000	Greece.....	12, 000	

*NOTE.—The figures given in Column 1 are calculated on the basis of 4 effectives per thousand of population. In the case of Austria and Hungary this proportion has been slightly increased on account of the large population existing in the capitals of the 2 countries, and also on account of the existing and possible state of unrest.

TABLE 3

COMPOSITION AND MAXIMUM EFFECTIVES OF AN INFANTRY DIVISION

Units	Maximum effectives of each unit		Remarks
	Officers	Men	
Headquarters of an Infantry Division.	25	70	(a) Each Regiment comprises 3 Battalions of Infantry, each Battalion comprises 3 Companies of Infantry and 1 machine-gun Company.
Headquarters of Divisional Infantry.	5	50	(b) Each Battalion comprises 1 Headquarters, 2 Pioneer Companies, 1 Bridging Section, 1 Searchlight Section.
Headquarters of Divisional Artillery.	4	30	(c) Each regiment comprises 1 Headquarters, 3 Groups of Field or Mountain Artillery, comprising 8 batteries, each Battery comprising 4 guns or howitzers (field or mountain).
3 Regiments of Infantry (a) (on the basis of 65 Officers and 2,000 men per Regiment).	195	6,000	(d) This detachment comprises:—Telephone and telegraph detachments, 1 listening section, 1 carrier-pigeon Section.
1 Squadron.....	6	160	
1 Battalion of Trench Artillery (3 Companies).	14	500	
1 Battalion (b) (3 Companies) ..	14	500	
1 Regiment Field Artillery (c) ..	80	1,200	
1 Battalion Cyclists (comprising 3 Companies).	18	450	
1 Signal Detachment (d)	11	330	
Divisional Medical Corps.....	28	550	
Divisional Parks and Trains...	14	940	
Total for an Infantry Division.	414	10,780	

TABLE 4

COMPOSITION AND MAXIMUM EFFECTIVES FOR A CAVALRY DIVISION

Units	Maximum effectives of each unit		Remarks
	Officers	Men	
Headquarters of a Cavalry Division.	15	50	(a) Each Regiment comprises 4 Squadrons.
Regiment of Cavalry (a)	30	720	(b) Each group comprises 9 fighting cars, each carrying one gun, one machine-gun and one spare machine-gun, 4 Communication cars, 2 small lorries for stores, 7 lorries, including 1 repair lorry. 4 motor cars.
Group of Field Artillery (3 Batteries).	30	430	
Group of Motor Machine-guns and Armoured cars (b)	4	80	
Miscellaneous services.....	30	500	
Total for a Cavalry Division of 6 Regiments.	259	5,380	

NOTE.—The large Cavalry Units may include a variable number of Regiments and be divided into independent Brigades within the limit of the effectives laid down above.

TABLE 5

COMPOSITION AND MAXIMUM EFFECTIVES FOR A MIXED BRIGADE

Units	Maximum effectives of each unit		Remarks
	Officers	Men	
Headquarters of a Brigade.....	10	50	(a) Each Regiment comprises 3 battalions of Infantry, each battalion comprises 3 Companies of Infantry and 1 Machine-gun Company.
2 Regiments of Infantry (a)....	130	4,000	
1 Cyclist Battalion of 3 Companies.	18	450	
1 Cavalry Squadron.....	5	100	
1 Group Field or Mountain Artillery of 3 Batteries.	20	400	
1 Trench Mortar Company....	5	150	
Miscellaneous services including Communication detachment.	10	200	
Total for Mixed Brigade..	198	5,350	

TABLE 6

MINIMUM EFFECTIVES OF UNITS WHATEVER ORGANISATION IS ADOPTED IN THE ARMY (DIVISIONS, MIXED BRIGADES &C.)

Maximum effectives (for reference)		Units	Minimum effectives		Remarks
Officers	Men		Officers	Men	
414	10,780	Infantry Division.....	300	8,000	
259	5,380	Cavalry Division.....	180	3,650	
198	5,350	Mixed Brigade.....	140	4,250	
65	2,000	Regiment of Infantry.....	52	1,600	
16	650	Battalion of Infantry.....	12	500	
3	160	Company of Infantry or Machine-guns.	2	120	
18	450	Cyclist Group.....	12	300	
30	720	Regiment of Cavalry.....	20	450	
6	160	Squadron of Cavalry.....	3	100	
80	1,200	Regiment of Field Artillery.....	60	1,000	
4	150	Battery, Field Artillery.....	2	120	
3	150	Company of Trench Mortars.....	2	100	
14	500	Battalion of Pioneers.....	8	300	

TABLE 7

MAXIMUM AUTHORISED ARMAMENTS AND MUNITION SUPPLIES

Material	Quantity for 1,000 men	Amount of munitions per arm (rifles, guns, etc.)	Remarks
Rifles or Carbines	1, 150	500 rounds	Automatic rifles or carbines are counted as light machine- guns.
Machine-guns, heavy or light .	15	10, 000 rounds	
Trench Mortars, light. }	2	1, 000 rounds	
Trench Mortars, medium. }	2	500 rounds	
Guns or howitzers (field or mountain).	3	1, 000 rounds	

NOTE—No heavy gun, i. e., of a calibre greater than 105 m.m. is authorised.

Annex C to CF-27

Naval Clauses

ARTICLE 20.

From the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty all ex-Austro-Hungarian warships, submarines included, are declared to be finally surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

All the monitors, torpedo boats and armed vessels of the Danube Flotilla will be surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

ARTICLE 21.

The ex-Austro-Hungarian auxiliary cruisers and fleet auxiliaries enumerated below will be disarmed and treated as merchant ships:—

Bosnia	Persia	Trieste
Gablonz	Prince Hohenlohe	Baron Bruck
Carolina	Gastein	Elisabeth
Africa	Helouan	Melcavich
Tirol	Graf Wurmbrand	Baron Call
Argentina	Pelikan	Gaea
Lussin	Hercules	Cyclop
Teodo	Pola	Vesta
Nixe .	Naiade	Nymphe
Gigante	Pluto	Buffel
Dalmat	President Wilson (ex Kaiser Franz Joseph)	

ARTICLE 22.

All warships, including submarines, now under construction in ports which belong or previously belonged to Austria-Hungary, shall be broken up.

The work of breaking up these vessels will be commenced as soon as possible after the coming into force of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 23.

Articles, machinery and material arising from the breaking up of ex-Austro-Hungarian warships of all kinds, whether surface vessels or submarines, may not be used except for purely industrial or commercial purposes.

They may not be sold or disposed of to foreign countries.

ARTICLE 24.

The construction or acquisition of any submarine, even for commercial purposes, shall be forbidden in the State of Austria.

ARTICLE 25.

All arms, ammunition and other naval war material, including mines and torpedoes, which belonged to Austria-Hungary at the date of the signature of the armistice of 3rd November, 1918, are declared to be finally surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

ARTICLE 26.

During the three months following the coming into force of the present Treaty, the Austrian high-power wireless telegraphy station at Vienna shall not be used for the transmission of messages concerning naval, military or political questions of interest to the State of Austria, or any State which has been allied to Austria-Hungary in the war, without the assent of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. This station may be used for commercial purposes, but only under the supervision of the said Governments, who will decide the wave-length to be used.

During the same period the State of Austria shall not build any more high-power wireless telegraphy stations in her own territory or that of the State of Hungary, Germany, Bulgaria, or Turkey.

G. C.
W. W.
D. Ll. G.
V. E. Or.

PARIS, May 23, 1919.

Appendix D to CF-27

Air Clauses

ARTICLE 27.

The armed forces of the State of Austria must not include any military or naval air forces. No dirigible shall be kept.

ARTICLE 28.

Within two months from the coming into force of the present

Treaty the personnel of the air forces on the rolls of the Austrian land and sea forces shall be demobilised.

ARTICLE 29.

Until the complete evacuation of Austrian territory by the Allied and Associated troops the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy in the State of Austria freedom of passage through the air, freedom of transit and of landing.

ARTICLE 30.

During the six months following the coming into force of the present Treaty, the manufacture and importation of aircraft, parts of aircraft, engines for aircraft, and parts of engines for aircraft, shall be forbidden in all territory of the State of Austria.

ARTICLE 31.

On the coming into force of the present Treaty, all military and naval aeronautical material must be delivered by the State of Austria and at the expense of the State of Austria, to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Delivery must be effected at such places as the said Governments may select, and must be completed within three months.

In particular, this material will include all items under the following heads which are or have been in use or were designed for warlike purposes:—

Complete aeroplanes and seaplanes, as well as those being manufactured, repaired or assembled.

Dirigibles able to take the air, being manufactured, repaired or assembled.

Plant for the manufacture of hydrogen.

Dirigible sheds and shelters of every kind for aircraft.

Pending their delivery, dirigibles will, at the expense of the State of Austria, be maintained inflated with hydrogen; the plant of the manufacture of hydrogen, as well as the sheds for dirigibles, may, at the discretion of the said Powers, be left to the State of Austria until the time when the dirigibles are handed over.

Engines for aircraft,

Nacelles and fuselages,

Armament (guns, machine guns, light machine guns, bomb-dropping apparatus, torpedo-dropping apparatus, synchronisation apparatus, aiming apparatus).

Munitions (cartridges, shells, bombs, loaded or unloaded, stocks of explosives or material for their manufacture).

Instruments for use on aircraft.

Wireless apparatus and photographic or cinematograph apparatus for use on aircraft.

Component parts of any of the items under the preceding heads.

The material referred to above shall not be removed without special permission from the said Governments.

ARTICLE 32.

The aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall have full liberty of passage and landing over and in the territory and territorial waters of the State of Austria and shall enjoy the same privileges as aircraft belonging to the State of Austria, particularly in case of distress by land or sea.

ARTICLE 33.

The aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall, while in transit to any foreign country whatever, enjoy the right of flying over the territory and territorial waters of the State of Austria without landing subject always to any regulations which may be made by the State of Austria, and which shall be applicable equally to the aircraft of the State of Austria and those of the Allied and Associated countries.

ARTICLE 34.

All aerodromes in the State of Austria open to national public traffic shall be open for the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers, and in any such aerodrome such aircraft shall be treated on a footing of equality with Austrian aircraft as regards charges of every description, including charges for landing and accommodation.

ARTICLE 35.

Subject to the present provisions, the rights of passage, transit and landing, provided for in Articles 32, 33 and 34 are, subject to the observance of such regulations as the State of Austria may consider it necessary to enact, but such regulation shall be applied without distinction to aircraft belonging to the State of Austria and to the aircraft of Allied and Associated countries.

ARTICLE 36.

Certificates of nationality, airworthiness, or competency and licences, issued or recognised as valid by any of the Allied and Associated Powers, shall be recognised in the State of Austria as valid and as equivalent to the certificates and licences issued by the State of Austria.

ARTICLE 37.

As regards internal commercial air traffic, the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy in the State of Austria most favoured nation treatment.

ARTICLE 38.

The State of Austria undertakes to enforce the necessary measures to ensure that all Austrian aircraft flying over her territory shall

comply with the Rules as to lights and signals, Rules of the Air and Rules for Air Traffic on and in the neighbourhood of aerodromes, which have been laid down in the Convention relative to Aerial Navigation concluded between the Allied and Associated Powers.

ARTICLE 39.

The obligations imposed by the preceding provisions shall remain in force until the 1st January, 1923, unless before that date the State of Austria shall have been admitted into the League of Nations or shall have been authorised by consent of the Allied and Associated Powers; to adhere to the Convention relative to Aerial Navigation concluded between those Powers.

[Appendix E to CF-27]

Inter-Allied Commissions of Control

ARTICLE 40.

All the Military, Naval and Air Clauses contained in the present Treaty, for the execution of which a time limit is prescribed, shall be executed by the State of Austria under the control of Inter-Allied Commissions (Military, Naval, Air) specially appointed for this purpose by the principal Allied and Associated Powers.

The above mentioned Commissions will represent the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in dealing with the Government of the State of Austria in all matters concerning the execution of the Military, Naval or Air Clauses. They will communicate to the authorities of the State of Austria the decisions which the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have reserved the right to take or which the execution of the Clauses may necessitate.

ARTICLE 41.

The Inter-Allied Commissions of control may establish their organisations at Vienna and shall be entitled, as often as they think desirable, to proceed to any point whatever in the territory of the State of Austria, or to send a sub-commission or to authorise one or more of their members to go to any such point.

ARTICLE 42.

The Government of the State of Austria must furnish to the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control all such information and documents as the latter may deem necessary to ensure the execution of their mission; and all means (both in personnel and in materiel) which the above mentioned Commissions might need to ensure the complete execution of the Military, Naval or Air Clauses.

The Government of the State of Austria must attach a qualified representative to each Inter-Allied Commission of Control with the duty of receiving from the latter any communications which it may have to address to the Government of the State of Austria and to furnish it with, or to procure, all information or documents demanded.

ARTICLE 43.

The upkeep and cost of the Commissions of Control and the expenses involved by their work shall be borne by the State of Austria.

ARTICLE 44.

It will be the special duty of the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control to receive from the Government of the State of Austria the notifications relating to the location of the stocks and depots of munitions, the armament of the fortified works, fortresses and forts, and the location of the works or factories for the production of arms, munitions and war materiel and their operations.

It will take delivery of the arms, munitions, war materiel and plant intended for war construction, will select the points where such delivery is to be effected and will supervise the works of destruction, and rendering things useless, or of transformation of materiel, which are to be carried out in accordance with the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 45.

It will be the special duty of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control to proceed to the building yards and to supervise the breaking-up of the ships which are under construction there, to take delivery of arms, munitions and naval war materiel, and to supervise the destruction and breaking-up provided for.

The Government of the State of Austria must furnish to the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control all such information and documents as the Commission may deem necessary to ensure the complete execution of the naval clauses, in particular the designs of the warships, the composition of their armaments, the details and models of the guns, munitions, torpedoes, mines, explosives, wireless telegraphic apparatus, and in general everything relating to naval war materiel, as well as all legislative or administrative documents or regulations.

ARTICLE 46.

It will be the special duty of the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control to make an inventory of the Aeronautical material which is actually in the possession of the Government of the State of Austria, to inspect aeroplane, balloon and motor manufactories, and factories producing arms, munitions and explosives capable of being used by aircraft, to visit all aerodromes, sheds, landing grounds, parks and depots which are now in Austrian territory and to authorise where necessary a removal of material and to take delivery of such material.

The Government of the State of Austria must furnish to the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control all such information and legislative, administrative or other documents which the Commission may consider necessary to ensure the complete execution of the air clauses and in particular a list of the personnel belonging to all the air services of the State of Austria and of the existing material, as well as of that in process of manufacture or on order, and a list of all establishments working for aviation, of their positions, and of all sheds and landing grounds.

[Appendix F to CF-27]

General Clauses

ARTICLE 47.

After the expiration of a period of three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the laws of the State of Austria must have been modified and shall be maintained by the Government of the State of Austria in conformity with the first part of the present Treaty.

Within the same period all the administrative or other measures relating to the execution of this part of the Treaty must have been taken.

ARTICLE 48.

The following portions of the Armistice of 3rd November, 1918 (Villa Giusti) :—

Paragraphs 2, 3, 4 of Chapter 1 (Military Clauses).

Paragraphs 2, 3, 6 of Chapter 1 of the annexed Protocol, (Military Clauses).

remain in force so far as they are not inconsistent with the above stipulations.

ARTICLE 49.

The State of Austria undertakes from the coming into force of the present Treaty not to accredit to any foreign country any Military, Naval or Air Mission and not to send, or allow to leave, any such Mission; it undertakes, moreover, to take the necessary measures to prevent nationals of the State of Austria leaving its territory in order to enlist in the Army, the Fleet, or the Air Service of any foreign power, or to be attached to such with a view to helping in its training, or generally to give any assistance to the Military, Naval, or Air instruction in a foreign country.

The Allied and Associated Powers undertake, on their part, that from the coming into force of the present Treaty they will neither enlist in nor attach to their Armies, Fleets or Air Forces any na-

tional of the State of Austria with the object of helping in military training or in general employ any national of the State of Austria as a military, naval, or air instructor.

The present provision, however, in no way hinders the right of France to recruit her Foreign Legion in accordance with French Military Laws and Regulations.

ARTICLE 50.

So long as the present Treaty shall remain in force the State of Austria undertakes to submit to any investigation that the League of Nations by a majority vote may consider necessary.

VERSAILLES, 13 May, 1919.

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House, Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Friday, May 23, at 4 p. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B.

Count Aldrovandi

Professor P. J. Mantoux

BRITISH EMPIRE

Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

ITALY

M. Orlando

Secretary.

Secretary.

Interpreter.

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE read a communication which had been circulated by the Secretary-General from Marshal Foch, the gist of which was that the Germans would not sign a peace of violence, and were preparing a new war, especially against the Poles; that negotiations had been carried on with the Soviet with satisfactory results; and that German non-commissioned officers, who had volunteered to help the Bolsheviks, would be collected at Königsberg. (W. C. P. 838.)

Information
From Germany

He also read a telegram he had just received from Cologne, where the British representative had had an interview with the Burgomaster just returned from Berlin. The trend of this information was that the German Government would refuse to sign the terms, but that after the advance, the hopelessness of the situation would be realised, and peace would be signed under protest.

2. M. CLEMENCEAU handed to M. Mantoux, who read it, an interview between the French General Desticker and Dr. Heim, the Bavarian Deputy, which took place at Luxemburg on 19th May, 1919, in the course of which, Dr. Heim urged that the tendency of the Treaty of Peace was to assist the domination of North Germany, which was Protestant and Socialistic, and dangerous, instead of promoting what he urged would be a better policy, namely, the formation of a separate Catholic, and consequently Anti-Bolshevik Confederacy in South Germany. (Appendix 1).

Proposed
South German
Confederacy

3. (The Naval Clauses for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace were initialled.

The Naval
Clauses in
the Austrian
Treaty of
Peace

Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward them to the Secretary-General, for the information of the Drafting Committee of the Peace Conference.)

4. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had information that Italian public opinion was very bitter against France. It was a fact, the reasons of which he did not wish to discuss. M. Barrère, the French Ambassa-

Withdrawal
of French
Divisions
From Italy

dor at Rome, who was notoriously a firm friend of Italy, had sent him very unpleasant despatches within the last few days. The Marseillaise had been whistled down in Turin, and officers insulted in other places. M. Barrère had made representations to the

Italian Government, and suggested that they ought to interfere, in order to stop the storm of abuse in the Press. Today, M. Barrère reported that French officers had been so seriously insulted at Milan that they ought no longer to be left there. There were altogether 1,200 French soldiers at Milan. M. Clemenceau had asked the French War Office if they could not be withdrawn, and had received the reply that Milan was the base of the French troops in Italy, and if the base was withdrawn, the whole of the troops must be withdrawn also. He did not like to do this without consulting M. Orlando. He felt it was dangerous to withdraw, because it would indicate a separation between France and Italy. On the other hand, if he did not withdraw, there was the risk of a very serious incident. He could not take the responsibility of risking such trouble. Today, there was to be a solemn demonstration in the French Chamber and Senate to celebrate the fourth anniversary of Italy's entry into the war. This had the full approval and support of the French Government. It was at this very moment that these insults to French officers were taking place. He did not accuse the Italian Government, as he knew that M. Orlando had no part in the matter.

M. ORLANDO said he greatly regretted that he could not deny that the state of feeling in Italy was one that gave cause for anxiety. There were signs of exasperation, partly due to war weariness, and partly to anxiety created by the fact that the questions most interesting to Italy had not yet been settled, and the people could see no way out. Hence, there was a certain mania that Italy was being persecuted. The Government, of course, had nothing to do with these movements, which had latterly been turned against the Italian Government itself. This was the reason of his recent journey to meet his colleagues. On this occasion, he had been told that the situation within the last few days was somewhat better, and that there was a certain calm. He had, at M. Clemenceau's request, made enquiries about the alleged incident at

Genoa, and had been told by the Prefect that there was nothing in the allegation. This was the first he had heard of these latter incidents, and he had not heard of M. Barrère's representations to the Italian Government. He was informed by Count Aldrovandi that no despatch on the subject had come from the Italian Foreign Office.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that M. Barrère had mentioned the probability that this information might have been kept at Rome, and had asked M. Clemenceau to speak to M. Orlando about it.

M. ORLANDO said he would make enquiry, and give a reply at once. He learned of these incidents with the greatest sorrow and regret.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked that no time might be lost, as he ought to take away the troops at once, if there was not to be a serious incident. In reply to Mr. Lloyd George, he said that he saw no particular object in leaving the French troops in Italy, except that the moment was inopportune to take them away. It would also involve the withdrawal of the two Italian divisions from France.

M. ORLANDO said that he believed there was only one brigade of French troops and one brigade of British troops now in Italy.

(Mr. Philip Kerr entered.)

5. PRESIDENT WILSON, at the request of his colleagues, read the attached draft despatch to Admiral Koltchak, prepared by Mr. Kerr, at the request of the Council. (Appendix II.)

Russia

President Wilson expressed doubts as to whether the memorandum would be acceptable to General Denekin and M. Tchaikowsky.

MR. KERR said that both these *de facto* Governments had recognised Admiral Koltchak as the central Government of Russia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that a copy of the despatch might be sent to General Denekin and to the Archangel Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU objected to the proposed abolition of conscription as one of the conditions.

M. ORLANDO agreed.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that although he had been in favour of it, he regretted that the Covenant of the League of Nations had not abolished conscription.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he did not wish to press the use of these particular words in this document, but he was convinced that somehow or other, conscription must be got rid of in Russia. Otherwise, he was apprehensive lest Russia might raise six millions of soldiers and, sooner or later, Russia might come into the German orbit.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if Mr. Kerr was sure about the alleged declaration by Admiral Koltchak, recognising Russia's debt as an obligation.

MR. KERR then read the following telegram from Mr. Klioutchnikoff¹ to the Ambassador in Paris:—

November 27th, 1918.

Please communicate the following to the Government to which you are accredited.

“The Russian Government at the head of which stands Admiral Koltchak remembering that Russia always kept all her obligations towards her own people as well as other nations to which it was bound by conventions, presumes it necessary to announce in a special declaration that it accepts all obligations incumbering [*sic*] to the Treasury and will fulfill them in due time when Russia's unity will be again achieved. These obligations are the following: Payments of interests, redemption of inner State debts, payments for contracts, wages, pensions and other payments due by law, and other conventions. The Government declares at the same time all financial acts promoted by the Soviet Powers as null and void, being acts edicted by mutineers.”

PRESIDENT WILSON observed that Lenin's suggestion, that the Russian debt was our principal pre-occupation, had been resented.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that in this draft, it was only mentioned that Koltchak had made this statement, but it was not made a condition.

M. CLEMENCEAU again earnestly asked that the reference to the abolition of conscription might be removed.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if recognition of Admiral Koltchak depended on the conditions laid down in the despatch.

MR. KERR replied that it did not. Acceptance of these proposals was a condition of the continuation of assistance and no mention was made of recognition.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the versions which had previously been suggested, insisted not only on the free election of the Central Legislature, but also of regional bodies, for example, in the territory administered by Koltchak, Denekin and the Archangel Government.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that para. 2 went as far in this direction as was now possible. To ask the Russian groups to hold elections in the middle of a war, when great confusion must prevail, would be to ask too much.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested the substitution of the words “to promote elections” instead of “to permit elections.”

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether this was fair. Koltchak had latterly made a very big advance and there must be considerable confusion in his rear. In these circumstances, he could not fairly be asked to promote an election. It had not been found possible to

¹ Y. V. Klyuchnikov, Acting Foreign Minister of the Kolchak government, Omsk.

hold an election even in the United Kingdom during the war. Much less was it possible in France or in Italy. In Russia a Constituent Assembly had been elected within the last two years or so by universal suffrage, and had only been got rid of by the Bolsheviks, because it was not sufficiently extreme. Nevertheless, it had been a thoroughly democratic body.

M. CLEMENCEAU said Russia should be allowed to choose.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the memorandum permitted this. It provided that if an election could not be held, the Constituent Assembly should be summoned when Koltchak reached Moscow.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that the memorandum could only with complete truth be applied to the British Government, which, he believed, alone had supplied Russia with munitions etc. The United States had only supplied the Czechs, but this supply had stopped. They had not furnished supplies to Koltchak.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that France had sent very little, mainly because Great Britain had to supply the shipping. He would like to make enquiries on this.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the declaration might be made by the British Government only, since they alone were literally in a position to make this declaration, but it should be made with the avowed approval of the Associated Powers.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the difficulty might be surmounted by stating in the text that it was the British Government that had supplied more than £50,000,000 worth of munitions.

PRESIDENT WILSON explained that he was in an awkward situation. The British and French Governments had both dealt with Koltchak as a *de facto*, though not as a *de jure* Government. Meanwhile, the United States had looked on, and had only helped to guard the railway which was under an International Commission, of which an American engineer was President. His position, therefore, was very anomalous. He would like to consult Mr. Lansing on the subject of how the United States could associate themselves in this declaration without getting into a still more anomalous position.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would like time to consult M. Pichon. He again raised the question of the inclusion of the abolition of conscription among the conditions which he asked should be removed.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested the phrase "limitation of armaments and of military organization".

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would accept that.

M. ORLANDO also accepted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed to make this alteration in Mr. Kerr's draft.

(The subject was adjourned for further consideration.)

Ports,
Waterways,
and Railways
in the
Bulgarian
Treaty

6. (It was agreed that the Commission on the International Regime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways should be asked to prepare for consideration, clauses for insertion in the Treaty with Bulgaria.)

Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to notify the Secretary-General of this decision.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he had instructed the representatives of the United States of America on the various Commissions, that as the United States of America was not technically at war with Bulgaria, strictly speaking, the American representatives ought not to sign the Treaty of Peace with that country. Since, however, through the operation of the League of Nations Covenant, which he presumed would be included in this Treaty, the United States became in some degree a guarantor of the results of the Treaty, the American plenipotentiaries would be entitled to sign, and on this understanding the experts had been authorised to take part in the various enquiries.

7. PRESIDENT WILSON drew attention to the statement made by General Bliss at the morning meeting, which seemed to him to carry considerable weight.

Military
Clauses in
the Treaty
of Peace With
Austria.
Armaments of
Small States

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed, but pointed out that it only affected one side of the question.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE urged that the Great Powers should not allow the small States to use them as cats-paws for their miserable ambitions. Prussia had begun just as these States were beginning, and at that time, had not a population as large as Jugo-Slavia. Peace had to be made with Austria. Were we to say that Austria was only to have a few thousand men and that Germany was only to have 100,000 men, and yet Czecho-Slovakia was to be allowed 1½ million troops, and Poland, who was insisting at this very moment against the decision of the Great Powers on embarking on imperialistic enterprises, an army of two millions? This was an outrage on decency, fair-play and justice. We ought to be fair even to the German people.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that the whole armaments question ought to be settled as a whole.

M. ORLANDO said he had been thinking the matter over. The consequences of the decisions taken now would be various and of very great importance. The reduction proposed by the military representatives at Versailles would bring the effectives of these States down to the same standard of military strength as Italy had had before the war. Czecho-Slovakia was to have 50,000 men; Italy's peace effectives had been 180,000 men, although the Italian popula-

tion was three times the size of that of Czecho-Slovakia. The numbers proposed by the military representatives at Versailles did not amount to disarmament. If compared with the numbers to be allotted to Germany, the Czech-Slovak army would be immensely larger in proportion, half, indeed, as large as the German army, although Germany was many times larger than Czecho-Slovakia. All the world must reduce their armaments.

M. CLEMENCEAU said his view was that this was the most difficult question of all that had to be decided. He saw the point of what Mr. Lloyd George said, but he also saw the other side of the question. He thought they ought to hear what these small nations themselves had to say. At the very moment when they were being charged with part of the debt of Austria-Hungary, they would not be very well disposed towards the Great Powers if they were asked to reduce their armaments. One of the strongest guarantees against German aggression was that behind Germany, in an excellent strategic position, lay these independent States—the Poles and the Czecho-Slovaks. This fact would make it much harder for Germany to renew the policy of 1914. His Military Advisers were opposed to reducing the Polish army owing to the danger to Poland from Russia. The same applied to Roumania. After all that she had suffered would Serbia be content to be reduced to 20,000. The same applied to the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs. While he fully recognised the force of Mr. Lloyd George's remarks he did not quite see how this policy could be carried out.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had added up the total figures proposed by the Military Representatives and they would only amount to 350,000 men for the whole of Eastern Europe.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the figures given by the Military Representatives were not really an indication of the strength of the armies proposed. Except in the case of Germany, Austria and Hungary, where only volunteer armies would be allowed, the figures would be practically annual figures. For example, if Czecho-Slovakia had an army of 50,000 men and this number was trained for a year, in 12 years she would have an army of half a million.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he understood from his Military advisers that part of the plan was to limit military equipment.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed to the experience of Great Britain which had had very little military equipment at the beginning of the war, and said that it was very difficult to guarantee that these nations would not manage to provide themselves somehow with equipment.

(The question was adjourned.)

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 23 May, 1919.

Appendix I

Interview Between General Desticker and Dr. Heim, Bavarian Deputy, at Luxembourg, May 19, 1919[Translation¹]

Dr. Heim introduced himself as a member of the Bavarian Volkspartei * and member of the Peace Committee in the Reichstag. He came from Berlin, where he had just spent several days. His statements as summarized below were written down immediately after the interview:

"The conditions of peace resolved upon by the Entente are quite different from those of which M. Clemenceau had first thought.

The conditions of the Entente aim actually at a parcelling out of Germany, whereas M. Clemenceau had in mind the division of Germany into separate states.

But the policy of the Entente will result in the creation of a Germany which is diminished in size, no doubt, but still united, for the German states with separatist tendencies, such as Bavaria, could not promote these ideas in Germany's time of trouble without being accused of treason.

Accordingly, under the conditions of the Entente, Germany will remain united.

In such a united Germany, North Germany, Prussia, will continue to exert its influence and that influence will tend to suppress particularism and to maintain centralization and you know that centralization is the leading doctrine of socialism.

You should know also that socialism is much further developed and more dangerous in North Germany than in South or West Germany.

In consequence the united Germany which the Entente is making will be extremely socialistic.

It will be so all the more readily since the situation at Berlin, from which I have just come is of this sort: The people are apathetic, indifferent to everything, with no moral ideas. Their morale is dead. Their leaders have been displaced. They are so divided at the top that they are incapable of pursuing a fixed policy. The life of Berlin is scandalous. Two hundred clubs are open every night. At each of them millions are staked. In spite of the scarcity of provisions the gamblers are able to enjoy suppers free of cost as in peacetime. Can you want such a Germany to survive?

If such a peace is signed as has been proposed the people will accept it with complete indifference because of their apathy and also because everyone considers that the economic and financial clauses are illusory.

Even if the troops of the Entente advance there will be no feeling. 'You wish to visit us? Then come ahead!'

It would be otherwise if the ideas of M. Clemenceau were followed.

¹ Translation from the French supplied by the editors.

* Christian democratic party. [Footnote in the original.]

The states with separatist tendencies are: Hanover to the Weser, Bremen, Oldenburg, Westphalia, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse-Nassau, the Rhine Province, Bavaria.

Add to them German Austria and you would have a group of states which I call 'The Confederation of the Rhine and Danube,' with a population of 30 million, almost equal to that of North Germany, which would have 36 million.

Q. There is an immediate objection to the plan which you outline. You make two Germanys, but these two Germanys reunited would be larger than the old Germany since you will have added German Austria. And who will guarantee to us that the two Germanys will not reunite, forming thus a bloc more dangerous than before?

A. The guarantee I offer you is the separation of the two Germanys. There would be two independent governments. Besides the Entente would have the right to exercise a control: we would accept the 'patronage', the protection of the Entente.

Q. What do you understand by protection?

A. Especially an economic protectorate.

Q. From the economic point of view could the two Germanys you speak of be independent?

A. No. We Bavarians, for instance need the coal of Saxony and Silesia. Between the two Germanys need be no economic barrier. There would need to be an open frontier.

I come to the religious question. You have noted that in the 'Confederation of the Rhine and Danube' I have combined all the Catholic states of Germany, thus forming a bloc against the Protestantism of the North. Why am I, who cannot be suspected of religious prejudices an advocate of the formation of a Catholic bloc in Germany? Because I consider Catholicism a stronger dike than Protestantism against Bolshevism. Protestantism, especially that of Prussia, is too material.

And from the religious point of view you see that the conditions of peace are disastrous to German Catholicism. All the areas which you are taking away from Germany are Catholic, even the portions of East Prussia which you are giving to Poland. Our Catholic areas are located on the borders, on the margin of central Germany, and it is there that you are making these separations.

(I am only speaking from the religious point of view because I am alone with you. In Germany I would be stopped at the first word.)

So the peace which you want to make will strengthen Protestantism in Germany and, I have just said, socialism as well.

I repeat again, that if such a peace is signed the people will remain calm because they have become apathetic, but Bolshevik ideas will gain rapidly. Already in the month of April we have had an increase of 400,000 unemployed. People will not tell you so, but it is a simple fact. As for the reparations which you hope for, they will be illusory.

Q. You speak of reparations. How does the system which you propose offer us better guarantees of these reparations?

A. You will have better guarantees because half of Germany will become healthy (*Gesund*) again. The other half is by now very unhealthy. It is three-quarters socialist. The method which I propose will save the healthy part from contagion.

Q. What positive guarantees do you offer us for reparations?

A. On the principle of reparations and upon the duty of Germany to restore Belgium and Northern France, we are entirely in agreement.

As for the practical means, it is difficult to be precise. We shall restore everything that was taken from you and we can even furnish you with construction materials.

Q. And labor?

A. That is a delicate question. It is not that we are lacking labor. We have estimated that under the new economic conditions which confront us we shall have an excess of 20,000,000 population. I say that 20 million Germans will no longer be able to live in Germany. What will they do? They will kill themselves, or die of hunger, or they will emigrate. Among the three solutions, the last is the least bad. You see then that it will not be difficult to furnish you with labor.

If I say that it is a delicate question, that is because, if you do not take care, you will have workers who are in large measure socialists or Bolsheviks. To avoid that danger, you must ask from us young men. We can easily furnish them to you since we shall no longer have compulsory military service. You will have to organize, lodge and feed these people, and pay them suitably, then you will get complete satisfaction, but I urge you to call for young men only.

If, besides, you would agree that this labor can be put to our credit on reparations, all Germany would be satisfied.

I come back to the question of German Austria. I believe that Italy is favorable to the reunion of German Austria and South Germany.

As for the remainder of the old Austria, it is necessary to group together Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. A federation must be formed. Italy is not favorable to that idea, but it is a necessity.

Q. You have said that in North Germany socialism is more menacing than in South Germany. However, the military forces of Germany are being reorganized, and was it not, I believe, Prussian troops who restored order at Munich?

A. That is true. Noske³ has greatly improved the volunteer corps. The workers have been eliminated, and our volunteer corps are now composed entirely of sons of the middle class and of the peasantry. There are now 300,000 of them. This figure is absolutely necessary to maintain order in Germany. In your conditions of peace you talk of 100,000 men. It is absolutely impossible to drop to such a figure. In the present condition of Germany, the indispensable minimum is 300,000.

As for the old Army, that has been more or less Bolshevised. I believe that it has been almost completely broken up.

Q. What is the present situation in Bavaria?

A. Order has been reestablished.

From the point of provisioning, there is still scarcity, but it will not continue. From the end of June, thanks to the early harvests of some portions of our country, we shall be out of trouble. The problem will arise again in April, 1920 and then with what can we pay for what we need?

But the most troublesome question is that of clothing. Before the war we imported 97 per cent of our clothing material, producing our-

³ Gustav Noske, German Minister for Defense.

selves only 3 per cent. You cannot imagine in what sort of condition we are now. The question of clothing has also been used as a pretext by our revolutionaries. To excite the people the agitators walk the streets in rags and barefooted.

Q. Was not the Bavarian revolution provoked by other causes?

A. In Bavaria as in Hungary and as in Russia there were the eastern Jews who prepared the revolution. You know that the eastern Jews, persecuted for centuries, have the spirits of rebels. They are the ones who caused all the trouble with us.

Q. You have said that under the conditions of peace which have been presented to you, reparations would be illusory. Can you give me any more information on that subject?

A. That is clear. With what are we going to be able to pay you? With our exports. But these exports amounted to 10 milliards per year before the war. However, your economic demands would reduce these to almost nothing. For example, coal, which as an item of export produced for us 2 milliards, we would have no more, since you take from us the Saar and Silesia, in addition to our having to furnish you yearly with millions of tons for Belgium, France, and Italy.

Machinery, as an item of export, in the past produced 600,000,000. We would not be able to manufacture any more since we would have no ore.

In short, I cannot see anything but chemical and pharmaceutical products which would provide us with income. Our exports of these before the war amounted to one milliard per year.

Q. I shall transmit to Marshal Foch all you have told me. But don't you think your suggestions will arrive too late?

A. Oh! Not at all. There is still time to consider them. The Peace Commission of the Reichstag, of which I am a member, will not meet again until May 26. Up to that date, I shall be at Wiesbaden, at the disposition of Marshal Foch or of the governments which might wish to summon me."

Appendix II

Draft Despatch to Admiral Koltchak

(Prepared by Mr. Philip Kerr for consideration at the request of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, 23 May, 1919)

The Allied and Associated Powers feel that the time has come when it is necessary for them once more to make clear the policy they propose to pursue in regard to Russian affairs.

It has always been a cardinal axiom of the Allied and Associated Powers to avoid interference in the internal affairs of Russia. Their original intervention was made for the sole purpose of assisting those elements in Russia which wanted to continue the struggle against German autocracy and to free their country from German rule, and in order to rescue the Czecho-Slovaks from the danger of annihilation at the hands of the Bolshevik forces. Since the signature of the Armistice on November 11th 1918 they have kept forces in various

parts of Russia and the British Government have sent munitions and supplies to assist those associated with them to maintain their position to a total value of more than £50,000,000 (?). No sooner, however, did the Peace Conference assemble than they endeavoured to bring peace and order to Russia by inviting representatives of all the warring Governments within Russia to meet them in the hope that they might be able to arrange a permanent settlement of Russian problems. This proposal and a later offer to relieve the distress among the suffering millions of Russia broke down through the refusal of the Soviet Government to accept the fundamental condition of suspending hostilities while negotiations or the work of relief was proceeding. They are now being pressed to withdraw their troops and to incur no further expense in Russia on the ground that continued intervention shows no prospect of producing an early settlement of the Russian problem. They are prepared, however, to continue their assistance on the lines laid down below, provided they are satisfied that it will help the Russian people to recover control of their own affairs and to enter into peaceful relations with the rest of the world.

The Allied and Associated Governments now wish to declare formally that the object of their policy is to restore peace within Russia by enabling the Russian people to resume control of their own affairs through the instrumentality of a freely elected Constituent Assembly and to restore peace along its frontiers by arranging for the settlement of disputes in regard to the boundaries of the Russian state and its relations with its neighbours through the peaceful arbitration of the League of Nations.

They are convinced by their experiences of the last year that it is not possible to secure self-government or peace for Russia by dealings with the Soviet Government of Moscow. They are therefore disposed to assist the Government of Admiral Koltchak and his Associates with munitions, supplies, food and the help of such as may volunteer for their service, to establish themselves as the government of All Russia, provided they receive from them definite guarantees that their policy has the same end in view as that of the Allied and Associated Powers. With this object they would ask Admiral Koltchak and his Associates whether they will agree to the following as the conditions upon which they accept the continued assistance from the Allied and Associated Powers.

In the first place, that, as soon as they reach Moscow they will summon a Constituent Assembly elected by a free, secret and democratic franchise as the Supreme Legislature for Russia to which the Government of Russia must be responsible, or if at that time order is not sufficiently restored they will summon the Constituent

Assembly elected in 1917 to sit until such time as new elections are possible.

Secondly, that throughout the areas which they at present control they will permit free elections in the normal course for all local and legally constituted assemblies such as municipalities, Zemstvos, etc.

Thirdly, they will countenance no attempt to revive the special privileges of any class or order in Russia. The Allied and Associated Powers have noted with satisfaction the solemn declarations made by Admiral Koltchak and his associates that they have no intention of restoring the former land system. They feel that the principles to be followed in the solution of this and other internal questions must be left to the free decision of the Russian Constituent Assembly; but they wish to be assured that those whom they are prepared to assist stand for the civil and religious liberty of all Russian citizens and will make no attempt to reintroduce the regime which the revolution has destroyed.

Fourthly, that the independence of Finland and Poland be recognised, and that in the event of the frontiers and other relations between Russia and these countries not being settled by agreement, they will be referred to the arbitration of the League of Nations.

Fifthly, that, if a solution of the relations between Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Caucasian and Transcaspian territories and Russia is not speedily reached by agreement, the settlement will be made in consultation and co-operation with the League of Nations.

Sixthly, that, as soon as a government for Russia has been constituted on a democratic basis, Russia should join the League of Nations and co-operate with the other members in the limitation of armaments and of military organisation throughout the world.

Finally, that they abide by the declaration made by Admiral Koltchak on November 27th 1918 in regard to Russia's national debts.⁴

The Allied and Associated Powers will be glad to learn as soon as possible whether the Government of Admiral Koltchak and his associates are prepared to accept these conditions, and also whether in the event of acceptance they will undertake to form a single government and army command as soon as the military situation makes it possible.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 902.

**Notes of a Meeting Held at President Wilson's House in the Place
des Etats-Unis, Paris, on Saturday, May 24, 1919, at 11 a. m.**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

President Wilson.

FRANCE

M. Clemenceau.

Sir Maurice Hankey, K. C. B. }
Count Aldrovandi } *Secretaries.*
Prof. P. J. Mantoux. } *Interpreter.*

BRITISH EMPIRE

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M. P.

ITALY

M. Orlando

N. B. The following business was transacted during the assembly of the larger meeting for discussion of the Economic Clauses in the Treaty of Peace with Austria.

1. (M. Tardieu and Mr. Headlam-Morley¹ were introduced.)

MR. HEADLAM-MORLEY reported that, after further consideration, the Committee had come to the conclusion that the two replies to Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau's letters of May 13th and May 16th, approved by the Council on May 22nd, (C. F. 24)² and which had been prepared somewhat hastily, were susceptible of improvement in drafting. They had therefore ventured to incorporate the two replies in a single draft, which he now submitted. He and M. Tardieu were in complete agreement and Dr. Mezes³ had approved it in place of Dr. Haskins,⁴ who was away.

(The revised reply (Appendix) was approved, and Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward it to the Secretary-General, as superseding the reply forwarded on May 22nd, and for the following action:—

(1) To prepare a reply in French for M. Clemenceau's signature and for despatch.

¹ French and British representatives, respectively, on the special committee on the Saar Basin.

² *Ante*, p. 826.

³ American representative on the Commission for the Study of the Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace on the Geographical Frontiers of Germany.

⁴ American representative on the special committee on the Saar Basin.

(2) To communicate to the Drafting Committee in order that the necessary alteration may be made in the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

(3) For publication as soon as signed and despatched.

(M. Tardieu and Mr. Headlam-Morley withdrew.)

2. The Articles regarding the return of Prisoners of War, approved on the previous day for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace with Austria (C. F. 27)⁵ were initialled by the four Heads of Governments.

Initials to
Articles
Regarding
Prisoners of
War in the
Treaty of
Peace With
Austria

(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward them through the Secretary-General to the Drafting Committee.)

3. The Air Clauses approved on the previous day (C. F. 27)⁶ for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace with Austria, were initialled by the four Heads of Governments.

Initials to
Articles for
Treaty of Peace
With Austria.
Air Clauses

(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to forward them to the Drafting Committee through the Secretary-General.)

4. PRESIDENT WILSON asked that the clauses in regard to Inter-Allied Commissions of Control, recorded as approved on the previous day (C. F. 27),⁷ might not be submitted for initials. He wished to reserve them for the present, as he was inclined to think that United States officers ought not to take part.

Commissions
of Control
in Austria.
Reservation by
President Wilson

5. After M. CLEMENCEAU, PRESIDENT WILSON and Mr. LLOYD GEORGE had initialled the General Clauses, namely, Articles 47 to 50 of the Military, Naval, and Air Terms with Austria,^{7a} M. ORLANDO withheld his initials, on the ground that the Armistice of 3rd November, 1918, which had been drawn up hastily, had been found to omit certain of the islands included in the Treaty of London, and he wished to have the Clauses re-examined by his military advisers.

General
Clauses of
the Military,
Naval and Air
Terms of Peace
With Austria

(NOTE: This Meeting was continued after the conclusion of the discussion of the Economic Clauses with the Economic Experts.)

6. PRESIDENT WILSON read the following memorandum which he had received from Dr. Mezes, pointing out alterations made by the Drafting Committee in Articles 102 and 104 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany:—

Danzig.
A Drafting
Error in
Articles 102 &
104 of the Treaty
of Peace With
Germany

“The Articles as drafted and as they appear in the Treaty are given below in parallel columns, the divergencies of importance being underscored ⁸:—

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 873–877 and 882.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 882 and 892.

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 882 and 895.

^{7a} Approved May 23, pp. 882 and 897.

⁸ The underscored words are printed in *Italics*.

DRAFT

ARTICLE 2.

The Five Allied and Associated Great Powers *undertake to establish the Town of Danzig* together with the rest of the territory described in Article I as a free city.

ARTICLE 4.

The Five Allied and Associated Great Powers undertake to negotiate a Treaty between the Polish Government and the Free City of Danzig, *which shall come into force at the same time as the establishment of said free city.*

The effect of the changes is to bring Danzig into existence as a free city as soon as the Treaty is signed. According to the draft, Danzig comes into existence as a free city only after its representatives and representatives of the Five Principal Powers have worked out its constitution, and further have negotiated a satisfactory Treaty between it and Poland. It may well be more difficult for the Five Great Powers to provide Danzig with a constitution drafted with the general interest in view, and also difficult, maybe impossible, to negotiate a satisfactory Treaty between Danzig and Poland if the former is set up as an autonomous and going concern immediately upon the signing of the Treaty and without further need of assistance on the part of these Powers.

If these points are well taken, it is important that the articles of the Treaty above set forth, should be modified so that they may accord with the draft."

M. CLEMENCEAU, after consulting the French text, said that it was obviously a translation from the incorrect English text.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought it possible that the Germans would make a strong resistance to the whole of the Clauses of the Treaty of Peace dealing with Poland. This would give an opportunity to the Allied and Associated Powers to make a correction.

(It was agreed that the Drafting Committee should be instructed to revise the articles in the final erratum or in the final Treaty of Peace handed to the Germans.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to prepare an instruction to the Drafting Committee for the initials of the four Heads of Governments in the afternoon.)

7. PRESIDENT WILSON said that he had sent a copy of Mr. Philip Kerr's draft despatch to Mr. Lansing, who had replied that he considered the statement right, and that the United States were justified in joining in it. Mr. Lansing would have preferred to withhold the despatch until a reply had

Russia

TREATY

ARTICLE 102.

The City of Danzig, together with the rest of the territory described in Article 100 *is established* as a free city and placed under the protection of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 104.

A Convention, the terms of which shall be fixed by the principal Allied and Associated Powers shall be concluded between the Polish Government and the free city of Danzig.

been received from Mr. Morris, who had been sent to Omsk. He himself, however, did not agree in this. He agreed, however, to the following addition to the paragraph numbered "fifthly", at the top of page 5, which Mr. Lansing had proposed:—

"and that until such settlement is made, the Government of Russia agrees to recognise those territories as autonomous, and to confirm the relations which may exist between the Allied and Associated Governments and the *de facto* Governments of those territories."

(This was accepted.)

(It was agreed to discuss the question in the afternoon.)

8. PRESIDENT WILSON read a despatch from the American Diplomatic Representative in Warsaw, showing M. Paderewski still to be strongly favourable to the views of the Allied and Associated Powers, ending with a message that he had strongly defended President Wilson's views.

The Polish
Ukrainian
Armistice

MR. LLOYD GEORGE read telegrams showing that General Haller's Army was now being moved from the Ukraine to the Polish front, and that the Ukrainians had sent envoys to negotiate peace with the Polish Government.

VILLA MAJESTIC, PARIS, 24 May, 1919.

Appendix to CF-29

Revised Reply to Letters From Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau of 13th and 16th May, 1919

(Approved by the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on 24 May, 1919)

SIR: I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of May 13th, 1919,⁹ and also of your further letter of May 16th;¹⁰ as these two communications concern the same subject, it will be convenient that I should answer them in one letter.

With regard to the more general observations contained in your first letter, I must emphatically deny on behalf of the Allied and Associated Governments the suggestion contained in it that "German territories are by the Treaty of Peace made the subject of bargains between one sovereignty and another as though they were mere chattels or pawns in a game". In fact the wishes of the population of all the territories in question will be consulted and the procedure followed in such consultation has been carefully settled with special regard to local conditions.

⁹ Appendix II to CF-23, p. 817.

¹⁰ Appendix III to CF-23, p. 820.

In the territories ceded to Belgium, full liberty is ensured for popular opinion to express itself within a period of six months. The only exception that has been made applies to that part of the territory of Prussian Moresnet lying west of the road from Liege to Aix-la-Chapelle, the population of which numbers less than 500 inhabitants, and in which the woods are transferred to Belgium as part reparation for the destruction of forests by Germany on Belgian territory.

As to Slesvig, I am to explain that this question was taken up by the Peace Conference on the request of the Danish Government and the population of Slesvig.

As regards the inhabitants of the Saar Basin, the "domination" which is termed "odious" in your letter is the administration of the League of Nations. The scheme contained in Section IV has been drawn up with the greatest care so that, while it provides compensation for the destruction of the coal mines in the North of France, it also secures the rights and welfare of the population. They are assured of the maintenance of all their present liberties and in addition there are guaranteed to them in financial and social matters a number of special advantages; moreover, definite provision is made, after a period of 15 years, for a plebiscite which will enable this population, which is of so complex a character, to determine the final form of government of the territory in which it lives, in full freedom and not necessarily to the advantage either of France or of Germany.

As a larger part of your two communications are devoted to observations on the scheme concerning the Saar Basin, I must explain that the Allied and Associated Governments have chosen this particular form of reparation because it was felt that the destruction of the mines in the North of France was an act of such a nature that a definite and exemplary retribution should be exacted; this object would not be attained by the mere supply of a specified or unspecified amount of coal. This scheme therefore in its general provisions must be maintained, and to this the Allied and Associated Powers are not prepared to agree to any alternative.

For this reason the suggestion you make in your first letter for some other means of making good the deficiency of coal—a suggestion which is developed with more precision in the annex to your second letter—cannot be accepted. In particular, I would point out that no arrangement of the kind put forward could give to France the security and certainty which she would receive from the full exploitation and free ownership of the mines of the Saar.

Similarly, the proposed handing over of shares in German coal-mines situated in German territory and subject to German exploitation would be of doubtful value to French holders, and would create

a confusion of French and German interests which, under present circumstances, could not be contemplated. The complete and immediate transfer to France of mines adjacent to the French frontier constitutes a more prompt, secure and businesslike method of compensation for the destruction of the French coal-mines; at the same time, by securing that the value of the mines should be credited to the reparation account due from Germany, it makes full use of them as a means of payment on the general account of reparation.

In some points your letter of the 13th seems to have been written under a misapprehension as to the meaning and purport of certain articles in the scheme. There is not, as you suggest, in the Treaty any confusion between trade contracts to be established for delivery of coal from the Ruhr districts (see Annex 5 of Part VIII) and the cession of the Saar mines; the two questions are essentially distinct.

The interpretation which you in your letter place upon Clause 36 of the Annex assumes that the effect of this clause will be to bring about a result which emphatically is not one which the Allied and Associated Governments ever contemplated. In order to remove any possibility of misunderstanding, and in order to avoid the difficulties which you apprehend as to Germany's ability to effect the payment in gold contemplated in this clause, the Allied and Associated Governments have decided that some alteration is desirable; they propose, therefore, to substitute for the last paragraph of the said clause the following:—

“The obligation of Germany to make such payment shall be taken into account by the Reparation Commission, and for the purpose of this payment, Germany may create a prior charge upon her assets or revenues upon such detailed terms as shall be agreed to by the Reparation Commission.

If, nevertheless, Germany, after a period of one year from the date on which the payment becomes due, shall not have effected the said payment, the Reparation Commission shall do so in accordance with such instructions as may be given by the League of Nations, and if necessary, by liquidating that portion of the mines which is in question.”

MAY 24, 1919.

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¹This is primarily a subject index; no attempt has been made (except in a few instances) to include names of persons. Directories of the various delegations are printed in vol. III, pp. 1-153.

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